GEORGE MILLER,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 165412

Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

- versus -

SECRETARY HERNANDO B.
Promulgated:
PEREZ, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Justice AND
May 30, 2011
GIOVAN BERNARDINO,
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated June 14,
2004 and Resolution[2] dated September 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72395. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent Secretary of Justice in
issuing his Resolution[3] dated March 21, 2002 which ordered the exclusion of
respondent Giovan Bernardino (Bernardino) from the Information for attempted
murder.
The facts as culled from the records:
Petitioner George Miller is a British national and an inmate at the Maximum
Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa City. In
November and December 1998, while serving as Acting Secretary General of the
Inmates Crusade Against Drugs (ICAD) based at NBP, petitioner wrote two

confidential letters [4] addressed to then NBP Superintendent Col. Gregorio Agaloos. The letters contained a detailed report of the alleged irregularities and drug
trading activities of respondent Bernardino and Rodolfo Bernardo (Bernardo), both
inmates at the Medium Security Compound and ICAD Treasurer and Chairman,
respectively. Petitioner also recommended the transfer of Bernardino and
Bernardo to the Maximum Security Compound.
On January 6, 1999, at around 2:30 p.m., while proceeding towards the
volleyball court at the Medium Security Compound, petitioner felt a crushing blow
at the back of his head. As blood oozed from his head, petitioner ran to the
Infirmary for first aid treatment. Later, petitioner was transferred to the NBP
hospital. On January 17, 1999, Dr. Ma. Corazon S. Alvarez, Medical Specialist at
the NBP hospital, issued a Medical Certificate[5] with the following findings:
-

lacerated wound, one (1), about 8 to 9 cms. long,

1 cm. deep, on parietal area of the head.

Barring unforseen (sic) circumstances, healing period is

from 7 to 10 days.

Investigation of the incident was immediately ordered by Supt. Agaloos. PGIII Cecilio M. Lopez conducted the investigation and submitted to the NBP
Director his Report[6] dated January 5, 1999. Based on the sworn statement of
petitioner and the verbal admissions made by inmates Constantino Quirante, Jr.
(Quirante) and Roberto Ceballos (Ceballos), it was found that a few days before
the incident, Bernardo and Bernardino confronted petitioner regarding the letters
he wrote reporting the alleged illegal drug activities of Ace Aprid (Aprid),
Bernardo and Bernardino at ICAD. Bernardo and Bernardino were furious when
petitioner admitted having authored the letters, threatening him with the words
Mamamatay ka, which petitioner fully understood: he is going to die. Petitioner
discovered that another inmate (Valeroso) to whom he confided the matter, had
divulged the existence of the letters to Bernardo and Bernardino. At the time he
was hit at the back of his head, petitioner was able to turn around and saw his
assailant, later identified as Quirante, who ran away through the gate leading to the
talipapa where petitioner lost sight of him. Petitioner then saw two persons

standing near the entrance of the talipapa and shouted at one of them asking for
the identity of his assailant and if he saw the incident. However, the man just kept
mum. As petitioner realized that blood was oozing from his head, he immediately
went to the Infirmary.
The day after the incident, Bernardo and Bernardino along with fellow
inmates Aprid, Virgilio Adrales, Rogelio Aguilar, Amable Bendoy, Arnel
Modrigo, Alfred Magno and Vergel Bustamante, were brought to the investigation
section.
In the course of the investigation, Quirante and Ceballos admitted their
participation in the attack on petitioner and the information they provided was
summarized by the investigating officer as follows:
xxxx
While the investigation was in progress, inmates Roberto Ceballos
and Constantino Quirante voluntarily surfaced admitting their
participation in the clubbing of Miller. After having been informed of
their constitutional rights, the two during interrogation and without
second thought, narrated in detail how and why they attempted to kill
Miller in the following manner:
At around 10:30 A.M. of January 6, 1999, in whiling the time
under the shade of a tree in a basketball court of the Medium Security
Camp, Quirante and Ceballos were approached by Aprid and Bernardino
to engage their services and offered an amount of P1,500.00 to kill
Miller. Being in dire need of money at the very moment, Quirante and
Ceballos accepted the offer. Quirante admitted treacherously hitting
Miller at the back of his head with a piece of wood but for failing to get
him with one blow, he had to flee. On the other hand, Ceballos admitted
as the lookout and was asked by Miller the identity of his assailant right
after he was clubbed. Accordingly, what motivated them to reveal
everything is the fact that only P100.00 was paid in advance to them by
Bernardino and Aprid and the balance of P1,400.00 as promised to be
paid sooner was never fulfilled. The duo even signified their intention to
reduce their participation in writing to authenticate the admission of their
guilt. However, in the absence of a lawyer to assist them and to
safeguard their constitutional rights, the officer on case opted not to do
so.

To ascertain the veracity of Ceballos and Quirantes confession, a

confrontation was made at the Directors Office. Several inmates were
lined-up with Ceballos and Quirante. Miller when asked to identify his
assailant, he spontaneously pointed to Quirante as the one who clubbed
him on the head and likewise pointed to Ceballos as the man whom he
had shouted at asking for the identity of his assailant.
x x x x[7]

On the basis of the foregoing, PGIII Lopez recommended that Quirante and
Ceballos be charged with Frustrated Murder and the case be placed under further
investigation pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict inmates
Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid. [8] On February 10, 1999,
the case was endorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor submitting to the said
office the following documents: (1) Investigation Report of PGIII Lopez; (2)
Sworn Statement of petitioner; (3) Medical Certificate; (4) Routing Slip of Supt.
Agalo-os; and (5) petitioners letters dated November 21, 1998 and December 27,
1998 addressed to the NBP Superintendent. [9] The case was docketed as I.S. No.
99-B-01314.
On March 30, 1999, Prosecutor Antonio V. Padilla issued his
resolution[10] finding the evidence sufficient to charge Quirante with attempted
murder while dismissing the case against Ceballos for insufficiency of evidence,
thus:
Anent the charge against Giovan Bernardino and Rodolfo
Bernardo, we noticed that the same is merely anchored on suspicion and
conjecture. Except the bare allegations of the complainant, nothing
would link them to the assault against the complainant. In fact, their
names were not even mentioned in the referral letter, dated February 10,
1999, of the Bureau of Corrections addressed to our Office.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned respectfully
recommends that the attached Information be filed in court. Further, it is
recommended that the charge against Ceballos be dismissed on ground
of insufficiency of evidence. As to the charge against Bernardino and
Bernardo the same is likewise recommended dismissed on ground of
insufficiency of evidence without prejudice to the refilling of same in the

event that evidence against them may be unearthed by concerned

authorities. [11] (Italics supplied.)

Thereafter, an information for attempted murder was filed against Quirante

only in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City (Branch 256), docketed
as Criminal Case No. 99-452.
On or about April 14, 1999, Quirante and Ceballos executed a joint affidavit
in Tagalog (Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay[12]) which was sworn to before
Prosecutor Padilla. They declared that at noontime of January 6, 1999, their
services were engaged through their Bosyo or Commander, Rodrigo Toledo
(Toledo), who told them that if they hit (paluin) petitioner they will be
paid P1,500 by Bernardino and Bernardo. Hence, they carried out the clubbing of
petitioner by 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day infront of the volleyball court of
the Medium Security Compound while petitioner was walking from
the talipapa. Quirante struck at petitioner from behind using a piece of wood
and then ran away towards the talipapa. Petitioner turned around and saw
Ceballos whom he asked for the identity of his assailant. In pain and with bleeding
wound on his head, petitioner momentarily sat down and then brought himself to
the infirmary. Ceballos thought that petitioner did not recognize him since his
face was then covered with shirt cloth. A day later, Toledo handed them P100 as
initial payment, the balance to be paid by Bernardo and Bernardino also
through Toledo. However, three days passed without the P1,400 being paid to
them, until they were called to appear before the Directors office. When
questioned during the investigation, they readily owned up to the assault on
petitioner because Bernardino and Bernardo did not pay the agreed amount.
The sworn statement of Quirante and Ceballos was corroborated
by Toledo who likewise executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay[13] on even date stating
that as early as December 1998, Bernardo and Bernardino have been talking to him
about their plan to have petitioner killed. Toledo being the leader of their group
(BC 45) at the Medium Security Compound, Bernardo and Bernardino promised
that they will pay whoever among his (Toledo) men can do it. Toledo claimed
that he initially declined but due to the daily conversations with Bernardo and
Bernardino who also gave him food, he finally called on two of his men, Quirante

and Ceballos, to carry out the plan to kill petitioner. He was confident that
everything will be alright since Bernardo and Bernardino committed to pay P1,500
for the job. A day after the clubbing of petitioner, he gave Quirante and
Ceballos P100 as initial payment by Bernardo and Bernardino for their
services. Three days later, he learned that Quirante and Ceballos were summoned
before the Directors Office in connection with the incident. He affirmed the truth
of the admissions made by Quirante and Ceballos because Bernardo and
Bernardino failed to comply with their undertaking.
On December 2, 1999, Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo executed new
affidavits [14] in English, which were sworn to before Bureau of Corrections
Assistant Director Joselito A. Fajardo and Prosecutor Leopoldo B. Macinas. These
new affidavits gave a more detailed narration of the incident and pointed to
Bernardo and Bernardino as the masterminds with Aprid being an
accomplice. Bernardo and Aprid allegedly planned the killing of petitioner
together with Toledo, the BC 45 Gang Commander, wherein Quirante agreed to be
the one to kill petitioner while another gang member, Ceballos, would act as his
lookout. The affidavits also mentioned what transpired during the preliminary
investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla and the earlier April 1999 Tagalog
affidavits they executed before Prosecutor Padilla. These documents were
submitted during the reinvestigation conducted by Prosecutor Macinas.
Bernardo and Bernardino submitted their Joint Counter-Affidavit[15] dated
January 19, 2000, stating that it was the second time they were being implicated in
the case and pointing out that both investigations by the Investigation Section of
the Bureau of Corrections and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Muntinlupa City
showed that they have no participation in the commission of the offense. They
asserted that the charges against them have no basis and the fruit of the wrong and
malicious imputations of the witnesses. They denied having committed any
violation of the rules and regulations of ICAD, of which Bernardo is Chairman
while Bernardino is the Treasurer. They claimed that in the three years they have
been serving the ICAD, the organization has more than progressed and benefitted
their fellow inmates at the NBP. As to the statements given by Quirante, Ceballos
and Toledo, and other witnesses, these are conflicting and muddled, showing so
much evidence of them having been tutored.

Bernardo
and
Bernardino
likewise presented a Sinumpaang
[16]
Salaysay executed by their witnesses, co-inmates Arnel Modrigo, Virgilio
Adrales and Rogelio Aguilar. Said affiants declared that when petitioner
approached them and asked if Aprid and Bernardo had anything to do with the
incident, they plainly answered in the negative and told petitioner he should ask
those persons instead. Everyday, petitioner goes to them asking them to pinpoint
Aprid, Bernardo and Bernardino as the masterminds in order to strengthen the case
against them. Petitioner even asked them to sign a handwritten letter[17] prepared
by petitioner himself, addressed to Supt. Agalo-os and which, while requesting for
their transfer to the Medium Security dormitories, also affirmed the culpability of
Aprid, Bernardo and Bernardino for the attempt on the life of petitioner. However,
they refused to do so as they know there was no truth to the contents of said letter.
On March 20, 2000, Prosecutor Leopoldo Macinas issued his
Memorandum[18] addressed to the City Prosecutor finding probable cause against
Quirante, Ceballos andToledo in conspiracy with Bernardino, Aprid and Bernardo,
for the crime of attempted murder. Prosecutor Macinas was convinced that the
detailed account given by Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo were executed freely and
voluntarily, and found no reason why they would incriminate their co-inmates
other than the truth of the statements in their affidavits. On the other hand, the
defenses proffered by Bernardo and Bernardino are evidentiary matters which can
be best passed upon after a full-blown trial.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents
Giovan Bernardino, Rod[o]lfo Bernardo, Rodrigo Toledo, Ace Aprid
and Roberto Ceballos be all indicted by way of the herein attached
amended information as co-conspirators of accused Constantino
Quirante in attempting to kill George Miller, prima facie case having
[19]
been established.

Consequently, an Amended Information was filed with the RTC which

included the names of Bernardino, Aprid, Bernardo, Toledo and Ceballos as coconspirators in the crime of attempted murder.
Bernardino filed a petition for review[20] with the Department of Justice
(DOJ) arguing that there was no sufficient evidence presented to support a claim of

conspiracy, which was based merely on conflicting testimonies or affidavits in a

language foreign to the affiants. He noted that the English affidavits pointed to
three people as the masterminds when originally only two have been implicated by
the perpetrators (Quirante and Ceballos).
Petitioner filed his opposition,[21] alleging that contrary to the claim of
Bernardino, the Bureaus investigation was far from complete as the Report of
PGIII Lopez itself stated that the case is recommended for further investigation
pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo
Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid. As to the Tagalog affidavits,
petitioner pointed out that these could not have been produced during the
preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla since the documents
were executed only on April 14, 1999, two weeks after Prosecutor Padilla rendered
his resolution. Further investigation by the Bureau led to the execution of two
affidavits in Tagalog (Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo) without the knowledge of
petitioner. However, said Tagalog affidavits disappeared and petitioner was not
allowed access to the Investigation Sections file despite his complaints to Director
Sistoza, the Bureau and DOJ. Prior to the November 25, 1999 hearing on
reinvestigation, petitioner had new affidavits in English prepared with the
assistance of a former Supreme Court interpreter (inmate Chua) and these were
subsequently signed by Toledo, Quirante and Ceballos and sworn to before
Prosecutor Macinas. Hence, the said documentary evidence was already
considered in the March 20, 2000 Resolution of Prosecutor Macinas. Petitioner
further alleged that Bernardo and Bernardino received thru registered mail copy of
the March 20, 2000 Resolution on June 16, 2000 but the petition for review before
the DOJ was actually filed only on July 27, 2000 but conveniently dated July 14,
2000.
On March 21, 2002, public respondent, then Secretary of Justice Hernando
B. Perez, issued his Resolution[22] finding merit in the petition. According to
Secretary Perez, the new affidavits of Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo are not
credible considering the length of time they were executed since the commission
of the crime and also because said documents cannot be considered newly
discovered evidence. He further noted that the affidavits were executed by the
same persons investigated by the Bureau of Corrections and who all participated in
the preliminary investigation of the case. At most, said affidavits can only be

considered as afterthought or made upon the prodding or influence of other

persons. Public respondent thus ordered:
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution is MODIFIED. The
City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City is directed to amend the information
to exclude accused Giovan Bernardino therefrom, and to report action
taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED. [23]

On March 25, 2002, a Motion to Admit Second Amended Information,

which dropped the name of respondent Bernardino as one of the accused, was filed
in court.[24]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied under
Resolution[25] dated August 1, 2002.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. Petitioner argued that public respondent gravely abused his
discretion in disregarding all material evidence presented which clearly showed
that the affidavits of Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo had not been submitted during
the preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla. Contrary to the
pronouncement of the Secretary of Justice, the absence of said affidavits could not
be construed as an irregularity in the conduct of preliminary investigation. This
must be so since the March 30, 1999 resolution of Prosecutor Padilla explicitly
stated that if and when evidence be unearthed by the concerned authorities, the
case may still be re-filed against the other suspects, including Bernardo and
Bernardino, for conspiracy in the attempted murder of petitioner. Petitioner also
faulted the public respondent in granting the petition for review despite the same
having been filed out of time, more than one month after receipt of the DOJ
resolution.[26]
On June 14, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision sustaining the ruling of the
Secretary of Justice, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
questioned resolutions. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
by the CA.

Petitioner is now before this Court, alleging that

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW, AND AS SUCH THE INSTANT
PETITION SHOULD BE ALLOWED, WHEN, IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE DISREGARDING
THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE WITNESSES DATED APRIL 14, 1999
AND DECEMBER 2, 1999, IT RELIED HEAVILY ON A MERE
INFERENCE BASED NOT ON ESTABLISHED FACTS BUT ON
ANOTHER INFERENCE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW, AND AS SUCH THE INSTANT
PETITION SHOULD BE ALLOWED, WHEN, IN AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE REVERSING THE
INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS FINDINGS OF PROBABLE
CAUSE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT, IT DEPARTED
FROM THE ESTABLISHED FACTS, AND IN THE PROCESS,
FAILED TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT AND THOROUGH
DETERMINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
IN
LIGHT
OF
APPLICABLE
LAWS,
RULES
AND
[27]
JURISPRUDENCE.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in concluding that the decision of the
Secretary of Justice was supported with factual basis notwithstanding that its
conclusion that the new affidavits were executed upon the influence of persons
who merely wanted to indict respondent Bernardino, was based merely on another
inference - that there was considerable length of time before the said affidavits
were executed. He assails the CA which, like the Secretary of Justice, closed its
eyes on the clear indications of culpability appearing on the faces of the affidavits
presented during the reinvestigation. The CA disregarded these pieces of evidence
despite the same having established prima facie that respondent Bernardino is
probably guilty of the charge, for the reason alone that since the Secretary of
Justice himself doubts the veracity of the affidavits of Quirante, Ceballos and
Toledo, it would be embarrassing to compel [him] to prosecute the case.
On the other hand, respondent Bernardino in his Comment argued that the
plain, speedy and adequate remedy of petitioner from the ruling of the Secretary

of Justice should have been the trial courts resolution of the Motion for Leave to
File Second Amended Information which had been set for hearing, and not the
petition for certiorari he filed before the CA. He also insists that only one copy of
the March 20, 2000 Memorandum of Prosecutor Macinas was sent to the NBP
which was addressed to petitioner. It was only on July 4, 2000 that his family was
able to secure a copy from the Office of the City Prosecutor. As to the resolution
of public respondent Secretary, respondent Bernardino maintains that the Secretary
of Justice was correct in disregarding the new English affidavits as they were
subscribed by unlettered affiants who can hardly speak Filipino and know only the
Visayan dialect.
On its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the dismissal
of the petition as the Secretary of Justice committed no grave abuse of discretion in
modifying the ruling of Prosecutor Macinas by ordering the exclusion of
respondent Bernardino from the Information. Considering that the affidavits
indicting respondent Bernardino were executed after the initial preliminary
investigation and after an information was already filed in court, the Secretary of
Justice was justified in giving less credence to the said evidence.
We find the petition meritorious.
Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted. [28] To determine the existence of probable cause, there is
need to conduct preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes
a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. [29] Its purpose is to determine
whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause
to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering which
person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime.[30]
It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of
filing an information in court is an executive function which pertains at the first
instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. [31] The
Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after
which he shall direct theprosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding

information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or

move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.[32]
The Court considers it sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the
conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the Department of Justice ample
latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. [33] Its duty in
an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial
determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. [34]
However, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence
of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when
necessary for the orderly administration of justice. [35] Although policy
considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings,
courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances
warrant, to determine whether the prosecutors findings are supported by the facts,
or by the law.[36]
In this case, Secretary Perez disregarded the new (English) affidavits
executed by Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo, saying it was an afterthought or made
simply upon the prodding or influence of other persons. He also stated that
Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo all participated in the investigations of the Bureau
of Corrections. No mention, however, was made of the fact that said new
affidavits firmly reiterated what Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo declared in their
earlier Tagalog affidavits and their verbal admissions during the investigation
proceedings conducted by PGIII Lopez. These Tagalog affidavits in turn, although
executed two weeks after the initial preliminary investigation conducted by
Prosecutor Padilla, were properly admitted and considered by the investigating
officer, Prosecutor Macinas who took over during the reinvestigation of the
case. The recommendation of Prosecutor Padilla which initially found probable
cause only against Quirante, explicitly reserved the inclusion of Bernardo and
Bernardino whose complicity may eventually be established, by qualifying the
dismissal of the case as against them for insufficiency of evidence, with the words
without prejudice to the refiling of the same in the event that evidence against
them may be unearthed by concerned authorities. The reservation made by

Prosecutor Padilla for the inclusion of other persons who may have had complicity
in the commission of the crime was grounded on reasonable belief that there were
other conspirators or masterminds, on the basis of the findings of PGIII Lopez
during the investigation by the Bureau, the verbal admissions of Quirante and
Ceballos as to their culpability and the alleged masterminds they identified. Hence,
the English affidavits submitted during the reinvestigation cannot be considered an
afterthought and executed merely upon the influence of certain persons, and
Prosecutor Macinas properly admitted those in evidence.
Indeed, the English affidavits contained a reiteration and more detailed
account of the clubbing incident earlier given by Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo in
the Tagalog affidavits. In these affidavits executed on December 2, 1999, as well
as in the Tagalog affidavits dated April 14, 1999, they were consistent in pointing
to Bernardo and Bernardino as the masterminds with Aprid as accomplice, in the
crime charged. Further, the English affidavits fully explained the circumstances as
to why they were not able to give sworn statements during the Bureau investigation
and initial preliminary investigation conducted by Prosecutor Padilla, before whom
they subscribed their Tagalog affidavits, and the reason for the execution of new
affidavits in English which were subscribed before Prosecutor Macinas. Thus, the
pertinent portions of their individual affidavits in English read:
Affidavit of Roberto Ceballos
xxxx
On January 9th 1999 at around 10:00 a.m. inmate Constantino
Quirante was arrested by the ICA (Inmates Custodial Aide) who took
him to the Overseers Office for interrogation. I was arrested shortly
afterwards by the ICA and taken to their office also for
investigation. Inmate Constantino Quirante and I were then confined to
the Bartolina (disciplinary cell) where we remained for two months and
twenty one days (2 mos. 21 days) before being transferred to the
Maximum Security Compound.
Shortly after being confined in the disciplinary cell at the Medium
Security Compound, inmate Quirante and I were summoned to the
Maximum Security Compound for interrogation. We first went to the
office of Superintendent Agalo-os and made a joint statement which we
did not sign as we were nervous and a lawyer (Ace Aprids counsel I

think) was present. We were then taken to the ante-room of the

Directors office where inmate Dr. George Miller was with an Inspector
Lopez from the Bureaus Investigation Section and an [illegible]
Inspector Lopezs questions in Tagalog and Dr. Miller asked why those
people from ICAD wished to have him killed. We told him it was
because he had informed on them with a report to the
Superintendent. While confined in the Medium Security Compounds
Bartolina we were visited by Giovan Bernardino who told us to keep
quiet about what had happened and gave us hamburgers. He also
promised us money but this never materialized.
Later in the beginning of March we were escorted to the
Muntinlupa City Prosecutors Office for a preliminary hearing. We were
surprised nobody from ICAD was there but Miller said he would not
prefer charges against us provided we turned States witnesses and
deposed to a counter-affidavit exposing the masterminds, those in fact
who had commissioned the crime. Quirante and I requested the Asst.
Prosecutor Padilla for a few days within which to think about submitting
a counter-affidavit. The Asst. Prosecutor Padilla arranged a second
preliminary hearing which was on the 11th March 1999 when we
informed him we were still thinking it over. Afterwards when we were
transferred to the Maximum Security Compound we discovered the
Bureau of Corrections Investigation Section had commenced an inquiry
into the management of ICAD. We were summoned to the Penal
Superintendents office with inmate Rudy Toledo, when Quirante and I
gave a joint affidavit with Toledo giving another of his own account. All
three of us were then escorted to Assistant Prosecutor Padillas office
in Muntinlupa City when we swore in our respective affidavits. I
understand from Dr. Miller these affidavits have been misplaced and
he is unable to access copies from the Bureau of Corrections. I therefore
agreed to execute another deposition which differs from the joint
affidavit sworn earlier in that this is more thorough. [37]

Affidavit of Constantino Quirante

xxxx
On January 9th, I was urinating in front of building 5 when I was
called to the office of Inspector Del Prado. I changed into my issue
uniform at the brigada and proceeded to Inspector Del Prados office
where I was arrested. I admitted to the hit on Miller and that I was

acting on orders received from Boy Bernardo and Giovan Bernardino of

ICAD given to the BC 45 gang commander, Rudy Toledo. I was then
confined at the Medium Security Compounds disciplinary cell. Roberto
Ceballos, who had been arrested and interrogated by the ICA joined me
in the bartolina. Giovan Bernardino later visited us in the bartolina
bringing hamburgers but no money. Upon his request I promised to
keep quiet about the involvement of inmate Boy Bernardo and himself.
He assured me not to worry and that everything would be taken care of.
Round about Jan. 29th, Roberto Ceballos and I were escorted to
the office of Superintendent Agalo-os at the Maximum Security
Compound. We gave Superintendent Agalo-os a statement but did not
sign it. I believe the attorney of Ace Aprid was present so Ceballos and I
were nervous of signing. We were then taken to the ante room of the
Directors office where inmate Miller was present with Inspector Lopez
of the Investigation Section and an interpreter. We were asked a number
of questions in Tagalog by Inspector Lopez and Dr. Miller asked why
Bernardino and Bernardo wished him to be killed [illegible] myself
provided we completed a counter-affidavit naming Bernardo and
Bernardino as the masterminds. Asst. City Prosecutor Padilla said he
would give us some time to consider and he arranged a second
preliminary hearing for March 11th 1999. At the second meeting we
refused to give a counter-affidavit as we had not yet decided and also we
were worried.
Thereafter we were transferred to the Maximum Security
Compound on the 30th of March. Approximately one month later we
were called to the office of Superintendent Agalo-os with inmate Rudy
Toledo. Ceballos and I prepared a joint affidavit for the Bureaus
Investigation section and Rudy Toledo completed a sep[a]rate
affidavit. These handwritten affidavits were photocopied in
Super[intendent] Agalo-oss office by the Investigation Section Officer
and at approximately 4:00 p.m. we were escorted into Assistant City
Prosecutor Padillas office w[h]ere the affidavits were sworn.
This further affidavit is made at the request of Dr. Miller, as I
understand the prior affidavits sworn in front of Attorney Padilla have
disappeared and he has not been allowed access to the Bureau of
Correction[s] file copies with the Investigation Section. This affidavit
is more comprehensive and better than our first joint affidavit which was
hurriedly completed in manuscript. [38]

Toledos affidavit not only dovetailed with the above-mentioned

circumstances surrounding the execution of the two sets of affidavits, but also
positively identified Bernardo, Bernardino and Aprid as the masterminds and
detailed how the crime was planned and carried out on January 6, 1999. Thus:
xxxx
On or about December 15th, 1998 I had a meeting with inmate
Giovan Bernardino at the Inmates Crusade Against Drugs restaurant in
the Medium Security Compound of Camp Sampaguita. The meeting
was arranged by Giovan Bernardino when he spoke to me in my capacity
as commander of the BC 45 Gang (Medium Security Compound)
requesting that I arrange for some of my members to kill Dr. George
Miller of the Inmates Crusade Against Drugs. He offered the sum of one
thousand five hundred pesos (PHP 1,500.00) to be paid after the task was
accomplished. Initially, I refused to accept this mission. Thereafter, we
met several times in ICADs premises mainly, at the billiard table. At
each meeting, he endeavoured to persuade me of that which he required
earlier, namely to have some of my gang members kill inmate George
Miller. Everytime I refused inmate Bernardino said there was no need to
worry he was able to take care of everything afterwards. In January he
contacted me again when I was invited to ICADs offices where I
remember seeing a computer. Inmate Rodolfo Boy Bernardo, the
Chairman of the Inmates Crusade Against Drugs was present with
another ICAD member inmate, Ace Aprid, who was the Sigue Sigue
Sputnik commander of the Medium Security Compound. Inmates
Bernardo and Aprid were the colleagues of inmate Bernardino and all of
them wanted Miller killed as they stated he had submitted a report
concerning their activities in ICAD to Superintendent Agalo-os and was
responsible for ICADs premises being subjected to a search by sniffer
dogs at the Superintendents direction. Later I arranged for two of my
gang members, inmates Constantino Quirante and Roberto Ceballos,
who agreed to do as ICADs Bernardo, Bernardino and Aprid had
requested. This was the morning of the 6th of January and it was agreed
that Quirante would be the assassin while Ceballos was to be the
lookout. At the meeting it was planned that I would arrange for a
distraction to take place simultaneously when Quirante and Ceballos
where [sic] killing Miller. Inmate Millers movements to the High
School and elsewhere that day were closely monitored and in the
afternoon he went to the store of inmate Boy Sabater at the talipapa. I
organized Sinulog Dancing for the BC 45 Gang anniversary at Camp

Sampaguitas Plaza Compound with gang members to divert attention

from Quirantes and C[e]ballos assassination of Miller. When the
dancing was finished one of my men informed me that Miller was still
alive and had been sent to the NBP Hospital from the Camp Sampaguita
Infirmary. Quirante had struck Miller on the head from behind when he
left the talipapa but failed to kill him. Afterwards inmates Giovan
Bernardino and Ace Aprid gave Quirante and Ceballos the sum of one
hundred pesos (PHP100.00). They were not paid the promised one
thousand five hundred pesos (PHP1,500.00) as their mission was not
completed in that they failed to kill Miller.
In February I was transferred to the Maximum Security
Compound where I met Dr. Miller and informed him that I was prepared
to testify regarding the foregoing. Inmates Quirante and C[e]ballos had
been transferred earlier to the Maximum Security Compound after
confessing their involvement. Later the Bureau of Corrections carried
out an investigation regarding the affairs of ICAD when Quirante,
C[e]ballos and myself where [sic] summoned to the Penal
Superintendent Agalo-oss office. The Bureaus Investigation Section
then took an affidavit from me and a joint affidavit was completed by
Quirante and C[e]ballos. Thereafter we were escorted to the City
Prosecutor[s] Office in Muntinlupa City where the affidavits were
sworn in before the Assistant Prosecutor Padilla. Copies were taken for
the Investigation Sections file. I was informed by Dr. Miller that the
affidavits in the City Prosecutor[s] Office have disappeared and he
had been prevented to date from accessing the Bureau of Corrections
file, hence this further affidavit. [39]

Confronted with these evidence clearly showing prima facie that respondent
Bernardino was among those involved in the crime committed against petitioner,
Prosecutor Macinas was correct in finding probable cause, upon reinvestigation, to
include respondent Bernardino along with Bernardo, Aprid, Quirante, Ceballos and
Toledo as those who will be formally charged with attempted murder and
recommending the filing of an amended information for this purpose. In
modifying the said amended information by dropping the name of respondent
Bernardino, Secretary Perez gravely abused his discretion, his conclusion that the
new affidavits were mere afterthought being contrary to the facts on
record. Besides, the Secretarys act of absolving respondent Bernardino arbitrarily
ignored the consistent and categorical declarations of Quirante, Ceballos and

Toledo that respondent Bernardino together with Bernardo and Aprid instigated,
planned and ordered the attack on petitioner, harping solely on their belated
execution of affidavits even if such delay have been satisfactorily explained.
We need not over-emphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public
prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. [40] In a
preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties
evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or not there is
evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person. Onlyprima
facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or
defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain
sufficient. Therefore, matters of evidence, such as who are the conspirators, are
more appropriately presented and heard during the trial. [41]
The term probable cause does not mean actual and positive cause nor does
it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely,
there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.[42]
While it is this Courts general policy not to interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to
determine probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered to substitute their
judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without
or in excess of authority. [43] Where the Secretary of Justice dismissed the
complaint against the respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of
probable cause, such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a
reversal.[44] The CA thus clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary Perez
for the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder

despite a prima facie case against him having been established by the evidence on
record.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision dated June 14, 2004 and Resolution dated September 14, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72395 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Secretary of Justice is hereby DIRECTED to REINSTATE or REFILE with deliberate dispatch the Amended Information which included Giovan
Bernardino as accused in Criminal Case No. 99-452 of the National Capital
Judicial Region, Regional Trial Court of MuntinlupaCity, Branch 256.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSELITO DEL

ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the decision of the court a quo finding accused

Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs of the victim Virginia
Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages.[1]
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias
Boy Santos and John Doe alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot
and killed her.[2]
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded not guilty,[3] Virgilio Boy Santos and
John Doe alias Dodong remained at large. Ernesto Jun Marquez was killed in a
police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario was tried.

These facts were established by the prosecution from the eyewitness account of
tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the
evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nitas Drugstore, General Luna St.,
Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of about one
and a-half (1) meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del
Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2) men and a woman grappling for possession
of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of the two men armed with a gun started
chasing a man who was trying to help the woman, while the other snatcher kicked the
woman sending her to the ground. Soon after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken by the man was
brought to the tricycle of accused del Rosario where someone inside received the
bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the
sidecar. When the tricycle sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate
number of the tricycle. He also recognized the driver, after which he went to the nearest
police headquarters and reported the incident.[4]
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own version of the incident: At around 5:30
in the afternoon he was hired for P120.00[5] by a certain Boy Santos,[6] his coaccused. Their original agreement was that he would drive him to cockpit at the Blas
Edward Coliseum.[7] However, despite their earlier arrangement boy Santos directed him
to proceed to the market place to fetch Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya. He (del
Rosario) acceded.[8] Marquez and Bisaya boarded in front of the parking lot of Merced
Drugstore at the public market.[9] Subsequently, he was asked to proceed and stop at
the corner of Burgos and General Luna Sts. where Bisaya alighted on the pretest of
buying a cigarette. The latter then accosted the victim Virginia Bernas and grappled
with her for the possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted from the tricycle to help
Dodong Bisaya.[10] Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek help but Boy Santos
who stayed inside the tricycle prevented him from leaving and threatened in fact to
shoot him.
Meanwhile, Dodong Bisaya succeeded in taking the victims bag, but before
boarding the tricycle Jun Marquez mercilessly shot the victim on the head while she
was lying prone on the ground. After the shooting, Dodong Bisaya boarded the
sidecar of the tricycle while Jun Marquez rode behind del Rosario and ordered him to
start the engine and drive towards Dicarma. While inside his tricycle, del Rosario
overheard his passengers saying that they would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where
there were cogon grasses.[11] Upon arriving at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and
warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities about the incident otherwise he
and his family would be harmed.[12] Del Rosario then went home.[13] Because of the
threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the
barangay captain and the police.[14]
As earlier stated, the court a quo found accused Joselito del Rosario guilty as
charged and sentenced him to death. He now contends in this automatic review that
the court a quo erred in: (1) Not finding the presence of threat and irresistible force
employed upon him by his co-accused Virgilio Boy Santos, Ernesto Jun Marquez
and Dodong Bisaya; (2) Not considering his defense that he was not part of the
conspiracy among co-accused "Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya to

commit the crime of Robbery with Homicide; (3) Not considering the violations on his
constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of Court. [15]
The conviction of del Rosario must be set aside. His claim for exemption from
criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and
unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from
leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of the robbery and killing, and was only
forced to help them escape after the commission of the crime.[16]
But the trial court ruled that his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote,
hence, could not be considered uncontrollable; and that a gun pointed at him did not
constitute irresistible force because it fell short of the test required by law and
jurisprudence.[17]
We disagree. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like
one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is
exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito
factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force
contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who
acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must
be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury
is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity
for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.[18]
As a rule, it is natural for people to be seized by fear when threatened with
weapons, even those less powerful that a gun, such as knives and clubs. People will
normally, usually and probably do what an armed man asks them to do, nothing more,
nothing less. In the instant case, del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not
therefore be expected to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the
same circumstances would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security
rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day. [19]
Corollary with defense of del Rosario, we hold that the trial court erred when it said
that it was Boy Santos who left the tricycle to chase the companion of the victim and
then shot the victim on the head, instantly killing her.[20] A careful and meticulous
scrutiny of the transcripts and records of the case, particularly the testimonies of the
witness Alonzo and del Rosario himself, reveals that it was Jun Marquez who ran after
the victims helper and fired at the victim. Witness Alonzo testified on direct
examination Q: What was that unusual incident that transpired in that place at that time?
A: I saw two men and a lady grappling for the possession of a bag, sir x x x x
Q: What happened after the bag of the lady was grabbed by the two men?
A: One helper of the lady was chased by the other man, sir.
Q: Who was that man who chased the helper of the lady?

A: He was the one holding the gun, sir x x x x

Q: What happened when the bag of the woman was already taken by the two men who
grappled the same from her?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned to the scene while the other man
was then kicking the lady who in turn fell to the ground, sir.
Q: What happened to the lady who to the ground?
A: The man who chased the helper of the lady returned and then shot the woman who was
then lying on the ground, sir x x x x
Q: What about the bag, what happened to the bag?
A: The bag was taken to a motorcycle, sir.
Q: Will you please state before the Court what you noticed from the tricycle which was at a
distance of about one and a half meter?
A: There was a passenger inside the tricycle, sir x x x x
Q: What happened to that woman that was shot by the man who grappled for the
possession of the bag?
A: She was no longer moving and lying down, sir.
Q: After the shooting by one of the two men of the woman what else happened?
A: They went away, sir x x x x
Q: Will you please tell the Court in what portion of the tricycle did these men sit in the
tricycle?

A: The man who was holding the gun sat himself behind the driver while the other
man entered the sidecar, sir.[21]
On the continuation of his direct examination, after an ocular inspection on the
crime scene conducted by the trial court, witness Alonzo categorically stated
Q: Will you please tell us where in particular did you see the accused who was then holding
the gun fired at the victim?
A: At the time one man was kicking the victim it was then his other companion holding the
gun chased the helper of the deceased going towards Burgos Avenue, sir.
Q: What happen (sic) afterwards?
A: The man with the gun returned and then while the victim was lying down in this spot the
man holding the gun shot the victim, sir.[22]

On cross-examination, the same witness further clarified

Q: So, you saw the two other accused returned back to the tricycle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And one of their companion was already inside the tricycle?

xxxx

Court:

There was somebody inside the tricycle where the handbag was given.

xxxx
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And the one who sat at the back of the tricycle driver was the person with the
gun?
A: Yes, sir.[23]

On the other hand, accused Del Rosario declared during the direct examination that

Q: x x x x On the evening of May 13, 1996 you were the driver of the tricycle as testified to
by Eduardo Nalagon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you also heard that there was a shoot out near the Cathedral and the Nitas
Drugstore at Gen. Tinio St.?
A: Yes, sir.

xxxx
Court: At that time you were seated at the tricycle, which tricycle was used by the assailants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Then what did you do?
A: I tried to escape, sir, but I was stopped by them.
Q: When you said they to whom are you referring?
A: Boy Santos and Jun Marquez, sir.
Q: And at that time where was Boy Santos?

A: He was inside the tricycle, sir .

Q: And what about Jun Marquez?

A: He alighted from the tricycle and helped him grabbed (sic) the bag of the victim.
Q: And was the bag grabbed and by whom?
A: Yes, sir, by Dodong Visaya was able to grab the bag.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: Both of them rode inside my tricycle, sir.
Court:

Did you not see any shooting?

A: There was, sir.

Q: Who was shot?
A: Jun Marquez shot the woman, sir x x x x

Q: When the bag of the woman was being grabbed you know that what was transpiring was
wrong and illegal?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you did not try to leave?
A: I tried to leave but Boy Santos who was inside my tricycle prevented me.
Q: During that time before you leave (sic) how many firearms did you see?
A: Two firearms, sir, one in the possession of Boy (Jun?) Marquez and one in the
possession of Boy Santos x x x x
Q: And at the time when the shooting took place where was Boy Santos?
A: He was still inside my tricycle, sir.
Q: And during the shooting when Boy Santos was inside the tricycle and when you tried to
escape that was the time when Boy Santos threatened you if you will escape something
will happen to your family?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the shooting who first boarded the tricycle, Boy (Jun?) Marquez or Dodong Visaya?
A: Dodong Visaya, sir.
Q: And immediately thereafter Jun Marquez boarded your tricycle sitting at your back?
A: Yes, sir.[24]

On cross-examination, accused further stated

Q: After shopping in that place for one minute what else happened?
A: I saw Dodong Bisaya grabbing the bag of the woman, sir.
Q: How about your two companions, what are (sic) they doing while Dodong Bisaya was
grabbing the bag of the woman?
A: Jun Marquez was helping Dodong Bisaya, sir.
Q: What happened after Jun Marquez helped Dodong Bisaya?
A: I heard a gunshot and I saw the woman lying down x x x x
Q: You could have ran away to seek the help of the police or any private persons?
A: I was not able to ask for help because Boy Santos pointed his gun to me, sir.
Q: Was the gun being carried by Boy Santos, is the one that is used in shooting the old
woman?
A: No, sir x x x x.
Q: Where was Boy Santos when Dodong Bisaya and Jun Marquez were grappling for the
possession of the handbag?
A: He was then inside the tricycle, sir x x x x [25]

Q: Mr. Witness, you testified that the reason why you just cannot leave the area where the
incident occurred is because a gun was pointed to you by Boy Santos and he was telling
you that you should not do anything against their will, they will kill you and your family
will be killed also, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, is it not a fact that at the time you stop (sic) your tricycle which was loaded by your
other three co-accused in this case, all of them alighted and that Boy Santos ran after a
helper of the victim going towards the public market along Burgos Street?
A: He did not alight from the tricycle, sir.
Court: Are you quite sure of that?
A: Yes, sir.[26]

Del Rosario maintains that Boy Santos never left the tricycle and that the latter
pointed his gun at him and threatened to shoot if he tried to escape. He also asserted
that it was Jun Marquez who shot the victim and sat behind him in the tricycle.
From the narration of witness Alonzo, these events stood out: that after the bag of
the victim was grabbed, her male helper was chased by a man holding a gun; that the
gunwielder returned and shot the victim and then sat behind the driver of the tricycle;
and, the bag was given to a person who was inside the tricycle. Taking the testimony of
witness Alonzo in juxtaposition with the testimony of del Rosario, it can be deduced that
Jun Marquez was the person witness Alonzo was referring to when he mentioned that
a helper of the lady was chased by the other man and that this other man could not
be Boy Santos who stayed inside the tricycle and to whom the bag was handed
over. This conclusion gives credence to the claim of del Rosario that Boy Santos
never left the tricycle, and to his allegation that Boy Santos stayed inside the tricycle
precisely to threaten him with violence and prevent him from fleeing; that there could
have been no other plausible reason for Boy Santos to stay in the tricycle if the
accused was indeed a conspirator; that Boy Santos could have just left the tricycle and
helped in the commission of the crime, particularly when he saw the victim grappling
with Dodong Bisaya and resisting the attempts to grab her bag; and, that Boy Santos
opted to remain inside the tricycle to fulfill his preordained role of threatening del
Rosario and insuring that he would not escape and leave them behind. [27]
Even if the tricycle of del Rosario was only parked one meter and a half (1) in front
of the tricycle of witness Alonzo, the latter still could not have totally seen and was not
privy to events that were transpiring inside the vehicle, i.e., the pointing of the gun by
Boy Santos at del Rosario simultaneously with the robbing and shooting of the
victim. From the exhibits submitted by the prosecution panel the back of the sidecar of
del Rosario tricycle was not transparent.[28]
There is no doubt that the fear entertained by del Rosario because of the gun
directly pointed at him was real and imminent. Such fear rendered him immobile and
subject to the will of Boy Santos, making him for the moment of automaton without a will
of his own. In other words, in effect, he could not be any more than a mere instrument
acting involuntarily an against his will. He is therefore exempt from criminal liability

since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled against his will to transport his
co-accused away from the crime scene.
On the issue of conspiracy, the trial court anchored del Rosarios conviction on his
participation in the orchestrated acts of Boy Santos, Jun Marquez and Dodong
Bisaya. According to the trial court, del Rosario facilitated the escape of the other
malefactors from the crime scene and conspiracy between accused and his passengers
was evident because while the grappling of the bag, the chasing of the helper of the
victim and the shooting that led to the death of Virginia Bernas were happening,
accused Joselito del Rosario was riding on his tricycle and the engine of the motor was
running;[29] that the accused did not deny that the tricycle driven by him and under his
control was hired and used by his co-accused in the commission of the crime; neither
did he deny his failure to report to the authorities the incident of robbery, killing and
fleeing away from the scene of the crime.[30]
We disagree with the trial court. A conspiracy in the statutory language exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. The objective of the conspirators is to perform an act or omission
punishable by law. That must be their intent. There is need for concurrence of wills or
unity of action and purpose or for common and joint purpose and design. Its
manifestation could be shown by united and concerted action. [31]
Admittedly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy. Since by its nature
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can rarely be proved by direct
evidence. Consequently, the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in
conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is
proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred
though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be
termed an implied conspiracy.[32] Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or
approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence. In fact, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime
is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[33]
In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he
was the driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt
against him by asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of his coaccused to rob and kill since he was not given any briefing thereof. He was merely
hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreed destination and he was prevented at gunpoint
from leaving the scene of the crime since he was ordered to help them escape.

In this case, the trial court stated that "there is no evidence that the accused came
to an agreement concerning the commission of the felony and decided to commit the
same."[34] Therefore, in order to convict the accused, the presence of
an implied conspiracy is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the
fact that del Rosario was with the other accused when the crime was committed is
insufficient proof to show cabal. Mere companionship does not establish
conspiracy.[35] The only incriminating evidence against del Rosario is that he was at the
scene of the crime but he has amply explained the reason for his presence and the
same has not been successfully refuted by the prosecution. As stated earlier, he feared
for his safety and security because of the threat made by his co-accused that he would,
be killed should he shout for help. No complicity can be deduced where there is
absolutely no showing that the accused directly participated in the overt act of robbing
and shooting although he was with the persons who robbed and killed the victim. [36]
That del Rosario did not disclose what he knew about the incident to the authorities,
to his employer or to the barangay captain does not affect his credibility. The natural
hesitance of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice.[37] It must
be recalled that del Rosario was merely a tricycle driver with a family to look
after. Given his quite limited means, del Rosario understandably did not want to get
involved in the case so he chose to keep his silence. Besides, he was threatened with
physical harm should he squeal.
Del Rosario further contends that there was violation of his right to remain silent,
right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and
right to be informed of these rights as enshrined and guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights.[38] As testified to by SP04 Geronimo de Leon, the prosecution witness who was
the team leader of the policemen who investigated the 13 May incident, during his
cross-examination -

Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, they proceeded to Bakod
Bayan in the house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle
was summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and was invited
for interview. The driver was accused Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to
name his passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police station,
accused informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place
where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their
officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to
Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired that
lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter, they
went inside the house where they found Marquez dead holding a magazine
and a gun. While all of these were happening, accused del Rosario was at
the back of the school, after which they went back to the police station. The
investigator took the statement of the accused on May 14,1996, and was only
subscribed on May 22,1996. All the while, he was detained in the police
station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on May 16,

1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay

was done with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera.[39]
A further perusal of the transcript reveals that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma,
del Rosario was handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. [40]
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself
to elicit incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it encompasses any question
initiated by law enforcers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.[41] This concept of custodial
investigation has been broadened by RA 7438 [42] to include "the Practice of issuing
an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides that -

x x x x Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in

his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission
of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known and understood by
him of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to
confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he
must be provided with a competent and independent counsel by the
investigating officer.
From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was deprived of his rights during
custodial investigation. From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the house of
the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation, but he was
not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already
knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing
and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that
del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his
participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as
the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was unlawful since there was no warrant
therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:[43]

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has

committed it; and, (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the
police raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy. Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People
vs Sucro[44] we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance,
or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof,
he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113,
since the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In essence,
Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, requires that the accused be caught in flagrante delicto or
caught immediately after the consummation of the act. The arrest of del Rosario is
obviously outside the purview of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested on the day
following the commission of the robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113, necessitates two (2) stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected: (1) an offense has just been
committed; and (2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. Hence, there must be a large
measure of immediacy between the time the offense was committed and the time of the
arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. Aside from the sense of
immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the arrest must have personal
knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be taken into custody has
committed the crime.[45] Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these
requirements since, as earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation
of the crime and not immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just
committed" at the time the accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had
no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed
the offense since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime,
and they became aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during
the custodial investigation.
However the conspicuous illegality of del Rosario's arrest cannot affect the
jurisdiction of the court a quo because even in instances not allowed by law, a
warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and any objection thereto is waived when
the person arrested submits to arraignment without any objection, as in this case.[46]
A transgression of the law has occurred. Unfortunately, an innocent person lost her
life and property in the process. Someone therefore must be held accountable, but it
will not be accused Joselito del Rosario; we must acquit him. Like victim Virginia
Bernas, he too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with
nefarious designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible
force" has been substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. On the other hand,
conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a

doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime
charged.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
convicting accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide
and sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons
is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-93-983 August 7, 1995

GUILLERMA DE LOS SANTOS-REYES, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Pairing Judge, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan,respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In her complaint filed on 23 March 1993, Guillerma de los Santos-Reyes charges the respondent
judge with gross ignorance of law and evident dishonesty in the performance of his work in that he
granted bail to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 487-M-91, 488-M-91, and 488-M-91 without the
required petition for bail and without conducting any hearing to accord the prosecution an
opportunity to establish that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong.
In compliance with the resolution of 24 May 1993, the respondent judge filed his comment wherein
he disclosed that the issue raised was the subject of G.R. Nos. 108478 -79 1 pending before the
Second Division of this Court.

