Morbach - Terrorism and Organized Crime, The Alliance of Tomorrow How To Counter A Possible Future Threat (Master Thesis, 1998)
Morbach - Terrorism and Organized Crime, The Alliance of Tomorrow How To Counter A Possible Future Threat (Master Thesis, 1998)
Morbach - Terrorism and Organized Crime, The Alliance of Tomorrow How To Counter A Possible Future Threat (Master Thesis, 1998)
MONTEREY CA
93943-5101
THESIS
TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME:
THE ALLIANCE OF TOMORROW?
HOW TO COUNTER A POSSIBLE FUTURE THREAT
by
Gemot W. Morbach
June 1998
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How to Counter a
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While in the post-Cold War era threats to international security have become less direct and apocalyptic, they
are today more diffuse and insidious. With the probability of large scale, high intensity conflicts decreasing during the
1990s, terrorism and transnational organized crime each in itself constitute an increasing and serious threat to the
national security of affected nations. Any alliance of these two criminal phenomena is likely to cause a disproportional
The
an analytical/inductive approach,
such alliances.
Although aims and objectives of terrorists and organized criminal groups are different by nature, alliances of convenience
With globalization apparently working in the favor of terrorists and organized crime, it
seems to be only a question of time before they begin merging and start working jointly. Since those criminal
organizations tend to exploit the weaknesses of international cooperation by increasingly operating in the transnational
sphere, any attempt at a successful counter-strategy has to meet this threat where it originates. Against this background,
"Internal Security", it seems,
international cooperation of law enforcement agencies becomes increasingly important.
in the past.
15.
PAGES 172
16.
17.
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REPORT
Unclassified
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
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OF ABSTRACT
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Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
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of the
ABSTRACT
While
in
War
the post-Cold
large
scale,
high
intensity
more
conflicts
each
diffuse
decreasing
in itself
become
less
the
1990s,
terrorism
and
Any
alliance
is likely
The
thesis,
rationale for such alliances. Although aims and objectives of terrorists and organized
criminal groups are different by nature, alliances of convenience have already formed in
the past. With globalization apparently working in the favor of terrorists and organized
crime,
jointly.
it
start
working
in
where
it
originates.
Against this
"Internal Security",
it
VI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
n.
1.
Terrorism
2.
Organized Crime
B ABOUT DEFINITIONS
C CHAPTER OUTLINE
POSTMODERN TERRORISM
11
Trends
in Tactics
2.
Trends
in
3.
Trends
in Lethality
4.
Summary
B TERRORISM
C.
D:
III.
11
11
14
Targeting
17
23
(1998
24
1.
Factors of Influence
24
2.
Future Targets
28
NEW THREATS
29
1.
30
2.
Religious Terrorism
32
3.
Cyber-Terrorism
35
4.
Unabomber
The Lone
Terrorist
CONCLUSION
38
37
in
vn
Theory
41
41
42
2.
3.
B.
From
b.
Reality
Summary
POLITICAL
44
45
50
51
Organized Crime
2.
Economic Aspects
55
3.
Summary
58
D.
44
Moscow
51
58
59
2.
Major Gangs
in
3.
Major Gangs
in St. Petersburg
4.
Major Gangs
in
Yekaterinburg
65
5.
Major Gangs
in
Vladivostok
65
6.
Summary
61
66
Austria
b.
c.
Belgium
Cyprus
d.
Czech Republic
e.
f.
i.
k.
67
67
67
68
68
68
Germany
Hungary
69
Netherlands
69
70
70
Poland
70
g. Italy
h.
64
Sweden
71
2.
71
3.
Summary
73
74
1.
Basic Concerns
74
2.
Recent Trends
78
vni
F.
3.
TheNordex Corporation
87
4.
Summary
89
CONCLUSION
IV ALLIANCES
A.
89
AND COUNTER-STRATEGIES
93
EXCURSUS: NARCOTERRORISM
1.
93
94
Movement
Private Counter-Insurgency
c.
101
2.
Peruvian Narcoterrorism
107
3.
109
4.
Implications
Ill
B FUTURE ALLIANCES
112
1.
113
2.
115
3.
About
Alliances
119
120
d.
Supply-Demand Relationships
Dominant Partner Relationships
Congruence ofMotivation
Temporary vs. Long-Term Alliances
e.
Summary
a.
b.
c.
4.
C.
94
98
122
122
123
124
Conclusions
COUNTER STRATEGIES
1
121
National Efforts
125
Towards an
Integrated
Approach
126
a.
Basic Concerns
126
b.
Recommendations
127
Cooperation
129
2. International
129
b.
130
c.
132
a.
IX
d.
V.
Recommendations
CONCLUSIONS
A.
133
135
MAJOR FINDINGS
135
1.
The
Terrorists
135
2.
The Criminals
136
3.
The Narcoterrorists
138
4.
The Alliances
138
5.
The Counter-Strategies
140
6.
The Outlook
142
B FUTURE RESEARCH
142
LIST OF REFERENCES
145
151
LIST
OF FIGURES
Figure
2- 1
Figure
2-2
1991-96
Figure 2-3
12
13
Arithmetical
Mean
of Event, 1991-96
14
Figure 2-4
15
Figure 2-5
Figure 2-6
Arithmetical
16
Mean of International
Terrorist Incidents
by
16
per Decade
Figure 2-8
17
1991-96
20
Figure
2-9
Fatalities
Figure
2-10
21
Worldwide
Figure 3-1-1
23
Gangs -I-
60
Gangs -II-
61
99 1-95
Figure 3-2
Figure 3-3
Trafficking
Figure 4-1
100
Figure 4-2
Armed Violence
104
Figure 4-3
Pathway
in
for
Activities,
Nuclear Materials
Colombia, 1988-1991
72
77
117
XI
Xll
LIST
OF TABLES
Table 3-1
Table 3-2
Table 3-3
43
50
Russia
Crime
53
Moscow
Table 3-4
Major Gangs
in
Table 3-5
Major Gangs
in St. Petersburg
Table 3-6
Major Gangs
in
Yekaterinburg
65
Table 3-7
Major Gangs
in
Vladivostok
66
Table 3-8
Table 3-9
in
63
64
79
Russia
82
Table 3-10
84
Table 4-1
96
Table 4-2
Guerrilla
Table 4-3
Assassinations
Table 4-4
Guerrilla Taxes
Membership
in
Colombia, 1978-1996
Among Levels
of Government
98
100
1994-95
105
Table 4-5
105
Table 4-6
108
xni
XIV
LIST
OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS
M-
ADM-1
BND
BPA
BTX
Type-A
CB
CIA
Central Intelligence
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent
CSIA
CSIS
DEA
DOS
Department of State
DPA
DSB
ELN
ELP
FARC
9)
Botulinal Toxin
Agency
States
Army)
FBI
FEI
Obninsk
FinCEN
FRG
FSB
Institute
Network
FSU
GDR
GNP
xv
Army)
HEU
BEWS
Institute for
IRA
Irish
KGB
Intelligence
LE
Law
LTTE
MTNATOM
MOD
Ministry of Defense
EastWest Studies
Republican
Army
Agency of the
FSU
Enforcement
Eelam
MRTA
MVD
M-19
Movimiento 19 de A bril ( 1
NATO
NSC
NYT
OC
Organized Crime
PERA
Provisional
PKK
RCB
ROC
Terrorism
UK
United Kingdom
UN
United Nations
UP
Union Patriotica
U.S.
U-XXX
Uranium-XXX
WMD
WTC
th
of April Movement)
IRA
xvi
of FARC)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the end of the Cold War, threats to international security have
direct
less
and apocalyptic. Today they are more diffuse and insidious. The international
become
of challenges that
On
is
as
complex as
it
is
990s and
novel.
January 27, 1998, in his "State of the Union Address", President Clinton
new threats".
Whereas the
new,
two
pillars
significantly
of these non-
since the
global
a greater
from
level,
no boundaries, whether
political, organizational,
Secondly, they cannot easily be deterred, since they have no homeland and
thus constitute no discrete target. Finally, they can have ready access to
weapons of mass
destruction.
While as such,
threat
by
itself,
either
is
significant
likely
to
disproportionately increase the overall threat to the national security of affected nations.
In order to explain the rationale for such alliances, this thesis will try to
following questions:
xvii
answer the
What
are
the
characteristics
and
Have
What
in the past?
likely?
Which
able to muster
know-how and
powers. The appearance of new types of terrorists from the margins makes targeting and
difficult.
Technology has
new
battlefield
which
is likely
to be exploited by terrorists
and organized crime. In consequence, nowadays' societies have to face the evolved,
traditional terrorist together with the
new
Since Russian organized crime had been contained in the power structure of the
Soviet Union, particular attention
was
paid to
its
development
its
in the
will thus
post-Cold
War
era.
in
worldwide. Several organizations are already cooperating with other mafia groups such as
the Yakuza, the Colombian Cartels, or the Italian Mafia.
As
criminal organizations
and
gangster bureaucrats position themselves to increase their political power and wealth, their
criminal activities are likely to further extend internationally.
Since 1991 Europe and the U.S. have already witnessed a significant increase in
What
is
xvni
is
that they
new
As
of
common
objectives did not exclude short or mid term alliances as long as they served the
goal of saturating law enforcement agencies. Thus, evidence exists that under specific
may
unlikely.
Despite a fundamental difference between the means and ends of criminal and
organizations,
terrorist
irreversible, trend
there
factors
are
towards convergence.
which
suggest
growing,
and
perhaps
organizations are
ends.
political
third
is
still
government
exists,
it
has
war
terrorism
seem
become
era,
less important.
seem
As
likely to turn to
organized crime as
While the motives of terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations may
differ,
the strategies they adopt to achieve their objectives seem to converge. Linkages and
alliances
Organized crime,
behavioral
established
likely to saturate
pattern.
it
Together
with
logical
technology
its
favor.
An
consequence of an already
and
weapons
including
WMDthis kind of evolution could even lead to a quasi-equilibrium with the legitimate
structures.
xix
As
it,
if
it
is
is
increasingly
to be effective, should be
transnational as well. Criminal organizations in the past have proven to be not only highly
sophisticated, but also extremely adaptable in their efforts to exploit the existing gaps in
the patterns of cooperation. Against this background, the international cooperation that
Any
kind of cooperation and counter-strategy ultimately will depend upon the will
efforts to control
and prevent transnational organized crime. Considering the grave threat transnational
organized crime poses to world security, the international community must begin to
this
The
internal
very nation
starts.
In summary,
it
is
should
terrorists is
it
will happen.
It
possibility
require operational, organizational, and legislative measures, as well as the will of the
xx
what
it is
-a transnational challenge to
I.
"Terrorism,
drugs,
INTRODUCTION
organized crime,
and
proliferation of
weapons of mass
economic
stability
President William
J.
and undermine
"
Clinton 1
A.
Since the end of the Cold War, threats to international security have
direct
of challenges that
is
as complex as
it
On
is
novel.
The
international
With the
threats.
January 27, 1998, in his "State of the Union Address", President Clinton
axis
of
threats".
Whereas these
War
new,
become
less
Western democracies nowadays are facing a variety of threats which are more
complex, and hence harder to counter. Terrorism and organized crime are the two
since the
pillars
threats.
less
new
insidious.
become
global
greater
from
The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force, POD Responses to
Volume I Final Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For
Acquisition & Technology, Washington DC, October 1997, pi.
Quoted
in:
Transnational Threats:
What makes
to accumulate a degree of
possessed by governments.
of billions of dollars
in
Some
that rivals
and
in
financial systems. In
is
move hundreds
that
its
extradition
country's vast resources, and they control most of the banks and the media. Today, global
organized crime
by moral and
is
is profit,
unhampered
ethical considerations.
level,
no boundaries, whether
political, organizational,
or moral. Secondly, they cannot easily be deterred, since they have no homeland and
legal,
thus constitute no discrete target. Finally, they can have ready access to weapons of mass
destruction.
While as such,
threat
by
itself,
either
is
significant
likely
to
disproportionately increase the overall threat to the national security of affected nations. In
fact,
ability to obtain
scenarios,
which
in the
realistic.
In order to explain the rationale for such alliances, this thesis will try to answer the
following questions: Is a future alliance between terrorism and organized crime likely?
What kind of
contemporary "Organized
in the past?
What
are the
strategies to
First,
pillars
briefly
introduced
Terrorism
1.
While the face and origins of terrorism have changed over time, for a long period
its
essential aims
at
still
all.
'Kill
one - frighten
Terrorism
and by
is
by dissidents and by
political activists
of the
left
and
the right, by guerrillas and freedom fighters, as well as by nationalists, by ethnic and
religious
groups,
well
as
as
by
mafia-style
and
drug
trafficking
organizations.
Given
as
"The purposeful
more
concerned, 'terror'
is
is
state.
monopoly of the
p. 83).
far as the
of the employment of
(lethal) force,
which
is
considered to be a
or channel the employment of (lethal) force, the more horrifying the terrorist
greater the psychological impact
unfortunately, there
is
audience
upon
target
itself
can be
lethality
act, the
p. 105).
Thus,
or
merely criminal. While in the past foreign governments have frequently sponsored terrorist
activities,
this thesis, is
The
itself, in
the context of
variety of threats posed by terrorism include those related to the safety and
welfare of ordinary people, the stability of political and economic systems, the health and
of nation
scientific,
cultural
and
social
states in
behavior and capabilities of terrorists. Given the evolution in information technology and
the available 'information-highways', today's terrorists have nearly the same access to
to
be better organized,
more
professional,
their
2.
Organized Crime
With the
1990s,
transnational
organized
crime received
increased
scrutiny
from
intelligence
agencies and academic researchers. Whether one calls these organizations 'Mafia', 'Cosa
Nostra', and 'Camorra' in Italy, 'Triads' in China, 'Yakuza' in Japan, or 'Cartels' in
Colombia, they
all
have
in
common
that they
threat. Since
Russian organized crime had been contained in the power structure of the Soviet Union,
particular attention
was
paid to
its
development
in the
post-Cold
War
era.
Assessments of
the seriousness of the security challenge posed by Russian organized crime diverge
remarkably. At one end of the spectrum, certain authors view the Russian mafia as a
dangerous successor to the threat posed to Western societies by the Soviet Union. At the
other end of the spectrum, observers believe that the threat
that Russian organized crime
is
in Russia's society
and
who
Claire Sterling,
command. There
Nevertheless,
usurping
its
political
seat or
clans
life,
resources
home
has no
are no ancestral
proliferating
it
it
in extortion, theft,
forgery,
armed
assault,
gambling,
loan
marketing
-all
sharking,
money
embezzling,
and
black
international
scale.
laundering
Against
on the
will focus
B.
this
rise
ABOUT DEFINITIONS
The purpose of any
specific
its
"something"
is
definition
to the
new approach
is
same
is
Any
it
is
not. Thus,
any definition
at
difficult to define.
new
definition
still
definition.
emotional responses by victims and practitioners. Thus, the old myth that
terrorist is
same time
by nature
the
what a
seems to be
alive.
"One man's
Consequently, no one
of terrorism has gained universal acceptance, and even the U.S. government
The following
definitions
in this thesis
do not
claim to be the only possible or even the best. They simply help to set the stage for the
following discussion.
Terrorism
is
of
threat'
Transnational
defined
is
'Movement of
as
money, physical
information,
Transnational Threat
national
security
is
security
including
of weapons of
mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized
international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation
and/or any
crime
individual or
group
Non-State Group
is
defined as an
who
It
can be 'transnational',
objectives
that
transcend
nation-state
of
Mass Destruction
(WMD)
and
boundaries;
Weapons
i.e.,
it
may be
are defined as
p. 16).
weapons
that include
Definition in accordance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d).
draw on various
sources,
among others
is
DOD's Defense
Science
this thesis,
in
partially
the literature,
and
CHAPTER OUTLINE
C.
thesis.
Chapter
II,
to
lie
of
that is likely
ahead. In the attempt to predict future developments in the sphere of terrorism, the
analysis
of recent trends
will
of the
changed, and which kind of terrorism societies are likely to face in the years lying ahead.
Chapter
II
salient
features
its
this
phenomenon has
to focus on
its
model, called "The Chameleon Syndrome", and with the advantage of hindsight, the
chapter will argue that the evolution of Russian organized crime seemingly
political aspects
was
inevitable.
of organized crime
in
Russia. Subsequently, the major mafia gangs and the activities of Russian organized crime
will
be introduced.
address the problem of nuclear trafficking. Since this aspect provides insight into the
potential threat
WMD proliferation,
its
discussion will be
more
for
amalgamation between
the
of the
elements
old
Soviet
power
and
structure
in
first
phenomenon of Colombian/Peruvian
predominantly
connection, which
is
domestic
security
threat,
Colombian-Lebanese
the
cooperation on a transnational
level.
salient elements
terrorist
and
organizations,
may
introduces
lead to similar
future alliances.
