G.R. No.

83759

July 12, 1991

SPOUSES CIPRIANO VASQUEZ and VALERIANA GAYANELO, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MARTIN VALLEJERA and APOLONIA OLEA,
respondents.
Dionisio C. Isidto for petitioners.
Raymundo Lozada, Jr. for private respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch 56, Himamaylan, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 839 (for
specific performance and damages) ordering the petitioners (defendants in the civil case) to resell Lot No. 1860
of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental to the respondents (plaintiffs in the civil case) upon
payment by the latter of the amount of P24,000.00 as well as the appellate court's resolution denying a motion
for reconsideration. In addition, the appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as
necessary and useful expenses in accordance with Article 1616 of the Civil Code.
The facts of the case are not in dispute. They are summarized by the appellate court as follows:
On January 15, 1975, the plaintiffs-spouses (respondents herein) filed this action against the defendantsspouses (petitioners herein) seeking to redeem Lot No. 1860 of the Himamaylan Cadastre which was previously
sold by plaintiffs to defendants on September 21, 1964.
The said lot was registered in the name of plaintiffs. On October 1959, the same was leased by plaintiffs to the
defendants up to crop year 1966-67, which was extended to crop year 1968-69. After the execution of the lease,
defendants took possession of the lot, up to now and devoted the same to the cultivation of sugar.
On September 21, 1964, the plaintiffs sold the lot to the defendants under a Deed of Sale for the amount of
P9,000.00. The Deed of Sale was duly ratified and notarized. On the same day and along with the execution of
the Deed of Sale, a separate instrument, denominated as Right to Repurchase (Exh. E), was executed by the
parties granting plaintiffs the right to repurchase the lot for P12,000.00, said Exh. E likewise duly ratified and
notarized. By virtue of the sale, defendants secured TCT No. T-58898 in their name. On January 2, 1969,
plaintiffs sold the same lot to Benito Derrama, Jr., after securing the defendants' title, for the sum of P12,000.00.
Upon the protestations of defendant, assisted by counsel, the said second sale was cancelled after the payment
of P12,000.00 by the defendants to Derrama.
Defendants resisted this action for redemption on the premise that Exh. E is just an option to buy since it is not
embodied in the same document of sale but in a separate document, and since such option is not supported by
a consideration distinct from the price, said deed for right to repurchase is not binding upon them.
After trial, the court below rendered judgment against the defendants, ordering them to resell lot No. 1860 of the
Himamaylan Cadastre to the plaintiffs for the repurchase price of P24,000.00, which amount combines the price
paid for the first sale and the price paid by defendants to Benito Derrama, Jr.
Defendants moved for, but were denied reconsideration. Excepting thereto, defendants-appealed, . . . (Rollo, pp.
44-45)
The petition was given due course in a resolution dated February 12, 1990.
The petitioners insist that they can not be compelled to resell Lot No. 1860 of the Himamaylan Cadastre. They
contend that the nature of the sale over the said lot between them and the private respondents was that of an
absolute deed of sale and that the right thereafter granted by them to the private respondents (Right to
Repurchase, Exhibit "E") can only be either an option to buy or a mere promise on their part to resell the
property. They opine that since the "RIGHT TO REPURCHASE" was not supported by any consideration distinct
from the purchase price it is not valid and binding on the petitioners pursuant to Article 1479 of the Civil Code.
The document denominated as "RIGHT TO REPURCHASE" (Exhibit E) provides:
RIGHT TO REPURCHASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, CIPRIANO VASQUEZ, . . ., do hereby grant the spouses Martin Vallejera and Apolonia Olea, their heirs and
assigns, the right to repurchase said Lot No. 1860 for the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00),
Philippine Currency, within the period TEN (10) YEARS from the agricultural year 1969-1970 when my contract
of lease over the property shall expire and until the agricultural year 1979-1980.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed my name at Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, this 21st day of
September, 1964.
SGD. CIPRIANO VASQUEZ
SGD. VALERIANA G. VASQUEZ SGD. FRANCISCO SANICAS
(Rollo, p. 47)
The Court of Appeals, applying the principles laid down in the case of Sanchez v. Rigos, 45 SCRA 368 [1972]
decided in favor of the private respondents.
In the Sanchez case, plaintiff-appellee Nicolas Sanchez and defendant-appellant Severino Rigos executed a
document entitled "Option to Purchase," whereby Mrs. Rigos "agreed, promised and committed . . . to sell" to
Sanchez for the sum of P1,510.00, a registered parcel of land within 2 years from execution of the document
with the condition that said option shall be deemed "terminated and lapsed," if "Sanchez shall fail to exercise his
right to buy the property" within the stipulated period. In the same document, Sanchez" . . . hereby agree and
conform with all the conditions set forth in the option to purchase executed in my favor, that I bind myself with all
the terms and conditions." (Emphasis supplied) The notarized document was signed both by Sanchez and
Rigos.
After several tenders of payment of the agreed sum of P1,510.00 made by Sanchez within the stipulated period
were rejected by Rigos, the former deposited said amount with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and
filed an action for specific performance and damages against Rigos.
The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Sanchez and ordered Rigos to accept the sum judicially
consigned and to execute in Sanchez' favor the requisite deed of conveyance. Rigos appealed the case to the
Court of Appeals which certified to this Court on the ground that it involves a pure question of law.
This Court after deliberating on two conflicting principles laid down in the cases of Southwestern Sugar and
Molasses Co. v. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., (97 Phil. 249 [1955]) and Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc. v. Cua Hian Tek,
102 Phil. 948 [1958]) arrived at the conclusion that Article 1479 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the
promissory if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
and Article 1324 thereof which provides:
Art. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offerer a certain period to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at
any time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when the option is founded upon a
consideration, as something paid or promised.
should be reconciled and harmonized to avoid a conflict between the two provisions. In effect, the Court
abandoned the ruling in the Southwestern Sugar and Molasses Co. case and reiterated the ruling in the Atkins,
Kroll and Co. case, to wit:
However, this Court itself, in the case of Atkins, Kroll and Co., Inc. v. Cua Hian Tek, (102 Phil. 948, 951-952)
decided later than Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., (supra) saw no distinction
between Articles 1324 and 1479 of the Civil Code and applied the former where a unilateral promise to sell
similar to the one sued upon here was involved, treating such promise as an option which, although not binding
as a contract in itself for lack of separate consideration, nevertheless generated a bilateral contract of purchase
and sale upon acceptance. Speaking through Associate Justice, later Chief Justice, Cesar Bengzon, this Court
said:
Furthermore, an option is unilateral: a promise to sell at the price fixed whenever the offeree should decide to
exercise his option within the specified time. After accepting the promise and before he exercises his option, the
holder of the option is not bound to buy. He is free either to buy or not to buy later. In this case however, upon
accepting herein petitioner's offer a bilateral promise to sell and to buy ensued, and the respondent ipso facto
assumed the obligation of a purchaser. He did not just get the right subsequently to buy or not to buy. It was not
a mere option then; it was bilateral contract of sale.

Lastly, even supposing that Exh. A granted an option which is not binding for lack of consideration, the authorities
hold that
If the option is given without a consideration, it is a mere offer of a contract of sale, which is not binding until
accepted. If, however, acceptance is made before a withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale, even
though the option was not supported by a sufficient consideration . . . (77 Corpus Juris Secundum p. 652. See
also 27 Ruling Case Law 339 and cases cited.)
This Court affirmed the lower court's decision although the promise to sell was not supported by a consideration
distinct from the price. It was obvious that Sanchez, the promisee, accepted the option to buy before Rigos, the
promisor, withdrew the same. Under such circumstances, the option to purchase was converted into a bilateral
contract of sale which bound both parties.
In the instant case and contrary to the appellate court's finding, it is clear that the right to repurchase was not
supported by a consideration distinct from the price. The rule is that the promisee has the burden of proving such
consideration. Unfortunately, the private respondents, promisees in the right to repurchase failed to prove such
consideration. They did not even allege the existence thereof in their complaint. (See Sanchez v. Rigos supra)
Therefore, in order that the Sanchez case can be applied, the evidence must show that the private respondents
accepted the right to repurchase.
The record, however, does not show that the private respondents accepted the "Right to Repurchase" the land in
question. We disagree with the appellate court's finding that the private respondents accepted the "right to
repurchase" under the following circumstances: . . as evidenced by the annotation and registration of the same
on the back of the transfer of certificate of title in the name of appellants. As vividly appearing therein, it was
signed by appellant himself and witnessed by his wife so that for all intents and purposes the Vasquez spouses
are estopped from disregarding its obvious purpose and intention."
The annotation and registration of the right to repurchase at the back of the certificate of title of the petitioners
can not be considered as acceptance of the right to repurchase. Annotation at the back of the certificate of title of
registered land is for the purpose of binding purchasers of such registered land. Thus, we ruled in the case of Bel
Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio (174 SCRA 589 [1989]), citing Tanchoco v. Aquino (154 SCRA 1 [1987]),
and Constantino v. Espiritu (45 SCRA 557 [1972]) that purchasers of a registered land are bound by the
annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. In effect, the annotation
of the right to repurchase found at the back of the certificate of title over the subject parcel of land of the private
respondents only served as notice of the existence of such unilateral promise of the petitioners to resell the
same to the private respondents. This, however, can not be equated with acceptance of such right to repurchase
by the private respondent.
Neither can the signature of the petitioners in the document called "right to repurchase" signify acceptance of the
right to repurchase. The respondents did not sign the offer. Acceptance should be made by the promisee, in this
case, the private respondents and not the promisors, the petitioners herein. It would be absurd to require the
promisor of an option to buy to accept his own offer instead of the promisee to whom the option to buy is given.
Furthermore, the actions of the private respondents (a) filing a complaint to compel re-sale and their demands
for resale prior to filing of the complaint cannot be considered acceptance. As stated in Vda. de Zulueta v.
Octaviano (121 SCRA 314 [1983]):
And even granting, arguendo that the sale was a pacto de retro sale, the evidence shows that Olimpia, through
her lawyer, opted to repurchase the land only on 16 February 1962, approximately two years beyond the
stipulated period, that is not later than May, 1960.
If Olimpia could not locate Aurelio, as she contends, and based on her allegation that the contract between her
was one of sale with right to repurchase, neither, however, did she tender the redemption price to private
respondent Isauro, but merely wrote him letters expressing her readiness to repurchase the property.
It is clear that the mere sending of letters by the vendor expressing his desire to repurchase the property without
accompanying tender of the redemption price fell short of the requirements of law. (Lee v. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 197 [1972])
Neither did petitioner make a judicial consignation of the repurchase price within the agreed period.
In a contract of sale with a right of repurchase, the redemptioner who may offer to make the repurchase on the
option date of redemption should deposit the full amount in court . . . (Rumbaoa v. Arzaga, 84 Phil. 812 [1949])
To effectively exercise the right to repurchase the vendor a retro must make an actual and simultaneous tender
of payment or consignation. (Catangcatang v. Legayada, 84 SCRA 51 [1978])

