EU Euroculture

M
a
r
t
i
n

T
a
m
c
k
e
,

J
a
n
n
y

d
e

J
o
n
g
,

L
a
r
s

K
l
e
i
n
,

M
a
r
g
r
i
e
t

v
a
n

d
e
r

W
a
a
l

(
E
d
s
.
)

E
u
r
o
p
e

-
S
p
a
c
e

f
o
r

T
r
a
n
s
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l

E
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
?

Universittsverlag Gttingen Universittsverlag Gttingen
E
urope - Space for Transcultural Existence? is the frst volume of the new se-
ries, Studies in Euroculture, published by Gttingen University Press. The se-
ries derives its name from the Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence Euroculture:
Europe in the Wider World, a two year programme offered by a consortium of
eight European universities in collaboration with four partner universities outside
Europe. This master highlights regional, national and supranational dimensions of
the European democratic development; mobility, migration and inter-, multi- and
transculturality. The impact of culture is understood as an element of political and
social development within Europe.
The articles published here explore the feld of Euroculture in its different ele-
ments: it includes topics such as cosmopolitanism, cultural memory and trau-
matic past(s), colonial heritage, democratization and Europeanization as well as
the concept of (European) identity in various disciplinary contexts such as law
and the social sciences. In which way have Europeanization and Globalization in-
fuenced life in Europe more specifcally? To what extent have people in Europe
turned transcultural? The trans is understood as indicator of an overlapping
mix of cultures that does not allow for the construction of sharp differentiations.
It is explored in topics such as (im)migration and integration, as well as cultural
products and lifestyle.
The present economic crisis and debt crisis have led, as side-result, to a public at-
tack on the open, cosmopolitan outlook of Europe. The values of the multicultural
and civil society and the idea of a peoples Europe have become debatable. This
volume offers food for thought and critical refection.
ISBN: 978-3-86395-062-0
ISSN: 2196-3851
Europe - Space for
Transcultural Existence?
Edited by Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong
Lars Klein, Margriet van der Waal
Studies in Euroculture, Volume 1
1

Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong, Lars Klein, Margriet van der Waal (Eds.)
Europe Space for Transcultural Existence?

This work is licensed under the
Creative Commons License 3.0 by-nd,
allowing you to download, distribute and print the
document in a few copies for private or educational
use, given that the document stays unchanged
and the creator is mentioned.

Published in 2013 by the Universittsverlag Gttingen
as Volume 1 in the Series Studies in Euroculture

Europe Space for

Edited by
Martin Tamcke,
Janny de Jong, Lars Klein,
Margriet van der Waal

With contributions from
Asier Altuna-Garca de Salazar, Bill Bell,
Paul Blokker, Marcin Galent, Elizabeth M.
Goering, Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz, Janny de
Jong, Lars Klein, Alexandre Kostka, Anna Pia de
Luca, John McCormick, Pter Ndas, Mara Pilar
Rodrguez, Bianca Polo Del Vecchio, Grzegorz
Poarlik, Katharina Raabe, Sascha Schiel, Richard
Swartz, Martin Tamcke, Bassam Tibi, Herman
Voogsgeerd, and Margriet van der Waal

Studies in Euroculture
Volume 1

Universittsverlag Gttingen
2013
Bibliographische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliographische Daten sind im Internet ber
<http://dnb.ddb.de> abrufbar.

Studies in Euroculture Series Editors
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Martin Tamcke, Georg-August-Universitt Gttingen;
Dr. Janny de Jong, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen;
Dr. Lars Klein, Georg-August-Universitt Gttingen;
Dr. Margriet van der Waal, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

Editors of Volume 1
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Martin Tamcke, Georg-August-Universitt Gttingen;
Dr. Janny de Jong, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen;
Dr. Lars Klein, Georg-August-Universitt Gttingen;
Dr. Margriet van der Waal, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

This work is protected by German Intellectual Property Right Law.
It is also available as an Open Access version through the publishers homepage and
the Online Catalogue of the State and University Library of Goettingen
(http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de). Users of the free online version are invited to
read, download and distribute it. Users may also print a small number for educational
or private use.

Redaktion: Jrg Zgel
Umschlaggestaltung: Margo Bargheer
Titelabbildung: iStockphoto, File #17095396

2013 Universittsverlag Gttingen
http://univerlag.uni-goettingen.de
ISBN: 978-3-86395-062-0
ISSN: 2196-3851

Table of Contents

Martin Tamcke / Janny de Jong / Lars Klein / Margriet van der Waal
Introduction 9

1. European Identities

Pter Ndas / Richard Swartz / Katharina Raabe
Europa im Zwiegesprch 21

Bassam Tibi
European Identity Contested? 47

Lars Klein
How (Not) to Fix European Identity? 57

John McCormick
Cosmopolitanism and European Identity 67

Grzegorz Poarlik
Individual, Collective, Social
Identity as (Most) Contested Social Science Concept in the Symbolic
Interactionism Perspective 77

2. Postcolonial Europe

Bill Bell
Zeichen als Wunder?
Eine der Geschichte entnommene Anekdote 89

Europe Space for Transcultural Existence? 6
Janny de Jong
Empire at Home 117

Contesting Cultural Memory.
Rethinking Postcolonial Identities in Europe 125

Elizabeth M. Goering
Entering the Third Dimension.
A CMM (Coordinated Management of Meaning)
Analysis of Transculturalism in Inter/Action 133

3. Towards a Transcultural Europe?

Martin Tamcke
On the Path to Transculturality 143

Janny de Jong
Here We Go Again.
The Supposed Failure of Multiculturalism in Historical Perspective 151

John McCormick
European Multiculturalism.
Is It Really Dead? 163

Mara Pilar Rodrguez
Multiculturalism vs Transculturality.
European Film 175

Asier Altuna-Garca de Salazar
Envisaging Transcultural Realities through Literature in Europe.
The Case of Ireland 185

Anna Pia de Luca
Transcultural Encounters in Re-Inscribing Identity.
European Memories and Ethnic Writing in Canada 195

Marcin Galent
Social Capital of Migrants in Transcultural Europe 207

Table of Contents 7
Alexandre Kostka
The Neustadt in Strasbourg.
A space for Transcultural Identity Building? 217

4. The Role of the State

Paul Blokker
Multiple Democracies.
A Cultural-Sociological Approach to
Democratization and Europeanization 235

Herman Voogsgeerd
The European Court of Justice between Cosmopolitanism and
National Identity 243

Bianca Polo Del Vecchio
The United Kingdom and the European Union.
The Shaping of Public Opinion 251

Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz
From a Traumatic Past to a Constructive Future.
The Spanish Transition Period as a Case Study 261

Sascha Schiel
Identity, Memory, and Belonging. The Friedland Transit Camp
and the Process of Admission to Post-War Germany 271

Aknowledgements 285

About the Contributors 287

Introduction
Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong, Lars Klein and Margriet van der Waal
This book is the joint publication of two international scientific conferences that
took place from 18-19 June 2010 at the University of Groningen, the Netherlands,
and from 24-25 June 2011 at the University of Gttingen, Germany. Both confer-
ences were closely related to the Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence Eurocul-
ture: Europe in the Wider World, a two year (120 ECTS) programme offered by a
consortium of eight European universities in collaboration with four partner uni-
versities outside Europe.
The Master programme uses the term Euroculture as a concept to reflect in an
interdisciplinary way on the many different expressions and manifestations of self-
understandings of societies, social groups and individuals of, about and within
Europe. The programme includes knowledge of historical perspectives, political
issues, social relations, legal issues and cultural and religious traditions. Discussions
on cultural identity take a prominent position in the programme as do issues such
as transnational cultural contacts, popular culture and the role and function of the
media in shaping social processes.
Therefore, the first scientific conference associated with the programme had
the explicit intention to explore the impact of culture as an element of political and
social development within Europe. As was stated in the call for papers:

The term Euroculture offers great advantages as a label for a study pro-
gramme and poses exciting challenges as a conceptual research tool. Cross-
over and interdisciplinary research include attempts to link political concepts
such as Europeanisation with cultural ones such as identity. The concept of
citizenship has (in this) become a central focal point.

The participants to this first conference discussed topics such as cosmopolitanism,
cultural memory and traumatic past(s), colonial heritage, democratization and Eu-
ropeanization as well as the concept of (European) identity in various disciplinary
contexts such as law and the social sciences.
The second conference continued where the one in Groningen left off by ask-
ing more specifically in which way Europeanization and globalization have influ-
enced life in Europe. It has become a truism that in todays world all countries and
cultures have become interconnected and been influencing each other constantly.
But what does that mean exactly? To follow up on this question further, the sec-
ond conference inquired whether people have turned transcultural. The trans
was understood as indicator of an overlapping mix of cultures that does not allow
for the construction of sharp differentiations anymore. Wolfgang Welschs distinc-
tion of intercultural, multicultural and transcultural has thus been a recurring
theme during the conference.
1
While in Welschs view transculturalism entails an
appreciation of diverse influences, it is in no way a given that indeed these influ-
ences constitute positive enrichments rather than a dissolution and watering down
of traditional and cherished understandings of culture.
By investigating a Space for Transcultural Existence, the conference put a
special emphasis on topics such as (im)migration and integration, as well as cultural
products and lifestyle. Most contributions turned out to examine the receiving end,
rather than that of the senders, in the spread of Europeanization and globalization.
Others asked how these processes are organized and which role the state and other
institutions or companies play or could play.
The usage of space, finally, underlines the openness of the procedures and
structures. It is thus more than a geographical category, it is also a social concept.
According to Homi Bhabha, in creating and discussing culture, communication
and exchange processes provide for a constant change in all original perspectives.
2

So that in effect, there is neither the one nor the other anymore. Any bipolar un-
derstanding is overcome and a third space, an in-between created. Whether or
not that is the case, was what many contributors aimed to find out. The call for
papers posed the following questions:

Is there space for more than one culture in oneself, or can it be that peo-
ple are afraid of challenging the very core of their identity? Does transcultur-
ality stand in competition to multicultural or intercultural approaches, or is it
of supplementary nature? This leads to more general understandings of cul-
ture and to questions of inner homogeneity and outer delimitation. Here,
one could reflect, for example, on increasing extremist nationalism, separa-
tism and ghettoization.

Sections
For this publication, we have decided not to maintain the ordering of the contribu-
tions according to the original conferences, but rather to follow thematic threads
that run through the various contributions. These threads form the basis of the
section description below.