On 22 September 1993, this Court, upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), dismissed this case, "the issues raised . . . being sub-judice but without
prejudice to its revival should the Court in G.R. Nos. 108478-79 find the orders to have been issued
with grave abuse of discretion."
In the decision promulgated on 21 February 1994, 2 this Court dismissed G.R. Nos. 108478-79. The
complainant then filed on 23 November 1994 a motion to revive this complaint.

On 23 February 1995, the respondent judge filed an Additional Comment and Observation to stress
that what he did was to quash the warrant of arrest, determine probable cause on the basis of the

record and documents available, order the arrest of the accused, and grant bail to those against
whom the evidence of guilt was weak.
Issues having been joined and the revival of this complaint being in order, this Court required the
parties to manifest whether they agree to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings
they have submitted. In their separate manifestations, the parties responded in the affirmative.
The antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant complaint (as well as to G.R. Nos. 108478 -79)
are summarized in the decision in G.R. Nos. 108478-79 as follows:
On November 4, 1990, Patrolman Celso Reyes, Bgy. Captain Pedro Panganiban and
Armando Vitug were ambushed along Ipo-road, Kay-Pian, San Juan del Monte, Bulacan,
resulting in the untimely death of Reyes and Panganiban. The National Bureau of
Investigation conducted an inquisition of the incident and after which charged petitioners
Estelita Hipolito and Alfredo Bolsico, together with Romeo Adviento, Romeo Permejo,
Rolando Gozum and four (4) John Does with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose del Monte, then presided over by Judge Virginia
Pagarogon.
Judge Pagarogon conducted a preliminary investigation of the witnesses and on November
14, 1990 issued an order admitting the complaint and ordering the detention of all the
accused after finding that the crimes charged have been committed and there is reasonab le
ground to believe that the accused are probably guilty thereof. No bail was recommended.
Judge Pagarogon then forwarded the records of the cases to the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office of Bulacan for appropriate action. The Investigating Prosecutor, witho ut conducting a
thorough investigation of the cases, concluded that there was no probable cause and
ordered motu proprio the release of the accused from custody. So, the widow of Patrolman
Reyes petitioned the Department of Justice to disqualify the Provin cial Prosecutor's Office
from conducting the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases.
In due course, the DOJ acted favorably on the petition and designated State Prosecutor
Santiago Turingan to take over and handle the cases. The State Prose cutor found probable
cause for murder and frustrated murder against all the accused and consequently, they were
formally charged with said crimes on March 13, 1991, before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 487-M-91, 488-M-91 and 489-M-91. No
bail was recommended and the corresponding warrants of arrest were issued.
The accused were quick to learn of the filing of the informations. On the same day (March
13, 1991), they filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest," praying for the suspension of court proceedings on the ground that they are filing a
petition for review of the resolution of the State Prosecutor.
On March 21, 1991, the accused, who were not yet arrested or placed under the jurisdiction
of the trial court (after their precipitate release earlier), filed a "Petition to Grant Bail" in C.C.
Nos. 487-M-91 and 488-M-91 and a "Petition to Reduce Bail in C.C. No. 489-M-91.
On March 25, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying the petitions since the accused
had not yet surrendered and/or apprehended and, therefore, the court has not acquired
jurisdiction over their persons.

On the same day (March 25, 1991), the accused filed another petition entitled
"Reinstatement of the Petition to Grant Bail in the above entitled cases and Motion to
Reduce Bail Bond and Motion to Set Petition for Hearing with Manifestation to Surrender the
Accused on the Hearing of this Petition."
On April 4, 1991, the trial court, apparently with a change of heart, issued an order
consolidating the petitions for bail, set them for hearing on April 6, 1991, and directed the
DOJ and/or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the
preliminary investigation of the cases within ten (10) days from notice.
On April 15, 1991, petitioners filed an urgent motion to quash the warrants of arrest alleging
want of probable cause.
On April 22, 1991, the accused withdrew their motion for reinstatement of their petition for
bail bond and opted to pursue their motion to quash the warrants of arrest.
On May 2, 1991, the trial court quashed the warrants of arrest and set the hearing on May
15, 1991 for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause.
On May 17, 1991, after examining the records of the cases as forwarded to him by the
prosecution, the trial court found the existence of probable cause but instead of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest, for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of
the accused upon their apprehension or voluntary surrender, it ex mero motu granted bail to
them despite the absence of (because it was previously withdrawn) a petition for bail and,
worse, the lack of a hearing wherein the prosecution could have been accorded the right to
present evidence showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.
On August 23, 1991, the prosecution filed an omnibus motion praying for the cancellation of
the bail bonds as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest on the fundamental ground that
the trial court could not legally grant bail in a capital offense without the prosecution being
accorded the right to show that the evidence of guilt is strong.
On October 28, 1991, the trial court denied the prosecution's motion on the principal ground
that its questioned orders had become final and executory. On December 2, 1991, the
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
On March 3, 1992, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary
injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order before respondent Court of Appeals,
CA-G.R. S.P. No. 27430, assailing the following orders of the trial court: the May 17, 1991
order which granted bail to the accused; the October 28, 1991 order which denied the
prosecution's omnibus motion praying for the issuance of warrants of arrest's as well as the
cancellation of what it perceived to be irregularly posted bail bonds; and the December 2,
1991 order which denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration. Upon the filing of said
petition, respondent court issued the temporary restraining order.
On the other hand, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition before
the same court, CA-G.R. S.P. No. 27472, seeking: (a) to annul the orders of the trial court
resetting the hearings on different dates for being dilatory and violative of their constitutional
right to a speedy trial; (b) to command the trial court to dismiss with prejudice all the criminal
cases; and (c) to perpetually prohibit the prosecution of the criminal cases.

On July 31, 1992, respondent [Court of Appeals] ruled in favor of the prosecution. The
dispositive portion of its consolidated decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition (SP No. 27430) is hereby granted and the
questioned orders of respondent Court dated May 17, 1991, October 28,
1991, and December 2, 1991 are annulled and set aside. Accordingly, the
accused herein (private respondents) are ordered arrested/committed
pending the trial of their cases, without prejudice on their part to f ile in the
proper court a petition for bail after the arrest, detention or deprivation of their
liberty, wherein the prosecution is accorded the right to present evidence to
prove that evidence of guilt is strong. SP No. 27472, on the other hand, is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, considering that the delays incurred
herein were due to unavoidable circumstances and were therefore
reasonable in nature.
No costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner s Hipolito, et al. filed with this Court a
petition for review, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 108478-79, which, as earlier stated, was dismissed on 21 February 1994.
Respondent judge asserts that he is not administratively liable for what he did because he was
merely guided by the doctrine in Lim vs. Felix, 3 to the effect that the determination of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest should be personally determined by the judge. Since in these cases
the issuance of the warrants of arrest was based solely on the certification of the state prosecutor, he
granted the motion to quash the warrants of arrest and, considering that on the date of the hearing to
determine probable cause the witnesses for the prosecution did not appear and the private pros ecutor
submitted the issue on the basis of the proceedings had at the preliminary investigation and the affidavits
of witnesses, he formally resolved it on such basis. He further alleges that since he found the evidence
purely circumstantial, except as against Romeo Permejo who was positively identified as the gunman, he
believed that the evidence of guilt as against the others was not strong and, accordingly, admitted them to
bail in the amount of P80,000.00 each.

The explanation of the respondent judge is wholly unacceptable for, contrary to his belief that he has
shown perfect knowledge of the rules on the issuance of warrants of arrest and grant of bail, he has
demonstrated either gross ignorance of the constitutional and statutory principles and settled
jurisprudence thereon or gross incompetence which no claim of good faith can exculpate or even
mitigate.
From the above recitals of the factual and procedural antecedents of the criminal cases before the
trial court, it is obvious that the accused filed their petitions to grant bail and to reduce bail, motion to
reinstate petition to grant bail and urgent motion to quash warrants of arrests before the court
acquired jurisdiction over their persons either through the effective service and enforcement of the
warrants of arrest or their voluntary surrender, i.e., before they were placed in the custody of the law
or otherwise deprived of their liberty. Such being so, the trial court, initially, denied correctly the
petition for grant of bail but subsequently disregarded law and jurisprudence when it favorably acted
on the motion to reinstate the petition for grant of bail and set the motion for hearing on 6 April 1991,
directing, for that purpose the Department of Justice and the Office of the Provincial Prosecu tor to
forward to it the records of the preliminary investigation.

In this jurisdiction it is settled that a person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. 4 While it may be true that the disregard of this precept was not
consummated, it was not because the respondent judge corrected himself, but because the accused
withdrew their petition for the grant of bail and opted to pursue their urgent motion to quash the warrants
of arrest grounded on want of probable cause. Instead of retracing his steps back to the proper judicial
path, the respondent judge, still forgetting that the accused remained scot -free, not only quashed the
warrants of arrest, but, thereafter motu proprio converted, in effect, the "hearing" for the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest, which he set on 15 May 1991, to a hearing on
the matter of admission to bail, as his order of 17 May 1991 indisputably shows. In so doing, the
respondent judge had either utterly confused the proceeding to determine probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the proceeding on a petition for admission to bail, order deliberately
ignored the basic requisites for the grant of bail.

The determination of probable cause in the issuance of a warrant of arrest is mandated by Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution. 5 Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest means such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 6 A hearing is not necessary therefor. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge,
following the established doctrine and procedure, shall either (a) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, or (b) if on the face of the information he finds no probable cause,
he may disregard the prosecutor's certification and require the submission of the supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. 7

This procedure is dictated by sound public policy; otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing
and deciding cases filed before their courts. 8 At this stage of a criminal proceeding, the judge is not
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation; it is sufficient that
he personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining
probable cause. 9

This judicial function does not carry with it a motu proprio review of the recommendation of the
prosecutor in a capital offense that no bail shall be granted. Such a recommendation is the exclusive
prerogative of the prosecutor in the exercise of his quasi-judicial function during the preliminary
investigation, which is executive in nature. 10 In such cases, once the court determines that probable
cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the warrant of arrest shall forthwith be issued and i t is
only after the accused is taken into the custody of the law and deprived of his liberty that, upon proper
application for bail, the court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing
called for the purpose may, upon determination that such evidence is not strong, admit the accused to
bail. 11

Since the accused unilaterally withdrew their petition for bail, there was then nothing to be heard or
acted upon in respect thereof. Even if they did not withdraw their petition, they ha ve no right to
invoke the processes of the court since they have not been placed in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the filing of the information. For
the same reason, the court had no authority to act on the petition. 12
Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the application for bail was regularly filed, the
respondent judge wantonly ignored the due process requirement of hearing to afford the prosecution
reasonable opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the applicants is strong. 13 To grant an
application for bail and fix the amount thereof without such hearing duly called for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes ignorance or incom petence whose
grossness cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence 14 or constitutes

inexcusable conduct which reflects either gross ignorance of the law or cavalier disregard of its
requirements. 15

At the very least, the respondent judge exhibited gross incompetence. Gross ignorance of law and
incompetence are characteristics and quirks impermissible in a judge. A judge is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperat ive that
he be conversant with basic legal principles. 16 He should he studious of the principles of the law, 17 and
he must be faithful to the law and must maintain professional competence.

18

The respondent judge does not have an enviable record as a living personification of justice and the
rule of law.19
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-753, 20 for abuse of discretion, this Court censured the respondent
judge for issuing an order granting bail to an accused without affording the prosecution the opport unity to
present evidence to show that the evidence of guilt was strong.

In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-91-742, 21 for gross ignorance of law and serious misconduct, the
respondent judge was admonished to be more circumspect in the resolution of the cases before him and
given a last warning that any form of infraction cases hereafter would be dealt with severely.

The respondent judge has indisputably failed to comply with the strict and exacting demands of the
public-trust character of his office.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of law or incompetence and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, respondent Judge CAMILO O. MONTESA, JR., Presiding Judge of Branch 18
of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the s ervice with forfeiture
of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or service of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. His dismissal shall take effect immediately
upon his receipt of a copy of this decision which must be personally served by the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to the records of the respondent with this Court.
SO ORDERED.

with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally
question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page
by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on
his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions.
At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ".
. . probable cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.

If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of
the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and
reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his
own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge
denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that th e mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient
for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine
the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary
documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the
circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the
Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discre tion for, after all, the
personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as
the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's
certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and
witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case
so require.
It is worthy to note that petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim presented to the respondent
Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were used to establish a prima
facie case against them. Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in
the determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial (Tan Ang Bun v. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. L-47747, February 15, 1990, People v. Lao Wan Sing, 46 SCRA 298 [1972]) the
respondent Judge before issuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over
the records of the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence now
presented by the concerned witnesses in view of the "political undertones" prevailing in the cases.
Even the Solicitor General recognized the significance of the recantations of some witnesses when
he recommends a reinvestigation of the cases, to wit:
It must be pointed out, however, that among the documents attached to this Petition
are affidavits of recantation subsequently executed by Jimmy Cabarles and Danilo
Lozano and an affidavit executed by one, Camilo Sanano, father of the complainant's
witnesses, Renato and Romeo Sanano. It was precisely on the strength of these
earlier written statements of these witnesses that the Municipal Trial Court of
Masbate found the existence of a prima facie case against petitioners and
accordingly recommended the filing of a Criminal Information. Evidently, the same
written statements were also the very basis of the "Fiscal's Certification", since the
attached affidavits of recantation were not yet then available. Since the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses is now assailed and put in issue and, since the petitioners
have not yet been arraigned, it would be to the broader interest of justice and fair
play if a reinvestigation of this case be had to secure the petitioners against hasty

prosecution and to protect them from an open and public accusation of crime, from
the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from
useless and expensive trials (Salonga v. Pao G.R. No. 59524, February 18,1985).
(Rollo of G.R. Nos. 94054-56, pp. 200-201)
We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from
relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The exte nt of the reliance depends
on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the
Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest.
Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's
certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other
basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are hereby GRANTED. The questioned Order of respondent
Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared
NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction issued in the instant Petitions are made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-8666. March 28, 1956.]

NATALIO P. AMARGA, provincial fiscal of Sulu, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE MACAPANTON ABBAS, as
Judge, of the Court of First Instance of Sulu, Respondent.
D ECIS ION
PARAS, C.J.:
The Petitioner, the Provincial Fiscal of Sulu, filed in the Court of First Instance of Sulu an information for
murder (criminal case No. 1131, People of the Philippines vs. Madpirol, Awadi, Rajah, Sali, Insa and
Maharajah Bapayani). At the foot of the information the Petitioner certified under oath that he has
conducted the necessary preliminary investigation pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 732.
As the only supporting affidavit was that of Iman Hadji Rohmund Jubair, to the effect that the latter
was told that the deceased was shot and killed by three persons named:
Hajirul Appang, Rajah
Appang and Awadi Bagali, and the Petitioner had failed or refused to present other evidence sufficient
to make out a prima facie case, theRespondent judge issued an order the dispositive part of which reads
as follows: In view of the foregoing considerations, and considering that the only affidavit supporting
the information does not make out a prima facie case, this case is hereby ordered dismissed without
prejudice to reinstatement should the provincial fiscal support his information with record of his
investigation which in the opinion of the court may support a prima facie case.
chanr obles vir t uallawlibr ar y

chanrob
les vir t u
alawlibr ary

Whereupon the Petitioner instituted in this court the present petition for certiorari and mandamus,
wherein it is contended that, as he had already conducted a preliminary investigation, it became the
ministerial function of the Respondent judge to issue the corresponding warrant of arrest upon the filing
of the information in criminal case No. 1131.
Upon the other hand, the Respondent judge argues that the issuance of a warrant of arrest involves a
judicial power which necessarily imposes upon him the legal duty of first satisfying himself that there is
probable cause, independently of and notwithstanding the preliminary investigation made by the
provincial fiscal under Republic Act No. 732;
and to that end he may require the fiscal to submit such
evidence as may be sufficient to show at least a prima facie case.
chanr obles vir tualawlibrary

Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. As was said in the case of U.S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil., 1,
41-42, The question whether probable cause exists or not must depend upon the judgment and
discretion of the judge or magistrate issuing the warrant. It does not mean that particular facts must
exist in each particular case. It simply means that sufficient facts must be presented to the judge or
magistrate issuing the warrant to convince him, not that the particular person has committed the crime,
but that there is probable cause for believing that the person whose arrest is sought committed the
crime charged. No rule can be laid down which will govern the discretion of the court in this matter. If
he decides, upon the proof presented, that probable cause exists, no objection can be made upon
constitutional grounds against the issuance of the warrant. His conclusion as to whether probable
cause existed or not is final and conclusive. If he is satisfie d that probable cause exists from the facts
stated in the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then his conclusion is
sufficient upon which to issue the warrant for arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call such
witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. The issuance of the warrant of arrest is
prima facie evidence that, in his judgment at least, there existed probable cause for believing that the
person against whom the warrant is issued is guilty of the crime charged. There is no law which prohibits
him from reaching the conclusion that probable cause exists from the statement of the prosecuting
attorney alone, or any other person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of
the judge or magistrate.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the Petitioner under Republic Act No. 732 which formed the
basis for the filing in the Court of First Instance of Sulu of criminal case No. 1131 does not, as correctly
contended by the Respondent judge, dispense with the latters duty to exercise his judicial power of
determining, before issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists
therefor. The Constitution vests such power in the Respondent judge who, however, may rely on the
facts stated in the information filed after preliminary investigation by the prosecuting attorney.
While the Respondent Judge was within his right in requiring the Petitioner to submit further evidence
so as to show probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, he exceeded his jurisdiction in
dismissing the case which was filed with the Court of First Instance of Sulu not merely for purposes of
preliminary investigation. In other words, the failure or refusal of thePetitioner to present further
evidence, although good as a ground for the Respondent Judge not to issue a warrant of arrest, is not a
legal cause for dismissal.
Wherefore, the petition is granted and the Respondent Judge ordered to proceed with criminal case No.
1131 in accordance with law, it being understood that, if within ten days after notice by
the Respondent Judge, the Petitioner still fails or refuses to present other necessary evidence, the
dismissal will stand for lack of prosecution. Without costs.

Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988

20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and FORTUNE
LEDESMA, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Office for petitioner.
B.C. Salazar & Associates for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner questions the application of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and
seizures to raids conducted in connection with the government's anti-film piracy campaign. The main
issue hinges on whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon
the application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the complaint filed by the
petitioner.
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through
counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches
and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the lettercomplaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant
violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants ag ainst
the video outlets owned by the private respondents. The applications were consolidated and heard
by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.
Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video
outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left
with the private respondents.

Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private
respondents, the lower court issued an order dated October 8, 1985, lifting the three (3) search
warrants issued earlier against the private respondents by the court. The dispositive portion of the
order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that Search Warrants Nos. SW- 85-024;
issued against Eduardo M. Barreto of the Junction Video, etc., Paranaque, Metro
Manila; SW No. 85-025, issued against Raul M. Sagullo of South Video Bug Center,
Inc., etc., also of No. 5355 Pres. Avenue BF Homes, Paraaque, Metro Manila; and
SW No. 85-026, issued against Fortune A. Ledesma of Sonix Video Services of San
Antonio Plaza, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, be lifted.
Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of the three sea rch warrants which
could not be a basis of any criminal prosecution, now in the possession of the
National Bureau of Investigation which under the law must be delivered to this Court,
but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby ordered to be returned to the ir owners
through their lawyer, Atty. Benito Salazar or his agents or representatives, against
proper receipt, to be forwarded to this Court for record purposes, as proof that said
properties have been returned to the possession of the rightful owners." (p . 34, Rollo)
The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in its order dated January
2, 1986.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul the October 8, 1985 and
January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court. The petition was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue hinges on the meaning of "probable cause" within the context of the constitutional
provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section 3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution, now,
Section 2, Article Ill, 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the questioned search warrants after finding the
existence of a probable cause justifying their issuance. According to the petitioner, the lower court
arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses which
were taken through searching questions and answers by the lower court.
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution which substantially reproduces Section 3, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution on illegal searches and seizures provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable invasion of his privacy
and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We have explained in the case of People v.
Burgos (144 SCRA 1) citingVillanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's
home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293
119661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 630
[1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure
and the Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize constitutional right as the
embodiment of a "spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards."(ibid, p. 74).
The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers and effects is
circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches and seizures provision of the
Constitution.
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133 SCRA 800), we defined probable cause for a
valid search "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched." This constitutional provision also demands "no
less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the
issuance of a search warrant may be justified" in order to convince the judge, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of a probable cause.
(Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, supra).
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search warrants against the private
respondents on the ground that it acted on the application for the issuance of the said search
warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that
infringement of copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower court
stated in its questioned order dated January 2,1986:
According to the movant, all three witnesses during the proceedings in the
application for the three search warrants testified of their own personal knowledge.
Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of the
Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video cassettes that were
pirated, so that he did not have personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The
witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated without stating the
manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.
On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes
was from master tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because,
according to him, it is of his personal knowledge.