The private respondents' ineffectual acceptance of the option to buy validated the petitioner's refusal to sell the
parcel which can be considered as a withdrawal of the option to buy.
We agree with the petitioners that the case of Vda. de Zulueta v. Octaviano, (supra) is in point.
Stripped of non-essentials the facts of the Zulueta case are as follows: On November 25, 1952 (Emphasis
supplied) Olimpia Fernandez Vda. de Zulueta, the registered owner of a 5.5 hectare riceland sold the lot to
private respondent Aurelio B. Octaviano for P8,600.00 subject to certain terms and conditions. The contract was
an absolute and definite sale. On the same day, November 25, 1952, (Emphasis supplied) the vendee, Aurelio
signed another document giving the vendor Zulueta the "option to repurchase" the property at anytime after May
1958 but not later than May 1960. When however, Zulueta tried to exercise her "option to buy" the property,
Aurelio resisted the same prompting Zulueta to commence suit for recovery of ownership and possession of the
property with the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
The trial court ruled in favor of Zulueta. Upon appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision.
We affirmed the appellate court's decision and ruled:
The nature of the transaction between Olimpia and Aurelio, from the context of Exhibit "E" is not a sale with right
to repurchase. Conventional redemption takes place "when the vendor reserves the right to repurchase the thing
sold, with the obligation to comply with the provisions of Article 1616 and other stipulations which may have been
agreed upon. (Article 1601, Civil Code).
In this case, there was no reservation made by the vendor, Olimpia, in the document Exhibit "E" the "option to
repurchase" was contained in a subsequent document and was made by the vendee, Aurelio. Thus, it was more
of an option to buy or a mere promise on the part of the vendee, Aurelio, to resell the property to the vendor,
Olimpia. (10 Manresa, p. 311 cited in Padilla's Civil Code Annotated, Vol. V, 1974 ed., p. 467) As held in Villarica
v. Court of Appeals (26 SCRA 189 [1968]):
The right of repurchase is not a right granted the vendor by the vendee in a subsequent instrument, but is a right
reserved by the vendor in the same instrument of sale as one of the stipulations of the contract. Once the
instrument of absolute sale is executed, the vendor can no longer reserve the right to repurchase, and any right
thereafter granted the vendor by the vendee in a separate instrument cannot be a right of repurchase but some
other right like the option to buy in the instant case. . . (Emphasis supplied)
The appellate court rejected the application of the Zulueta case by stating:
. . . [A]s found by the trial court from which we quote with approval below, the said cases involve the lapse of
several days for the execution of separate instruments after the execution of the deed of sale, while the instant
case involves the execution of an instrument, separate as it is, but executed on the same day, and notarized by
the same notary public, to wit:
A close examination of Exh. "E" reveals that although it is a separate document in itself, it is far different from the
document which was pronounced as an option by the Supreme Court in the Villarica case. The option in the
Villarica case was executed several days after the execution of the deed of sale. In the present case, Exh. "E"
was executed and ratified by the same notary public and the Deed of Sale of Lot No. 1860 by the plaintiffs to the
defendants were notarized by the same notary public and entered in the same page of the same notarial register
...
The latter case (Vda. de Zulueta v. Octaviano, supra), likewise involved the execution of the separate document
after an intervention of several days and the question of laches was decided therein, which is not present in the
instant case. That distinction is therefore crucial and We are of the opinion that the appellee's right to repurchase
has been adequately provided for and reserved in conformity with Article 1601 of the Civil Code, which states:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves the right to repurchase the thing sold, with
the obligation to comply with the provision of Article 1616 and other stipulations which may have been agreed
upon. (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
Obviously, the appellate court's findings are not reflected in the cited decision. As in the instant case, the option
to repurchase involved in the Zulueta case was executed in a separate document but on the same date that the
deed of definite sale was executed.
While it is true that this Court in the Zulueta case found Zulueta guilty of laches, this, however, was not the
primary reason why this Court disallowed the redemption of the property by Zulueta. It is clear from the decision
that the ruling in the Zulueta case was based mainly on the finding that the transaction between Zulueta and
Octaviano was not a sale with right to repurchase and that the "option to repurchase was but an option to buy or
a mere promise on the part of Octaviano to resell the property to Zulueta.

In the instant case, since the transaction between the petitioners and private respondents was not a sale with
right to repurchase, the private respondents cannot avail of Article 1601 of the Civil Code which provides for
conventional redemption.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. 839 of the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental 12th Judicial District Branch 6 is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103338

January 4, 1994

FEDERICO SERRA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.
Andres R. Amante, Jr. for petitioner.
R.C. Domingo, Jr. & Associates for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:
A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable. An accepted
unilateral promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor if the
promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price. (Article 1479, New Civil Code) The first is the
mutual promise and each has the right to demand from the other the fulfillment of the obligation. While the
second is merely an offer of one to another, which if accepted, would create an obligation to the offeror to make
good his promise, provided the acceptance is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
Disputed in the present case is the efficacy of a "Contract of Lease with Option to Buy", entered into between
petitioner Federico Serra and private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. (RCBC).
Petitioner is the owner of a 374 square meter parcel of land located at Quezon St., Masbate, Masbate.
Sometime in 1975, respondent bank, in its desire to put up a branch in Masbate, Masbate, negotiated with
petitioner for the purchase of the then unregistered property. On May 20, 1975, a contract of LEASE WITH
OPTION TO BUY was instead forged by the parties, the pertinent portion of which reads:
1. The LESSOR leases unto the LESSEE, an the LESSEE hereby accepts in lease, the parcel of land
described in the first WHEREAS clause, to have and to hold the same for a period of twenty-five (25) years
commencing from June 1, 1975 to June 1, 2000. The LESSEE, however, shall have the option to purchase said
parcel of land within a period of ten (10) years from the date of the signing of this Contract at a price not greater
than TWO HUNDRED TEN PESOS (P210.00) per square meter. For this purpose, the LESSOR undertakes,
within such ten-year period, to register said parcel of land under the TORRENS SYSTEM and all expenses
appurtenant thereto shall be for his sole account.
If, for any reason, said parcel of land is not registered under the TORRENS SYSTEM within the aforementioned
ten-year period, the LESSEE shall have the right, upon termination of the lease to be paid by the LESSOR the
market value of the building and improvements constructed on said parcel of land.
The LESSEE is hereby appointed attorney-in-fact for the LESSOR to register said parcel of land under the
TORRENS SYSTEM in case the LESSOR, for any reason, fails to comply with his obligation to effect said
registration within reasonable time after the signing of this Agreement, and all expenses appurtenant to such
registration shall be charged by the LESSEE against the rentals due to the LESSOR.
2. During the period of the lease, the LESSEE covenants to pay the LESSOR, at the latter's residence, a
monthly rental of SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00), Philippine Currency, payable in advance on or before
the fifth (5th) day of every calendar month, provided that the rentals for the first four (4) months shall be paid by
the LESSEE in advance upon the signing of this Contract.
3. The LESSEE is hereby authorized to construct as its sole expense a building and such other improvements
on said parcel of land, which it may need in pursuance of its business and/or operations; provided, that if for any
reason the LESSEE shall fail to exercise its option mentioned in paragraph (1) above in case the parcel of land
is registered under the TORRENS SYSTEM within the ten-year period mentioned therein, said building and/or
improvements, shall become the property of the LESSOR after the expiration of the 25-year lease period without
the right of reimbursement on the part of the LESSEE. The authority herein granted does not, however, extend to

