G.R. No.

177430

July 14, 2009

RENE M. FRANCISCO,1 Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
This case assailed the Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 00-186411, and its Resolution4
dated 6 July 2007 denying petitioner Oscar A. Ojedas Motion for
Reconsideration.
In an Information dated 12 September 2000, Ruel "Jayar" Tolentino,
Oscar A. Ojeda, Rene M. Francisco, Danilo J. Lintag, Antonio Caamic,
Michael Umagat, Amado Gonzales and Police Officer 3 (PO3)
Roberto Nadora were charged before the RTC of Manila with
violation of Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-186411
and was raffled to Branch 21. The Information reads:
That on or about November 18, 1999, in the City of Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, all the above-named
accused, with evident intent to defraud the government of
legitimate taxes accruing to it from imported articles, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly participate in and facilitate
the transportation, concealment, and possession of dutiable
electronic equipment and accessories with a domestic market value
of P20,000,000.00 contained in container van no. TTNU9201241, but
which were declared in Formal Entry and Revenue Declaration No.
118302 as assorted mens and ladies accessories, all of said accused
knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, to the
damage and prejudice of the Philippine Government.5
On 16 October 2000, orders for the arrest of the accused were
issued by the trial court.6 Tolentino, Francisco, Lintag, PO3 Nadora
and Ojeda were granted provisional liberty after filing their
respective personal bail bonds.
On 6 December 2000, when arraigned, Tolentino, Francisco, Lintag
and PO3 Nadora, assisted by their respective counsels de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.7 Assisted by counsel, Ojeda
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 28 February 2001.8 Accused
Caamic, Umagat and Gonzales remained at large.
The pre-trial conference was conducted and terminated on 17 April
2001.9 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Lt. Julius
Agdeppa,10 member of Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force
(PASTF) Aduana; (2) Atty. Eden Dandal,11 Special Assistant to the
Director of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS); and
(3) Zenaida Lanaria,12 Acting Chief, Liquidation and Billing Division,
Bureau of Customs (BOC).
The evidence for the prosecution shows:
On 18 November 1999, the PASTF Aduana received intelligence
information that a container van with No. TTNU 9201241 containing
electronic appliances on board a trailer truck with Plate No. GDW
833 would be released from the Manila International Container Port
(MICP) without payment of the required customs duties and taxes.
At around 3:45 p.m. of the same date, the PASTF Aduana led by Lt.

Julius Agdeppa, together with five of its members (Sgt. Marvida, Sgt.
Narag, Sgt. Azarcon, Sgt. Segismundo and Sgt. Alcid), spotted the
said truck with container van leaving the MICP compound. The team
tailed the truck and upon reaching the South Superhighway, Lt.
Agdeppas vehicle overtook the truck and ordered the driver to pull
over. When the driver pulled over, Lt. Agdeppa and Sgt. Marvida
approached it and asked the truck driver (Amado Gonzales) to show
the documents of the cargo. Gonzales presented only photocopies
of the Formal Entry, Internal Revenue Declaration No. 11830213 and
Invoice No. LPI/99-500.14 Meanwhile, Michael Umagat, the driver of
a white Honda Civic following the truck, approached them and asked
what the problem was. Umagat said, "Pare, ano problema nyan?
May problema ba yan?" After Lt. Agdeppa identified himself, he
asked Umagat who the owner of the cargo was. Umagat said, "Pare
kay Ruel Tolentino, okey na yan kay Danilo Lintag."15 When Lt.
Agdeppa inquired about the destination of the cargo, Umagat
pointed to PO3 Nadora who was on board a stainless-type jeep and
said, "Siya ang escort, siya ang nakakaalam kung saan pupunta yan,
sir."16 PO3 Nadora told them he did not know the destination of the
cargo. Suspecting there was something illegal about the cargo
considering that the items mentioned in the entry (mens and ladies
accessories) were different from those enumerated in the invoice
(VHS, Betamax, etc.), and that the taxes paid were not
commensurate with the size of the container van, Lt. Agdeppa told
Gonzales, Umagat and PO3 Nadora to follow them to Warehouse
No. 16, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City where the cargo would be
subjected to examination. The photocopies of the entry declaration
and the invoice were taken by Lt. Agdeppa as part of evidence and
as basis for the inventory.
On 20 November 1999, the opening of the container van was
witnessed by, among other persons, Atty. Eden Dandal, CIIS MICP
Chief, Rene Francisco, Gen. Calimlim, Head of PASTF Aduana, and
the media.17 The container van contained dutiable assorted
electronic equipment and appliances as mentioned in Invoice No.
LPI/99-500, contrary to the 450 cartons of assorted mens and
ladies accessories declared in the Formal Entry and Internal
Revenue Declaration No. 118302.18 Invoice No. LPI/99-50019
enumerates the following items:
QUANTITY
DESCRIPTION
51 grs. Shirt
@US$0.20/grs.
50 grs. Blouse 0.20/grs. 10.00
100 sets Television
0.30/set
29 grs. Dress
0.40/grs. 11.60
30 grs. Jacket 0.50/grs. 15.00
80 sets Vcd
0.20/set 16.00
30 grs. Jumper 0.50/grs. 15.00
150 sets Vhs
0.238/set 35.70
30 grs. Skirt
0.40/grs. 12.00
1000 grs. blank tape
0.05/grs.
40 grs. Sandals 0.20/grs. 8.00
20 grs. Bags
0.50/grs. 10.00
30 sets Components
0.40/grs.
40 grs. Tights
0.30/grs. 12.00
100 sets Fishing rods
2.50/set

UNIT PRICE
US$10.20

AMOUNT

30.00

50.00

12.00
250.00

US$497.5020
The Formal Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration contained,
among other things, the following entries: Exporter: PAWA Brothers
Trading PTE, Ltd.; Importer: Loxon Phils., Inc. #33 Taguig St., Makati
City, Philippines; Broker/Attorney-in-Fact: A&N Brokerage Services;
Number and Kind of Packages: 450 Cartons: Assorted Mens and
Ladies Accessories, etc.; Container Van No. TTNU 9201241: the
weight, which was voluntarily upgraded to 1,350%; Customs value:

US$3,588.75; Dutiable value: P158,768.57; Total assessment:

P81,939.00.21 The itemized contents of the container van were
enumerated in the inventory sheet22 prepared by PO1 Nestor
Marvida, to which Atty. Eden Dandal and Lt. Agdeppa agreed.
Per certification issued by Stanley N. Villavicencio of the Valuation
and Classification Division of the Bureau of Customs, the domestic
market value of the assorted electronic equipment contained in the
container van consigned to Loxon Phil., Inc. is P20,000,000.00.23
Formal Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302 was
assigned by Customs Operations Officer 5 (COO5) Oscar Ojeda to
Customs Operations Officer 3 (COO3) Rene Francisco for
examination. Francisco recommended its continuous processing
without actual examination of the cargo, which Oscar Ojeda
concurred in. The entry with the attached clearance from the CIIS
monitoring team headed by Danilo Lintag was forwarded to the cash
division for payment. For allegedly facilitating the release of said
cargo, the three customs personnel were charged with violation of
Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
Atty. Dandal testified that he knew Oscar Ojeda, Danilo J. Lintag and
Rene M. Francisco, they being his co-workers at the Bureau of
Customs. He did not know PO3 Roberto Nadora. He disclosed that
he received a call from Gen. Calimlim of the PASTF Aduana
requesting him to witness the 100% examination of apprehended
goods covered by Formal Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration
No. 118302 and consigned to Loxon Phils., Inc. He revealed that
cargoes described as general merchandise, those with alert orders
and those coming from China, Hongkong, Thailand and Singapore
were usually subjected to 100% examination. He said the persons
authorized to issue alert orders and orders for 100% examination
were the Director of CIIS, the Director of Enforcement and Security
Service, and the District Collector. With respect to the cargo
involved in this case which came from Singapore, there was no
request from the foregoing persons to subject the same to 100%
examination.
Atty. Dandal explained that the Bureau of Customs adopted a
selectivity system called the ASYCUDA (Automated System for
Customs Data) Program to determine if the cargo was to be
subjected to 100% examination. In said program, entries are
classified into three lanes: (1) the green color lane, where the entry
is forwarded to the cash division for payment and immediate release
of cargo; (2) the yellow color lane, where only verification of
documents is done by the examiner; and (3) the red color lane,
where the goods are subjected to 100% examination. He said that
the cargo involved was categorized as yellow, which means that
document-only verification is required. It is the Assessment Section
that reviews documents falling on the yellow lane. He explained that
there are instances when entries classified as yellow are subjected
to 100% examination, such as (1) when there is an Alert Order; or (2)
when the value of the particular shipment is "hit," which means that
the valuation is under question, and when the declarations on the
entry and the supporting documents themselves contradict each
other.24 In these instances, the appraiser may either increase the
valuation or conduct a re-computation of the duties and taxes to be
paid or secure sample for valuation purposes. He added that it is
impossible for a fraudulent entry to pass the bureau without passing
the intelligence detachment assigned to each district, unless there is
some sort of conspiracy. He revealed that Oscar Ojeda belonged to
the Assessment Office where importation documents mandatorily
passed.
Atty. Dandal said he found "striking" and "peculiar" the entries made
in the documents regarding the subject cargo. The Formal Entry and

Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302 merely described the

cargo as 450 cartons of assorted mens and ladies accessories. It did
not state the weight as is normally indicated in the Bill of Lading,
invoice and packing list. He said that the weight of the shipment
mentioned in the Bill of Lading (3,500 kg or 3.5 tons) was excessive
for 450 cartons of mens and ladies accessories. He likewise said
that the quantity and valuation in the import declaration was very
peculiar. He explained that there was no way to determine the
number of pieces of each mens and ladies accessories and the unit
price of each. He found it almost impossible also that the value of
the containerized importation was only US$500.00. With all the
electronic equipment and appliances (30 sets of components worth
only US$12.00, 150 sets of VHS worth only US$35.00, and 100 sets
of TV worth only US$30.00) declared in the invoice, the importation
should not only be subjected to 100% examination, but should be
alerted and the processing stopped by the examiners. The persons
who acted on the particular entry were COO3 R.M. Francisco, COO5
A. Ojeda, and Felicitacion de Luz, Acting District Collector.
Atty. Dandal explained that Oscar Ojeda, as COO5, received the
findings of the examiner/appraiser. The COO5 or the principal
examiner may also request a 100% examination of the cargo. In the
cargo subject of this case, the assessment was based merely on the
documents, because when the entry was transmitted to the Entry
Encoding Center, yellow appeared as the color code. Thus, Ojeda
merely reviewed the supporting documents. He added that the
principal examiner could have upgraded the valuation if the value
was very low, and determined if the documents were properly
classified. In the subject importation, there was voluntary upgrading
(of the value of the importation) to 1,350%. Ojeda made an
adjustment from P39,000.00 to P159,000.00. He said Danilo Lintag,
who was assigned with the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, had
no authority to conduct 100% examination. The goods, subject
matter of the case, were, according to him, absolutely misdeclared
and claimed to be mens and ladies accessories.
Zenaida Lanaria testified that in November 1999, she was the
Assistant Chief of the Liquidation and Billing Division of the BOC. She
explained that the Liquidation and Billing Division was part of the
processing of importations. She said that importation documents
should pass her office. As regards Formal Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration No. 118302, she said that this document only passed the
Collection Division and never reached her division. She did not know
why this happened. It was only when she was subpoenaed by the
court that she learned of it.
For the defense, the following took the stand: (1) PO3 Roberto
Nadora,25 assigned at Jose Abad Santos Avenue Police Station 7,
Western Police District; (2) Danilo J. Lintag, Customs Agent, BOC;26
(3) Oscar Ojeda, Customs Examiner, BOC;27 (4) Ruel Tolentino,
businessman and resident of Taguig, Metro Manila;28 (5) Atty.
Domingo Leguiab, Assistant Chief, Appellate Division, Legal Service,
Office of the Commissioner, BOC;29 (6) Manuel Oktubre,
businessman and resident of Malabon, Metro Manila;30 and (7)
Renato M. Francisco, Acting Customs Operations Officer 3 (COO3),
Special Warehousing Assessment Unit, BOC.31
PO3 Nadora denied the charge against him. He testified that on 18
November 1999, he was assigned at the Mobile Patrol Support Unit.
On said day, he reported for work at 7:00 a.m. and went home at
4:00 p.m. On his way home, he saw Michael Umagat and Amado
Gonzales, who asked for his assistance. They told him that their
container van was missing so he helped them look for it. They
located the container van inside Camp Aguinaldo in the warehouse
of Task Force Aduana. He inquired from the person in authority why

