Eighth Air Force Tactical Development, August 1942 - May 1945
Eighth Air Force Tactical Development, August 1942 - May 1945
Eighth Air Force Tactical Development, August 1942 - May 1945
EIGHT
R FORCE.
th Air Frce
S. .,.
Prepared by
Eighth Air Force
and
Army Air Forces Evaluation Board
(European Theater of Operations)
wmrn.--1
LL
-11
F~
6wPr~~rn
r
9r
OVAI
ri,
e er
u ent
j...
'
sl,
j.~r
Y2raJr
342
nJr
andt <Y
teiducai
alnRecyaikflld
94
h0a
'hM.r
r:M
:kdl-
9 July,
1945
FOREWORD
In a Directive dated 26 November 1944 LieutenantGeneral James H. Doolittle, then Commanding General, Eighth
Air Force requested a report of the development of the
Eighth Air Force for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces
and to be used as a background for tactical study by the Air
Force Tactical School.
This report, "Eighth Air Force- Tactical Development
- August 1942 - May 1945" was prepared under the direction of
Major General Orvil A. Anderson, former Deputy Commander for
Operations, Eighth Air Force.
It is believed that the report is sound in its
statements and conclusions, and that it offers valuable information
to anyone reviewing the combat activities of the Eighth Air
Force during the air war against Germany.
..
ArlI
Lauu?~ 2 iiiL:
c ti
tt:M
;.
t;I
ii
II
I Nb
-.-
i3
Y ?
jL~t
CONTENTS
Chapter I
Chapter II
- Targets.
Chapter V
Appendix "A"
10 w
NI~~a~e
iii
IM
CHAPTER I
Page
Separate Squadrons of 6 a/c each (August,
18 a/c Group (September, 1942)
36 a/c Group (September,
1942)
........
4&
..
1942).. .............
. .
Page
Basic Type of Escort Employing 3 Fighter Squadrons
i)& II
10 & 11
Strafing -Part
..
13 & 14
Strafing
..
Part
. .
19
Airborne Radar
. .
57
58
. .
59
. .
63
63
66
...........
67
69
26 & 27
. .
H21
during 1944
69
. . .
69
69
9 a/c each
29 & 30
during
32 & 33
...........
...
.....
........
. .
35 & 36
38
.............
70
72
. .
72
. .
73
1 April 1944,
Chart A
79
...
77
79
SO
45
1 August 1943
46
1 February 1944 . . .
S0
47
1 August 1944 . . . .
81
4g-
...
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER II
Fighter Escort-Battle Formation - Plan View .....
CHAPTER IV
41
..
on Which Targets
...
43
. .
........
.....
"Bombs Away"
. .
42
1944
39
. .
55
20
Bombing (Deflection-range)
*
r
22, 23 & 24
Navigation
. .
CHAPTER III
H2X is
1944)
. . . . . . .
.16 & 17
55
.
. . .
. *
51
Flak Chart,
.........
23 February 1945,
Chart B
......
87
s7
iv
Page
91
Chart A
3.
.Y
S ... .
..
95
.....
95
..
. . . . .
Chart
Chart A
Chart
..
97
Mission to Leipzig,
....
99
Mission to Merseburg,
. . .. .
99
..
101
. . . .1.
01
. . .
Chart C
Chart
. ..
. .
. .
. ....
o103
12 May 194
105
.. .
.
.
.........
..........
Mission to Berlin,
5 December 1944
. .
140
.
.
141
"
1 May 1945,
Chart
141
APPENDIX A
Schematic Organization of the Eighth Air
2-A
..............
. . .
6-A
. .
8-A
. . .
111
113
..
107
135
136
..........
109
109
"
"
..
Chart B.
May 1945,
11 September 194
135
107
October 1942:
Penetration, Chart A .
Withdrawal, Chart B .
129
132 & 133
............
21 June 1944 -
Mission to Lille,
. . .
20 February 1944..
o105
....
. . . .
125
103
.....
.
. .
. .
101
Mission to Leuna,
123
127
Range Capabilities,
127
97
....
. . .
.. ...
..
. .....
. . . . . . . ..
Chart A
9 October 1943 .
93
119
.............
93
Mission to Marienburg,
Certain Individual Losses as a Percentage
.
of Aircraft Bombing, Chart B
119
91
115
10-A
..............
Continental
Invasion
117
ll~thS
1E
12-A
........
..
FiGHTER
HIGH
3900f1
COVER
HIH FIGHTER
COVER
3,000 ft
above BOMBERS
FIGHTER
2000ft
fo COVER
iSO0
above BOMBERS
A
;
;: F,
.,
. -. S
F-
'
y
..
itS
FIGHTER
1.500 R
iOO ft. to COVER
above BOMBERS
SiL4
W-Wi
Fighter
Groups
on
Supportinq
Sweeps
1L
Fiqh
t e r
KJI
RoCKETS
Cover
HIGH
Front cover
FLAK
and
BURSTS
PINK, RED
K
Sweep
Fighter
fiQ
S ujeep;n
hI'
tp'n9
Air dr"It
tcrs
4
1
cover
Ot ah4 $
'
siDE
F qhter
*b
Rear Cover
,,,
to
rd
A I
DI V I 5
r*
FLAK
f -,
,_
s/i I0cloud
f
over Target area
-FLAK
AIR
N-'
DII oN
1io/ 10
cUMULUS
and
STR AT 0 C UMU L U S
._i..
.-- ,-.__
---
.,
a s e
~CCC~~rrC
2000
CCYrCrs
3/T0
ft,
to
cloud
of
North
Target" area
Enemy Twin Jet A/c
~LCC
A/F
r
I
Oranknburg
I-
i1'..y&
Li
_
_I
Gun Emplacements
around Target area.
r7
r
A/F
i'i
--
FRONTISPIECE
18 MARCH, 1945
Target
BERLIN
at I100 hrs.
:
UNCLASSIFIED
rL\
t,
r_-
"- c
2'
43""
...
t
cs~p;
WEST
AND
EAST
FRISIAN
ISLANDS
WILHELMSHAVEN
4
I,
HAMBURG
ZUtDER
ZEE
FRONTISPIECE
CHAPTER I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF
BASIC BOMBER FORMATIONS
AND
PROCEDURES
dery4hj i "
ri
,YY
VC
P1:
Fr
rp
..
:.
i
t
J.+.;,J
er .
ie/
yZ/'
I
R
:)~
'~r"
iTHPROB1rvr
,
'
THE PROB
defense to enable the force to venture unescorted deep into Germany where our choice
targets lay. Enemy tactics had improved; new German armament out-ranged our .50 calibre
machine guns. The rocket mortar mounted on twin-engined fighters, was lethal beyond the
Much needed fighter escort of long range was soon to make its appearrange of our guns.
ance.
With the advent of these long-range fighters, the development of bomber formations
Now the need was to develop a formation
proceeded toward quite different objectives.
which:
(1)
(2)
would break down easily into units giving a better bomb pattern,
(3)
and
The charts and pictures following illustrate the developments in formation flying,
first, to gain fire power for defense against enemy aircraft and, later, to improve
escorting capabilities, the bomb pattern, and the defense against flak. The formations
shown indicate the general trend; but commanding officers of units had leeway to experiment and make changes in formation as they gained experience in battle.
U~I \I1~AI:j
2
DIAGRAM
I - SEPARATE
DIAGRAM I
UN,
4)~
3 Miles
PLAN of SQUADRON
H-
780'
-3O'
-- 280'-
>
11~
I~
so '
150'
11/2
Miles
I2Miles
EA
PROFILE of SQUADRON
2 MIL ES
A
PLAN
L*,'-
Miles
-12
4:
112Miles
1,000'
_
__
S_
of GROUP
1,000'
_~JhI
__IA
A
I ,oI"oo
B
44
[---2 MILES-
PROFILE of GROUP
I-2 MILES
iiiiiiiii
IIIII
a:)
'8
DIIAGRA
AM I
SQUADRON
UNCLASSEIEJD
6 A/c
3 MILES
1,000'
II MILES
01,
00'
2 MILEs
B1i
g MILES
BERCK
DIAGRAM 2 -18A/C
At a time when Germany's U-boat campaign was inflicting mounting losses on Allied
shipping, the Eighth Air Force increased its penetration and ventured beyond escort range
to attack submarine bases in France, Holland and Belgium.
Growing aggressiveness of the Luftwaffe dictated compression of the previous loose
formation of four squadrons, in order to make possible mutual support and more concentrated
fire power. Air commanders experimented with two basic formations, the 18 aircraft group
(Diagram 2) and the 36 aircraft group (Diagram 3).
The 18 aircraft group consisting of two boxes of 9 aircraft each, was designed to
permit better control of more aircraft. Each squadron was a "V" of 3 elements, and each
element a "V" of 3 aircraft. The 9 aircraft in each squadron flew at the same altitude
with the wing elements in trail of the lead element. The second squadron of 9 aircraft
flew 500 feet above the first, slightly in trail
and ocheloned away from the sun.
Although this formation was more compact than the original "Rouen" formation, it had
less flexibility.
On turns, wing aircraft lost sight of those toward the center of the
formation during completion of the maneuver.
Because unstacked elements blocked out each
other's field of fire, vulnerability to German Air Force attacks at certain times was
increased.
DIAGRAM 2
UNLASSIFED
-1
1,170'
480'
iGroup
590'
[-
2,340'
PLAN
of GROUP
IA/c
1,170'
I Squadron
I Group
@G600'
500'
ISquadron
I Element
I Group
I
I ?<
<
50
++
;;+
Z;+;++
=12
!=
;:
50'
--
390'
r390'
- 160
I
--
2,340'
I A/C
FRONT
ELEVATION
of GROUP
CIiCLAS3IgW
@v
PROFILE of GROUP
I A/c
DIAGRAM 2
UNC.ASSI IEDo
2,340y
- ,o'----__
600'
IELEMENj
3 I/C~
SQUADRON
3Elements of 3 A/c
18 A/c GROUP
Detail
of PLAN
2 Squadrons of 9 A/c
Detail
of PLAN
-It
2-
ii4LI~-
~PE~4 -z
IGROUP
18 A/C
_-.
,..
ilil l-. I
This alternate formation was a further step in the direction of unified control.
It had 3 units of 12 aircraft each, with each unit broken down into 4 elements of 3
Inner aircraft were protected but the formation did not solve the problem
aircraft each.
Also, it was difficult to fly. The two
of flexibility, nor did it increase fire-power.
trailing elements were required to be abreast of each other with all 6 aircraft at an
These elements were echeloned toward the sun
elevation 80 feet below the lead elements.
from the lead elements.
The formation did, however, solve in overall fashion the problem of staggering.
In such a 36 aircraft group, three units of 12 aircraft each flew in a staggered formation,
a lead unit, followed by a wing unit to the side and 500 feet above the lead; then the
other wing unit still
further behind at the opposite side and 1,000 feet above the lead.
Although this type of formation kept as tightly closed as possible, tho lead aircraft
flew out of the line of vision of many unite, and this made a cohesive formation virtually
impossible.
$''
I
ia
..
.~:.
~1r~I
~,
r,
"..~
:.
..
~r
~' 'i
r P.' 1
~i4ili iij
.i*.i*~i
DIAGRAM 3
SCLASS FIED
2,730'
PLAN of GROUP
I Squadron
1,170'
R,
CS
PROFILE of GROUP
IIIII
DIAGRAM
(September 194
36 A/c GROUP
~_~
Il
l
...
USR
2 7 3 0 J.
EB
1320
170'
130'
12 A/c SQUADRON
4 Elements
36 A/c GROUP
Detail
of PLAN
3 Squadrons of 12 A/c
---- -----Z~L
Y"1~
ylX11~St
tY-L=i
L~aFrJtC
-----
l'
~lr
Numerical growth of the Eighth Air Force began to increase the capability of attackRomilly and Wilhelmshaven.
But this
ing more targets and penetrations went as deep
It should be remembered that at this
extended time of exposure to enemy fighter attacks.
relied primarily on their own fire-power for defense against
time bomber formations still
Therefore, the development of a formation affording an abso lute
the German Air Force.
maximum of mutual fire support was vital.
As
It consi sted of
standardized Javelin formation appeared in December 1912.
The first
in
echelo n, each
comprised
two
elements
high,
and
low.
Squadrons
three squadrons - lead,
Th is change
similarly
stacked.
and
squadrons
element stacked toward the sun, with elements
increased flexibility over the previous 36 aircraft formation, and brought greater firepower to bear within each group, but it did not significantly help forward fire-po wer.
The Luftwaffe exploited the vulnerability of the lightly defended nose of our airc raft,
Attempting to deny the enemy
causing losses of 10 percent and 12 percent by mid-winter.
stacked above and behind the lead
his best line of attack, groups were flown in trail,
group and echeloned toward the sun. The groups became separated beyond the range o f mutual
fire-support, but at least column ffect provided some denial to the enemy's freedLom of
attack.
Stacking in trail
The chief disadvantage was difficulty of flying-this formation.
at increasing altitudes, caused troublesome speed differentials between high and 1ow
Abortives mounted as individual bombers we re
groups with resultant "stringing-out".
The
unable to remain in formation, and mutual support became increasingly difficult.
group to the Air Force made it necessary to discard this javel in
addition of a fifth
format ion.
i'
12
....
~~
.~
...
" ..
~ ~ ~~
.. . ,'.
..
:.
,i.
DIAGRAM 4
UNCLA SSFED
--
- 780'
i"
c-
>
.
E:
IGrouo
2,340'
I A/C
PLAN of GROUP
I A/C
2,340'
PROFILE of GROUP
UMNLA SrED
DIAGRAM 4
UNCLASSIFIED
Individuol Groups of
J AV E L IN of GROUPS
.-320'-4-1
3 A/c
(December
1942)
nn
o13o640'
'II7n--
780'
90C
f-rt6 - 3 90'
ELEMENT
18 A/c each
SQUADRON
2 Elements of 3 A/c
18 A/c GROUP
3 Squadrons of 6 A/c
1943)
Airzraft, squadrons,
This formation considerably shortened the column but did not entirely overcome a
tendency to "string-out" caused by a difference in altitude between high and low groups.
What it did do was to reduce the speed differential between lead and trailing groups, by
placing the leader at mid-altitude.
Also, by increasing forward fire-power it
Diagram 6.
.,B
fI
I
15
UNrl 3j ic
DIAGRAM 5
1640'
I Groul
I Squadron
a0}.
IE
2,340'
I A/c
PLAN
of
3ROUP
GROUP
640' -
We
--
I Element
I A/c
I Squadron
780',
I Group
ELEVATION
I Squadron
I Group
900'
-6-- 320' -
2,340'
FRONT
900'
of
GROUP
ICL.ASSIFrED
PROFILE of GROUP
DIAGRAM 5
(February 1943)
Individual Groups
PS
1,4s+
' 2340'
:r~~, 4
;,
'o"
900'
f"rROUP
ELEMENT
3 A/c
SQUADRON
2 Elements of 3 A/c
18 A/c GROUP
3 Squadrbns of 6 A/c
BERCK
a lead group with one high wing-group and one low wing-group echeloned
to the sides;
(2)
a lead group with high and low groups above and below and slightly in
trail.