the making or allowing any unlawful, improper or offensive used of the leased premises, or any use thereof,
other than banking and office purposes. The maintenance and upkeep of such building, structure and
improvements shall likewise be for the sole account of the LESSEE. 1
The foregoing agreement was subscribed before Notary Public Romeo F. Natividad.
Pursuant to said contract, a building and other improvements were constructed on the land which housed the
branch office of RCBC in Masbate, Masbate. Within three years from the signing of the contract, petitioner
complied with his part of the agreement by having the property registered and
placed under the TORRENS SYSTEM, for which Original Certificate of Title No. 0-232 was issued by the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Masbate.
Petitioner alleges that as soon as he had the property registered, he kept on pursuing the manager of the branch
to effect the sale of the lot as per their agreement. It was not until September 4, 1984, however, when the
respondent bank decided to exercise its option and informed petitioner, through a letter, 2 of its intention to buy
the property at the agreed price of not greater than P210.00 per square meter or a total of P78,430.00. But much
to the surprise of the respondent, petitioner replied that he is no longer selling the property. 3
Hence, on March 14, 1985, a complaint for specific performance and damages were filed by respondent against
petitioner. In the complaint, respondent alleged that during the negotiations it made clear to petitioner that it
intends to stay permanently on property once its branch office is opened unless the exigencies of the business
requires otherwise. Aside from its prayer for specific performance, it likewise asked for an award of P50,000.00
for attorney's fees P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and the cost of the suit. 4
A special and affirmative defenses, petitioner contended:
1. That the contract having been prepared and drawn by RCBC, it took undue advantage on him when it set in
lopsided terms.
2. That the option was not supported by any consideration distinct from the price and hence not binding upon
him.
3. That as a condition for the validity and/or efficacy of the option, it should have been exercised within the
reasonable time after the registration of the land under the Torrens System; that its delayed action on the option
have forfeited whatever its claim to the same.
4. That extraordinary inflation supervened resulting in the unusual decrease in the purchasing power of the
currency that could not reasonably be forseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the establishment of the obligation, thus, rendering the terms of the contract unenforceable, inequitable
and to the undue enrichment of RCBC. 5
and as counterclaim petitioner alleged that:
1. The rental of P700.00 has become unrealistic and unreasonable, that justice and equity will require its
adjustment.
2. By the institution of the complaint he suffered moral damages which may be assessed at P100,000.00 and
award of attorney's fee of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages at P100,000.00. 6
Initially, after trial on the merits, the court dismissed the complaint. Although it found the contract to be valid, the
court nonetheless ruled that the option to buy in unenforceable because it lacked a consideration distinct from
the price and RCBC did not exercise its option within reasonable time. The prayer for readjustment of rental was
denied, as well as that for moral and exemplary damages. 7
Nevertheless, upon motion for reconsideration of respondent, the court in the order of January 9, 1989, reversed
itself, the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court reconsiders its decision dated June 6, 1988, and hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. The defendant is hereby ordered to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in favor of plaintiff selling,
transferring and
conveying the property covered by and described in the Original Certificate of Title 0-232 of the Registry of
Deeds of Masbate for the sum of Seventy Eight Thousand Five Hundred Forty Pesos (P78,540,00), Philippine
Currency;
2.

Defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees;

3.

The counter claim of defendant is hereby dismissed; and

4.

Defendants shall pay the costs of suit. 8

In a decision promulgated on September 19, 1991, 9 the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court
that:
1.

The contract is valid and that the parties perfectly understood the contents thereof;

2.

The option is supported by a distinct and separate consideration as embodied in the agreement;

3.

There is no basis in granting an adjustment in rental.

Assailing the judgment of the appellate court, petitioner would like us to consider mainly the following:
1.

The disputed contract is a contract of adhesion.

2. There was no consideration to support the option, distinct from the price, hence the option cannot be
exercised.
3. Respondent court gravely abused its discretion in not granting currency adjustment on the already eroded
value of the stipulated rentals for twenty-five years.
The petition is devoid of merit.
There is no dispute that the contract is valid and existing between the parties, as found by both the trial court and
the appellate court. Neither do we find the terms of the contract unfairly lopsided to have it ignored.
A contract of adhesion is one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the stipulations in the contract,
while the other party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto. These types of contracts are as
binding as ordinary contracts. Because in reality, the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.
Although, this Court will not hesitate to rule out blind adherence to terms where facts and circumstances will
show that it is basically one-sided. 10
We do not find the situation in the present case to be inequitable. Petitioner is a highly educated man, who, at
the time of the trial was already a CPA-Lawyer, and when he entered into the contract, was already a CPA,
holding a respectable position with the Metropolitan Manila Commission. It is evident that a man of his stature
should have been more cautious in transactions he enters into, particularly where it concerns valuable
properties. He is amply equipped to drive a hard bargain if he would be so minded to.
Petitioner contends that the doctrines laid down in the cases of
Atkins Kroll v. Cua Hian Tek, 11 Sanchez v. Rigos, 12 and Vda. de Quirino v. Palarca 13 were misapplied in the
present case, because 1) the option given to the respondent bank was not supported by a consideration distinct
from the price; and 2) that the stipulated price of "not greater than P210.00 per square meter" is not certain or
definite.
Article 1324 of the Civil Code provides that when an offeror has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept,
the offer maybe withdrawn at anytime before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when the
option is founded upon consideration, as something paid or promised. On the other hand, Article 1479 of the
Code provides that an accepted unilateral promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
In a unilateral promise to sell, where the debtor fails to withdraw the promise before the acceptance by the
creditor, the transaction becomes a bilateral contract to sell and to buy, because upon acceptance by the creditor
of the offer to sell by the debtor, there is already a meeting of the minds of the parties as to the thing which is
determinate and the price which is certain. 14 In which case, the parties may then reciprocally demand
performance.
Jurisprudence has taught us that an optional contract is a privilege existing only in one party the buyer. For a
separate consideration paid, he is given the right to decide to purchase or not, a certain merchandise or property,
at any time within the agreed period, at a fixed price. This being his prerogative, he may not be compelled to
exercise the option to buy before the time
expires. 15
On the other hand, what may be regarded as a consideration separate from the price is discussed in the case of
Vda. de Quirino v. Palarca 16 wherein the facts are almost on all fours with the case at bar. The said case also
involved a lease contract with option to buy where we had occasion to say that "the consideration for the lessor's
obligation to sell the leased premises to the lessee, should he choose to exercise his option to purchase the

same, is the obligation of the lessee to sell to the lessor the building and/or improvements constructed and/or
made by the former, if he fails to exercise his option to buy leased premises." 17
In the present case, the consideration is even more onerous on the part of the lessee since it entails transferring
of the building and/or improvements on the property to petitioner, should respondent bank fail to exercise its
option within the period stipulated. 18
The bugging question then is whether the price "not greater than TWO HUNDRED PESOS" is certain or definite.
A price is considered certain if it is so with reference to another thing certain or when the determination thereof is
left to the judgment of a specified person or persons. 19 And generally, gross inadequacy of price does not affect
a contract of sale. 20
Contracts are to be construed according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves
have used. In the present dispute, there is evidence to show that the intention of the parties is to peg the price at
P210 per square meter. This was confirmed by petitioner himself in his testimony, as follows:
Q. Will you please tell this Court what was the offer?
A.

It was an offer to buy the property that I have in Quezon City (sic).

Q. And did they give you a specific amount?

xxx xxx
A.

xxx

Well, there was an offer to buy the property at P210 per square meters (sic).

Q. And that was in what year?

A . 1975, sir.
Q. And did you accept the offer?
A.

Yes, sir. 21

Moreover, by his subsequent acts of having the land titled under the Torrens System, and in pursuing the bank
manager to effect the sale immediately, means that he understood perfectly the terms of the contract. He even
had the same property mortgaged to the respondent bank sometime in 1979, without the slightest hint of wanting
to abandon his offer to sell the property at the agreed price of P210 per square meter. 22
Finally, we agree with the courts a quo that there is no basis, legal or factual, in adjusting the amount of the rent.
The contract is the law between the parties and if there is indeed reason to adjust the rent, the parties could by
themselves negotiate for the amendment of the contract. Neither could we consider the decline of the purchasing
power of the Philippine peso from 1983 to the time of the commencement of the present case in 1985, to be so
great as to result in an extraordinary inflation. Extraordinary inflation exists when there in an unimaginable
increase or decrease of the purchasing power of the Philippine currency, or fluctuation in the value of pesos
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation. 23
Premises considered, we find that the contract of "LEASE WITH OPTION TO BUY" between petitioner and
respondent bank is valid, effective and enforceable, the price being certain and that there was consideration
distinct from the price to support the option given to the lessee.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the decision of the appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168325