the container van was there. Instead of being given a reply, he was
accused of escorting the container van.
Mr. Lintag denied participating in the crime charged. He testified
that as a Customs Agent, it was his duty to supervise and review all
port entries made by agents, to submit a report with proper
recommendation, and to analyze reports of agents regarding
violations of the Tariff and Customs Code and the rules and
regulations pertaining thereto. It was also his duty to conduct and
witness a 100% examination of shipments consigned to or handled
by certain individuals regardless of whether they were classified as
green, yellow or red under the ASYCUDA Program.32
At around 3:45 p.m. of 18 November 1999, he was in his office. He
did not order a 100% examination of Container Van No.
TTNU9201241 covered by Formal Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration No. 11830233 and Invoice No. LPI/99-500, because
there was no notice from the agents. He had no knowledge about
Formal Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302, because
not a single document related to it passed his office. He also did not
sign any document regarding the same. He denied that the signature
appearing on Exhibit M was his. He likewise denied that shipments
passed through the CIIS Monitoring Teams created by former BOC
Commissioner Nelson Tan.34
Oscar Ojeda, denying the charge against him, testified that on 18
November 1999, he was Acting Principal Examiner at the MICP, BOC.
As such, it was his duty to review the importation documents
(Consumption Entry) and the findings of his examiner. He recalled
having reviewed the documents of the shipment consigned to Loxon
Phils., Inc. covered by Formal Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration No. 118302. The documents for said shipment were
forwarded to his division by the Entry Processing Division (Marine
Division). Upon receipt thereof, the same was given to the principal
examiner for assignment to the examiner. For this cargo, he said he
assigned the documents to Rene Francisco. It is standard operating
procedure for the examiner to enter the documents in the computer
for registration and to enter the necessary findings on the contents
of the documents. When the documents were returned to him by
Francisco, he found them to be in order. All the supporting
documents were attached. Ojeda said he did not find any
discrepancy. He did not conduct (physical) examination of this
particular cargo, but only reviewed the documents. Having been
categorized as yellow, the cargo would be examined by the
examiner based on documents and not by actual physical
examination. He did not receive any order from his superior to
examine physically the cargo, subject matter of this case. He said
that he did not see the name of Rene Francisco in any document
passed to him, and that he was not aware of the ownership of the
importation.

As a former examiner/appraiser for thirteen years prior to his

appointment as principal appraiser, Ojeda said he was very familiar
with the duties of an examiner. It is part of an examiners job to
examine documents covering importations and the actual objects
imported. Even without the superiors permission, an examiner can
conduct actual or physical examination. It is the initiative of the
examiner to perform actual examination if he finds it necessary in
the face of the document, even if there is no alert order. Ojeda
claimed that the principal examiner could not perform an actual
examination unlike the examiner. He further explained that once the
principal examiner affixed his signature approving all the documents
that had been recommended by the examiner, the responsibility for
the documents would be assumed by the principal examiner.

Ojeda said he found the contents and their values, as well as the
total worth of the importation, to be unusual. Despite all these, he
did not conduct 100% examination because there was a voluntary
upgrading by the importer. The value of the invoice was upgraded
by 1,350%.
When confronted with his counter-affidavit, he admitted that the
following was stated therein: "In fact, Mr. Danilo Lintag even affixed
his signature on his report and attached the same to the other
pertinent documents as a sign of clearance on his part." He said that
when the clearance reached his table, the signatures of his examiner
and of Lintag were already there.
Mr. Ruel Tolentino denied any participation in the alleged smuggling
and said that he had no intention to defraud the government. He
testified that he was a licensed cargo forwarder (Jara Cargo
Forwarders). As such, he hauled cargo from any place in Metro
Manila to any point in Luzon. He said he was not the "Jayar"
mentioned in the information and had never used said name. He
claimed he had no participation in the importation, subject of this
case. He did not participate in the processing or release of the cargo
involved. He admitted, however, that he sent a letter dated 7
December 1999 to the Collector of the BOC offering to redeem the
merchandise, there being already a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention over the goods. Not being the importer or broker of the
cargo, he made the offer to redeem, because a certain Paolo
Gonzales, the holder of the original Bill of Lading of the seized
goods, approached him and asked for his help in formally making
the offer of redemption of the forfeited goods. Paolo Gonzales gave
him a Special Power of Attorney, and he wrote the letter making a
formal offer to redeem the seized articles. The offer was approved
by the Chief of the Law Division and indorsed to the Collector of
Customs. He claimed that he was included in the complaint because
of his letter making the offer to redeem.
Mr. Tolentino explained that his only evidence that Loxon Phils., Inc.
was existing was what Paolo Gonzales told him. He added that if the
cargo would be released, Paolo Gonzales would give him 2% of the
redemption value.
Atty. Domingo Leguiab testified on the events that happened
involving the supposed shipment of Loxon Phils., Inc. He said the
shipment was placed under Warrant of Seizure and Detention on 23
November 1999 because it was misdeclared pursuant to Republic
Act No. 7651 without subjecting the shipment for hearing. The
shipment was forfeited in favor of the government also on 23
November 1999. Under Section 2307 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, the importer has the right to redeem under certain
conditions. The offer of redemption can be made by the importer or
by an Attorney-in-Fact by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA). In this case, the offer to redeem was made on 27 December
1999 by Ruel Tolentino pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney, and
was duly received by the Law Division.
Atty. Leguiab said that on record Loxon Phils., Inc. was the
importer/consignee. The Law Division did not go to the extent of
determining whether said corporation was a registered importer or
not. He had no knowledge that the President of Loxon Phils., Inc.
had brought a disclaimer that it was the importer of the forfeited
goods. He recalled that the goods were auctioned off and the
redemption did not push through.
Manuel Oktubre testified that he knew Ruel Tolentino. He often saw
the latter at the MICP, which was a cargo forwarder. He said he saw