In the final section of Chapter
and
countries
their
respective
IV appropriate counter-strategies
for affected
in
what
for
Whereas
them
is
what
is
still
able
to
find
transnational ethnic networks created by migration, law enforcement efforts often find
frontiers
the
where cooperation
is
pillars
on
counter the challenge of transnational crime. National law enforcement efforts constitute
the
first
element.
lies
that
moves from
the
seems,
no
it
is
longer a mere domestic issue, can no longer be achieved with national efforts alone, but
demands a
IV
underlines the
necessity
transnational problem.
Chapter
of
research topics.
summary of
the findings
it
will briefly
introduce future
10
H.
"He related
atomic bombs on the
POSTMODERN TERRORISM
to us that
cities
II,
the
killing
250,000
civilians,
the
and he
said that the Americans would realize if they suffered those types of casualties that they
"
were at war.
to the
World
Any
first
start
it
has changed,
A.
following analysis of recent trends will focus on three aspects. First, the tactics and
of the
identified, the
recently the
terrorist acts.
most
first
salient features
use of
Trends
1.
in fatalities,
and more
Figure 2-1 below shows the development of tactics over the past three decades.
Although, as
it
will later
terrorists
lethal,
The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force, POD Responses to
Volume I Final Report Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For
Acquisition & Technology, Washington DC, October 1997, p. 11.
Quoted
in:
Transnational Threats:
11
60
O 1960s
1970s
D 1980s
BOMBING
Figure 21.
ATTACK
SHOOTING
HIJACKJHOST.
OTHER
Source: Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities", Terrorism and Political
Violence, vol. 5, no. 2, 1993, pp.13; 25.
Bombs
fairly
provide for dramatic effects, and offer 'more bang for the buck'. They are
easy to produce, the necessary technology and ingredients are readily available, and
meager
away when
expertise,
it
skills
is
bomb,
plant
it,
and be miles
knowledge,
back-up
options,
or
logistical
support
required
by
more
Against
this
background,
it is
p.
13)
the complexity or expertise required, and the frequency of types of terrorist acts (see
all
is
common
tactic,
12
shootings;
account for the remaining 'other' incidents. The fact that the percentages remained
relatively
organizations
have
not
innovation occurred,
been
if at all,
tactically
mostly
innovative.
in the
of
According
to
Bruce
terrorist
Hoffman,
devices, but not in tactics, and, at least until the end of this period, not as far the use of
never used
which
is
p. 12).
Whether
WMD were
questionable, since analysts believe that there might have been attacks in
biological,
One must
ascertain whether the trend detected in the period between 1968 and
the favorite terrorist tactic throughout the 1990s, accounting for roughly 60 percent of
incidents
in
the
previous
of identifying a trend
of the use of a
in terrorist behavior,
different source
however,
this
The
decades,
different
by
attack,
typology of
can be neglected.
80-rl
D1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
BOMBING
Figure 2-2.
ATTACK
ARSON
HIJJHOSTJKID.
OTHER
13
Figure 2-3 below gives an overall picture of the trend in the period 1991-1996 and
is
statistical data,
respective percentages.
BOMBING
ATTACK
18,3
HIJJHOSTJKID.
ARSON
OTHER
61,9
Figure 2-3.
Thus,
in the last
radical in their
demands and
politics,
tactics.
Although
Trends
2.
in Targeting
In their attempt to call attention to terrorist groups and their cause, terrorist
attacks in the past tended to be directed against objects rather than people. Since terrorist
'symbolic'
operations
are
adversary,
such as embassies,
in
'symbols'
of the
airlines
character,
they
are directed
against
(symbolic by dint of their national identification), and the military (Hoffman, 1993, 5:2,
p. 14).
The
latter,
power of the
As
state
which
itself is
monopoly of
terrorist.
Figure 2-4 below shows, diplomatic targets have been the focus of most
terrorist attacks
and
civilian targets.
airline, military
14
in
itself,
however, being
statistically
insignificant.
D 1960s
1970s
D 1980s
DIPLOMATIC
Figure 2-4.
BUSINESS
MILITARY
AIRLINE
OTHER
CIVILIAN
Source: Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics, Trends, and Potentialities", Terrorism and Political
Violence, vol.
As
in
the
in the
period
5, no. 2,
is
between
be found
1968
and
1989
can
in
the
nineties
as
well.
Whereas the
facilities
and
targeted victims, the data used in Figure 2-5 relate to the type of targeted victim alone.
Terrorist acts in this period either consciously tended to inflict
in
more
casualties, or resulted
more
indiscriminate
targeting accounts for the relatively high increase in the data set 'Other'. Beside this, as far
as discrete targets are concerned, business targets have been the focus of terrorist attacks
in the last six years,
15
80
70-
60-
1991
1992
50-'
D1993
40- '
1994
30- '
1995
1996
20-'
DIPLOMATIC GOVERNMENT
Figure 2-5.
Per Cent of
MILITARY
OTHER
BUSINESS
Type of
slight
change
observed
in
decades, this has to be seen against the background of the complexity of targeting
more protected
assets,
in security
itself
can be regarded as an output of earlier experiences. Figure 2-6 below provides the
arithmetical
mean over
OTHER
BUSINESS
GOVERNMENT
DIPLOMATIC
MILITARY
61,8
Figure 2-6.
Terrorist Incidents
16
While the
terrorist acts,
last
two
were exclusively
figures
total
number of
Trends
3.
in Lethality
p.
of
is
caused by
lethality,
before. (Hoffman,
at least
among
casualties,
and
killing,
become more
number of incidents,
two
kill
WMD,
tended to
terrorists
kill,
14)
Reasons to explain
that
that did
destruction. Figure
fatalities
if
total
in the past
decades.
NO.INCIDENTS
NO.CASUALTIES
NO.FATALITIES
1970s
Figure 2-7.
1980s
Fatalities of International
17
pp. 173-82.
not
The
and
data
shown
in
Compared
number of incidents
increased by 44 percent, while the number of casualties and fatalities increased by 121
As
seems
it
in
that,
among
On
October 23, 1983, a large truck, used by state-sponsored terrorists, and laden
with the equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT, whose destructive power was
Airport,
Team
at Beirut International
exploded, destroying the building and killing 241 U.S. Marines. The explosion
has been described as the 'largest non-nuclear blast ever detonated on the face of
the earth'. In another blast, which occurred 20 seconds
killed.
later,
p. 3;
On December 22,
to
New
1988, Pan
York, exploded
in
bomb was
Am Flight
mid
air
citizens
1 1
103, a Boeing
manufactured
plastic
According to Hoffman,"... it
sponsored
is
not
on average,
therefore,
surprising,
eight times
more
p.
to find that
lethal
state-
technology and weapons was often only possible through a sponsor. This situation,
however, has changed. The opening of the former Warsaw Pact members to free trade
after the disintegration
left
the market of
for nearly
anybody who
is
their
18
it.
still
states,
all
now
less
is
Tehran
is
On
new
Muslim
nations because
it
situation, the
government
in
Khartoum, backed by
in
Sudan
(Laqueur,
1996, p.26)
The
trend towards
more
casualties
and
lethality
is
rooted in more than one factor. Contemporary terrorist organizations are not only smarter
than their predecessors, they also tend to be more ruthless and less
seems, "...violence becomes an end in
itself
-a cathartic
idealistic.
For some,
release, a self-satisfying
struck against the hated 'system'- rather than being regarded as the deliberate
specific political
A
religious
for
example,
reinforce
the
causal
link
Turning
now
16)
According to the
RAND
Chronology of International
all
international terrorist
total
number
relation
between 1982 and 1989, but were responsible for 30 percent of the
to a
mentioned resurgence of
activities
blow
means
p.
it
5:2, p. 17)
to the
more
19
Number
7000
6000
5000-K
4000 ./
O INCIDENTS
CASUALTIES
3000
2000-
1000-
565
,317
363^1 *1
1991
Figure 2-8.
1993
1992
1995
1994
1996
in 1991,
is
up-and-
characterized by a slight
in 1996.
The
figure for
1996 marks a
25-year low. Moreover, about two-thirds of these incidents were minor acts of politically
motivated violence against commercial targets. The terrorist campaign waged by the
Kurdistan Worker's Party
(PKK)
in
all
this target
(U.S. Department of
terrorist incidents.
State, 1997, p. 1)
of
1994, followed an upward trend with a significant increase towards the end of the period.
The high
critically,
attack
37 people severely
and 984
moderately. 8
Statistics
went
to
US Army
Medical Research
total
Institute for
20
24
fatalities).
hrs, but
were not
Since Figure 2-8 focuses on the overall casualties (those injured as well as those
killed),
Figure 2-9 below shows the number of fatalities caused by International Terrorism
1992
1991
Figure 2-9.
1994
1993
1995
1996
1991-96
in
The following
more
While
this time,
however,
in general the
increasing,
number
making
lethal.
lethal
and spectacular
-On
left
underground parking garage of the World Trade Center (WTC), scattered debris
throughout an adjacent subway station, and
filled all 1
The
terrorists also
On
July
front
8,
of a Jewish
21
On March
Aum
Kyo
placed
containers of the deadly chemical nerve agent sarin on five trains of the
Tokyo
20,
cult
Shinri
subway system during the morning rush hour, releasing poisonous gas into the
and subway stations. Apparently the sarin used was diluted, otherwise the
numbers of casualties (12 killed, more than 5,000 injured) might have been more
dramatic. (U.S. Department of State, 1996, p.l)
trains
On
rammed
downtown Colombo, killing
in
others. (U.S.
Department of
State, 1997, p. 5)
On
facility
Although
this is a selection
of the most
lethal
representative of the trend towards increasing lethality that has been identified earlier. In
addition,
it
in the
two
previous figures constitute only a part of worldwide terrorism, neglecting the domestic
aspect. Thus, in
and
fatalities),
lethality
of terrorism and
now, however,
its
sets
account.
22
1970-1983
Figure 2-10.
1990-1993
Source: Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, 1996, pp. 173-82.
Comparing both
periods,
it
first
period encompasses
14 years, whereas the second consists only of four years. While in the
annual average 2,008 people were
killed,
is
period on
first
was 9,125
The
trend towards
more
began
in
1992
is,
lethality
number of people
that
have been
insurgency
75,000.
4.
Summary
lethal,
it
seems to follow established patterns of tactics and targeting. For reasons already
bombing remains a
military installations,
and
As
laid out,
23
generally
terrorist
targets for reasons stated already as well. Additionally, the identified shift towards a
more
indiscriminate terrorist targeting in the nineties matches and of course supports the trend
towards more
lethality.
Although, terrorism
first
use of a chemical
in the past
weapon
in
in terrorist behavior.
With
this threshold
The following
is
B.
operations and campaigns. While the analysis does not claim to be complete,
it
tries to
Factors of Influence
1.
As
it
has been in the past, future terrorist operations will be influenced by a great
more
way.
factors
is
various terrorist organizations with their different motivations, and pursuing their various
aims, already exist.
It
is
otherwise mandatory discussion of the factors which led to their appearance in the
place. This insight,
first
terrorist types
and organizations.
Although
it is
difficult to
24
two
factors
seem to
be of greater significance than others -the motivation behind, and the objective of the
Both
terrorist act
ways
In the context of motivation, for instance, religious terrorist groups act in different
the
by
end,
religious
terrorism
duty.
latter are
political,
political
of the
infidel,
when
violence
of violence. There
becomes a sacramental
is
Religion
no need to
act or divine
own
martyrdom
of their
as suicide bombers, as both morally justified and expedient for the attainment
more
of the system
its
complete
lethal
and destructive operations and makes the category of enemies an open-ended one.
(Hoffinan, 1993, pp. 17-18)
terrorist act,
we must
instance, terror
long-term goal?
organization? 10
It is
in itself,
or
is
distinguish
means
between short-
to reach them.
Is,
for
of an overall strategy or
is
it
as Maria Moyano points out, in Argentina, except for the 1976-79 period, ransom was
most prevalent motive for kidnapping operations, a kind of fund-raising campaign, first
distributed to the poor in so-called Robin Hood type operations, later used to strengthen and support an
As an example,
by
far the
organization of increasing complexity and enabling large scale operations against the military
25
are
is
and
obtainability,
availability,
likely to
suitability
factor.
of the desired
organizations that
Terrorist
are
non-state organizations or acting on their behalf, are likely to be better funded and
equipped than groups that are acting on their own. 11 Given the required amount of money,
terrorists, especially after the disintegration
available.
Although trends of
the past point towards a traditional and conservative pattern of terrorist actions, with guns
and bombs remaining the main ingredients, recent developments and the
threats,
which
will
be discussed
later, indicate
of new
rise
1994, pp.29-30).
As
is
the target
itself,
An
is
highly complex. 12
As Michael
Stohl writes:
is
to recognize that
is
important, the
emotional impact of the terrorist act and the social effects are more
important than the particular action
terror are far
more important
itself.
of the
immediate act.(Stohl,1990,p.83)
11
For example drag cartels normally have remarkable financial and organizational capacities
disposal; the Russian mafia
is
at their
fissile
material.
12
For instance, in case of the Algerian insurgency that began in 1992, the government, which
illegitimate in the eyes of the terrorists, is the target, the society is both the audience
it is
and the
is
victim, as
should at least contribute to this attempt. Every reaction or repression by the government of course
terrorists,
because
first
it
place.
26
is
the
considered
An
in
its
organization
process,
itself.
Complex
on
organized terrorists can conduct more sophisticated operations, control more resources,
and,
more
often than not, have better connections. Terrorist groups which during their
existence have developed a complex organization in turn are likely to continue to operate,
Finally, but
of no
survival.
realistic, for
mere
the
in itself.
less
become an important
factor in
when
the context of terrorist operations, providing exactly the platform the terrorist seeks,
trying to advertise his cause. 13 In fact,
it
verbal communication
is
is,
public.
The media
has high news value, and provides for good ratings. In terms of ingredients
conflict
it
all
is,
carries
the
all
attention to terrorism
it
into entertainment.
of course, public
interest. (Martin,
in the
is
13
For a detailed study of the relationship between terrorism and the media
Media.
14
and
see:
preference that
Nacos, Terrorism
1994.
Data derived from: United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996.
.
27
all
&
the
it
is
democracies.
As
situation,
already mentioned,
have impact on
As
terrorist operations.
is
essential to determine a
Future Targets
2.
their
legitimacy the
this
type of target
15
which
make
made
that
state
Since nation-states can be targeted either directly -being victim and target of the
terrorist
and mistrust
meant as a
part
inflict either
fear
of a bargaining/ blackmailing
on December 17,
Movement (MRTA) during a diplomatic
In the course of the seizure of the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru,
1996 by
terrorists
of the Tupac
Amaru
Revolutionary
more than 500 persons were taken hostage, including Peruvian Ministers, six supreme court
justices, eight U.S. officials, and numerous foreign ambassadors -including Germany's. Although the
action was primarily directed against the Peruvian Government, demanding the release of convicted
MRTA activists, and putting political pressure on Peru, this incident showed how easily a variety of
nations and agencies could be targeted, and subsequently blackmailed at the same time. The event was
especially embarrassing, since in April 1996, Peru had just hosted the 'Inter- American Specialized
Conference on Terrorism '.(U.S. Department of State, 1996, p. 12)
reception,
28
strategy,
it
is likely that,
hit
more
lethality,
an increase of
societies
thereof.
Finally,
from year to
As Hoffman
countries
it
discovers: "Since 1968 the United States has annually headed the
whose
This phenomenon
p. 24)
attributable as
political
much
list
of
terrorists."
to the geographical
and military
interests, as to the
United States' stature as the only super-power and the leader of the free world. While
international terrorists
U.S.
itself,
there
is
may
perceive
it
difficult to
risks, since
American
and
interests
citizens
U.S. 'expansionism', 'imperialism', and 'economic exploitation' across the globe, together
with the unparalleled opportunities for exposure and publicity -thanks to the U.S. mediaensures that the United States' citizens and properties remain
terrorist's
is
likely to
likely,
crisis
or not, -the
p.24)
C.
NEW THREATS
This section describes future threats, such as
new
in the
WMD terrorism.
Not
29
all
the threats
some
cases
it
threats
Weapons
1.
On 20 March
Aum
the
of Mass Destruction
Kyo
Shinri
sect,
members of
in
The
trains
were
all
lines
scheduled to arrive
under
siege. It
had become a
of fear.
on the runway
at
was aboard
John
the
significant
turning
its
gas
felt
F.
flight.
Kennedy
New
(Kaplan, 1996,
York, an
point
Mass
in
transit
terrorist
systems
hours
p. 264)
While the chemical attack on Tokyo's subway system came as no great surprise to
many
terrorist
two decades
Among
that
arrest in
on a major urban
marked
their first
in isolated,
use in a large-scale,
various others: the reported 1975 theft of a large quantity of mustard gas from a
ammunition bunker
Sun',
for over
groups might resort to the use or threat of chemical or biological weapons against
civilian populations,
16
in
threats of
its
US
Chicago in 1972 of members of a US right-wing group known as the 'Order of the Rising
possessed 30-40 kg of typhoid bacteria cultures for use against water supplies in Chicago,
who
30
amass
material,
that a determined
WMD.
While due to problems of production, storage, and delivery, the use of nuclear
devices
is
What
less likely,
fortunately
makes
climatic factors.