1
Wolfgang Welsch, Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today, in Spaces of Culture:
City, Nation, Work, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1999), 194-213.
2
Homi K. Bhabha, The Postcolonial and the Postmodern. The Question of Agency, in The Location
of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 171-197.
Introduction 11
Section 1: European Identities
Section one on European identities opens with a conversation between the Hun-
garian writer Pter Ndas and the Swedish journalist and writer Richard Swartz.
Ndas and Swartz had met in 1989 for a long discussion on their life and work in a
changing Europe, which was subsequently published as a book. For the conference
in Gttingen, they had been asked to resume their discussion. Moderated by
Katharina Raabe and co-hosted by the Literarische Zentrum, the two paint a rather
dark picture of Europe today. Ndas senses a failure to come to an understanding
of Easterners and Westerners. Swartz argues that although the division has
historical roots, a better mutual understanding can only be achieved on the basis of
historical knowledge. This kind of freedom feels cold, as Ndas puts it.
In his contribution, the international relations scholar Bassam Tibi argues for
an understanding of identity that is based on cultural diversity. As in his definition
of Leitkultur that Tibi had coined in earlier writings for the German context, he
formulates an idea of cultural diversity that is conditioned by consent to the core
values civil society, freedom of belief and gender equality. For Tibi, identity has
many dimensions. He names individual identity, professional identity, citizenship
identity, as well as civilisational identity. Tibi perceives himself as part of two civili-
zations, Islam and Europe, so that with regard to both identifications identities, he
finds himself in a constant struggle for harmonization.
The political scientist John McCormick examines European identity in its cos-
mopolitan dimensions. In his contribution, he holds that the cosmopolitan quali-
ties of the EU have only been discussed theoretically, but they can be grasped in
the realities of the European experience. Here, McCormick points to European
understandings of patriotism and multilateralism, on which he further elaborates in
his text. A cosmopolitan approach in the latter case shows, according to the au-
thor, a turn away from a European exceptionalism or Europes self-doubt about
its power. With regard to the concept of patriotism, McCormick refers to Ha-
bermas concept of constitutional patriotism, which he considers applicable to the
European level. Whether or not it would be better to leave the meaning of Euro-
pean identity open for debate, is a question he concludes his article with.
This question is elaborated on by the cultural historian Lars Klein in his con-
tribution. He traces some attempts that have been undertaken to come to a com-
mon understanding of a European identity. For the author, neither an attempt to
define the EU against an other (such as the United States of America) nor an
attempt to define a set of common values haven proven to be a solid and inclusive
basis for the EU. He holds that the ongoing souvereign debt crisis was further
delimited this basis and suggests an open and always changing, always to-be-
negotiated understanding of Europeanness.
The section closes with political sociologist Grzegorz Poarliks discussion of
the challenge to maintain the use of identity as a useful concept in the social sci-
ences. In the first part of his contribution, the author explains that a conceptual
road map is required to ensure the use of this concept and he therefore intro-
duces the notion of symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionism is, as such a
concept, capable of bringing together individual and collective aspects of identity
formation, by emphasising the social dimensions of this process, influenced by the
flux and dynamic character of current society. In the second part of his paper,
Poarlik turns his focus to a number of recent studies, which indicate(s) the use-
fulness of applying the notion of symbolic interactionism to understanding pro-
cesses of identity formation in relation to social processes such as migration and
professional mobility within a European context.
Section 2: Postcolonial Europe
Section 2, on postcolonial Europe, opens with literature and history of the book
scholar Bill Bell launching a lucid and gripping myth busting engagement with
Homi Bhabhas influential article, Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Am-
bivalence and Authority under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817. By carefully re-
considering the historical evidence available about the anecdotal event describing
the assembling of a large group of Indians and the circulation of a number of cop-
ies of the Bible, Bell formulates caution with regard to a facile and uncritical use of
concepts such as hybridity, sly civility and mimicry. Bells paper shows that Bha-
bhas account clearly does not take the complexity of the historical facts and con-
text sufficiently or correctly in consideration and has too easily been inscribed in a
particular postcolonial critique of the relationship between Indians and the English
than the historical facts warrant. Bells account shows that the historical facts re-
veal not only a much more complex and multidimensional process, but also, and
even more importantly, the existence of specific human beings who become the
subjects of history. His conclusion, thus, echoes a warning to any project engaging
with social relationships across time: we should be careful not to write history out
of the subject, or the subject out of history.
Continuing with the lines of enquiry set out by Bill Bell, historian Janny de
Jong opens her paper on the relevance of studying colonial ties with the empire in
order to understand Europe and its relation with non-European countries by
stressing the longevity of imperial relations in the form of unequal power relations.
De Jong asks what benefit the discipline of history might experience from the
kinds of questions posed within the field of European Studies, by identifying two
key questions: To which extent does a common and unique European culture exist
in relation to non-European and regional cultures? Secondly, what are the percep-
tions within and from outside of Europe concerning cultural transformations in
Europe? Clearly, Eurocentrism plays a problematic role in endeavours to study
relations between Europe and its former colonies, as well as other areas of the
world. One way of dealing with this problematic Eurocentric attitude, is to direct
the gaze of inquiry about the effects of empire to European domestic history itself,
Introduction 13
in order to understand contemporary Europe with its multiplicity of cultural, social
and political dimensions.
It is exactly this idea of turning the gaze to the inside that is taken up in the
contribution by Margriet van der Waal, within the context of cultural studies. Her
paper considers collective memory and debates in a context where different expe-
riences of traumatic events are seemingly played out against each other in a strug-
gle for meaning and priority. The novel, Alleen Maar Nette Mensen (Only Decent
People), by Robert Vuijsje (published in 2008, and released as film in the Nether-
lands in October 2012), is such an occasion where the topics of Dutch colonialism
and slavery are brought into focus together with considerations of Jewish identity
and commemoration of the Holocaust. Van der Waal argues that the way in which
these issues are represented implies the existence of various, exclusive memory
cultures delineated along ethnic lines. Therefore, she explains, traumatic events
need to be investigated as semiotic sign systems constructing senses of cultural
identity, which in turn will allow a greater understanding of how constructions of
European identity are intertwined with such problematic issues as racism, trauma
and memory.
In the final contribution to this section, communication scholar Elizabeth
Goering contributes to the topic of the postcolonial in Europe with a critical re-
flection on the negative attitude towards the European multicultural society and
the possibility of transculturality by means of a case study. She analyses the social
and intercultural interaction between a school teacher and his/her pupils in the
French film, Entre les Murs (2008), with recourse to the coordinated management
of meaning method. In her conclusion she emphatically states that transcultural
spaces the location of multicultural interaction are possible, but admittedly
require arduous and continuous effort from the side of all (actors) involved. Such
effort entails being willing to share and listen in a context of respect and openness
to personal stories that we and others tell about ourselves and themselves. Within
such a context it does become episodically possible, as her analysis of the film
optimistically shows, to find evidence of the existence of transculturality within a
European context.
Section 3: Towards a Transcultural Europe?
All articles in this section were first presented at the 2011 Euroculture conference
in Gttingen and use the remark of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel that
multiculturalism has absolutely failed as a starting point. To what extent was her
statement correct, and if so, did or does it apply to Europe as a whole? What are
the underlying norms and values in todays Europe? At the time of the conference,
the British Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sar-
kozy had joined Merkels scepticism about the multicultural state and society which
made the problematising of this issue even more timely and up to date.
This section opens with a contribution, by ecumenics and oriental church historian
Martin Tamcke, on the path to transculturality. After giving the telling example
of two Muslim scholars in Bulgaria who converted to Christianity in the early
1900s and mingled Christian, Western ideas with Islamic reformatory speech and
in the process alienated themselves from both the Christian and the Muslim world,
he explores the various readings and explanations of transculturalism. Tamcke
defines transculturalism as a passage through all particularism and interaction
towards a common ground or aim. This does not mean by the way, that all cul-
tural differences are abandoned throughout this process.
The same holds true for multiculturalism, as Janny de Jong argues. Janny de
Jong and John McCormick both explicitly address the issue of multiculturalism,
and point to the difficulty of properly defining this concept. Contrary to how mul-
ticulturalism is depicted in the public debate, this idea/concept entails that integra-
tion of immigrants is possible without urging them to assimilate/copy norms, val-
ues and behaviour of the majority population. Taking a historical perspective into
consideration can be very helpful, De Jong argues, because it illuminates the roots
of the different integration policies throughout Europe. Furthermore it may serve
to create a more balanced view on migration through time, showing what multicul-
turalism was and really is about. Multiculturalism has become framed in public
debates as a (too) soft approach of problems related to immigration which stresses
the necessity of a more distanced perspective.
Proclaiming multiculturalism dead is absurd, John McCormick states, because
obviously all of Europe is distinctly multicultural and multinational in character.
Almost all European states consist of multiple cultures; within the European
member states there are no fewer than 160 national minorities. Although multicul-
turalism in the European context usually relates to immigrant communities, it is
more appropriately understood with regard to indigenous minorities. McCormick
argues that it has been very successful in that respect: Europe has recognized and
protected its cultural differences through, for instance, sustenance of minority
languages. However, it failed in accommodating racial and religious minorities, in
particular the postwar immigrants. The problems ascribed to the failure of multi-
culturalism therefore are in fact a function of race and religion.
In the next contribution the concepts of trans- and multiculturalism are ana-
lysed through the lenses of film and literature by cultural studies scholar Maria
Pilar Rodrguez, who shows how contemporary film directors address(ed) the shift
from national contexts to transnational surroundings, places and cultures. Two
films are discussed in more detail: InchAllah Dimanche (InchAllah Sunday by Yas-
mina Benguigui, 2001) and Gegen die Wand (Against the Wall by Fatih Akin, 2004).
These films show that cultural interaction results in new domestic and urban spac-
es, hybrid cultures and in multilingual practices. Contemporary life such as depict-
ed in these films is very different from official political discourses on multicultural-
ism.
Introduction 15
With Asier Altuna-Garca de Salazar, scholar of Irish literature, we turn to the
work of Roddy Doyle, Margaret McCarthy and Hugo Hamilton. Their works por-
tray a transcultural Irish reality in an Ireland whose society and economy has ob-
tained a global character. Doyles short story 57% Irish in particular shows the
lack of validity of former pillars of Irish identity; identity is not fixed but fluid.
Transculturalism, as Altuna writes, should be seen as a useful tool for the recogni-
tion of identity reformulation processes. What holds true for Ireland, also applies
to Europe at large.
Anna Pia de Luca, scholar of Canadian literature, shows how European mem-
ories, especially of second-generation writers, and Canadian experiences blend.
This is literally symbolized in the mixed grill dish that author Fred Wah makes in
his fathers restaurant as a symbol for a variegated cultural identity. Language and
doubleness form a recurrent pattern in literature, especially in the work of Gianna
Patriarca and Mary di Michele. But perhaps Janice Kulyk Keefer, who blends
Ukrainian family history with experiences in Canada, gives the clearest portrayal of
what Pia de Luca describes as the different selves that co-exist within a persons
variegated and constantly changing identity.
The sociologist Marcin Galent presents a study undertaken among Polish mi-
grants in the Belgian city of Leuven. His research into the scale and quality of the
social capital of these migrants allows Galent to further cluster this group. He dif-
ferentiates between residents, guests, commuters and diasporians, whose iden-
tity is influenced by their experiences and connections made in Leuven. In elabo-
rating on these ideal types, Galent also aims to contribute to a better understanding
of the conditions of the world in its transculturality and overlapping identities.
Alexandre Kostka, cultural historian, concludes this section with an analysis of
whether the Neustadt, an area within the inner city of Strasbourg, can be seen as a
space for transcultural identity building. The Neustadt was built between 1878 and
1918, a time when Alsace-Lorraine was part of the German Empire. Yet the build-
ings do not reflect a German patriotic or national character, making for instance
also use of French architectural styles. Kostka suggests that the architecture and
urban town planning of this part of Strasbourg can best be understood as a form
of histoire croise and the result of a continuous debate between many stakeholders
such as politicians, entrepreneurs and architects.