At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino
Reyes testified that when the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the
master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made
comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man Bacani. Why the master
tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare
statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand. "
Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude to the filing of criminal
cases under PD 49, the copyright infringement law, and although what is required for
the issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause, that probable cau se
must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is a time- honored precept that proceedings to
put a man to task as an offender under our laws should be interpreted in strictissimi
juris against the government and liberally in favor of the alleged offender.
xxx xxx xxx
This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of fact it had been
enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973 Constitution.
So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that master tapes were viewed by
the NBI and were compared to the purchased and seized video tapes from the
respondents' establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by competent
evidence and for that matter the probable cause hovers in that grey debatable
twilight zone between black and white resolvable in favor of respondents herein.
But the glaring fact is that 'Cocoon,' the first video tape mentioned in the search
warrant, was not even duly registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of
Opposition p. 152 record). So, that lacking in the requisite presentation to the Court
of an alleged master tape for purposes of comparison with the purchased evidence
of the video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from respondents, there was no
way to determine whether there really was piracy, or copying of the film of the
complainant Twentieth Century Fox." (pp. 37-39, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable
cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI agents who
acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which
was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel
who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that he
had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated
tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give
much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated
tapes were not shown to the court during the application.
All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it lifted the three questioned
search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to the petitioner's allegation that the lower court based
its January 2, 1986 order only "on the fact that the original or master copies of the copyrighted films
were not presented during the application for search warrants, thus leading it to conclude that it had
been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses." (p. 17, Rollo)

The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in their
possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the
master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely evidentiary
in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of
the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes
were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner
pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court the
copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated
to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the
copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
Furthermore, we note that the search warrants described the articles sought to be seized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
c) Television sets, Video Cassettes Recorders, rewinders, tape head
cleaners, accessories, equipments and other machines used or
intended to be used in the unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease
distribution of the above-mentioned video tapes which she is keeping
and concealing in the premises above-described." (p. 26, Rollo)
In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP supra, we stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
l] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
cabinets, tables communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the 'WE FORUM' newspaper
and any and all document/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to
"WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the 'WE FORUM and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas (379 U.S. 476,13 L ed 2nd 431), the search warrant
which authorized the search for 'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas,"
was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner,
directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise' have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which
authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54 197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]"' was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid (68 Am. Jur. 2d.,
pp. 736-737). The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. (at pp. 814-815)
Undoubtedly, a similar conclusion can be deduced from the description of the articles sought to be
confiscated under the questioned search warrants.
Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders and tape cleaners are articles which can be
found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax
tapes. In short, these articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate
business not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws.
Hence, including these articles without specification and/or particularity that they were really
instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes The search warrant too general which could result
in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually happened in the instant
case. Thus, the lower court, in its questioned order dated October 8, 1985 said:
Although the applications and warrants themselves covered certain articles of
property usually found in a video store, the Court believes that the search party
should have confined themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence
constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of intellectual property, but
not to other articles that are usually connected with, or related to, a legitimate
business, not involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of copyright
laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a whiteboard listing Betamax tapes,
video cassette cleaners video cassette recorders as reflected in the Returns of
Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged in the video tape
industry, and which could not be the subject of seizure, The applicant and his agents
therefore exceeded their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate personal property
usually found in a video cassette store or business establishment." (p. 33, Rollo)

All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lowe r court when it lifted the search
warrants it earlier issued against the private respondents. We agree with the appellate court's
findings to the effect that:
An assiduous examination of the assailed orders reveal that the main ground upon
which the respondent Court anchored said orders was its subsequent findings that it
was misled by the applicant (NBI) and its witnesses 'that infringement of copyright or
a piracy of a particular film have been committed when it issued the questioned
warrants.' Stated differently, the respondent Court merely corrected its erroneous
findings as to the existence of probable cause and declared the search and seizure
to be unreasonable. Certainly, such action is within the power and authority of the
respondent Court to perform, provided that it is not exercised in an oppressive or
arbitrary manner. Indeed, the order of the respondent Court declaring the existence
of probable cause is not final and does not constitute res judicata.
A careful review of the record of the case shows that the respondent Court did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it issued the questioned orders. Grave
abuse of discretion' implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.' But
far from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders were motivated by a noble
desire of rectifying an error, much so when the erroneous findings collided with the
constitutional rights of the private respondents. In fact, the petitioner did not even
contest the righteousness and legality of the questioned orders but instead
concentrated on the alleged denial of due process of law." (pp. 44 -45, Rollo)
The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the gove rnment of much needed
revenues but is also an indication of the widespread breakdown of national order and discipline.
Courts should not impose any unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy campaign.
However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards. To say that the problem
of pirated films can be solved only by the use of unconstitutional shortcuts is to denigrate the long
history and experience behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill of Rights. The trial court
did not commit reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-35149 June 23, 1988

EDUARDO QUINTERO, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HON. ELIAS ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, and HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, City Fiscal of Pasay City, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
Supervening events, like the February 1986 revolution and the reported death in th e United States of
herein petitioner, of which the Court cannot however take cognizance (in the absence of formal
notice from the parties), could be the most convenient grounds for declaring this case closed and
terminated. But the convenient way is not necessarily the proper judicial recourse, especially when
the issues raised remain contentions, sharpened by the persuasive force of enlightened advocacy,
and which not even the impact of such supervening events has succeeded to meet.
Besides, what the Court says and decides today in this case may well be the source of wisdom for
succeeding governments which should all be determined, at the very least, to avoid the excesses
and, therefore, fatal pitfalls of a past regime.
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, with preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to
annul and declare as void and without legal effect Search Warrant No. 7, issued on 31 May 1972 by
respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, as wel l as all acts
and proceedings taken thereunder.
The antecedents, now a part of the country's political history, are as follows:
On 19 May 1972, petitioner Eduardo Quintero, delegate of the first district of Leyte to the 1971
Constitutional Convention (Con-Con, for short) delivered a privilege speech 1 at a plenary session of
the Con-Con. In his speech, Delegate Quintero disclosed that, on different occasions, certain persons
had distributed money to some delegates of the Con-Con, apparently in an effort to influence the
delegates in the discharge of their functions. As an offshoot of this disclosure, Delegate Quintero
delivered to the Con-Con the aggregate amount of the "payola" he himself had received, the amount of
eleven thousand one hundred fifty pesos (P11,150.00) in cash, preserved intact for delivery to the proper
officials of the Con-Con, for whatever action it may wish to take on the matter. Delegate Quintero,
however, did not reveal the names of the persons who gave him the money; and he begged at t hat time
not to be made to name names. 2

However, pressure mounted on Delegate Quintero to reveal the Identities of the people behind the
"payola" scheme. Hence, on 30 May 1972 (the day after he returned from Tacloban City, where he
had attended the funeral of his brother), Delegate Quintero released from his hospital bed in San
Juan de Dios Hospital, where he was hospitalized due to an indisposed condition, a sworn statement
addressed to the Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con, mentioning the names of the persons
who gave him the "payola." The full text of the sworn statement released by Delegate Quintero is
quoted hereunder:
Republic of the Philippines
1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Manila

THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVILEGES

1971 Constitutional Convention
Manila Hotel
Manila
Thru: THE PRESIDENT
1972 Constitutional Convention
Dear Colleagues:
Complying with your request that I shed more light on the privileged
speech which I delivered on the floor of the Convention last May
19,1972, I wish to state under oath the following facts, without
prejudice to supplying additional details:
1. Amount No. 1. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me
at the Manila Hotel on March 19, 1971, by Delegate Gabriel Yniquez. He later made
me understand it from the First Lady.
2. Amount No. 2. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received from
the office of Representative Nicanor Yniquez of Southern Leyte on April 22, 1971.
3. Amount No. 3. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received from
Mrs. Paz Mate (wife of Congressman Mate of Leyte) in May 1971. She told me that
other delegates from Leyte were being given the same amount of money by the First
Lady.
4. Amount No. 4. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was received in
the house of Congressman Marcelino Veloso on June 2, 1971 from Delegate
Domingo Veloso at Bayview Hotel, Manila. Other envelopes were also given to other
Samar-Leyte delegates.
5. Amount No. 5. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me
by Delegate Jaime Opinion on June 10, 1971 in the suite of Delegate Domingo
Veloso at the Bayview Hotel, Manila. Other envelopes were also given to other
Samar-Leyte delegates.
6. Amount No 6 P500.00 The envelope containing this amount was handed to me
by Delegate Domingo Veloso in the Convention Hall on June 23, 1971. He made me
understand it came "from the same source."
7. Amount No. 7. P2,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to
me by Delegate Ramon Salazar on June 27, 1971, in the residence of De legate
Augusta Syjuco. Delegate Salazar told me that the First Lady met Samar -Leyte
delegates that noon and since I was not in that meeting, the money was being sent
to me.

8. Amount No. 8. P200.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me
by Delegate Domingo Veloso on June 28, 1971 during a party given by President
and Mrs. Diosdado Macapagal for the delegates and their ladies. Delegate Veloso
told me the money came from Delegate Augusta Syjuco.
9. Amount No. 9. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to me
by Delegate Federico dela Plana at the Convention Hall on July 13, 1971.
10. Amount No. 10. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was left inside
my drawer in the Convention Hall on August 5, 1971 by Delegate Constantin o
Navarro, Jr. He said it came from Delegate Venancio Yaneza.
11. Amount No. 11. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was placed on
my desk under a piece of paper in the session hall on August 11, 1971 by Delegate
Constantino Navarro, Jr. He said it came from Delegate Venancio Yaneza.
12. Amount No. 12. P450.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to
me by Delegate Domingo Veloso on September 6,1971. He said it came "from
Imelda." According to Delegate Veloso, Yniquez took from the envelo pe P50.00 for
an unnamed delegate.
13. Amount No. 13. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to
me on September 23, 1971 by Delegate Domingo Veloso near the men's room. He
said it came "from the First Lady."
14. Amount No. 14. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to
me on October 6, 1971 by Delegate Domingo Veloso near the office of the Sergeant at-Arms. Two other delegates, Delegate Damian Aldaba and Delegate Antero
Bongbong, received an envelope each that same afternoon.
15. Amount No. 15. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to
me by Delegate Gabriel Yniquez on December 2, 1971 at the entrance of the
Oakroom.
16. Amount No. 16. P1,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed
to me by Delegate Gabriel Yniquez on January 13,1972. He said. "This is for the
months of December and January.
17. Amount No. 17. P500.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed to
me on March 7, 1972 by Delegate Flor Sagadal, in the session hall. The envelope
was covered by a piece of paper which Delegate Sagadal placed on my desk.
18. Amount No. 18. P1,000.00 The envelope containing the amount was handed
to me by Delegate Damian Aldaba on May 8, 1972. He said it came from Delegate
Gabriel Yniquez.
In my privilege speech, I also said that "in that same evening of January 6,1972, after
the dinner was over, when we were still inside the Malacanang grounds on our way
to our cars, one of the delegates made this announcement: "The envelopes are
ready. They will be distributed in a couple of days." There was sepulchral silence
from the other delegates."

The delegate who made that announcement was Delegate Casimiro Madarang of
Cebu.
Yours
very
sincere
ly,
(Sgd)
EDUA
RDO
QUINT
ERO
Delega
te
First
District
of
Leyte. 3
Thus, the then First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, among others, was implicated in the Quintero in
expose. Hours after Delegate Quintero's statement was made public, then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos went on the air as well as on TV to denounce Mr. Quintero, and Mr. Marcos averred that he
"shall not rest until I have unmasked this pretender, his master -minds and accomplices." 4
The following day, 31 May 1972, Mr. Marcos also made a statement which was reported in the
Bulletin issue of 1 June 1972, as follows:
The President said he had already taken up the matter with his legal counsel and
that unlike the Quintero expose, he was preparing a "meticulous, circumspect and
legal" case against this tool of the hate Marcos group.
The President said his report from witnesses who would soon be presented showed
that the Quintero affidavit was originally prepared in the office of Senator Salonga, a
known oppositionist, and signed by a notary public who also works in the Salonga
law office.
The document according to the President, was brought to the hospital room of
Quintero and there it was signed by the Leyte delegate. The President said that at
the proper time and at the proper occasion, he would complete the jigsaw puzzle of
the case.
We will prove the personal motivation of this witness who turned about and sought to
implicate the name of the First Lady, after previously making public statements to the
effect that the First Family had nothing to do with this affair," the President said.
We will prove that this delegate came to Malacanang demanding money from the
President and the First Lady, and had been denied.

We will prove that this delegate has engaged in other immoral activities violative of
his oath as a delegate, as lawyer and which rendered him unacceptable as witness
to anything whatsoever.
The President said that while he suffered so much in the past over the verification
heaped on him, he had never seen a man who could stoop so low as to implicate the
First Lady on hearsay simply because the First Family had refused to give him
money.
I am passionate about this dastardly act," the President said. "I would, if necessary,
spend the rest of my life to uncover the person or persons behind this act. Quintero
was just a tool in the hands of these people. (Manila Bulletin, Thursday, June 1,
1972). 5
In the evening of the same day that Mr. Marcos issued the afore -quoted statement, the agents of the
respondent National Bureau of Investigation (NBI, for short) raided the house of Delegate Quintero,
at 2281 Mayon St., Sta., Aria, Manila, on the basis of Search Warrant No. 7 issued also on 31 May
1972 by respondent Judge Elias Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the raid,
said NBI agents claimed to have found in the Quintero residence, and therefore seized, bu ndles of
money amounting to P379,000.00.
On 1 June 1972, the NBI filed with the City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal complaint for direct bribery
against Delegate Quintero. The fiscal immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation in relation
thereto.
On 5 June 1972, Delegate Quintero availed of the present recourse.
On 6 June 1972, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the use in any proceeding
of the objects seized by the respondent NBI from the Quintero residence. The 1935 Constitution
which was in force at the time of the issuance of the questioned search warrant, provides:
Article IIIBill of Rights
Section 1 (3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searche d, and the persons or
things to be seized.
Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provided:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determine d by the
judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

Under the aforequoted provisions, a search warrant may issue only upon the finding of the judge of
"probable cause," and the latter has been defined as "such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 6
In the case at bar, the questioned search warrant was issued by respondent Judge, upon application
of NBI agent Samuel Castro. Said application was accompanied by an affidavit of the complainant,
Congressman Artemio Mate, whose affidavit was allegedly made also before the respondent judge.
The interrogations conducted by the respondent judge, upon the applicant NBI agent Samuel
Castro, showed that the latter knew nothing, of his own personal knowledge, to show that Mr.
Quintero had committed any offense. Said interrogation is quoted hereunder:
Interrogations Conducted by Judge Elias B. Asuncion Upon NBI
Agent Samuel Castro, this 31st day of May 1972 at City Hall, Manila
Questions by the Court:
(Witness Being Sworn To In Accordance With Law')
Q. Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
A. Samuel Castro, of legal age, married and NBI Agent, Manila.
Q. You are applying for a search warrant, what are the facts upon
which you base your application?
A. Facts gathered from my investigation on Congressman Artemio
Mate of Leyte who declared to us that he has seen Delegate Eduardo
Quintero receive bribe money from two men as a consideration of
signing a statement which he submitted to the Committee on
Privileges of the Constitutional Convention.
Q. Do you know where the bribe money is now kept?
A. We have reason to believe that the bribe money is now kept in the
residence of Delegate Eduardo Quintero at 2281 Mayon St., Sta.
Ana, Manila.
That is all.
Certification
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a record of the proceedings I took on my
interrogation of NBI agent Samuel Castro, the questions having been asked by me
and the answers given by NBI agent Samuel Castro in connection with his
application for a search warrant.
May 31,1972, Manila.

(Sgd) Elias B.
Asuncion
Judge
Branch XII, CFI

On the other hand, the sworn statement of Congressman Mate states:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
CITY OF MANILA
INTERROGATION BY JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
UPON CONGRESSMAN ARTEMIO MATE IN
CONNECTION WITH AN APPLICATION FOR
SEARCH WARRANT AT THE CHAMBER OF JUDGE
ELIAS B. ASUNCION THIS 31ST DAY OF MAY,
1972.
COURT QUESTIONING: (After Deponent was sworn to in accordance with law)
Q Please state your name and other personal circumstances.
A Artemio Mate, of legal age, married, Congressman of the first
district of Leyte, and a resident of Tacloban.
Q Why are you here, Congressman?
A I would want to declare in connection with the fact that Delegate
Eduardo Quintero had received half a million pesos as a
consideration for having signed an affidavit, or statement.
Q What about this affidavit or statement?
A It is his affidavit which he released to the Committee on Privileges
of the Constitutional Convention naming certain persons as having
doled out to him on various occasions sums of money contained in
envelopes.
Q Why do you say that Delegate Quintero received half a million
pesos as consideration of his having signed that affidavit?
A Because when I went to the San Juan De Dios Hospital in the
evening of May 29, 1972 where Delegate Eduardo Quintero is
confined, for the purpose of greeting him on his birthday, as I was
about to enter Room Number 307, I saw two persons at his bedside.
On seeing, them, I did not enter the room because from the door
screen I noticed that they were in serious huddle. So I stayed behind
the door screen which kept me out from their view. While there, I
heard one of them say that "half of the amount" promised will be

delivered immediately provided that he (Delegate Quintero) agrees to

sign the statement which he was then holding, after the person pulled
out a folder from his brief case. Then, I heard Delegate Quintero
asked. "Where is the half.?" At this time, one of the two was holding a
suitcase from the other man and then said: "Here it is," as he opened
a little the suitcase. As the suitcase was half-opened, I saw bundles
of money inside the suitcase.
Q Then, what happened?
A The suitcase was closed, and then I saw Delegate Quintero took
the folder from that person and Delegate Quintero placed the folder
under his pillow, while he was nodding as if saying "yes."
Q After that, what happened?
A The two stood up, together with Mrs. Quintero and after wishing
Delegate Quintero for speedy recovery, they were then walking
towards the door. Then, I heard Mrs. Quintero say to her husband
that it would be better for her to bring home the suitcase, and
Quintero agreed, So, Mrs. Quintero and the two men left together.
One of them offered to carry the suitcase for Mrs. Quintero. As they
were already going out, I pretended to have just arrived and so we
met.
Q What happened when you met them?
A I asked Mrs. Quintero where she was going, and she replied
nervously that she was going to their Sta Ana residence.
Q Why do you say that the money in the suitcase was for the
payment of Delegate Quintero's signing of the statement?
A Because we had an antecedent conversation with Mrs. Quintero
when we were still in Tacloban. There was one time I, and Delegate
Ramon Salazar, went to the house of Delegate Quintero at Tacloban
City. This was at the eve of the burial of the deceased brother of
Quintero. At this time, Delegates Feria and Occena were also in the
house of Delegate Quintero and we were informed that those two Feria and Occena were with Delegate Quintero in his room. So, we
wanted to see them also. As we were going up the stairs of the house
to The second floor, we were met by Mrs. Quintero. Mrs. Quintero
pulled us aside and pointblank whispered to us: "If you or your group
can match the one million pesos offered to us by Mano Pio Pedrosa
and the Liberals, your Tio Dading (Quintero) will agree not to proceed
with the expose."
Q And what did you tell her?
A I was taken aback by her relevation and I would not answer her.
After that we chose to leave her and we asked that we be allowed to
see Delegate Quintero. Upon seeing them Delegate Quintero,

Feria and Occena in the room, they immediately stopped their

conversation.
Q Now, going back to the money inside the suitcase. Did you see
Mrs. Quintero bring out the suitcase from the ward where Delegate
Quintero was confined?
A Yes, sir. They brought it out. It was held by the man who offered to
carry it for Mrs. Quintero.
Q Do you know where this money was brought?
A I have good reasons to believe that it is now in the residence of
Delegate Eduardo Quintero at 2281 Mayon Street, Sta Ana, Manila,
as I heard Mrs. Quintero told Delegate Quintero that it would be
better for her to bring the suitcase to their residence.
Q Do you wish to say more?
A I am ready to answer any question, but if no more asked now, then
I will declare on further details when the proper time comes.
Q Are you willing to sign this statement freely, without mental
reservations, nor of force, or threat or duress to vitiate your voluntary
will?
A Yes.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto sign this 31st day of May, 1972, at City Hall,
Manila.
(Sgd.)
ARTE
MIO
MATE
(
D
e
p
o
n
e
n
t
)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of May, 1972, at City Hall,
Manila.

(Sgd.)
ELIAS
B.
ASUN
CION
J
u
d
g
e
,
B
r
.
X
I
I
,
C
F
I
M
a
n
i
l
a
.
8

It is quite evident that the aforequoted statements did not provide sufficient basis for the finding of
probable cause upon which a search warrant could validly issue. The statement of the applicant, NBI
agent Samuel Castro, had no weight at all, for lack of personal knowledge about any offense that
was committed by petitioner. On the other hand, it is clear fr om a careful examination of
Congressman Mate's statement that, from it, no judicious, reasonable and prudent man could
conclude that probable cause existed that Mr. Quintero had committed the crime of direct bribery.
The statement of Congressman Mate was characterized with several material omissions. Firstly, it
was not shown by any competent evidence that the document inside the folder which he (Mate)
allegedly saw was being given to Quintero in the hospital room, was the very statement of "expose
which Quintero released to the Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con. Congressman Mate never
made any statement that he knew what the document was supposedly inside the folder handed to
Quintero. Neither was any verification made by the respondent judge to find out whether
Congressman Mate knew, of his personal knowledge, what the document was contained in the
said folder, and whether he (Mate) knew, of his personal knowledge, that the sworn statement
released by Quintero to the Committee on Privileges, was the very statement or document contained
in said folder.

Secondly, it was not shown by any competent evidence that the document supposedly inside "he
folder-whatever it was was actually signed by Quintero. What Congressman Mate supposedly
saw was that Quintero "placed the folder under his pillow, while he was nodding as if saying "yes." "
But the fact remained that the statement of Congressman Mate did not show that Quintero signed
whatever was inside the folder given to him by the two unidentified persons, before they left the
room; and then there was no showing by Congressman Mate that he ever saw Quintero sign
afterwards the alleged "statement" contained in the folder.
Thirdly, there was no showing by competent evidence that the money supposedly given to Quintero
was the payment for the signing by Quintero of the statement whatever it was given to him
inside a folder by the two persons. The only thing that linked the alleged giving of the money to
Quintero, to his alleged signing of the statement, was an inference from hearsay evidence, which
was the supposed statement of Mrs. Quintero, on a different occasion, that her husband was being
offered P1,000,000.00 by Pio Pedrosa and the Liberals to make the "expose." And from this, it was
drawn by Congressman Mate that the money supposedly delivered to Quintero in the hospital room
was payment for his signing the alleged document inside the folder, containing the "expose".
The supposed statement of Mrs. Quintero was purely hearsay, insofar as petitioner Quint ero was
concerned. Her statement, if any, was not binding upon the petitioner, and therefore, should not
prejudice the latter. The respondent judge should have known this before he issued the questioned
search warrant. As held by the Court, an application for search warrant, if based on hearsay, cannot,
standing alone, justify the issuance of a search warrant. 9 There is no doubt, in the case at bar, that the
alleged statement of Mrs. Quintero was indubitably hearsay, insofar as petitioner Quintero was
concerned.

The statement of Congressman Mate, which was the sole basis for the issuance of the search
warrant, was replete with conclusions and inferences drawn from what he allegedly witnessed when
he visited Mr. Quintero in the hospital. It lacked the directness and definiteness which would have
been present, had the same statement dealt with facts which Congressman Mate actually witnessed.
As held in one case, persons swearing to, or supporting the application for, search warrants, must
set forth the facts that they know personally 10 and not the conclusions, or the beliefs of the affiant, so
as to justify a reasonable and ordinarily prudent man, whose duty is to ascertain whether probable cause
exists, to conclude that a violation of the law has occurred.

Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or
belief. The facts recited in an affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant must be stated
with sufficient definiteness, so that, if they are false, perjury may be assigned on the
affidavit. 11 Hence, affidavits which go no further than to allege conclusions of law, or of fact, are
insufficient.

Considering the generality of the statement of Congressman Mate, a judicious and prudent man
would have attacked the statements made by the deponent, instead of asking leading questions, and
conducting the examination in a general manner, like what the respondent judge did in the case at
bar. As held in Nolasco vs. Pano, 12 the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions
to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner,
would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.

Had the respondent judge been cautious in issuing the questioned search warrant, he would have
wondered and, therefore, asked the affiant why said incident was reported only on 31 May 1972,
when the latter allegedly witnessed it on 29 May 1972. Also, respondent judge should have
questioned the statements of complainant Congressman Mate, and should have been alert to some
ulterior motives on the part of the latter, considering that Congressman Mate' s wife was one of those

implicated in the "expose" made by Quintero. 13 An ulterior motive to an application for search warrant
should alert the judge to possible misrepresentations.

14

Another circumstance which points to the nullity of the questioned sea rch warrant, for having been
issued without probable cause, is the fact that the search warrant delivered to the occupant of the
searched premises, Generoso Quintero (nephew of the petitioner) was issued in connection with the
offense of "grave threats" and not "direct bribery," which was the criminal complaint filed against
Quintero with the respondent fiscal. The offense charged or labelled in the questioned search
warrant had, therefore, no relation at all to the evidence, i.e., "half a million pesos, Ph ilippine
currency," ordered to be seized in said search warrant. There was thus no ground whatsoever for
the respondent judge to claim that facts and circumstances had been established, sufficient for him
to believe that the crime of "grave threats" had been committed, because, on the basis of the
evidence alone, and what was ordered to be seized in the search warrant he issued, no relation at
all can be established between the crime supposedly committed (grave threats) and the evidence
ordered to be seized.
It is true that the copy of the questioned search warrant that remained in the file of the respondent
Judge, had been changed to indicate that the offense was that of direct bribery under Art. 210 of the
Revised Penal Code. The change was effected by the deletion, in ink, of the typewritten words
"grave threats" and the superimposition, in ink, of the figures "210" (Art. 210 of Revised Penal Code
Direct Bribery) over the typewritten figures "282" (Art. 282 of the Revised Penal Code Grave
Threats). The respondents claimed that these changes were made at the time the warrant was
issued not after the search was made. But as admitted by respondents 15 the warrant in this case was
prepared beforehand by the NBI, in an NBI form, 16 which stated only the name of the crime charged, but
did not contain any description of the acts constituting the crime charged.