December 8, 2010

ROBERTO D. TUAZON, Petitioner,

vs.
LOURDES Q. DEL ROSARIO-SUAREZ, CATALINA R. SUAREZ-DE LEON, WILFREDO DE LEON, MIGUEL
LUIS S. DE LEON, ROMMEL LEE S. DE LEON, and GUILLERMA L. SANDICO-SILVA, as attorney-in-fact of the
defendants, except Lourdes Q. Del Rosario-Suarez, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In a situation where the lessor makes an offer to sell to the lessee a certain property at a fixed price within a
certain period, and the lessee fails to accept the offer or to purchase on time, then the lessee loses his right to
buy the property and the owner can validly offer it to another.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Decision2 dated May 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78870, which affirmed the Decision3 dated November 18, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 101, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-00-42338.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent Lourdes Q. Del Rosario-Suarez (Lourdes) was the owner of a parcel of land, containing more or
less an area of 1,211 square meters located along Tandang Sora Street, Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City and
previously covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-561184 issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City.
On June 24, 1994, petitioner Roberto D. Tuazon (Roberto) and Lourdes executed a Contract of Lease5 over the
abovementioned parcel of land for a period of three years. The lease commenced in March 1994 and ended in
February 1997. During the effectivity of the lease, Lourdes sent a letter6 dated January 2, 1995 to Roberto
where she offered to sell to the latter subject parcel of land. She pegged the price at P37,541,000.00 and gave
him two years from January 2, 1995 to decide on the said offer.
On June 19, 1997, or more than four months after the expiration of the Contract of Lease, Lourdes sold subject
parcel of land to her only child, Catalina Suarez-De Leon, her son-in-law Wilfredo De Leon, and her two
grandsons, Miguel Luis S. De Leon and Rommel S. De Leon (the De Leons), for a total consideration of only
P2,750,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale7 executed by the parties. TCT No. 1779868 was then
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the De Leons.
The new owners through their attorney-in-fact, Guillerma S. Silva, notified Roberto to vacate the premises.
Roberto refused hence, the De Leons filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City against him. On August 30, 2000, the MeTC rendered a Decision9 ordering Roberto to
vacate the property for non-payment of rentals and expiration of the contract.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 8, 2000, while the ejectment case was on appeal, Roberto filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
Complaint10 for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale, Reconveyance, Damages and Application for Preliminary
Injunction against Lourdes and the De Leons. On November 13, 2000, Roberto filed a Notice of Lis Pendens11
with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
On January 8, 2001, respondents filed An Answer with Counterclaim12 praying that the Complaint be dismissed
for lack of cause of action. They claimed that the filing of such case was a mere leverage of Roberto against
them because of the favorable Decision issued by the MeTC in the ejectment case.
On September 17, 2001, the RTC issued an Order13 declaring Lourdes and the De Leons in default for their
failure to appear before the court for the second time despite notice. Upon a Motion for Reconsideration,14 the
trial court in an Order15 dated October 19, 2001 set aside its Order of default.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a Decision declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale made by Lourdes in favor of
the De Leons as valid and binding. The offer made by Lourdes to Roberto did not ripen into a contract to sell
because the price offered by the former was not acceptable to the latter. The offer made by Lourdes is no longer
binding and effective at the time she decided to sell the subject lot to the De Leons because the same was not
accepted by Roberto. Thus, in a Decision dated November 18, 2002, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Its
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the above-entitled Complaint for
lack of merit, and ordering the Plaintiff to pay the Defendants, the following:
1. the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
2. the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
4. cost of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On May 30, 2005, the CA issued its Decision dismissing Robertos appeal and affirming the Decision of the RTC.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Roberto advancing the following arguments:
I.
The Trial Court and the Court of Appeals had decided that the "Right of First Refusal" exists only within the
parameters of an "Option to Buy", and did not exist when the property was sold later to a third person, under
favorable terms and conditions which the former buyer can meet.
II.
What is the status or sanctions of an appellee in the Court of Appeals who has not filed or failed to file an
appellees brief?17
Petitioners Arguments
Roberto claims that Lourdes violated his right to buy subject property under
the principle of "right of first refusal" by not giving him "notice" and the opportunity to buy the property under the
same terms and conditions or specifically based on the much lower price paid by the De Leons.
Roberto further contends that he is enforcing his "right of first refusal" based on Equatorial Realty Development,
Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc.18 which is the leading case on the "right of first refusal."
Respondents Arguments
On the other hand, respondents posit that this case is not covered by the principle of "right of first refusal" but an
unaccepted unilateral promise to sell or, at best, a contract of option which was not perfected. The letter of
Lourdes to Roberto clearly embodies an option contract as it grants the latter only two years to exercise the
option to buy the subject property at a price certain of P37,541,000.00. As an option contract, the said letter
would have been binding upon Lourdes without need of any consideration, had Roberto accepted the offer. But
in this case there was no acceptance made neither was there a distinct consideration for the option contract.
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit.
This case involves an option contract and not a contract of a right of first refusal
In Beaumont v. Prieto,19 the nature of an option contract is explained thus:
In his Law Dictionary, edition of 1897, Bouvier defines an option as a contract, in the following language:
A contract by virtue of which A, in consideration of the payment of a certain sum to B, acquires the privilege of
buying from, or selling to, B certain securities or properties within a limited time at a specified price. (Story vs.
Salamon, 71 N. Y., 420.)
From Vol. 6, page 5001, of the work "Words and Phrases," citing the case of Ide vs. Leiser (24 Pac., 695; 10
Mont., 5; 24 Am. St. Rep., 17) the following quotation has been taken:
An agreement in writing to give a person the option to purchase lands within a given time at a named price is
neither a sale nor an agreement to sell. It is simply a contract by which the owner of property agrees with
another person that he shall have the right to buy his property at a fixed price within a certain time. He does not
sell his land; he does not then agree to sell it; but he does sell something; that is, the right or privilege to buy at
the election or option of the other party. The second party gets in praesenti, not lands, nor an agreement that he
shall have lands, but he does get something of value; that is, the right to call for and receive lands if he elects.
The owner parts with his right to sell his lands, except to the second party, for a limited period. The second party
receives this right, or rather, from his point of view, he receives the right to elect to buy.
But the two definitions above cited refer to the contract of option, or, what amounts to the same thing, to the case
where there was cause or consideration for the obligation x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, in Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court of Appeals,20 an elucidation on the "right of first refusal" was
made thus:

In the law on sales, the so-called right of first refusal is an innovative juridical relation. Needless to point out, it
cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Neither can the right of first
refusal, understood in its normal concept, per se be brought within the purview of an option under the second
paragraph of Article 1479, aforequoted, or possibly of an offer under Article 1319 of the same Code. An option or
an offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on both the object and the cause or consideration of
the envisioned contract. In a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the exercise of the
right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantor's eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical
relation with another but also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed up. Prior
thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a class of preparatory juridical relations governed
not by contracts (since the essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite and
inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code
on human conduct.
Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been decreed under a final judgment, like here, its breach
cannot justify correspondingly an issuance of a writ of execution under a judgment that merely recognizes its
existence, nor would it sanction an action for specific performance without thereby negating the indispensable
element of consensuality in the perfection of contracts. It is not to say, however, that the right of first refusal
would be inconsequential for, such as already intimated above, an unjustified disregard thereof, given, for
instance, the circumstances expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, can warrant a recovery for damages.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is thus clear that an option contract is entirely different and distinct from a right of first
refusal in that in the former, the option granted to the offeree is for a fixed period and at a determined price.
Lacking these two essential requisites, what is involved is only a right of first refusal.
In this case, the controversy is whether the letter of Lourdes to Roberto dated January 2, 1995 involved an
option contract or a contract of a right of first refusal. In its entirety, the said letter-offer reads:
206 Valdes Street
Josefa Subd. Balibago
Angeles City 2009
January 2, 1995
Tuazon Const. Co.
986 Tandang Sora Quezon City
Dear Mr. Tuazon,
I received with great joy and happiness the big box of sweet grapes and ham, fit for a kings party. Thanks very
much.
I am getting very old (79 going 80 yrs. old) and wish to live in the U.S.A. with my only family. I need money to buy
a house and lot and a farm with a little cash to start.
I am offering you to buy my 1211 square meter at P37,541,000.00 you can pay me in dollars in the name of my
daughter. I never offered it to anyone. Please shoulder the expenses for the transfer. I wish the Lord God will
help you buy my lot easily and you will be very lucky forever in this place. You have all the time to decide when
you can, but not for 2 years or more.
I wish you long life, happiness, health, wealth and great fortune always!
I hope the Lord God will help you be the recipient of multi-billion projects aid from other countries.
Thank you,
Lourdes Q. del Rosario vda de Suarez
It is clear that the above letter embodies an option contract as it grants Roberto a fixed period of only two years
to buy the subject property at a price certain of P37,541,000.00. It being an option contract, the rules applicable
are found in Articles 1324 and 1479 of the Civil Code which provide:
Art. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any
time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when the option is founded upon a
consideration, as something paid or promised.
Art. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally demandable.

An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the
promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from the price.
It is clear from the provision of Article 1324 that there is a great difference between the effect of an option which
is without a consideration from one which is founded upon a consideration. If the option is without any
consideration, the offeror may withdraw his offer by communicating such withdrawal to the offeree at anytime
before acceptance; if it is founded upon a consideration, the offeror cannot withdraw his offer before the lapse of
the period agreed upon.
The second paragraph of Article 1479 declares that "an accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a
determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration
distinct from the price." Sanchez v. Rigos21 provided an interpretation of the said second paragraph of Article
1479 in relation to Article 1324. Thus:
There is no question that under Article 1479 of the new Civil Code "an option to sell," or "a promise to buy or to
sell," as used in said article, to be valid must be "supported by a consideration distinct from the price." This is
clearly inferred from the context of said article that a unilateral promise to buy or to sell, even if accepted, is only
binding if supported by consideration. In other words, "an accepted unilateral promise can only have a binding
effect if supported by a consideration, which means that the option can still be withdrawn, even if accepted, if the
same is not supported by any consideration. Hence, it is not disputed that the option is without consideration. It
can therefore be withdrawn notwithstanding the acceptance made of it by appellee.
It is true that under Article 1324 of the new Civil Code, the general rule regarding offer and acceptance is that,
when the offerer gives to the offeree a certain period to accept, "the offer may be withdrawn at any time before
acceptance" except when the option is founded upon consideration, but this general rule must be interpreted as
modified by the provision of Article 1479 above referred to, which applies to "a promise to buy and sell"
specifically. As already stated, this rule requires that a promise to sell to be valid must be supported by a
consideration distinct from the price.
In Diamante v. Court of Appeals,22 this Court further declared that:
A unilateral promise to buy or sell is a mere offer, which is not converted into a contract except at the moment it
is accepted. Acceptance is the act that gives life to a juridical obligation, because, before the promise is
accepted, the promissor may withdraw it at any time. Upon acceptance, however, a bilateral contract to sell and
to buy is created, and the offeree ipso facto assumes the obligations of a purchaser; the offeror, on the other
hand, would be liable for damages if he fails to deliver the thing he had offered for sale.
xxxx
Even if the promise was accepted, private respondent was not bound thereby in the absence of a distinct
consideration. (Emphasis ours.)
In this case, it is undisputed that Roberto did not accept the terms stated in the letter of Lourdes as he
negotiated for a much lower price. Robertos act of negotiating for a much lower price was a counter-offer and is
therefore not an acceptance of the offer of Lourdes. Article 1319 of the Civil Code provides:
Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to
constitute the contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance absolute. A qualified acceptance
constitutes a counter-offer. (Emphasis supplied.)
The counter-offer of Roberto for a much lower price was not accepted by Lourdes. There is therefore no contract
that was perfected between them with regard to the sale of subject property. Roberto, thus, does not have any
right to demand that the property be sold to him at the price for which it was sold to the De Leons neither does
he have the right to demand that said sale to the De Leons be annulled.
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc. is not applicable here
It is the position of Roberto that the facts of this case and that of Equatorial are similar in nearly all aspects.
Roberto is a lessee of the property like Mayfair Theater in Equatorial. There was an offer made to Roberto by
Lourdes during the effectivity of the contract of lease which was also the case in Equatorial. There were
negotiations as to the price which did not bear fruit because Lourdes sold the property to the De Leons which
was also the case in Equatorial wherein Carmelo and Bauermann sold the property to Equatorial. The existence
of the lease of the property is known to the De Leons as they are related to Lourdes while in Equatorial, the
lawyers of Equatorial studied the lease contract of Mayfair over the property. The property in this case was sold
by Lourdes to the De Leons at a much lower price which is also the case in Equatorial where Carmelo and
Bauerman sold to Equatorial at a lesser price. It is Robertos conclusion that as in the case of Equatorial, there
was a violation of his right of first refusal and hence annulment or rescission of the Deed of Absolute Sale is the
proper remedy.