Aum
Shinri
Kyo
on
much
difficult
are problems
in the attack
on the
Japanese town of Matsumoto in the summer of 1994, and in the subway attack,
fortunately the sarin used
was apparently
agents
may
thousands.
diluted. 17
away
(Laqueur, 1996,
p. 30)
Where
They are
kill
hundreds of
is
difficult
high, and
when
laboratories.
Thus,
it
lethal
would be
misleading to extrapolate directly from their individual lethal dose under laboratory
conditions to estimate casualties from mass attacks, given the need for effective delivery.
Nevertheless, in terms of sheer lethality, biological agents -in theory- offer a 'bigger bang
for the buck'. (Purver, 1997, p.3)
in the struggle to
cities;
is
US
'Minutemen' to introduce
hydrogen cyanide gas into the air-conditioning system of the United Nations building in
New
York;
27 June 1994 sarin attack on the Japanese town of Matsumoto For a good overview covering the
threat or use of biological and chemical weapons in the past see: Ron Purver. "Chemical and
Biological Terrorism: New Threat to Public Safety?", Conflict Studies no. 295, London, Research
Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1997.
the
on Aum Shinri Kyo and the Tokyo subway attack see: David Kaplan
and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World New York, Crown Publishers, 1996.
31
implement Armageddon
of a
millennialistic
sect.
may
actually
fail.
that
is
under
99 out of 100
Tokyo subway
has to be
do more
material damage, and unleash far greater panic than anything societies have experienced so
far.
(Laqueur, 1996,
p. 36)
Weapons of mass
or improvised and self-produced, offer marginal groups or even individuals the chance to
stage.
Even
now available
if it is
is
'will'.
Thus, scenarios akin to the subway attack can no longer be ruled out, or as Robert
Blitzer,
it's
is
of
// it's
in the
law
going to
when" 19
Religious Terrorism
2.
At about 5.07 a.m., the suicide bomber prepared himself for his journey.
Having performed the dawn prayers and drunk a few cups of sweet, strong
tea, he went through the details of his attack for the last time with his
leaders, received the blessings from a senior cleric and positioned himself in
the truck.
He was
from
am
kill
19
all
all
set to
go and meet
martyrdom.
He knew
the preaching and talks he had received that the instant he died he
Army
Quoted
his awaited
statement
at the
made
32
of 241
US
was
fulfilled,
Marines.
While
'religion', as a term,
is
'good' by nature, religion and terrorism share a long history. Historical examples of
terrorism motivated by a religious imperative are the 'Zealots', a millenarian Jewish sect
who
fought the
Roman
occupation of what
is
now
AD,
or the 'Thugs', an Indian association of professional robbers and murderers who, being
active from the seventh until the
mid- 19
th
Hindu goddess of
terror
wayward
and destruction.
(Hoffinan, 1993, p. 1)
In recent
While
in
religious, in
1993
at least
overshadowed the
relationship
groups could be
The basic
difference
described earlier.
justification
The
classified as
groups could
p. 2)
different value
more
dangerous,
and
irrational
lethal.
demand or
terrorist
religion.
unrealistic objectives
terrorism far
of terrorism and
Whereas secular
mean
in their
1993, pp.2-3)
33
The
thereof,
Whereas
actual
and
lies in their
their
in
terrorists live
and act
Since the
in isolation.
religious terrorist
composed of
better,
not try to preserve any components thereof, but to replace neighboring systems by his
own, he
is,
-Where
Although
fundamentalism,
religious
terrorism
(Hoffman, 1993,
predominantly
is
connected
p. 3)
with
Islamic
it
in itself.
is
by a new generation of
More
and
recently, they
sects,
such as
among
movements
in Israel,
and sedition
is justified
is
the fact
and legitimized
As
inspired terrorist
groups
is
associated with the millennium through acts of increasing violence, or, if that redemption
in
the year 2000, seek to correct this unfortunate development by the use
ofWMD? (Hoffinan,
34
Cyber - Terrorism
3.
Advanced
societies of
that the
importance
in the
day-to-day
life
of these
this
is
kind
battlefields as well.
makes them a
new
in
societies
power
supply,
and a large percentage of government's and private's sector's transactions are on-line.
This
in turn
exposes amounts of
vital,
of Special Projects
p. 3 5)
in the Office
this aspect
of future
threat.
The
possibilities
in the
U.S.
of disruption of
mafia-type and terrorist groups- to obtain funds through electronic penetration and
manipulation of financial systems, as well as the penetration of info-systems in an attempt
to get information on people and possible targets, opens up the dimension of information
p. 5)
home
ASSIST
Center of
name
government and private websites, including Army, Air Force, and Pentagon sites, as well as the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories. Additionally he claimed that his 'cyber-pals' will start to
hack in retaliation for his treatment by the government. 'Makaveli', however, was only the 'student' of
Ehud Tenenbaum, an Israeli teenager and master hacker code-named 'Analyzer', who orchestrated the
penetration of military and university research computers. In a statement, Deputy Defense Secretary
John Hamre spoke of "...the most organized and systematic attack the Pentagon has seen to date."
(The Monterey County Herald March 5-9, April 8, 1998).
35
in
to penetrate the
DISA
and techniques, but rather software available to anyone on the Internet, such as
and
ROOTKIT.
Initially,
full
SATAN
computers through the frontdoor. Then, by exploiting the relationships of trust of the three
percent,
ASSIST was
Of the 4
percent
who
all
hacked, only 5 percent reported the incident to their superiors. The numbers of real
attacks are rising.
Team
Whereas
in Pittsburgh)
plus per
month
CERT
(the
is
all
of 1991,
it
This new, highly educated terrorist does not think in terms of truckloads of explosives,
briefcases
puts
it,
of
sarin gas, or
tomorrow's high-tech
where modern,
societies in the
".
where we
industrialized
live
the place in which computer programs function and data moves." (U.S. Congress, Hearing
on October
1,
1997,
p. 85)
To wage cyber-war
more
likely to
be chosen by criminal
is
more
terrorists,
is
harm
that can
21
more
terrorists,
lethal
who
p. 3 5)
1989, p. 125).
36
4.
new
is
generation of terrorists,
Terrorist
who
more
are far
called
'boutique'
nobody has
When
difficult to detect
in
WTC
result
who
turned him
inflict
Mujahaddin',
is
how
nobody knows.
of mere
of Unabomber Ted
be investigating,
if
not for
mass
or
in.
target,
'wandering
and to
For example,
stands for
terrorists,
in the
it
casualties,
constraints that
may
more
hold
'fictious'
novels such as The Turner Diaries. In addition, they possess the technical competence to
steal,
22 'Boutique'
are individuals who do not work for any particular established terrorist
and are apparently not agents of any state sponsor (Description used by Raphael Perl,
terrorists
organization,
'Wandering Mujahaddin' are Islamic extremists from a variety of countries who happen to get together
and decide to commit a terrorist act; not belonging to any known group or organization, although
perhaps being sympathizers (Description used by Gail Soiin, Branch Chief, Counterterrorist Center,
CIA; Congressional Research Service, 1995, p. 9).
23 Salameh, the
first
bombing.
1994,
He was taken
own name,
into
WTC bombing,
p. 18).
Less than one and a half hour after the bombing, Timothy McVeigh was pulled over on Interstate 35
by an Oklahoma
concealed weapon
plate.
37
Since
McVeigh was
carrying a
of an
is
reduced to the
ethical
and moral
individual.
CONCLUSION
D.
As
the
statistical analysis in
the
first
part
were the
favorite tools
of traditional
terrorist
terrorists
of the
The
reason being obvious, since bombing, while requiring only a limited input, provides for a
recently,
becoming increasingly
violence,
terrorists to
engage
in
lethal. It is
form of indiscriminate
as a
societies
their victims.
A trend that
can
every day.
While the
total
number of
of their
street
lives,
When
risen. Terrorists
may
targets,
in the science
of
killing,
in
very well have higher thresholds for the number of casualties or level
As
gangs, the
inflict
upon
their targets.
for targeting, diplomatic, government, and military targets are favorite discrete
lethality
is
supported by a
shift
to
more
indiscriminate targeting throughout affected societies. While the discrete targets are likely
to remain the same, contemporary terrorism affects a broader spectrum of the population
in
the past.
Factors that have influenced terrorism are most complex in their structure and
influence each other in multiple dimensions. Thus, an exact prediction of future terrorist
activities,
38
Since
motivated
politically
on the
Thus, terrorism
rise,
is
Armageddon. In
in
motivated
number of
in the past.
and groups
cults, sects
Tokyo subway
The use of
attack of
Aum
Shinri
Kyo
And
available
means
and
WMD seem to
are
that
has changed
in their
know-how and
in
between
for the
first
time
will to
connections
and even
subway attack
as the
religious
reinforced by an increasing
loose
and
decline,
no longer be ruled
in
is
This effect
true,
terrorism
terrorists
ruthless
more
lethality
individuals
which
are
following
no
recognizable organizational pattern, makes targeting and preemptive measures for law
American
terrorists
soil
-the
WTC
difficult.
In addition, the old-fashioned type of terrorist has adapted, grown, and learned.
New
on-line not only are of benefit for government and business organizations, but for terrorist
and criminals as
well.
new
battlefield to
be exploited by
terrorists
and organized
crime.
with the
new
39
WMD.
now
Organized Crime.
40
pillar
of non-state
ffl.
"Today, Russia
is
the superpower
of crime
"
on the
rise
Any
its
must necessarily
economic and
first
focus on
political aspects
its
history.
of organized crime
activities
in Russia.
A third
the United States. Finally, the chapter addresses the problem of nuclear trafficking.
A.
organized crime
in
economies created
scarcities
that
in Russia,
in the Soviet
amounted
to
Union,
nationwide
shortages of virtually any item consumers wanted. Organized crime groups... exploited
these shortages in the past and continue to
p.
14)
Rawlinson
states ".
that
it
presence of organized crime which, up to a crucial point, has determined the latter's
24 Quoted
st
in:
Session, October
1,
th
Congress,
1997, p. 81.
25 In this subsection,
History"
41
p. 29,
emphasis
in the original)
Her argument
that
is
organized crime needs to interact with the legitimate structures of its host-state in order to
expand
its activities.
focus on the changing nature of the interaction between the legitimate and the illegitimate
structures.
Through these
merge with
the Russian state and begins to play a proactive role. Rawlinson calls her model the
'Chameleon Syndrome'.
1.
in
Theory
in the
relationship
The
stage, organized crime operates outside of, or contiguous to the legitimate structures.
host-system
is politically
marks the
first
fall
at
little
need to compromise
The second
particularly in the
economic
sector. Since
economic
failure often
means
political failure,
the host-system seeks to acquire from illegal sources that which cannot be gained
legitimately. If not actively
who
are.
suppliers,
it
at least
Consequently a shadow economy with low level bribery and corruption develops.
In the third stage, active assimilative, organized crime penetrates the legitimate structures
to the point that
it
beyond
crime
now
it
is fluent
transition
from
it
is
The
Money
in the legitimate
economy
are the
elements of organized criminal activities in this phase. Finally, the proactive stage
political,
42
4).
has penetrated
It
all
of power, and no longer needs to negotiate with the host-system. The complete
structures
process does not necessarily indicate a natural progression for every organized crime
group.
ultimately
legitimate structures.
Table 5-1.
Organized Crime
Bandits, teenage groups
No
Stage of Development
Legitimate Structures
REACTIVE
and economic
desire or ability to
negotiate
No
stability.
need to negotiate
PASSIVE
ASSIMILATIVE
Subtle weakening of
structures, e.g.,
economic
of
not in
money laundering
full control.
Prepared to negotiate on
prescribed terms
Integration
now more
controlled. Bribery
moves
ACTIVE
ASSIMILATIVE
and economic
structures significantly
Political
Money
laundering widespread
legit
participation in legit
economy
Significant control of legit
PROACTIVE
Anomie
structures, particularly
Acquiescence replaces
negotiation
enforcement.
Manipulation in
politics.
& Co.,
Brief History",
1997,
43
p. 31
in:
New
2.
Looking
principle
at the
Reality
in the end,
autocracy by another.
From
a.
at the
th
beginning of the
in
century
a feudal
system where the Tsar's authority was absolute. Even early attempts
at revolt,
finally
was an
Law
II in
in the autocratic
p. 33)
provided
little
survival
artifice
was
to the peasantry
on appeasement than
village,
such as the
became a key
practiced as
to success. Thus, truth and falsehood, the legal and the illegal
fluent
and
indistinct borders.
(Rawlinson,
997,
pp.33-34)
In the
it
880s and
industrial
boom
that brought
tariffs,
however, discouraged Russian businesses from adopting the advanced economic practices
(Rawlinson, 1997,
p.
industrial
industrialists.
boom was
34)
44
supported by foreign
to
economic
collapse.
When
Lenin and the Bolsheviks took over, their heritage included the
accompanies most
revolutions,
and
all
disastrous
economic
situation.
which
Furthermore,
Bolsheviks were products of Tsarist Russia, their thinking and conduct inescapably shaped
more
The
KGB, was
Cheka,
established.
performance,
became equivalent to
failure
failure.
economic
Under these
was almost
the
inevitable,
weak
given the
to
infrastructure, that
compromise
its
sooner or
later
ideological stance
What began
temporary means
of
shortages,
is,
goals.
as
alleviating
with the penumbral world of the second and shadow economies, became an
eventual cause of those shortages and the nemesis of a system
it
was
supposed to support, thus paving the way for the burgeoning of organized
crime from the
b.
late 1970s.
(Rawlinson, 1997,
of
was
war
p. 3 5)
chest.
Even Joseph
The
Bolsheviks
made a
ransom- added
but
substantially to
implicated in several heists, including a bank robbery in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.
Furthermore, the gang's harsh discipline and secrecy came to characterize the Bolshevik
cells and, eventually, the
Society, as the
tactics
weaker
Communist Party
force,
itself.
appeared to borrow
much of its
rhetoric
and organizational
45
in
turn
nothing so
why
reason
own
much
the Party
came
its
tsarist police.
When
strictly
Among
eyes of
many
its
members and
of the
adhered to by
new
criminal underworld
was
became known
system and the Soviet society, giving them an almost heroic status
this
a bloody
life
occurred
in the
in the criminal
until the
was
Great Patriotic
underworld. (Rawlinson,
1997, p.38)
In these early days,
by
their
compromise
either a loss
in their response. In
is
of ideals or
While the
status.
'rebels' offer
no
great,
such a
meaning
legitimate structures, the latter respond at best with reluctant tolerance if the effort to
is
not
so.
German
94 1
thousands of Russian
gangsters joined their fellow countrymen in the army and ammunition plants. Patriotism
traditional
Their leaders, the vory v zakone, however, considered this behavior as a betrayal of the
gang code of honor. Thus, when the gangsters returned from the
front, they
contempt, and were labeled with the same slang word applied to turncoats and informers
in prison: suki,
meaning
46
were viewed as
traitors.
Thus,
in the so called
As
a result,
was
finished.
in the gulag.
Soviet authorities falsely announced in the mid-1950s that the vorovskoi mir
Since crime had been extinguished in the Soviet Union, police was no longer supposed to
left
longer
prison.
What
who
when
Having been punished for violating one tenet of the code already, they no
obliged to adhere to
felt
really
its
other
commandments,
became the
financiers
The
essential
if the
line
between
legal
If a society
and
illegal
is
weak, however,
becomes
may
in this
if
corruption
is
oblique forms of
blurred,
is
process
lies
in
the
p. 3 8)
own
rules
filled
left
vacuum
was
By
who soon
established their
practically over.
criminal elite
arena.
The
and the
1997, p.40)
Even
industry
was running
socialism,
was
it
became evident
that Soviet
malfunctioning.
of Soviet
'pulling
this
the
41
kind of
'friction': blat,
efforts
eyes';
krugovaya
illegally
a dealer
gained
officials in
'extras'.
who would
the tolkach or
would
supply,
the population, however, turned to another source: the growing black market 27 With the
legitimate market failing to produce the
arising
official,
by
both having
profit,
was
in
common
between the
total symbiosis
new
order to
legal sector
that
in
and
services,
new
members of
breed of Party
salient feature
of this process
political elite
alliance,
now
and had
in return.
Together both
which would help them to take over the country. (Rawlinson, 1997, pp. 42-43)
By
the late 1980s the most successful dealers of the black market had risen
to tsekhoviki, owners of underground factories, which were the only efficient suppliers for
the growing
demand
became
these
new
entrepreneurs began
by
As
was
little
avtoritet (authority),
who was
in turn
directors'.
By
association,
Party members,
27 By 1990 official estimates admitted that 50 percent of Soviet citizens purchased a variety of goods
from the black market. In fact normal life was impossible without black market goods and services.
48
government employees and law enforcement workers became involved and profited from
the
new
alliance.
As
The
final
this relationship
became unbalanced
in
shift
While the most powerful Russian organized crime groups were already
place
in
partners
entering
associations,
the
became
former
its
own
power had
affairs,
first
state,
laundering,
private banks in
illegitimate structure.
independent of the
shifted in favor
money
market,
The
practically 'legal'.
contained
in
Law on
With foreign
through joint
Moscow
thus were
it.