Section 4: The Role of the State
The fourth section, on the role of the State, is opened with the article Multiple
Democracies by the sociologist Paul Blokker. Blokker discusses the phenomena
of democratization and Europeanization with regard to its cultural-sociological
implications. Especially the cultural dimension is important to him, since, as he
holds, it is often overlooked in research on democratization. As he shows with
case studies from post-1989 East-Central Europe, political culture is of relevance
in particular with regard to the ethics of rights, of identity, of solidarity, and of
participation.
The second article, in turn, argues that the relevance of the judiciary for cultur-
al matters is easily underestimated. Herman Voogsgeerd, whose fields of expertise
are law as well as international relations, discusses the role of the European Court
of Justice as caught between cosmopolitanism and national identities. Building on
the premise that there is an interrelation between law and identity, Voogsgeerd
asks whether the ECJ has been promoting cosmopolitan values. This question is of
special importance beyond the more narrow fields of law, since, as the author ven-
tures, law may easily enter the domain of culture. Voogsgeerd underlines the
ECJs role in cases concerning the rights of migrants and free-movers and stresses
the necessity to remain sensitive for cultural pluralism.
The political sociologist Bianca Polo Del Vecchio analyses the relationship be-
tween the United Kingdom and the European Union. Del Vecchios premise is
that the goodness of fit of domestic institutions, policies and processes with
those of the EU may explain the Eurosceptic stance taken by many in the UK,
though not fully. In her contribution, she thus starts off by rationalising negative
public attitudes towards the EU. In her analysis, a strong national identity in Brit-
ain as well as the misfit of institutions and the absence of a public debate on Brit-
ains EU membership contribute to a situation in which even members of the EU
parliament do not dare to take a more pro-European stance.
The historian and political scientist Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz discusses the
Spanish transition period from the early 1970s onwards as a transition from a
traumatic past to a constructive Future. He challenges those views according to
which memories of the Spanish Civil War have not been dealt with and adequately
reassessed after Francos death. Instead, he holds that in dealing with the past,
traumatic events have been worked on in a manner that contributed to and was
supported by the incorporation of the country into the European Union. The
opening of new perspectives and working across national borders has thus, accord-
ing to Ibarrola-Armendariz, been fostered in this transition period.
The historian Sascha Schiel, in his article, Identity, Memory and Belonging,
analyses the function of the Friedland Transit Camp in Post-War Germany. He
highlights the importance of the camp as the most outstanding place in which
people were prepared for entering German society as German citizens. It is these
conditions and procedures of admission that Schiel analyses in more depths,
since they help to understand what was expected of refugees and expellees going
through Friedland and which idea of a German citizen was prevalent at the time.
Thus, Schiel aims at a better understanding of identity, memory and public com-
memoration.

The contributions all analyse very important aspects of current developments in
Europe. The importance of this can hardly be underestimated and understated.
The present economic crisis and debt crisis have led, as side-result, to a public
Introduction 17
attack on the open, cosmopolitan outlook of Europe. The values of the multicul-
tural and civil society and the idea of a peoples Europe have become debatable.
The editors are convinced that in this respect the contributions in this volume will
offer food for thought and critical reflection.

Part One
European Identities

Europa im Zwiegesprch
Pter Ndas und Richard Swartz im Gesprch mit Katharina Raabe
1

Raabe:
Pter Ndas und Richard Swartz haben sich berreden lassen, hierher nach Gt-
tingen zu kommen und einen Abend lang ihr Gesprch wieder aufzunehmen, das
sie an vier Tagen im Jahr 1989 gefhrt haben. Sie werden versuchen, ihre damali-
gen Gedanken und Beobachtungen im Lichte der Dinge, die seit damals passiert
sind, zu reflektieren.
Bei den unzhligen Veranstaltungen zum 20. Jahrestag der Ereignisse von 1989
gab es hufig Gelegenheit, auf diversen Podien Rckschau zu halten und Einscht-
zungen abzugeben. Was aber nicht stattfand, das war die Besichtigung eines ver-
gangenen Zeitalters aus der Perspektive zweier Schriftsteller und Intellektueller, die
sich schon einmal, vor der epochalen Wende, wenige Monate vor dem Herbst
1989, ber sich selbst unterhalten haben, wie Freunde das tun, in einer gewissen
brderlichen Vertrautheit sich von ihrer Kindheit, ihrer Herkunft erzhlt und dabei
auch ein bisschen ineinander gespiegelt haben. Dass dies so ein ingeniser Versuch
war, hngt mageblich mit dem Autor des Buches zusammen, das dann auf
Deutsch unter dem Titel Zwiesprache erschien, nmlich mit Pter Ndas, der
dem Leser, jedenfalls zu Anfang, als Initiator vorkommen wird.
2
Er ist es, der sei-
nen Freund Richard Swartz, den Westmenschen aus Schweden, einem peripheren
europischen Land, in die Mangel nimmt und befragt.
Pter Ndas wurde 1942 geboren. Er ist ausgebildeter Fotograf, arbeitete kurze
Zeit als Journalist, genauer als Fotoreporter, und debtierte 1967 mit einem Band
erzhlender Prosa. 1977 erschien Ende eines Familienromans, gleichsam der groe
Anlauf zu seinem Werk Buch der Erinnerung
3
, das 1986 in Ungarn und 1991 in
Deutschland erschien und das viele Leser damals in ein geradezu schreckstarres
Erstaunen versetzt hat: Das Neue und berwltigende an diesem Buch war der
radikale, fast ins Vivisektorische gehende Versuch, die intimsten Regungen eines
empfindenden Subjekts, die verborgenen Zentren seines Ich als Austragungsort

1
Am 23.06.2011 in der Paulinerkirche Gttingen auf Einladung des Euroculture-Programms, des
European Studies Intensive Programmes und des Literarischen Zentrums Gttingen.
2
Pter Ndas / Richard Swartz, Zwiesprache. Vier Tage im Jahr 1989 (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt,
1994).
3
Pter Ndas, Buch der Erinnerung (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1992).
von gesellschaftlicher Repression zu beschreiben. Hier wird von den Verstrungen
einer Kindheit gesprochen, aber auch von der Sinnlichkeit, von der Sehnsucht
nach dem Anderen und der Verschmelzung mit ihm, von einem Begehren, dem
die frhe Erfahrung von Tod und Verlust eingebrannt ist. Das komplexe Werk
verknpft drei Erzhlstrnge: einen Entwicklungsroman aus dem Ungarn der 50er
Jahre, eine Erzhlung ber einen Schriftsteller, der, quasi wie ein Bruder von
Thomas Mann, um 1900 im Ostseebad Heiligendamm seine Homosexualitt ent-
deckt, und eine homoerotische Liebesgeschichte im Ost-Berlin der 70er Jahre. Die
markanten Ereignisse jener Zeit, das Jahr 1953, Stalins Tod, Arbeiteraufstand in
Ost-Berlin, der Aufstand in Budapest 1956, die Niederschlagung des Prager Frh-
lings all das bleibt im Hintergrund und ist doch im Textgewebe anwesend. Ndas
wollte, wie er sagte, die unpersnliche Geschichte auf die persnlichste Weise
aufarbeiten und rckte deshalb den Krper ins Zentrum der existentiellen Selbst-
erforschung. Pter Ndas ist ein Autor mit der seltenen Fhigkeit, aus den Details
des Ephemeren, der flchtigen Wahrnehmungen, der kaum an die Schwelle des
Bewutseins gehobenen Empfindung, Bilder einer Epoche aufzubauen. Er ist ein
Minimalist und Sensualist, er erforscht die labyrinthischen Verzweigungen und die
Brche und Schocks der Geschichte genauso mikroskopisch wie das gewaltige und
zarte Gebilde: die menschliche Seele.
Als Motto ber dem Buch der Erinnerung stand der Satz: Es war meine
Absicht, Geschichten zu erzhlen, ein wenig wie Plutarch, parallele Erinnerungen
verschiedener Personen zu verschiedenen Zeiten, und die verschiedenen Personen
wren naturgem alle ich, ohne dass ich es wirklich wre.
4
2005 erschienen, nach
achtzehnjhriger Arbeit, die also unmittelbar nach dem Ende des Buchs der Erin-
nerung begonnen haben muss, die Parallelgeschichten
5
, ein nochmals umfang-
reicheres Werk, ebenfalls Geschichten aus dem 20. Jahrhundert, in dem die paralle-
len Geschichten zwischen einer ungarischen und einer deutschen Familie, entlang
noch weit dramatischerer Bruchlinien erzhlt wird.
Pter Ndas hat sich seit der Wende immer wieder mit scharfsinnigen Reden
und Essays zum politischen Geschehen zu Wort gemeldet hat. Ich erinnere nur an
den groen Kursbuch-Aufsatz Armer Sascha Anderson
6
ber den Verrat eines
Schriftstellers an seine Kollegen.
Richard Swartz wurde 1945 in Stockholm geboren, studierte an der dortigen
Handelsakademie und ging 1970 bis 1972 an die Karls-Universitt nach Prag. Er
promovierte und arbeitete dreiig Jahre lang als Korrespondent des Svenska Dag-
bladet, seit 1976 von Wien aus. Whrend die meisten Korrespondenten irgend-
wann ihre Felder wechselten, nach Paris, damals noch nach Bonn, nach Washing-
ton, nach Moskau gingen, blieb Richard Swartz Ostmitteluropa treu und verfgt