Robertos reliance in Equatorial is misplaced. Despite his claims, the facts in Equatorial radically differ from the
facts of this case. Roberto overlooked the fact that in Equatorial, there was an express provision in the Contract
of Lease that
(i)f the LESSOR should desire to sell the leased properties, the LESSEE shall be given 30-days exclusive option
to purchase the same.
There is no such similar provision in the Contract of Lease between Roberto and Lourdes. What is involved here
is a separate and distinct offer made by Lourdes through a letter dated January 2, 1995 wherein she is selling
the leased property to Roberto for a definite price and which gave the latter a definite period for acceptance.
Roberto was not given a right of first refusal. The letter-offer of Lourdes did not form part of the Lease Contract
because it was made more than six months after the commencement of the lease.
It is also very clear that in Equatorial, the property was sold within the lease period. In this case, the subject
property was sold not only after the expiration of the period provided in the letter-offer of Lourdes but also after
the effectivity of the Contract of Lease.
Moreover, even if the offer of Lourdes was accepted by Roberto, still the former is not bound thereby because of
the absence of a consideration distinct and separate from the price. The argument of Roberto that the separate
consideration was the liberality on the part of Lourdes cannot stand. A perusal of the letter-offer of Lourdes would
show that what drove her to offer the property to Roberto was her immediate need for funds as she was already
very old. Offering the property to Roberto was not an act of liberality on the part of Lourdes but was a simple
matter of convenience and practicality as he was the one most likely to buy the property at that time as he was
then leasing the same.
All told, the facts of the case, as found by the RTC and the CA, do not support Robertos claims that the letter of
Lourdes gave him a right of first refusal which is similar to the one given to Mayfair Theater in the case of
Equatorial. Therefore, there is no justification to annul the deed of sale validly entered into by Lourdes with the
De Leons.
What is the effect of the failure of Lourdes to file her appellees brief at the CA?
Lastly, Roberto argues that Lourdes should be sanctioned for her failure to file her appellees brief before the CA.
Certainly, the appellees failure to file her brief would not mean that the case would be automatically decided
against her. Under the circumstances, the prudent action on the part of the CA would be to deem Lourdes to
have waived her right to file her appellees brief. De Leon v. Court of Appeals,23 is instructive when this Court
decreed:
On the second issue, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in considering
the appeal submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case of denial of the motion to dismiss is to file the
appellees brief and proceed with the appeal. Instead, petitioner opted to file a motion for reconsideration which,
unfortunately, was pro forma. All the grounds raised therein have been discussed in the first resolution of the
respondent Court of Appeals. There is no new ground raised that might warrant reversal of the resolution. A
cursory perusal of the motion would readily show that it was a near verbatim repetition of the grounds stated in
the motion to dismiss; hence, the filing of the motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period for filing the
appellees brief. Petitioner was therefore properly deemed to have waived his right to file appellees brief.
(Emphasis supplied.)lawphi1
In the above cited case, De Leon was the plaintiff in a Complaint for a sum of money in the RTC. He obtained a
favorable judgment and so defendant went to the CA. The appeal of defendant-appellant was taken cognizance
of by the CA but De Leon filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal with Motion to Suspend Period to file Appellees
Brief. The CA denied the Motion to Dismiss. De Leon filed a Motion for Reconsideration which actually did not
suspend the period to file the appellees brief. De Leon therefore failed to file his brief within the period specified
by the rules and hence he was deemed by the CA to have waived his right to file appellees brief.
The failure of the appellee to file his brief would not result to the rendition of a decision favorable to the appellant.
The former is considered only to have waived his right to file the Appellees Brief. The CA has the jurisdiction to
resolve the case based on the Appellants Brief and the records of the case forwarded by the RTC. The appeal is
therefore considered submitted for decision and the CA properly acted on it.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78870, which affirmed the Decision dated November 18, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 101, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-00-42338 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-28269

August 15, 1969

CONSUELO VDA. DE QUIRINO, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE PALARCA, respondent.
Rosendo J. Tansinsin for petitioner.
Jose Palarca in his own behalf.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari, taken by Consuelo Vda. de Quirino, petitioner herein and defendant in the lower courts,
from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part
of which reads:
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby renders judgment ordering the defendant within
fifteen (15) days from the date this judgment becomes final, to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the
plaintiff Jose Palarca, of age, Filipino, married to Querubina Cristobal, over Lot 30, Block 84 of the Sulucan
Subdivision, covered by TCT 59442 of the Manila Registry, with his postal address at 544 Corner Quezon Blvd.,
Manila, and directing said defendant to deliver the certificate of title, and ordering the plaintiff to deliver to the
defendant at the time of receiving the aforesaid deed of sale and title, the amount of P12,000 in cash. Costs is
charged against the defendant.
On October 4, 1947, said petitioner hereinafter referred to as the lessor and respondent Jose Palarca
hereinafter referred to as the lessee entered into a lease contract whereby the former leased to the latter a
parcel of land known as Lot 30 of block 84 of the Sulucan Subdivision, located at Sampaloc, Manila, with an area
of about 150 square meters, and more particularly described in TCT No. 59442 of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Manila. In their written contract of lease it was stipulated, inter alia, that the term thereof would be ten
(10) years, from November 1, 1947 to November 1, 1957; that the monthly rental would be P250, payable in
advance; that the lessee could demolish the lessor's old building on the leased premises and construct thereon
any building and/or improvements suitable for school purposes, which new building and/or improvements shall
belong to the lessee; that within one (1) year after the expiration of the lease, the lessee would have "the right
and option to buy the leased premises" for P12,000; that, should the lessee fail to exercise this option, said
(new) building and/or improvements shall be evaluated by a committee organized therefor, as set forth in the
contract; that, after such "valuation," the lessor shall "have the option to buy" said "building and/or improvements
within ... one (1) year, after the expiration of the contract"; and that, should neither of the parties exercise their
respective options, both "shall be free to look for a buyer for his or her respective property."
By a letter, dated September 15, 1958, the lessee informed the lessor that the former (lessee) was exercising
"his right to buy the leased property for the agreed price of P12,000," and inquired "when" the latter (lessor)
would be "ready to execute the deed of sale," so that the agreed price could be delivered to her. Soon thereafter,
before the expiration of the term of his option, or on October 6, 1958, the lessee wrote a follow-up letter to the
lessor, advising her that the former had in his "possession the amount of P12,000 with which to purchase" the
leased premises, and, asked her, once more, "when" she would be ready to execute the corresponding deed of
sale, in order that he (lessee) could pay said price. Through her counsel, the lessor replied, however, on October
10, 1958, that she "cannot accede" to the lessee's requests "because the ... contract of October 4, 1947, has
been novated by another agreement, wherein the rent of P250 a month was reduced to P100.00."
Thereupon, that same month, the lessee instituted the present action to compel the lessor to comply with her
obligation to execute the corresponding deed of sale in his (lessee's) favor, upon payment by him of said sum of
P12,000. The lessor filed her answer admitting some allegations of the complaint and denying other allegations
thereof, as well as alleging, as special defense, that the lease contract had been "modified" by a subsequent
agreement of the parties, which had been observed and carried out by them, and that payment of the stipulated
price had not been properly tendered or validly consigned. The lessor, likewise, set up a counterclaim for
damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance
rendered the decision adverted to above, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari, in which the lessor maintains: (1) that the lessee's option to purchase the leased premises
was null and void for want of consideration; (2) that the lessee should have been sentenced to pay rentals,
during the pendency of this case; and (3) that the lessee should have been sentenced, also, to pay damages,
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
The first contention is clearly without merit. To begin with, it is based upon the premise that the option of the
lessee is devoid of consideration, which is false. Indeed, in reciprocal contracts, like the one in question, the
obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of the other. 1 In the language of Article 1350 of
our Civil Code, "(i)n onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the prestation or
promise of a thing or service by the other ... ." As a consequence, "(t)he power to rescind obligations is implied in
reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him." 2