According to respondent judge, when the search warrant was presented to him by applicant NBI
agent Samuel Castro, he saw that the crime charged was for "grave threats." But after he allegedly
conducted his interrogations, he found that the proper charge should be "Direct Bribery." Hence he
caused the proper changes in the search warrant, but inadvertently, he failed to make the proper
changes in the sole copy that was presented by the NBI agents to Generoso Quintero, although the
copy retained by the NBI agents had been corrected.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that the changes in the questioned search warrant were made
after the search was made. According to petitioner, his counsel, Atty. Ordonez who was present
during the latter part of the raid-questioned in fact the materiality of the property being seized to the
offense stated on the warrant, i.e., "grave threats." Consequently, if the copy in th e possession of the
raiding party had indeed been corrected before the search, the raiding party, would have been able
to clear up the matter at once, when petitioner's counsel raised the question with them. However, the
raiding party kept silent on the matter at that time, thereby negating their later pretenses.
Besides, the explanation given by the respondent judge as to the difference in the copy of the
warrant served on the petitioner's representative and those retained by the respondents, cannot be
given any weight, for no presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions can be
invoked by a public officer, when he himself undertakes to justify his acts. 17 Furthermore, the Court
notes the admission of the respondents that it was an NBI form which was used for the search warrant,
and that it was pre-filled by the applicant, before it was presented to the respondent judge, but that, he
(the judge) allegedly made the changes after he had conducted his examination. The Court considers the
act of the respondent judge in entertaining a pre-filled search warrant as irregular; it casts doubt upon his
impartiality.

Disregarding for a moment the absence of "probable cause," the search itself that was conducted by
the NBI agents who raided the house of petitioner, pursuant to the questioned search warrant, was

highly irregular. The two (2) occupants of the house who witnessed the search conducted, Generoso
Quintero and Pfc. Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room where a search was being made by a
member of the raiding party, while the other NBI agents were left to themselves in the other parts of
the house, where no members of the household were in a position to watch them, and thus they
conducted a search on their own.
Such a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided premises
unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed by law are made to
witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding party in another part of the house,
is held to be violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law, 18 which provides that "no search of a
house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of at least one competent
witness, resident of the neighborhood."

Another irregularity committed by the agents of respondent NBI was their failure to comply with the
requirement of Sec. 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that "The officer seizing
property under the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same t o the person on whom or in
whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the presence of at least
one-witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property." The receipt issued
by the seizing party in the case at bar, 19 showed that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio Veracruz.
This person was a policeman from the Manila Metropolitan Police (MMP), who accompanied the agents
of respondent NBI during the conduct of the search, The requirement under the aforequoted Rule that a
witness should attest to the making of the receipt, was not complied with. This requirement of the Rules
was rendered nugatory, when the one who attested to the receipt from the raiding party was himself a
member of the raiding party.

The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned search warrant, and the actual
manner in which the search was conducted in the house of the petitioner, all but imperfectly, and yet,
strongly suggest that the entire procedure, from beginning to end, was an orchestrated movement
designed for just one purpose to destroy petitioner Quintero's public image with "incriminating
evidence," and, as a corollary to this, that the evidence allegedly seized from his residence was
"planted" by the very raiding party that was commanded to "seize" such incriminating evidence.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned search warrant issued by
respondent judge, is null and void, for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules o f Court.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge is declared
NULL and VOID and of no force and effect. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court
on 6 June 1972 is hereby made PERMANENT The amount of P379,200.00 allegedly seized from
the house of petitioner Quintero, now in the possession of the Central Bank, and already
demonetized, is left with said Central Bank, to be disposed of, as such, in accordance with law and
the regulations.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT
CO., INC., respondents.
K. V. Faylona & Associates for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, the President's arm assigned to
investigate and prosecute so-called "dollar salting" activities in the country (per Presidential Decree
No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002), asks the Court to hold as null and void two
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 1 and May 20, 1988, 2 reversing its Decision,
dated October 24, 1986. 3 The Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional Trial Court, 4 as well as its Order, dated
August 21, 1985. The Resolution, dated September 24, 1987 disposed of, and granted, the private respondent Karamfil Import -Export Co.,
Inc.'s motion for reconsideration of the October 24, 1986 Decision; the Resolution dated May 20, 1988, in turn, denied the petitioner's own
motion for reconsideration.

The facts are not in controversy. We quote:

On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assign ed with the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task
Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159,
160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B
Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans
Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation,
Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino),
Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises.
The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of
the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said
application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS
Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to
support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The
application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated
March 12, 1985. 5
Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a
petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court
issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5) days notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985.

In disposing of the petition, the said court found the material issues to be:
1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the petitioners;
2) Validity of the search warrants issued by respondent State Prosecutor;
3) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic because all the
search warrants sought to be quashed had already been implemented and
executed. 8

On April 16, 1985, the lower court issued the first of its challenged Orders, and held:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby declares Search
Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Accordingly, the
respondents are hereby ordered to return and surrender immediately all the personal
properties and documents seized by them from the petitioners by virtue of the
aforementioned search warrants.
SO ORDERED.

On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration.

On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of
Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower court.
In ruling initially for the Task Force, the Appellate Court held:
Herein petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated
under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign exchange violations defined and punished under
P.D. No. 1883.
The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial
Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search
warrants in question null and void.
Besides as correctly pointed out by the Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is appealable to the Office of the
President.10
On November 12, 1986, Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc. sought a reconsideration, on the question
primarily of whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible
officer' countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure.
As we have indicated, the Court of Appeals, on Karamfil's motion, reversed itself and i ssued its
Resolution, dated September 1987, and subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
In its petition to this Court, the petitioner alleges that in so issuing the Resolution(s) above mentioned, the respondent Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in
excess of its appellate jurisdiction," 11 specifically:
a) In deviating from the settled policy and rulings of the Supreme Court that no
Regional Trial Courts may countermand or restrain the enforcement of lawful writs or
decrees issued by a quasi-judicial body of equal and coordinate rank, like the PADS
Task Force;
b) For resorting to judicial legislation to arrive at its erroneous basis for reconsidering
its previous Decision dated October 24, 1986 (see Annex "I") and thus promulgated
the questioned Resolutions (Annexes "A" and "B"), which violated the constitutional
doctrine on separation of powers;

c) In not resolving directly the other important issues raised by the petitioner in its
Petition in CA-G.R. No. 08622-SP despite the fact that petitioner has demonstrated
sufficiently and convincingly that respondent RTC, in issuing the questioned Orders
in Special Proceeding No. M-624 (see Annexes "C" and 'D"), committed grave abuse
of discretion and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction:
1. In ruling that (a) the description of the things to be seized as stated in the
contested search warrant were too general which allegedly render the search
warrants null and void; (b) the applications for the contested search warrants actually
charged two offenses in contravention of the 2nd paragraph, Section 3, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court; and (c) this case has not become moot and academic, even if the
contested search warrants had already been fully implemented with positive results;
and
2. In ruling that the petitioner PADS Task Force has not been granted under PD 1936
'judicial or quasi-judicial jurisdiction. 12
We find, upon the foregoing facts, that the essential questions that confr ont us are- (i) is the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and
standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and (ii) may
the said presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law"
to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution questions we take up seriatim.**
In submitting that it is a quasi-judicial entity, the petitioner states that it is endowed with "expr ess
powers and functions under PD No. 1936, to prosecute foreign exchange violations as defined and
punished under PD No. 1883." 13 "By the very nature of its express powers as conferred by the laws," so it is contended, "which
are decidedly quasi-judicial or discretionary function, such as to conduct preliminary investigation on the charges of foreign exchange
violations, issue search warrants or warrants of arrest, hold departure orders, among others, and depending upon the evidence presented, to
dismiss the charges or to file the corresponding information in court of Executive Order No. 934, PD No. 1936 and its Implementing Ru les
and Regulations effective August 26, 1984), petitioner exercises quasi -judicial power or the power of adjudication ." 14
The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution now assailed, 15 was of the opinion that "[t]he grant of quasi -judicial powers to petitioner did not
diminish the regular courts' judicial power of interpretation. The right to interpret a law and, if necessary to declare one unconstitutional,
exclusively pertains to the judiciary. In assuming this function, courts do not proceed on the theory that the judiciary is superior to the two
other coordinate branches of the government, but solely on the theory that they are required to declare the law in every case which come
before them." 16

This Court finds the Appellate Court to be in error, since what the petitioner puts to question is the
Regional Trial Court's act of assuming jurisdiction over the private respondent's petitio n below and
its subsequent countermand of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's orders of search and
seizure, for the reason that the presidential body, as an entity (allegedly) coordinate and co -equal
with the Regional Trial Court, was (is) not vested with such a jurisdiction. An examination of the
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's petition shows indeed its recognition of judicial review
(of the acts of Government) as a basic privilege of the courts. Its objection, precisely, is whe ther it is
the Regional Trial Court, or the superior courts, that may undertake such a review.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 17 the Court of Appeals exercises:
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, reso lutions,
orders or awards of Regional Trial Court and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of
the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. 18

xxx xxx xxx

Under the present Constitution, with respect to its provisions on Constitutional Commissions, it is
provided, in part that:
... Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or
ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy ther eof. 19
On the other hand, Regional Trial Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. 20
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise:
... The Supreme Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to
handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations cases, agrarian
case, urban land reform cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of quasijudicial bodies and agencies and/or such other special cases as the Supreme Court
may determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice. 21
xxx xxx xxx
Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983: 22
... The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court [now, Court of Appeals] from
quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act
No. 5434 insofar as the same is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg.
129. 23
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appeals from specified agencies. Any provision of existing law or
Rule of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling,
award, order, decision, or judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary
of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered Six hundred and two, also
known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under Section 23 of
Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial
Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Securities and Exchange
Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil Aeronautics Board; the
Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to the
Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the
appeal involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of
law, or all three kinds of questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of
Appeals, the aggrieved party may appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as
provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 24

Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts,

25 jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the Labor Code, decisions and
awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory, but, nevertheless, 'reviewable by this Court throu gh a petition
for certiorari and not by way of appeal." 26

Under the Property Registration Decree, decisions of the Commission of Land Registration, en
consults, are appealable to the Court of Appeals. 27
The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate
Court, 28 and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.29
As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to
the Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms
of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter.
As we have observed, the question is whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
is, in the first place, a quasi-judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before
the regular courts, other than the higher tribunals the Court of Appeals and this Court.
A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than
a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule
making." 30 The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows:
(1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering
some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board,
Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans
Administration.
(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to
carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the
Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines.
(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing
some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings
Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways,
the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to
regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the
Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.
(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under
the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities &
Exchange Commission, Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving
Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission.
(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to
adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such
as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the
Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of
Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau. 31

As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine
rights, and unless its decision are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same
attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's
organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces
the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and
decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of
"dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, 32 it is tasked alone by the Decree to
handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. We quote:

SECTION 1. Powers of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force.-The

Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, hereinafter referred to as Task Force,
shall have the following powers and authority:
a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting
activities, including the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports;
b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers,
contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be
necessary in the conduct of investigation;
c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals,
investigators and hearing officers to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its
duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings,
receive evidence, both oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of
foreign exchange laws or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and
recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities;
d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and to adopt such measures and take such
actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree.
xxx xxx xxx
f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate cr iminal charges with
the fiscal's office or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine and/or
administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found
committing or to have committed acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroa d
of foreign exchange, provided said person voluntarily admits the facts and
circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign exchange
retained abroad has already been brought into the country.
Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person
before any other judicial regulatory or administrative body for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1883.
The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in Pesos taking into consideration the amount of
foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected taxes
and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors.

The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20 %)
thereof. The informer, if any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20 %) of the fine.
Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty percent
(40 %) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National
government. The amount of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part
of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task Force . 33
The Court sees nothing in the aforequoted provisions (except with respect to the Task Force's
powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. Its
undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the
filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial
recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". It is not unlike a fiscal's office that
conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether or not prima facie evidence exists to
justify haling the respondent to court, and yet, while it makes that determination, it cannot b e said to
be acting as a quasi-court. For it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the
fiscal.
It is not unlike the Presidential Commission on Good Government either, the executive body
appointed to investigate and prosecute cases involving "ill-gotten wealth". It had been vested with
enormous powers, like the issuance of writs of sequestration, freeze orders, and similar processes,
but that did not, on account thereof alone, make it a quasi-judicial entity as defined by recognized
authorities. It cannot pronounce judgement of the accused's culpability, the jurisdiction to do which is
exclusive upon the Sandiganbayan. 34
If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be
said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling
statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court.
In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustainin g the
assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.
It will not do to say that the fact that the Presidential Task Force has been empowered to issue
warrants of arrest, search, and seizure, makes it, ergo, a "semi-court". Precisely, it is the objection
interposed by the private respondent, whether or not it can under the 1973 Charter, issue such kinds
of processes.
It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are
exclusive upon judges. 35 To that extent, the case has become moot and academic. Nevertheless, since the question has been
specifically put to the Court, we find it unavoidable to resolve it as the final arbiter of legal controversies, pursuant to the provisions of the
1973 Constitution during whose regim e the case was commenced.

Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so unceremoniously discarded in
1986, its provisions conferring the power to issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other
than a judge, by fiat of legislation have been at best controversial. In Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 36 a 1975
decision, this Court ruled that a fiscal has no authority to issue search warrants, but held in the same vein that, by virtue of the responsible
officer" clause of the 1973 Bill of Rights, "any lawful officer authorized by law can issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest. 37 Authorities,
however, have continued to express reservations whether or not fiscals may, by statute, be given such a power. 38

Less than a year later, we promulgated Collector of Customs v. Villaluz, 39 in which we categorically averred:
Until now only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest." 40 "No law or presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the
same authority in a particular responsible officer ." 41

Apparently, Villaluz had settled the debate, but the same question persisted following this Courts
subsequent rulings upholding the President's alleged emergency arrest powers . 42 [Mr. Justice Hugo
Gutierrez would hold, however, that a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is (was) not a species of "arrest" in its technical sense, and that
the (deposed) Chief Executive, in issuing one, does not do so in his capacity as a "responsible officer" under the 1973 Chart er, but rather, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in times of emergency, or in order to carry out the deportation of undesirable aliens. 43 In the
distinguished Justice's opinion then, these are acts that can be done without need of judicial intervention because they are not, precisely,
judicial but Presidential actions.]

In Ponsica v. Ignalaga,44 however, we held that the mayor has been made a "responsible officer' by the Local Government
Code, 45 but had ceased to be one with the approval of the 1987 Constitution according judg es sole authority to issue arrest and search
warrants. But in the same breath, we did not rule the grant under the Code unconstitutional based on the provisions of the fo rmer
Constitution. We were agreed, though, that the "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of
approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 46

In striking down Presidential Decree No. 1936 the respondent Court relied on American
jurisprudence, notably,Katz v. United States, 47 Johnson v. United States, 48 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire 49 in which
the American Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors (like the petitioner) cannot be given such powers because of their incapaci ty for a
"detached scrutiny" 50 of the cases before them. We affirm the Appellate Court.

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,
prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to
determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a
prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice
is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," 51 he stands, invariably, as the
accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him bo th judge and
jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.

It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the
authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislatio n, it did not furnish the
legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the
Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are not
saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is
or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the
Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutr ality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no
manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.
According to the Court of Appeals, the implied exclusion of prosecutors under the 1973 Cons titution
was founded on the requirements of due process, notably, the assurance to the respondent of an
unbiased inquiry of the charges against him prior to the arrest of his person or seizure of his
property. We add that the exclusion is also demanded by the principle of separation of powers on
which our republican structure rests. Prosecutors exercise essentially an executive function (the
petitioner itself is chaired by the Minister, now Secretary, of Trade and Industry), since under the
Constitution, the President has pledged to execute the laws. 52 As such, they cannot be made to issue judicial
processes without unlawfully impinging the prerogative of the courts.

At any rate, Ponsica v. Ignalaga should foreclose all questions on the matter, although the Court
hopes that this disposition has clarified a controversy that had generated often bitter debates and
bickerings.
The Court joins the Government in its campaign against the scourge of "dollar - salting", a pernicious
practice that has substantially drained the nation's coffers and has seriously threatened its economy.
We recognize the menace it has posed (and continues to pose) unto the very stability of the country,
the urgency for tough measures designed to contain if not eradicate it, and foremost, t he need for
cooperation from the citizenry in an all-out campaign. But while we support the State's efforts, we do

so not at the expense of fundamental rights and liberties and constitutional safeguards against
arbitrary and unreasonable acts of Government. If in the event that as a result of this ruling, we
prove to be an "obstacle" to the vital endeavour of stamping out the blackmarketing of valuable
foreign exchange, we do not relish it and certainly, do not mean it. The Constitution simply does not
leave us much choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.
MANZANAS,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C.
VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court,
at Manila, THE HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE
PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY
ORDOEZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF
MANILA JESUS F. GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of
Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos.
82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were
denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the
existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently,
by the President; (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through
the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the
Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the
Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against
petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration
was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners '
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost
factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of
law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the
complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of t he grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedu re, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis

thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly lade n with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down
guidelines for the issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and
clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint -affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This,
continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying
on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office
holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an
accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privil ege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the
privileged character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such
a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect"
on press freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused
their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition
prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585,

82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en
banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 84873. November 16, 1990.]

ERLE PENDON, for himself and as Managing Partner of KENER TRADING COMPANY, Petitioner, v.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE T. JOCSON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch
47, Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, FISCAL ALEXANDER N. MIRANO, in his capacity as
City Fiscal of Bacolod City and THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER OF THE 331st PC COMPANY,
BACOLOD CITY, Respondents.
Ledesma, Guinez, Causing, Espino & Serfino Law Office for Petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; C RIMINAL PROC EDURE; SEARC H WARRANT; PROBABLE C AUSE; DEFINITION AND
REQUISITES THEREOF. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article
III (Bill of Rights), Section 2 of the 1987 C onstitution of the Philippines. Under this provision, the issuance of
a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. C hief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SC RA 800).
In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine
the . . witnesses personally; 2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be
reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SC RA 403, Ponsica
v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SC RA 647). These requirements are provided under Section
4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of C riminal Procedure.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OR OPINION THEREOF BY THE EXAMINING JUDGE, MUST BE SUPPORTED BY
THE REC ORD; NOT OBSERVED IN THE C ASE AT BAR. It has been ruled that the existence of probable
cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination (Luna
v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a
certain degree, be substantiated or supported by the record. In this case, We find that the requirement
mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must personally examine the applicant and his witnesses
in the form of searching questions and answers before issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied
with. The applicant himself was not asked any sear ching question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose
that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge
Magallanes. The application contained pre-typed questions, none of which stated that applica nt had personal
knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the
person against whom the search warrant was sought to be issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145 SC RA 687, citing the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984,
128 SC RA 388, where the applicant himself was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only
"to ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood (his affidavit) and onl y because the application was
not yet subscribed and sworn to," We held that: "It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and

exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry
on the intent and justification of the application."
cral aw vi rt ua
1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARTIC LES SOUGHT TO BE SEIZED, MUST BE DESC RIBED WITH PARTIC ULARITY. Another
infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law requires that the articles sought to be seized
must be described with particularity. The items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOC OR Galvanized bolts,
grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOC OR Towers parts and line accessories"
are so general that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener Trading, the
premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioners petition before respondent C ourt of Appeals and
which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap metals,
second hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles. Far more important is that the items described
in the application do not fall under the list of personal property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules on C riminal Procedure because neither the application nor the joint deposition alleged that
the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and other
proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.;SEIZURE OF INC RIMINATING ARTIC LES, C ANNOT VALIDATE AN INVALID WARRANT. No
matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their seizure cannot validate an
invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SC RA 388: ". . .
that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might
be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance C o., Inc. v. Herrera: It has been said
that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness
than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers
from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the
citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government." "Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the C onstitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor
of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights s ecured by the
C onstitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify it."

DE CISIO N

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision (pp. 38-42, Rollo) of respondent C ourt of
Appeals which affirmed the orders dated August 24, 1987 (p. 43, Record) and October 14, 1987, (pp. 53 54, Record) of the Regional Trial C ourt of Negros Occidental in C riminal C ase No. 5657.
On February 4, 1987, First Lieutenant Felipe L. Rojas, Officer-in-C harge of the Philippine C onstabulary C riminal Investigation Service (PC -C IS), Bacolod C ity, filed an application for a search warrant, alleging:
"x

j gc:chanrobl es.com.ph

x.

"That he was informed and verily believes that KENNETH SIAO who may be found at KENER TRADING
located at Rizal Street corner Lacson Street, Bacolod C ity has/have in her/his/their possession and control
the following property/ies, to wit:
j gc:chanrobl es.com.p
h

"NAPOC OR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly; aluminum wires and other NAPOC OR Tower
parts and line accessories.
which he/she/they is/are concealing in the premises above mentioned.
"The undersigned has verified the report and found it to be the fact and has therefore reasons to believe
that a SEARC H WARRANT should be issued to enable the undersigned or any agent of the law to take
possession and bring the following described property/ies, to wit:
j gc:chanrobl es. c
om.ph

"NAPOC OR Galvanized bolts; grounding motor drive as sembly; aluminum wires and other NAPOC OR Tower
parts and line accessories.
"WHEREFORE, the undersigned prays this Honorable C ourt to issue a SEARC H WARRANT commanding any
peace officer to search the premises/house described in this application and to seiz e and bring to this
Honorable C ourt the person/property/ies above -mentioned to be dealt with as the law may direct.
Bacolod C ity, Philippines
Feb. 4, 1987 .
SGD. FELIPE L. ROJAS, JR.
ILT, PC
OIC , PFOC IS, Bacolod C ity"
(p. 18, Records)
The application was subscribed before Judge Demosthenes D. Magallanes of the Municipal Trial C ourt of
Bacolod C ity and supported by the joint deposition of two (2) witnesses, Ignacio L. Reyes, an employee of
NAPOC OR (National Power C orporation) and IAI Eduardo Abaja o f the C IS of Bacolod C ity, quoted as
follows:
chanrobl es. com:cralaw:r ed

"We, Ignacio L. Reyes and IAI Eduardo Abaja, C IS after having been duly sworn to, testify as follows:

j gc:chanrobl e
s. c
om.ph

"1. QUESTION: What are your names and other personal circums tances?
"ANSWER: IGNAC IO L. REYES, 34 years old, married, an employee of NAPOC OR and presently residing at
Eroreco Subdivision, Bacolod C ity and AIA EDUARDO ABAJA, C IS, regular member of the C O/INP C IS
C ommand, Bacolod C ity.
"2. QUESTION: Do you know the premises/house of KENNETH SIAO located at Rizal Street, near cor. Lacson
St., Bacolod C ity?
"ANSWER: Yes, Sir.
"3. QUESTION: Do you have personal knowledge that said KENNETH SIAO who may be found in the said
premises/house has/have in his/her/their possession and control the following property, to wit:
j gc:chanrobl es
. co
m.ph

"NAPOC OR Galvanized bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOC OR Tower
parts and line accessories?
"ANSWER: Yes, sir.
"4. QUESTION: How do you know that above-described property/ies is/are being kept in said
premises/house?
"ANSWER: We conducted surveillance and we were able to purchase some of these items.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereunto set our hands and affixed our signature this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at
Bacolod C ity, Philippines.
"SGD. IGNAC IO L. REYES SGD. EDUARDO J. ABAJA Affiant Affiant
SUBSC RIBED AND SWORN to, before me this 4th day of Feb. 1987 at Bacolod C ity, Philippines.
SGD. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES
Judge

MUNIC IPAL TRIAL C OURT

BAC OLOD C ITY"
(p. 19, Record)
On the basis of the foregoing application and joint deposition, Judge Magallanes issued Search Warrant No.
181, commanding the search of the property described in the warrant.
Subsequently, constabulary officers stationed in Bacolo d C ity conducted a search of the premises described
in the search warrant and seized the following articles, to wit: 1) 272 kilos of galvanized bolts, V chuckle and
U-bolts; and 2) 3 and 1/2 feet angular bar. The receipt was signed by Digno Mamaril, PC Ser geant and
marked "from Kenneth Siao" (p. 21, Record).
A complaint for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) was filed against Kenneth Siao with the office
of the C ity Fiscal by the National Power C orporation. Thereafter, Siao filed a counter -affidavit alleging that
he had previously relinquished all his rights and ownership over the Kener Trading to herein petitioner Erle
Pendon. In a resolution (pp. 22-23, Record) dated May 18, 1987, the office of the C ity Fiscal recommended
the dismissal of the complaint against Siao and the filing of a complaint for the same violation against
petitioner. On the same day, a complaint (p. 24, Record) for Violation of the Anti -Fencing Law was filed
against petitioner and docketed as C riminal C ase No. 5657 of the Reg ional Trial C ourt of Negros Occidental.
The case was raffled to Branch 47 of the same court presided over by respondent Judge Enrique T. Jocson.
Before his arraignment, petitioner filed on July 9, 1987, an application for the return of the articles seized by
virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 (pp. 26-29, Record) on the ground that the said search warrant was
illegally issued. The prosecuting fiscal filed an opposition to the application (pp. 31 -32, Record). The
application was subsequently amended to an application for quashal of the illegally-issued search warrant
and for the return of the articles seized by virtue thereof (pp. 33-38, Records).
On August 24, 1987, respondent Judge Jocson issued an order impliedly denying the application for the
quashal of the search warrant without ruling on the issue of the validity of the issuance thereof. The order
states:
j gc:chanrobl es
.c
om.ph

"C ounsel for accused having admitted in the hearing in open court that at least one of the seized items
bears the identifying mark of the complainant National Power C orporation, and there being no statement
that the seized items were acquired in usual course of business for value, this court is constrained to have
the case tried without resolving whether or not the questioned search warrant was issued validly." (p. 43,
Records)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was denied on October 14, 1987 (p. 11, Rollo).
On October 20, 1987, petitioner filed with the C ourt of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with a prayer for a restraining order, assailing the legality of search warrant No. 181 and praying
for the permanent prohibition against the use in evidence of the articles and properties seized and the return
thereof to petitioner. On April 4, 1988, respondent C ourt of Appeals dismissed the petition. The appellate
court found the existence of a probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The respondent
court held:
j gc:chanrobl es
. co
m.ph

"x

"For reasons indicated, We hold that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the validity of the issuance of the
Search Warrant No. 181 and to sustain further the ruling of the respondent trial court in denying the petition
for the return of the articles and personal prope rties seized thereunder.
"WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner. The previous order to
maintain the status quo is hereby withdrawn and set aside.
"SO ORDERED." (p. 41, Rollo)
The motion for reconsideration of the above decision filed by petitioner on May 2, 1988 was denied in a
resolution (p. 49, Rollo) dated July 21, 1988.

