l\epnbhc of tbe llbilippines

~upreme ~ourt
manila
FIRST DIVISION
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG
. SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.,
Petitioner,

G. R. No. 187587

-versus-

MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS

OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT
OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE,
Respondent.

x------------------------- -x
WESTERN
BICUTAN
LOT
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Board of Directors,
Petitioner,
-versus-

MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS

OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT
OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE,
Respondent.

G. R. No. 187654
Present:
SERENO, CJ, Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:

JUN 0 5 2013 _

X------------------------------------------DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.

Penned b) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza (now a
member of this Court) and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring, ro/lo (G.R. No. 187587). pp. 62-82.

Decision

G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654

THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos
P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig,
Paraaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation. The
military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos)
issued Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which
excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a national
shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which
is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No.
2476, further amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a
handwritten addendum, which reads:
P.S. This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the abovequoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino
(President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially
reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots
1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274
and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172,
was issued on the same day.

2
3

CA rollo, p. 664.
Vol. 82, No. 5, pp. 801-805.

Decision

G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some

areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No. 1323
creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort
Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng
Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by
the Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureaus facilitation of
the distribution and sale of the subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners
Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially
praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to
the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in
Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting
the Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President
Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore,
controlling. The intention of the President could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative
powers, it could not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere
executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have
superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was
issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquinos legislative power had
ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is
indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision of
the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to

Supra note 2, at 68-69.

Id. at 72-76.
6
Id. at 205-212.
7
Id. at 213-218.
5

Decision

G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654

look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial
addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had
no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published
version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to
encroaching on the field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9
which was denied by the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to
reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January
2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division
rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAOs Petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and
January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP
Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein.
Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing

their respective Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS

Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 192 Phil. 221, 231 (1981).
CA rollo, pp. 112-113.
10
Id. at pp. 219-222.
11
Id. at 1285.
12
Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), pp. 39-61.
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 187654), pp. 3-26.
9

Decision

G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654

THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON

THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172
LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY
MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS
BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT
INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY
VARIOUS LAND CASES.14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT
DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN
ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS
INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the
publication of the said law.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western
Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that
the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when
he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.

14
15

Rollo (G.R. No. 187587), p. 47.

Rollo (G.R. No. 187654 ), pp. 15-16.

Decision

G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not

included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as
reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law.
In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is

indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise
provided. The phrase unless otherwise provided refers to a different
effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the
laws publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the
requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Taada
v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature
may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief
Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil
Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but one year after such publication.
The general rule did not apply because it was otherwise provided.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication
may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short
period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it
would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its
existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An

16

230 Phil. 528, 533-538 (1986).

Decision

G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654

example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a

relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable
only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as
a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative
powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public
place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in
the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree,
its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy
the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations
Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability
and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets.
Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized
as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a

Decision

G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654

valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper

notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases
supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot
rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and
effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "[t]he publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its
authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include
Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart
from the words appearing in the law. 17 This Court cannot rule that a word
appears in the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers,
Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 18 we ruled that "[u]nder Article 8 of the Civil Code,
'[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean,
however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law,
not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply
or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where
ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of
legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the lawto include
petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in
toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is
hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in
contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice, Chairperson
17

IR

Aparriv. CA, 212 Phil. 215.224 (1984).

369 Phil. 617. 626 ( 1999).

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G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654

WE CONCUR:

TW.J.=DttE~O
Associate Justice

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice