The petitioners (defendants) and private respondents (plaintiffs) entered into an amicable settlement regarding the sale of 3 parcels of land, with the petitioners agreeing to pay P84,000 within 4 months. The petitioners made partial payments to the private respondent Waldo del Castillo, who was authorized to represent his mother Guadalupe, over several years. While the trial court issued an order affirming consolidation of ownership of the remaining 2 parcels, the Supreme Court found that the original judgment was novated by the subsequent agreements between the parties, as the petitioners had fully paid the P84,000 amount through installment payments and receipts of several extensions from the private respondents. The Supreme Court set aside
The petitioners (defendants) and private respondents (plaintiffs) entered into an amicable settlement regarding the sale of 3 parcels of land, with the petitioners agreeing to pay P84,000 within 4 months. The petitioners made partial payments to the private respondent Waldo del Castillo, who was authorized to represent his mother Guadalupe, over several years. While the trial court issued an order affirming consolidation of ownership of the remaining 2 parcels, the Supreme Court found that the original judgment was novated by the subsequent agreements between the parties, as the petitioners had fully paid the P84,000 amount through installment payments and receipts of several extensions from the private respondents. The Supreme Court set aside
The petitioners (defendants) and private respondents (plaintiffs) entered into an amicable settlement regarding the sale of 3 parcels of land, with the petitioners agreeing to pay P84,000 within 4 months. The petitioners made partial payments to the private respondent Waldo del Castillo, who was authorized to represent his mother Guadalupe, over several years. While the trial court issued an order affirming consolidation of ownership of the remaining 2 parcels, the Supreme Court found that the original judgment was novated by the subsequent agreements between the parties, as the petitioners had fully paid the P84,000 amount through installment payments and receipts of several extensions from the private respondents. The Supreme Court set aside
The petitioners (defendants) and private respondents (plaintiffs) entered into an amicable settlement regarding the sale of 3 parcels of land, with the petitioners agreeing to pay P84,000 within 4 months. The petitioners made partial payments to the private respondent Waldo del Castillo, who was authorized to represent his mother Guadalupe, over several years. While the trial court issued an order affirming consolidation of ownership of the remaining 2 parcels, the Supreme Court found that the original judgment was novated by the subsequent agreements between the parties, as the petitioners had fully paid the P84,000 amount through installment payments and receipts of several extensions from the private respondents. The Supreme Court set aside
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G.R. No.
L-68477 October 29, 1987
SPOUSES ANICETO BALILA and EDITHA S. DE GUZ MAN, SPOUSES ASTERIO DE GUZMAN and ERLINDA CONCEPCION and ENCARNACION OCAMPO VDA. DE CONCEPCION, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HONORABLE FLORANTE S. ABASOLO, in his capacity as Judge, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Branch L, Villasis, Pangasinan, GUADALUPE C. VDA. DE DEL CASTILLO and WALDO DEL CASTILLO, respondents. Topic: 6. Novation, b. As to its form Ponente: Paras, J. Facts: Petitioners were defendants and private respondents were plaintiffs in a Civil Case. They entered into an amicable settlement wherein petitioners admitted having sold under a pacto de retro sale 3 parcels of land (Lot 965, Lot 16, Lot 52) in the amount of P84,000 and that they hereby promise to pay the said amount within the period of 4 months but not later than May 15, 1981. December 30, 1981 or more than 7 months after the last day for making payments, petitioners redeemed from private respondent Guadalupe Lot No. 52 by paying the amount of P20,000. August 4, 1982 Guadalupe filed a motion for a hearing on the consolidation of the title over the remaining 2 parcels of land namely Lot 965 and Loot 16 alleging that the earlier court decision (approving the amicable settlement) remained unenforced for nonpayment of the total obligation. Petitioners opposed, alleging that they had made partial payments to Guadalupes attorney-in-fact and son, Waldo, as well as to the Sheriff. TC issued an order affirming consolidation. On June 8, 1983, while the TC order had not yet been enforced, petitioners paid Guadalupe by tendering the amount of P28,000 to her son Waldo, thus leaving an unpaid amount of P35,200. A certification dated June 8, 1983 and signed by Waldo
showed that petitioners were given a period of 45 days from date
or up to July 23, 1983 within which to pay the balance. Such certification supported petitioners MR of the order of consolidation. MR was however denied. Issue: Was the Order approving the amicable settlement novated upon subsequent mutual agreements of the parties? YES Held: Petitioners' contentions deserve Our consideration.
The root of all the issues raised before Us is that judgment
by compromise rendered by the lower court based on the terms of the amicable settlement of the contending parties. Such agreement not being contrary to law, good morals or public policy was approved by the lower court and therefore binds the parties who are enjoined to comply therewith.
However, the records show that petitioners made partial
payments to private respondent Waldo del Castillo after May 15, 1981 or the last day for making payments, redeeming Lot No. 52 as earlier stated. There is no question that petitioners tendered several payments to Waldo del Castillo even after redeeming lot No. 52. A total of these payments reveals that petitioners share. fulIy paid the amount stated in the judgment by com promise. The only issue is whether Waldo del Castillo was a person duly authorized by his mother Guadalupe Vda. de del Castillo, as her attorney-in-fact to represent her in transactions involving the properties in question. We believe that he was so authorized in the same way that the appellate court took cognizance of such fact as embodied in its assailed decision. reading as follows:
It may be mentioned that on May 25,1981,
Guadalupe Vda. de Del Castillo, represented by her attorney in fact Waldo Castillo, filed a complaint for consolidation of ownership against the same petitioners herein before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. U-3650, the allegations of which are Identical to the complaint filed in Civil Case No. U-3501 of the same court. This case U-3650 was, however, dismissed in an Order dated May 27, 1983, in view of the order of consolidation issued in Civil Case No. U-350 1. (p. 37, Rollo) (Underscoring supplied)
The fact therefore remains that the amount of P84,000.00
payable on or before May 15, 1981 decreed by the trial court in its judgment by compromise was novated and amended by the subsequent mutual agreements and actions of petitioners and private respondents. Petitioners paid the aforestated amount on an insatalment basis and they were given by private respondents no less than eight extensions of time pay their obligation. These transactions took place during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the Order of the trial court dated April 26, 1983 in Civil Case No. U-3501, during the pendency of the petition for certiorari in AC-G.R. SP-01307 before the Intermediate Appellate Court and after the filing of the petition before us. This answers the claim of the respondents on the failure of the petitioners to present evidences or proofs of payment in the lower court and the appellate court. We have touched on this issue, similarly, in the case of de los Santos vs. Rodriguez 6 wherein We ruled that: As early as Molina vs. De la Riva 7 the principle has been laid down that, when, after judgment has become final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, the interested party may ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice and the facts.
For this reason, in Amor vs. Judge Jose,
following language:
we used the
The Court cannot refuse to issue a writ
of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or order its stay, for, as a general rule, parties will not be allowed, after final judgment, to object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or of law, except when there had been a change in the situation of the parties which makes such execution in- equitable; or when it appears that the controversy has never been submitted to the judgment of the court, or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party or that judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied or when the writ has been issued without authority. (emphasis supplied)
Likewise in the case of Dormitorio vs. Fernandez,
We held:
What was done by respondent Judge in setting aside
the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 5111 finds support in the applicable authorities. There is this relevant excerpt in Barretto v. Lopez 10 this Court speaking through the then Chief Justice Paras: "Allegating that the respondent judge of the municipal court had acted in excess of her jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution of December 15, 1947,
the petitioner has filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition for the purpose of having said writ of execution annulled. Said petition is meritorious. The agreement filed by the parties in the ejectment case created as between them new rights and obligations which naturally superseded the judgment of the municipal court." In Santos v. Acuna, 11 it was contended that a lower court decision was novated by the subsequent agreement of the parties. Implicit in this Court's ruling is that such a plea would merit approval if indeed that was what the parties intended. ...
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the same is
hereby given DUE COURSE and the assailed decision, SET ASIDE. Private respondents are hereby ordered to reconvey and deliver lot No. 965 and Lot No. 16 as covered by TCT Nos. 146360 and 146361 respectively in favor of petitioners. Should private respondents fail
to do so, the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court concerned is
ordered to execute the necessary deed of reconveyance, conformably with the provisions of the Rules of Court. The local Register of Property is ordered to register said deed of reconveyance. Private respondents are hereby authorized to withdraw the balance in the amount of P10,000 consigned by petitioners on January 9, 1985 with the trial court as per OR No. 9764172 (Annex "O") a full payment of petitioners' obligation.
This decision is immediately executory and no motion for
extension of the period within which to file a motion for reconsideration will be granted.