In the case at bar, the consideration for the lessor's obligation to sell the leased premises to the lessee, should
he choose to exercise his option to purchase the same, is the obligation of the lessee to sell to the lessor the
building and/or improvements constructed and/or made by the former, if he fails to exercise his option to buy said
premises. Then, again, the amount of the rentals agreed upon in the contract of October 4, 1947 which
amount turned out to be so burdensome upon the lessee, that the lessor agreed, five (5) years later, to reduce it
1 as well as the building and/or improvements contemplated to be constructed and/or introduced by the
lessee, were, undoubtedly, part of the consideration for his option to purchase the leased premises.
Then, again, the alleged lack of consideration therefor was not set up as a defense or otherwise put in issue,
either in the trial court or in the Court of Appeals. The appealed decisions of the Court of First Instance and the
Court of Appeals, and the records before us show that the defenses mainly pressed in said courts were the
alleged cancellation of the lessee's option and his failure to make a valid tender and consignation of the
stipulated price. The cancellation of the option was sought to be deduced from a novation made in 1952, when,
upon the lessee's request, the lessor agreed to reduce the monthly rental from P250 to P100. Neither defense
was, however, sustained by said courts, and, we think, correctly.
Indeed, not being inconsistent with the lessee's option to purchase the leased premises, said agreement to
reduce the rental did not necessarily cancel or extinguish the option. Although the lessor would have the Court
believe that she consented to said reduction, condition that the option be cancelled, this claim had not been
proven. What is more, it was refuted by her letter to the lessee, Exhibit D, dated January 29, 1952, stating that
"in view of the fact that you (lessee) find it very difficult to pay the rental of P250, I am willing to reduce it to P100
from January 1952, on the condition that the remaining balance (of the rental) will be settled." The cancellation of
the option was not, therefore, one of the conditions for the aforementioned reduction of the rental.
Then, too, the consignation referred to in Article 1256 of our Civil Code is inapplicable to the present case,
because said provision refers to consignation as one of the means for the payment or discharge of a "debt,"
whereas the lessee was not indebted to the lessor for the price of the leased premises. 3 The lessee merely
exercised a right of option and had no obligation to pay said price until the execution of the deed of sale in his
favor, which the lessor refused to do.
Said want of consideration not having pleaded or otherwise alleged as one of her defenses in either one of the
lower courts, the lessor may not set it up, for the first time, in her present second appeal. 4
As regards the rentals during the pendency of this case, suffice it to note that, had the lessor readily complied
with her obligation to execute the corresponding deed of conveyance to the lessee, upon payment by him of the
agreed price of P12,000, which he tendered in October, 1958, the premises in question would have become his
property on or before November 1, 1958, and since then he would have had no obligation to pay rentals. As a
consequence, it is neither just nor fair to impose such obligation upon him by reason of the lessor's illegal breach
of their contract. Otherwise, she would be rewarded therefor and we would jeopardize the sanctity of contractual
obligations.
The last point raised by the lessor is a mere corollary to those already disposed of. Hence, it needs no further
discussion.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the lessor,
petitioner-appellant Consuelo Vda. de Quirino.
G.R. No. 97332

October 10, 1991

SPOUSES JULIO D. VILLAMOR AND MARINA VILLAMOR, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MACARIA LABINGISA REYES AND ROBERTO REYES,
respondents.
Tranquilino F. Meris for petitioners.
Agripino G. Morga for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 24176 entitled,
"Spouses Julio Villamor and Marina Villamor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus Spouses Macaria Labing-isa Reyes
and Roberto Reyes, Defendants-Appellants," which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch
121) at Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-12942.
The facts of the case are as follows:

Macaria Labingisa Reyes was the owner of a 600-square meter lot located at Baesa, Caloocan City, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (18431) 18938, of the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
In July 1971, Macaria sold a portion of 300 square meters of the lot to the Spouses Julio and Marina and
Villamor for the total amount of P21,000.00. Earlier, Macaria borrowed P2,000.00 from the spouses which
amount was deducted from the total purchase price of the 300 square meter lot sold. The portion sold to the
Villamor spouses is now covered by TCT No. 39935 while the remaining portion which is still in the name of
Macaria Labing-isa is covered by TCT No. 39934 (pars. 5 and 7, Complaint). On November 11, 1971, Macaria
executed a "Deed of Option" in favor of Villamor in which the remaining 300 square meter portion (TCT No.
39934) of the lot would be sold to Villamor under the conditions stated therein. The document reads:
DEED OF OPTION
This Deed of Option, entered into in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 11th day of November, 1971, by and
between Macaria Labing-isa, of age, married to Roberto Reyes, likewise of age, and both resideing on Reparo
St., Baesa, Caloocan City, on the one hand, and on the other hand the spouses Julio Villamor and Marina V.
Villamor, also of age and residing at No. 552 Reparo St., corner Baesa Road, Baesa, Caloocan City.
WITNESSETH
That, I Macaria Labingisa, am the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land with an area of 600 square meters,
more or less, more particularly described in TCT No. (18431) 18938 of the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
province of Rizal, issued in may name, I having inherited the same from my deceased parents, for which reason
it is my paraphernal property;
That I, with the conformity of my husband, Roberto Reyes, have sold one-half thereof to the aforesaid spouses
Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor at the price of P70.00 per sq. meter, which was greatly higher than the
actual reasonable prevailing value of lands in that place at the time, which portion, after segregation, is now
covered by TCT No. 39935 of the Register of Deeds for the City of Caloocan, issued on August 17, 1971 in the
name of the aforementioned spouses vendees;
That the only reason why the Spouses-vendees Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor, agreed to buy the said
one-half portion at the above-stated price of about P70.00 per square meter, is because I, and my husband
Roberto Reyes, have agreed to sell and convey to them the remaining one-half portion still owned by me and
now covered by TCT No. 39935 of the Register of Deeds for the City of Caloocan, whenever the need of such
sale arises, either on our part or on the part of the spouses (Julio) Villamor and Marina V. Villamor, at the same
price of P70.00 per square meter, excluding whatever improvement may be found the thereon;
That I am willing to have this contract to sell inscribed on my aforesaid title as an encumbrance upon the
property covered thereby, upon payment of the corresponding fees; and
That we, Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor, hereby agree to, and accept, the above provisions of this Deed of
Option.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Deed of Option is signed in the City of Manila, Philippines, by all the persons
concerned, this 11th day of November, 1971.
JULIO VILLAMOR MACARIA LABINGISA
With My Conformity:
MARINA VILLAMOR

ROBERTO REYES

Signed in the Presence Of:

MARIANO Z. SUNIGA
ROSALINDA S. EUGENIO
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
At the City of Manila, on the 11th day of November, 1971, personally appeared before me Roberto Reyes,
Macaria Labingisa, Julio Villamor and Marina Ventura-Villamor, known to me as the same persons who executed
the foregoing Deed of Option, which consists of two (2) pages including the page whereon this
acknowledgement is written, and signed at the left margin of the first page and at the bottom of the instrument by

the parties and their witnesses, and sealed with my notarial seal, and said parties acknowledged to me that the
same is their free act and deed. The Residence Certificates of the parties were exhibited to me as follows:
Roberto Reyes, A-22494, issued at Manila on Jan. 27, 1971, and B-502025, issued at Makati, Rizal on Feb. 18,
1971; Macaria Labingisa, A-3339130 and B-1266104, both issued at Caloocan City on April 15, 1971, their joint
Tax Acct. Number being 3028-767-6; Julio Villamor, A-804, issued at Manila on Jan. 14, 1971, and B-138, issued
at Manila on March 1, 1971; and Marina Ventura-Villamor, A-803, issued at Manila on Jan. 14, 1971, their joint
Tax Acct. Number being 608-202-6.
ARTEMIO M. MALUBAY
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1972
PTR No. 338203, Manila
January 15, 1971
Doc. No. 1526;
Page No. 24;
Book No. 38;
Series of 1971. (pp. 25-29, Rollo)
According to Macaria, when her husband, Roberto Reyes, retired in 1984, they offered to repurchase the lot sold
by them to the Villamor spouses but Marina Villamor refused and reminded them instead that the Deed of Option
in fact gave them the option to purchase the remaining portion of the lot.
The Villamors, on the other hand, claimed that they had expressed their desire to purchase the remaining 300
square meter portion of the lot but the Reyeses had been ignoring them. Thus, on July 13, 1987, after
conciliation proceedings in the barangay level failed, they filed a complaint for specific performance against the
Reyeses.
On July 26, 1989, judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the Villamor spouses, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, and (sic) in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants ordering the defendant MACARIA LABING-ISA REYES and ROBERTO REYES, to sell
unto the plaintiffs the land covered by T.C.T No. 39934 of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P3,000.00 as and for attorney's fees and to pay the cost of suit.
The counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED, for LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the Reyes spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals on the
following assignment of errors:
1. HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF OPTION EXECUTED ON NOVEMBER 11, 1971 BETWEEN THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES AND DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS IS STILL VALID AND BINDING DESPITE THE
LAPSE OF MORE THAN THIRTEEN (13) YEARS FROM THE EXECUTION OF THE CONTRACT;
2. FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT THE DEED OF OPTION CONTAINS OBSCURE WORDS AND
STIPULATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES WHO
UNILATERALLY DRAFTED AND PREPARED THE SAME;
3. HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF OPTION EXPRESSED THE TRUE INTENTION AND PURPOSE OF THE
PARTIES DESPITE ADVERSE, CONTEMPORANEOUS AND SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLEES;
4. FAILING TO PROTECT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR IGNORANCE
PLACING THEM AT A DISADVANTAGE IN THE DEED OF OPTION;
5. FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT EQUITABLE CONSIDERATION TILT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANTS; and
6. HOLDING DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS LIABLE TO PAY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES THE AMOUNT OF
P3,000.00 FOR AND BY WAY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. (pp. 31-32, Rollo)
On February 12, 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court and
dismissing the complaint. The reversal of the trial court's decision was premised on the finding of respondent
court that the Deed of Option is void for lack of consideration.