The latter arrangement resulted in greatly increased forward fire-power and mutual
The high group had trouble
support, but was difficult to fly, particularly on turns.
keeping the lead group in view.
Even with the wing-men echeloned to the sides, this 54 aircraft formation proved
unwieldy, and squadrons at the outside positions, high and low, where too few guns could
be brought to bear, were exposed.
The doctrine of mutual support which prompted this larger formation was largely
Consequently, it was replaced shortly
negated by the technical difficulties encountered.
thereafter.
18
DIAGRAM 6
COM
640
UNPIASSL9
2 34
2340'
32
150'
ELEMENT
3 A/c
780
SoU
300'
SQUADRON
2 Elements of 3 A/c
18 A/c GROUP
3 Squadrons of 6 A/c
-ooon
-No00'
290C
- 000'
VERTICAL
SCALE
COMBAT WING
3 Groups
(54 A/c)
UNCLASSIFIED
Ip0o'
2,000'
4,000'
3,000'
HORIZONTAL
SCALE
5,000'
6,000'
7,000'
DIAGRAM 6
3 COMBAT WINGS of
54 A/c
NE
jMILES
a.ILC5
each (MARCH
1943)
,qVQ
In June 1943, P-47's of the Eighth'Fighter Command began escorting our bombers. As
the force gained in both experience and equipment these fighters gradually increased their
range from about 175 miles away from fighter bases in the United Kingdom to approximately'
250 miles. In October 1943, P-3S9s joined them. But bomber penetrations deepened even
further beyond escort range, increasing greatly the hazard from enemy fighter attack.
Consequently, mutual fire-power support continued to be the most important factor in bomber
defense, as the Luftwaffe waited for the fighter escort to return home before attacking the
bombers.
In this deadly struggle, the need for increased fire-power and minimum exposure
heightened. Hence two important variations in the 54 aircraft combat wing formation were
put into effect:
(1)
Aircraft in each element were stacked in one direction, while both the elements
and squadrons were stacked in the opposite direction;
(2)
the previously exposed highest and lowest squadrons were "tucked in" behind by
reversing the echelon of the elements in each wing squadron of each group.
which the enemy, with coordinated single-engine attacks, would pick off the stragglers.
Deep and costly penetrations, such as those to Schweinfurt in August and October,
finally caused discard of the inflexible 54 aircraft combat wing.
..
-.
*-
Tr
~rr
i~~ r
r,.
-,
21
DIAGRAM 7
UNCLASSIFIED
i
455'
S uoron
-- 390'1,138
==
~2~
PLAN of GROUP
~I
I Group
455'
1--- 320'-
IA/c
}JAIA/c
IElement
1,138
i 64
900'
640' --
PROFILE of GROUP
DIAGRAM 7%cL
ppoct COMBAT WING of 54 A/c
Zf 3 Squadrons of 6 A/c each
(APRIL to DECEMBER 1943)
-640
"-1138'
90C
3100
ELEMENT
3 A/c
SQUADRON
18 A/c GROUP
2 Elements of 3 A/c
3 Squadrons of 6 A/c
1280'
2845
2700'
UgLASiF1LD
DIAGRAM 7
UNCLASSIFIED
-6
6 M.
m LJ
dl~
e ach
' 4 )PR L 1943)
o h ((APRIL
Between mid October 1943 and mid Januay 1944, the Eighth experimented with a revised
aircraft
group, and after this period the 36 aircraft formation entirely replaced the
36
unwieldy 54 aircraft combat wing.
Two factors, more than any others, influenced the adoption of the 36 aircraft group
as Standard Operating.Procedure:
(1)
(2)
Seventy-five percent of the Eighth's attacks in January and February of 1944 involved
German targets, and over half of these were bombed through the overcast.
Because of the
shortage of P?
(Pathfinder Force) equipment, it was necessary that the squadrons be compressed as tightly as possible. This was accomplished by fashioning a 12 aircraft squadron
with four elements of 3 aircraft each. All aircraft in an element flew at the same elevation.' The four elements were a lead, a high-wing, a low, and a low-low trailing. This
uncovered more guns and increased cohesion of the individual unit, although the formation
was still difficult to fly.
Escort problems affected the group formation as much as overcast bombing influenced
the squadron. For all this time, the escort range and number of our fighters was increasing
and more attention was being paid to flying bomber groups in a way best calculated to aid
fighter escort. Savings of width and height were effected in the three squadrons which
flew as a group consisting of lead, high-wing, and low-wing squadrons.
The effectiveness of this tighter formation and its fighter escort was established in
the February debacle of the Luftwaffe, which was rendered temporarily impotent by a series
of knockout blows during the Spring of 1944.
f
,,.
"
:
.
;FM
.11.
CI'S
t
25
DIAGRAM 8
UNCLASSFIED
520'
I-
V- - 390 ,- 1,560
A I A/c
PLAN
of
GROUP
I:
52d'
400 -
>-I
>
I Group
I A/c
|*
I -~
FRONT ELEVATION
of
of
PROFILE
PROFILE of
of GROUP
GROUP
GROUP
GROUP
IN
800'
,..3~a"~
>1
I-o--50
DIAGRAM 8
0
1560'
520
SQUADRON
Sioo'
31 A/c
SQUADRON
36 A/c GROUP
4 Elements of 3 A/c
3 Squadrons of 12 A/c
Detail of Plan
DIVISION FORMATION
12 Groups of 36 A/c each
4 MILES
OWLS
41
can
07~1
CUXHAVEN
NFIUI
Ifu.,.nflh
.It
28
until operations
DIAGRAM 9
UNCLA, ED
I Group
800'
*e-
390'
1,170
PLAN of GROUP
9o'
0'39-
14
480'--
A/c
I Squadron
300'
--
1150'
A
IA/c
I
I Element
I Element
1,050'
I'
--ICdR- -iALC-~
-H+
FRONT
T
ELE~
....
-800'
--
PROFILE of GROUP
UNCLASSIFIED
o30d
DIAGRAM 9
4 SQUAW
K480
ch
0
soo'
Il
390'
SQUADRON
3 Elements of 3 A/c
Detail of Plan
ELEMENT
36 A/c GROUP
3 A/c
4 Squadrons of 9 A/c
DIVISION FORMATION
12 Groups of 36 A/c each
minutes
FISFL AFN
HAI
a 9fl'
Because the B-24 is more difficult to fly in formation and has more
restricted visibility, 2nd Air Division employed a slightly different 27 aircraft
group formation fromathe B-17s during this period.
Basically, the formation depicted in Diagram 10 is similar to that in Diagram
9. For better bomb pattern, however, one element (either high or low wing) was
flown to one side affording greater target coverage. The formation had the same
advantages as those used by the B-17s and became Standard Operating Procedure.
On the route in, number three or number two aircraft of the side element in
a squadron would sometimes cross over and the other two aircraft would close in.
This put two aircraft on one side of the squadron's main flight of six and one
aircraft on the other side.
Bombing was accomplished by squadrons with less per-plane exposure to flak.
Thus the enemy, short on Anti-Aircraft shells, was required to fire more per-plane
in order to cause the same damage as he had to the old 54 aircraft combat wing and
36 aircraft group formations.
31
UNCLASSIFIED
DIAGRAM 10
780'
(50
I-Ism nu
I Group 24C
50'
320'
1
I
TI
I
1.ie
<I Squadron
--
2,440'
PLAN
780'
-"
of GROUP
N
I Element
:' 50'
I Squadron
700'
I Group
I A/c
2,440'
FRONT ELEVATION of
GROUP
FRONT ELEVATION of GROUP
I Group
UIl
PROFILE of GROUP
twli;
airy
UNCLSIFED
DIAGRAM 10
THE 27A/c GROUP - B24 FORMATION
Februo
hrj.
5)
(Flow
3 SQUADRONS of
ch
o
i32 0
780
A240
150'
SQUADRON
3 Elements 3 A/c
27A/c GROUP
Detail of Plan
ELEMENT
3 Squadrons 9 A/c
3 A/c
DIVISION FORMATION
112
2 minutes
rr;ir.
TIM
NORDERNEY
BALTRUM
LANGEOOG
SPIEKEROOG
WANGEROOGE
S-"T
ALTE MELLUM
# SCHILLIG
3URHAVE
An improvement on the 2nd Air Division's formation (Diagram 10) was developed by the
This enabled groups to fly at closer interval, especially on the bomb run, with the
result that less aircraft were damaged by flak. Not only did it condense the size of the
group box and improve the bomb pattern, but it also enabled all three groups to give each
other superior fire support without losing the advantages of the formations shown in Diagrams 9 and 10.
Employment of this formation raised the standard of bombing accuracy and defensive fire
power of this group to the highest level of performance.
r"l
b':
;---;
~ I,,,
nllF.C~C~~
*.E
1
,B; B
~p
.~:"J
;~ ip~'jS~?C~ '
34
i'.
~cl~j~;
'~C~y~
i
~pr
"
c
r,;~S
DIAGRAM II
UPA
I Group
T
I
720'
1,170'
PLAN of GROUP
I Element
800'
I Group
T I'
150'
I Group
- 240'--
------
1,170'
720'
PROFILE of GROUP
~Ba~da .r
DIAGRAM II
THE 27 A/c GR
1,2 D A
BY THE
96TH COMBAT WIN ?,2N- AIR DIVISION
(Februory throughApril 1945)
3 SQUADRONS of 9A/c each
O4L- SFIED
L720."
1170'
Boo'
SQUADRON
3 Elements 3 A/c
27 A/c GROUP
Detail of Plan
3 Squadrons 9A/c
ELEMENT
3 A/c
-~Yi
~i_
')~-V7
-~
,
BLAUORT
TRISCHEN
I~Fa~j
'
In this procedure the three squadrons lead, high, and low - followed the penetration
route until they reached a spot not more than
five minutes before the Initial Point.
Then
the lead squadron proceeded straight ahead
while the other two took interval to the outside of the turn as follows.
The second (high)
squadron, echeloning away from the direction
of turn, took interval'of approximately two
miles to the side of the lead squadron. Number
two then flew parallel to the orininal course,
maint
,,Wt.,
atval
37
___
_II~
I_
NO
RTH
SEA
LINCOLN
0
NOTTINGHAM
DERBY
UNC SIriE
LEICESTER
COVENTRY
HUNTINGDON
0
L
MBRIDGE
t-
@3
NORTHAMPTON
BEDFORD
OXFORD
0r
CHELMSFORD
0,
UN CLASSIFIED
2ND AIR DIVISION
3RD. AIR DIVISION
LONDON
10
15
SCALE
OF
MILES
20
25
PRO
"I~f'
SQUADRONS
RETAIN ORIGINAL
ALTITUDE.
I.P
>TARGET
2 MILES
INTERVAL
_------
SQUADRONS
I.P
RETAIN ORIGINAL
ALTITUDE.
TARGET
0
I MILE
INTERVAL
f'
,,
SQUADRONS
A
Alll
II
I.PR
RETAIN ORIGINAL
ALTITUDE.
LEAD SQUADRON
HIGH SQUADRON
LOW SQUADRON
UNCLASSIFIED
TARGET
A TYPICAL MISSION
For the Eighth Air Force bombing of Berlin on 18 March 1945, a huge force of bombers
took off; climbed through 3,000 feet of overcast; assembled by Group, Wing and Division;
flew a briefed penetration route; maneuvered at the Initial Point for the bomb run; bombed;
reformed at the Rally Point; flew a briefed withdrawal route; disassembled by Division,
Wing and Group; then the entire force landed.
A rigid time schedule governed
The following eight diagrams show how this was done.
plane took-off until the entire force
each phase of the mission from the moment the first
landed.
40
GROUP ASSEMBLY
Mission :
BERLIN,
through
OVERCA
18,MARCH, 1945
s.LEAD
LEDA/
CRC
ISQUARO
SQUADRON CIRC
LEAD A/ OF
Pi ais
_J.I
-r -
""""
--.
___.
--
l--
tG
CLNUTESB300MNUTE
BUNCHER
NO 29
SIDE
VIEW
Lbill
iju-I
ku
UNmLASSIFIED
=
No 2
DETAIL PLAN
of
GROUP ASSEMBLY
LEAD HIGH and LOW SQUADRONS
BUNGHER
5 MILES
N 29
r
4 ,'
\pG\
0ppJ
00~
0O.
4,
BUNCHER
4,
NO 29
Py
~4,
C,~E
STT EOTS
A/D
UNCLASSIFIED
//
No 3
N'
0853 HRS.
RIOMER (SPLASHER No 5)
5233SN.
00005E.
WING
MARCH
0837 HRS.
WATTON
0843 V2 HRS.
NEOTS
UNCLAISIFiD
WING and DIVISION
ASSEMBLY
Ur
UICLASSIFIED
No. 4
5256'N
1336'E
CROMER
52043'N
LEAVE SOUTHWOLD
0902 HRS
CONTROL POINT NO.1
ALTITUDE 6,000 FT.
ROUTE to TARGET
and
RALLY POINT
p 7
No5
GROUP MANEUVER
'
AT
INITIAL POINT
AND AT
RALLY POINT
52 56' N
13" 38'E
R. P.
ALTITUDE
23,000 FT.
I. P.
LTITUDE 25,000 FT.
5253'N
i2028'E
No. 6
Uuf0
/7
CROMER
t
i414 HRS.
TUDE 7000 FT.
OC0
OlVISION
LIN
ROUTE OUT
from
RALLY POINT
/NODN
UNCLA55 t\tU
No 7
AIR FORCE
DISPERSDUN
TO INDIVIDUAL AIF
ENG
I',
THE
CROMER
1451 HRS
3
3RDA4 DIV(H)
~~~~9
IS
2ND AIR DIVISION
S
)
SOUTHWOLD
A/DS
R2ND
AIR DIVISION A/DS
?RDAIR DIVISION A/DS
SO
T WODLO
No. 8.
UNCLASSIFIED
at
BASE
.4
-V
DOWN
WIND
LEG
ONCLASSF~r
,fP
&' .-0 0
CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF
BASIC FIGHTER FORMATIONS
AND
PROCEDURES
49
{\t
i~I;
TO THE
(I)
(2)
(3)
The first group of P-j3's became operational in October to provide escort and target
support beyond the range of the P-47's.
For
a time small numbers and unforeseen mechanical
difficulties limited their effectiveness, but
in December another P-3S group and a group of
P-51B's were added with excellent results.
I.
group.
Air Commanders were encouraged to
experiment with new tactics, and did.