Tolentino on 26 September 2002 at the Marine Division of the MICP,

where he was requested by the latter to testify that he saw
someone entrust the SPA to Tolentino. Tolentino signed the SPA in
his presence. After signing the SPA, Tolentino introduced him to
Paolo Gonzales, the person who gave the SPA to the former. He
knew Paolo Gonzales to be the General Manager of Loxon Phils., Inc.
because he read the contents of the SPA. He disclosed that he was a
former examiner of the BOC and had known Tolentino since 1995.
As to Paolo Gonzales, he first saw him when the former gave the
SPA to Tolentino.
Renato M. Francisco testified that as COO3, the equivalent of
customs examiner or appraiser, he was tasked to examine, classify
and appraise importations assigned to him at the Formal Entry
Division, BOC. On 18 November 1999, he was in his office at the
Formal Entry Division. His immediate superiors were Andres Areza
and Oscar Ojeda. He explained that there were several instances
wherein physical examination has to be done on imported goods.
These are when the surveyor sees that the container van is broken
into or tampered, and when there is an alert or a hold order issued
by competent authorities. On said day, Oscar Ojeda assigned to him
Entry No. 118(302) consigned to Loxon Phils., Inc.
The usual procedure, he claimed, when an entry was assigned to
him, began with the consignee/owner of the importation paying the
bank the duties and taxes on the importation based on the invoice.
Thereafter, what followed was the filing of the entry at the encoding
center (ASYCUDA), which was manned by non-customs employees.
When he received the entry, he examined the entry and all its
supporting documents (Bill of Lading, Invoice and Packing List). He
evaluated the entry to check whether there were discrepancies or
unnecessary documents attached. In the subject importation, he
found that the invoice was voluntarily upgraded to 1,350%,
presumably by the consignee that was approved by the bank. He
found the entry and the documents in order. He did not find the
name of Ruel Tolentino on the face of the entry. The description of
the entry was 450 cartons of assorted mens and ladies accessories.
Upon document examination, he went to the computer to "trigger"
the entry. From the computer, he found out that the entry under the
ASYCUDA was categorized as "yellow." He explained that there were
three classifications under the ASYCUDA green, yellow and red.
Green meant that the entry went direct to the cash division for
payment; yellow meant document-only examination was required;
red meant that 100% physical examination of the entry was
required. One hundred (100%) percent examination meant that the
contents of the importation must be opened. This entry consigned
to Loxon Phils., Inc. was classified as "yellow." After consulting the
computer, he made his findings at the back of the entry.
He said it was the first time he encountered a voluntary upgrading of
1,350% and found the same irregular. However, since the bank
approved the entry and was accepted by the Entry Encoding System,
he considered it regular. He based his action on the approval of the
bank. He merely made a documentary examination of the entry
because there was no alert order or hold order on the entry. He
added that the entry fell on the yellow lane, and there was no
derogatory information regarding the same. He claimed that it was
not required of him to conduct physical examination, because the
entry was classified as yellow. He recommended the continuous
processing of the entry and the release of the shipment. Under the
entry, the customs duties and taxes paid amounted to P7,213.75. His
findings with respect to the duties and taxes amounted to
P81,781.00. After writing his findings at the back of the entry, he
forwarded or gave it to his superior, Oscar Ojeda. The formers
responsibility ended there. Ojeda consulted the computer and

triggered the entry. The latter then stamped the word "yellow" at
the back of the entry and signed it together with the final
assessment notice. The entry was forwarded to the Cash Division.
Francisco said he had no knowledge of or participation in the crime
charged. His only participation as regards the entry was performing
the usual procedures in the processing of documents. It was only in
court that he came to know of Ruel Tolentino and PO3 Nadora.
He admitted that his recommendation for the continuous processing
of the entry was contained in an Officer on Case Report dated 18
November 1999.35 Under the heading "findings" of said report, it
stated that "found as declared right." In said report, his signature,
together with the signatures of Francisco and Lintag, appears
thereon. He further admitted that the bank merely accepted
payment and did not examine, classify or appraise an entry. He said
he did not verify why the entry was upgraded to 1,350%. He added
that he did not comply with the Customs Memorandum Order
requiring 100% examination and getting samples for purposes of
evaluation, because the entry fell on the yellow lane.
On 27 August 2003, the trial court, agreeing with the version of the
prosecution, promulgated its decision finding Tolentino, Ojeda,
Francisco, Lintag and PO3 Nadora guilty of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused RUEL
"JAYAR" TOLENTINO, OSCAR OJEDA, RENE M. FRANCISCO, DANILO
LINTAG and PO3 ROBERTO NADORA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional as maximum and to pay fine of
P8,000.00 each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bonds posted for the provisional liberty of the
accused are hereby CANCELLED.
It appearing that accused ANTONIO CAAMIC, MICHAEL UMAGAT and
AMADO GONZALES have not been apprehended to date, let warrant
be issued for their arrest and let the case against them be ARCHIVED
to be reinstated upon their apprehension.36
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, especially the testimony of Lt. Julius Agdeppa, vis--vis
the denials of all the accused. No improper motive to testify falsely
against the accused was found on the part of the prosecution
witnesses.
The trial court convicted Ruel Toletino for being the owner of the
cargo subject of this case. As to PO3 Roberto Nadora, he was found
guilty of escorting the shipment while in transit to the supposed
consignee. His defense that his assistance was merely sought by
Umagat and Gonzales to look for the container van was not given
weight because of the declaration of Lt. Agdeppa that Francisco was
pointed to as the escort of the cargo truck and was present when
the same was apprehended in Manila.1avvphi1
Renato Francisco, Oscar Ojeda and Danilo Lintag were held
responsible for omitting certain procedural steps in the processing
of importation subject of this case. According to Zenaida Lanaria,
Acting Chief, Liquidation and Billing Division, BOC, importation
documents should pass through her office. In this case, Formal Entry
and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302 only passed the
Collection Division and never reached her division. Franciscos and