The balance of
The
assimilative
active
become
stage
At
still
involves
this point,
of Article 6 of the
filled
by those
with access to wealth. In an attempt to preserve their personal influence, there was a
compromise became a
fully
elite
active partnership
to invest in the
economic
sector.
Former
criminal groups.
Patronage became the province of the economic lords. The proactive stage had been
reached. (Rawlinson, 1997,
p. 49)
49
in Russia.
Table 3-2.
Organized Crime
Stage of Development
REACTIVE
Bandits,
Vory v zakone
Legitimate Structures
Tsarist autocracy
Soviet totalitarianism
(I)
(less sophisticated
gangs,
teenage groups)
War of bitches
Vory v zakone
Black market
PASSIVE
ASSIMILATIVE
(1940s)
(II)
tsekhoviki
Soviet totalitarianism
Quasi-totalitarianism
early 1970s
ACTIVE
ASSIMILATIVE
Growth of shadow
economy
Tsekhoviki increase
economic base
Perestroika
Democratization
ventures co-operatives,
joint ventures
PROACTIVE
bought
Yeltsin
Media manipulation
Infiltration into
banking
And
determining
3.
We
its
the
& Co.,
The
its
colors
-it
was now
surroundings.
Summary
told ourselves that Russians, given a genuine choice,
would grab
democracy with eager hands. And we were convinced that capitalism and a
freemarket
economy would provide the motor for Russia's
transformation. (Handelman, 1995, p. 6)
50
New
p. 30.
As
the discussion in the previous subsection has shown, the history of Russian
organized crime has been a history of responses by the legitimate structures to the
From
evolution even seems inevitable. In Russia's case, the weakness of the legitimate
structures
with entities outside of the dominant system until economic inefficiencies led to the decline
of the Soviet regime, and organized crime became proactive. (Rawlinson, 1997, pp. 50-51)
B.
The
dominant factor
this
Communist autocracy
as the end
completely.
the course of
system
power
structures
in their mobility,
system,
similar
in
Eastern
inevitable. Centralized
socialist
in
to
no longer
nomenclature and economic avtoritet, diminishing state-autocracy thus did not necessarily
mean
The
fact that
any
significant social
changes
which break down an established mode of life require a transformation of the previously
acquired value systems, was,
1.
Organized Crime -
In Russia today,
it
different people...
My
killed
at least initially,
by
is
the
p.
55)
same
grandfather
Stalin in 1937, so
was a
know.
general
Now
it's
who was
discredited and
it's
the
28 The argument in this section follows Prof. Louise Shelley's statement made in a testimony before the
House International Relations Committee on Post-Soviet Organized Crime, April 30, 1996; it is also
laid out in her article "Post-Soviet Organized Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism" in: Russian
Organized Crime: The New Threat?, ed. Phil Williams, Portland, Frank Cass & Co., 1997, pp. 122-38.
51
is
kill
You
you.
just
all
know
it.
While
was confined
crime ignores
KGB
operations,
Since governments
in
political
transition
is
it
structures.
phases often
display
weak power
successor states of the former Soviet Union (FSU), the collapse of existing state
institutions has transferred
control apparatus. Additionally, the government itself is subject to the corrupting influence
of organized crime groups, with the subordinate legitimate structures being complicit
in
Exploiting
the
weakness of declining
state
control
and economic
criminal
rings.
Law
in
foreign countries.
FSU
p.
135)
all
traditional Soviet
its
and human
rights.
political
(Shelley,
1997,
123)
52
Table 3-3.
Soviet Authoritarianism
vs.
Authoritarianism of
Authoritarianism of Post-Soviet
Organized Crime
1
state
Not
state or complicit
on demise of nation
with compromised
governmental agencies
2.
2.
Ruling
organized crime
3.
Controlled elections
3.
Infiltration of
structures undermines
impotent
democracy and
state. Presidential,
legislative
results in
executive and
Subordination of citizens'
interests to the state
and
Communist Party
2.
Compulsion of the
citizen by state
2.
its
citizens
legal system
State
Relation to
its
Citizens
3.
3.
4.
denied
human
and
4.
its
citizens or residents
Subversion of emergent
civil society
rights
5.
.
state's objectives
Ideological
2.
news coverage
control
3.
who
53
Intimidation of scholars
seek to
Table 33.
(continued)
Soviet Authoritarianism
Authoritarianism of Post-Soviet
Organized Crime
1
1.
at
home base;
invest
transnationally
2. State
2.
Create
new monopolies
labor unions
3.
Economy
Use of economic
levers to control
4.
Strategic
5.
6.
transactions
1.
economic objectives
6.
labor unions
other states
5.
economies
1.
Weakened
state legal
state or citizens
2.
State maintains
monopoly on
and
2.
organized crime
forces of coercion
deployment of violence
3.
Legal
System
in foreign countries
4.
4.
and executions
groups
5.
5.
unpunished
Source: Louise
Crime: The
I.
New Threat?
Cass
& Co.,
1997, pp.124-26.
While the authoritarian threat posed by post-Soviet organized crime does not
present directly affect international security, the increasing wealth and
criminal groups have the potential to seriously
54
impede the
at
power of organized
transition to
democracy
in
groups
criminal
constitute
FSU
[already]
political
CIA
force
that
opposes
actively
The
the
collusion
of corrupt legitimate structures with criminal groups makes the citizenry vulnerable to
intimidation.
who
Individuals
live
in
fear in turn
enhancement of
p.
state
is
power
the resurrection of
name of
in the
fighting
136)
may welcome
in
this
development
in turn is likely to
more
this
resilient
process
it
legitimate
structures could be subjugated to terrorist activities in the attempt to break any remaining
resistance.
emergence of a criminal
state,
now, however,
illegitimate
also an actor
on
who
path of democratization. This course of events, however, seems less likely since the
liberties
basically
what
Economic Aspects
2.
The
reap
in a
much
good
higher profits.
position, for
Many members
example to
were
from the large transfer of
illegally profit
elite
diverting
capital
overseas,
revenue
involvement
from
increasing
the
Russian
opportunities
economy...
for
profit
Continued
of the government offers new opportunities for
the
and
heavy
official
th
nd
30 Statement given in a hearing before the Committee on International
Relations, 104
Congress, 2
55
must
find a source
of income.
go unpaid
31
Corruption and extensive crime are the forces that undermine the
economic
as the
stability
its
political as well
between the
political
collectively
corruption
go beyond the
its
fertile
importance
in the redistribution
of former
These
acts
of
underworld. Since 1996, each year about 20,000 crimes connected with corruption are
officially
scale
recorded, but experts believe this figure to be less than one percent of the real
its
own
(MVD) assume
Interior
high-ranking
official
who
provides protection. In
in
Moscow.
This situation
is
that almost
made
is
sometimes more
possible because of
p. 54)
President Yeltsin has already accused officials of turning a blind eye to the criminal
penetration of the
crime. Officials
"lethal
MVD,
BND)
p. 57).
that there is
A report
in
meanwhile a
Russia" (U.S.
on
certain individuals or
groups
in the
become
infiltration:
relationships to their
31
activity
of mutual
16,
in
The
is
1997)
th
Congress, 2
nd
56
pp A5-46.
Committee on
The
BND
comes
document
structures," the
government." (Shpakov,
are
active
in
16,
1997)
Russia.
Many of
these
groups
membership estimated
operate
in
loose
criminal
oil
at
money
45
rubles -equal to almost 25 percent of the gross national product (GNP). One-fifth
in
1996, Russian organized crime controlled an estimated 50,000 companies and accounted
for approximately
pp. 53-54;
Dunn, 1997,
p.63)
Russia
working
is
directly in
(CSIS, 1994,
p.
is
110)
a sobering perspective on
officials,
70-80
percent of private businesses are paying extortion fees worth 10-20 percent of their total
retail sales.
month
Even
MVD
established or are
officials
now
estimate that
enterprises
were
either
57
of the economy
is
it
can be assumed
that the
shooting of prominent bankers and businessmen -the Russian version of 'hostile take-
over'-
is
among
is
Summary
3.
The
political
undermines the
economic
stability
its
continued progress towards stable, free-market democracy. The collusion between parts
of the former
political
new form of
within
its
which affected
citizens
crime intimidates individuals inside and outside the confines of the FSU. The exploitation
of Russia's
military-industrial
no longer be seen
C.
as a
in
complex adds a
MVD,
the
in
1990 to more than 8,000 by mid- 1996. The estimated overall number of active
to
more than
on the
source. Ruthlessness and propensity to use violence, as well as the ability to operate
32 For example,
on July 28, 1997, the director of the North Western River Shipping company. E.
Khokhlov, and his deputy N. Yevstafev were gunned down in a Leningrad Port office building.
Economically-motivated crime and violence in St. Petersburg included 30 killings in the period fall
1993 - summer 1994 (IEWS Russian Regional Report, vol.2, No.44, December 18, 1997).
33
and city
officials,
from a
based on a
series of confidential
prosecutors, regional
58
officials,
salient characteristics
Army was
stationed in
could be exploited
communities
many European
when
on a transnational
two
factors
scale,
activities.
make
the
seem
Red
they can melt into close-knit ethnic minorities in an otherwise alien society. Today, an
estimated
the
1 1
in
same
of operations and
logistics.
is
broad range
operations and are increasingly operating abroad, constitute the most significant threat.
1.
Although there
no
is
set
shown
in
that larger
knowledgeable
Elite
Group -
specialized,
for
consists
example
his
deputies/aids
who
are
strategists,
Support Group -
34
is
and
59
Congress, 2
nd
Session,
Security
Group -
is
in street
gangs,
of
Elite
Group
Leadership, Management,
'obshak'
Support Group
Security
Specific
Group
Security
Organization of
and
Counter Intelligence
Crime
Working Units
Burglars, Thieves, Prostitutes,
Extortionists
Street
Figure 3-1-1.
Source. Financial Crimes Enforcement
Relations. U.S. Congress, 104
th
Gangs
Network (FinCEN)
Congress, 2
nd
in:
This structure enables the organization to conduct and control complex operations
places simultaneously.
The
who
in different
elite
leadership
is
is
done only
at the
top of
the pyramid in order to minimize the risk of detection. According to law enforcement
sources, this structure resembles the organizational pattern of old style Soviet criminal
enterprises.
Thus
it
60
in the future.
An
alternate structure
provided by
is
Dunn Shown
of large military
in
staffs
or industrial enterprises.
Leader
Deputy
Economic
Banking
Counter-
Strategy
Adviser
Consultant
intelligence
Other
Smuggling
Team
Team
Team
Team
Team
Team
Team
Leader
Leader
Leader
Leader
Leader
Leader
Leader
Soldiers
Figure 3-1-2.
Source:
Drug
Security
& Co.,
Soldiers
Soldiers
Soldiers
in Russia",
in:
New Threat?,
ed. Phil
1997, p.64.
This type of organization provides the same advantages as the one described above
but allows for an even greater diversification of
activities.
The
capabilities
of both
organizational patterns are further increased through the availability of latest technology.
Additionally,
characteristics:
ties
the uninhibited use of intimidation and violence (Dunn, 1997, pp. 64-65)
2.
Major Gangs
in
Moscow
st
Only
six
61
20
real
power.
As
Gang
operations,
activities
have
is
shifted
from extortion to
for a small
financial
single obshak,
officials,
-pooled
financial
Among
the
other major
mafia gangs,
the
Slav groups
{Solntsevskaya and
Podolskaya) are the natural enemies of the Chechen gangs. In 1990-91, the Slav gangs
waged war
of a
were over
strategic war.
country, and
is
The
battles to
The Solntsevskaya
gang
in the
rich
conflicts, survival
in
Moscow,
(Dunn, 1997,
clash
size ranges
of these gangs requires coalition with one or the other large gang.
p. 70)
62
in the
Russian
Table
Name
3-^1.
Members
Major Gangs
in
Moscow
Main Operations
'Chechen
banking, prostitution,
car smuggling,
International Operations
(consists of three
gangs below)
drug smuggling
Connection'
1,500 to 3,000
Kingdom
counterfeiting,
Tsentralnaya
included above
drug smuggling.
extortion, kidnapping
as
prostitution,
Chechen Connection
financial fraud,
(see above)
member of the
arms smuggling,
'import/export'
Ostankinskaya
Avtomobil'naya
included above
domestic and
Northern Caucasus,
international road
as
Chechen Connection
member of the
Solntsevskaya
3,500 to 4,000
U.S.,
retail, prostitution,
500
and
drug production,
Cali cartel
smuggling and
distribution,
kidnapping
prostitution,
drug and
transits cocaine
U.S.
laundering, extortion,
kidnapping,
financial fraud,
in the U.S.
its
operations
'import/export'
extortion, kidnapping,
prostitution, active in
21" Century
Association
1,000
oil
(umbrella
and
insurance,
controls nationwide as
organization)
Source:
& Co.,
in Russia", in:
1997, pp.65-67.
63
New Threat9
ed. Phil
Major Gangs
3.
St. Petersburg is
As
in St.Petersburg
Table 3-5.
Name
in
(twice as
production and
much
in a loose
distribution,
kidnapping
prostitution,
contraband
association)
International Operations
trading,
1,500
all
St.Petersburg
Main Operations
arms dealing, car
Tambovskaya
p. 72)
Major Gangs
Members
its
business
prostitution,
Malishevskaya
1,500 to 2,000
(up to 5,000
arms dealing
drug production,
extortion, abduction
car dealing
drifters')
and
and arms
Kazan'skaya
1,000 to 1,500
trading, drug
unknown
dealing, kidnapping,
prostitution
Vorkutinskaya
arms dealing,
2,000
Finland, Sweden,
Germany
car smuggling,
kidnapping, protection
racketeering, contraband
alcohol
and tobacco
production
Source.
The
& Co.,
in Russia",
in:
New Threat?,
ed. Phil
1997, pp.72-74.
in the
One of
operate independently, but rather pay tribute to one of the larger organizations. The major
ethnic
gangs are the Chechen, Azerbaijan, and Dagestan gangs. (Dunn, 1997,
64
p. 74)
Major Gangs
4.
Since
996 the
situation
Tsentralnaya.
Now,
in
Yekaterinburg
of organized crime
in
is
p. 74)
Table 3-6.
Name
Major Gangs
in
Yekaterinburg
Main Operations
Members
Yekaterinburg.
in
International Operations
Uralmashskaya
estate manipulations,
if
smuggling of raw
(up to 200
and metals,
necessity
materials
arises)
nuclear material
United States
smuggling,
prostitution
drugs and
arms smuggling
extortion, gambling
prostitution,
Tsentral'naya
unknown
Hungary
('legitimate business')
Belgium
metal smuggling
15 to 20
Afghantsy
(200
drifters;
mostly Afghan
drug smuggling,
petrol selling
war veterans)
5.
& Co.,
Major Gangs
in:
in
strict
ed. Phil
Vladivostok
and had a
New Threat?,
1997, pp.74-76.
was closed
to almost
all
foreigners
still
in
65
new
p. 77)
Table 3-7.
Name
Major Gangs
Members
in Vladivostok
Main Operations
International Operations
Mikho's Gang
100
(200-250
prostitution, extortion,
electronic goods
drifters)
China
prostitution,
60
Kostenava
(up to 150
China
smuggling, trading in
cars
drifters)
and
electrical
appliances
<20
kovolskava
dealing
Japanese Yakuza
extortion, prostitution,
Makorskaya
40
to
60
unknown, contract
contract killing,
(mostly martial
killing suspected
arms dealing
arts experts)
Source.
In
addition,
& Co.,
in Russia", in:
Phil
1997, pp.77-80.
Tajikistan,
Summary
6.
at the
is
impressive and
a broad range of operations and logistics. Today, an estimated 110 Russian mafia gangs
operate in more than 44 countries worldwide. Strongholds of large mafia groups with
international reach are
complex
structure
increasingly
Moscow
that
worldwide
and
enables
stage.
St. Petersburg.
them to conduct
sophisticated
operations
on an
cooperating with other mafia groups such as the Yakuza, the Colombian Cartels or the
Italian Mafia.
66
D.
In June
conducting
996, the
operations
Most of
independently
these
either
cooperation
in
international
sections
1 1
with
foreign
partners,
or
permanently based abroad. Together, they encompass about 7,000 members. Russian
organized groups are believed to operate
in
more than 44
countries, including:
Czech Republic,
Israel,
Italy,
United Kingdom, the United States and former Yugoslavia. (Dunn, 1997,
p.81)
Activity in
1.
European Countries
is
affected
the following brief survey will focus on those countries which are most affected.
Austria
a.
More
sophisticated groups also exploit Austria's lax banking and tax laws. This accounts
its
made
its
money smuggling
Austrian banks,
authorities
are
also
headquartered
clamped down on
XXXX
in
now
Vienna. 35
and deported 70 of
XXXX,
launders
its
which
in
initially
money through
In
its
p.81)
Dunn
it, it
is
67
b.