However,
the four-ship Battle Formation remained basic
(Diagram I).
protection,
[;J,4;;4j
ENDURANCE
50
LIMIT OF THEIR
Distances between aircraft, altitude flown, andtactics employed would vary with each f~itt
4
,i..2"
:j~~~~~-
F;
BATTLE FORMATION
FIGHTER ESCORT
wm
Wv
mIATAVMEW
THE
,
- - -.....
DIAGRAM I
FLIGHT
4 A/C.
...
.....
250 YDS
A SQUADRON
44.
74.
A SQUADRON
4-
16 A/C.
LEAD FLIG T
MILE-(800 YDS)
2ND
IGHT
LEAD SECTION
MILE
{( ,850 YDS)
S OFT UP A
FROM THE
LEAD AC
A SQUADRON
2/4 MILES
(3,950 YDS
GROUP
ttttrtt~cc~c~cy
140I,
A GROUP : 48 A/C.
3 SQUADRONS, A LEAD, A HIGH
AND A LOW. THE HIGH SQUADRON
FLIES APPROXIMATELY 1000 FT. ABOVE
HIH
(
1/4
LEAD SQUADRON
SQUADRON
IMILE
FLIES APPROXIMATELY
MILES)
A GROUP
(9 MILES WIDE}
----IIAI~eI
a 4ft
,
_
TO THE
miles from base), where both bombers and fighters landed at Russian bases. Later the fighters
shuttled down to Fifteenth Air Force bases in
Italy, then escorted a bomber mission back
again to bases in Britain.
TYPES
(2)
(3)
a combination of both.
and
Close Support
Fighter range is reduced considerably on
escort duty because fighters must weave to
Even though
stay with the slower bombers.
fighters flying alone have enough range to go
directly to a target area and return from a
deep penetration, the necessity of weaving
drastically reduces their range,
To overcome this difficulty in connection
with Eighth Air Force missions, a "relay
system" of fighter escort was planned in which
one group of fighters would pick up the bombers
52
OF
"Y"
All this time the swarm of P-51's multiplied. In September 19q44, the P-38's were
replaced; by October most of the P-47 groups
had switched to P-51's.
December saw the
entire Fighter Command operating P-51's except
for the 56th Group which retained P-47's.
The
switch-over caused notable gains in range and
in actual number of escort hours.
It was the
final phase in the transformation of a fighter
force having primarily a protective escort
function, into a much more versatile one possessing offensive and harassing capabilities as
well.
ESCORT
.. F
arriv-
to
FIGHTER ESCORT
'
DIAGRAM 2
SQUADRON 5 MILES
AHEAD and SLIGHTLY
ABOVE BOMBERS TO
STOP HEAD ON
ATTACKS by ENEMY A/c
SQUADRON
BOMBERS
SQUARN
iOO00ft ao V,56CK
ABOVE BC)MYR
J/1'
ON TURNS TO COVER
EACH OTHER AGAINST TAIL ATTACK. SECTIONS and SQUADRONS CRISS CROSS FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.
Ua~~ED~8
FIGHER
DIAGRAM 3
ESCORT
UNCLASSIFIED
PX!
r.
Tt~j~
FIGHTER ESCORT
DIAGRAM 4
EMPLOYING
SQUADRONS.
SQUADRON 5 MILES
AHEAD and SLIGHTLY
ABOVE BOMBERS TO
STOP HEAD ON
ATTACKS by ENEMY A/c
HIGH SECTION
1,000' to 1,500'
ABOVE BOMBERS
UlAS;L5
III.1.
;
~
.I''j
56
i "~-
Radar-assisted ground control was impossible at the distance our fighters operated from
England. So was radio contact with our controllers, except through airborne relays.
British Ground Control Interception radar was
always available to our ground fighter control,
but was effective only within approximately
100 miles of the English coast. British "Type
16" radar increased this range slightly and was
more accurate, but still possessed only limited
range. Microwave Early Warning became available to Eighth Air Force in the summer of 1944,
but not until late November of that year, when
it was moved to Gulpen, Holland, was ground
control in depth possible.
.
1
~
'~1''
3% "~
h '~U; C~-
c.i~*.~r~
'*~" s~S r~a
~Ir1:
L'~
Iff~~pj~T~i~l
S trafing Technioue
These astonishing results were achieved
by. a technique which, with variations from
group to group, was basically this:
The attacking group would come in on the
deck to avoid detection and flak, nulling.up to
1,000 feet about a mile from the target.
The
first
squadron would continue to climb, and then
circle the airfield at 3,500 feet to provide top"
cover.
The second squadron would strafe gun
emplacements and anti-aircraft batteries.
The
third or rear squadron would attack airfield
installations and parked aircraft.
The second squadron would then relieve the
first
as top cover.
This would enable the
latter
to go down and strafe those installations
untouched by. the second and third. Upon order,
from the air commander all squadrons would
escape at deck level to reform at a briefed
rally point.
DIAGRAM 5
(Part I)
STRAFING
FIRST STAGE of STRAFING
AN ENEMY A/D
cpg(Aii~au
Ist SQUADRON
AFFORD
COVER BY CIRCLING
A/D AT 3,500'
I ST SQUADRON
;;~~~
.~ _
--
aLls~
-""~Baep88P~,~;57
:_;~.
...
e~ll~L~F~g&e~
-E
GUN EMPLACEI
ND SQUADRON
~-~i
2ND SQUADRON
ATTACK GUN
EMPLACEMENTS
U~d"Ph
PF t- P. P.
DIAGRAM 5
(Part 2)
STRAFING
SECOND STAGE of STRAFING
AN ENEMY A/D
IST SQUADRON
CONTINUES TO
CIRCLE A/D
1ST SQUADRON
r
~iIc~
-~
~~il~s~l~~i~~(r
I~iqjtJC1~
-;5
DIAGRAM 5
STRAFING
utNCLASSiFIED
-'4~
s"'~-~l:l
(Part 3)
- --~lrA
3RD SQUADRON
PROCEED TO
RALLY POINT
FIGHTER
Fr: ,T 7
b 7
i
60
Ri';
I1
ftCc-
BOMBING
CHAPTER III
BOMBING
ir! 2
ptbwt
7.
~I
7.1
'7
K;
L ri
61
!I asp ~
r ; r
AWIN~n
,i
;.ULU
.:,
the delivery rate of new bomb groups and replacement aircraft to Eighth Air Force was well
behind schedule. Such retarded expansion was
accentuated by the relatively small load per
bomber.
It was not possible to achieve the depth
of penetration desired in the fulfillment of
our target commitments before 1944. We were
limited by the size and range of our escort
62
size.
Bomb patterns were improved by varying
the shape of the formation.
The tendency was
to get more and more compact squadrons in
order to obtain a denser bomb pattern.
Both flak and enemy fighters reduced the
accuracy of our bombardiers compared to training standards.
Harassing attacks by enemy
aircraft made it difficult to concentrate on
bombing.
If the lead bombardier was shot down,
the deputy aircraft would have to take over in
a minimum of time under heavy pressure.
This
mental hazard coupled with the inefficiency of
operating under oxygen and heavy personal
equipment, were definite disadvantages.
The
accuracy of enemy anti-aircraft fire normally
required our formations to bomb from heights
around 25,000 feet despite the fact that bombing accuracy decreased in direct proportion to
altitude. Early experiments with bombing from
7,500 and 8,000 feet resulted in such heavy
flak losses that, as a rule, the Eighth Air
Force never thereafter bombed heavily defended
targets from low altitude.
14O
Chart A.
1944
1945
Chart B.
1943
1944
1945
BOMBING (CONT'D)
later.
The direction of the bomb run was frequent.
ly an adverse factor to bombing accuracy. Was
the sun in the right positin for the runt
Could the direction of the wind enable formations to race across flak defenses with
minimum hazard in spite of the fact tk't do~n-
OVERCA S
GENERAL
OMBNG
STATEMENT
line.
If the shore were irregular in shape so
that a landmark would appear in the scope, the
Jandmark would aid in locating the target.
.In
gene'ral,
t-Ld
64
the
I. H2X
LA
1"
d ..
{
t:j11
Ai
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(YrV
t
i1<A:
'
e~1n~y
~3~
~t
65
65
Open Country
I i I
'3
04..
Z
r
0.12
QOh
-~
r%
'h~
br
Cre I efctio
to7
da er
paale
dr
11*
entrance
0
Corner Reflection
0r
1y
L
to
,tse
@
Rays emerge parallel to
entrance.
V.~r
I-
It
r-.
~;
P r,~.
-
BING
UNCLASSI
RANGE
DEFLECTION
Track Line
-
Lubber Line
Lubber Line
ccS
9C
Target
~---
IIAIfli
~-~--~~--
i"
JI
E
rd
5L
flif- 1
Mddelms
Yll
i- i Ir;;.
---
'
Zierk
(
30'
Neuzen
-----
---
eI
..
1"
O_
pictur
Oehe
e
d
Hulstl
oepeNn
Cho
Aud nrde.
L-
'
Goe
.,;
Steenbergen
WdOtissekerke
30'N
;'---
ee
w er
Sbur
----
rs
g .
wert
stric
....-
Grommo
LEULOT
mmet
Rn
TI
LE
T e.
Dstnc
Todbearngs
ise
.. a..l .
iege
aStrdn
STT
Ht
ners
50*30'N
Louvir
Sh
presentation and c
ing poin
-he
relation
between
an H2%
scope
ts on a map.
.
lost
OM
t"wt
theNom
Rthatrrinbeowth
4Etwo
landmarks.
r of the scope to
rom the center of the
---
. ..
..
UNCLASIFE
% SERVICEABILITY OVER
TARGET OF H 1 X DURING 1944
SORTIES AND EFFECTIVE
SORTIES FLOWN BY HpX
DURING 1944
NUMBER OF BOMBARDMENT
GROUPS EQUIPPED WITH
H X DURING 1944
Average serviceability
for 1944 88%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
00%
F
0%
2. GEE-H
r
y
arP
1fine
Ilk~
t
t'Sl,
.S
Pt
'S
f.
t:I
\X:~Cl
\i;yc~y_.l~1
wt&bfi
3. MICRO--H
71
-ma
PERCENTAGE
I SEPTEMBER
1944 -
1944 (EXCLUSIVE
.4
DISTANCE FROM
4. COMPARISON
DISTRIBUTION WITHIN
.3
.5
.6
.7
.8
THE AIMING POINT IN MILES
1
DISTANCE
While the above charts compare the accuracy attained when bombing visually with
bombing by instruments, this is not really a fair comparison. Bombing through the
overcast is not an alternative method to visual bombing. It represents a direct
addition to capability by permitting bombing when visual sighting is impossible.
H2X is a valuable means of bombing specially selected large area targets which
can be located by the H2X radar scope. It is also of great value in correcting navigation on partially overcast days so that the bombing force may line up correctly for
a visual run.
Gee-H and Micro-H permit reasonably accurate bombing of pin-point targets within
their range when the more accurate visual sighting cannot be used.
All types of overcast bombing made possible additional visual bombing since the
forces would go out prepared to bomb either way should the target be cloud-covered.
If the clouds would clear briefly, a visual run would be made.
4
FROM
oDECjJAN.
o;F FEB.
bILhUgSI-AlO
CHART SHOWING, BY MONTHS, THE NUMBER OF DAYS ON WHICH TARGETS WERE ATTACKED
BY
E IGHTH AIR FORCE HEAVY BOMBERS
NOTE:-
m
-
AUG. SEPT. OCt NOV. DEC. JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY JUN. JULY AUG. SEPT OCT. NOV. DEC. JAN. FEB. MAR. APR. MAY
1942
1943
* OBOE
NOV.
1944
MAR. APR. MAY JUN.
74
~ ~.~!'2
~ r7
r -;
;y
;i
''
;
rrL
~I -t'l -
,,
!
~''
.t
~.
'11
..
~P ";!
;1:
" tc_ L ,~
ii
CHAPTER
TARGETS
75
Eighth Air Force attacks against the submarine considerably hampered the refitting of
U-boats. A profitable contribution wasmade,
thereby, to the defeat of the submarine menace,
while concurrently developing tactics and
technique for future full-scale air operations
against Germany's war structure.
What
(2)
(3)
Ball bearings;
(4)
76
losses.
. fw
F
f-
f-- ;t;rl
rU:.
,~
rtL
MILLIONS
T '
TARGET
OF
TONS
1.5
'
AU
IN
GE
GERMANY),
(INCLUDING
"a~::
1.2
OIL
PRODUCTION
STILL
CAPACITY
+:""-ROUCTIVE
TRITR
LED
CONTTROL
RMAN
:+
I,350,000
."a~"
BUT
HELD
OF
BECAUSE
IDLE
StZMBING
TONS
METRIC
"."."."PRODUCED
..
ir
":::a
":
ff
ra
ra
":
6,00
Oro
aaa
,rf
;aia"
1 11
ir
ri
::r
;:a
.ra
a~rrrr
..
:r
,r~a
.k
"
+ 1'
++
r"
a+
"
"
;r
.ra,
-++"
"r
+a
+
:aaa
"
.
"
rr
aa
aa
I
-L00
"
ra
"
+
":
"
"r
MY.
"i
-"Y
--
J U
+"
;:
r
NE IJULY I AU
"a
r
L~-
".r
"
"
"
::r+
rrrr
"
..
:.
-I~-
----
_Y-
""
i_
.
+r
"
"
.
r""
+.
...
+.
------
JAN.
"
.r
"
"
i"
!
::r
"
+
+"
:i
+::
"r""
i+.
a
a
"
"+"
ar.a
:
:
,.
r"
;
:
:"
""+
a:
:+
a
r
a
:;
:r",
:+
"
"rr
"r
:r
"
i":a
"
"
"a
"
:;:
"
1944
greatly diminished the vulnerability of the
jet complex as a target system, the seriousness
of the threat caused jet production to be put
on a high priority in the fall of 1944.
It
retained this priority until the end of the
war.
And though aircraft now were produced in
ever increasing numbers, the decline in the
number of our bombers lost attest to the fact
that the fighting capabilities of the Luftwaffe
were rapidly declining.
This is further underlined by the great number of the enemy which
our fighters now destroyed.
rI
a:
"++
""
""
i-'
,.;
.r
.;"
r
"r
r
"
r
,.":
:
""
+:ir
"
rr
."
+",
f" "
a~~a
AP
;r
"+"
+.
..
a~ar
rr
rr
ae;
+.
""
.
":
r"r
+"aa
++a
+"
++
"
"
"a":
,,
."
++
"
"+
"""
'"
+"
ar.;
N+r
,,+
"a
,"
,fr
r.
+":
r+
+a
a""+
r:
a;
r
+
,+:
rare
r rr.
a"+
:.
;"
:.
:::
r+
a;,
""+
"
+:
r"
re+r"
"
+;
ia
a
aa
I;
"a
"~ri
+
"
"".'
1
r~r
":"
rm+
:"
11FN
"
r:
:..+
"
.".
a.+
;:
"
+ar
ai
""
a,,
"a
aaa
II++r:"
.f
"+
raa:r
l
'
raa
f""
L--
I FEB.
a
" +"
T-W""-k0
ka
MAR.
1945
the beleaguered Luftwaffe.
Lack of combat
success added home criticism to its woes.
Toward the end of the war, the Luftwaffe
ceased to be a factor to be reckoned with.
Oil
The great attack on the Leipzig area on 20
February, 19)4 had an important collateral
effect.
For it demonstrated that the time was
near when the great synthetic oil refineries of
Germany would be within our bombing range.
It had been held that oil could not become
a major target system for the Eighth Air Force
until the great aggregation of refineries at
Ploesti, Rumania had been seriously crippled.
A low-level attack on 1 August, 1943, and subsequent attacks by the Fifteenth Air Force, had
crippled
capacity to a satisfactory
degree.
Now the Eighth Air Force was indicating
a capability of penetration in depth necessary
to attack all the vital synthetic oil producers.
Ploesti's
77
joined in.
If
..
jr......
tp;.
9
78
w[
on Manpower
to 700,000.
A more difficult group to evaluate is the
enormous number of people employed, wholly or
in part, in producing the machines, munitions
and supplies reouired by all the personnel of
the German Air Force, the flak batteries and
It would be rash to
the watching services.
it comprised an importthat
but
guess,
a
hazard
manpower, there can
Germany's
of
ant percentage
is the fact
important
more
Even
doubt.
be.no
Air Force,
German
the
categories,
three
that all
services,
warning
the
and
the flak batteries,
reouire nersonnel much above average intelligence and skill, thus involving a qualitative
drain even more costly than the great quantitative drain would indicate.
j1
TARGETS
Chart A.
Chart B.
The huge production of oil at the Ploesti refineries
dominated the oil target situation.
Oil production in Germany was divided into two categories: refining of crude oil, and synthetic production.
The great areas of crude oil refining were around
Hamburg, Hanover, and the Ruhr.
Synthetic oil production centered around the area of
Magdeburg-Leipzig-Dresden, with a very important plant at
Politz near Stettin.
TARGETS
Chart A
Early in the war German single-engine fighter assembly
was centered around a few great mass production plants.
These areas are shown above in proportion to their relative
importance.
Chart B
Before the great attack on aircraft assembly plants
begun 20 February 1944, a start had been made at dispersal
of facilities.
little.
TARGETS
Chart B
Chart A
success,
b, Li
Fi
82
__ _
CHAPTER "
THE AIR WAR ON THE WESTERN FRON 1942 -1945
__
1
83
CHAPTER
rte'N4
'
Rt
4100
Ruhr.
84
an
defensive.
I.
to carry out the appalling task of water invasion of Europe, Britain turned to the air
weapon as a prime means of defeating Germany.
Failure of the German Air Force with its predominance of medium bombers to effect vitally
the war economy of Britain, and the long expressed American confidence in the four-engined
bomber, certainly influenced Britain to begin
mass production of this type of aircraft.
The
British concept of air war was bold, but it
missed part of the lesson already taught to the
Germans by the Royal Air Force, for the British
attempted to use heavily loaded four-engined
bombers for low-level daylight attack deep into
enemy territory without adequate defense for
the bombers.
The first
raid to Augsburg, 4
April 1942, met with such disaster that the
British decided to turn at once to night attacks,
in which enemy interception was less efficient,
but in which also bombing of precise target s
became much more difficult.
The American View of Air Warfare
America, then, had two test cases to study
as to the practicability of daylight air bornmbardment of enemany industry: first,
the German
and then, the British. Both cases indicated
that daylight bombardment deep into the air
defenses of the enemy's country was too costly
for sustained operations.
Both nations had
resorted to protective darkness to hinder enemy
defenses in spite of the fact that darkness also
SETTING
Weather
Weather in England and Western Europe is
bad for flying.
Over England, France and Germany, all through the year, there is a procession of storms, frequent fogs and low hanging
clouds.
Every three days on the average dur
-the winter, a severe storm will be found in
area between London and Berlin.
There will
early morning fog approximately twice a week
During the winter, cloud cover over Germany
averages 60-80 percent, and even in summer the
STAGE
FOR
THE
EIGHTH
AIR FORCE
2.
There were several factors- having a general effect on selection of targets for Eighth
Air Force attack - weather, flak, and radar and
radio.
THE
CERTAIN
FACTORS
AFFECTING
TARGETS
OBEiSRE
bp
The Problem:
Obviously it was necessary
to have as high a rate of operations as possible
in order to make repeat attacks to prevent Germany from repairing damage caused by bombing.
Every effort was made to study European weather
and to devise methods for increasing the Eighth
Air Force's rate of operations.
There were
The problem was complicated.
serious difficulties in forecasting such variable weather.
There was an additional difficulty of making forecasts of a type with which
meteorologists never before had been required
to deal on a large scale.
For instance, accurate forecasts were required for high-level
85
NG
It was necessary
winds and over large areas.
to know also the base and top of all layers of
low, medium and high cloud to facilitate the
The
prediction of route and assembly weather.
time of arrival in the base area of major storm
It was-vital to
systems had to be estimated.
know ceiling and visibility for landing at base
areas.
Early in the war there were standard
minimum operational limits. Bombers did not
attempt to take off when visibility was less
than half a mile and ceiling less than 500 feet.
Assembly of the bomber force required several
thousand feet of clear weather at operational
Formation flying was not undertaken
altitude.
along routes which would be obstructed by high
few bombing
The Eighth's first
cloud tops.
missions required conditions of no more than
5/lOths cloud below 20,000 feet for visual attack on the targets, and landing requirements
were a mile of visibility and 1,000 foot ceiling.
TARGETS
1942
In planning a mission the weather map
forecast was an important factor in selection
of the target. Altitude and routes were chosen
to a considerable extent to be where cloud and
condensation trails were at a minimum. The
direction of attack was governed largely by the
wind forecast at bombing altitudes over the tarThe zero hour was chosen primarily to obget.
All these
tain minimum cloud over the target.
at base
conditions
to
factors had to be geared
suitable for take-off and landing.
Multiple plans for a mission were frequent, with final decision delayed until arrival of the latest weather information. Sometimes this final decision would not be made
until the Eighth was over enemy territory. Even
then orders for the bombers might be changed on
recommendations of P-51 weather scouts, and for
the fighters on recommnenda lons of the MicroUltimately
wave Early Warning control station.
could be
force
task
a
where
reached
a point was
priority
equal
of
targets
of
assigned a number
in a general area having variable cloud conditions. Arriving before the bombers in the area,
P-51 weather scout would advise the task force
Scommanderwhere weather was best and which targets to attack.
New and improved types of navigational
equipment increased the capacity of the force
to navigate to distant targets over full cloud
cover. Modifications of this equipment, and
techniques to utilize it specifically for bomb-
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
7
3
3
8
4
1943
1944
1945
4
5
9
4
9
7
10
8
11
7
11
10
11
18
23
21
25
28
27
23
20
18
18
21
21
20
26
month.
(CONTINUED ON PAGE 87)
...
a
86
wt
Chart B
Chart A
2.
Flak
The Importance of Flak: Flak was a major
and ever-present problem throughout the war in
Europe. The number of Eighth Air Force bombers
damaged by flak always exceeded those damaged
by enemy aircraft.
However, flak damage usually
was repairable in a short time.
After May 1944
bombers lost to flak exceeded those lost to
enemy aircraft, but this represented no great
increase in the effectiveness of flak. It was
due rather to the negative reason that the enemy
fighter force was losing its effectiveness.
The number of bombers damaged and lost to
flak rose steadily from August 1942 until
October 1944, due to greater numerical exposure
which occurred when increasing numbers of bombers were sent out against heavily defended
targets. After October 1944 the damaged and
lost total fell off. This trend came about
mainly because skilled enemy anti-aircraft
artillerymen were not available in suffi
numbers to meet the enemy' s
ments and later because of
CERTAIN
FACTORS
AFFECTING
TARGETS
UN CLASIFED
UNCLAS~~
end of February 1945, one was lost for every
22 damaged.
German Anti-aircraft Artillery Dispositions: The location of enemy flak guns in the
areas of bombing attacks by the Eighth Air
Force was well known throughout the war. Rarely
did a heavier disposition of anti-aircraft guns
turn up than was estimated beforehand.
Flak
intelligence was of a high order, due to constant use of photographic reconnaissance to
locate the enemy guns.
Shifts and increases in enemy antiaircraft gun dispositions tended to follow
variations in target priorities.
As Eighth
Air Force bombers penetrated deeper into enemy
territory and attacked targets in a new category, anti-aircraft defenses built up rapidly
around similar targets located within the
Eighth's demonstrated range capability.
The magnitude of enemy flak defense is
(COINTINUED
ON PAGE 88)
RK
11
CERTAIN
FACTORS
AFFECt
The Large Battery Site: The chief technical development of the war in enemy flak deSome sites
fenses was the large battery site.
had as many as 36 guns, all operating under one
The Germans claimed certain
tactical control.
these
large batteries, but
for
advantages
their employment was due, at least in part, to
the lack of an adequate supply of gun sighting
Another cease was the increasing
devices.
shortage of highly trained technical personnel
as the war progressed.
Early in
Crocess.
t.
88
2.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Conclusions:
Although the enemy experimented with centimeter wave-length radars,
proximity fuzes, and radio-guided missiles and
many other things, data now available indicate
that the most inmortant source of heavy flak
loss and damage was the conventional antiaircraft gun, controlled and fired by conventional methods.
TING
TARGETS
"spoofing".
With a huge force of bombers, such as the
Eighth Air Force operated, the difficulties
involved in attempting to "spoof" or confuse
the enemy are great.
Sometimes, however,
startlingly successful results were accomplished with the aid of special equipment to jam
enemy interception of radio messages.
For
example, on 27 November 1944, the enemy de-
(corTinuED
ON PAGE 90)
89
2.CETI
90
3.
CAPABILITIES
gallons.
pounds.
feet.
minutes
mph I.A.S.
Such conditions permitted a depth of penetration of approximately 360 miles beyond the
enemy coast and return, this range being calculated from fuel consumption records compiled
over many months of combat.
When the climb could be made over the
North Sea or the Atlantic Ocean, range was, of
course, extended.
Hence the curves in the
lines on the chart extending the range eastward
along the North German coast, and southward in
France along the coast on the Bay of Biscay.
For the B-17 with Tokyo Tanks (or wing
tanks): Fuel capacity rose to 2,812 gallons
and gross weight (including 5,000 pounds of
bombs) to 63,000 pounds.
This fuel capacity
and load, for the same conditions as before
gave a penetration beyond the enemy coast line
of 630 miles and return.
So much for range.
What were the other
characteristics and capabilities of the B-17??
The aircraft has excellent stability.
It
is strong and will absorb great battle damage
before control is lost.
Its air-cooled engines
(CONTINUED ON PAGE
92)
Uf1~Lki~~agg~
Chart B.
Chart A.
action.
UI
NCLA SSIIED
"Practical Range Capability" (shown in red) is a coined term meaning "the range of the aircraft after altitude assembly, flying in formation, at given settings, directly into enemy territory, and withdrawing
penetration which the commander can expect from his aircraft and crews
under those specific conditions.
3.
CAPABILITIES
OF TH
FF0RCES
I Lr
profitable dividends.
This was particularly
true because of the limited opportunity for
additional training in the theater.
Virtually
all suitable weather was used to fly operational
missions.
There was less opportunity to check
performance on combat missions than in training
practice.
The Crew
The Bomber Formations
The performance of a bomber crew depends
largely on the amount of training received, and
the amount of training possible in war time is
The goal is not
limited by many factors.
theoretical perfection, but rather adequacy to
defeat the enemy.
A summary of training, based on experience
in the European Theater may have some value.
Pilots received the most adequate training
of the officer crew members. A higher degree
of competence and experience instilled into
navigators and bombardiers before they arrived
in the Theater of Operati ons might Pave paid
To oppose German fighter defenses effectively during daylight penetrations over the
continent, large bomber formations were tactically necessary for the massing of defensive
fire against concentrated fighter attacks, and
to increase the capabilities of our escort
fighters.
Certain disadvantages, however, had to be
For instance, on direct penetrations
accepted.
during the decisive phase of the air war it
tpok two-and-one-half hours to assemble a
This, as
forhation and reach enemy territory.
mentioned in the previous section, gave tie
nd..
enemy early warning of an ie
At
impend
92
ON PAGE 91)
Chart A.
In this chart, certain bomber losses which were large, for that
period of the war, are compared to the average bomber losses for the
The average was obtained by taking the total number of bombers
month.
for
the month and dividing by the number of days on which missions
lost
Losses were those reported plus Category E damage.
were flown.
October 1943, was the month of largest average loss by the Eighth
An average of 25 bombers per mission was lost. Immediately
Air Force.
thereafter average losses drop and fluctuate between 10 and 20 bombers
per mission, for the rest of the war.
In October 1943 the period of deep
Two facts are noteworthy:
penetration far beyond the range of escort ended. For a short time,
By January 1944, long-range
penetrations were considerably reduced.
In February
escort' fighters began to be available in increasing volume.
flown with part of
time, deep penetrations could
1944, for the first
the escort force accomnoanying the bombers during the entire route.
te
The largest loss for any single mission was on 6 March, 1944 when
72 bombers were lost during an attack on Berlin. But the bomber force
had grown to such proportions that, despite 23 missions flown during
March 1944, the average loss per mission was only 15 bombers.
Chart B.
Here, data presented on the previous chart are related to the size
To illustrate, on 14 October 1943, when
of the attacking bomber force.
66 bombers were lost, this number represented 2S percent of the aircraft
Similarly, an average of 2S bombers
bombing at Schweinfurt on that day.
was lost per mission, during October 1943, and this represented just
over 10 percent of the average number of bombers attacking targets each
mission during that month.
This tells
the story of the Air War with Germany in terms of perIn 1943, when the Eighth Air Force's force of bombers
centage losses.
was small and escort short range, the enemy could inflict losses of
around Th percent of the number of our aircraft actually bombing targets.
In the 6 months ending with April 1944, he could inflict average losses
This drop was
per mission of around 4 percent of the force bombing.
actual
growth
of
our bomber force,
of
long
range
escort,
caused by advant
It was
and great relative growth compared to enemy fighter onposition.
accomplished in spite of the fact that the number of days of operation
had been stepped up from about 8 per month to over 20 per month in
March and April, 1944.
For
mis
in
93
3.
94
CAPABILITIES
OF
THE AIR
Bombing Ran ge
The demonstrated range of our bomber
forces varied in the different phases of the
war, (for a detailed discussion see Section 4
of this chapter).
From August to December 1942,
the Eighth Air Force was limited to very shallow
attacks up to 50 miles beyond the enemy coast
line.
On 12 December 1942, an attack was made
on Romilly, .thereby effecting a penetration of
130 miles into enemy territory.
This did not
represent addition of new equinpment but resulted
in part from increased size of the bomber force.
Until 24 April 1943, this penetration was not
exceeded.
On 25 April 1943, an attack was made at
Rostock indicating that the Eighth Air Force
had extended its old capability.
On 17 August 1943, the Eighth Air Force
made attacks on Regensburg and Schweinfurt. The
force sent to Regensburg, equipped with Tokyo
tanks, returned, not to England, but to Africa.
This force demonstrated the capability, through
use of such tanks, of attacking anything in
Western Germany and all of France and Italy.
The force penetrating to Schweinfurt consisted
of B-17s with standard tanks.
It returned to
England.
This force demonstrated the capability of penetrating some 320 miles into enemy
territory and returning to the United Kingdom.
This was not exceeded until 20 February 1944.
However, this first
attack on Schweinfurt, and
a later attack on 14 October 1943, both resulted
in such severe bomber losses that the Eighth's
bomber force clearly could not carry on sustained operations of this nature.
After both
missions, a period of repair and recuperation
was necessary before attempting another large
scale attack.
On 20 February 1944, Eighth Air Force
bomber formations, accompanied by long-range
escort, penetrated to Leipzig.
Then on 19
March 1944, bombers with escort attacked
Munich, demonstrating a new range capability of
450 miles penetration into enemy territory.
This was not exceeded until June 1944.
On 21 June 1944, while several Task Forces
flew against oil targets near Leipzig, one of
northgD4(
W.i.
.r
'-.,
,;:
I~t~%~;
AY IJUN JUL IA
1942
1943
Chart A.
1944
Chart B.
This shows
basis.
1944
1945
Early growth of our fighter force was limited to one type, P-47s,
which at that time were of limited range.
In January, 1944, P-38s began to make their appearance, and in
of the P-51 for the reThe special utility
February, P-51s appeared.
quirements of this theater, caused it to be preferred for most duties to
Similarly, there were certain deficiencies in the
the other two types.
P-38 for the specialized uses in the air war in this theater which caused
its use to be discontinued.
Toward the end of the war in Europe, the P-47 had been improved to
the point where it could make sweeps across enemy territory, even flying
formnnidable firepower, rugged construction,
beyond Berlin.
Because of its
and the persistent functioning of its air-cooled radial engine, even
after much damage by enemy fire, the P-47 was never eliminated but continued to give excellent results in skilled hands to the end of the war.
(Note:
P-38s had been delivered to the Eighth Air Force in 1942 in small
numbers, but they were then withdrawn for use in the African campaign before they could be used for escort in the European Theater
of Operations).
3.
OF THE A
R
I~~SES
(e)
(f)
(g)
(a)
(a)
(b)
CAPABILITIES
(c)
(d)
There are four main classes of enemy fighters to be considered; single-engine fighters,
twin-engine fighters, jet and rocket powered
aircraft.
Single-Engine Aircraft:
(get
production
models for immediate war use despite many imThe Me-262 had high speed, well
perfections.
beyond the speed range of our fighters, and
Its
its endurance was at least 2 hours.
speed, and
maneuverability was good for its
its firepower, consisting largely of 30 mm.
cannon, was lethal against our bombers but was
not a match for our .50 calibre machine guns,
in fighter against fighter combats,
Our weapons had higher muzzel velocity, rate of fire,
The 30 mm. cannon
and volume of ammunition.
was designed primarily to attack bombers.
(CONTINUED ON PAGE
96
98)
Chart A.P-7EcrRaes
In May 1943, P-47s began to join the Spitfires in escorting Eighth
Bomber Command's missions. At the start, their range was about as restricted as the Spitfire. A distance of around 175 miles from Newmarket
or Salisbury and return, was about their maximum range.
During the months of May and June, our fighter pilots gained experience, and modifications to equipment now gave them additional confidence in their aircraft. During June 1943, the radius of action of the
P-47 was expanded to 230 miles from the base area.
The first practical drop tanks of 75 gallons fuel capacity were
added in July 1943. The radius of action now was extended to 540 miles
from bases. The tactical surprise gained by the increased range was used
to good advantage, enemy aircraft were shot down in larger numbers on the
first two days it was demonstrated.
In August 1943, 108 gallon belly tanks extended the radius of action
to 375 miles from bases.
February 1944 saw the 150 allon belly tank in action again extending the radius of the P-47 to 425 miles. In the same month, earlier experiments came to fruition: two 150 gallon tanks were mounted on the
wings of the P-47, giving them their ultimate escort radius of 475 miles.
P-47s equipped with wing tanks could fly much further than the
ranges given above when not on escort duty. During sweeps, they ranged
even beyond Berlin.
Chart B.
Escort ranges given for our three types of fighters are believed
to be fair comparisons).
UNCIASSIFED
3.
By the beginning of 1944 the policy adopted by the German Air Force High Command was to
direct fighters at Eighth Air Force bombers and
avoid or evade the escort.
Later, near the end
of the war, German fighters assigned to intercept bombers received fighter escort, designed
to engage our fighters while the bombers were
under attack.
With this objective - bomber
CAPABILITIES
to machine gun fire from enemy fighters increased about 300 percent in just two years.
4%YORC
OF
1942_ 193j
"A" (Elementary Fly-
100
70
52
Fighter School
60
G60
40
Operational Training
Pool
16-18
20
Total Hours:
210
136-138 112
(2) In the early part of 1944, a conversion to fighter pilots of bomber pilots, staff
pilots, and instructors from schools, was
commenced. This conversion course was compressed into approximately one month of training, at the end of which the pilot reported to
an operational fighter unit.
A flow of "trained" pilots to operational
units was maintained sufficient to keep the
supply of pilots for aircraft in balance.
However, the quality of the pilots became progressively worse.
This progressive deterioration may be explained by (a) the shortening of
the training program and (b) the use of men who
originally had been considered more suitable
for operations in types of aircraft other than
fighters.
In addition the following factors also had
the effect of lowering operational efficiency
of fighter unite:
(I)
The German High Command did not stick
to a consistent policy of operations for its
fighters.
Early in 1942 the German fighter
pilot frequently was in air combat against
Allied fighters.
When the threat of attack by
heavy bombers became acute, for a time all
training and other efforts were directed toward
developing the best method of attacking bombers.
German pilots were ordered to pay no attention
to Allied fighters, but to attack four-engine
"heavies" and in some cases the mediums. Later
many fighter pilots were assigned to ground
support missions. German pilots soon lost the
art of "dogfighting", and became no match for
the Allied pilots who continually perfected
their individual fighter versus fighter tactics.
From time to time German fighters were detailed
to attack the escorting fighters. When they
did so, their lack of training for this job
became more evident.
194
UNCLSSiRlED
Chart A.
Chart B.
The rise in the number of bombers destroyed per hundred combats was
due to the increasing destructive power of the individual enemy fighter.
This destructive power resulted in part, from better enemy tactics, and
in part from increased weight of armament of enemy fighters, (as describ-
Eighth Air Force's bomber force was relatively slow, and the German Fighter Force was expanding rapidly.
force in the Fall of 1943, and after the beginning of attacks on enemy
aircraft plants, the enemy rapidly lost out in the race for air supremacy.
The steep drop in the percentage of bombers which were only hit by enemy
fighters shows how rapidly they lost the power of anything like
opposition to our bombing.
44
The rise in the number of cannon hits per 100 machine gun hits
indicated that the enemy fighter force resorted to heavier and heavier
armament in an attempt to halt the Eighth Air Force bombing attacks.
It is apparent that the number of bombers known to have been lost
to enemy aircraft attack has some relationship to the percentage of
carnon strikes on the bombers per 100 machine gun hits. That is to say,
the enemy's policy of increasing the weight of his armament did result
in destruction of a larger number of bo:ubers. But, as pointed out in
Chapter 5, Section 3, this increase of armament in combination with
several other factors, caused German Air Force fighters to become inferior in fighter against fighter combats.
Note: That the time-periods chosen in the chart were of varying
The rate of change in armaments and losses therefore,
lengths.
shown
in this chart.
is not
IR NCLASSIFIED
I
3..
(2) Lack of gasoline was a factor affecting the efficiency of the German Fighter Force.
Fuel allotments for training schools continually
were cut to supply first line units. Pilots
posted to operational units often were prohibited from using gasoline for further training.
(3)
Loss of experienced leaders was also
The change in the age
an important factor.
level of pilots in 1941-1 9 42 points to the fact
that experienced leadership largely had been
killed off. Effort was made to train new unit
leaders in a course covering four to six weeks.
The fact that none of these reached the prominence of Galland, Molders, Matoni and others,
is an indication that such training was not
adequate.
(d)
;ar
on 17 August 1942.
All during this period, bombers of the
Royal Air Force had been making attacks on
German held territory and shipping.
When the Eighth Air Force began its bombing of targets in Occupied France, the German
fighter pilot was a skilled and experienced
fighter.
Units like the "Abbeville Kids" will
long be remembered as daring and aggressive
opponents.
But the tactical skill of German
commanders did not match up with the abilities
of their pilots.
Attacks were made initially
by small units when and where they could make
interceotion.
It took many months of air
opposition to the Eighth's invasions before
the German Air Force indicated a trend to concentrated attacks on single units of our force.
(e)
the
100
3L,
G.A.F.
3000
QN
Chart A.
T E WESTERN FRONT
i=:l S/E
NIGHT FIGHTERS
."' **.
.. :
'
1ooo
::
:1
;'..
..
;.:
:....*...
.::
., .*
::,.*
.. "#.
, ...
J J AS O N D J F MA M J J AS O
I
"
D J F MAM
ON
1942
..
".:O
-'
:
".,:( :.
*1943.
.1:
..*
...
4: Y#
.*Enemy
**.*
e
a
qen
STRENGTH
.anticipated
1943
....
J FM
1944
TION OF FIGHTERS
,U
PRDU
,,..;
Figures also are shown which were quoted in a letter from Speer,
Reichsminister for Production, to Reichsfuhrer Hitler. Until corroboratory evidence becomes available, these figures must be suspected of
p*
padding.
*:.
1000
s
A SON
'
i.;i
4.a....
D J FM AM J JASON
1942
't.".D
...
.,,
Planned Production. There were many German plans for fighter production during the war, but one regarded by captured German experts as
."
%;
...
.,
D J F MA M J JASON
1943
....,*, 'Y
..
S4'
..
DJ F MA
1944
1945
E/A
QST
OYED IN COMBAT
Bomber Claims:
BY FI HTERS
B-4MBERSl
**SBY
RE-E
ALUATE SOMBER
RECL--ALUAMS
(TED
BOMBNTATIVE)
CLMS (TENTATIVE)
1000
-*.t,
J M
JJASONDJ FMA
:F
1942
'
.4
2000 -.
.*,
rate
G.A.F.
(2)
1945
Chart B.
PR
Strength
1943
1944 "
:...
:;,
1945
UNLJ
3.
had the
benefit
echelons.
This
passed over land lines also, but a very considerable part of it was passed by radio to the
senior control.
In many cases it was consolidated and passed out again by radio as a "Running
Commentary", to keep the fighters and all ground
echelons informed of the progress of the operation.
As additional aid, to early evaluation,
the German senior controller developed the use
of spotter and observer aircraft, the sole
function of which was to obtain visual contact
with the Allied force and report by radio all
pertinent data about it.
Other factors which
undoubtedly were of great assistance to timely
interpretation of our operations were knowledge
of weather over Germany, which allowed the
German controller to limit the places to which
the operation might go, the known target
priorities
of the Eighth Air Force and knowledge of usual approach and withdrawal routes.
With all this information and an added
"feel" based on experience, the German Senior
Controller made and executed his plans.
Over
the entire course of the air war, the effective range of the Eighth's fighter escort had a
powerful influence on these defensive plans.
Prior to mid-February 1944, when P-51s became
operational, the main effort of German singleengine aircraft in the area west of the German
border was to turn back escorting fighters, so
that from the German border on to the target,
the main defenses could go into operation.
These defenses consisted of single-engine aircraft, as well as twin-engine day and night
fighters.
Emphasis clearly was on defense of
the approaches to Central Germany, as opposed
to defense of occupied territory.
There was
no great need for the twin-engine fighters to
assemble with the single-engine fighters because the Eighth's escort which would have been
lethal against the "twins" turned back at the
German border.
However, there was substantial
need for single-engine coastal aircraft to
assemble.
To accomplish this coastal assembly
a single coastal control frecuently assembled,
vectored and controlled a number of aircraft
from different sectors of Jafues.
To do this
a single radio frequency for all German singleengine fighters came into use.
This resulted
in substantial increase in flexibility of control of these coastal based fighters and ranid
reinforcement of one area by another.
102
'Sut"
CAPABILITIES
OF
THE
AIR FORCES
(CONTINUED ON PAGE
o04)
No. of
Aircraft
2000
No.of
Aircraft
1200
1000
II
17/8142
1/12/42
Chart A.
24/7/43
19/2/44
I
20/6/44
Single-Engine Fighters.
Average numbers and percentages during each of the five phases in
) are shown above.
the air war (see Chapter V, Section 4
The importance placed on the air war in the West by the German High
Command is noteworthy. Both numbers of aircraft, and percentage of the
total available single-engine fighter force, on the Westerk Front increased steadily to oppose the Eighth Air Force, and later, the Invasion.
UILASSIFIE
8/5/45 1742
I , 42
24/7/43
Chart B.
19/2/44
20/6/44
8/545
103
3.
orovides
the
104
CAPABILITIES
Western
split
Chart A.
Chart B
AFw
ajrTages
All major targets plotted on this map, were targets of the Eighth
Air Force with the exception of the area around Vienna.
This shows clearly that the industrial heart of Germany is centered
around Leipzig, the focus cf our attacks in the fourth phase, which
began in February 1944.
UNCA SSIFIED
105
4. STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PH
?17AUGUST 1942 THROUGH II DE
106
FIRST PHASE
Chart A.
resulting
Chart B.
17 Aug.1942 - II Dec.1 9 4 2
First Phase
The range capability which bombers of the Eighth Air Force demonstrated to the enemy during this nhase of the Air War, is shown as a
black line roughly paralleling the coast of France. The major targets
attacked are shown as red dots. Thus, the area.s of our attacks were
generally, the Pas de Calais; the Atlantic Coast of France from Brest
southward; and the vicinity of Rotterdam, Holland.
The depth of penetration was limited, not by range of the bombers,
This was a period of
but by the limited endurance of escort fighters.
trying out equipment, developing techniques, and gaining battle
experience.
4. STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PHASE I.
DECEMBER 1942
17 AUGUST 1942 THROUGH
11
<p/V
108
Chart A.
Penetration. The main attack of 10S Eighth Air Force bombers with
10 squadrons of Spitfire escort was made with a straight route from
Orfordness to the target, preceded by a fighter sweep by 94 Spitfires
over the Pas de Calais. A fixing attack was carried out by 7 B-17s with
Spitfire escort toward Abbeville, and a Spitfire sweep toward the Dutch
Islands was intended to divert other enemy fighters.