4
Ndas, Buch der Erinnerung, 6.
5
Pter Ndas, Parallelgeschichten (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2012).
6
Pter Ndas, Armer Sascha Anderson, Kursbuch 108 (Juli 1992): 163-88.
deshalb ber eine sehr seltene, lange Epochenerfahrung. hnlich wie Pter Ndas
mit seinem Buch der Erinnerung war auch Richard Swartz mit einem einzigen
Buch pltzlich da: Room Service
7
, dieser zu Recht international stark wahrge-
nommene Band von Reportagen, Berichten und Erzhlungen hat einem ahnungs-
losen Publikum das unbekannte, kaum beleuchtete, in Dunkel und Verfall dahinle-
benden osteuropischen Gelnde nahegebracht. Richard Swartz hat entlegene,
unbequeme Orte, besucht. Er hat den Bericht eines alten Synagogenkantors aufge-
zeichnet, dessen Worte es ohne ihn, Richard, in der Welt jetzt nicht mehr gbe. Er
hat nach der Revolution, nach der Erschieung des Ehepaars Ceauescu, mit den
Revolutionren Rumniens gesprochen. Und er gehrt, vielleicht wie Karl Schlgel
und Martin Pollack, wie Claudio Magris und Timothy Garton Ash, zu denjenigen,
ohne die wir sehr viel weniger ber die sogenannte andere Hlfte Europas wssten.
In der Zwiesprache heit es: Meine ganze Existenz ist darauf begrndet, dass
ich mich mit einer Welt beschftige, die nicht die meine ist, auch wenn sie mir sehr
nahe steht.
8

Die Welt, ber die diese beiden im Frhjahr 1989 in Ungarn reden, war damals
tatschlich noch eine geteilte Welt. Wie sieht diese Welt heute aus? Was htten Sie
sich zu sagen, wenn Sie Ihr damaliges Gesprch heute wiederholen wrden? Wann
haben Sie berhaupt zum letzten Mal miteinander gesprochen? Wann haben Sie
sich das letzte Mal gesehen?
Swartz:
Pter lebt in Gombosszeg und ich lebe in Wien, das heit, wir begegnen uns nicht
sehr hufig. Das letzte Mal, dass wir uns getroffen haben, war unter merkwrdigen
Umstnden: Pter erschien mir in einem Traum mit schnem Gesicht und buschi-
gen Augenbrauen. Er erzhlte mir, Kardinal Richelieu habe an Seelenwanderung
geglaubt. Ich war skeptisch, denn das klingt nicht sehr katholisch, eher blasphe-
misch. Aber Pter insistierte, dass Richelieu auf seinem Sterbebett sogar angefan-
gen habe, Heu zu essen, weil er berzeugt gewesen sei, in seinem nchsten Leben
ein Pferd zu sein. Das habe ich dir nicht geglaubt, Pter, aber ich glaube oft nicht,
was du mir erzhlst.
Ndas:
Ja, das ist unser groes Problem, obwohl ich natrlich immer die Wahrheit sage, er
glaubt mir nie.