The basic issue raised in this petition is the legality of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 181. It is the
contention of petitioner that the application for the search warrant and the joint deposition of the witnesses
miserably failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the C onstitution and the rules.
The petitioner argues that the application of 1st Lt. Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaja and Reyes failed
to comply with the requisites of searching questions and answers. The joint deposition of the witnesses
showed that the questions therein were pretyped, mimeographed and the answers of the witnesses were
merely filled-in. No examination of the applicant and of the joint deponents was personally conducted by
Judge Magallanes as required by law and the rules.
Additionally, petitioner also contends that both the application of Rojas and the joint deposition of Abaya and
Reyes show that neither of the affiants had personal knowledge that any specific offense was committed by
petitioner or that the articles sought to be seized were stolen or that being so, they were brought to
Kenneth Siao.
chanrobl es virt ualawli b
r ary c
hanrobles.com:c
hanro
bl e
s. c
om.ph

Lastly, the petitioner contends that, even assuming for the sake of polemics, that the articles belong to the
latter, his C onstitutional right prevails over that of NAPOC OR.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed un der Article III (Bill of Rights), Section
2 of the 1987 C onstitution of the Philippines which provides:
j gc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge alter examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and th e witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
cral aw v
i rt ua1
aw li b
r ary

Under the above provision, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable
cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched (Burgos, Sr. v. C hief of Staff,
G.R. No. 64261, Dec. 26, 1984, 133 SC RA 800). In determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: 1) the judge (or) officer must examine the . . witnesses personally; 2) the examinatio n must
be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and
answers (Marinas v. Sioco, 104 SC RA 403, Ponsica v. Ignalaga, G.R. No. 72301, July 31, 1987, 152 SC RA
647). These requirements are provided unde r Section 4, Rule 126 of the New Rules of C riminal Procedure
which states: "Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oa th the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record
their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted."
cral aw vi rt u
a1awl ibra
ry

It has been ruled that the existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion
of the judge conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, G.R. No. L-27511, Nov. 29, 1968), however, the
opinion or finding of probable cause must, to a certain degree, be substantiated or supported by the record.
In this case, We find that the requirement mandated by the law and the rules that the judge must
personally examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before
issuing the warrant, was not sufficiently complied with. The applicant himself was not asked any searching
question by Judge Magallanes. The records disclose that the only part played by the applicant, Lieutenant
Rojas was to subscribe the application before Judge Magallanes. The application contain ed pre-typed
questions, none of which stated that applicant had personal knowledge of a robbery or a theft and that the
proceeds thereof are in the possession and control of the person against whom the search warrant was
sought to be issued. In the case of Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, Nov. 25, 1986, 145 SC RA 687, citing
the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SC RA 388, where the applicant himself
was not subjected to an interrogation but was questioned only "to ascertain, among others, if he knew and
understood (his affidavit) and only because the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to," We held
that:
j gc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be

found later that his declarations are false.

"x

"It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro forma, if
the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application."
(Emphasis supplied; p. 695)
Likewise, the joint deposition made by the two (2) witnesses presented by the applicant can hardly satisfy
the same requirement. The public respondent prosecutor admitted in his memorandum that the questions
propounded were pre-typed.
chanrobl es.com.p
h : vir tual lawl ibrary

The offense which petitioner was sought to be charged was violation of the anti -fencing law which punishes
the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy or sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should have known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (Sec. 2a, P.D. 1612). The four (4) questions p ropounded could
hardly support a finding of probable cause. The first question was on the personal circumstances of the
deponents. The second and third were leading questions answerable by yes or no. The fourth question was
on how the deponents knew about their answers in the second and third questions. The judge could have
exploited this last question to convince himself of the existence of a probable cause but he did not. There
was also no statement in the joint deposition that the articles sought to be s eized were derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or a theft or that applicants have any knowledge that a robbery or theft
was committed and the articles sought to be seized were the proceeds thereof. It was not even shown what
connection Kenneth Siao has with Kener Trading or with the premises sought to be searched. By and large,
neither the application nor the joint deposition provided facts or circumstance which could lead a prudent
man to believe that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense, if any, are in the possession of the person named in the application.
". . . [T]he searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses must
depend to a large extent upon the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish a reasonable
ground to believe the commission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and
said answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be se arched and the persons or things to be
seized. The examination or investigation which must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be
held in the secrecy of his chambers. Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not
merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required information. To repeat, it must be under
oath and must be in writing. (Mata v. Bayona, 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SC RA 388) ( Emphasis supplied)
And, in Quintero v. NBI, G.R. No. L-35149, June 23, 1988, 162 SC RA 467, 483:

j gc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"As held in Nolasco v. Pao No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SC RA 163), the questions propounded by
respondent Executive Judge to the applicants witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant."
cral aw vir t u
a1awl ibra
ry

Another infirmity of Search Warrant No. 181 is its generality. The law requires that the articles sought to be
seized must be described with particularity. The items listed in the warrant, to wit: "NAPOC OR Galvanized
bolts, grounding motor drive assembly, aluminum wires and other NAPOC OR Towers parts and line
accessories" are so general that the searching team can practically take half of the business of Kener
Trading, the premises searched. Kener Trading, as alleged in petitioners petition before respondent C ourt of
Appeals and which has not been denied by respondent, is engaged in the business of buying and selling
scrap metals, second hand spare parts and accessories and empty bottles.
Far more important is that the items described in the application do not fall under the l ist of personal
property which may be seized under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules on C riminal Procedure because neither
the application nor the joint deposition alleged that the item/s sought to be seized were: a) the subject of an
offense; b) stolen or embezzled property and other proceeds or fruits of an offense; and c) used or intended
to be used as a means of committing an offense.
chanrobl es v
i rt ua
l awlibrarychanrobles.com:c
hanrobles.com.p
h

It is noted that respondent Judge Jocson himself had doubts about the existence of probable cause in the

issuance of the search warrant. In denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion
to quash and application for articles seized by virtue of search warrant No. 181, he stated:
j gc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"The seeming lack of probable cause during the application for search warrant in the lower court is cured by
the admission for the accused of counsel that at least one of the items seized bore the identifying mark of
complainant National Power C orporation and the failure to aver in the quashal motion and in the open
hearing that the seized items themselves were acquired in the usual course of business for value in good
faith. However, this order is without prejudice to the right of the accuse d to pursue against the
administrative liability of MTC C Judge Demosthenes Magallanes." (p. 54, Rollo)
In his memorandum, C ity Fiscal Mirano stated that the articles seized by virtue of search warrant No. 181
was taken from the possession of petitioner who signed the receipt in behalf of Kener Trading, which
possession is punishable under Section 5, P.D. 1612, which states:
j gc:chanrobles.com.p
h

"Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any goods, article, item, object or anything of value
which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing."
cral aw vi rt ua1
aw li b
r ary

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the petitioner may be, their seizure cannot validate an
invalid warrant. Again, in the case of Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. 50720, March 26, 1984, 128 SC RA 388:
j gc:chanrobles.com.p
h

". . . that nothing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It
might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance C o., Inc. v. Herrera:
chanrob1es v
i rt ua
l 1aw libra
ry

It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that invol ves the exemption of his private
affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government."
cral aw vir tua1awli brary

"Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the re quirements of the C onstitution
and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the C onstitution. No
presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it."

cral aw vi rt ua
1aw library

Finally, the seized articles were described in the receipt issued by PC Sergeant Mamaril as galvanized bolts,
V-chuckle, U-bolts and 3 1/2 feet angular bar (p. 21, Record). There is no showing that the possession
thereof is prohibited by law hence, the return thereof to petitioner is proper. Also, the use in evidence of the
articles seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant is enjoined by Sec tion 3(2), Article III of the
C onstitution.
AC C ORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered: 1) declaring Search Warrant No.
181 issued by Judge Demosthenes Magallanes NULL and VOID; 2) ordering the return of the items seized by
virtue of the said warrant to herein petitioner; and 3) permanently enjoining respondents from using in
evidence the articles seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 181 in C riminal C ase No. 5657.
chanrobl es vi rtual lawli brary

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 88919 July 25, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.

HONORABLE ENRIQUE B. INTING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH

38, DUMAGUETE CITY, AND OIC MAYOR DOMINADOR S. REGALADO, JR., respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election
offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Fiscal now Provincial Prosecutor, before the
Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not
probable cause exists?
On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador
Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly
transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a
very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as
required by law.
Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor
of Dumaguete City: (1) to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case; (2) to prepare and file
the necessary information in court; (3) to handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows
a prima facie case and (3) to issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may be. The
directive to conduct the preliminary investigation was pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 1752
dated January 14, 1986. The resolution, in turn, is based on the constitutional mandate that the
COMELEC is charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections (sec. 2, Article XII-C of the
1973 Constitution) and on the Omnibus Election Code which implements the constitu tional provision.
The Resolution provides, among others:
xxx xxx xxx
Further, Regional Election Directors and Provincial Election Supervisors are hereby
authorized to conduct preliminary investigations of election offenses committed in
their respective jurisdictions, file the corresponding complaints and/or informations in
court whenever warranted, and to prosecute the same pursuant to Section 265 of the
Omnibus Election Code. (Rollo, p. 15)
After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case.
Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of
section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor.
In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused OIC Mayor. It also fixed the bail at five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as recommended by
the Provincial Election Supervisor.
However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arres ted, the trial
court set aside its September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to
determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The court stated
that it "will give due course to the information filed in this case if the same has the written approval of
the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and
control of the latter." (at p. 23, Rollo, emphasis supplied)

In another order dated November 22, 1988, the court gave Atty. Lituanas fifteen (15) days from
receipt to file another information charging the same offense with the written approval of the
Provincial Fiscal.
Atty. Lituanas failed to comply with the order. Hence, in an order dated De cember 8, 1988, the trial
court quashed the information. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent trial court justifies its stand on the ground that the COMELEC through its Provincial
Election Supervisor lacks jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause in an election
offense which it seeks to prosecute in court because:
While under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code approved on December 3,
1985 duly authorized legal officers of the Commission on Elections have the
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to
prosecute the same, it is doubtful whether said authority under the auspices of the
1973 Constitution, still subsists under the 1987 Constitution which has deleted in its
Section 2, Article III, the phrase "and such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" in the equivalent section and article of the 1973 Constitution.
(Rollo, p. 24)
The petition is impressed with merit.
We emphasize important features of the constitutional mandate that " ... no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge ...
" (Article III, Section 2, Constitution)
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal
or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone
makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him
to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not have to follow what the
Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It
is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make
his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper
which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries
are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about
the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge.
The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor.
The Court made this clear in the case of Castillo v. Villaluz (171 SCRA 39 [1989]):

Judges of Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance) no longer have
authority to conduct preliminary investigations. That authority, at one time reposed in
them under Sections 13, 14 and 16 Rule 112 of the Rules of Cour t of 1964, (See
Sec. 4, Rule 108, Rules of Court of 1940; People v. Solon, 47 Phil. 443, cited in
Moran, Comments on the Rules, 1980 ed., Vol. 4, pp. 115-116) was removed from
them by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985,
(Promulgated on November 11, 1984) which deleted all provisions granting that
power to said Judges. We had occasion to point this out in Salta v. Court of
Appeals, 143 SCRA 228, and to stress as well certain other basic propositions,
namely: (1) that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is "not a judicial function ...
(but) part of the prosecution's job, a function of the executive," (2) that wherever
"there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts
are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them," and the fact
"that a certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be
indiscriminately exercised."
The 1988 Amendments to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, declared effective
on October 1, 1988, (The 1988 Amendments were published in the issue of Bulletin
Today of October 29, 1988) did not restore that authority to Judges of Regional Trial
Courts; said amendments did not in fact deal at all with the officers or courts having
authority to conduct preliminary investigations.
This is not to say, however, that somewhere along the line RTC Judges also lost the
power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether
probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search
warrant). Such a power indeed, it is as much a duty as it is a power has been
and remains vested in every judge by the provision in the Bill of Rights in the 1935,
the 1973 and the present (1987) Constitutions securing the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of
mere Court rule or statute to revoke. The distinction must, therefore, be made clear
while an RTC Judge may no longer conduct preliminary investigations to ascertain
whether there is sufficient ground for the filing of a criminal complaint or information,
he retains the authority, when such a pleading is filed with his court, to determine
whether there is probable cause justifying the issuance of a warrant of a rrest. It might
be added that this distinction accords, rather than conflicts, with the rationale of
Salta because both law and rule, in restricting to judges the authority to order arrest,
recognize that function to be judicial in nature.
We reiterate that preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation
for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for
the determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of
preliminary investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The second kind of
preliminary investigation which is more properly called preliminary examination is judicial in nature
and is lodged with the judge. It is in this context that we address the issue raised in the instant
petition so as to give meaning to the constitutional power vested in the COMELEC regarding election
offenses.
Article IX C Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of votes, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases
of violation of election laws, including acts or omission constituting election frauds,
offenses, and practices. (Emphasis supplied)
In effect the 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but also to prosecute
cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge
determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with
COMELEC.
The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer
all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to
investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The
evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to
insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result
in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the
sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of
the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in
relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this
clear constitutional mandate.
From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the
Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its
prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear
election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office as
contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and
jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182
and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978
reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether
private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instanc e, irrespective
of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that
matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests
exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct
of elections. (Corpus v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 [1987])
Hence, the Provincial Fiscal, as such, assumes no role in the prosecution of election offenses. If the
Fiscal or Prosecutor files an information charging an election offense or prosecutes a violation of
election law, it is because he has been deputized by the COMELEC. He does not do so under the
sole authority of his office. (People v. Basilla, et al., G.R. Nos. 83938-40, November 6, 1989). In the
instant case, there is no averment or allegation that the respondent Judge is bringing in the
Provincial Fiscal as a deputy of COMELEC. He wants the Fiscal to "approve" the COMELEC's
preliminary investigation.
i t c- a
sl

It is to be noted that on February 27, 1987 (when the 1987 Constitution was already in effect) the
President issued Executive Order No. 134 which was the ENABLING ACT FOR ELECTIONS FOR
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ON MAY 11, 1987 AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Section 11 thereof
provides:
Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable as provided for in the preceding section, and to pr osecute the same:
Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within
two (2) months from filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the Office of
the Fiscal or with the Department of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution,
if warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government.
It is only after a preliminary examination conducted by the COMELEC through its officials or its
deputies that section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution comes in. This is so, because, when the
application for a warrant of arrest is made and the information is filed with the court, the judge will
then determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparant that the respondent trial court misconstrued the
constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.
As indicated above what the respondent trial court should have done was to enforce its September
30, 1988 order, to wit:
Pursuant to Circular No. 12 of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court dated June 30,
1987 and considering that after a personal examination of the evidence submitted by
the investigating Provincial Election Supervisor III Negros Oriental (Designated Legal
Officer), there is reasonable ground for this Court to rely on the certification of said
Provincial Election Supervisor III in the information that a probable cause exists, let a
warrant issue for the arrest of the accused filing the bail at FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor III.
The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Orders dated October 3, 1988,
November 22, 1988 and December 8, 1988 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent trial
court's Order dated September 30, 1988 is REINSTATED. The respondent court is ordered to
proceed hearing the case with deliberate speed until its termination.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO
DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS
V. SESE, petitioners,

vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL. REX
D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer,
PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND
DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS
ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO:
ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro
Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESO L UT IO N

PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above -entitled petitions, seeking
reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which
dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision
did not rule as many misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party
or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreove r, the
decision merely applied long existing lawsto the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.
Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar
organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this
connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as
the elected representative of the people not the Court that should repeal, change or modify
them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made
without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly
Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons
arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and
subversive documents found in their possession at the time of ar rest, inasmuch as
those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of
extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed
by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint. 4Therefore, the function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court
before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without
warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law,
would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by
law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the groun ds upon
which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said
Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without
warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like
rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit

such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance ( sic) on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them
apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in t he St. Agnes
Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That
Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA
member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would
shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this
sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end
upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which
compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting office rs of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual
facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case,
that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has
just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is
based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest . 11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the
said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols
the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along
Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded
man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old
of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member
("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable
and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to
engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by
circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were
actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually th en being treated
in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the records of this case disclosed later,
"Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded
man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the
law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the
officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed
to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly

perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been
ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made i n compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an
information charging double murder with assault against agents of per sons in authority was filed
against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was
thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers).
On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple(G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are
also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were
found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore,
caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule
113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests
without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within
judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas
corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen t o
remain in detention in the custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former
NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain
house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their
safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by
court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then
confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions,
radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking
member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988,
and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the
rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of
Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions, and
she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when
they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess
them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises
ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject
of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence
and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casip le and Ocaya) that the
reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information
given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and
the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information
as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or
occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounde d said arrests (of Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the
information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the
Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine,
who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted
ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly aft er their arrests,
they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members.
In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were filed in court against said
arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant
made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do
not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the aforenamed persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say
that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest.
That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action
against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting
the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in
the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5,
Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in acco rdance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed
guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an ar rest
without warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24 But if they do
not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the
attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of
drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press
Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus
drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling
within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist,
during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech
regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers
to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soo n thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times,
the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced
from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For
Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the
hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88 -68385) has been
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo
Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing,
was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested
Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without
warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of
Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made
promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite t he lapse of fourteen (14)
days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of
Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an
information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the
killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was
denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to
post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same
trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian,

Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition
for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of
the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in
fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because
of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on
probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in
Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to
the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in
the case ofAmelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession
during her arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in
the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in
their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengt hen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the
commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty
of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the
guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It
pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the
light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps
with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant
be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into and
all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same the legality of the arrest without warrant
so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution,
are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met,
then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the
end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The
Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the
arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or palatability to some
groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 96080 April 19, 1991

ATTY. MIGUEL P. PADERANGA petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III, ATTY. HENRICK F. GINGOYON,
HELEN B. CANOY and REBECCA B. TAN, respondent
Concordio C. Diel, Constantino G. Jaraula for petitioner.
Benjamin G. Guimong for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.: p

In this special civil action for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction/restraining order, petitioner seeks to enjoin herein public respondents from incl uding the
former as an accused in Criminal Case No. 86-39 for multiple murder, through a second amended
information, and to restrain them from prosecuting him.
The records disclose that on October 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in t he
Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo,
Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato
Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to
Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244.
Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at
large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then.

In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely
Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as
his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The trial court in an order
dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecut or "to conduct
another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity
to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense."
In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated
herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.
The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the preliminary
investigation against petitioner at the instance of the latter's coun sel, per his resolution dated July 7,
1989. In his first indorsement to the Department of Justice, dated July 24, 1989, said city prosecutor
requested the Department of Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary
investigation against herein petitioner.
In a resolution dated September 6, 1989, 1 respondent State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, who was
designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary investigation against petitioner, directed the
amendment of the previously amended information to include and implead herein petitioner as one of the
accused therein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, 2 contending that the preliminary investigation was
not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present
a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged
"linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by respondent Gingoyon in his order
dated January 29, 1990. 3

From the aforesaid resolution and order, petitioner filed a Petition for Review 4 with the Department of
Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with Memorandum, 5 and then a Supplemental
Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating Evidence Annexed, 6 attaching thereto an affidavit
of Roxas dated June 20, 1990 and purporting to be a retraction of his affidavit of March 30, 1990 wherein
he implicated herein petitioner.

On August 10, 1990, the Department of Justice, through respond ent Undersecretary Silvestre H.
Bello III, issued Resolution No. 648 7 dismissing the said petition for review. His motion for
reconsideration having been likewise denied, petitioner then flied the instant petition for mandamus and
prohibition.

Petitioner raises two basic issues, namely: (1) that the preliminary investigation as to him was not
complete; and (2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion
in the second amended information.
Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint
or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose exc ept that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in
jeopardy. 8
The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasijudicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. 9 Hence, the

general rule is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.
of Brock a, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. 11 cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit:

10

The case

a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;

b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppressi on or
multiplicity of actions;
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied.
A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will readily show that
the same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions. Hence, the petition at bar must be
dismissed.
1. Petitioner avers that he was deprived of a full preliminary investigation by reason of the fact that at
the time the resolution of September 6, 1989 was issued, there were still several incidents pendi ng
resolution such as the validity of the testimonies and affidavits of Felizardo Roxas and Rogelio
Hanopol as bases for preliminary investigation, the polygraph test of Roxas which he failed, and the
clarificatory questions which were supposed to be propounded by petitioner's counsel to Roxas and
Hanopol. Petitioner likwise claims that he was deprived of the opportunity to file his counter -affidavit
to the subpoena of April 25, 1989. These contentions are without merit.
Firstly, it will be noted that petitioner had already filed his counter-affidavit, pursuant to the subpoena
issued to him on April 17, 1989, wherein he controverted the charge against him and dismissed it as
a malicious design of his political opponents and enemies to link him to the crime. We hold that this
is sufficient compliance with the procedural requirement of the Rules of Court, specifically Section
3(b) of Rule 112 thereof. Besides, petitioner failed to show that the subpoena issued on April 25,
1989 involved a separate complaint charging an offense different and distinct from that charged in
the complaint attached to the first subpoena issued to him earlier.
Secondly, the veracity and credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies are matters of defense
best addressed to the trial court for its appreciation and evaluation.