Chart B.
Withdrawal.
The enemy fighter attack on the main bomber force grew
in intensity toward the target. 66 B-17Ts bombed the Lille marshalling
yards and steel plants under visual bombing conditions, and with.fair to
poor results. Four bombers were lost, 40 damaged, and one escort fighter
was shot down.
Our fixing attack at Abbeville,
Twenty plus
enemy fighters came up, but no encounters ensued. As our main force of
bombers crossed over St. Omer on the way to the target, attacks by 0SO
plus enemy single-engine fighters began.
5.
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PHASE
tI
Gene'ral Description:
This period opened
with the first
Eighth Air Force attack on the
Romilly airfield and storage depot on 12 December 1942 and ended when an attack on Rostock,
on 25 July 1943, began a new phase.
It represented an extension of the Eighth Air Force's
demonstrated depth of penetration to approximate
ly 160 miles of enemy territory as compared to
approximately 50 miles in the first
period.
This addition was the result of the increased
size of the bomber force and of the formations
flown which gave some improvement in defensive
fire.
There was no increase in escort range,
armament or any other defensive factor.
Enemy
disposition had changed little
by the beginning
of the period but by the period's end in July
1943, there had been a considerable build-up
chiefly in Holland and Northwest Germany of
110
(CONTINUED O PAGE
112)
UNCLASSIE
SECOND PHASE
Chart A.
page 119.
Chart B.
12 Dec.1942
24 July 1943
Second Phase
Major target areas of the Eighth Air Force were now Northwest
Germany around Bremen and Kiel; the Atlantic Coast of France from Brest
southward; and the Seine River area up to Paris.
Approximately half of the penetrations still were into the first
area of demonstrated penetration. The chief new areas under attack
were: the submarine facilities on the Northwest German Coast; the
vicinity of Antwerp; and Paris.
Di
~it>~tit
process
,,l
"
.;
'"
M.A -
w ig,
aSofI'L
112
114)
Chart A.
Penetration. On 13 June 1943, two forces of bombers were dispatched over the North Sea to attack targets in Northwest Germany.
76 bombers of the 4th Bomb Wing were dispatched to attack the U-boat
construction yards at Kiel.
152 bombers of the slet Bomb Wing were dispatched to attack similar targets at Bremen.
Cloud and visibility
conditions were excellent at both targets. No escort could be provided
as yet for such a distance.
It was anticipated that enemy interception capabilities at Bremen
could be very severe. In an effort to assist the bombers going to
Bremen, the escort flew a half hour to the rear of the Kiel force.
As the Kiel formation passed over the Danish coast, it was attacked
by an interception force of 110 or more single-engine enemy fighters.
Attacks were made in formations of from 2 to 6 in line. The enemy
concentrated on the leading groups of bombers.
His fighters came in
from all angles and took advantage of the sun and clouds to obtain
surprise. Attacks chiefly were aimed at the nose of the bombers.
Some twin-engine enemy fighters remained out of range firing
cannon shells into our formations. There were at least two air-to-air
bombings by enemy fighters, one of which destroyed a bomber.
The Bremen force was shielded on the wda to th
position behind the Kiel raiders. No enemy attacks i,
bombers reached their target.
Chart B.
Withdrawal. Severe attacks on the Kiel force continued until it
withdrew over the Danish coast.
The bombers attacking Bremen meanwhile were under light attack by
a mixed force of single- and twin-engine fighters which followed the
bombers for some distance out to sea. The Bremen raiders withdrew well
to the North.
The force which bombed Kiel withdrew to the South and East of the
Bremen force.
Single-engine enemy fighters based in Holland now flew
far out over the North Sea to attack the Kiel force.
Combats continued
virtually to the English coast.
The Kiel raiders lost 22 out of 76 bombers or 34 percent.
This was
far the greatest percentage loss to date.
The Bremen force lost 4, for
a total loss of 26. Enemy fighters accounted for 21 bombers, flak for
2, and 3 bombers were lost to other causes.
Claims of enemy fighters destroyed, probably destroyed, and damaged
were 39-5-14 by the Kiel force, and 2-2-1 by the Bremen force.
Bombing at Kiel was hampered seriously by the severity of the
enemy attack.
At Bremen, an effective smoke screen lowered effectiveness of the bombing.
NC4 LSSIFIEO,
up
114
triis
Chart A.
Penetration. On 22 June, 1943, 257 B-17s of the 1st and 4th Bomb
Wings, were dispatched to attack the synthetic rubber factory at Huls.
Fighter support could be provided for withdrawal only, and therefore
various other measures were taken to divert enemy fighters. A fixing
attack was planned against the Ford Motor plant at Antwerp by 42 bombers
of the 1st Bomb WVing, with 8 squadrons of P-47s for escort. Twelve
Mitchells with Spitfire escort were to bomb Rotterdam, and a diversion
was to be flown by one group of B-17s over the North Sea.
Enemy fighters expected to oppose these attacks consisted of 110
single-engine fighters based in Holland and 130 single-engine fightrs in
the Pas de Calais area. Some twin-erngine fighters could be expected.
As the main force flew southeastward over the Dutch Islands toward
Huls, the Eitchells struck at Rotterdam and the B-17s at Antwerp. Some
20 interceptors were vectored toward the Mitchells but no contact was
made.
The same fighters then attempted interception of the Antwerp
bombers, but were forced to land through shortage of fuel.
Some 70 single-engire and 8 twin-engine fighters attacked the Antwerp force which did not effect rendezvous with the P-47s until Antwerp
had been passed.
Meanwhile, the main bomber force was attacked upon crossing the
enemy coast. GO60
or more single-engine fighters engaged part way to the
target. An additional 30 attacked the leading bombers just before they
reached Huls
Chart B.
Withdrawal. After bombing, the main force experienced attacks all
the way to the coast on withdrawal. Fighters from the Pas de Calais,
some on second sortie, attacked the 1st Bomb Wing which was about 2 miles
ahead of the 4th Bomb Wing. As the coast was neared, 23 squadrons of
Spitfires and 3 squadrons of Typhoons joined the bombers as escort.
Attacks decreased sharply thereafter and ended at the coast.
Bombing results by 170 bombers attacking at Huls were good, 39
attacking at Antwerp gave fair bombing results. The bombers claimed
enemy fighters as destroyed, probably destroyed, or damaged to the extent.
of 47-23-44. Escorting fighters claimed 2 probable and 1 damaged.
Our bomber losses totalled 20, 14 to enemy fighters, 5 to flak, and
1 to cause unknown. One escort fighter was lost.
and
rfl
41?)
sbr
116
Chart A.
Penetration.
Chart B.
104 bombers of the 1st Bomb Wing (120 dispatched) had a route to the
target across Brittany,
ed) flew far out into the Atlantic around Brest Peninsula to attack from
the direction of the sea. These 4th Wing bombers were using the longrange wing tanks (Tokyo tanks) for the first time. Both forces made
feints toward Lorient to confuse the enemy regarding the target to be
attacked. The 1st Wing was escorted about 40 miles beyond the coast of
Brittany by 83 Squadrons of P-47s.
Meanwhile 50 3-17s of the 1st Wing made a feint toward Amiens,
south of the Pas de Calais, with the intention of arousing enemy fighters
in the Beaumont area and preventing them from flying southwestward to
reinforce fighters defending against our main attacks at St. Nasaire.
After the feint, these 50 B-17s circled back to the English coast and
then bore directly down toward the airfield at Beaumont-le-Roger. Snemy
fighters in the Pas de Calais area were air-alerted by the feint but,
in general, turned back to their bases as the bombers turned away from
the French coast back toward Ingland. About 20 enemy fighters left
Beaumont-le-Roger flying toward St. Nazaire.
The 1st Bomb Wing was not attacked while crossing Brittany under
escort, but as the escort turned back, the bombers were engaged by somn
50 enemy fighters from Brest Peninsula which were later reinforced by
the 20 from Beaumont.
Withdrawal.
The 4th Bomb Wing, coming in from the sea to attack and withdrawing
out to sea, was virtually unnoticed by the enemy.
As the two Wings withdrew, the let Bomb Wing flying the course
nearest the Continent was attacked by about 30 enemy fighters far out
to sea. These attacks continued half way to Lands End. The enemy
fighters probably were on second sortie.
The attack on Beaumont successfully prevented most of the enemy
fighters in that area from reinforcing the defenders at St. Nazaire,
The enemy in the Pas de Calais area and around Beaumont had been "put
off balance" to the extent that only 40 of his fighters made interception. Most of these were handled by the escort.
U~bh~j~iw
..
L'v
F'
6. STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PHASE 3.
25 JULY 1943 THROUGH 19 FEBRUARY 1944
General Description:
On 25 July 1943, an
attack was made by Eighth Air Force heavy bombers on a target at Rostock in North Germany,
thus initiating a new phase in the depth of
penetrations to which the Eighth was prepared
This phase ended when the
to extend operations.
attacks of 20 February 1944, on targets near
Leipzig, began the fourth phase.
The limits of the penetrations for this
third phase weredemonstrated on the 17 August
1943, when one force, equipped with Tokyo tanks,
thrust deep into Germany to attack the Messerschmidt Aircraft Plant at Regensburg, and withdrew southward over the Alps to North Africa. A
few hours later a second force of B-17s with
standard tanks, flew to Schweinfurt to attack
the ball bearing plant there and then withdrew
force demonThe first
westward to England.
strated a capability of attacking anything in
114!'.
118
A * :
was composed of four flat elements of three aircraft, the elements stacked as a lead, high, low
and a low-low.
Combat Wings now lost much of their
identity as units. In such a formation there
was a four mile interval between the lead and
number one group, and another four mile interval
between the number one and number two groups.
The two groups following after the lead were
staggered slightly to opposite sides of the line
of flight.
an interval
The Combat Wing following left
The lead group of the next
of four miles.
of the lead group
Combat Wing flew in the trail
of the previous Combat Wing.
The Group formation presented a compact
defensive fire for the defense of its 36 air-
- Legend -
/E Day
25July,1943 - 19 Feb.,1944
THIRD PHASE
Chart A.
Chart B.
Third Phase
The previously demonstrated range of the Eighth Air Force was exThe maximum depth of
ceeded 25 July 19+3 in the attack on Rostock.
this phase was reached
for
to
England
withdrawal
and
direct penetration
the same day, another
On
1943.
August
17
in the attack on 5chweinfurt,
Southwest Germany at
in
deep
attacked
tanks,
force, equipped with Tokyo
this force back
in
getting
delay
The
Regensburg and withdrew to Africa.
This renge was not exto England prevented repetition of this route.
ceeded until 20 February 1944.
The major target areas now were (1) Northwest German ports; (2) the
of Hamm and Munster, North of the Ruhr; (3) Hanover-Brunswick;
4) Frankfurt-Schweinfurt; and (5) Paris.
iicinity
uNC L A,
I
Lw)'
+ +
UR
'ui,i" :
T:
:-.-
6.
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PHASE 3.
25 JULY 1943 THROUGH 19 FEBRUARY 1944
craft.
Limiting this unit to 36 instead of 54
aircraft added considerably to flexibility.
Escort Tactics during this Period: The
processes of "opening out" the fighter formation continued throughout this period.
Late in
July 1943, the first belly-tanks became available for the P-47s, and made possible some
tactical surprises. The enemy had been in the
habit of forming up just beyond range of escort
with his twin-engined fighters. On several
occasions following the sudden addition to
range, Eighth Air Force fighters were able to
fly straight into an enemy formation, score
many victories and thereby disrupt the attack
on our bombers.
iBy September 1943, the Eighth Air Force
fighters began to get useful aid from the
British "Y" Service.
Trained radio operators
Vo'Y. 2
120
'.
194
Chart A.
Penetration.
Chart B.
North over the Danish Peninsula to attack distant aircraft and naval
targets in East Prussia and Poland at Marienburg, Danzig and Gdynia.
Such range was possible because of the low altitude and route assembly
which gained perhaps two hours of flying time compared to direct peneTwo other combat wings, flying on a route somewhat to the
trations.
South were to bomb the Focke Wulf aircraft plant at Anklam, and withdraw on a reciprocal route. By engaging much of the enemy the Anklam
attackers would aid both penetration and withdrawal of the forces going
deeper. Escort could not be provided except for part of the withdrawal
over the North Sea. Enemy disposition included 135 single-engine day
fighters in Northwest Germany and Denmark with an additional 135 in
Holland as potential reinforcement. 240 single-engine night fighters
-~
80 twin-engine day
As the first bombers started out over the North Sea, the enemy,
confused by our "carpet" radar countermeasures, sent out scouting forces
to report on the bombers. None of these made contact. Our first force
Again near Anklam singlewas engaged by local defenders over Denmark.
engine and twin-engine fighters attacked. Many enemy fighters, disposed
in Northwest Germany, started Northward but failed to "folio through"
at Danzig,
burg.
6.
111'
122
Chart A.
o Muste,
Char BeMisson
274 B-17s of the lst and 3rd Divisions were dispatched on a direct
route to bomb the railway and waterway junctions at Munster. They were
escorted to a new depth of penetration by P-47s. The 3rd Division, in
the lead, was out of escort for about 30 minutes, during which time concentrated enemy attacks destroyed 29 bombers. The 1st Division, following closely, was escorted for the entire route, having one group of P-47s
with it in the target area. The escorted force was largely avoided by
the enemy, which destroyed only one bomber.
Enemy fighters were disposed 135 single-engine in Holland, 100
single-engine and 80 twin-engine in Northwest Germany. A further dis-
force.
After bombing,
10Octber1943.
The lst Division proceeded to the target with few enemy attacks
en route.
123
6. STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PHASE 3.
25 JULY 1943 THROUGH 19 FEBRUARY 1944
.1
V
124
'1
~Z'A
'
&
10
Chart A.
Chart B.
Withdrawal.
The enemy now had airborne some 200 single-engine
and about 120 twin-engine fighters, 50 of which were rocket-firing.
The weight of the attack became very severe as the bombers turned nearly
270 degrees to the right for withdrawal. Most of the 60 bombers lost
were shot down during this turn.
As the two Divisions began to withdraw westward, they ran into bad
weather.
The combination of
aircraft, which intended to intercept soon after the target, were not
able to make contact.
Few bombers were lost to attacks during the withdrawal.
The bombing at Schweinfurt had been good in spite of vicious
mall
UNCLASI3FIED
7. STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PHASE 4.
20 FEBRUARY 1944 THROUGH 20 JUNE 1944
spread out 25 to 30 miles in width and frequently a squadron or a group was sent to sweep the
route directly ahead of the bomber formation,
Increasing use was made of groups on a
"free sweep". They would fly deep into enemy
territory toward an area of expected enemy
assembly, there break down into flights and
"throw out a net" to enmesh the enemy fighters.