The
prostitution,
Belgium
activities
in
Belgium concentrate on
is
Antwerp, the
city's port
in its
p. 82)
Cyprus
The Mediterranean
island
is
By 1996
The number of
in
which has a
36
.
money
laundering, as
wave of bomb
was believed to be
partly
killed
attacks in Limassol
from Cyprus
tL
suffers
up
in
that
p. 82)
Prague. Consequently,
the previous
Czech Republic
gangs
in
in the
Czech
trafficking, extortion
capital.
some
The
and protection
rackets,
entering
prefer Prague as
36 Since the activities of the Russian 'companies' are extremely profitable for Cyprus, the country has
refused a request from the Russian Central
Bank (RCB)
68
to consult
it
their
base
gangs
in Central
in the
Czech
capital
The
meeting point
city as their
officials. In
December 1995,
groups.
He
was dismissed
apparently tipped off leading Russian mafia leaders that were to be arrested
during a planned
visit
to Prague in
May
p.
Germany
e.
82)
the
Moscow
GDR
region.
during the Cold War, and thus already had contacts there.
Their main activities include prostitution, car theft, extortion, drug related offenses,
German
Germany
is
in
estimated to be the
at least
materials. One-third
work of Russian
10,000 Russian
criminals.
women
all
According
are forced to
of
Germany,
work
Berlin,
Hungary
In 1991
last
week before
its
more than 1,000 Russians deserted from the Red Army during
when
and smuggling of
the
is
Many
relatively high in
cars, prostitution
released
release.
on the
October 1995 after authorities were fooled by a bogus fax from the
immediate
As a
member was
1997, p.82).
69
the
in
late
his
in
in the privatization
p.
83)
Italy
g.
At
least six
most powerful
in
Italian
in Italy.
Their
extortion.
Some
p.84)
Netherlands
h.
The
of Amsterdam
city
is
the
stronghold
Exploiting the liberal drug laws, Russian gangs use the Netherlands as a transit point for
drug
Other
trafficking.
stolen cars.
As elsewhere
in
is
high.
transatlantic operations.
Poland
makes
(BMW,
in
in Poland.
Mercedes driven
in
Warsaw
is likely
vehicles.
On
Armed
Herzegovina by the
Italian
arms
to
Italy,
70
German
average, a
car-jacking
at least
to
20
Bosnia-
foreigners
Most of the
Sweden
k,
in
set
up a large underground
Up
industry for false or stolen passports, visas and other travel documents.
(Dunn, 1997,
known
to $3,000 are
as 'criminal tourism'.
p. 84)
2.
As was mentioned
earlier,
in
p.
New York
City, Philadelphia,
citizens,
this context,
testified in a hearing
that
is
liberalized its
KGB
many who
Daniel Lungren,
where there
139)
it
when they
preference, Russian organized crime in the U.S. has spread in cities and states
is
smuggling
before the
of
hard-core criminals,
Mariel boatlift
continued their
life
of crime
in
39
law granting
its
further
in
increased
November
following
the
congressional
May
71
1991. 39
20
years,
reported
its
15
most
significant
organized crime groups with former Soviet ethnic origins which were
operating in the U.S. According to law enforcement agencies, Russian organized crime
identified
to
operate in
New
Diego,
affected
cities
San
operating in the U.S. often are interconnected, and have ties to organized crime groups in
Russia.
Figure 3-2 below gives an overview of types of crime committed by criminals from
the
60
a Fraud
Money Laundering
Drugs
Violent Crime
Extortion
Forgery
D Racketeering
D Prostitution
Loan Sharking
1991
Figure 3-2.
95
Tri-State Project
Law Enforcement
Activities,
1991-95
'
Survey 4
40 According to an April 1986 report by the President's Commission on Organized Crime, the
indication of an element of organized crime
in 1975,
when
first
a gang
from the Odessa region was discovered to be involved in major fraud. The Brighton Beach area of New
the hub for Russian organized crime during the mid-1970s.
The 'Rutgers
University/Tri-State Project
Law Enforcement
72
state,
county,
and
local) of
Today, 28
states report
activity.
These
activities include
extortion, prostitution, car theft, counterfeiting, credit card forgery, narcotics trafficking,
Among
Los Angeles
money
New York
soil.
City, the
Union from
FSU, both
and
legal
political barriers
Whenever more
sophisticated
They are
in
become involved
trying to cover
which prevented
well.
considered to be
the
is
Summary
3.
the Soviet
Mafia
up
in
activities
encompass
targets.
WMD,
government in every
legal business as
traditional
in
fissile
state.
Participants were asked whether their agency had, within the previous five
agencies, 167 replied with 'yes', 65 of the latter indicating that they considered Russian-emigre crime
a major problem within their jurisdiction. Participants were also asked about the types of crimes
committed within their area by Russian emigres. Since participants were allowed to report multiple
add up to more than 100 percent (TriState Joint Soviet-Emigre Organized Crime Project, Documentation, Appendix
p.215).
42
To
give two examples of the magnitude of the operations: Between March 1993 and September 1995,
IRS undercover operations resulted in 10 major indictments, involving 136 defendants and $363.70
million in evaded taxes. In California, Russian emigre Michael Smushkevich was the mastermind of a
medical diagnostic testing scheme that generated $1 billion of fraudulent billings to medical insurance
carriers (U.S. Senate, Hearing,
May
73
on the
organized crime.
E.
fissile
left
p. 42).
FSU
democrats,
KGB
officers
dirty hybrid
moving
after
new
the
functionaries, quasi
in
initially
were assessed to
situation
crime.
Basic Concerns
1.
that
came
activities
arguably
carve
out
new
criminal
WMD.
channels
trade
and
increase
potential
nuclear trafficking does not qualify as a particularly successful criminal enterprise, and that
'legitimate' buyers are hard to identify 43 Additionally,
lead to a
low
priority
43 'Legitimate' buyers are buyers that are not linked to undercover police and/or intelligence operations.
A 1995
(BKA)
Federal Republic -
74
is
no market
date.'" (Lee,
1997, p. 109)
it
Finally, nuclear
fairly
the
FSU
of
and technology
terrorist groups,
in states
it
more
is
smuggling system might direct the flow of material southward and eastward to meet
lethal
itself
Mafia groups
political
the late
weapons
is
it
in
1)
intelligence officials
warned
is
growing." Early
in 1993, in Brussels,
threat in an ".
Federation, the
own
visible face
this
military
cohesion as the material welfare of the officer corps deteriorates in tandem with the
especially those
most secure
working
facilities
in concert,
44 (Lee,
1997, p.
pose a
1
likely
insiders,
at the
12)
and
managers estimate
that a combination
of only four people could accomplish a successful diversion of weapons-grade uranium from the
facility.
Building 116 holds a significant quantity of 95%-enriched uranium U-235, enough to make
several nuclear
p. 1 12).
75
Although
little
criminal organization controls the smuggling of radioactive materials, the supply chains
and mechanisms to transport such materials over long distances and across international
boundaries are already
in existence.
of former nuclear workers, small metals traders, opportunistic businessmen and petty
smugglers. 45
Furthermore,
nuclear
trading
government
channels
times
at
are
augmented
by
officials,
Most of
wrenching
social
and morale
Even Russian
where
responsibility
forces. Discipline
where troop
soldiers in a society
of the
officials are
unbearable
in the
Soviet Union.
weapons or technology
living conditions
WMDs
have dropped to
fast disappearing,
and organized
p. 250)
Sergeyev, Russia's Defense Minister, admitted that crime in the armed forces has reached
a critical level, with powerful organized criminal groups penetrating the army. Last year
18,000 officers were charged with a range of criminal offenses. General Sergeyev said that
"...the criminal situation in the
the
addition,
is
Departments
in early
their gravity."
is
reaching a
critical level,
1 1,
both
in
terms of
1998)
doubtful.
proliferation
armed forces
reorganization of the
MVD
and
and
45
The
'Munich
case',
76
which
will
be discussed
later,
As one
FSB
officials
in
front
companies
assume
materials vanished
network of small
result, a
facilities.
(Lee, 1997,
p.
up by the
other cities in
1995.
in
set
As
994 to
a consequence,
30 to 40 percent of
below
PLANNING
(employees or former employees
of nuclear enterprises; outside
criminal groups)
IMPLEMENTATION
(enterprise insiders: managers,
scientists,
equipment operators,
security personnel)
INTERIM STORAGE
I
TRANSPORT
INTERMEDIATE BUYER OR BROKER
(small metals traders, import-export firms)
SMUGGLE ABROAD
(couriers, professional smugglers,
transport companies)
specialized distributors)
TRANSPORT
AGENTS OF END-USER STATES
OR 'SOVEREIGN-FREE' ORGANIZATION
DELIVERY TO FINAL DESTINATION
Figure 3-3.
& Co.,
77
in:
New Threat?
ed.
The
situation
is
Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) to
officials
view counter-smuggling
national priority.
weapons
trafficking.
efforts as a
(MINATOM)
officials
low
have
repeatedly and openly criticized undercover operations as 'provocation', arguing that they
create an artificial market for nuclear substances. This assumption
MTNATOM's own
is
other evidence presented here, the Russian official posture on nuclear smuggling appears
2.
p. 11
7)
Recent Trends
U-235 were
depot at Andreeva Guba, 30 miles from the Norwegian border. Four months
4.34 kilograms were stolen from the military port
later
fleet
another
was recovered by
at
from a
stolen
The
investigator
both cases, Mikhail Kulik, reported to his superiors that "...organized crime groups
Fleet.
of large-scale
staff,
study
(Cockburn, 1997,
weak
p. 76)
46 Under Mikhailov,
MINATOM
itself
theft.
One
eager to tighten export controls for nuclear and arms technology, the Russian bureaucracy-, for various
reasons, has not always effectively carried out his orders (Gordon.
9.
1998);
47 Mikhail Kulik
is
the
78
p. 75)
Table 3-8.
Location
Date
in
U-235
stolen
Remarks
Perpetrators
Enrich-
ment
Level
Andreeva
Zazimsk
Gulf,
Northern
Fleet,
kg
two
4.5
1993
(1.8
two
weighing
kg of HEU
July
36%
rods)
sailors of
officers also
them
radiation safety
against
services
dismissed for
lack of evidence
material
Se\inorput
recovered and
Polyarny-Rosta
Northern Fleet
Nov.
3 fuel
fuel storage
1993
rods together
approx.
20%
two captains,
one lieutenant
dump
thieves
apprehended
months
six
after
theft
Severodvinsk
4 local business-
men from
Sevmash
(nuclear
July
submarine
1994
20%
to 40%
kg of
Uranium Dioxide
3.5
Severodvinsk
progress
trial in
arrested; links to
workers in
construction)
Sevmash
plant
Sevmash
perpetrators
Oct.
no
fuel rods
1994
no information
arrested in
Arkhangelsk; not
info.
charged
Severodvinsk
culprits stopped
Zvezdochka
before removing
(maintenance
July
and
1995
repair of
fuel rods
no
contract employees
info.
of Northern Fleet
uranium from
plant
-case under
nuclear
submarines)
investigation
Zvezdochka
criminals carried
material out of
Jan.
fuel rods
1996
no
contract employees
info.
of Northern Fleet
Zvezdochkamash
but were arrested
in Severodvinsk
-case under
investigation
Sovietskaya
4.5
Gavan' Pacific
Jan
Storage and
1996
HEU,
Submarine
40%
to 60%
7 kg of
kg of zirconium,
somecesium-137
Fleet Fuel
0.5
Repair Facility
workers of
facility
& Co.,
9.
79
in:
seized in
Gavan', 2.5 kg
employees of
in Kaliningrad
same
export-import
(part of
company
theft)-case under
in
Kaliningrad
Source: Rensselaer Lee, "Recent Trends in Nuclear Smuggling",
kg
Sovietskaya
investigation
(HEU) occurred
in the
Murmansk-Arkhangelsk
1997,
p.
HEU
is
By
January 1996
Sovietskaya Gavan'.
at
Fleet,
area
Northern Fleet
is
been confirmed,
it
116)
officially
more often than once. In 1993 a Russian Colonel who was vigorously pursuing
nuclear smuggling cases
in
of a
investigating rumors
Moscow who
was forced
to quit the
MVD. When
how
done
In
popularity
May
sold'.
so, the
in turn
Hungarian
was
financed,
Moscow
he
three
likely,
the
the
1994 Tengen, a
when German
little
town
in
police stumbled
the
market. While they were searching the house of Adolf Jaekle, a suspected counterfeiter,
detectives found 5.6
The
origin
facility.
two
interesting pieces
the
Vienna, a bank
in his
owned by
80
it
The
two
Kurchatov
Moscow. (Cockburn,
Institute in
material.
enriched),
Germany, a
was searched
was made
it
U-235 from
city
U-235
that
was
became
clear that
called 'Autotransport'.
which
justice
It
14,
Landshut sample,
was Alexandr
origin.
the quantity of
clear that
its
When on December
became
was not
it
'fingerprints' as the
become a
it
arrest
first
During
worker
his interrogation
masters back in
Russia -another indication for the presence of organized crime. In the further course of
the investigation
it
became
clear to
Czech
officials that
concluded that
criminals.
When on August
down
in
officials
at least
Czech
from
Moscow
touched
who had
who had
in a suitcase
belonging to
studied medicine in
sell
Moscow
in
helicopters
48 Other events at this time include: Bulgarian police finding capsules of radioactive material in a bus
bound
an Azeri national
selling
three kilograms of
U-238 under
1997, p. 84).
81
on July
19,
1994 (Cockburn,
was
arrested at
Munich
living.
airport.
his
it
the political
'aftermath'
for
become
German
is
intelligence
more than
more
is
cautious.
likely to
productive impact on future efforts to trap nuclear dealers 49 Finally, the direction of
nuclear trafficking
is
likely
to
shift
grade nuclear materials in Russia and Central Europe from 1992 through 1994.
Table 3-9.
in
Oct. 1992
Feb. 1994
May
1994
Location
kg of uranium
Podolsk
1.50
(Railway Terminal)
St.
Possible Source
Material Seized
Petersburg
Luch'
(U-23 5)
kg uranium dioxide
90% U-235
Plant
design
3.05
Tengen-Weichs
Baden Wuerttemberg
Scientific Production
Association
Germany
BND. German
intelligence
and law
enforcement agencies were accused of having intentionally endangered the passengers of the
Lufthansa
flight.
and further
attempts to effectively trap nuclear dealers appear to be politically unacceptable. (Falkenrath. Richard
A,
Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard University, interview
by Jiirgen Marks,
FOCUS.
82
Table 3-9.
Date
(continued)
Possible Source
Material Seized
Location
Experimental
June 1994
Landshut
0.80 g of 87. 7%
Bavaria
U-235
Germany
Aug 1994
Dec. 1994
fast reactor,
Obninsk Institute of
Physics and Power Engineering
possibly at
(FEI)
Munich
Bavaria
Germany
210goflithium-6
fuel with
kg of 87.7%
Prague
2.73
Czech Republic
U-235
FEI
Experimental
fast reactor
(chemically the
same
as Landshut
seizures)
& Co.,
all
in:
New Threat?,
ed.
stories
but stopped. 50
Table 3-10 below gives an overview of additional seizures from April 1995
50 According to unclassified information accessible via the homepage of the Bundespresseamt (BPA), the
number of cases
total
were 163
still
in 1995,
the 1995 cases involved states, with definitive proof that in two of
and
51
and 77
in 1996.
Although these
them the
BND,
active buyers
16 of
were Iran
Iraq.
Although there have been no seizures of nuclear material in the U.S., two cases involved conspiracies
to import radioactive material into the U.S. In
New
seized in Cyprus.
material
was
Investigations of the
May
The
15, 1996).
83
th
Congress, 2
nd
Session,
Table 3-10.
Date
Event
6 kg of U-235, U-238, radium, and palladium are found in a Kiev apartment which
is occupied by an army lieutenant colonel and a warrant officer; seized material
April 4, 1995
reportedly
November
10, 1995
November
7,
1995
Iranian press reports that Iranian law enforcement arrested five Iranians with nine
amount, or enrichment
Russian
FSB
level
members of a
arrests nine
cities;
no further
details
on
origin,
were given
U-235
Belarussian
March
14,
1996
March
17,
1996
Tanzanian police
arrests
of uranium in Bielska-Biala
cesium.
Source: Paul J Ljuba, "Organized Crime in Russia and United States National Security", Thesis, Naval
CA
1996, p.49.
from Yekaterinburg to
are larger and better established than those for radioactive materials and criminal penalties
for dual-use smuggling are less stringent.
reputedly
was
financed by Yuri Alekseyev, a Yekaterinburg businessman and political figure with close
52 Nonfissile materials
beryllium, zirconium.
84
hafnium,
ties to
in
Chechen gang
in
Moscow,
the
Tsentral 'naya group, occasionally also trades in nuclear materials. While in the past most
Even
itself.
if traffic
transit
in
availability
54 In the
Combined
hotbeds of organized crime and narcotics trafficking, the region could easily
traditionally
widespread
tier.
indicates a
zone
for
would-be
14-15)
hands of
terrorists,
significant threat in
might contaminate a wide area. Certain powdered radioactive substances introduced into
the ventilation of an office building such as the
question
is
whether the
terrorist
few attempts
at
WTC
bomb
its
fatalities.
itself.
known
to date.