7
Richard Swartz, Room Service. Geschichten aus Europas Nahem Osten (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn,
1996).
8
Ndas / Swartz, Zwiesprache, 192.
Swartz:
Das mag stimmen, traf in diesem Fall aber sicher nicht zu. Unser letztes wirkliches
Treffen war vor anderthalb Jahren. Ich bin zu Pter nach Gombosszeg gereist, um
etwas ber Ungarn zu erfahren.
Raabe:
Pter Ndas hatte Sie von Anfang an im Verdacht, nicht einfach nur Journalist zu
sein. In Ihnen stecke eigentlich ein Schriftsteller.
Swartz:
Das klingt etwas abfllig gegenber Journalisten.
Ndas:
Ich meinte damit lediglich, dass Richards Schilderungen die Grenzen des Journa-
lismus berschreiten. Das beginnt schon mit den Fragen, die er stellt, denn sie
zielen nicht einfach auf Antworten ab, sondern ermuntern die Gesprchspartner
zum richtigen Erzhlen. Dieser Wunsch, Hintergrnde auszuleuchten, ist kein
typischer Charakterzug von Journalisten, das geht ber die bloe journalistische
Neugier weit hinaus. Das hat mich davon berzeugt, dass Richard selbst eine Nei-
gung zum Erzhlen hat. Ich habe mich darin auch nicht getuscht. Er hat in der
Tat im Laufe der Zeit angefangen, seine eigenen Erzhlungen zu verffentlichen.
Diese Erzhlungen sind unglaublich fein und sehr tiefgehend, zeugen also von
einer groen Erfahrung.
Swartz:
Sie sehen, wie sanft wir miteinander umgehen?
Ndas:
Sei ruhig, es wird hrter.
Raabe:
Richard Swartz, Sie haben immer gesagt, dass das Sich-Fremd-Fhlen in diesem
Osteuropa wichtig fr ihre journalistische Arbeit war. Sie hatten die Freiheit, zu
kommen und wieder zu gehen. Sie konnten sich den Dingen, die Sie interessierten,
zuwenden und dann wieder verschwinden. Ein Schriftsteller aber bleibt doch an
den Dingen hngen, er wird sie nicht so einfach wieder los. Die Tatsache, dass Sie
bis zum heutigen Tag immer wieder hinfahren, spricht dafr, dass Sie sie nicht
wieder losgeworden sind.
Wie hat sich denn dieses gesamte west-stliche Gelnde verndert seit Ihrer letzten
Zwiesprache im Jahr 1989? Reizt es Sie noch, dorthin zu fahren, oder qult es Sie?
Swartz:
Beides, wrde ich sagen. Es kann auch gar nicht anders sein. Schauen Sie, allein
einen anderen Menschen wirklich kennenzulernen, Dinge ber sein Leben zu er-
fahren und ihn zu verstehen, ist eine fast unmgliche Aufgabe, wahrscheinlich weil
man von sich selbst bereits so wenig wei. Um wie viel schwieriger ist es da, sich
eine ganze Welt anzueignen! Und den Begriff Welt wrde ich fr dieses Osteuropa
verwenden wollen. Diese Aufgabe ist eine Zumutung, sie ist nicht zu lsen. Man
kann die Grenzen berschreiten und versuchen zu verstehen, aber man schafft es
nicht wirklich.
Pter hatte die gleiche Neugier, nur in der umgekehrten Richtung. Er selbst
kann das besser schildern als ich, aber ich glaube, auch er hat bis zum heutigen Tag
nicht alles verstanden, was unser Leben im Westen ausmacht.
Was ist geblieben vom alten Osteuropa von vor 1989? Ich frchte, sehr viel.
Ich bin der Letzte, der die vielen Vernderungen, die stattgefunden haben, unter-
schtzen mchte. Es ist unglaublich, was da passiert ist, dass der Kommunismus
verschwunden ist. Ich hatte nie erwartet, das erleben zu drfen. Und dennoch, es
ist vieles auch geblieben.
Ndas:
Ich kann von mir selbst sagen, dass ich in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren ge-
scheitert bin in dem Versuch, den Westen besser zu verstehen. In der ersten Hlfte
meines Lebens habe ich mich sehr darum bemht, in Belangen der Kunst und
Kultur mit der westlichen Welt mitzuhalten und mich auch ber das Politische
ausreichend zu informieren. Aber die Quellen, die einem zur Verfgung standen,
waren nicht immer die verlsslichsten. Ich beispielsweise whlte den Wiener Rund-
funk, um mehr ber Demokratie zu erfahren. Das war nicht gerade die beste Quel-
le fr diesen Zweck, aber die einzige, die mir zur Verfgung stand. Ich wusste
damals jedoch nicht, wie unzulnglich ich da informiert wurde.
Swartz:
Es war sogar eine sehr schlechte Quelle.
Ndas:
So ist das halt, wenn man in einem Haus ohne Elektrizitt auf einer Donauinsel
wohnt. Mit meinem kleinen russischen Sokol-Radio konnte ich nur sterreich 1
empfangen. Das hat mir damals sehr viel bedeutet. Ich hrte jeden Tag Nachrich-
ten und andere politische Sendungen, auch Konzerte. Dennoch, auf der Basis
solch unzulnglicher Quellen hat man sich auf unserer Seite der Grenze falsche
Vorstellungen gemacht. Das gilt nicht nur fr mich persnlich, sondern fr die
gesamte Region.
Wie das Leben im Westen wirklich war, konnten wir hufig nicht erahnen, an-
gesichts der ganz anderen Lebensverhltnisse, die wir hatten. Nur ein kleines Bei-
spiel hierfr: Es gab im realexistierenden Sozialismus keine Reklame im westlichen
Stil. Was es gab, das waren groe Hinweisschilder, wenn ein Produkt, das sonst
Mangelware war, einmal zur Verfgung stand. Dann konnte man beispielsweise
berall lesen: Geht ins Schuhgeschft und kauft Schuhe! Das war die uns gelu-
fige Form der Reklame. Also bin ich, wenn diese Schilder auftauchten, auch tat-
schlich ins Schuhgeschft gegangen, denn Schuhe sind ein menschliches Grund-
bedrfnis. Nur hufig wurden eben keine neuen Schuhe angeboten.
Swartz:
Oder es wurde nur ein linker beziehungsweise nur ein rechter Schuh angeboten,
nicht beides zusammen.
Ndas:
Nein, das stimmt nicht. Es gab schon passende Schuhpaare, nur eben nicht jeder-
zeit. Wenn es sie gab, sprach man davon, dass Schuhe geworfen werden.
Swartz:
Daran erinnere ich mich auch noch. Als ich Student in Prag war, hat man sich
sofort in eine Schlange eingereiht, die sich irgendwo gebildet hatte, ohne berhaupt
zu wissen, was da gerade feilgeboten wird. Nach einiger Zeit fragte man die Leute
dann: Was wird denn hier geworfen? Und hufig kam die Antwort: Das wis-
sen wir nicht, irgendetwas halt. Aber wir stehen schon mal an dafr.
Ndas:
Genau. Aufgrund dieser eigenen Erfahrungen machte man sich falsche Vorstellun-
gen vom Westen, insbesondere wenn das wenige, das man kannte, die westliche
Form von Reklame war, was sehr hufig der Fall war. Denken Sie an den
Marlboro-Mann, diese Werbefigur mit einem krftigen Krper und scharfen Ge-
sichtszgen, die rauchend durch die Gegend reitet. Man stellte sich in Osteuropa
tatschlich vor, dass so die Wirklichkeit in Stockholm aussieht. Wir waren schlicht
desinformiert und hatten dadurch deformierte Bilder im Kopf. Das gilt fr die
ganze Region. Die DDR war da keine Ausnahme, sondern im Gegenteil sehr ty-
pisch. Reklame wurde einfach mit der Realitt verwechselt.
Swartz:
Das kann ich aus eigener Erfahrung besttigen. Ich war in Albanien, als der Kom-
munismus zusammenbrach, und besuchte Freunde dort. Die Tchter der Familie,
11 und 14 Jahre alt, saen den ganzen Tag vorm Fernsehgert und haben italieni-
sche Sender geschaut, hauptschlich wegen der Werbung. Die eigentlichen Pro-
gramme haben sie gar nicht so interessiert. Wenn die liefen, haben sie halt irgen-
detwas anderes gemacht. Aber die Werbung, die wollten sie auf keinen Fall verpas-
sen. Naja, wenigstens haben sie dabei sehr gut Italienisch gelernt.
Ndas:
Ich persnlich bin zumindest dieser Gefahr, mir falsche Vorstellungen aufgrund
von Werbung zu machen, entgangen. Reklame hat auf mich nie einen groen Ein-
druck gemacht. Das gilt auch fr die Konsumgter, fr die sie warben. An solchen
Dingen hatte ich nie groes Interesse.
Dennoch bin auch ich gescheitert bei dem Versuch, mir ein korrektes Bild
vom Westen zu machen. Vor allen Dingen erlag ich der Illusion anzunehmen, dass
die westliche Welt auf Vernunft aufgebaut sei, dass Demokratie und Kapitalismus
gleichbedeutend mit Vernunft seien. Es war eine sehr groe Enttuschung zu be-
greifen, dass das nicht so ist. Ich habe in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren gelernt,
dass Vernunft auch im Westen nur lokal vorkommt und sehr begrenzt ist. Wo man
auf sie trifft, das kann man sich ab und ausrechnen, aber auch nicht immer.
Menschliche Interessen und Vernunft sind hufig gegenlufig, sie fallen nicht im-
mer zusammen.
Swartz:
Das alles httest du eigentlich schon vorher wissen knnen, denn ich hatte es dir
jahrelang gesagt.
Ndas:
Ja, aber ich hatte dir das einfach nicht geglaubt.
Meine Vorstellung von der Gesellschaftsordnung der Demokratie war beein-
flusst von ihren Ursprngen in der Franzsischen Revolution, die selbst wiederum
aus der Aufklrung erwuchs. Ohne die Aufklrung htte es die Franzsische Revo-
lution nicht gegeben. Mein Irrtum lag darin, anzunehmen, dass die Revolution
selbst und das, was daraus erwuchs, vernunftgeleitet sein musste.
Swartz:
So steht es in den Bchern, aber das ist nicht die Wirklichkeit.
Ndas:
Das wei ich schon jetzt.
Swartz:
Diese Vorstellung von der Hoheit der Vernunft, wenn diese die Freiheit hat, sich
zu entfalten, hast du mit Leuten im Westen geteilt, beispielweise mit den Neolibe-
ralen. Ich habe in der damaligen Zeit viele Gesprche mit Menschen gefhrt, die
immer wieder sagten: Der Kommunismus ist weg, wir werden diese Gesellschaf-
ten jetzt sehr schnell umbauen. Und wenn ich nachfragte, wie das genau gesche-
hen soll, antworteten sie einfach: Parlamentarische Demokratie und freie Markt-
wirtschaft ergeben automatisch ein normales Leben. Sie haben fest daran ge-
glaubt, auch wenn ich Vorbehalte anmeldete und bekrftigte, dass es so schnell
und zwangslufig nicht vonstattengehen werde. Im Grunde genommen erlagen sie
also dem gleichen Trugschluss wie du.
Ndas:
Beide Seiten hatten ganz einfach einen sehr groen Mangel an Information. Das
betraf im Westen nicht nur die Liberalen, sondern Konservative und Linke fast
genauso. Als Helmut Kohl, alles andere als ein Liberaler, 1990 sagte, dass auf dem
Gebiet der DDR innerhalb weniger Jahre blhende Landschaften entstehen wr-
den, wusste jeder, der die DDR gut kannte, dass das ganz einfach Bldsinn war.
Eine zerfallene Gesellschaft, eine zerfallene Industrie, eine zerfallene Landwirt-
schaft das alles konnte keine blhenden Landschaften hervorbringen. Diese Art
Trugschlsse entwuchsen aus einem Mangel an Information, aus einem Unverm-
gen zu begreifen, was auf der anderen Seite eigentlich vorgegangen ist. Das war
auch ein gelenkter Mangel an Information, denn man wollte viele Dinge ganz ein-
fach auch nicht wissen.
Swartz:
Es ist sehr wichtig, das hervorzuheben: Man wollte es nicht wissen. Der Unter-
schied zwischen Ost und West liegt hierbei darin, dass diese Dimension der Ideo-
logie, die ja auf dem Unterdrcken von Information beruht, zwar im Osten zu-
sammengebrochen ist, im Westen aber weitergelebt hat.
Wir haben in diesem Zusammenhang zuvor bereits das Wort Glauben ver-
wendet. Solch ein Glaube kann sehr gefhrlich sein, wenn er in ideologischer Form
daherkommt. Viele unserer Vorstellungen im Westen waren und sind es immer
noch von Ideologie geprgt. Um die Empirie hat man sich nicht gekmmert. Ich