Eighth Air Force fighter pilots were becoming
increasingly aggressive.
Frequently, a flight
of four would charge into an assembly of 50 to
100 of the enemy, break up this formation and
destroy a considerable number for little or no
loss.
Sometimes the enemy would not come up to
fight.
Then our sweeping fighters would go
"down to the deck", strafe airfields,.flak
towers, railroad trains and other suitable
railitary targets.
Escort Tactics:
A new factor of the utmost
importance now had entered the air war, the long
rnge escort fighter began to appear in increasing numbers.
Instead of evading the enemy, the
aim now was to provoke attack and to force enemy
fighters into combat which the Eighth Air Force
could stand but which the Luftwaffe could not.
The escorting fighter groups continued to
126
20 Feb .1944
FOURTH PHASE
Chart A.
Chart B.
and
20 June,1944
Fourth Phase
IUNCLASSIFIED
7. STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PHASE 4.
20 FEBRUARY 1944 THROUGH 20 JUNE 1944
succeeding waves of fighters flying lineabreast were exceedingly lethal to any bomber
unit which had become too widely separated from
its fighter escort.
During the
"'-"-
128
UNCLASSE
Chart A.
Penetration.
enemy's deep targets with a Northern bombing force, get his defenses off
balance, and then thrust straight into the vital area around Leipzig,
where the enemy's disposition was designed to defend with maximum power.
The possibility of serious loss was great unless the enemy defenses were
disrupted.
German controllers saw our first Task Force (314 B-17s) swing out
over the North Sea toward Denmark. Recognizing this as a potential
threat to Berlin, the enemy dispatched 50 twin-engine and 30 singleengine fighters towards the Kiel Canal. Actually its targets were in
Poland.
O80
minutes behind our first force, German controllers detected a
second force coming straight for Holland. German observation posts soon
afterwards warned that this force constituted a huge attack. Though by
now the fighters sent toward Kiel had crossed the Danish border, they
were recalled.
The first Task Force crossed Denmark under the attack of local det'enders and flew out over the Baltic to find such bad weather that its
attack was cancelled.
Our main attack, to Leipzig and vicinity was intercepted by some
60 single-engine and 30 twin-engine fighters which were engaged by our
escort. One group of P-38s flying eastward to rendezvous with the bombers soundly defeated 40 or more single-engine enemy fighter reinforcements.
7. STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-PHASE 4
20 FEBRUARY 1944 THROUGH 20 JUNE 1944
weather
r4
Ilk
%1
f
130
Eighth
(CONTINUtIED
ON
PAGE 131)
7. STRATEGIC OPERATIONS-P
20 FEBRUARYI1944 THROUGH
4y
il Ell
O
fi7
L
aid
Destroyed Damaged
91
6
3
11
134
3
29 (16
on fire)
Railroad Station
Roundhouse
Switch Tower
Signal House
1
1
1
24
Tug
Canal Locks
13
1
1
I
1
15
2
I
2
-w
The success of the landings could be assured if the German forces defending the beach area
could be prevented from bringing up from other
areas troop reinforcements, adequate supplies,
and most important, fighter aircraft.
Allied
tactical air forces were operating in the immediate vicinity of the ground battle.
The fighter
force of the Eighth'received the task of extending beyond the tactical zone the area of interdiction of the German Air Force, ground reinforcements, and supplies.
18
Miscellaneous Targets
Small Oil Refinery
Oil Tank
Staff Car
High Tension Towers
Power Station
Redar Stations
Radar Towers
Radio Station
Radio Tower
Flak Towers & Installations
1
5
In addition, there is a long list of damaged targets, including searchlights, gun posts,
amunition depots, hangars, water towers,
factories, warehouses, barracks, an ore smelter,
and miscellaneous buildings.
Ninth Air Force and the Royal Air Force
had additional impressive claims to those of
the Eighth Air Force, enumerated above.
Besides causing a serious disruption of
eneany transportation, this fighter mission must
have brought the war "home" to more than half
of the population of Germany.
F
h
"w rj
j nrr
131
Chart A.
Early Penetration. Clear weather, forecast for Central Germany enabled the Eighth Air Force to initiate attacks on synthetic oil production. To double the effect of the attack, counter-air fighter sweeps
were worked into the plan.
Around 700 single-engine and twin-engine enemy fighters were based
within interception distance of routes toward Leipzig. It was decided
that a route to Frankfurt and thence towards Leipzig would bring up the
bulk of the enemy's serviceable fighters to concentrate near Frankfurt.
Our forces consisted of 15 Combat Wings (886 heavy bombers) flying
as three Air Divisions, escorted by 17 Groups of fighters (5 Groups from
Four
Ninth Air Force), and supported by 4 fighter Groups on sweeps.
greatest
the
this
making
in
joined
squadrons
Mustang
Force
Air
Royal
number in a fighter escort force to date (total - 987 fighters).
As the bombers crossed the Belgium coast, some 350 enemy fighters
were flying towards the Frankfurt area for a massive concentration. Two
P-47 groups, well in advance of the bombers, made for this area. The
first group, as it reached the area, split into small units and spread
widely to harass the enemy's converging units. Our second fighter group
remained in formation so as to be ready to make a large-scale attack on
any enemy concentration reported.
132
Chart B.
Continued Penetration. Our first sweeping fighter group, spread
out into the so-called "Zemke Fan" formation, engaged many units of the
enemy, and together with our second sweeping group, routed 175 of the
enemy fighters. The whole process of the enemy's assembly was delayed
and about 75 enemy fighters were effectively removed from further battle.
The 3rd Air Division, in the lead, crossed the Rhine under escort
by only one fighter group, the other group assigned having rendezvoused
with other bombers. At this point, 130 single-engine enemy fighters
attacked, overwhelming our escort and scoring heavily against the bombers.
A second escort group arrived and joined the fight, but it was not until
a third fighter group joined in that equilibrium was established, and the
pressure was taken off the bombers.
UNCLASSIIIED
Chart C.
Chart D.
Withdrawal.
Shortly after our bombing some 40 enemy single-engine
fighters attempted interception of the 1st and 2nd Divisions but were
well engaged by our escort.
results.
The 2nd Air Division bombed synthetic oil plants at Bohlen and
Zeitz, both with excellent results.
8.
it~
.k tf } l i
kA
41
jf"
1i i'F
<V
134
...
-
FIFTH PHASE
Chart A.
1944
Chart B.
Fifth Phase.
Unable to provide for all thesevital needs, the High Command redisposed the fighter force, first one way and then another, vitiating
muc of its defensive power.
135
AA
Chart A.
had only one scuadron of escort fighters. These enemy fighters were
highly skilled. They attacked in a new formation which later became
known as the "Company Front". Waves of fighters in line abreast bored
down on the bombers, swamping the defensive fire. In a brief attack of
this nature, 11 bombers were destroyed.
Penetration. The weather forecast for the day of this mission was
"excellent visibility everywhere on the Continent of Europe" but early
fog at bases.
1,120 heavy bombers and 715 fighters of the Eighth Air Force were
dispatched against ail targets in Germany and many other targets including a military vehicle factory, aero engine works, tire plants, and an
ordnance plant.
The bombers flew in three divisions, the First and Third Air
Divisions preceeding the Second and flying to the Leipzig and Dresden
One force from
areas deep in Germany, where many targets were bombed.
plant and provehicles
military
Chemnitz
the Third Division bombed the
bases.
Russian
to
ceeded, with Mustang escort, on
Chart B
Withdrawal.
of targets.
After bombing, withdrawal was uneventful for all forces. The enemy
had committed his entire available force before the targets were reached.
With 181 enemy fighters destroyed, 26 probably destroyed and 75 damaged,
(according to Eighth Air Force claims) the Luftwaffe was in no condition
for second sortie.
Bombers claimed 19-19-9 enemy for a loss of 140 bombers, 18 lost to
enemy fighters, 13 to flak and 9 to unknown cases.
Our fighters claimed 162-7-66 enemy aircraft for a loss of 25,
6 to enemy fighters, 2 to flak, and 17 to unknown causes.
UNm[L&JL i D
Tx
~!
S!
N
1G
.,
-:
(.
!.wr
a
.
"r.. gip
.w'
is
y+
1741
a
8.
.w
i
s"T
}^
+.J
E-A
41"i,
But
bomb damage meant a quick end of the war.
his attempts at defense against our bombing
attacks cost him aircraft and pilots which offset by far any results he attained. At the
same time, the German ground army was demanding
far more air support than the Luftwaffe could
offer, and German army cooperation aircraft
were already taking a terrible mauling from the
And the Russian
Allied tactical air forces.
forces to the east had to be stopped.
During this phase
Rockets and Jets:
German rocket and jet-propelled aircraft made
For a detailed discussion of
their appearance.
the aircraft see Section 3 of this chapter.
137
UN C SSIFIED
UNCA37EO
Chart D.
Mission of 27 November, 1944
Chart C.
As "Seen" by German Fighter Controllers
1130 hours. The above maps show the plots made by enemy fighter
controllers of what they believed was taking place.
At 1130 hours, the enemy was reporting a great bomber force under
heavy fighter escort approaching the Weser River and extending far back
Specific "plots" were made where a 3-17 or a fightover the North Sea.
Aircraft reported as "unidentified" are
er aircraft is shown in black.
shown by outlined aircraft.
The enemy, deprived of radio interception of our messages, was
Once his controllers had concluded
thoroughly confused as to the facts.
that this great force was made up of bombers and escort, nothing seems
to have shaken this belief. It is probable that conditions of cloud
and contrails further deceived them.
1315 hours.
He indicated one force of bombers with escort fighters to be heading from the vicinity of Leipzig toward Berlin. Near Frankfurt, bombers
A
and fighters were plotted as heading both eastward and westward.
east
the
concentration of bombers was shown flying southwestward along
spread
side of the Ruhr. Unidentified aircraft heading toward the west
from the Ruhr to Heligoland Bight.
Enemy plots showed our bombers crossing westward over France when
actually they had been in that area considerably earlier.
This mission, though admittedly taking place under unusual
ion opened up by a
conditions, indicates the
message interception.
,io
on
based
control system
'39
Chart A.
Mission of 5 December,
1944 - Berlin
Penetration. This mission is notable first because of the proportion of fighter escort force to bombers (959 fighters dispatched with
only 56F bombers); and, second, because of the complete inability of a
large force of enemy fighters to penetrate the escort sufficiently to
press home an attack on the bombers.
Twelve Combat Wings of bombers escorted by 12 Grouns of P-51s, flew
directly toward Berlin which as cpital of the Reich was a sensitive
spot for the enemy. Some fighters were specifically assigned to escort
duty while others were free to join combat with the enemy and pursue
him anywhere.
Four Comboat Wings of B-24s followed the earlier bombers, turning
off at Zwolle with three grouns of escort fighters to bomb Munster.
This light escort was permissible because of a screened route and
shallow penetration.
A "mandrel" screen was flown over the North Sea in an attempt to
deny the enemy access to our V.H.F. radio conversations.
About 310 single-engine enemy fighters began to assemble near
Berlin. Possibly the radio countermeasures acted to disrupt their
timing.
At any rate, they were not fully assembled when the Eighth
Air Force began bombing Berlin.
Chart B.
Withdrawal. After Berlin had been bombed, some 130 enemy fighters
attempted interception but were routed by our escort without a shot
being fired at the bombers. Units numbering 35 to 60 continued to
attemot attacks on the bombers. But our escort had the situation so
well in hand that g88
enemy fighters were destroyed in this area, one
was claimed by the bombers.
Royal Air Force Lancasters with Spitfire escort were due to bomb
the Hamm marshalling yards and the dam on the Roer River, as our bombers
neared the same longitude on withdrawal. Of the tactical enemy fighters
which rose in this area, some 75 made attemnots at interception. However,
Royal Air Force escort fighters engaged at least 50 of the enemy so that
the attacks on the bombers were few.
About 12 Me-262s working in pairs, made an apearance in the area
of Dummer Lake.
Mustang escort prevented attacks on the Fortresses.
Eighth Air Force fighters claimed 90-7-24 enemy aircraft destroyed,
probably destroyed and damaged. The bombers made no claims.
12 bombers were lost, none to enemy fighters, 8 to flak, and 4
to unknown causes.
18 fighters were lost, only )4of which were to
enemy fighters.
140
OU~Z
Cha~rt
A.
nm
ihe
insto
1 January, 1945
With the ground battle lines now at the Rhine, enemy fighters were
concentrated in Germany.
The number of aircraft had increased considerably, but the aquality of pilots had deteriorated.
LUIV~LASs~L~a
9. TACTICAL
EMPLOYMENT
"Although the landing operation was attended by hazards and difficulties greater than
have ever before faced an invading army, the
first
great obstacle has been surmounted".
Immediately after D-Day the role of airpower was two-fold: (1) to isolate and neutralize the battle zone (2) to destroy transportation and communication within its confines.
While heavy bombers attacked rail junctions
feeding the battle area, and post-holed airfields in the vicinity, fighter-bombers stalked
enemy motor transport, tanks, and troop concentrations. Systematically, Allied air-power
paralyzed the four principal lateral railroads
in the Brittany- Paris arc, thereby placing a
heavy strain on motor transport. The enemy
found it unsafe to move except by night.
Fi
1" ' ;
' S
142
* isrya
" ' . a
r.-z.
4
tt
;-+
PHUI
a
wAU 7IWd
ILI4
9. TACTICAL
EMPLOYMENT
Break-through Opera.tions:
Operations of
this nature were carried out at Caen on the 1g
July and the
Aaugast 19)44; at St. Lo on the
24 and 25 July 1944; and at Escheiller on 16
November 1)44.
These operations were carried
out by the Eighth Air Force and various other
air forces.
All accomplished the objective:
namely, to paralyze the enemany defense long
enough for our ground forces to exoloit the
situation and break-through the enemy lines.
By the time the mission was run at
Eschweiller in November technioues had been
developed, and many security measures adopted,
to eliminate hazard to Allied ground troops
from our bombing.
tErlier missions had been
marred by small numerical losses to Allied
troops.
These losses, unavoidable under the
circumstances, were negligible compared to the
results of the bombing.
The ease with which
Allied ground forces were able to exploit the
paralizing effect on the enemy of Eighth Air
Force bombing, reduced over-all casualties for
these operations to a major dbgree including
the small number of casualties resulting from
friendly bombing fire.
Had the same troops
moved forward under a huge rolling barrage of
artillery fire required to accomplish a similar
result, the losses probably would have been far
greater.
t* S14)
'43
U14
9. TACTICAL
After D-Day
was assigned
communicaon great
months
s
a
communities, and
a
iversion centers for traffic which
the great marshalling yards no longer could
handle.
With enemy air defenses waning, task forces
of the Eighth Air Force could break down
into
smaller units and attack a multitude of
targets
144
superiority.