Thirdly, the right of petitioner to ask clarificatory questions is not absolute. The fiscal has the
discretion to determine whether or not he will propound these questions to the parties or witnesses
concerned. As clearly provided for under Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may
set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without
the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit
questions to the to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the
parties or witnesses concerned.
Lastly, it has been held that "the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation
should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance of a preliminary investigation does not go to the
jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It could even be waived.
Indeed, it is frequently waived. These are matters to be inquired into by the trail court not an
appellate court." 12
2. Petitioner further submits that there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient
justification to hold him to a tedious and prolonged public trial, on the basis of the following grounds:
the questioned resolution of respondent Gingoyon is full of factual misrepresentations or
misapprehensions; respondent's reliance on the decision of the Regional Trial Court against Felipe
Galarion suffers from constitutional and procedural infirmities considering that petitioner was not a
party thereto, much less was he given any opportunity to comment on or rebut the prosecu tion
evidence; reliance on Rogelio Hanopol's testimony is likewise "contemptible," it being merely
hearsay in addition to the fact that petitioner was never given the opportunity to cross -examine
Hanopol at the time he testified in court; and the affidavit of Roxas dated March 30, 1989, which is
the only evidence against petitioner, has been rendered nugatory by his affidavit of retraction dated
June 20, 1990.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
should be held for trial. 13 The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a wen grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. 14 We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings in the case at bar that there
exists prima facie evidence of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are
inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross examine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter -affidavit,
to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be
present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was not given the
opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during
the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any legal right to cross examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such r ight was never available to

him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court
during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation
could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the
evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the
record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional
Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court if not
presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present such
testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the admissibility
thereof; or the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel the presentation of
Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-examination.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Department of Health vs. Sy Chi Siong ***

People vs. Villanueva ***

G.R. No. L-60349-62 December 29, 1983

CITY FISCAL NESTORIO M. PLACER, ASST. CITY FISCALS AGELIO L. BRINGAS, ERNESTO
M. BROCOY, RAFAEL V. FLORES, FELIXBERTO L. GUIRITAN, MACARIO B. BALANSAG and
ROSARIO F. DABALOS, all of Butuan City, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NAPOLEON D. VILLANUEVA, in his capacity as City Judge of
Butuan, respondent.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

ESCOLIN, J.:

The legal question raised in this petition is whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the
information as to the existence of probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant
of arrest.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. During the period from March 30 to April 14, 1982,
petitioners, The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan the
following informations, to wit:
CRIMINAL
CASE
NO.

TITLE

1220

People vs,
Jimmy Tan

Slight Phy.
Inj.

12210

People vs.
Carlito
Fortun

Violation of
P.D. 1306

12211

People vs.
Jarail Majini

-do-

12212

People vs.
Amelita Dy

Violation.
of B.P. 22

12213

People vs.
Angelito Dy

-do-

12214

People vs.
Jesus
Aloyan

Estafa

12215

People vs,
Bebot
Lauron

Mal.
Mischief

12216

People vs.
Mariano
Trani

Usurption
of authority

Antonio
Monghit

authority

People vs.
EIorde
Subingbing

Alarm &
Scandal

12217

Fernando
Sagay
12218

People vs.
Perla
Trasga

Grave oral
defamation

12219

People vs.
Renato
Dayan

Estafa

12220

People vs.
Edgardo
Dayan

Estafa

12221

People vs.
Benito Sy
Ibaez

Estafa

12222

People vs.
Benito Sy
Ibaez

-do-

These informations, except the last four, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 12219 12220, 12221. and
'2222, were certified to by the respective investigating Fiscals as Follows: "that a preliminary
examination has been conducted by me in this case, having examined 'the complainant and his
witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements, and other evidence submitted before this
Official there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime charged has been commited and that
herein accussed is probably guilty thereof " The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 12219 and
12220 bore the certification of 3rd Assistant Fiscal Felixberto Guiritan that I am filing this information
upon directive of the Minister of Justice, who upon review of this resolution of the un dersigned
investigating fiscal has found prima facie case against herein accused, 1 while the informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12221 and 12222 were certified to by 2nd Assistant Fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy in this
wise: "I am filing this information upon directive of the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No.
911, who, upon review of the resolution of the investigating fiscal now on temporary detail with the office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Surigao del Sur, has found prima faciecase against the herein accused." 2

Following receipt of said informations, respondent judge issued an order setting on April 5, 1982 the
hearing of said criminal cases for the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing the
corresponding warrants of arrest. After said hearing, respondent issued the questioned orders dated
April 13, 15, 16 and 19, 1982, requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations t o aid him in
the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners. 3
Petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration of said orders, contending that under P.D.
Nos. 77 and 911, they are authorized to determine the existence of a probable cause in a
preliminary examination/investigation, and that their findings as to the existence thereof constitute
sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest by the court. 4 On April 28, 1982, respondent
judge denied said motions and reiterated his order to petitioners to submit the supporting affidavits and
other documents within five (5) days from notice. 5

Hence, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the aforesaid orders
and to compel respondent to issue the warrants of arrest in Criminal Cases Nos. 12209 -12222.
Meanwhile, the respondent, in addition to his duties as presiding judge of Branch I of the City Court
of Butuan, was also assigned to preside over Branch II of said co urt, as Judge Jesus Ruiz, presiding
judge of said sala, had retired from the service. The informations filed by petitioners in Branch II
likewise remained dormant because of respondent's firm refusal to issue the corresponding warrants

of arrest for want of affidavits of the witnesses. Thus, as disclosed by petitioner's urgent motion, 6 no
warrants had been issued in 113 informations as of July 15, 1982.

On July 12, 1982, respondent judge received Our May 19, 1982 Resolution requiring him to
comment on the petition. However, interpreting the same as a denial of the petition itself, respondent
issued on the following day, July 13, and Omnibus Order directing petitioners to submit immediately
the supporting affidavits and other evidence in Criminal Cases Nos. 12209-12222. Having failed to
secure a reconsideration of said Omnibus Order, petitioners finally submitted the required affidavits
and documents on July 15, 1982 in order to avoid further delay in the prosecution of these cases.
This move on the part of the petitioners would have rendered the instant petition moot and
academic. But while respondent gave due course to some of said cases either by issuing the
warrants of arrest or taking some other appropriate action, 7 he refused to issue the warrants in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12417, 12418, 12419, 12420 and 12422, and instead ordered the records thereof
remanded to the City Fiscal "for further preliminary investigation or reinvestigation," for on the bases of
said affidavits, respondent found no prima facie case against the accused.

Petitioners therefore filed a motion with this Court to restrain respondent from enforcing the orders
subject of the main petition and to compel him to accept, and take cognizance of, all the informations
filed in his court. They contend that the fiscal's certification in the information of the existence of
probable cause constitutes sufficient justification for the judge to issue a warrant of arrest; and that
such certification binds the judge, it being supported by the presumption that the investigating f iscal
had performed his duties regularly and completely.
Upon the other hand, respondent justifies his order as an exercise of his judicial power to review the
fiscal's findings of probable cause. He further maintains that the failure of petitioners to fil e the
required affidavits destroys the presumption of regularity in the performance of petitioners' official
duties, particularly in the light of the long standing practice of the Office of the City Fiscal of Butuan
of attaching to the informations filed with the court the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing
a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.
We sustain the position of respondent judge.
The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of probable cause.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that... no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer, as may be re cognized
by law, after examination under oath or affirmance of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce ....
P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the existence of probable cause.
Thus,
If on the basis of complainant's sworn statements and documents submitted, the
investigating dismiss the raise. If probable cause is established by complainant's
evidence, he shall notify the respondent by issuing a subpoena .... (Sec. 1 [b], RA
5180, as amended by P.D. Nos. 77 and 911).

The fiscal or state prosecutor shall certify under oath in the information to be filed by
him that he has examined the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of the
sworn Statements and other evidence submitted before him there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof ... (Sec. 1[d], Id.).
There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest, But does such certification bind
the judge to come out with the warrant? We answer this query in the negative. The issuance of a
warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of
the issuing magistrate. This is clear from the following provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court:
Warrant of arrest, when issued. If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.
Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing ,
a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscals certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule
since U.S. vs. Ocampo 8 and Amarga vs. Abbas. 9 And this evidently is the reason for the issuance by
respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13, 1982. Without the affidavits
of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been
attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the
determination of probable cause. For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted
the required affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he
was satisfied that probable cause existed.

German to the issue at hand is the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases

10

applicable to the

following, to wit:

I. B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violation of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental laws;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One Thousand
Pesos [1,000.00], or both irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or
otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom; Provided, however, that in offenses
involving damage to property through reckless negligence, this Rule shall govern
where the imposable fine does not exceed Ten Thousand Pesos [10,000.00].
In said cases, the filing of the affidavits of witnesses with the court is mandatory. Section 9, par. 2 of
said Rule prescribes that "the complaint or information must be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are defendants plus two (2)
copies for the court's files.

Section 10 of the Summary Rule provides:

On the basis of the complaint or information and the affidavits accompanying the
same, the court shall make a preliminary determination whether to dismiss the case
outright for being patently without basis or merit, or to require further proceedings to
be taken. In the latter case, the court may set the case for immediate arraignment of
an accused under custody, and if he pleads guilty, may render judgment forthwith. If
he pleads not guilty, and in all other cases, the court shall issue an order,
accompanied by copies of all the affidavits submitted by the complainant, directing
the defendants to appear and submit his counter-affidavit and those of his witnesses
at a specified date not later than ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Failure on the part of the defendant to appear whenever required, shall cause the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest if the court shall find that a probable cause exists
after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
his witnesses.
The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his
witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to require
further proceedings.
One last point. It appears that after petitioners had submitted the required affidavit s of witnesses, the
respondent judge ordered Criminal Cases Nos. 12417, 12418, 12419, 12420 and 12422 remanded
to the City Fiscal for further preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. We hold that respondent did
not abuse his discretion in doing so. From the informations and affidavits presented to him, he found
the charges patently without basis or merit. For respondent to issue the warrants of arrest and try the
accused would only expose the latter to unnecessary harrassment, anxiety and expense. And as
already pointed out, under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent judge
has the power to order the outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the affidavits
attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-36906-07

July 27, 1987

ISAAC O. TOLENTINO, ESTEBAN MENDOZA, LADISLAO ACERON, EUFRONIO ERNI,

MARCIAL DIMAPILIS, AGAPITO MENDOZA, CORNELIO MARAAN, JOSE FERMA, EFREN
MENDIOLA, ALFREDO NER, REGINO PANGHULAN, RAFAEL BAYOT, AURELIO M. PARRA,
and SIMPILIO V. CASTILLO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
7th Judicial District, TEODORO B. SANTOS, in his capacity as Asst. City Fiscal of Pasay City

and Trial Fiscal of the Circuit Criminal Court and CRISANTO R. MOJICA a nd ESPIRIDION
MANALASTAS, respondents.
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
The Court dismisses the petition and upholds the validity of the preliminary examination and
investigation conducted by respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-43, Tagaytay City, of
the now defunct Circuit Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District as well as in Criminal Case
No. CCC-VIII-306, T.C., on the controlling authority of Collector of customs V. Villaluz and five other
cases jointly decided therewith, 71 SCRA 356, 1 which held that judges of the special circuit criminal
courts2 are vested with the same authority as judges of the regular courts of first instance to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses falling within their jurisdiction.
The first two petitioners were the Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively, while the third up to the
eleventh petitioners were Councilors of Tagaytay City, during the period involved. Bayot was the
former treasurer of the city while Parra and and Castillo were the Acting City Auditor and incumbent
Officer in-Charge, respectively, of the City Treasurer's Office.
Respondent Teodoro B. Santos was the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City and the trial fiscal
assigned in respondent Judge's sala. Respondent's Crisanto Mojica and Esperidion Manalastas
were the City Fiscal and Asst. City Fiscal, respectively, of Tagaytay City.
The undisputed antecedent facts are as follows:
On or about January 25, 1973, private respondent Fiscal Mojica filed a complaint against petitioners
Bayot, Parra and Castillo before the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, presided by respondent
Judge, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for their alleged refusal to pay his
salary as City Fiscal of Tagaytay City since June, 1969. The sworn complaint docketed as Case No.
CCC-VII-28-Tagaytay City, read as follows:
That since June, 1969 and continuously up to the present, notwithstanding repeated
demands and despite the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, concurred in by the Auditor
General, both known to said respondents, that the salary of the City Fiscal may be paid out
of the appropriation for City Attorney, the said respondents, conspiring together, with evident
bad faith or gross negligence in the performance of their official duties, caused undue injury
to herein complainant by refusing to pay his salary as City Fiscal of Ta gaytay City at the rate
of P4,200.00 per annum.
Contrary to law.
After conducting a preliminary examination and investigation of the complaint, respondent Judge on
January 29, 1973, issued in open court a resolution: (a) ruling that under existing law, the City Fiscal
was entitled to receive the salaries from the City under Section 3 of the Decentralization Act; (b)
holding that there exists a prima faciecase against petitioners Bayot, Parra and Castillo; (c) ordering
the issuance of warrants of arrest against them; (d) directing the respondent Fiscal to file the
necessary information within 48 hours; and (e) ordering respondent Fiscal to "conduct the
preliminary examination and investigation in this case to determine the criminal hability of all the
members of said City Council and thereafter to file the corresponding information in the court of
competent jurisdiction, if the evidence so warrants.

Pursuant to the Order of respondent Judge, respondent Fiscal Santos filed the information against
Bayot, Parra and Castillo for violations of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The information, dated February 16, 1933, was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC -VII-1306-T.C.
On February 26, 1973 respondent Fiscal Santos summoned all the members of the City Council for
preliminary investigation after which respondent Esperidion Manalastas filed another complaint,
dated March 30, 1973, against the three officials charged in Criminal Case No. CCC -VII-1306-T.C.
This time, the complaint also included then incumbent City Mayor, Atty. Isaac C. Tolentino and City
Councilors Alfredo Ner and Efren Mendiola. The complaint, docketed as CCC-VII-43, reads as
follows:
That since October 11, 1971 and continuously up to the present, notwithstanding repeated
demands and despite the opinion of the Secretary of Justice, concurred in by the Auditor
General, both known to said respondents, that the salary of the Asst. City Fiscal may be paid
out of the appropriation for City Attorney, the said respondents, conspiring toge ther, with
evident bad faith or gross negligence in the performance of their official duties, caused
undue injury to herein complainant by refusing to pay his salary as Asst. City Fiscal of
Tagaytay City at the rate of P3,000.00 per annum.
Contrary to law.
Respondent Judge set the case for preliminary investigation for April 5, 1973 and April 12, 1973. On
April 5, 1973, an "Urgent Motion to Quash/Dismiss" the information was filed but respondent Judge
denied the same in his resolution of May 15, 1973.
On May 23, 1973, simultaneous Urgent Motions for Reconsideration of the denial of their Motion to
Quash the information were filed in Case No. CCC-VII-43 and in Case No. CCC-VII-1306-T.C. which
were likewise simultaneously denied by respondent Judge in two reso lutions, both dated May 26,
1973.
Hence, this petition for certiorari seeking to enjoin respondent Judge or any of his representatives
from continuing with the investigation and trial of Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1306 and of Criminal
Case No. CCC-VII-43 and to declare null and void all proceedings taken and orders issued by
respondent Judge in connection therewith.
Petitioners assail respondent Judge's giving due course to the two complaints and proceeding with
the preliminary investigation thereof as in violation of law and the constitutional rights of the accused
to due process which allegedly constitute a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners contend that Criminal Circuit Courts did not have the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and citing Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 5179 allege that said special courts
were created with limited jurisdiction, concurrent with regular courts of first instance, to try and
decide only certain specific criminal cases.
As already indicated, petitioners' contention has been rejected in the controlling cases of Collector
of Customs v. Villaluz, et al., supra. The Court's ruling therein is fully applicable here, as follows:
What is limited by Republic Act No. 5179 is the scope of the cases that may be tried by
Circuit Criminal Courts.
Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction, only because they cannot try and decide all
criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as courts of
general jurisdiction. They can only take cognizance of cases expressly specified in Section 1

of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 126. Nevertheless, they
have the same powers and functions as those conferred upon regular Courts of Fi rst
Instance necessary to effectively exercise such special and limited jurisdiction. This is plain
and evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic law, Republic Act No. 5179:
Section 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the
Courts of First Instance and the trial, and disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein
shall be applicable to the Circuit Judge and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
xxx

xxx

xx x

Section 6. ... Unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the Circuit Criminal Courts
shall have the same powers as those conferred by the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court
upon regular Courts of First Instance, insofar as may be necessary to carry their jurisdiction
into effect. 3
If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal Courts are to alleviate the burden of the
regular Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of the cases therein as well
as stem the tide of criminality, it is only logical that such authority vested in the judges of the
Courts of First Instance is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal Courts. Otherwise, the
Courts of First Instance would still be carrying the burden of conducting preliminary
investigations in those cases where Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and
consequently delaying the trial and disposition of criminal cases pending before such Courts
of First Instance.
1avvphi1

That Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 5179 clearly intended, by Sections 2 and 6
thereof, to clothe the Circuit Criminal Court with all the powers vested in regular Courts of
First Instance including the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations,
is confirmed by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, otherwise known as Republic Act No.
6452, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 44, Section 39 of which confers on Circuit
Criminal Courts. Courts of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable thereunder and expressly directs
that the "preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing". 4
In ruling that the power of preliminary examination and investigation exercised by judges of Courts of
First Instance is also possessed by judges of the now defunct Circuit Criminal Courts, the Court in
the cited cases admonished Circuit Criminal Courts judges to refrain from encumbering themselves
with the additional burden of conducting preliminary investigations of criminal complaints. The
reminder therein that the main task of trial judges is to concentrate on hearing and deciding cases
filed in their courts and not to conduct preliminary investigations of criminal complaints which are
best left to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal is equally applicable to judges of the regular
courts such as the Regional Trial Courts, and is herein reiterated:
But while We sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary
examination (p. 36), pursuant to Our constitutional power of administrative supervision over
all courts (See. 6, Art. X, 1973 Constitution) as a matter of policy, We enjoin the respondent
Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court Judges to concentrate on hearing and deciding
criminal cases filed before their courts (see Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28 -29, March 31,
1973). The primary purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the
existing Courts of First Instance, as above intimated, is to mitigate the case load of the

Courts of First Instance as well as to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving
serious offenses specified in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, as amended. Circuit Criminal
Judges therefore, should not encumber themselves with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints, which they should refer to the municipal judge or
provincial or city fiscal, who in turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to
conduct such preliminary examination and investigation. 5
Another contention of petitioners is improper venue. They alleged that "the Criminal Circuit Court has
no power, authority and jurisdiction to try and decide, much less conduct the questioned preliminary
investigations of cases over crimes which allegedly were committed in the Province of Cavite,
because of improper venue. The rule, it is true, is that "the Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions
anywhere within their respective districts." This rule, however, is subject to the condition that " cases
shall be heard within the province where the crime subject of the offense was committed" (Section 4,
RA 5179) However, the law also directs that "when the interest of justice so demands with prior
approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the district,"
which conditions do not exist in the instant petition such as to justify the hearing in Pasig of an
offense committed in the Province of Cavite."
Petitioners cited correctly the provisions of Section 4 of Republic Act 5179 but their contenti on of
improper venue must be rejected. The Court in its Resolution of May 16, 1972 approving respondent
Judge's petition for authority to hear certain cases in Pasig, Rizal, had granted respondent Judge a
general authorization to hear and decide all succeeding cases that may be filed with his court from
the province of Cavite and its three cities, at Pasig, Rizal. The resolution is reproduced as follows:
M-19-22 (In re: Petition for authority to hear cases in Pasig, Rizal, Onofre A. Villaluz, Judge
of the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, petitioner).-Considering: (a)
the comment of Hilarion Maglabe, accused in Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1-974, Tagaytay
City, stating that he has no objection to the petition of Judge Onofre A. Villalu z; (b) the
manifestation and comment of the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite, interposing no objection to the
instant petition of said judge; and (c) the supplementary manifestation and comment of said
Provincial Fiscal that in his eagerness to comply with this Court's resolution of March 20,
1972, he failed to notice that Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-939, Cavite, was filed directly with
the Circuit Criminal Court. The Court Resolved to AUTHORIZE Judge Onofre A. Villaluz to
conduct the arraignment and trial of criminal cases Nos. CCC-VII-939-Cavite & CCC-VII-940Cavite, entitled People v. Eliseo Calderon y de la Cruz, CCC-VII-964-Cavite, entitled People
v. Nestor Bencito, et al., Hon. Maglabe, et al., and all succeeding cases that may be filed
with his Court from the province Of Cavite and its three cities, at Pasig, Rizal. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners' argument that the two complaints cannot be the subject of a judicial inquiry is without
basis. It is alleged that to compel petitioners to pay the salaries of resp ondent fiscals is in effect an
encroachment by the courts into the council's power to legislate for it is necessary that the council
should pass a resolution to appropriate the amount sufficient to cover the salaries claimed by
respondent fiscals.
It is clear from the records that the payment of the salaries of respondent fiscals had been
authorized by the Auditor General pursuant to an opinion of the Secretary of Justice. Moreover, as
gleaned from the resolution dated January 29, 1973, respondent Judge fou nd that the payment of
salaries of respondent fiscals find justification under Section 3 of the Decentralization Act in relation
to Section 25 of the said act. Thus, respondent Judge in the exercise of his discretion, after
considering the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation and concluding that the

petitioners acted in bad faith in refusing to pay respondent fiscals' salaries properly ordered the filing
of the informations.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed and the restraining or der issued is lifted and set
aside. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44910 November 29, 1976

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF SERAFIN G. CRUZ.
SERAFIN G. CRUZ,petitioner,
vs.
GEN. ROMEO GATAN of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga,respondent.
RESO L UT IO N

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents on August 30, 1976, at the Baguio Checkpoint along
Kennon Road, Baguio City, and brought to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, under the
command of respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan, for custodial interrogation, where he is presently
detained.
On October 22, 1976, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed i n his behalf
wherein it was claimed that the said Serafin Cruz is held incommunicado; that he is restrained of his
liberty without due process of law and is in the custody of the respondent not by virtue of a judgment
or court order; that he is not a member of any subversive organization covered by Proclamation No.
1081 and falls within the class of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not
been suspended. 1
The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus returnable to the Court on Frida y, November 12, 1976 at
3:00 p.m. and required the respondent to make a return of the writ not later than Wednesday,
November 10, 1976. 2
Admitting that the petitioner has been arrested and detained, the respondent justifies such arrest
and detention as having been legally ordered by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of
his powers under martial law claiming that Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by virtue of Arrest, Search,
and Seizure Order No. 4122, dated August 28, 1976, issued by the Secretary of National Defense,
for violation of Art. 147 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Associations), Serafin G. Cruz being the
"Over-all Commander and Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders Command," an unregistered

veterans outfit, at the time of his arrest. It is further claimed that his continued detention is the free
will and volition of the petitioner who expressed fears that he might be harmed or injured by some
members of the "Bataan Defenders Command" if he were free from custody while the mastermi nd
and legal counsel of the association, one Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, has not yet been arrested.

On November 17, 1976, counsel, who filed the petition in behalf of Serafin G. Cruz, filed a comment
on the return saying, among others, that after November 12, 1976, he talked with Serafin G. Cruz
and the latter avowed his preference to stay within the confines of Camp Olivas, notwithstanding the
subsequent arrest of the said Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, thus rendering the issues raised in the
petition unnecessary and/or irrelevant. 4 Then, at the hearing of the case, Serafin G. Cruz manifested to
the Court that he prefers to stay under protective custody. Under the circumstances, there is no other
recourse but to dismiss the case.

But, be that as it may, under General Order No. 2-A, as amended, the President of the Philippines,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, ordered the Secretary of National
Defense "to arrest or cause the arrest and take into custody and to hold them until otherwise ordered
released by me or by my duly designated representative: 1. Such persons as may have committed
crimes and offenses in furtherance or on the occasion of or incident to or in connection with the
crimes of insurrection or rebellion as defined in Articles 134 to 138 of the Revised Penal Code, and
other crimes against public order as defined in Articles 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 154, 155, and
156 of the same Code; ...
The petitioner in the instant case was arrested and detained by virtue of an Arrest, Search, and
Seizure Order issued by the Secretary of National Defense for violation of Article 147 of the Revised
Penal Code pursuant to the aforequoted General Order No. 2 -A, as amended; hence, his arrest and
continued detention is legal. The declaration of martial law and the consequent suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons reasonably believed or charged to be
engaged in the disorder or in fomenting it having been settled in the case of Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce
Enrile etc., et al., 5 any inquiry by this Court into the continued detention of the petitioner would be
purposeless.