The Villamor spouses brought the instant petition for review on certiorari on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PHRASE WHENEVER THE NEED
FOR SUCH SALE ARISES ON OUR (PRIVATE RESPONDENT) PART OR ON THE PART OF THE SPOUSES
JULIO D. VILLAMOR AND MARINA V. VILLAMOR' CONTAINED IN THE DEED OF OPTION DENOTES A
SUSPENSIVE CONDITION;
II. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE QUESTIONED PHRASE IS INDEED A
CONDITION, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING, THAT THE SAID CONDITION HAD
ALREADY BEEN FULFILLED;
III. ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE QUESTIONED PHRASE IS INDEED A
CONDITION, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE IMPOSITION OF SAID CONDITION
PREVENTED THE PERFECTION OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE DESPITE THE EXPRESS OFFER AND
ACCEPTANCE CONTAINED IN THE DEED OF OPTION;
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEED OF OPTION IS VOID FOR LACK OF
CONSIDERATION;
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A DISTINCT CONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY
TO SUPPORT THE DEED OF OPTION DESPITE THE EXPRESS OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE CONTAINED
THEREIN. (p. 12, Rollo)
The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is the validity of the Deed of Option whereby the private
respondents agreed to sell their lot to petitioners "whenever the need of such sale arises, either on our part
(private respondents) or on the part of Julio Villamor and Marina Villamor (petitioners)." The court a quo, rule that
the Deed of Option was a valid written agreement between the parties and made the following conclusions:
xxx xxx

xxx

It is interesting to state that the agreement between the parties are evidence by a writing, hence, the
controverting oral testimonies of the herein defendants cannot be any better than the documentary evidence,
which, in this case, is the Deed of Option (Exh. "A" and "A-a")
The law provides that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest no
evidence of their terms of the agreement, other than the contents of the writing. ... (Section 7 Rule 130 Revised
Rules of Court) Likewise, it is a general and most inflexible rule that wherever written instruments are appointed
either by the requirements of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth,
any other evidence is excluded from being used, either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or
alter them. This is a matter both of principle and of policy; of principle because such instruments are in their
nature and origin entitled to a much higher degree of credit than evidence of policy, because it would be attended
with great mischief if those instruments upon which man's rights depended were liable to be impeached by loose
collateral evidence. Where the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the document itself, being
constituted by the parties as the expositor of their intentions, it is the only instrument of evidence in respect of
that agreement which the law will recognize so long as it exists for the purpose of evidence. (Starkie, EV, pp.
648, 655 cited in Kasheenath vs. Chundy, W.R. 68, cited in Francisco's Rules of Court, Vol. VII Part I p. 153)
(Emphasis supplied, pp. 126-127, Records).
The respondent appellate court, however, ruled that the said deed of option is void for lack of consideration. The
appellate court made the following disquisitions:
Plaintiff-appellees say they agreed to pay P70.00 per square meter for the portion purchased by them although
the prevailing price at that time was only P25.00 in consideration of the option to buy the remainder of the land.
This does not seem to be the case. In the first place, the deed of sale was never produced by them to prove their
claim. Defendant-appellants testified that no copy of the deed of sale had ever been given to them by the
plaintiff-appellees. In the second place, if this was really the condition of the prior sale, we see no reason why it
should be reiterated in the Deed of Option. On the contrary, the alleged overprice paid by the plaintiff-appellees
is given in the Deed as reason for the desire of the Villamors to acquire the land rather than as a consideration
for the option given to them, although one might wonder why they took nearly 13 years to invoke their right if
they really were in due need of the lot.
At all events, the consideration needed to support a unilateral promise to sell is a dinstinct one, not something
that is as uncertain as P70.00 per square meter which is allegedly 'greatly higher than the actual prevailing value
of lands.' A sale must be for a price certain (Art. 1458). For how much the portion conveyed to the plaintiffappellees was sold so that the balance could be considered the consideration for the promise to sell has not
been shown, beyond a mere allegation that it was very much below P70.00 per square meter.

The fact that plaintiff-appellees might have paid P18.00 per square meter for another land at the time of the sale
to them of a portion of defendant-appellant's lot does not necessarily prove that the prevailing market price at the
time of the sale was P18.00 per square meter. (In fact they claim it was P25.00). It is improbable that plaintiffappellees should pay P52.00 per square meter for the privilege of buying when the value of the land itself was
allegedly P18.00 per square meter. (pp. 34-35, Rollo)
As expressed in Gonzales v. Trinidad, 67 Phil. 682, consideration is "the why of the contracts, the essential
reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract." The cause or the impelling reason on the
part of private respondent executing the deed of option as appearing in the deed itself is the petitioner's having
agreed to buy the 300 square meter portion of private respondents' land at P70.00 per square meter "which was
greatly higher than the actual reasonable prevailing price." This cause or consideration is clear from the deed
which stated:
That the only reason why the spouses-vendees Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor agreed to buy the said onehalf portion at the above stated price of about P70.00 per square meter, is because I, and my husband Roberto
Reyes, have agreed to sell and convey to them the remaining one-half portion still owned by me ... (p. 26, Rollo)
The respondent appellate court failed to give due consideration to petitioners' evidence which shows that in 1969
the Villamor spouses bough an adjacent lot from the brother of Macaria Labing-isa for only P18.00 per square
meter which the private respondents did not rebut. Thus, expressed in terms of money, the consideration for the
deed of option is the difference between the purchase price of the 300 square meter portion of the lot in 1971
(P70.00 per sq.m.) and the prevailing reasonable price of the same lot in 1971. Whatever it is, (P25.00 or
P18.00) though not specifically stated in the deed of option, was ascertainable. Petitioner's allegedly paying
P52.00 per square meter for the option may, as opined by the appellate court, be improbable but improbabilities
does not invalidate a contract freely entered into by the parties.
The "deed of option" entered into by the parties in this case had unique features. Ordinarily, an optional contract
is a privilege existing in one person, for which he had paid a consideration and which gives him the right to buy,
for example, certain merchandise or certain specified property, from another person, if he chooses, at any time
within the agreed period at a fixed price (Enriquez de la Cavada v. Diaz, 37 Phil. 982). If We look closely at the
"deed of option" signed by the parties, We will notice that the first part covered the statement on the sale of the
300 square meter portion of the lot to Spouses Villamor at the price of P70.00 per square meter "which was
higher than the actual reasonable prevailing value of the lands in that place at that time (of sale)." The second
part stated that the only reason why the Villamor spouses agreed to buy the said lot at a much higher price is
because the vendor (Reyeses) also agreed to sell to the Villamors the other half-portion of 300 square meters of
the land. Had the deed stopped there, there would be no dispute that the deed is really an ordinary deed of
option granting the Villamors the option to buy the remaining 300 square meter-half portion of the lot in
consideration for their having agreed to buy the other half of the land for a much higher price. But, the "deed of
option" went on and stated that the sale of the other half would be made "whenever the need of such sale arises,
either on our (Reyeses) part or on the part of the Spouses Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor. It appears that
while the option to buy was granted to the Villamors, the Reyeses were likewise granted an option to sell. In
other words, it was not only the Villamors who were granted an option to buy for which they paid a consideration.
The Reyeses as well were granted an option to sell should the need for such sale on their part arise.
In the instant case, the option offered by private respondents had been accepted by the petitioner, the promise,
in the same document. The acceptance of an offer to sell for a price certain created a bilateral contract to sell
and buy and upon acceptance, the offer, ipso facto assumes obligations of a vendee (See Atkins, Kroll & Co. v.
Cua Mian Tek, 102 Phil. 948). Demandabilitiy may be exercised at any time after the execution of the deed. In
Sanchez v. Rigos, No. L-25494, June 14, 1972, 45 SCRA 368, 376, We held:
In other words, since there may be no valid contract without a cause of consideration, the promisory is not bound
by his promise and may, accordingly withdraw it. Pending notice of its withdrawal, his accepted promise
partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results in a perfected contract of sale.
A contract of sale is, under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, "perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that moment, the parties may
reciprocally demand perform of contracts." Since there was, between the parties, a meeting of minds upon the
object and the price, there was already a perfected contract of sale. What was, however, left to be done was for
either party to demand from the other their respective undertakings under the contract. It may be demanded at
any time either by the private respondents, who may compel the petitioners to pay for the property or the
petitioners, who may compel the private respondents to deliver the property.
However, the Deed of Option did not provide for the period within which the parties may demand the
performance of their respective undertakings in the instrument. The parties could not have contemplated that the
delivery of the property and the payment thereof could be made indefinitely and render uncertain the status of
the land. The failure of either parties to demand performance of the obligation of the other for an unreasonable
length of time renders the contract ineffective.

Under Article 1144 (1) of the Civil Code, actions upon written contract must be brought within ten (10) years. The
Deed of Option was executed on November 11, 1971. The acceptance, as already mentioned, was also
accepted in the same instrument. The complaint in this case was filed by the petitioners on July 13, 1987,
seventeen (17) years from the time of the execution of the contract. Hence, the right of action had prescribed.
There were allegations by the petitioners that they demanded from the private respondents as early as 1984 the
enforcement of their rights under the contract. Still, it was beyond the ten (10) years period prescribed by the
Civil Code. In the case of Santos v. Ganayo,
L-31854, September 9, 1982, 116 SCRA 431, this Court affirming and subscribing to the observations of the
court a quo held, thus:
... Assuming that Rosa Ganayo, the oppositor herein, had the right based on the Agreement to Convey and
Transfer as contained in Exhibits '1' and '1-A', her failure or the abandonment of her right to file an action against
Pulmano Molintas when he was still a co-owner of the on-half (1/2) portion of the 10,000 square meters is now
barred by laches and/or prescribed by law because she failed to bring such action within ten (10) years from the
date of the written agreement in 1941, pursuant to Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code, so that when she filed the
adverse claim through her counsel in 1959 she had absolutely no more right whatsoever on the same, having
been barred by laches.
It is of judicial notice that the price of real estate in Metro Manila is continuously on the rise. To allow the
petitioner to demand the delivery of the property subject of this case thirteen (13) years or seventeen (17) years
after the execution of the deed at the price of only P70.00 per square meter is inequitous. For reasons also of
equity and in consideration of the fact that the private respondents have no other decent place to live, this Court,
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction is not inclined to grant petitioners' prayer.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent appellate court is AFFIRMED for reasons
cited in this decision. Judgement is rendered dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. C-12942 on the ground
of prescription and laches.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113665