Because the enemy's aircraft assembly
plants offered accessible targets and other
II.
Judged in
of aviatife
fle1
the enemy's
capacity to resist
i r force attacks
on oil, and his ability to train pilot replacements.
The drying up of the oil supply at its
source greatly weakened the German ground army,
through loss of mobility in the armored forces
themselves, through a reduction in motorized
transport and supplies.
Destruction of the German Transportation
System: The second objective of the Eighth Air
Force was to cripple the German military,
economic and industrial capacity to wage war.
Cutting supply lines is a time-honored method
of crippling a military machine, but a new
factor in war, made possible by strategic
bombing, is the crippling of supply lines to
The
vital industries in the enemy country.
Eighth Air Force, with other air forces in the
European Theater, joined in the attack on supp)y
This attack
lines behind the German Army.
simultaneously disrupted the transportation
system of Germany to the point where industrial
production came virtually to a standstill.
The bombing of German rail transportation,
motor and canal traffic systems was augmented
by the attacks on oil.
Yehrmacht
- 11 months
of the collapse of the
High German officers and
after the invasion.
officials confirm this.
So America's air strategy was highly
Because of Allied air domination,
successful.
moderate sized land forces were able to carry
out a difficult and hazardous crossing of an
extensive water barrier and achieve a successful landing without air opposition; then invade
to the heart of enemy power and thereafter
rapidly force a complete military collapse. This
took place with a loss of Allied lives which was
most economic when considered in terms of past
landing operations.
Offensive action was fundamental to the
When an Eighth Air Force
tactics employed.
bomber-fighter team fought its way to enemy tar-
eLjGE
46)
145
fillThVIA
er
I"
-rP7a
"IAl
in~f
v6
qffight
e
e
s use of his air force
a
missed the major point concerning air power:
that its greatest value in war is as an offensive weapon.
The enemy had no insurmountable difficulty
in concentrating his fighters against Eighth
Air Force attacks during many months of the air
As soon as our bomber force reached
war.
sufficient proportions to require mass interception, enemy controllers employed radar and
radio intercepts to provide warning of impending
This warning, plus the time used by
attacks.
the bombers in reaching enemy territory, gave
the enemy adequate time to assemble defensive
forces even from extended dispositions. However,
later in the war, Eighth Air Force fighter
sweeps often hindered or disrupted enemy assemblies.
But the Luftwaffe's tactics in applying
fighter attacks against our bombers were,
during most of the war, a vitiation of the
Interceptions were
principle of concentration.
made when and where various enemy units could
make them, without reference to other units.
Later in the war after -the German Air Force
fighter force had lost much of its combat
capability for decisive action, the enemy
evolved somewhat sounder tactics. Large assenblies were carried out with the purpose of
He
making mass attacks to swamp our defenses.
continued weak, however, in the matter of concentrating his attacks on single formations,
with the object of swamping the bomber defense,
depleting the limited supply of ammunition, and
gaining the accumulated effect of sustained
attack.
Surorise was difficult of attainment by
the enemy against the Eighth's Task Forces
since these were constantly disposed in a deThe enemy had some success
fensive attitude.
with numerous small-scale ruses. But he never
accomplished a major success through surprise and he missed many good opportunities.
Instead of varying his tactics radically,
from time to time, the enemy tended strongly to
pattern in his operations.- Alarge-scale surprise attack on airfie:4s in the United Kingdom,
for example
IA4
146
1?7
ACY
~~
(EXCLUSIVE
OF THREE ATTACKS
IN CLOSE
COORDINATION WITH
GROUND
FORCES)
4,453
damoaged by flak.
4000
316
3000 30
2000
1000
942
1942
J J AS
D J45F M AM 1943
1943
ON
FMA
M JJ
1944
1944
OND
JF
145
1942
b.LL;h
148
1943
1944
_
..
!
---
:1
fi
r.+.y
''
'
1F
'
'
'
+AiiA
APPENDIX
DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
ORGANI Z ATI ON
I,
Li;,tti
i''
Germany
Four days after Pearl Harbor,
This act
declared war on the United States.
brought down upon German industry and on all
other sources of supply and replacement of the
German Armed Forces, the most concentrated air
When this comassault in military history.
upon at a joint
decided
was
offensive
bined air
chiefs of
American
and
British
the
of
meeting
be:
to
determined
was
purpose
its
staff,
(I)
(2)
Eighth Air
On 22 May 1942 the first
operational
for
Force combat unit arrived
then ready
was
Eighth Air Force
training.
to enter the second phase of its organizational development.
kt ey+f' ,
}i"4 ;4
(3)
two of
Under the inmpetus of the first
was
organization
these Commands, a minimum
controlling
Kingdom
framed in the United
Then, secondbomber operations and supply.
tackled
were
ary organizational problems
relating to rendering operational fighter,
training, and transport commands.
(2)
CHART No.I
22 MAY 1942
UELASSF lED
)
HORTH
SEA
PJ
FORT DI:
SAVANNAH I
GEORGIA
SCHEMATIC
ORGANIZATION of the EIGHTH
AIR FORCE as of 22 MAY 1942
UN LASSIFI
PLANNED
BUT NOT YET
ACTIVATED
2-A
GROWING PAINS
(I)
expansion,
(2)
(3)
lst
NFh
3-A
Chart
Y)rw+5
Ub~sZ~~i~~-I
17 AUGUST 1942
IINo
No. 2I2
NOR
SEA
P
1L
RANGE
NEW UNITS
U LA
TH
(1)
the need for an intermediate operational contrcl between the bomb wing
and the bomb group,
(2)
the unsatisfactory system of operating both heavy and medium bomb groups
under a single command,
(3)
(4)
'
4
5-A
A W
- HART No.3
10 MAY 1943
NORTH
r----
6-A
SET- UP
..
!r'
;.
r...
rr
"'!
,"
...
,.
LvP
'
_s:f
m^
!'
F'
j
1
w-
7-A
=a
ii
CHART NO 3A
COMMANDING
OFFICER
OR FIGHTER
PROJECTED ONLY- NOT ASSIGNED UNTIL AUGUST, 1943.
LATER REPLACED ON BOMBER STATIONS ONLY BY SUB-DEPOT
LATER COMBINED TO FORM ORDNANCE S 8 M COMPANIES OF
WHICH ONE WAS ASSIGNED TO EACH TACTICAL STATION AS AVAILABLE
TYPICAL U. S. AIRDROME
IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
STATION ORGANIZATION
(TYPICAL)
SHOWING COMMAND AND
LINE ORGANIZATION IN
THE SPRING OF 1943
T GROUP
UNITS
ye
t-p.j
r~tan-
~r
Sn" ,
STREAMLINI
INTERNAL
(2)
(3)
with assumption of medium bombardment responsibility, an important operational and administrative mission.
Receipt of the 3rd Bombardtransferred intact from
ment Wing (Medium),
Eighth Bomber Command also gave Air Service
Command an experienced intermediate headquarter
Si.
Q-A
....
ii":' ",ir<~r
. .L.
I1
i..''
organizat-
(2)
for
an increasing need was being felt
Need
a reconnaissance headquarters.
not only to coordinate the reconnaissance operations of the photographic
group, but also to enable the Air
Force to print, interpret and distribute the vast amount of target and
other operational photographs required
by the air forces as well as theater
At this stage the work
headquarters.
was being done largely by British
Not only did the increasagencies.
ing volume strain the British
facilities, but lack of facilities
and personnel to do this specialized
job within Eighth was considered a
selfserious shortcoming to its
sufficiency;
(3)
Chart
UhiCg
--
II
5 SEPTEMBER 1943
PARTN
CHART No 4
UN
IO-A
till!
L;'
I,
a ;~
Il-A
CHART No 5
6 MARCH 1944
I ST
BOMB
2ND
3RD
]ZIII
BOMB
BOMB
FIGHTER
IIL A.F.
SERVICE
DIVISION
DIVISION
DIVISION
COMMAND
COMMAND
r A.F.
OMPOSITE
OMMAND
IST
- TRATEGICI
ARDPOT
IST
C.C.R.C.I
GOP
IT
OM A
B WIN
2ND
OMBAT
BWI
65TH
FPIGHTERI
WIG
4TH
- COMBAT
9WINg
8 TH RCN
ING(PROV)
6 GCRC
7RH
PHOTO
.Rj
2ND
41R DEPOT
-
STRATEGIC
4TH
TRATEGIC
R DEPOT
6TTH
-FIGHTER
20
466 GP~
12-A
r, .
13-A
INVASION
AND VICTORY
Eighth Reconnaissance
77
IOCTOBER
1944
AR DEPARTMEN
r-~
CHART N* 6
--
-{HQ AAFj
I
E.T.O.
Ist
BOMB
DIVISION
2ND
BOMB
DIVISION
3RD.
BOMB
DIVISION
ORGANIZATION
QF THE
EIGHITH AIR FOROE
FOJUR MONTHS AFTER
A
"
INVASION of CONTINENT
B
,4
PSA
PA
N
N
Dl
__
Piri
Li
r
7,4'r
APPENDIX
MAJOR MODIFICATIONS
TO AIRCRAFT AND
EQUIPMENT
--
- - - - -
- -
~rfr47
CHANGE
"7:t.-
.;,
r 2 1gy
No matter how perfect the combat plane is when it rolls off the assembly line, its
As the need
the requirements of combat.
manufacturers cannot possibly anticipate all
made.
be
must
modifications
arises
Following is a tabular summary of the significant modifications of tactical importance made in aircraft arriving in this theater or as requested by the Eighth Air
Force.
These modifications are considered in the light of combat requirements, and how
Did they increase the performance
these were met after the modifications were installed.
safety as well as to that of its
its
to
add
they
Did
aircraft?
of
the
and striking power
personnel?
flying
Modifications affecting armament, performance, safety, navigation, bombing devices,
armor, communications and signals, and personnel equipment are considered in this table.
'
i-8
5" ;
rt
.' .'
7 i
BOMBER
Type of
Aircraft
MODIFICATIONS
Date
Modification
Accompl i shed
Remarks
ARMAMENT
3-17
Twin .50 calibre nose gun installations mounted in center of nose compartment over bombsight
January -
March 1943
March -
mount
April 1943
February
February
July -
B-17
Metal tail
enclosure modified to
give 90-degree cone of fire
B-17
R-17
B-17
B-17
3-17
B-17
August
1944
September
April
infrequency of enem
tion plus subsequent increase in
orange, altitude, and performance
19+3
1943
August 1943
19 4
1945
l9
pf
at
die
r-.
IF.L'
BOMBER
Type of
Aircraft
B-24
Modification
Twin .50 calibre nose gun mounted
over bombsight
Date
Accomplished
Early 19 43
MODIFICATIONS
--
---
Remarks
--
tection
B-24
B-24
Nov ember
1943
January -
March 1943
Fall 1943
B-24+
Fall 1943
B-2
June 1944
Increased performance
B-24
April
1945
implemented
RANGE
B-17
&
B-214
November
19
43
it
2]:
3-B
r'A'4R4
~
BOMBER
'k
16
MODIFICATIONSJ
Date
Type of
Aircraft
Modification
I
Accomplished
Remarks
SAFETY
B-17
December
1943
Many crews were lost due to the aircraft sinking before the life-rafts
could be released.
Also, in order
to release the rafts from the radio
compartment one or two men were required to remain in the aircraft
after it was ditched
B-24
January
1944
The
bomb-bay construction was
Less
unsatisfactory for ditching.
time was available after a water
landing than in the case of the B-17
B-24
January
3-24
Early
1944
B-17
&
September
1944
During
To prey
1944
3-24
B-17
&
3-24
B-24
1943
f3
kY
. a
6w C
4-B
BOMBER
Aircraft
&
B-24
&
3-17
&
3-24
r e
} i,
MODIFICATIONS
Date
Type of
B3-17
tr K
'Modification
Accomplished
Remarks
To prevent fires
April
19+5
Spring
1944
April
April
1945
1945
BOMBING
B-17
B-17
B-24
a) H2X
b) Gee-H
c) Micro-H
ARMOR
B-17
&3-24
3-24
1943
5-B
Iis
5U
(r.
4 "M ~f Y1:a
BOMBER
Type of
Aircraft
3-17
3-24
B-17
&
Modification
MODIFICATIONS
Date
Accomplished
February
Late 1943
& Early 1944
1943
wounds
1944
19)43
1942-19)43
Fall 1942
3-24
B-17
Remarks
71i
PERSONAL EQUIPMENT
B-17
&
3-24
3-17
&
3-24
3-17
&
3-24
in obtaining a
&
fl
6-B
BOMBER
Type of
Aircraft
Modification
Date
Accomplished
MODIFICATIONS
Remarks
B-17
Fall 1942
B- 17
July 19+44
January
B-17
Fall 1943
B-17
Spring &
3-24
B-17
&
3-24
&
B-24
&
B-2)4
B-17
&
B-2)4
B-17
19 43
Fall 1944
April
1944
Began in
March 1944
Fall
'194-4
ference
7-B
,
.IB
a~o :. " ..
"
,.
j 1r
<C'
&t
FIGHTER
MODIFICATIONS
Modification
Date
Accomplished.
Early 1944
To equip a number of fighterbombers with bombsights for attacking strategic German targets
March 1943
Type of
Aircraft
Remarks
----~
ARMAMENT
P-47
P-38
P-S5
BOMBING
P-38
SAFETY
P-47
P-51
P-1y7
P-47
1943
P-51
P-47
1944
P-51
fry j
f r
UOW
m2
FIGHTER MODIFICATIONS
Date
Type of
Aircraft
P-47
P-3S
P-51
Modification
Accomplished
Remarks
P-47
P-51
January
P-51
Fall 1944
P-Wy
&
Reconnaissance
1945
afircraft
aircraft
PERFORMANCE
P-Wy
Late 1943
P-Wy
Late
Early 1945
P-38
P-51
P- 7
P-51
1944
rr-i f7
-i
9--8
r
'
.Lm
liu.
r.' Q+
FIGHTER
MODIFICATIONS
Date
Type of
Aircraft
P-51
sAW
Modification
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
Accompliished
Spring
1945
February 19 43-
February 1945
aircraft
Remarks
P-51
The long range P-51, initially equipped with a 75 gallon metal tank made
its deput as an escort fighter, and
eventually replaced both the P-47 and
P-51.
Later it was equipped with
either the 108 gallon metal or paper
Subseouently, this tank and
tank.
its suspension were modified by using
1944
'I
~U'Kr~~~jj $
~
4
IO-B
cl-
FIGHTER MODIFICATIONS
Type of
Aircraft
Aircraft
Date
Mo
di
ficati
on
Accomplished
Remarks
Modification
a two-point suspension channel permitting the same tank and suspension
to be used on either the P-51 or
P-47. The 10 gallon tanks were
later modified with front and rear
outlets to make them useable on
both the P-47 and P-51
P-51
February
1945
:l
SY
I-B
ar'14