Ojedas claims that they merely followed procedure when they

subjected the cargo involved to documentary examination and not
to 100% actual physical examination were not accepted by the trial
court in view of the presence of discrepancies and irregularities on
the face of the documents relative to Formal Entry and Internal
Revenue Declaration No. 118302. Lintags contention that the
documents involved did not pass through his office was not believed
by the trial court. This contention, the trial court said, was belied by
the Memorandum for the District Collector of Customs dated 18
November 1999,37 which was signed by him and contained the
findings "Found as Declared." As to Lintags claim that the signature
therein was not his, the trial court ruled that he, having the burden
to prove the same, failed to show that there was indeed a forgery.
The trial court expounded:
This court need not be a computer expert as to clearly detect
whether or not a kind of manipulation must have intervened into
the procedure. It may not be mere suspicion but simple curiosity
that would drive anyone to ask and find out whether the invoice is
credible or not. To the plain understanding of the Court, it is basic in
any computer system, which is Asy[c]uda program being adopted by
the Bureau of Customs as mentioned in their testimonies pertaining
to certain documents covering importations. Common sense also
would dictate that the computer can not think and act like the
operator. It is still the user who could possibly make it operate in the
manner said user would like to produce the desired result. If you
feed it garbage facts or data it will in turn emit the same
input/output following the "garbage in, garbage out" principle in
computerization. If the user wants the document to fall under a
certain color code like yellow, red or green, it is possible because the
user knows to come about it.
If the entry and invoice stated items at random (mostly mens and
ladies accessories) inserting some electronics appliances and
devices such as TV, blank tape, components VCD and VHS among
them, the user can command the color code desired for it in the
computer as mere yellow (code indicating the items in the
document which does not require 100% examination) without even
regard for the pricing, quantifying, etc. The examiners stressed in all
the procedures corresponding to each and every phase of their
duties and responsibilities that, they have no hand in deviation or
omission that would occur in the course of the performance of each
task or work assigned to persons involved in this case. Any error or
defect along this line of function can easily be attributed by them to
the computer, to the program or system adopted. What they wish to
actually show to this Court is that the Bureau of Customs procedure
have been computerized so it is following a system that could
facilitate matters without much meticulous and rigid inspection or
physical examination as it used to be when the system was not yet
computerized.
Mere browsing of the documents in question if common sense is
employed vice the computer, the listed items considered mens and
ladies accessories therein could have aroused the BOC officials and
personnel thinking why there were insertions of items other then
mens and ladies accessories and the quantities and pricing of which
could also raise their eyebrows over the pieces of declared items for
being not commensurate to more realistic unit price? How about the
real mens and ladies accessories? Are they relief goods or items for
charity or donation that the pricing thereof are so low or cheap? Is
the importer intending to re-s[ell] these goods?
Now what about the computer if they really rely on it in the Bureau
of Customs? Does it totally replace laymans visual determination of

assessing such goods or items? Would not accused be but tempted

to make even a mere glance of them to find out what the cartons or
packages contain as to even accidentally discovering that contrary to
what had been declared in the invoice. They are not mere mens and
ladies accessories but appliances and electronic items. Had the
accused been more prudent and attentive enough in the course of
their assigned task no other work force or imported goods, being
transported for delivery to the consignee without being assessed of
the corresponding duties and taxes.
The irregular transaction could not have been possible without any
form of collusion among the accused who handled the processing of
the documents. x x x. Had they efficiently checked/verified the entry
and invoice, the shipment could not have been released without
payment of correct duties and taxes.38
The trial court found that the accused participated directly and
constructively in the act charged for which they were held criminally
liable.
On 28 August 2003, Tolentino applied for probation.39 PO3 Nadora,
Ojeda, Francisco and Lintag filed their respective notices of appeal.
Subsequently, PO3 Nadora withdrew his notice of appeal and filed
his application for probation. The notices of appeal having been filed
on time, the trial court directed the transmission of the records of
the case to the Court of Appeals. The applications for probation of
PO3 Nadora and Tolentino were granted and a probation period for
two years was imposed on each.40
During the pendency of the appeal with the Court of Appeals, Lintag
died.41
On 13 April 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
denying the appeal and affirming in toto the decision of the trial
court. The Motion for Reconsideration42 of Ojeda was denied by the
appellate court in its resolution dated 6 July 2007.
Petitioners Francisco and Ojeda are now before us via petitions for
review respectively docketed as G.R. No. 177430 and No. 178935.
Per resolution of the Court, the cases were ordered consolidated.43
Petitioner Francisco cites the following grounds:
I
WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
OR PROVED DURING TRIAL.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APELLANT RENE M.
FRANCISCO WAS PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE DECISION OF BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT VIOLATED SECTION 14, ARTICLE VIII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Ojeda raises the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
PETITIONER OJEDA AND HIS CO-ACCUSED LIABLE FOR CONSPIRACY
IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE

ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY IN THE

INFORMATION;
WHETHER OR NOT, IN THE ABSENCE OF CONSPIRACY AND/OR ANY
ALLEGATION OF CONSPIRACY IN THE INFORMATION, THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED; and
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
CONSPIRACY IN THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
The issues raised by petitioners can be limited to:
(1) Was conspiracy properly alleged in the information?
(2) If properly alleged, was conspiracy proven beyond reasonable
doubt?
(3) Was the guilt of petitioners proven beyond reasonable doubt?
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it.44 In our jurisdiction, conspiracy can be alleged in the
Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as
constitutive of the crime itself.45
When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself,46 the sufficiency of
the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed
by Section 6,47 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In other words, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said
crime must be set forth in the complaint or information.48 The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is
to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so
as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.49
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when
conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime. There is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information, because conspiracy is not the
gravamen of the offense charged. Conspiracy is significant only
because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused and makes
them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their
participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is
collective, and each participant will be equally responsible for the
acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.50
The Court in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,51 citing People v.
Quitlong,52described how conspiracy as the mode of committing
the offense should be alleged in the information, viz:
In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the
information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a
bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the
accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One
such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more
accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of
an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to
during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an
allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute
criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature
and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or
others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and
can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate
the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being

imputable to all the others [People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442]. Verily,
an accused must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his
co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the
components of conspiracy or allege all the details thereof, like the
part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused
with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it
necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts relied
upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will
admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common
understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally,
that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of
the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of
the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following
the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the
respective statutes defining them [15A C.J.S. 842-844].
xxxx
x x x Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters
agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to
actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the
accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has
been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to
commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the
absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or
"confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly
appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting
conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of
purpose or the community of design among the accused must be
conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its
derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting
the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a
matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy
when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from
shown acts and conduct of the accused. (Emphases supplied.)
From the foregoing discussion, it is sufficient to allege conspiracy as
a mode of the commission of an offense in either of the following
manners: (1) by the use of the word "conspire," or its derivatives or
synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner
that a person of common understanding would know what is
intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts.53
In the case before us, petitioners contend that the information did
not contain any allegation of conspiracy, either by the use of the
words conspire or its derivatives and synonyms, or by allegations of

basic facts constituting conspiracy that will make them liable for the
acts of their co-accused.

2. the declaration of the quantity in the invoice the unit of

measurement is gross but the invoice does not specify the number
of items per gross;

We find this contention untenable.

It is settled that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in
the information.54 A look at the information readily shows that the
words "conspiracy," "conspired" or "in conspiracy with" does not
appear in the information. This, however, does not necessarily mean
that the absence of these words would signify that conspiracy was
not alleged in the information. After carefully reading the
information, we find that conspiracy was properly alleged in the
information. The accusatory portion reads in part: "all the abovenamed accused, with evident intent to defraud the government of
legitimate taxes accruing to it from imported articles, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly participate in and facilitate
the transportation, concealment, and possession of dutiable
electronic equipment and accessories with a domestic market value
of P20,000,000.00 contained in container van no. TTNU9201241, but
which were declared in Formal Entry and Revenue Declaration No.
118302 as assorted mens and ladies accessories x x x." We find the
phrase "participate in and facilitate" to be a clear and definite
allegation of conspiracy sufficient for those being accused to
competently enter a plea and to make a proper defense.
Both Rene Francisco and Oscar Ojeda were charged because they
assisted in and facilitated the release of the subject cargo without
the payment of the proper duties and taxes due the government by
omitting certain acts in light of glaring discrepancies and suspicious
entries present in the documents involved in the subject importation
(Formal Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302, invoice,
bill of lading and packing list).
Francisco stresses that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable. He contends that he faithfully, carefully and regularly
exercised his official duties as customs examiner in accordance with
the applicable processes and procedure of his office. He further
contends that the prosecutions principal witness, Lt. Agdeppa,
absolved him of any involvement in the crime charged by saying that
the former was not present when the cargo was apprehended, and
that he did not know how Franciscos name was written in Formal
Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302. He adds that
the decisions of both lower courts violated Section 14, Article VIII55
of the 1987 Constitution, when they failed to name or identify who
among the accused allegedly manipulated the computer system.
We are not persuaded that Francisco faithfully and regularly
performed his duties as examiner as regards Formal Entry and
Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302. His total reliance on the
ASYCUDA (Automated System for Customs Data) Program employed
at the BOC to determine if a cargo is to be subjected to 100%
physical examination will not exonerate him. The fact that the
subject importation was classified as "yellow" (examination of
documents only) did not mean he could not and should not conduct
100% physical examination of the cargo in view of the glaring
discrepancies and suspicious entries in the documents involved. The
glaring discrepancies and suspicious entries include:
1. the Bill of Lading shows that the weight of the shipment is 3,500
kg. or 3.5 tons while the declared quantity of the importation was
450 cartons of assorted mens and ladies accessories. According to
Atty. Dandal, 3.5 tons is too heavy for 450 cartons of mens and
ladies accessories;

3. the declaration of the prices in the invoice has no basis, e.g., the
declaration of 20 centavos per gross has no basis for the valuation, it
does not say how many pieces of t-shirts or blouses are worth 20
centavos;
4. the amount of the importation which was merely $500 is
unusually low for a containerized importation;
5. the voluntary upgrading by 1350% is unusually high.56
By merely looking at Formal Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration
No. 118302 and the invoice, one can readily see the discrepancy
between what are declared in the former and in the latter. In Formal
Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302, what were
mentioned were mens and ladies accessories. However, in the
invoice, electronic equipment and appliances such as VHS, Betamax,
television and the like were stated. Despite all these questionable
entries, Francisco recommended the continuous processing of the
importation documents, conducting merely a document
examination and not a 100% actual physical examination of the
cargo. How can he turn a blind eye to all these obvious
discrepancies? His failure to perform a 100% physical examination of
the cargo, under the circumstances, is inexcusable and illicit,
amounting to non-performance of his duty.
Franciscos contention that Lt. Agdeppa cleared him by saying that
the former was not present when the cargo was apprehended, and
that the latter did not know how Franciscos name was written in
Formal Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302 deserves
scant consideration. Francisco was included in the charge, not
because he was present when the container van was apprehended,
but because he recommended the continuous processing of the
subject importation without subjecting the same to 100% actual
physical examination despite the clear disagreement of the entries
in the importation documents. The lack of knowledge on the part of
Lt. Agdeppa as to how Franciscos name was written in Formal Entry
and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302 is so trivial and does
not mean that the latter did not participate in the anomalous
processing of the subject importation. From the testimonies of Atty.
Dandal, Ojeda and from Franciscos own testimony, it was shown
that the latter took part in the processing of the subject importation
and that his name appeared on the dorsal portion of Formal Entry
and Internal Revenue Declaration No. 118302.
We did not find any violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. Crucial here were the actions of the accused Customs
employees when they did not perform a 100% physical examination
of the cargo despite the glaring discrepancies and suspicious entries
in the documents involved. In fact, they issued a Memorandum for
the District Collector of Customs dated 18 November 1999, wherein
it was stated "Found as Declared." Such statement is a brazen lie,
because the entries in the documents were not in harmony with one
another. The entry described the cargo as mens and ladies
accessories, but the invoice clearly contained items (electronic
equipment and appliances) not classified as mens and ladies
accessories. Moreover, the weight, prices and the quantity thereof
were so vague and should have called the attention of the persons
who processed the subject importation to order its 100% physical
examination.