One embarrassing
were
53
wrong
hands. 55
The
However,
in late
components
The
Sinyaki, sometimes called the third branch of the Sverlovsk mafia, after Uralmash and Central
Gang, is based in Nizhny Tagil and Yekaterinburg. It appears to be an Islamic-influenced group,
which maintains close contact with counterpart criminal organizations in the Caucasus, primarily in
Chechnya, and the Central Asian States (Lee, 1997, p. 1 14).
and strontium-90.
55 Mikhailov
was abruptly relieved from his duties on March 2, 1998. He was succeeded by Yevgeny
Adamov. Since Adamov recently was on Mikhailov's team that went to Teheran to meet with Iranian
officials, his
Mikhailov himself
is
who
at
85
it is
likely that
Mikhailov's re-
military
burial
demonstrated that
in the
was
just a
full
MINATOM
it
material.
Boris Yeltsin's National Security Council. 57 Since one of his responsibilities was nuclear
security,
be
in the stockpile.
way
into the
are,
it
cannot be
levels
is
in illegal trade
of
WMD technology.
officer in
placement had more to do with allegations of corruption involving uranium sales and a subsequent
power struggle within the Russian government (New York Times, March 3-5,
known
Moscow, he
now
the
title
on
Arzamas- 16 is
Germany in 1994.
1998).
New York
Times' bureau
17, 1998).
56
radiation exceeded Moscow's permissible levels by a factor of 310. On November 23, 1995 the
Russian press reported that four containers of radioactive cesium-137 were missing from the
The
aluminum
industry
and funds
his presidential
(R-NY)
October
in a Hearing of the
1,
House
International Relations
1997.
86
he had been
selling the
Set
up
in
December 1989
in
York
KGB.
to
that
3.
for the
it
Hong Kong.
Moscow,
In
valuable partnerships
two
emerged
offices
from
New
as well, including
materials. 60 Yuri
Luzhkov,
who
is
possible successors for President Yeltsin, also enjoyed a profitable relationship with
Nordex. In
above mentioned
city
agency
in partnership
politicians
German
and
politically
weakened
state",
BND
report
is
much evidence
Aum
Shinri
Kyo
cult,
an
to suggest that
is
expense of an economically
politicians at the
"Nordex
in
"...the
A further
international
to President Yeltsin
(Cockburn, 1997,
p. 232).
New York received an unexpected offer from Russia. The Columbus Company of
which Nordex was a shareholder, proposed to donate a giant statue of Christopher Columbus. The
artist of 'choice' proposed to work with a high refined form of copper that is very expensive and
normally reserved for use in the electronics industry. Russia had a large stockpile of this material, but
its
export
was
(Cockburn, 1997,
p. 112).
87
last
enough
to
weapons trade
A
known
major
activity linked to
Nordex
is
was
is
without special
illegal
of the Materials and Technical Supply Department of the local nuclear research
operated
MTNATOM,
by
contacted
Yuri
Ivanovich
Moscow
Alexeyev,
institute
Yekaterinburg
organized crime. 62 Karate-Do provided for the financing of the operation with a
volume of 30
million rubles.
Rudenko, by using a
MINATOM
letterhead, send a
phony
purchase order to Obninsk and requested 4,000 kilograms of beryllium and nine kilograms
in Sverdlovsk,
in Zurich,
who was
called
willing to
VEKA in
pay $24
times the market price. Thanks to police intervention, the deal never
Lithuania,
million, ten
was completed.
Although intelligence agencies never could prove the identity of the mysterious buyer
Zurich, they expressed the firm conviction that
61
Beryllium
is
per kilo).
It
is
used in missile
Nordex was
in
aluminum but stronger than steel and very valuable (about $600
guidance systems and other sophisticated electronics
inertial
62
1 16).
63 According to unconfirmed sources, the buyer was said to represent Korean interests (George J.Weise,
Commissioner U.S. Customs Service, Hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate 104
.
The
'Vilnius case'
Connection", U.S.
th
Congress, 2
nd
Session,
May
15, 1996).
was taken from: Zimmermann, Tim, and Alan Cooperman, "The Russian
Report, October 23, 1995; and Cockburn, One Point Safe,
pp. 115-16.
88
in nuclear materials.
Trying to satisfy
its
customers Nordex also offers delivery systems. In 1994 a cargo plane of the Nordex
Corporation, en route from North Korea to Teheran, touched
down
Ukraine. Inside the plane were launchers for Scud missiles. Former
at
CIA
an airport
in
Director John
activity.'
Summary
4.
While interdicted smuggling incidents to date have been minor, nuclear trafficking
remains a low-profile but potentially dangerous threat to international security. The record
of
thefts
facilities is disturbing,
and evidence
demand
in states
such as
Iran, Iraq,
move
tier
could
develop into a widespread and nearly uncontrollable transit zone for potential
proliferators.
on a
Given the
if Russian
low
priority to
anything -including
relatively
of challenges
fissile material.
in place that
can
Economic
corruption in the Russian armed forces makes the access to willing insiders easy.
It
thus
F.
CONCLUSION
Russian organized crime,
in its different
responses by the legitimate structures to the presence of the former. In Russia's case, the
89
rule
accounted for
the readiness to negotiate with entities outside of the dominant system until economic
inefficiencies led to the rapid decline
proactive.
The
political
force that undermines the political as well as the economic stability of Russia and threatens
its
continued progress towards democracy and market economics. The collusion between
parts
of the former
represents a
political
Soviet organized crime intimidates individuals and states outside the confines of the
FSU
as well.
in
more than 44
countries
worldwide. These groups are characterized by a complex structure that enables them to
As
Several of the
level.
power and
wealth,
their
Since 1991 Europe and the U.S. have already witnessed a remarkable increase in
Russian organized crime. According to FBI Director Louis Freeh, Russian syndicates
October
2, 1997).
of Russia's
Whereas
interdicted
military-industrial
U.S.
encompass
Washington
traditional mafia
vistas to
an
issue.
activities
in the
90
security.
tier
could develop into a transit zone for potential proliferators. At the same time, Russian
authorities
seem to accord
relatively
low
priority to
armed
forces, caused
by economic hardships and low morale, could encourage nuclear proliferation and enable
organized crime groups to obtain nearly every weapons technology, including the whole
WMD spectrum.
In a hearing before the
October
threat
1,
1997,
FBI
House Committee on
Director Freeh
was asked
now than
if
at the height
is
on
under a greater
terrorist,
would be
yes.
The
controls that
1,
who
1997)
state,
criminal
organizations normally do not deliberately set out to do so. Indeed, organized crime
prefers to ignore the country
it
operates
in,
itself.
When
One
would be an
alliance with
terrorist groups.
will
91
92
"
IV.
"To date
this threat is
difficult to
counter as
old and new bad actors take advantage of weak governments, new technologies, and
rekindled ethnic rivalries.
Former Secretary
As
the discussion in the previous chapters has shown, either of the criminal
threat
by
itself.
Any
kind
of an
alliance
between these
constitutes a
is
likely
to
disproportionately increase the overall threat to the national security of affected nations.
This chapter
first
analyzes
some
historical
groups and organized crime. The chapter will subsequently develop a model for possible
future alliances between these
two
pillars
of non-state originated
threat,
and
finally will
introduce counter-strategies.
EXCURSUS: NARCOTERRORISM
A.
Any
terrorist
groups sooner or
later
Colombia and Peru are two major producers of illicit drugs. At the same time, both
countries confront left-wing guerrilla movements. Since rural insurgency as well as drug
Do
is
is:
many
reports suggest collaboration, this marriage seems to be a tempestuous one. (Lee, 1991,
p.155)
64
The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force, POD Responses to
Volume I Final Report, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For
Acquisition & Technology, Washington DC, October 1997, p.57.
Quoted
in:
Transnational Threats:
93
Since the evolution of the narco-guerrilla connection in the Colombian case offers
a greater variety of interpretations, this subsection will focus
on Colombia.
It
will first
will also
in
Colombia. Similar
be discussed. While
in
both Latin
will
be introduced
later,
1.
its
in the
suitable for
the business
is
grown
in
drove cocaine
skills
traffic
it
over.
Pablo Escobar and Jorge Ochoa, the most important of the Medellin
drug
lords,
and Ochoa knew each other, but they did not pool
1981,
kill
insurgency
..Escobar
when Ochoa's sister was kidnapped. The death squad they formed to
was the first in a series of collaborations that knitted
the kidnappers
them together
As
traffickers.
the following
section will
movement through
a.
in
is
Colombia.
long history of civilian rule and control over the armed forces. While
94
Colombia has a
it
remained the
and
is
still
civilian-military conflict,
political
political parties. 65
dominant
of
was
nevertheless
it
conflict
between the
-La
in
Violencia, a rampant
war
civil
political
Colombia, but instead gave birth to the oldest active guerrilla groups
in Latin
peace to
America.
FARC),
ELN), and
1960s,
major
three
left-wing
guerrilla
the
organizations,
Revolutionary
Colombia
the
Army
Army
th
in
EPL), together
Abril
65
The
last military
in
its history:
1830
(for eight
months
armed
forces
had
forced the then ruling General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla into exile (Hanratty, 1990, p.xxiii).
66
FARC:
urban
fronts,
traffickers
wing of
class.
1996
(U.S.
Government Printing
ELN:
Washington DC,
The attempted
peace talks with the Colombian government ended in 1992. Includes 32 rural and 11 urban
and
companies.
ELN
specialized
in
periodic kidnappings
of foreign
fronts,
employees of large
corporations for large ransom payments, as well as in extortion and bombings against
US and
other
Government Printing
95
Table 4-1.
Group
FARC
Groups
Tactics
Abandoned armed
won
ELN
Guerrilla
Status
ties later.
M-19
Colombian
targets; kidnappings.
struggle in 1989;
efforts,
attack
on Palace of Justice.
but entered
negotiations in 1989
EPL
The
Implications of Colombian
The
RAND Corporation,
guerrillas sought to
of key
economic
Political
1993, p.28.
installations.
facilities,
Although
military
counter-insurgency
operations placed the guerrillas on the defensive in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they
regained
much of their
To
in
Security Statute. 67 Despite his stringent policy, Ayala did not succeed in reducing the
proposed a
political rather
were
process the
FARC,
life.
As
67
The
statute
UP),
who were
gave expanded arrest powers to the armed forces, granted military tribunals jurisdiction
over several crimes, and subjected the media to censorship (Hanratty, 1990. p.xxvi).
96
allowed to keep their weapons, soon violated the cease-fire 68 The 'National Dialogue'
ended,
November
6, 1985.
among them
M-19 abandoned
11
Bogota on
in
Justices,
were
army more
killed.
While
major
still
active.
The
FARC
remains the
Despite the worldwide decline of communism, the communist insurgents of both, the
FARC
ELN
and the
can
still
significantly. 69 (Hanratty,
after
1990, p.xxvi).
1982.
The reasons
for this
obviously
was used
for reconstitution
Second,
in the early
development are
of President Betancourt
guerrilla groups. 70
them
to seek an
understanding with the narco-traffickers. In return for financial support granted by the
drug-lords, guerrillas started to provide security and protection for the traffickers. Finally,
the increased use of political violence and the appearance of right wing counter-
68
Both sides -the military and the guerrillas- repeatedly violated the cease-fire (Hanratty, 1990,
p.300).
69
Whereas Table 4-2 offers a more conservative (official) of the respective development of the
membership of these two groups, other sources speak of up to 15,000 troops of the FARC and 4,000
guerrillas in the ELN (Deutsche Presse Agentur December 31, 1997).
.
70
A behavioral
when
opportunities offered by the 1973 amnesty under the administration of President Hector
Campora
to
establish a variety of
97
own
efforts.
GROUP
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1996
1,200
1,800
4,000
5,800
6,800
5,700
ELN
190
230
1,800
2,600
3,150
2,500
EPL
100
350
1,400
1,250
550
450
M-19
750
300
1,200
1,200
100
80
2,240
2,680
8,400
9,650
10,600
8,730
19.64
275
330.8
373.2
289.73
FARC
TOTAL
Change
(1978=100%)
Marco A.
Palacios,
Comparative Study", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1997, p.54.
guerrilla
Private Counter-Insurgency
b.
protection from guerrilla crimes gave parts of the population reason to develop a counter-
insurgency project consistent in the formation of private self-defense groups. In the late
against
Squads".
In
the
presence
it
is
eventually earning
illegally
98
left-wing guerrillas, the former, most likely, must sooner or later have
extortion by the
latter.
become
subject to
however, the relationship more and more turned into an armed confrontation between both
criminal organizations. (Gantiva and Palacios, 1997, p. 76)
antagonists
as
"vigilantism"
establishment
sister
in
members by
Medellin
in
case
the
elite.
of
The
of a drug-cartel member by
M-19
guerrillas. 71
The meeting
which
received an
$4.5 million by the drug lords. Over the next three months, the
for
in
response to this event and the subsequent demand for $1 million in ransom,
which
guerrillas. In
rise
violence
initial
MAS
contribution of
M-19's
kidnapping.
(Lee,
1991,
pp. 162-63)
The violence
that
fall
into
particularly
lines.
The
links
grown
since
between the
finance,
Figure 4-1 below gives an overview of the total number of victims of death
squad massacres.
71
The kidnapped was Marta Nieves Ochoa, sister of Jorge Ochoa of the Medellin cartel, who in turn
called for the conclave of drug lords. Marta Ochoa was released unharmed in February 1982 (Lee,
1991, p. 162).
99
Number
of Victims
300
170
-No. of Massacre
Victims
1986
1987
Figure 4-1.
1988
1990
1989
1991
Source. Kevin Jack Riley, The Implications of Colombian Drug Industry and Death Squad Political
Initially the
guerrillas
and
nearly everyone
the
armed
who opposed
forces,
judges,
RAND Corporation,
activity
was
1993, p.28.
and
government
officials.
Drug
traffickers
officials
with
members of
increasingly
their
own
hit
Table 4-3.
Local
Total
Source. Kevin Jack Riley,
83%
3%
17%
100%
10%
87%
100%
Departmental
The
Implications of Colombian
DEATH SQUADS
RAND Corporation,
1993, p.23.
100
While drug
and hence conduct
their
homicides predominantly
the larger
level
cities,
The
at
in
on the national
multifold pattern of political violence in Colombia, however, does not only constitute an
attack
on the
political structure
fabric
of
society.
its
Colombia committed
armed forces to
fight
its
social
national security, in
is
1996
referred to as
narcoterrorism.
According to Lee, evidence to date does not clearly suggest the existence
As Lee
writes,
Drug
some
anti-establishment
views, they are strongly anti-US., and they favor a more egalitarian social
structure.
industrial
p.
power
indeed, they tend to perceive the latter as a mortal threat. (Lee, 1991,
12)
traffickers,
connection, however,
evolution led to the
is
its
first
provided to
phenomenon
If there ever
financial support
that
was a
is
process.
nowadays known
real alliance
And
in its
consequences
this
as narcoterrorism.
guerrillas,
appearance most probably can be dated back to the period following the
first
November
fields
in the
At the same time the navy blockaded the coastlines to cut off narcotics
101
somewhat
Upon assuming
the presidency in
opening of the 'National Dialogue'. At the same time, however, Betancur' s minister of
justice,
traffickers
successful raid
"war without
in April 1984.
quarter", and
Law
in kind.
In
December 1986, a
hit
significantly.
The
ambassador to Hungary and Bonilla's successor as minister of justice during the Betancur
administration.
One month
General Carlos
later,
gunmen employed by
major of Bogota and son of former President Misael Pastrana (Hanratty, 1990, pp.309).
There are indications that during
guerrillas
necessity
alliance
this
period an
initial
in turn led
them to seek an
with the narco-traffickers. In return for financial support granted by the drug-
welcomed
in times
traffickers,
which was
the cease-fire provided by the 'National Dialogue', the guerrillas were in a phase of
reconstitution and had the resources available to provide the diversionary action desired by
Crenshaw
terrorism
may
[also]
serve internal organizational functions [as for example] ... morale building within the
terrorist
p. 3 8 7),
a function
whose importance
increases
during an armistice. Although a connection between drug traffickers and guerrillas never
72
On one occasion,
authorities
102
FARC (Lee,
1991. p. 171).
could be proven,
in
the case of
M-19's 1985
attack
on the Palace of
the
Justice,
combination of place, time, and victims points to more than mere coincidence.
Since most narco-traffickers are not revolutionaries, and hence seek to buy
into
political
assumed that the drug lords expected the marriage with the
Given the
divorce.
drug
however,
cartels,
guerrillas,
who saw
it
is
it
can be
relative
it,
and
guerrillas
by the
soon led
This
guerrillas.
The process
led
that
to
guerrillas,
the situation
efforts to
two wars
traffickers.
and
demanded
civilians
who
structures.