wei das sehr gut, denn ich fhlte mich mit meinem Interesse an Osteuropa jahr-
zehntelang oft recht einsam im Westen. Kaum einer im Westen hat sich fr die
Wirklichkeit im Osten richtig interessiert. Die Menschen wollten einfach nicht
wissen, was in diesem anderen Teil Europas vor sich ging. Es gab gewisse Kon-
junkturen des Interesses und Engagements, aber das war dann immer schnell wie-
der weg. Das war so beim ungarischen Aufstand 1956, beim Prager Frhling 1968,
whrend der Hochphase der Solidarno in Polen 1980...
Ndas:
Bei Solidarno war das Interesse schon deutlich geringer als 1956 und 1968.
Swartz:
Nein, das wrde ich nicht sagen. Das Interesse war auch damals da, nur ist es eben
schnell wieder abgeflaut.
Das Gleiche kann man auch heute beobachten. Es gibt eigentlich keine Hin-
dernisse mehr, die Informationen im Weg stehen, aber ich habe nicht den Ein-
druck, dass man sich im Westen besonders fr Osteuropa interessiert. Ich kann
beispielsweise nicht erkennen, dass man in Deutschland besonderen Anteil daran
nimmt, was in Ungarn vor sich geht, dass es da ein bemerkenswertes Interesse
gbe. Analog gilt dies auch fr andere Staatenkombinationen, etwa fr das Desin-
teresse der sterreicher an Rumnien. In meinem Heimatland Schweden ist es
nicht anderes. Nicht einmal die naheliegenden baltischen Staaten interessieren
meine Landsleute wirklich.
Raabe:
Wrden Sie sagen, dass es noch immer eine Zweiteilung Europas in Ost und West
gibt, oder haben sich diese Grenzen verschoben?
Swartz:
Das muss man differenziert betrachten. Natrlich sind sehr viele von diesen Gren-
zen verschwunden. Das Wort Freiheit ist hier bisher noch nicht gefallen, aber na-
trlich ist diese Freiheit, die sich auch als Verneinung von Grenzen ausdrckt, eine
ungeheure Errungenschaft. Das ist etwas ganz Fantastisches, was da passiert ist.
Aber wenn man das genauer analysiert, erkennt man doch, dass es sehr viele Ph-
nomene gibt, Regungen der Seele, Traditionen, Sitten, die uns noch immer tren-
nen.
Ndas:
Ich mchte das Desinteresse an Osteuropa, von dem wir gesprochen haben, doch
verteidigen. Das ist ganz einfach auch menschlich. Genauso wie reiche Menschen
sich nicht fr arme Menschen interessieren, nur umgekehrt, ist es auch mit Regio-
nen: Arme Regionen interessieren sich immer fr die reichen Regionen, aber in der
entgegengesetzten Richtung ist das Interesse nur da, wenn man etwas Konkretes
haben will, wenn man etwas wegnehmen oder ein Tauschgeschft eingehen mch-
te. Handel und Finanzgeschfte basieren auf dieser menschlichen Ungleichheit.
Aber wir knnen von den Reichen, Altreichen wie Neureichen, nicht erwarten,
dass sie ein generelles Interesse fr rmere Menschen oder Regionen aufbringen.
Es gibt da noch eine andere Komponente, die vielleicht noch wichtiger ist: Das
Strukturierte will immer noch strukturierter werden und nicht unstrukturierter.
Es gibt Umstrukturierungen, sicher, aber das Ergebnis ist dann nur noch mehr
Struktur, nicht weniger. Die westlichen Gesellschaften haben mehrere Wellen von
Modernisierungen durchgemacht, welche die stlichen Gesellschaften nicht ken-
nen oder nur zum Teil kennen. Das ist ein Strukturproblem.
Ein sehr bedeutender ungarischer Historiker, Jen Szcs, Schler des ebenfalls
sehr bedeutenden Historikers Istvn Bb, hat diesbezglich eine These aufgestellt,
die mir sehr schlssig erscheint. Er identifizierte drei historische Regionen Euro-
pas, die im Kern bis auf das Reich Karls des Groen zurckgehen: das katholische
Europa I, das protestantische Europa II und das orthodoxe Europa III. Diese
historischen Grenzen, die auch mit der zivilisatorischen Entwicklungsstufe der
stdtischen Kultur zusammenhngen, zu beseitigen, dafr bentigen wir nicht
zwanzig Jahre, sondern vielmehr hunderte von Friedensjahren. Das heit nicht, die
Errungenschaften der jngsten Geschichte kleinzureden, die Tatsache, dass es in
Europa keine Kriege mehr gibt, oder dass beidseitig der beschriebenen Grenzen,
abgesehen von Weirussland, zumindest eine Art von Freiheit existiert. Aber den-
noch sind diese groen historischen Grenzen geblieben. Mit Tomasi di Lampedusa
knnte man hier sagen, man braucht sehr groe Vernderungen, um beim Alten zu
bleiben. So sehe ich es zumindest.
Swartz:
Ich teile diese Vorstellung. Auerdem bin ich berzeugt, dass unsere westliche
Zivilisation das Ergebnis einer historischen Wellenbewegung vom Westen nach
Osten ist. Was sich am weitesten westlich abgespielt hat, die Amerikanische Revo-
lution, ist in diesem Zusammenhang wahrscheinlich sogar noch bedeutender als
die Franzsische Revolution, obwohl wir das in Europa natrlich etwas anders
sehen. Das Entscheidende ist aber, dass der zivilisatorische Schwerpunkt im angel-
schsisch-franzsischen Bereich liegt. Das ist das Problem fr Lnder wie Ungarn
oder Schweden. Wir sind im Grunde genommen Randvlker, die historisch sehr
wenig zu dieser westlichen Zivilisation beigetragen haben. Es ist sehr schmerzlich,
das zuzugeben, aber man muss mit sich selbst da ins Reine kommen. Auch die
Deutschen haben, im Vergleich zu Franzosen und Englndern, nicht viel beigetra-
gen, erst sehr spt zumindest.
Ndas:
Nun ja, wenn man an die Hansestdte denkt und an die Entwicklung einer stdti-
schen Kultur, die sich mit ihr verknpft, dann knnen wir weder Deutsche noch
Schweden ganz auen vor lassen.
Swartz:
Das stimmt, die Deutschen haben uns Schweden kultiviert, so wie wahrscheinlich
die Ungarn auch von den sterreichern kultiviert wurden. Diese Erkenntnis ent-
krftet aber nicht das Hauptproblem, das darin besteht, dass zivilisatorische Er-
rungenschaften sich von Westen nach Osten ausbreiten, nicht umgekehrt. Diese
Zivilisation ist praktisch etwas, das auf uns zugekommen ist, das wir bernommen
haben und diese bernahmeprozesse haben oft hunderte von Jahren gedauert.
So etwas hren Ungarn oder Rumnen oder Schweden oder schon gar Russen
berhaupt nicht gern, obwohl es stimmt. Mit dieser Feststellung wird man in Un-
garn keine Wahlen gewinnen. Vielmehr gibt es dann eine Gegenbewegung, in der
es heit: Nein, wir waren schon etwas, bevor die westliche Zivilisation uns er-
reichte und darauf bauen wir auf und daraus machen wir Politik! Die Konfron-
tation mit der westlichen Zivilisation und den Dynamiken, die sie mit sich bringt,
provoziert hufig diese Reaktion, eine Art von Fundamentalismus, bei dem man
sich auf das besinnt, was man immer schon hatte. Aber was man hatte, war in
Wirklichkeit sehr wenig. Darf man das so offen sagen?
Ndas:
Nein, du hattest vielleicht sehr wenig. Ich hatte sehr viel.
Raabe:
Zeichnen Sie beide hier nicht das Bild eines sehr starren Europa, eines Europas,
das sich in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren doch ganz anders dargestellt hat?
Man knnte dem historischen Zivilisationsmodell von Szcs beispielsweise das des
Arabisten sowie Platon- und Aristoteles-Kenners Rmi Brague gegenberstellen,
der an der Sorbonne gelehrt hat. Brague hat von einem exzentrischen Europa ge-
sprochen, dessen Strke darin liege, sich das jeweils Andere und Fremde anzueig-
nen, so wie beispielsweise bereits das antike Rom sich die Errungenschaften Grie-
chenlands angeeignet hat. Was Ihr Zwiegesprch vor 20 Jahren auszeichnete, war
doch genau das, nmlich dass sie damals versucht haben, voneinander zu lernen.
Und diese Art von Stoffwechsel ist in den letzten zwanzig Jahren bei sehr vielen
Menschen in Gang gekommen, er hat diesen Kontinent verndert. Dass jetzt neue
Probleme und Konflikte auftauchen, denken wir an Ungarn, ist unbestritten, deren
Herkunft msste man aber doch genauer beschreiben, anstatt nur auf historische
Kontinuitten zwischen Arm und Reich oder Strukturiertem und Unstrukturiertem
zu verweisen.
Swartz:
Darf ich diesen Einwurf so interpretieren, dass die Betonung des Desinteresses,
von dem wir gesprochen haben, realittsfremd sei? Das kann ich nicht nachvoll-
ziehen, gerade nicht zu einer Zeit, da Griechenland fast im Begriff ist, Europa zu
zerstren. Das eigentliche Problem bei dieser Griechenland-Krise liegt doch nicht
darin, dass ber lange Zeit mit Geld um sich geschmissen wurde. Vielmehr haben
wir uns ber Jahrzehnte hinweg einfach nicht darum gekmmert, was in diesem
Land und dieser Gesellschaft vor sich geht. Wir hatten doch keine Ahnung, wie
man dort lebt, was die Menschen tun und unterlassen, wie ihr Verhltnis zur Arbeit
ist und welche Erwartungen sie an das Leben richten. Das ist echtes Desinteresse,
aus dem die jetzige Krise erwachsen ist. Daher verstehe ich diese rosigen Vorstel-
lungen von Austausch und vom voneinander Lernen nicht. Natrlich knnten die
Menschen voneinander lernen, wenn sie es wirklich wollten, aber sie tun es ganz
einfach nicht.
Raabe:
Was mich strt, sind die allzu pauschalen Urteile. Die Faszination des Zwiege-
sprchs lag doch gerade darin, dass Sie damals nicht wie Politiker gesprochen ha-
ben, sondern als sensible Objekte, als Literaten, die sich Gedanken darber ma-
chen, wie sie als Personen von der historischen Situation in ihren Hemisphren
individuell geprgt worden sind.
Pter Ndas, Sie haben geschrieben: Ich bin in Ruinen aufgewachsen unter
Versehrten. Ich bin selbst ein versehrter Mensch. Die gesamte, gewaltige Schreib-
arbeit Ihres Lebens ist ja nichts anderes gewesen, als der Versuch, mit dieser Ver-
sehrtheit zurechtzukommen. Diese Versehrtheit hat auch Ihre gegenseitige Wahr-
nehmung bestimmt, die Reaktionsweisen, die ins Unbewute reichen, die Reflexe.
Sie haben damals von Ihrem eingefleischten Gefhl, schuldig zu sein gespro-
chen. Im Unterschied zu Richard, der als Westmensch wei, dass die Institutionen
des Rechtsstaates ihn schtzen, ist Ihnen dieser Gedanke fremd Zum Beweis er-
zhlten Sie damals, wie sie einmal in West-Berlin von einem Polizeihund ange-
sprungen wurden. Ihre spontane Reaktion: Ja, richtig, das musste ja kommen!
Richard Swartz hat Ihnen ihre Reaktion, ihren Mangel an Emprung, damals im
Zwiegesprch zum Vorwurf gemacht. Er hielt Ihr Verhalten fr inakzeptabel.
Das sind die Dinge, dich mich interessieren. Ich wsste gerne, ob diese Reflexe
in Ihnen beiden noch lebendig sind, oder ob sich in den zwanzig Jahren seit 1989
in dieser Hinsicht etwas gendert hat.
Ndas:
Wahrscheinlich haben die wenigsten im Publikum das Buch gelesen oder die
Anekdote in Erinnerung, also werde ich sie kurz rekapitulieren: Ich gehe auf einer
Strae in West-Berlin und pltzlich werde ich aus einer Ecke von einem Polizei-
hund angegriffen. In der letzten Sekunde, bevor der Hund mir die Nase abbeien
kann, wirft sich der Polizist, der zuvor wahrscheinlich geschlafen hatte, dazwischen
und ringt den Hund zu Boden. Ich habe Richard diese Situation geschildert und
kam zu dem Schluss, dass nichts Weltbewegendes passiert war. Der Hund hat