WHEREFORE, the instant case should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED. No costs.

G.R. Nos. 78347-49 November 9, 1987

ADOLFO OLAES and LINDA M. CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE ALICIA L. SANTOS (In her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73), respondents.

CRUZ, J:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the petitioners challenge the
admission by the respondent judge of evidence seized by virtue of an allegedly invalid March
warrant and of an extrajudicial confession taken from them without according them the right to
assistance of counsel. 1 They seek to restrain further proceedings in the criminal case against them for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act (which we have suspended)

and ask that they be acquitted with the setting aside of the questioned

orders.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, suggests that the petition should be dismissed as it is not
alleged therein that the respondent judge has committed grave abuse of discre tion or acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction. He adds that if any reversible error has been committed, it may be
corrected not in this petition but in an ordinary appeal, which may not even be necessary if the
petitioners are exonerated. 3
The petitioners, in their Reply, do not meet these arguments head-on, thus impliedly admitting the
formal defect in their petition, but subject that technicalities should yield to substantial questions in
the interest of justice and to avoid unnecessarilyor protracted litigation. Their contention is that since
there are important constitutional issues involved, these questions should disposition of their
case 4 be decided in this petition instead of having them debated and resolved first in the lower court in
acconce with the usual procedure, to the prejudice of the speedy

We are not usually persuaded by this kind of argument, since procedural rules are intended
precisely to insure an orderly administration of justice. Rights are best established in accordance
with the procedure laid down by the adjective law, which is as binding on the parties as the
substantive law since they are supposed to complement each other. The Solicitor General is
obviously correct in faulting the petition and in contending that, besides bein g defective, it is not the
proper remedy at this time. There is no disputing this stand.
Worthy of note in this connection is The separate opinion of the present Chief Justice in Joseph v.
Vilialuz, 5 where he declared that:
. . . the Court adheres to the settled rule that it will not overrule in a special civil
action the trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss for failure or
insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence since it cannot review in such special civil
action the prosution's evidence and decide here and now in advance that it has or
has not established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioners -accused.
The orderly procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court is for the accused to present
their evidence after which the trial court will on the basis of the evidence presented
before it by both the prosecution and the defense render its judgment of conviction or
acquittal. If the verdict be one of acquittal, the case ends there. If it be a verdict of
conviction, then appeal is the proper remedy - and such appeal in order to have a
review of the trial court's findings of fact hes within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals.
We reiterate the rule here.
Even so, the Court has decided, without detracting from the validity of the above-cited observations.,
to deviate from the established procedure on this matter and to categorically resolve the issues
presented iii the case before us. The challenged orders are, indeed, interlocutory. Nevertheless, a
restatement of the principles governing such issues wilt it is expected, simplify the proceedings in
the court. below and speed up the disposition of the criminal case against the petitioners.

The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by the respond ent judge is unconstitutional
because it does not indicate the specific offense they are supposed to have committed. There is,
therefore, according to them, no valid finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance of
the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights. In support of this argument, they cite Stonehill v.
Diokno, 6 where Chief Justice Concepcion struck down the search warrants issued therein for being
based on the general allegation that the petitioners had committed violations of "Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code." He declared:

In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstr act. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal law.
We have examined the search warrant issued in the instant case and find it does not come under
the structures of the Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited, there was a ba re reference to the laws in
general, without any specification of the particular sections thereof that were alleged to have been
violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained in such modifications. There is no similar
ambiguity in the instant case.
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with "Violation of
RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Acts of 1972," it is clearly recited in the text
thereof that "There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias "Debie" and alias "Baby" of
No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their possession and control and
custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited and exempt
narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above." 7 Although the specific
section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause. The search warrant also
satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be made of the "place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

The petitioners also fault the admission of the extrajudicial confessions which they had given without
the assistance or advice of counsel and cite Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution
providing that "any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
In the separate sworn statements taken from Adolfo Olaes and Linda Cruz on September 24,
1982, 8 it appears that both petitioners were, before being examined, specifically informed of their right to
the assistance of counsel, which would be provided them by the investigating office at their request.
Asked if they understood, they said "Opo" and affixed their signatures opposite their answer. This was
followed by a statement entitled "Pagpapatunay" or Verification in which they said inter alia that they did
not need the assistance of counsel ("Hindi ko na kailangan and tulong ng isang manananggol.") which
they also signed. It was only after these preliminary precautions had been taken that the interrogation
began and was recorded in the sworn statement later introduced against them at their trial. There is no
claim that any force, violence, intimidation or threat or any means vitiating the free wig was employed
against them. Their only objection to the extrajudicial confessions is that they were obtained without the
assistance of counsel. They do not aver in their petition that they were not apprised of their right to
counsel or that they were denied the assistance of counsel when they asked for it, or, indeed, that they
had asked for it.

Even so, their investigation did not conform to the requirements laid down in People v. Galit, 9 where
we declared:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any,
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested
shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplislied.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of coursel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein
laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
These requirements were made even stricter under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
providing as follows:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferally of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Applying the above rules, we reach the conclusion that the extrajudicial confessions should be
declared inadmissible as evidence against the herein petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted. The extrajudicial confessions are excluded but the
articles seized under the challenged search warrant may be admitted in evidence. Our temporary
restraining order of May 25, 1987, is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-60504 May 14, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS MELITON C.
GERONIMO, petitioner
vs.
LT. FIDEL V. RAMOS IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF THE CONSTABULARY AND THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-60591 May 14, 1985

MELITON C. GERONIMO, petitioner,
vs.
JULIAN PENDRE, AND THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 60732-39 May 14, 1985
MELITON C. GERONIMO AND 75 OTHER PERSONS NAMED AS ACCUSED IN THE VARIOUS
COMPLAINTS ATTACHED TO THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO E. JAVIER, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT JUDGE OF BARAS, RIZAL and TERESA,
RIZAL, SIMPLICIO C. PAGTALONAN ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL,
FORTUNATO U. MALABANAN, INP Station COMMANDER of BARAS, RIZAL and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR, J.:

These interrelated petitions arose from the controversy over the mayoralty elections in 1980,
wherein the petitioner who was elected to the post of mayor of Baras, Rizal was subsequently
disqualified as a candidate for mayor by this Court's affirmance of the Commission on Elections'
decision on the ground that he was a political turncoat.
The controversy stemmed from the following uncontroverted facts:
On January 8, 1980, private respondent Julian Pendre filed a petition with the Commissio n on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify petitioner Meliton C. Geronimo from running as a candidate for
the mayorship of Baras, Rizal on the ground of political turncoatism.
After hearing the petition, the COMELEC on January 19. 1980 issued Resolution No. 83 05
disqualifying Meliton C Geronimo. On January 22, 1980, Geronimo filed a motion to reconsider the
said resolution, and on January 28, 1980 or two days before the elections, he filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari to restrain the COMELEC from implementing its resolution. Or. the same day,
this Court issued a temporary restraining order against the COMELEC.
In the elections of January 30, 1980, Geronimo obtained a margin of 325 votes when he garnered
2,695 votes as against his opponent Bayani Ferrera's 2,370 votes. On March 11, 1980, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9554, reinstating the proclamation made earlier by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Baras, Rizal in favor of Geronimo as the winning candidate for mayor but
the proclamation was declared temporary subject to the decision of this Court on the petition for
certiorari filed by Geronimo.
On September 26, 1981, this Court rendered a decision in G.R. No. 52413, entitled "Meliton C.
Geronimo v. Commission on Elections and Julian C. Pendre", dismissing the petition for certiorari
and ordering the lifting of the restraining order of January 28, 1980. We ruled that Geronimo was
disqualified to run as a candidate for mayor for being a political turncoat. The petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but it was denied with finality on January 19, 1982.

On February 15, 1982, the COMELEC issued the questioned resolution No. 82 -428 which set aside
the temporary proclamation of Geronimo "it appearing that the disqualification of said respondent
Geronimo had been finally decided by the Supreme Court ..." and which further provided for the
following:
1. To declare the certificate of candidacy of Meliton C. Geronimo for the position of Mayor in the
January 30, 1980 elections null and void from the beginning;
2. To declare all votes cast for Meliton C. Geronimo for Mayor in the January 30, 1980 elections as
"STRAY" votes;
3. To proclaim Bayani A. Ferrera, who garnered 2,370 votes, as the duly elected Mayor of Baras,
Rizal in the January 30, 1980 elections:
4. To direct Meliton C. Geronimo to turn over to Bayani A. Ferrera the position and office of
Municipal Mayor of Baras, Rizal.
On February 15, 1982, Geronimo filed a motion to defer action which was denied by the COMELEC
in Resolution No. 82429.
On February 17, 1982, Geronimo filed a motion for reconsideration followed on March 18, 1982 by
an urgent motion to set aside COMELEC Resolution Nos. 82-428 and 82- 429 with motion to enjoin
Bayani Ferrera from exercising the functions of the mayor of Baras, Rizal. On March 22, 1982, the
COMELEC denied Geronimo's motion for reconsideration.
On May 3, 1982, the petitioner together with some of his political followers of more than fifty persons
entered en masse the Municipal Hall of Baras, occupied its premises a nd continued to do so until
May 13, 1982, causing a paralyzation of official business in the municipality. During this period,
Ferrera held office in his own house. Parenthetically, Geronimo did not enter the office of the mayor
but stayed in another room in the municipal building.
On May 4, 1982, Pendre filed with the COMELEC a motion to cite and declare Geronimo in
contempt. On May 10, Geronimo amended his urgent motion of March 18, 1982 and further moved
to have the oath of office of Bayani A. Ferrera declared premature, ineffective, and void.
On May 12, 1982, the COMELEC after hearing, issued Resolution No. 82 -605, finding Geronimo
guilty of contempt and sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment of five (5) months and to pay a fine
of P1,000.00. In said resolution, the COMELEC simply "noted" Geronimo's urgent motion because of
its previous denial of his motion for reconsideration. The amended urgent motion was likewise
"noted", since it was declared a mere repetition of what was already decided by the COMELEC.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of May 14, 1982, Geronimo and his followers, mostly
women were forcibly taken out of the municipal hall of Baras, Rizal by the military with tile use of
teargas grenades. Gun shots were also fired by the Philippine Constabulary. Some of Geronimo's
followers retaliated with empty bottles when they heard the breaking of the glass windows of the
room where Geronimo was staying. The petitioner was seized, handcuffed, and brought to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa, Rizal.
Sometime between the months of April and May, 1982, a series of criminal charges were filed
against Geronimo and his followers namely: Usurpation of Authority [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code
(RPC)]; Violation of Usurpation of Authority of Official (sic) [Art. 177, Revised Penal Code (RPC)];

Tumultous Affray [Art. 153, RPC]: Sedition (Art. 139, RPC); Illegal Possession of Firearms;
Disobedience to a Person in Authority or the Agent of such Person (Art. 151, RPC) and Alarm and
Scandal (Art. 155, RPC).
On May 19, 1982, Geronimo filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that there is no legal basis for
his arrest and detention since the COMELEC's resolution no. 82-605 holding him in contempt was
issued with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
60504.
On May 27, 1982, this Court issued a resolution ordering the release of Geronimo on his own
recognizance, pending the determination by this Court of the petition's merits.
On May 31, 1982, Geronimo filed another petition docketed as G.R. No. 60591, seeking to annul
and set aside COMELEC's resolution no. 82-605 declaring petitioner in contempt of the COMELEC
and which also dismissed petitioner's motion to set aside COMELEC resolution nos. 82 -428 and 82429.
The third petition was filed by Geronimo and seventy-five (75) others on June 16, 1982, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 60732-39, seeking the dismissal of the criminal complaints earlier filed against them in the
months of March, April and May, 1982.
In the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, Geronimo maintains that there is no
legal basis for his detention. He contends that the resolution of the COMELEC ordering his detention
was issued with grave abuse of discretion or without jurisdiction. Geronimo anchors his charge that
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion on three grounds: (1) that the questioned resolution
was not properly promulgated; (2) that Ferrera did not acquire the plurality of votes for the mayorship
of Baras; and (3) that Julian Pendre who filed the motion for contempt had no personality to institute
the same because he did not file his candidacy for the position of mayor, of Baras, Rizal.
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which governs contempt proceedings only requires(a)
that a charge be made in writing and (b) that an opportunity be given to the accused to be heard by
himself or counsel for certain acts enumerated in said rule, after which a person may be punished for
contempt. As we held in Aguador v. Enerio (37 SCRA 164), "... there is no particular form prescribed
by the Rules of Court in which a contempt charge shall be framed or described. There is also no
requirement in the Rules of Court that a copy of the contempt charge shall be served on the
respondent named therein when it is filed in court. All that Section 3, Rule 71 (formerly Rule 64)
requires on this matter is that a charge in writing be filed. The respondent in a contempt proceeding
is, of course, entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, but this
requirement is properly satisfied when the court, after the respondent appears before it, reads to the
respondent the complaint or furnishes him a copy thereof." Likewise, during the promulgation of the
decision, the accused-respondent need not be present. It is enough that he is notified of the same
either personally or by registered mail. Since the petitioner was duly notified of the charges against
him and was given an opportunity to be heard, after which he was informed an d shown a copy of the
COMELEC resolution finding him guilty of contempt, there was sufficient compliance with the due
process requirement in the contempt proceeding against him.
The fact that Ferrera did not acquire the plurality of votes for the mayorship of Baras and the fact
that Julian Pendre did not file his candidacy for the said position are both immaterial to the charge of
contempt. What is important is whether or not the petitioner committed contumacious acts in utter
disregard of the COMELEC resolution which was issued pursuant to the decision of this Court.

The record shows that after hearing the petition filed by Juan C. Pendre, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8305 disqualifying Meliton C. Geronimo for political turncoatism. The decision was
based on Section 10, Article XII-C of the Constitution prior to its amendment in 1981 and on
Presidential Decree No. 1661 and Batas Pambansa No. 52. As earlier stated, this decision of
COMELEC was affirmed by this Court. Two motions for reconsideration were denied with finality and
a third motion for reconsideration was no longer considered for deliberation but was merely noted.
The regrettable defiance by the petitioner of a COMELEC decision affirmed by this Court and
declared final is sufficient basis for the exercise of the contempt power.
Nonetheless, we take certain factual considerations into account. The petitioner was acting under
strong political pressures from his followers. His defiance of the COMELEC may have been based
on an erroneous interpretation of the turncoatism provisions of the Constitution and statute as shown
by our decision in G.R. No. 52413 dismissing Mr. Geronimo's petition. However, the emotional
impulses which prodded him to act as he did must be understood in the light of his successful
campaign for the mayorship and the happenstance that "turncoatism" was and remains a highly
controversial and perplexing concept. As a matter of fact, the Constitution and the statute have been
amended to allow political "turncoats" to run for member of the Batasang Pambansa in the last
elections.
There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC when it held the
petitioner guilty of contempt. However, we find the penalty of five (5) months imprisonment to be
harsh. Time and again, this Court has held that the power to punish for contempt should be
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, on the corrective and not on the
retaliatory Idea of punishment. (See Repeque v. Aquilizan, 130 SCRA 258; Lipata v. Tutaan, 124
SCRA 880, citing Gamboa v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 270; and People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265; Yangson v.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 43, Balasabas v. Aquilizan, 106 SCRA 502; and Sulit v. Tiangco, 115 SCRA
211-212).
We rule, therefore, that the thirteen (13) days during which the petitioner was confined in the
National Penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal more than suffice for the purpose of serving his sentence
for contempt.
The second petition filed by Mr. Geronimo docketed as G.R. No. 60591, seeks to annul the same
COMELEC Resolution No. 82-605, subject matter of the first petition for two reasons: (1) it declared
petitioner guilty of contempt; and (2) it dismissed petitioner's urgent motion to set aside COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 82-479 and 82-429 which, among others, proclaimed Ferrera as the winning
candidate and directed herein petitioner to turn over to the former the position and office of the
Municipal Mayor of Baras, Rizal.
As we have already disposed of the issue of contempt in the first petition, we shall deal only with the
other matter covered by the questioned resolution.
The petitioner maintains that the COMELEC exceeded its power and jurisdiction when it proclaimed
Bayani A. Ferrera as mayor of Baras, Rizal, in spite of the fact that he did not obtain the plurality of
votes in the January 30, 1980 municipal elections.
We find this contention impressed with merit.
In the case of Yason v. Comelec (G.R. No. 52731, January 31, 1985.), we ruled that:
In elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to give effect to the
expressed will of the majority. It is true that constitutional and statutory provisions

requiring compliance with measures intended to enhance the quality of our

democratic institutions must be obeyed. The restriction against turncoatism is one
such measure. However, even as there should be compliance with the provision on
turncoatism, an interpretation in particular cases which respects the free and
untrammelled expression of the voters' choice must bee followed in its enforcement.
The importance of the people's choice must be the paramount consideration in every election, for the
Constitution has vested in them the right to freely select, by secret-ballot in clean elections, the men
and women who shall make laws for them or govern in their name and behalf. The people have a
natural and a constitutional right to participate directly in the form of government under which they
live. Such a right is among the most important and sacred of the freedoms inherent in a democratic
society and one which must be most vigilantly guarded if a people desires to maintain through self government for themselves and their posterity a genuinely functioning democracy in which the
individual may, in accordance with law, have a voice in the form of his government and in the choice
of the people who will run that government for him. (See also U.S. v. Iturrius, 37 Phil. 765). Thus, it
would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican
forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried
unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris
2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote
the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere
belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. This is particularly true where, as in this case, there is only one other candidate who
ran for the public office. The votes for the deceased or non-qualified candidate are still expressive of
a public clamor that the majority of the voters do not like the losing candidate to be their
representative or to hold the reins of government for them.
As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an election cannot
be proclaimed the winner in the event that the candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to
which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes (23 Phil. 238)
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of
fraud or irregularities in the election is quite different from that produced by declaring
a person ineligible to hold such an office. ... If it be found that the successful
candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal
manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in
favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots. ...

The result is a failure of elections for that particular office. The winning candidate is not qualified and
cannot qualify for the office to which he was elected. A permanent vacancy is thus created.
Section 48 of the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Big. 337, which provides:
SEC. 48. Permanent Vacancy in the Office of the Governor, City or Municipal Mayor..
(l) In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor, city or municipal mayor
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies or is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, as the case may be, shall
assume the office for the unexpired term of the former.
xxx xxx xxx
merely reiterates the established and more democratic rule to meet the situation present in this case.
It is, therefore, patent that the COMELEC committed a grave error when it proclaimed the defeated
candidate, Bayani Ferrera, elected to the office of mayor. After the ineligibility of Geroni mo had been
ascertained and after his proclamation was set aside, the COMELEC should have proclaimed the
vice-mayor as entitled to the office and not Ferrera who failed to obtain the plurality of votes in the
election.
Anent the third petition, G.R. Nos. 60732-39, petitioners maintain that the criminal charges filed
against them are "excessive and harsh, obviously vindictive, harassing, intimidating and prosecuting,
aimed primarily at discouraging and unnerving Meliton C. Geronimo from asserting his right t o the
mayorship of Baras to which the electorate of Baras, many of whom are his co -accused in the many
criminal suits pending against them, has elected him.
It is an undisputed fact that all the criminal charges were the result of the events that transpire d
before and until the May 14,1982 incident, when Mr. Geronimo was forcibly taken out of the
municipal building of Baras by the military. The charges were also filed almost successively: one on
March 20; one on April 12; one on April 14; two on May 4, two on May 14, and one on May 19,
and with the same court and presided over by the same judge. In one of the criminal complaints
wherein about 75 people were charged, the warrants of arrest were issued on the same day that the
preliminary examination was conducted. Such a hasty and manifestly haphazard manner of
conducting the preliminary examination to determine probable cause for the issuance of the warrants
of arrest and eventually for the filing of the necessary information cannot be sanctioned by this
Court. A judge must first satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant
or order of arrest. The requirements are strict. (See Placer v. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463). The
examination must be legitimate and not a feigned one intended to justify a course of action already
predetermined.
In the very recent case of Salonga v. Patio, et al, (G.R. No. 59924, February 18, 1985) we had
occasion to underscore the importance and purpose of a preliminary investigation and how it should
be conducted if it is to conform with the paramount requirements of due process. In that case we
ruled:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and pub lic
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also
to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigat ion is

a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due

process. (See People v. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in
the sense of making sure that a transgressor shag not escape with impunity. A
preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it
is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who
live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case
may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no
probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.
Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable
cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in
given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard
the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See La
Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might
later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the
courts are created to uphold ...
Similar caution is warranted for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the case at bar and especially
considering the background circumstances which led to the filing of charges, we find it highly
improbable for the judge to be able to determine the existence of reasonable grounds to believe that
the offenses have been committed and that each and everyone of the seventy -six (76) persons are
probably guilty thereof in a matter of a few hours and to proceed with the issuance of the warran ts of
arrest also on the same day. It should be remembered and the judge should have taken into account
that all the offenses which were allegedly committed were only the product and result of the outburst
of the feelings and emotions of the people of Baras due to the highly tense situation in the
municipality, which culminated with the May 14, 1982 incident. The judge, therefore, in conducting
his preliminary investigation should have ascertained with double care if, indeed, there was ample
evidence to warrant the issuance of arrest warrants and eventually the filing of criminal informations
against such a big number of persons, most of whom were impelled by different motivations and
whose respective participations were of varying natures and degrees. One o f the crimes charged
was sedition, a particularly grave offense not to be lightly treated by any prosecuting officer or judge.
The possibility of prolonged detention because of the charge should have been considered.
In view of the above considerations and, as suggested by the Solicitor-General in his manifestation
made during the hearing on these petitions, embodied in our resolution dated May 29, 1984, the
warrants of arrest issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Teresa, Rizal are recalled and the matter is
referred to the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal who is directed to determine whether or not the preliminary
examinations should be continued and, thereafter, to make a ruling on the results of any
examination.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 60504, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby GRANTED. The penalty
for contempt of the Commission on Elections is declared fully satisfied; the petitioner's bail on his
own recognizance is CANCELLED; and he is restored to his liberty.
In G.R. No. 60591, the petition is GRANTED in part. The resolution of the Commission on Elections
proclaiming Bayani A. Ferrera duly elected mayor of Baras, Rizal is SET ASIDE. A permanent
vacancy having arisen in the Office of Mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume the office after taking his
oath and qualifying.

In G.R. Nos. 60732-39, the petition is GRANTED in part. The warrants of arrest issued by the
Municipal Trial Court of Teresa, Rizal are RECALLED as null and void. The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal
is ORDERED to determine whether or not the preliminary examinations should be continued and,
thereafter, to take the appropriate action on the matter, according to the tenor of this decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br.
103], SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES
(Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY
HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once
more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of
its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number of similar
cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem, where
season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite
impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of
arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant

City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters o n Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition
for habeas corpusherein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due
process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
6, 1990. 5On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this
case and in G.R. No. 921647 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator
Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions. Said return
urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandezruling because-and this is putting it very
simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et
al.charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of
rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime ("delito
complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to
in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and
the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less
grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for
Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stat ed that it was issued
without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners
and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the
Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's
petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes,
and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the
Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave
character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is reinforced
by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986
Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime
which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the
Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of the crimes
penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses
upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense
in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11In thus acting, the President in effect by
legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court can do no less
than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should
be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with
the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be
proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words
of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que
hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the
Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and
then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso
de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito
mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran
los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment,
restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period
to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the
acts charged were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal
Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. Indeed, if
one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In
directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a
penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense, if imposed
separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible.
When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead
of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the
maximum of the penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is
that Hernandezremains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely

provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against
defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies
described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed
by said defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of
rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge
cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable
to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary
to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the
initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without
first personallydetermining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has
already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest
issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which
hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary
investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not
have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation
of Hernandezas applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner 's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges
a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing
with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no d ifference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail
hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in
a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such plea s has only
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that
it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the
Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if
the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift
to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.

92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factualmilieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly
pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case
No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1,
1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violationthey claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand
in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days,
as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable
to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define a nd delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners
are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once
bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.