As
related crime
UP
guerrilla groups,
Political
is
characterized
cartels
and
groups were the main agents of violence. This period marks a high of rightcartel related violence,
73
their
violent
Whenever
cartels,
unity,
one
itself.
again.
This
predominantly expressed by
particularly the
FARC,
increased their
killing
financial
Bernardo Jaramillo of the UP, the Liberal Luis Carlos Galan, and Carlos Pizarro of ADM- 19
(Accion Democratica M-19 Democratic Action M-19). All three homicides were reportedly
carried out on narco-traffickers' orders (Gantiva and Palacios, 1997, p.81).
103
cocaine trafficking. 74
Number
of
Incidents
140
1341
-Guerrillas
Narco-Traffick,
Organized Crime,
Private Justice
1988
Figure 4-2.
1990
1989
Armed Violence
in
1991
Colombia, 1988-1991
The
exploit
all
guerrillas'
approach
narco-production assets
in taxing the
in territories
under
their control.
by
their
While
attempt to
initially
they
low-level processing) than the more lucrative downstream phases (refining and exporting),
the
FARC
in all levels
of the cocaine
the leading trafficking syndicates apparently have the resources, the weaponry, and the will
to protect their refining and export operations against guerrilla groups, the
likely
74
has created
While the
its
FARC
own drug
75
According
to
It
the regions
p.
13)
of income.
1991,
most
cartel. 75 (Lee,
FARC
p. 81).
fully
embraced narco-trafficking as
its
primary source
provides security for drag laboratories, charges taxes on drags transported in and out of
its
its
own drag
104
Table 4-4 below underlines this evolution and summarizes the taxes
imposed by the
Table 4-4.
guerrillas.
ACTIVITY
Cultivation
Processing
kilo shipped
Operation of laboratory
Up
Use of airstrip
month
liter
Industry
New York,
St.
Martin's Press,
p. 179.
The
figures in Table
narco-trafficking as of the
amount
in guerrilla
guerrilla
Table 4-5.
significant
that
in
FARC
in narco-trafficking.
Source
Extortion
FARC
ELN
222
222
Natural Resources
270
Extortion
Kidnapping
87
106
Budget Deviation
51
Narco-trafficking
575
102
TOTAL
935
709
Ruben D. Mestizo Reyes, "State Strength and Guerrilla Power: The Equilibrium between the
Colombian Government and the Guerrilla Groups", Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
Source:
December 1996,
p. 37.
105
With
guerrillas are
common
international
abandoning
One
criminals.
their
communism being
FARC
largely
are
spent
political
force,
like
group. 76 Under these circumstances, anti left-wing coalitions are likewise losing their
ideological threat
paramilitaries
nowadays
still
government
officials
its
their interests,
The
p.
190)
when
traffickers are
weakened
capability to
76
(Clawson, 1996,
inevitable.
terrorist acts. 78
commit
seem to be almost
p.
of convenience
190)
to this evolution and other lucrative deals with drug cartels, the FARC today is state-of-theequipped and more than a match for the Colombian forces: On October 19, 1997, FARC rebels,
Thanks
art
in
police, shot
down
(BBC Summary of
GMT, 20 October 1997).
five helicopters
In another clash in the first week of March 1998, 70 soldiers of a Colombian elite unit were killed in
an ambush. The 24-hour battle that took place in an unidentified "remote region that is a center of
Colombia's cocaine trade", resulted in 30 government casualties (The Monterey County Herald
March
77
6, 1998).
On November 20, 1997, for example, Colonel Guillermo Rubio, Commander of Intelligence Brigade
No 20 was removed from his post on the basis of his alleged links with drug-cartel sponsored
paramilitary groups (BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, November 22, 1997; Source: Inravision
TV1, Bogota, 1730 GMT. 20 November 1997).
78
For example, during 1993 an intense government assault on the military arm of the Medellin cartel
to
make
tactical
ELN
cartel
might
induce some Cali leaders to commandeer guerrilla support for a new narcoterrorist campaign against
the authorities (Clawson, 1996, p. 191).
106
As
relationship's
of the
the
own dynamics
coalition.
From
alliance has
occurred the
two
to a criminal metamorphosis that caused the Colombian government not only to fight
wars
one
against guerrillas,
regular
now
armed forces
now
themselves involved
combat an
to
in
drug trafficking
but
also to
commit
their
Peruvian Narcoterrorism
2.
Once
the center of the powerful and wealthy Inca Empire, Peru in the early and
trying to
societal,
political
citizens polled in a
1990 survey
PCP-SL,
hereafter
SL) as
the nation's most serious problem. 79 Despite a major blow to SL, caused by the capture of
its
remained largely
79
Guzman
leading cadres,
intact
in
its terrorist
capability
threat.
By
In 1991, the British newsletter Latin American Special Reports ranked Peru as the Latin
country with the region's highest percentage of poor (60 percent) (Hudson, 1993,
p.
American
xxxv).
Sendero Luminoso was founded in early 1970 by then university professor Abimael Guzman in
Ayacucho, a highland department in the southwestern Peruvian Andes, and one of the poorest and
most underdeveloped regions in Peru. SL is considered one of the world's most ruthless guerrilla
goal
organizations.
Its
revolutionary
regime.
is to
and a
large
SL engages
It is
number of
in
particularly
brutal
forms of terrorism,
SL
including
As
of October 1992,
the
armed
women
constituted a reported 56 percent of SL's leadership (U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global
Tarazona, 1990,
p. 4).
107
Office,
terrorist
in
May
1980,
already had caused the death of a total of 28,809 people. (Hudson, 1993, p.xxxv)
fatalities
caused by
political violence in
Table 4-6.
Source.
Victims of
1990-1992
YEAR
NUMBER OF DEATHS
1990
3060
1991
3400
1992
3101
Rex A. Hudson,
ed., Peru:
By
"emergency
military zones,"
The
them
support
it
once had. In
began
SL
it
was
strategy
exposed to
sympathy
to,
to "win" the
rondas
fronts,
fact, legally
central
living in
as in the
by drug
Colombian example
lords.
(Hudson,
1993, pp.xxxv-xxxvii)
variety
of
of
Guzman
in
in
flight for
it
showed charges of
108
Peru's most important drug trafficker, Demetrio Limoniel Chavez Penaherrera, confirmed
had supplied SL with arms and had paid "taxes" of $5,000 per
that he
flight plus
$3.00 per
kilogram paste or $6.00 per kilogram base respectively. The "Red Path" faction, a splinter
is
According to arrested drug traffickers and former SL members, Ramirez had collected
$200
million
in battles against
Ramirez's gang in November 1994 came from the drug trafficking group of Walso Vargas.
(Clawson, 1996,
The drug
of any strategic
p.
181)
traffickers
alliance,
guerrillas' exactions.
who
weak
Compared
to
Colombian
cartels,
to resist
effectively the
relatively
all
is
sold to
Andean
cartels
that
is
Whereas the
the SL,
it
trafficker-guerrilla balance
of power
in the
common
common
common
objective
strategic goal
became
of the
particularly
apparent in periods of coca eradication programs, for example between 1983 and 1989.
3.
In
its
due to the
joint
won
illicit
crop
109
September
materials arrive in
1,
of illicit crop may not be necessary any longer, since the raw
in
from
Colombia and Peru. Thus Lebanon, which has long been known as a major source of
grown
locally
drugs, has
now become
in turn is
The
(DEA)
agents,
Rawi
Hariri,
dealers. (Atlas,
capital
dozen laboratories
however,
in several
billion.
1,
Of greater
is
among
the
1997, p.21)
in
Lebanon's
DEA
the fact that large amounts of the turnover are used to provide heavy financial
is
West, mainly the United States, and the terror organizations in Lebanon. Especially the
Hezbollah.
..." ( The
According
to
antinarcotics
is
80
1997)
Lebanon's
major
participation
in
the
sources,
1,
this deal
in the
Hezbollah: Literally "The Party of God", created in 1982 by Iranian military intelligence. Hezbollah
covers the whole spectrum of terrorist
tactics,
and suicide bombings. Hezbollah is known to have training camps and maintain
cells throughout the Middle East, the U.S. and Western Europe (The Washington Post. September 1,
1997; for a detailed description see Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance. New York,
Columbia University Press, 1997).
paramilitary attacks,
110
teach sophisticated terrorist tactics to the armed wings of the drug cartels.
More
recently,
however, Western intelligence has confirmed "...that the Lebanese drug trade has
branched out to expedite an ideologically based strategy by Islamic extremists to wage a
narcoterrorist
and economic war against the United States and the West
1997, p.21)
1,
Lebanon,
activities in
who
testified
16,
in general." ( The
Erlich,
deputy director of
terror."
War
against
this
[drug]
money from
government
Israeli
".
there
1,
is
1997,
p.21)
Intelligence sources in both the
full alert
as fanatical and well-financed Hezbollah agents are likely to spread out across the globe to
strike at the
While
U.S. and
its allies
likely
is.
Implications
4.
As
seem not to be of
with
Israel
the
cartels
with their
As
objectives
between
traffickers
and
guerrillas
traffickers are
As
the
further shown,
weakened
once an
capability to
weak,
commit
terrorist acts.
dynamics can lead to the evolution of new criminal wings on the side of each coalition
partner. Narcotics traffickers
have adopted
Ill
flow of drugs.
guerrillas
the balance of
most
likely to
led to
two
cartels
and
and
it
different wars.
latest
on the
side
is less
of the drug
traffickers,
the
guerrillas
organization.
More
disturbing
money and
fusion of
Hezbollah
is
is
For
seems to be
less
however,
it is
complicated.
its
in affected
marriage
countries,
In the examples introduced, the existence of different long term objectives did not
in counter-operations.
seem
unlikely.
and
terrorists
remain dominant, or
if
is
goal of saturating
may
common
B.
FUTURE ALLIANCES
As
the
use of terror tactics by transnational criminal organizations and their links with terrorist
and guerrilla organizations are already existing threats and give reason for concern.
may
may
making model"
112
that can
between organized
criminal
this
1.
two
work
it
is
tends to direct
its efforts
against specific
law enforcement policies rather than towards the overthrow of the existing power
structure. If possible, organized crime prefers to follow the 'soft strategy'
of corruption of
public officials. Transnational criminal organizations engage in terror simply and only to
provide a more congenial environment for their criminal enterprises. This behavioral
pattern, however, is likely to deteriorate
its
own
existence
is
if
the
aimed
at the
If terrorist
in
purpose of obtaining resources which enable them to pursue more effectively their aims
this
may be
factors
which suggest a
tactics.
transnational
Examples
criminal
and
done so to disrupt
its
p. 25)
Colombian
terrorist tactics
of vigorous government
113
They have
policies, to intimidate or
law enforcement
eliminate effective
sentencing
policies.
All
these
operations
more
officials,
activity. (Williams,
common
in
1996,
lenient
create
to
an
p. 25)
ends.
political
As
the example of
narcoterrorism in Peru has shown, the involvement of Sendero Luminoso in the cocaine
trade
made
government for a
significant period.
developed,
is
For SL
is
What
thus
its
p.
100)
alternative source
illicit
organized crime
it
and
A third
exists,
difficult,
still
much more
As
seem
likely to turn to
it
government
organized crime as an
"...deals involving
weapons
for
p. 26;
emphasis mine)
The
final
weapons, the
element
availability
is
of technological
WMD-blackmail, are
more
know-how
likely to
make
difficult (Williams,
its
insiders,
p. 26).
nuclear trafficking
The
security
of
81
of biological or chemical
1996,
in
theft
weapons and
The
technological opportunity.
terrorist organization
II.
114
their
own
criminal group.
While the motives of terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations may
the strategies they adopt to achieve their objectives seem to converge. Linkages and
differ,
alliances
likely
Whereas the
activities are
threat
will
at least in the
make both
difficult.
perceived as
more
short-term
traditional
to saturate
law enforcement
is
rather subtle
and
indirect, terrorist
Law
enforcement agencies could not but focus their efforts on combating the putative greater
threat
one of
their
major objectives
more
2.
organized crime that can be linked to the emergence of Russian mafia organizations on the
international arena, lead to the assumption that organized crime, at least for the predictable
future, is likely to
On
Russia
itself this
has led to
September 24, 1997 President Yeltsin reportedly said that "criminals have today
From
illicit
1,
its
laws,
helped by corrupt
1997, p.81)
82
is
actor. In
weapons
In 1994, Yeltsin reportedly called his country "the biggest mafia state in the world.
of crime that
is
devouring the
state
from top
to
the superpower
P-81).
115
1,
1997,
European
deliveries;
link
crime groups
transnational
predominantly
the
to
organizations thus
provide to
advantage
would only be
is
for
each other.
of organized
Globalization,
crime.
An
works
seems,
it
with
alliance
terrorist
is
of market domination.
for reasons
The
that
diversification
decision making
model described
in Figure
4-3
is
OC and
terrorism
hereafter
is
be
likely to
initiated
suit
it
tends to
operates
create
organizations
enforcement
survival. 84
terrorist
in.
In contrast to T,
the objectives of
risk',
Once
OC
is
to
law enforcement
likely to experience
group that
is
activities.
OC
This
in
search of financial
OC
a continuous pattern of
more vulnerable
OC
two non-state
country
hereafter
presence
continuity
efforts.
makes
Facing
an increasing threat to
felt,
its
OC
criminal
higher
'law
organizational
which
a more pressing and greater threat to the national security of the host nation(s). Given the
vaster resources and networks of
formed,
83
OC
it
model stands
84
OC,
Apprehension,
arrest,
It
thus constitutes a
many targets.
116
risk' that
criminal
It
it
is
probabilistic
the
most
likely one.
Increases Investigation/Efforts
Organized Crime
Law Enforcement
(OC)
(LE)
Poses increasing threat to
National Security
OC tries to saturate
LE
Option 2;
Option
Saturation through
Saturation through
orchestration of
increase of criminal
targeting for
terrorist activities
activities
easier
Pathl:
Path 2:
Own terrorist
efforts
Support existing
group
terrorist
LE
Organization
Saturates
increasingly
targeted by
LE
LE
LE tends to
concentrate on
Endangers own
more imminent
organization
threat (terrorist)
Figure 4-3.
117
Provides further
LE
is
OC
is
flourishing and thus poses an increasing threat to the national security of the affected
nation(s). In response,
law enforcement
its
likely situation,
hereafter
cannot but
in turn, trying to
target and
combat OC,
constitutes the
While
the
has shown,
Consequently,
OC
in
is likely
advanced
organizational survival
At
LE
this point
further evidence to
own
threat,
terrorist
would be
this
model,
at the
same time
become proactive
developed systems
when
is
favorable to LE.
would
lead to a saturation
however, provides
to be realistic. Option
its efforts,
in sight.
situation.
Thus,
itself offers
two
different tracks.
By
LE
easier. In turn,
For
OC
OC
is likely
this process,
to favor
activities.
following Path
1,
OC
would launch
group. Since terrorist acts constitute the more imminent and dangerous
increasingly targeted
survival of OC,
in
OC
were to follow
this path,
it
Following Path 2
Option
2,
OC
situation.
85
for subsequent
saturate LE.
2, the saturation
LE
in
Option 2
its
OC will try to
further increase
at least in
Option
significant threat,
compensate
industrial democracies,
is at risk,
through an increase
LE will
of
efforts to
of
LE
its
in
FSU
increase
efforts to
LE
LE in
of a
specific operation,
which
the context of this model is not a specific law enforcement agency of an affected nation or of a
group of affected nations, but any agency or conglomerate of agencies tasked to combat OC.
118
is
OC's (temporary)
tailored to suit
benefits
from
would be OC,
LE
objectives. 86
terrorist
terms of increased
at least
while
its
capabilities.
sponsorship of
remains a
-at least temporarily. This assumption remains realistic as long as the terrorist threat
kept
at
a high
level.
Any
WMD,
technology, including
OC
provided by
is
to the terrorist
organization in question, and the terrorist's determination and credibility to use this
power, would
in a
counter-terrorism effort,
OC
In conclusion, and
a second front,
is
most
LE
is in
its
a winning situation.
likely to saturate
would become
would be
between
in
such
OC
specific terrorist
battlefield,
About Alliances
3.
It
of imaginable
it
in existence
and the
on a more
abstract
likely to favor
initial
is
mere
groups
theoretical
evaluation of
86
87
For example a
and the
will to use
LE data banks.
WMD. A
single
thus would significantly increase the credibility of any organization that proclaims to be
in possession of
88
or a computer attack on
This approach does not negate the assumption of the previous section that under given circumstances
119
is likely to
remain the
Supply-Demand Relationships
a.
As
the
Colombian
example
already
supply-demand
shown,
has
relationships are an important factor that favors the formation and development
alliances
(T).
of
first
the Japanese
to approach
difficult to satisfy
legislature in
and
strictly
transnational connections,
Aum
Shinri
Whereas
pp. 167-73).
controlled
Kyo
weapons
it
should
weapons control
strict
to buy
weapons from
this cooperation,
from the
viewpoint of Japanese law enforcement, involves two domestic actors, similar relations
can
easily
fissile
occur on a transnational
material
Aum
level.