meine Nase eben nicht abgebissen, sie ist genauso lang wie frher. Richard konnte
meine Sichtweise des Geschehens einfach nicht nachvollziehen. Er verstand nicht,
warum ich dem so gleichgltig gegenberstand und mich nicht mehr emprt habe.
Aber meine Reaktion ist eben von meinen eigenen Versehrungen geprgt, die aus
einer historischen Situation erwachsen sind. Ich bin noch whrend des Zweiten
Weltkriegs in einem der betroffenen Staaten geboren worden, Richard erst nach
Ende des Krieges in einem Land, das neutral geblieben war. Als ich ein Kind war,
fuhr ich mit einem Schlitten, mit dem meine Eltern einst Tote eingesammelt und
transportiert hatten. Dann habe ich die Verhafteten, die Gequlten und die Hinge-
richteten whrend des ungarischen Aufstandes 1956 gesehen. Meine Eltern waren
als berzeugte Kommunisten fr das, was damals geschah, auch zum Teil verant-
wortlich. Das ist der Grund, warum ich die Geschichte mit dem Polizeihund ganz
anders erlebt habe, als das bei Richard der Fall gewesen wre. Unsere Reflexe sind
vllig unterschiedlich aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Umstnde, in denen wir auf-
wuchsen. Ich habe damals ganz einfach nicht verstanden, warum Richard sich so
darber aufgeregt hat, dass ich nicht protestiert hatte. Heute, zwanzig Jahre spter,
verstehe ich das besser.
Dennoch, im Grunde genommen haben sich meine ngste nicht sehr vern-
dert. Ich halte Freiheit fr eines der wichtigsten zivilisatorischen Gter, die es
berhaupt gibt. Ein Teil davon ist politische Freiheit, die wir schaffen oder eben
nicht schaffen. Was ich damals nicht vollkommen begriff, was Richard mir jedoch
nahezubringen versuchte, war, dass Freiheit auch sehr kalt ist. In Freiheit zu leben,
heit, Klte zu erfahren. Das habe ich in den vergangenen zwanzig Jahren am ei-
genen Leib erlebt. Diese Klte habe ich nun selbst erfahren und erfahre sie jeden
Tag.
Swartz:
Das wechselseitige Interesse und die Neugier, von der wir gesprochen haben, das
Bemhen, von anderen zu lernen das alles funktioniert nur als individueller Pro-
zess. Als historische oder gesellschaftliche Gre kann man sich darauf nicht ver-
lassen. Es wird immer nur ein einzelner Mensch sein, der diesen Weg einschlgt
oder dazu fhig ist. Die historischen und gesellschaftlichen Prozesse werden davon
wenig beeindruckt. Vernderungen gehen auf andere Weise vonstatten und sie
dauern sehr lange. Die Schwierigkeit liegt darin, genau das zu begreifen. Wenn sich
irgendetwas in die Welt hineingefunden und sich eingenistet hat, sei es Gewalt oder
Kommunismus oder Diktatur, dauert es eine sehr lange Zeit, das wieder komplett
zu vertreiben. Wie Pter sagen wrde, es bleibt in den
Ndas:
In den Knochen.
Swartz:
in den Knochen stecken. Daher gibt es fr uns, fr Menschen in unserem Alter,
nicht so sehr viel Hoffnung, um es einmal brutal auszudrcken. Pter wird immer
mit seinen ngsten leben, ich werde immer mit meinen ngsten leben.
Aber es kommen ja neue Generationen. Meine Frau ist Kroatin und wir be-
suchten unlngst Freunde in Zagreb. Wir sprachen ber die Vergangenheit, genau-
er gesagt ber Bcher und ihre damalige Bedeutung. Einige der Shne und Tchter
dieser Freunde waren auch anwesend und haben zugehrt, worber sich die alten
Leute da unterhielten. Ich erwhnte einen Autor und sagte: Das war ein sehr
schnes Buch, das er damals geschrieben hat, aber er konnte es ja nicht publizie-
ren. Darauf reagierte ein junger Mann in der Runde, 17 oder 18 Jahre alt, mit
vlligem Unverstndnis: Wieso konnte er es nicht publizieren, wenn es so ein
schnes Buch war? Das verstehe ich nicht. Daraufhin haben wir lteren in der
Runde zunchst ihn angestarrt und dann uns angestarrt. Erst dann haben wir ver-
standen: So wird man alt. Dieser junge Kroate konnte einfach nicht nachvollzie-
hen, was Zensur einst bedeutet hatte. Er hat das schlichtweg nicht begriffen, er
hatte keine Ahnung. Das war einerseits ein erschreckendes Erlebnis, aber anderer-
seits auch wunderschn.
Ndas:
Etwas Schnes kann ich daran nicht finden.
Swartz:
Ich sage das nur polemisch.
Ndas:
Solche jungen Menschen mssen geprgelt werden.
Swartz:
Aber sie haben wirklich das Glck der Ignoranten. Es ist doch herrlich, dass sie in
einer Welt leben knnen, wo man sich um so etwas nicht mehr zu kmmern
braucht.
Ndas:
Das stimmt allerdings.
Swartz:
Er htte es natrlich wissen mssen, aus anderen Grnden, aber das war fr ihn
kein Problem. Insofern hat sich also doch schon sehr viel getan.
Ndas:
Das ist doch sehr gefhrlich. Er lebt in Kroatien, in Zagreb, tagtglich mit den
Folgen der Diktatur konfrontiert und wei dabei nicht einmal, woher er stammt.
Das beraubt ihn doch der Mglichkeit, die Dinge richtig zu reflektieren und zu
beurteilen.
Swartz:
Da hast du Recht.
Ndas:
Das ist schon fast tragisch, aber natrlich ist es auch eine menschliche Reaktion.
Die Nachkriegsgeneration wollte ber die Kriegsereignisse auch nichts wissen. Der
Holocaust und Auschwitz wurden nicht nur von den Deutschen oder von den
Ungarn unterschlagen, sondern auch von den berlebenden. Sie wollten darber
ebenfalls nicht sprechen. Sie empfanden es als fast schon pervers, ihre Kinder mit
so etwas zu belasten. Ich kenne Menschen, die das erst viel spter aus den Ge-
schichtsbchern erfahren haben, nicht von den Familienmitgliedern, die es selbst
erlebt hatten.
Ein Freund von mir wurde in seiner Jugend von seiner Mutter gezwungen,
nicht weniger als drei Fremdsprachen zu lernen. Warum? Die Mutter hatte einst ihr
Leben dadurch retten knnen, dass sie flieend Franzsisch sprach und sie daher
Franzosen in einem der Lager, Auschwitz oder Ravensbrck, ich wei nicht wel-
ches, dazu bewegen konnte, ihr zu helfen. Das ist bis heute eine unglaubliche Last
fr diese Menschen. Fremdsprachen zu lernen, was wir ja eigentlich als positiv und
optimistisch definieren wrden, war hier motiviert aus dem Negativsten, aus dem
Glauben, nur so berleben zu knnen. Mein Freund verstand das ganz einfach
nicht.
Die Geschichte besteht aus einer stndigen Bewegung, aus Phasen der Pro-
gression und aus Phasen der Regression. Das gehrt zusammen, das wechselt sich
ab. Was wir jetzt in Europa beobachten, in Griechenland und anderswo, ist eine
solche Phase der Regression, eine Regression, die vor den historischen Grenzen
nicht haltmacht, sondern West und Ost gleichermaen betrifft.
Swartz:
Ich komme noch einmal darauf zurck, wie schwierig es ist, einen anderen Men-
schen zu verstehen oder sich ihm zu ffnen, denn es gibt Dinge, ber die wir Men-
schen nicht sprechen knnen. Das berhrt, was Pter ber das Schweigen der
berlebenden gesagt hat. Dasselbe trifft ja auch auf Soldaten zu, auf Mnner oder
auch auf Frauen, die im Krieg waren. Viele reden nicht darber oder nur sehr un-
gern. Man fragt sich warum. Sicherlich ist da Schmerz, den man nicht wieder auf-
whlen mchte. Es gibt Verdrngung, man mchte ganz einfach nicht daran erin-
nert werden. Aber ich glaube, sehr wichtig ist es auch, die dialektische Situation des
Austausches zu verstehen. Wenn man mit jemandem ein Gesprch fhrt, gibt es
auch eine Voraussetzung, nmlich dass der Andere dazu fhig ist zu verstehen,
worber man redet. Ich kann mir vorstellen, dass es viele menschliche Erfahrun-
gen gibt, die
Ndas:
die nicht zu verstehen sind.
Swartz:
nicht zu verstehen sind. Ich kann mir gut vorstellen, dass jemand, der im Kon-
zentrationslager war, fast aggressiv sagen wrde: Warum sollte ich mit dem dar-
ber reden? Ihm fehlt die Voraussetzung, etwas zu verstehen. Oder wenn ich in
Stalingrad war und das mit Glck berlebt habe, warum sollte ich darber spre-
chen, wenn ich wieder daheim bin? Was verstehen die berhaupt davon? Ich habe
berhaupt keine Mglichkeit, das an jemanden weiterzugeben, auch nur im kleins-
ten Mastab verstndlich zu machen.
Ndas:
Hinzu kommt, dass berleben immer auch bedeutet, dass andere nicht berlebt
haben. Das heit, der Betroffene wei etwas, das die Nachwelt auch nicht wissen
soll, nicht wissen darf. Ich kann niemanden darin einweihen, wie ich einem Ster-
benden den letzten Rest seines Brotes oder einem halbtoten Soldaten in Stalingrad
die wrmenden Stiefel weggenommen habe. Das wird nicht eingestanden, das kann
man nicht eingestehen.
Swartz:
Vielleicht ist das auch eine Frage der Zeit. Knntest du dir nicht vorstellen, dass
man irgendwann doch dazu bereit ist, so etwas zu teilen?
Ndas:
Nein.
Swartz:
Es knnte vielleicht eine Zeit kommen, da man ber den real existierenden Sozia-
lismus nicht mehr sprechen will und auch nicht mehr sprechen kann. Denn wie
spricht man etwa mit diesem jungen Kroaten in Zagreb, den ich erwhnt habe?
Wenn er gar keine Ahnung von Zensur und von der Unterdrckung der Intellek-
tuellen hat, dies nicht mit dem Kommunismus verbindet, hat man dann noch das
Bedrfnis oder lohnt es sich berhaupt noch, mit einem solchen Menschen dar-
ber zu sprechen? Ich wrde es hoffen, aber ich bin mir diesbezglich nicht sicher.
Ndas:
Diese Mglichkeit schliee ich leider aus, denn dann htte Hegel recht behalten,
die Geschichte wre an einem Endziel angekommen und wir lebten in der besten
aller Welten. Diese Vorstellung ist wahrscheinlich nicht richtig.
Swartz:
Ich sehe ein anderes Problem, nmlich dass die Menschen nicht dazu fhig sind,
diese Dinge immer wieder durchzukauen, sich stndig mit ihnen zu konfrontieren.
Dabei ist die Erinnerung wahrscheinlich die einzige kleine Mglichkeit, die wir
haben, zu verhindern, dass wir das Ganze nochmals durchleben mssen. Aber ich
habe den Eindruck, die Menschen wollen das nicht, immer wieder an das Vergan-
gene zu rhren. Wir strzen uns in die nchste Katastrophe, anstatt ein Gesprch
darber zu fhren, was war und wie es war. Wir tun es ganz einfach nicht.
Die Deutschen haben es nach 1945 brav und tchtig getan, aber nur, weil sie
dazu gezwungen wurden. Wir anderen hingegen lgen noch immer ber die Ver-
gangenheit, ergehen uns in Mythen. Die Polen sagen, sie htten mehr gelitten als
alle anderen. Dann kommen die Juden und sagen: Entschuldigung, wir sind auch
noch da! Das emprt dann wiederum die Polen. Die Schweden und die Schweizer
behaupten, dass sie whrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges neutral gewesen sind und
mit dem ganzen ungeheuerlichen Geschehen nichts zu tun hatten, dabei haben ihre
Staaten sehr viel Geld verdient in dieser Zeit. Die Russen sind davon berzeugt,
dass sie ganz alleine Europa befreit haben, dabei war die Sowjetunion zwei Jahre
lang Deutschlands wichtigster Alliierter und sie wre das wahrscheinlich auch ge-
blieben, htte Hitler nicht den Angriff befohlen. In Frankreich redet man stndig
von der Rsistance, dabei waren Franzosen die eifrigsten Kollaborateure. Und so
weiter und so fort.
Wir lgen alle, alle lgen wir ber die Vergangenheit. Nur die Deutschen nicht.
Sie sind die Einzigen, die ber die Vergangenheit nicht lgen. Aber nicht etwa weil