October 7, 2004

SPOUSES REMEDIOS DIJAMCO and TEODORO DIJAMCO, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review1 of the January 7, 1994 resolution and March 30, 1993 decision2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 34125, affirming the February 27, 1991 decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
109, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 5795, which dismissed petitioners complaint against private respondent
Premiere Development Bank for recovery of real property and damages.
This dispute arose from the following facts, as summarized by the RTC and the CA:
It appears on record that plaintiffs were granted four separate loans by defendant bank, as follows: Industrial
Loan No. 1833 in the amount of P75,000.00 granted on April, 1976; Industrial loan No. 2985 in the amount of
P80,000.00 granted on March, 1980; Real Estate Loan No. 2084 in the amount of P80,000.00 granted on
February, 1986 and Real Estate Loan No. 64 in the amount of P210,000.00 granted on October, 1981. The
subject of this complaint pertains to the fourth loan or the Real Estate Loan No. 2084. To secure the payment of
the fourth loan, plaintiffs executed a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land located in Pasay City covered by
TCT No. 34450 which according to plaintiffs has an improvement thereon a five-door apartment.
Due to severe economic reverses, plaintiffs failed to remit monthly amortizations regularly on the fourth loan. It
appears that plaintiffs were not only in arrears on the fourth loan but also on the second and third loans, as well.
At the time that the plaintiffs were negotiating for the settlement of the second and third loans, the fourth loan
was about ten (10) months in arrears. Because of this predicament, plaintiffs approached Atty. Araos, Vice
President of defendant bank and a family friend of the Dijamcos. According to the plaintiffs, Atty. Araos "advised
them to first settle all the two smaller loans (the second and third loans) and not to worry about the P210,000.00
loan" (par. 6, page 2, Amended Complaint). On the other hand, defendant bank alleges that it was plaintiffs (sic)
scheme to pay off the second and third loans first so that they (plaintiffs) would then use the collateral of these
loans in securing a loan from another which proceeds they would then use to pay off the fourth loan, but this
plaintiffs failed to do despite the cooperation of defendant bank.
xxx

xxx

xxx

On March 6, 1983, defendant bank sought the assistance of the City Sheriff of Pasay City regarding defendant
banks Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage under Act 3135 against spouses Remedios R. Dijamco
and Teodoro S. Dijamco (See Exh. 4), stating therein among other things that the mortgagors, herein plaintiffs,
have violated the provisions of the mortgage contract executed in favor of the defendant bank and that the
mortgagee bank is now entitled to foreclose the same. On September 6, 1983, Deputy Sheriff Umberto Ramos
for and in behalf of the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasay City issued a Notice of Sheriffs sale (Exh. 5) stating therein
that a sheriffs sale shall be conducted on October 6, 1983 by virtue of the power of attorney inserted in the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage and upon the verified petition of the mortgagee in accordance with the provisions of Act
4118. However, the sheriffs sale was not held as previously scheduled due to the request for postponement filed
by herein plaintiffs dated October 4, 1983 (Exh. 6). Plaintiffs requested for five successive postponements in
separate requests, to wit Nov. 4, 1983 (Exh. 7); Dec. 7, 1983 (Exh. 8); Jan. 5,1984 (Exh. 9); and Feb. 4, 1984
(Exh. 10).1avvphi1.net
On March 7, 1984, the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasay City issued a Certificate of Sale of even date
(Exh. 11), stating therein that the mortgaged property covered by TCT 34450 was sold in public auction on said
date, with defendant bank as the highest bidder for the price of P359,881.80.
xxx

xxx

xxx

...plaintiffs failed to redeem the property within the redemption period.

In a letter dated June 11, 1986 (Exh. 14) addressed to Dr. Procopio C. Reyes, President of defendant bank,
plaintiff Remedios Dijamco offered to repurchase the subject property, the pertinent and most important contents
of which is hereinbelow reproduced and underlined, as follows:
" x x x.
We have sought ways and means to repurchase the subject property from you up to this time we are unable to
do so. However, we could pay interest monthly, just so the principal of P622,095.00 as of May 30, 1986 will no
longer be increased. In connection therewith we wish to repurchase our foreclosed properties within a years
time and are submitting the following plan of payment for your approval:
Repurchase price as of May 30, 1986 - P622,095.00
Interest of 26% PA to be paid monthly P13,478.00
Grace period requested to repurchase the subject properties is one (1) year from May 30, 1986 or until May 30,
1987.
CONDITIONS:
1. Interest of P13,478.73 shall be paid on a monthly basis starting June 30, 1986 and every 30th day of every
month until May 30, 1987.
2. Failure to remit interest payment when the same is due will render this proposal automatically revoked without
need of formal demand, and you may immediately enforce your Writ of Possession.
3. That in case of failure to repurchase the subject property within the period above mentioned, all interest and
other payment made by us shall be treated as rentals for the use of the property.
We shall appreciate your favorable action on the matter.
Very truly yours,
Signed
REMEDIOS R. DIJAMCO
CONFORME:
Premiere Development Bank
By:
Signed Procopio C. Reyes
Authorized Signatory"

xxx

xxx

xxx

In compliance with the letter-agreement dated June 11, 1986 (Exh. 14), plaintiffs paid defendant bank six (6)
monthly remittances in the amount of P13,478.73 or a total of P80,872.38. According to the plaintiffs, the
payment was discontinued by the plaintiffs when Atty. Araos informed plaintiffs that "none of the amount will be
deducted from the purchase price x x x" (Par. 17, Amended Complaint). ([RTC] Decision, pp. 1-7; Records, pp.
446-452) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).4
In accordance with the June 11, 1986 agreement, petitioners remitted monthly interest for six months, until
January 1987, after which petitioners stopped paying and sued respondent Premiere Development Bank on May
13, 1988. They claimed that the latter employed fraud and undue advantage in depriving them of their property
and prayed for recovery of said property for P350,000 and damages. The RTC dismissed the complaint for utter
lack of merit and the CA affirmed such dismissal.1avvphi1.net
Hence, this appeal.
We hold that the RTC and the CA were correct in dismissing petitioners complaint. Thus, we deny this petition.
Petitioners themselves admit the uniform factual findings of the RTC and the CA that respondent bank validly
acquired the subject property at the auction sale, and that it was only after the title was consolidated and
transferred to the bank that petitioner Remedios Dijamco signed the June 11, 1986 agreement to purchase the
same property (not to repurchase it, as their right of redemption had long expired).5 Remedios voluntarily
entered into the June 11, 1986 agreement without fraud or undue advantage from respondent bank. As such, the
agreement was binding, valid and enforceable between the parties, pursuant to Articles 13156 11597 and 13708
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Contrary to petitioners assertion that the June 11, 1986 agreement was a contract of sale, we hold that it was a
contract of option to purchase and a contract to sell.
We distinguish between a contract of sale in which title passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing sold and a
contract to sell where, by agreement, the ownership is reserved by the seller till full payment of the purchase
price. Thus:
a. In a contract of sale, non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition.
In a contract to sell, full payment is a positive suspensive condition.
b. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the thing sold until and unless
the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside.
In a contract to sell, the title remains in the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of
making payment at the time specified in the contract. If the vendor, because of non-compliance with the
suspensive condition stipulated, seeks to eject the buyer form the land object of the agreement, said vendor is
enforcing the contract and is not resolving the same.9
Indeed, the CA was correct in finding that the June 11, 1986 agreement was a contract to sell because:
1. By its own terms, it [was] a contract whereby the appellants [were] granted the right to repurchase the
property involved at the fixed price of P622,095.00 within a year provided they [paid] monthly interest payments
of P13,478.73;
2. No transfer or conveyance of ownership was effected by its terms;
3. The interest payments [were] not even part of the repurchase price because in case of failure to exercise the
right to repurchase they would be considered as rentals for the use of the property. They [were] not to be
returned (Condition No. 3);
4. The interest payments were in a way a consideration to preserve the right to repurchase. In default of the
interest payments, the right to repurchase terminate[d] (Condition No. 2)10
The stipulation on interest payments was actually a consideration for the contract of option to purchase in
compliance with the second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code, that is, "An accepted unilateral promise
to buy (in this case, by petitioners) or to sell a determinate thing (in this case, the subject real property of
respondent bank) for a price certain (in this case, P622,095) is binding upon the promissor if the promise is
supported by a consideration distinct from the price" (in this case, a monthly interest payment of P13,478.73).
The contract of option to purchase was separate from the contract to sell and both contracts needed separate
and distinct considerations for validity.

The monthly interest payment of P13,478.73 as consideration for petitioners option to purchase the lot formerly
owned by them and which they continued to occupy even after the filing of their complaint in 1988 until mid of
1989,11 was valid, fair and reasonable. First, it was the petitioners themselves who proposed such consideration
which was duly accepted by private respondent bank in writing. Hence, it was a valid, binding and enforceable
contract between them. Second, the consideration was fair and reasonable because it preserved not only
petitioners preferred right to purchase subject property at a fixed price for one year but also their continued
possession and enjoyment of it. Third, petitioners could not feign mistake or ignorance of the terms of the
agreement because, as observed by the CA, "plaintiff-appellant Dijamco testified that she had come to realize
the alleged unfairness of having to pay P13,478.73 all for interest only after she paid the monthly installment12
and everytime she paid she told them (the bank people) it is unfair.13 Yet inexplicably, she kept on paying for
six months even after she had come to know about such unfairness."14
Although petitioners paid six months interest until January 1987, they did not exercise their right to purchase the
property during that period. Neither did they keep on paying the monthly interest as consideration for the
continuation of their option right for the next six months. Hence, the automatic revocation clause of the
agreement took effect, resulting in the rescission of the contract of option to purchase and the contract to sell by
respondent bank. A judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides
that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.15 Furtheremore, inasmuch
as the six months interest was the consideration for petitioners option to purchase the property during that
period, the payments therefor could not possibly be credited as part of the purchase price of the contract to sell.
All told, petitioners have no right to demand reconveyance of the subject property for P350,000 and claim
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.