Ojeda argues that he cannot he held responsible for affixing his

signature to the documents involved and for not ordering the 100%
physical examination of the cargo because he relied on the
recommendation of his subordinate. In support thereof, he alleges
(1) that Francisco failed to report the alleged glaring irregularities on
the documents, hence, he did not examine the documents and
relied on the recommendation of Francisco; (2) that he performed
his duties in good faith; (3) that the suspicion of irregularity was
obliterated by the voluntary upgrading of the value of the
importation to 1,350%; and (4) that a clearance was issued by Lintag
for the release of the cargo.
His arguments fail to convince us.
We find it surprising why he raises as his defense the alleged failure
of Francisco to report the glaring irregularities on the documents.
The very same documents checked by Francisco are in Ojedas
hands. Why is there a need to report any discrepancy if the latter
himself can easily see the glaring discrepancies? From the entry and
the invoice alone, one can definitely see something strange and
irregular. His claim of good faith will not stand. As principal examiner
and the superior of Francisco, his duty was to carefully review the
evaluation made by his subordinate. This, he miserably failed to do.
On the face of the documents, there were admittedly glaring
discrepancies and suspicious entries that should have alerted him.
But despite all these, he claims he merely approved what was
recommended by Francisco only document verification without
100% actual physical examination.
His contention that the suspicion of irregularity was obliterated by
the voluntary upgrading of the price (of the importation) by 1350%
is tenuous. The upgrading by 1350% did not obliterate but
heightened plenty-fold the suspicion of irregularity. As an examiner
for thirteen years before becoming a principal examiner, it is not
believable for a person having so much experience not to know that
there was something wrong with the importation. We agree with
the Court of Appeals when it says:
Regardless of the alleged voluntary upgrading, the verity alone that
the prices of the declared items were grossly low indicated by itself,
an irregularity. Verily, the high voluntary upgrading should have put
the Appellants on inquiry. Even Appellant RENE M. FRANCISCO
(hereinafter Appellant FRANCISCO) admitted in his testimony that it
was his first time to come across such a high voluntary upgrading
and that it was unusual and irregular. Appellant FRANCISCO
conceded that the bank merely accepts payment. In view of this
admission, the fact that the voluntary upgrading was approved by
the bank is irrelevant and immaterial to the question of the
regularity or lack of it of the valuation of the cargo.
Moreover, it was not just the prices which rendered the invoice as
suspect and incredible on its face. The presence of electronic items
in the list of what was supposed to be just 450 cartons of mens and
ladies accessories, inter alia, should have alerted the examiner of
the existence of an irregularity.57
The approval/signature of Lintag (in the Memorandum for the
District Collector of Customs dated 18 November 1999 also signed
by Francisco and Ojeda) will not absolve Francisco or Ojeda from
liability. As found by both lower courts, Lintag, who was authorized
to order 100% examination, gave his approval for the release of the
cargo without ordering any physical examination despite the glaring
discrepancies in the documents involved. Further, as found by both
lower courts to which this Court agrees, Lintag was part of the
conspiracy whereby he, Ojeda and Francisco facilitated the release

of the subject importation. Thus, Ojedas argument, that because a

person occupying a position higher than his approved the release
will free him from responsibility, cannot be sustained because this
approving authority is part of the conspiracy.
Ojeda cites Macadangdang v. Sandiganbayan,58 Arias v.
Sandiganbayan,59 De la Pea v. Sandiganbayan60 and Magsuci v.
Sandiganbayan61 to justify his reliance on the recommendation of
his subordinate and on the "yellow" classification of the ASYCUDA
(Automated System for Customs Data) Program.
The cited cases do not apply to the instant case. The circumstances
obtaining therein are different from the facts of the present case. In
Macadangdang, the petitioner had no authority or duty to go
beyond what appeared on the face of the documents. In the case
before us, Ojeda has the authority to go beyond the documents if on
the face thereof appear irregularities. Ojeda cannot also invoke Arias
because his participation in the instant case is not limited to affixing
his signature to a transaction. In Arias, the participation of the
petitioner therein was limited to his signing on the document. In the
instant case, Ojeda consulted the computer and he himself stamped
the word "yellow" at the dorsal portion of Formal Entry and Internal
Revenue Declaration No. 118302. De la Pena and Magsuci cannot
apply because in said cases, this Court found the accused therein
negligent of their duties. In the case before us, we find that the
action or inaction of Francisco, Ojeda and Lintag was not the result
of negligence, but was intentionally or deliberately done.
Conspiracy as a basis for conviction must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty.62 While conspiracy need not be established by
direct evidence, it is, nonetheless, required that to be proved by
clear and convincing evidence by showing a series of acts done by
each of the accused in concert and in pursuance of a common
unlawful purpose.63
There was no direct evidence showing that all the accused came
together and planned the crime charged. However, it is clear that
their acts were in pursuance of one common criminal objective.
They wanted to evade the payment of correct duties and taxes due
the government. The failure of Francisco, Ojeda and Lintag to order
a 100% examination of the subject importation, in spite of the
glaring discrepancies and suspicious entries in the documents
involved, without any doubt, facilitated the release of the
importation involved by making it appear that said importation was
legally done. Allowing the subject cargo to pass through Customs
without a hitch clearly points to a conspiracy between and among all
the accused. Their individual participation has been duly established.
Since conspiracy has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, all the
conspirators, regardless of their degree of participation, are
criminally liable for the crime charged and proved the act of one is
the act of all.64
Was the crime of smuggling committed in this case?
Smuggling is committed by any person who (1) fraudulently imports
or brings into the Philippines any article contrary to law; (2) assists in
so doing any article contrary to law; or (3) receives, conceals, buys,
sells or in any manner facilitates the transportation, concealment or
sale of such goods after importation, knowing the same to have
been imported contrary to law.65
Article 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, which
contains the penalties for smuggling, reads:

SECTION 3601. Unlawful Importation. Any person who shall

fraudulently import or bring into the Philippines, or assist in so
doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell,
or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale
of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been
imported contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling and shall be
punished with:
1. A fine of not less than fifty pesos nor more than two hundred
pesos and imprisonment of not less than five days nor more than
twenty days, if the appraised value, to be determined in the manner
prescribed under this Code, including duties and taxes, of the article
unlawfully imported does not exceed twenty-five pesos;
2. A fine of not less than eight hundred pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos and imprisonment of not less than six months and
one day nor more than four years, if the appraised value, to be
determined in the manner prescribed under this Code, including
duties and taxes, of the article unlawfully imported exceeds twentyfive pesos but does not exceed fifty thousand pesos;
3. A fine of not less than six thousand pesos nor more than eight
thousand pesos and imprisonment of not less than five years and
one day nor more than eight years, if the appraised value, to be
determined in the manner prescribed under this Code, including
duties and taxes, of the article unlawfully imported is more than fifty
thousand pesos but does not exceed one hundred fifty thousand
pesos;
4. A fine of not less than eight thousand pesos nor more than ten
thousand pesos and imprisonment of not less than eight years and
one day nor more than twelve years, if the appraised value, to be
determined in the manner prescribed under this Code, including
duties and taxes, of the article unlawfully imported exceeds one
hundred fifty thousand pesos;
5. The penalty of prison may or shall be imposed when the crime of
serious physical injuries shall have been committed and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the crime of
homicide shall have been committed by reason or on the occasion of
the unlawful importation.
In applying the above scale of penalties, if the offender is an alien
and the prescribed penalty is not death, he shall be deported after
serving the sentence without further proceedings for deportation; if
the offender is a government official or employee, the penalty shall
be the maximum as hereinabove prescribed and the offender shall
suffer an additional penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office, to vote and to participate in any public election.
When, upon trial for violation of this section, the defendant is shown
to have had possession of the article in question, possession shall be
deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the
defendant shall explain the possession to the satisfaction of the
court: Provided, however, That payment of the tax due after
apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution
under this section.
There is no doubt that smuggling was committed in this case. The
collective evidence on record shows that the Francisco, Ojeda and
Lintag assisted in the unlawful importation of dutiable articles by
facilitating their release from the Bureau of Customs without
payment of proper duties and taxes. Having the power to order the
physical examination of the subject importation, they intentionally
did not do so despite the glaring irregularities found on the face of

the documents (Formal Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration No.

118302, Invoice No. LPI/99-500 and Bill of Lading). They helped
conceal the true nature of the cargo. Thereafter, the cargo, which
had the appearance of having been legally imported through their
help, was removed from customs premises and was being
transported to an undisclosed location. Unfortunately for all the
accused, said cargo, which was being guarded and escorted by PO3
Nadora, was intercepted by Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force
(PASTF) Aduana.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it says:
In the instant case, the web of conspiracy covered the acts of the
Appellants who facilitated the release of the subject importation
without subjecting it to 100% physical examination, thus, preventing
the discovery of the illegal importation. The other accused i.e. PO3
ROBERTO NADORA, ROEL TOLENTINO as well as ANTONIO CAAMIC,
MICHAEL UMAGAT and AMADO GONZALES participated in the
transportation of the subject importation and helped secure the
same.66
The Court notes that accused Danilo J. Lintag died during the
pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals. Thus, pursuant
to People v. Bayotas,67 wherein we ruled that the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon, the appeal
of the late Danilo J. Lintag before the Court of Appeals is dismissed.
We now go to the penalties imposed on Francisco and Ojeda. The
trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, imposed on each of
them a fine of P8,000.00 and an imprisonment of four (4) years and
one (1) day, as minimum to six (6) years as maximum.
Under Number 4 of Article 3601 of the TCCP, if the appraised value,
including the duties and taxes, of the article illegally imported
exceeds one hundred fifty thousand pesos, the person liable shall be
punished with a fine of not less than eight thousand pesos nor more
than ten thousand pesos and imprisonment of not less than eight (8)
years and one (1) day nor more than twelve (12) years. In the instant
case, the domestic value of the subject importation is
P20,000,000.00.68
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by
a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same.69 Applying said
provision of law, the trial court failed to impose the correct penalty
of imprisonment. It imposed a penalty of imprisonment the
minimum of which was below that prescribed by the law. To correct
this error, we therefore increase the same to eight (8) years and one
(1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum. This applies
only to petitioners Francisco and Ojeda. As to accused Tolentino and
PO3 Nadora, we can no longer modify the penalty imposed on them
because the decision of the trial court is already final.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 13 April 2007 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28025 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Rene M. Francisco and
Oscar A. Ojeda are each sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, as maximum.

As to accused Danilo J. Lintag, his criminal liability and the civil

liability based solely on the act complained of, are extinguished. His
appeal before the Court of Appeals is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.