Shinri
from
goods
financial support are being traded for a specific service. In the case
narco-guerrilla connection,
OC,
in
the
initial
its activities
from
of the Colombian
phase of cooperation,
subsidized the
or
latter, at least
guerrillas in
temporarily,
OC to T.
In this case, the service did not require an immediate pay-back. Alliances
OC
when deemed
necessary by
this
OC
The example of
will provide a
the Colombian-
currently receives regular financial support in exchange for a promise to conduct terrorist
actions
on OC's
120
it
in the future. In
such a "sleeping
alliance",
OC
activities is not
taken. 89
b.
The
OC
is
in this
context
infancy, or in decline,
partnership
alliance to
is
is
is
in
state-sponsorship which in effect leads to T's decline and might endanger the survival of
the organization.
As
the
Mohammed
Assuming Hezbollah
desires to continue
its
Per
officials
Spiegel
struggle against
the "Great Satan", the strategic importance of its relationship with Colombian drug cartels
is likely
to increase.
it
has
become obvious
but most likely will remain determined by the lack of a coherent organizational structure
on the
side
likely to
89
Here
is
of the drug
traffickers.
Given
their organizational
that
T is not to
spoil operations of
121
OC.
is
Congruence of Motivation
The long-term
objectives of
OC
and
T may
differ significantly.
Whereas
seek radical change, T's long-term objectives often envisage a radical systemic change.
is
more complex.
most
survival, is to
Ethnic, religious,
common
maximize
the
profit,
socio-revolutionary,
responds. Surrogate warfare and the already mentioned redemptive single act are activities
which can also be linked to the imperatives stated above. Again, the example of the
OC
both partners
become
in this
that alliances
of convenience between
subject to dynamics
is
reached.
The
on
increase of
this kind
of
alliances.
is
The
profit; the
OC
and
an alliance between
duration of alliances.
tl
Temporary
Confluence of
acquisition
vs.
Long-Term Alliances
interests,
the
struggle
for
organizational
survival,
the
122
organizations are in competition, are factors that are likely to influence the duration of
OC-T
alliances.
As
is likely
similar to the
is
As long
argumentation
of Colombian
interest
operations,
it
is likely
US
due to
its
in the
it is
As
OC
and
itself.
The Colombian
situation,
likely
likely to
is
position to challenge
methods or expansion
know-how,
c:
Any
is
as,
so,
even
90
know-how
is
acquired the
initial
no longer operative.
Summary
alliance
between
OC
and
presumably
will
be influenced by more
no
if it could.
than one of the above mentioned factors. Unless one of the criminal organizations
clearly
in
is
would
narco-guerrilla connection
when
OC
and
guerrillas are
123
is
in a
likely to
be
complex
in nature.
more
T,
best.
Nevertheless,
religious/politically
indication of a
more
and
likely
connection
the
strategic pattern
Colombian
between
interests
of both,
OC
cartels
and
is
first
of cooperation.
Conclusions
4.
While the motives of terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations may
the strategies they adopt to achieve their objectives
differ,
alliances
to
perspective
saturate
organized crime
is
likely
at least in the
Whereas the
threat
posed by
more
but focus their efforts to combat the putative greater threat posed by terrorism. This
would
suit
objectives
organized criminal groups, since this situation provides for one of their major
Organized crime,
at least for
of global business
organizations
organizations
pattern.
it
it
is likely
its
favor. In the
begin merging
and
start
logical
working
jointly.
An
alliance
with terrorist
including
political force,
OC
and
T seems
level,
OC
124
terrorist
well.
is likely
OC
and
T on
as
the transnational
COUNTER STRATEGIES91
C.
in effect,
a borderless world.
Law
illicit
is still
for
them
Mere procedural
what
in
aspects which
come
is
tend to hamper progress that otherwise would have been possible. The international
community,
conflicts,
it
seems, preoccupied as
come
it
was with
new
globalization of transnational organized crime and terrorism. (Williams and Savona, 1996,
p.viii)
The World
Ministerial
Naples/Italy from 21 to 23
Conference,
November
1994,
sponsored
was
the
first
by
United
the
Nations
in
its
subsection focuses
prevention
its
recommendations,
pillars
that
lies
are
The
first
particularly
element
is
useful
in
of international cooperation.
It
that
underlines the
91
that
this
it
seems,
is
issue,
can
The following section follows predominantly Phil Williams and Ernesto Savona, (eds), The United
Nations and Transnational Organized Crime. Portland, Frank Cass & Co., 1996, a collection of
background papers that were prepared for the World Ministerial Conference on Transnational
Organized Crime.
92
Justice
125
Interior
from 142
states
demands a
transnational approach.
National Efforts
1.
combat
this
phenomenon.
Basic Concerns
a.
a time
when
accentuated,
measures
to the
efforts to secure
essential. 93
security
effective preventive
being
particularly
and control
cooperation to the benefit of criminal organizations. The absence of legal and regulatory
number of countries
transition.
Because of their
specific situation,
and
their
by a
large
and countries
in
future,
these countries are primarily targeted by criminal organizations. This underlines the urgent
need for a strengthened international cooperation and for assistance to those countries.
(Williams and Savona, 1996, p.75)
While a
significant
implementing substantive
93
legislation,
in
Preventive measures are measures pursued in order to reduce the opportunities for accumulating
profits
through
infiltration
illicit activities,
and
and governments
to
by organized crime.
Control measures are measures designed to weaken, disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations by
prosecuting and convicting their
through, or used
126
suitable to
legal
provisions,
successfully
as
the judicial
still
of objectives
essential. It
availability
of resources, which
all
turn makes
in
forms of crime
on which of
the most dangerous ones should be pursued, taking into account the limited resources
available. In a next step, efforts
The
overall success.
criteria for
difficulty
of
prioritizing objectives,
however
lies in
is
determining the
perceived as more
of a
The
level
It
street
of being
is
perceived as less threatening than other forms of crime. Consequently, in countries where
organized crime does not strike the public as being as violent or as damaging as
other countries,
it
to public opinion
may
may be
who
it
is
in
are sensitive
otherwise could have been used in the fight against organized crime. Furthermore, the
existence of a global-local nexus in relation to transnational organized crime
is
reality,
b.
Recommendations
in
would be considerably
127
the area of
power of
criminal organizations.
p. 76)
in
The improvement of
for self-
perpetuation;
The development of
'penetrate'
criminal
methods
investigative
that
make
interceptions
possible to
it
of
commu-
deliveries, the
protection of witnesses and victims, and the reward and protection for
The development of
seizing
and freezing
The measures
methods
investigative
illicit
profits.
and...
mechanisms aimed
at
p. 76)
and resources
if this
in
On the
The
limitation
128
A more
example
in
reporting
(Williams and
suspicious transaction.
Savona,
1996, p.77)
The
effort
is
integration
of these
strategies, policies
a challenging but promising answer on the national level to the increasing threat
International Cooperation
2.
As organized crime
response to
increasingly
must be transnational as
it
is
well.
last
to be a step ahead. Criminal organizations have proven to be not only highly sophisticated,
but also extremely adaptable in their efforts to exploit the existing gaps in the patterns of
cooperation.
intensified. (Williams
p.80)
a.
more
is
frequently in systematic
their activities.
consequence, organized criminal groups not only extend the reach of their
but also expand their capacity to
their capacity to exploit
licit
commerce
for concealment
make
it
inability
extremely
difficult for
move and
,
of their
illicit
In
markets,
organizations that
operate transnationally,
is
the
single
129
may
lead to a
Most
in
harm to the
little
which criminal
from a
safe
effective.
As
Williams
more
their activities to
and by
when
other countries
national countermeasures
of
efforts.
are
may be used
consequently
with organized
criminals,
The attempt
difficulties
and
it
is
same
mobility, the
same
ingenuity and innovation, and the same organizational flexibility as their antagonists.
Consequently,
homogeneous
officials
bilateral
to
and
multilateral
legal
this
mechanisms
will
have
to
be
more
to display the same mobility and efficiency as the criminals they pursue. (Williams
p. 82)
b.
In spite
matter of national jurisdiction and a main expression of national sovereignty. The key
assumption
in
this
context
is
that
given
state
recognizes
monopoly of the
130
no higher
legal
and
who
its
own
law.
Even
mean
that
another
if
sovereign entity has good reason for prosecution, states are often reluctant to extradite
their
in
own
Even
such a situation,
organization in
home
its
important factor
in
may provoke
this act
a state
is
willing to extradite
violent opposition
more
their ability
between
likely to further
states
becomes an
citizens
its
terms of
if
human
difficult
far,
law enforcement
threat
political
priority. (Williams
p. 84)
states.
These differences
in the effectiveness
of
systems are in turn the weaknesses which organized crime awaits to exploit.
is
the premise
how
based. (Williams
p. 85)
The
question,"...
is
to control
on cooperation pose
political,
when
is
the
ignore
if
nations recognize that continued preoccupation with the symbolism of maintaining national
sovereignty in law enforcement efforts can lead to the opposite, a situation where
sovereignty
is
systematically undermined
131
make
Savona, 1996,
some nominal
sacrifices
much more
effective. (Williams
As
and
86)
levels
of sovereignty are
in several different
ways.
It
can be
bilateral
bilateral
and multilateral
at several different
in scope,
and
it
can
bilateral
cooperation between extremely unequal powers can lead to rejection or become unpopular
in the
weaker
multilateral
state.
'variable
it
bilaterally. In
may be more
web
more comprehensive
activities.
To
eroded, encouraging
new
initiatives.
be
p. 87)
at the
expense of
all
other goals, particularly not at the expense of the integrity and effectiveness of national
investigations.
It
and a
p. 90)
it
of
facilitating
One approach
is
to this problem
not simply a
is
to assign a
132
efforts, including
p. 90)
The process of
need not to begin
at
ground zero.
NATO,
It
crime. 94
According to the 'Discussion Guide for the Ninth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders' cooperation should mobilize, pool
and
and
centers,
facilities
such as training
operational compatibility
on a global
scale." (Williams
While law enforcement should not become an exclusive task for the
report
on
"DOD
own
military, the
in national roles
DOD
could respond to
in its
organization.
Transnational threats
demand a
unconventional solutions should not be neglected. This would limit future options and
likely to
work
in favor
who
is
d
Any
Recommendations
kind of cooperation and counter-strategy ultimately will depend upon
human and
control and prevent transnational organized crime. This in turn requires recognition of the
94
international cooperation
'resource',
however,
133
is
Command,
the a
efforts.
Control, and
Communication
in
threat
in
ministries
of justice or the
interior.
What
is
in the following
areas:
Training
Information-sharing
and
of law
exchange
and
enforcement
criminal
justice
personnel;
among
relevant agencies;
such counter
measures;
Clear
identification
of coordinating
authorities
in
the
individual
countries;
Effective
coordination
of
activities
the
at
bilateral,
p.
regional
and
104)
scale.
be met with a transnational response. The internal security of an affected nation no longer
ends where the sovereignty of
transnational
this
very nation
starts.
134
combat the
a transnational dimension.
In the attempt to
of any
thus requires
V.
"This isn
't
a new problem,
CONCLUSIONS
it is
zealots with
a few
sticks
and technology..
"
.
A.
MAJOR FINDINGS
The
1.
As
the analysis has shown, terrorists of the past followed identifiable patterns in
their choice
terrorist
Terrorists
of tactics and targets Bombs and guns were the favorite tools of
bombs
that
traditional
While the
number of
total
As
risen. Terrorists
the military
it
Factors that influence and cause terrorism are most complex and are likely to
become more
so.
activities,
is in
decline,
task.
The
number of
terms and
cults, sects
in apocalyptic
95
in.
increasing
Terrorists, organized
The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force, POD Responses to
Volume I Final Report. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For
Acquisition & Technology, Washington DC, October 1997, p. 1.
Quoted
in:
Transnational Threats:
135
feel
crime, fanatical single issue groups, and even individuals are able to muster
As
WMD
seem to
fit
the
know-how and
subway attack
in
more
lethality.
difficult.
targeting and
In addition, the
old-fashioned type of terrorist has adapted, grown, and learned. Technology has proven to
be a double-edged sword.
benefit for
New
which
is
likely to
be exploited by
societies
terrorists
and
terrorist
and criminals as
well.
new
new
2.
WMD.
The Criminals
its
different
responses by the legitimate structures to the presence of the former. The weakness of the
legitimate structures accounted for the latent readiness to negotiate with entities outside of
the dominant system. In the end, economic inefficiencies led to the rapid decline of the
Soviet regime, and organized crime
The
political
became a dominant
force.
force that undermines the political as well as the economic stability of Russia and threatens
its
continued progress towards democracy and market economics. The collusion between
represents a
it
led
in
more than 44
countries
worldwide. Several of the larger organizations are already cooperating with other mafia
136
Italian Mafia.
As
criminal
extend internationally.
Since 1991 Europe and the U.S. have already witnessed a significant increase in
Russian organized crime. According to the FBI, Russian syndicates conduct the most
Moody, who
is
FBI
until
retiring
what
is
make
as
Deputy Assistant
Russian
of Russia's
military-industrial
Whereas
significant threat.
activities
encompass
vistas
to
the
an already
among
in
ruthless terrorist groups, Russia's southern tier could easily develop into a transit
An
proliferators.
armed
forces, caused
by economic
hardships and low morale, makes the access to willing insiders easier. This development
not only encourages nuclear proliferation, but also enables organized crime groups to
obtain nearly every
era. In
American
96
soil
According
Relations,
weapon of mass
destruction
137
on
do
so, at least
criminal
state,
itself.
When
threatened by
law enforcement, however, these criminal groups tend to respond with every means
available.
The
3.
As
Narcoterrorists
As
modern
new
alliance has
criminal wings
on
Of greater
concern
in the transnational
context
is
is likely
to provide
As
mid-term
common
goal of saturating law enforcement agencies. Thus, evidence exists that under specific
may
remain dominant, or
if the partners in
territory or business.
4.
The
Alliances
the existing
power
it
tends to direct
138
of corruption of public
officials
aimed
at
terrorist
quo
or the international
to pursue
level. If
normally do so for
simply
Terrorist organizations,
in terror
more
effectively their
aims and objectives. Despite this fundamental difference between the means and ends of
criminal and terrorist organizations, there
may be
factors
First,
tactics.
Having a
more conducive
criminal
single goal in
common,
As
political ends.
A third
is
it
difficult.
organized crime
still
seem
war
era, international
As
seem
likely to
government
source of funds.
Finally,
technological
the
theft
know-how through
material or even
weapons and
more
difficult.
of biological
make
or
chemical
weapons,
the
availability
of
its
WMD-
security
139
in
nuclear
While the motives of terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations may
differ,
the strategies they adopt to achieve their objectives seem to converge. Linkages and
alliances
law
enforcement agencies.
Whereas the
activities are
threat
perceived as
more
Thus law
is
their efforts
one of
their
a more
major objectives
between Colombian
is
cartels
first
Organized crime,
and
religious/politically
indication of a
with
established
terrorist organizations
behavioral
more
seems more
best.
strategic pattern
of cooperation.
pattern.
it
Together
logical
technology
with
than the
likely
alliances
its
favor.
An
consequence of an already
and
weapons
including
structures.
The Counter-Strategies
5.
when
efforts to secure
lack
of such measures
effective preventive
140
being accentuated,
As organized crime
it,
if
it
is
increasingly
to be effective, should be
is
transnational as well. Criminal organizations in the past have proven to be not only highly
sophisticated, but also extremely adaptable in their efforts to exploit the existing gaps in
the patterns of cooperation. Against this background, the international cooperation that
As
stronger and
more
is
frequently in systematic
its
activities.
consequence, organized criminal organizations not only extend the reach of their
markets, but also expand their capacity to
mobility, their capacity to exploit
licit
for concealment
of
illicit
Their enhanced
commerce
In
their activities,
and
the use of the global banking system to accumulate, move, and launder the revenues of
their crimes,
make
it
extremely
difficult for
this
threat.
This challenge,
it
if
would support
commands
this
sacrifices
much more
approach
is
in
law enforcement
of sovereignty are
effective.
likely to
The process of
NATO,
make
creating
as a security
its
disposal that
Any
upon
the will
and prevent transnational organized crime. Considering the grave threat transnational
organized crime poses to world security, the international community must begin to
141
scale.
security
starts.
In the attempt to
this
The
internal
very nation
The Outlook
6.
It is
the strong believe of this author that the emergence of alliances between
it
is
will
no longer a question of
going to happen.
It is
happen.
if it's
in this direction.
For law enforcement agencies the conclusion should be that preemptive search
patterns and investigations should consider the possibility of linkages between these
criminal organizations.
legislative
threat for
Combating
and
measures, as well as the will of the respective decision makers to treat this
what
it
is
security
Since freedom and liberty never have been a given, but often enough were the
result
B.
efforts.
FUTURE RESEARCH
The challenge
cooperation,
is
that is
rivalry
legislative aspects
142
itself.
and/or
organizational
structures
in
future
counter-strategies
against
forces
could
143
144
LIST
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Monterey, California 93943-5101
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