die bessere Menschen sind, sondern weil die dazu gezwungen wurden, nicht mehr
zu lgen. Dieser Zwang ist jedoch die groe Ausnahme. Wo er nicht ausgebt
wird, wird eifrig weitergelogen. Also ich sehe das ziemlich schwarz.
Ndas:
Ich auch. Wenn man versucht, diese Dinge zu klren, ist das eine sehr schwierige
Angelegenheit, bei der man eigentlich neue Begriffe verwenden msste. Nur gibt
man alte, eingefahrene Begriffe nicht gerne auf. Man knnte beispielsweise auch
fragen, ob wir gerecht mit dem Begriff des Kommunismus umgehen. Wo gab es
berhaupt Kommunismus? Kommunismus ist eigentlich ein scharf umrissener
Begriff. Wo herrschten denn in Wirklichkeit Kommunisten? Meine Eltern waren
Kommunisten und sie waren nicht die einzigen Kommunisten, die ich kannte.
Aber nach einigen Jahren wurden sie aus dem Verkehr gezogen von Kommunis-
ten, die im Grunde Nichtkommunisten waren. Wir sollten viel passender von einer
Diktatur sprechen, von einem sowjetischen Imperium. Aber wie gesagt, man gibt
die alten Begriffe nur ungern auf, auch den des Kommunismus.
Raabe:
Pter Ndas, unmittelbar nach der Wende haben Sie in mehreren Essays ber die
nationale und die individuelle Selbstbestimmung geschrieben. Das klang damals, in
der Wendezeit, hoffnungsvoll. Was ist daraus heute geworden? Warum gibt es
gerade in Ungarn, aber auch in Serbien, in Rumnien, anders als in Deutschland, so
viele virulente Geschichtslgen? Hngt das miteinander zusammen, dass man nati-
onal sich selbst bestimmen will und dass man einen erlogenen Mythos dazu
braucht?
Ndas:
Das hngt eher mit dieser historischen Wellenbewegung zusammen. Nach einer
progressiven Phase, die recht lange dauerte, etwa sechs oder sieben Jahre, trat die
ungarische Gesellschaft in eine regressive Phase ein. Diese Regression, die gesund
und ntig gewesen ist, hlt nun aber schon sehr viel lnger an und ist auch unntig
tief.
Alles das ist in gewissem Sinne selbstverstndlich. Jeder nutzt seine Freiheitsrechte
in der Demokratie, auch die Nationalisten und Rechtsextremen. Darauf war ich
nicht vorbereitet, dass die Demokratie gegenber Krften, die sie unterwandern
wollen, ausgeliefert ist, eigentlich schutzlos. Denn wenn Demokratie sich schtzen
wrde, dann wird sie zur Diktatur oder nimmt zumindest die Zge einer Diktatur
an. Es handelt sich also um eine Gratwanderung.
In Deutschland verbindet man die Vernderungen von 1989 hauptschlich mit
dem Mauerfall. Bei uns in Ungarn ist keine Mauer gefallen, daher spricht man vom
Systemwechsel. Bei diesem Systemwechsel wurde auch unsere alte Verfassung
reformiert. Die Personen, die dafr verantwortlich gezeichnet haben, einige davon
Freunde von mir, hatten hufig an amerikanischen Universitten studiert und zum
Teil auch gelehrt. Sie waren stark beeinflusst vom amerikanischen Freiheitsver-
stndnis und das spiegelt sich in der neuen Verfassung, in der viele Elemente des
amerikanischen Politik- und Rechtssystems bernommen worden sind. Nur verga
man dabei, welche Traditionen, auch rechtliche Tradition, die ungarische Gesell-
schaft selbst hat. Die Progression ist also zu weit gegangen, hatte negative Seiten.
Das hatte die jetzige Regression zur Folge. Das meine ich mit dieser historischen
Wellenbewegung.
Swartz:
Ich sehe es ein bisschen anders. Wie zuvor bereits betont, Demokratie und Wohl-
stand, das alles braucht Zeit. Es kommt nicht von einem Tag auf den anderen.
Dessen war man sich in Osteuropa nicht bewusst und das hat am Ende zu einer
Enttuschung gefhrt. Man hatte es sich anders vorgestellt. Es sollte alles viel
schneller kommen. Aber es kommt eben nicht so schnell.
Ndas:
Schnell und vor allem automatisch.
Swartz:
Ja, das ist ein wichtiges Wort in diesem Zusammenhang, automatisch. Wenn wir
von der Mangelwirtschaft zur Marktwirtschaft bergehen, dann lsen sich alle
Probleme von alleine, dann sind Wohlstand und Demokratie die logische Folge.
Das war die Vorstellung.
Ndas:
Eine sehr amerikanische Vorstellung.
Swartz:
Wahrscheinlich. Wenn man dann am eigenen Leib sprt, dass es nicht so schnell
und automatisch geht, dann entwickeln sich Enttuschung und Frustration. Daraus
entsteht die besagte Regression, der Rckfall auf das, was einem vertraut ist. Nur
ist das jetzt nicht mehr Kommunismus, sondern Nationalismus. Der Nationalis-
mus ist eine Ideologie fr frustrierte Vlker und Menschen. Er hat mit der Wirk-
lichkeit der modernen Welt nichts zu tun. Es ist ein Weg, den man eigentlich nicht
begehen kann. Aber viele, die enttuscht sind, verfallen doch darauf, denn der
Nationalismus hat seine Vorteile. Beispielsweise ist immer jemand anderes an einer
Misere schuld. Man selbst trgt keine Verantwortung, weder als Gesellschaft noch
als Individuum. Die Vorstellung ist, dass, wenn man denjenigen, der verantwortlich
oder schuldig ist, ausmerzen kann, dann wird alles rosig und schn. Der Nationa-
list braucht und sucht also immer einen Feind. Ohne diesen Feind kann er nicht
existieren.
Das erklrt viele der Dinge, die etwa heute in Ungarn vor sich gehen. Im Wes-
ten sind viele gerade von dieser Entwicklung in Ungarn berrascht worden, zum
Teil weil die Sprachbarriere bei diesem Land so hoch ist. Das ist wirklich eine die-
ser Grenzen, die geblieben sind. Das Schlimmste, was in Ungarn passiert, ist diese
Identifizierung von Feinden, von der ich gesprochen habe. Gerade in dieser Hin-
sicht msste die Europische Union strker eingreifen.
Ndas:
Die Europische Union hat bisher alles geschluckt, was in Ungarn vor sich gegan-
gen ist. Barroso und Merkel sind einverstanden. Gelegentlich regen sich einige
westliche Zeitungen auf, aber diese Aufregung verpufft angesichts der politischen
Akzeptanz, die die Vernderungen gefunden haben.
Diese moralische Gleichgltigkeit gegenber den Verhltnissen in Ungarn ha-
be ich auch zuvor schon beobachtet, in Zeiten der Diktatur, als Jnos Kdr eine
Art Vermittlerrolle zwischen Ost und West einnahm. Willy Brandt hat sich ganz
gut mit Kdr verstanden. Die kleine demokratische Opposition in Ungarn, die
strte nur bei dem Versuch der westeuropischen Linken, eine Verbindung zu den
Kommunisten in der Sowjetunion aufzubauen. Als Brandt und Kdr nach ihren
erfolgreichen Verhandlungen miteinander tanzten, durchaus im wrtlichen Sinne,
war man sich bezglich der Beurteilung der ungarischen Demokraten sehr einig:
Was wollen diese Menschen berhaupt? Warum regen sich die so auf? Das sind
doch Verrckte!
Die Geschichte hatte ihre eigene Logik. Ich habe nichts gegen die Verhandlun-
gen, die Willy Brandt mit Jnos Kdr oder die Helmut Schmidt mit Erich Ho-
necker fhrten. Diese Verhandlungen haben einen Dritten Weltkrieg verhindert
und das war strategisch wichtiger. Aber sie fanden eben immer statt hinter dem
Rcken einer kleinen demokratischen Opposition, im Falle Polens sogar hinter
dem Rcken einer groen demokratischen Opposition. Dieser Wahrheit muss man
sich heute stellen, also hinter die Kulissen der Lgen und Spiele und des Theaters,
die es frher gab, blicken. Das wird nicht immer akzeptiert. Als ich einmal einen
Vortrag bei der Deutschen Bank in Frankfurt hielt und diese Dinge ansprach, hat
mich die anwesende Witwe von Brandt schwer dafr angegriffen. Erst beim an-
schlieenden Abendessen haben wir uns dann vershnt.
Raabe:
Wir mchten die Zwiesprache jetzt zum Publikum hin ffnen. Es sind ja sehr viele
wichtige Themen angeklungen, und vielleicht gibt es dazu Fragen oder Kommen-
tare?
Frage:
Herr Ndas und Herr Swartz, sie haben sich in der Zwiesprache sehr ausfhrlich
darber unterhalten, dass Freundschaften in Osteuropa und in Westeuropa unter-
schiedlich funktionierten. Diese Vorstellung artikuliert sich ja sehr oft, nmlich
dass es einen engeren Zusammenhalt zwischen Freunden und Bekannten in Ost-
europa gab. Herr Swartz betonte damals sogar, dass er das beneide. Woraufhin
Herr Ndas sagte: Wir sind immer nur eine Notgemeinschaft. Stell dir darunter
nicht so etwas Schnes vor! Hat sich das verndert, ist es gleichgeblieben? Wie
fhrt man heute Freundschaften in Osteuropa?
Ndas:
Das ist eine schwierige Frage, weil Freundschaften oder Liebschaften zu den Din-
gen gehren, die durch das politische Geschehen nicht richtig vernderbar sind.
Ich wrde nicht behaupten, dass es gar keinen Einfluss gibt, aber im Kern sind
solche Verbindungen unvernderbar oder doch zumindest nur langfristig vern-
derbar. Dieser Hang zu Notgemeinschaften oder zum Familiren, das ist geblie-
ben. Aber die Kontakte sind khler geworden, zurckhaltender. Man wird vorsich-
tiger. Frher spielte es fr mich keine Rolle, welchem meiner Freunde ich welche
Frage stellte oder wie ich eine an mich gerichtete Frage beantwortete. Heute ber-
legt man doch hufiger, ob man eine bestimme Frage berhaupt stellen oder wie
man eine Frage beantworten sollte. Das ist auch eine Gefahr, die mit der Freiheit
kommt. Freiheit ist gefhrlich, aber Diktatur ist noch gefhrlicher.
Swartz:
Ich wei gar nicht mehr, was da genau im Buch steht, aber fr mich sind Freund-
schaften nicht abhngig von politischen Systemen. Das heit, vielleicht mit einer
Einschrnkung, die mit der Dimension der Zeit zu tun hat. Wie vieles, das wichtig
ist im Leben, brauchen auch Freundschaft und Liebe Zeit, um sich zu entwickeln.
Das war der groe Unterschied zwischen West- und Osteuropa damals: In Osteu-
ropa hatte man sehr viel Zeit. Das traf im Westen berhaupt nicht zu, teilweise mit
verheerenden Folgen. Natrlich gab es andere Einflsse im Osten, die zerstre-
risch auf Freundschaften wirken konnten, aber Zeit hatte man. Ich erinnere mich
immer noch mit Freuden daran, wie oft und freundschaftlich ich in Osteuropa
aufgenommen wurde und wie viel Zeit die Menschen sich fr mich nahmen.
Manchmal gab es sogar die Mglichkeit, sich zu revanchieren, wenn Freunde
in den Westen reisen durften und mich in Wien besuchten. Aber dann stellte sich
immer auch schnell ein riesiges Problem ein, weil diese Freunde Vorstellungen von
dieser gemeinsamen Zeit hatten, die ich nicht oder nur unter uersten Anstren-
gungen erfllen konnte. Denn sie waren davon ausgegangen, dass ich ewig fr sie
da sein und mit ihnen etwas unternehmen wrde was ich aber nicht konnte. Ge-
legentlich hat das sogar zu regelrecht peinlichen Situationen gefhrt.
Ndas:
Ab und zu auch zu komischen Situationen.
Swartz:
Komisch, ja. Aber fr dich habe ich ja immer eine Ausnahme gemacht.
Ndas:
Wirklich? Ich erinnere dich da an die Zeit, als ich deine Gastfreundschaft drei Wo-
chen strapazieren musste, weil ich in Wien auf ein Visum wartete. Du hast mir
damals einfach nicht erlaubt, ohne das Visum abzureisen. Aber diese Art von Be-
suchen ist schon nach wenigen Tagen eine Belastung, um wie viel mehr nach drei
Wochen!
Swartz:
Ja, das war zugegeben echt zu lang. Ich habe dir mehrmals auf meine diskrete Art
und Weise angedeutet, dass du wieder abhauen solltest, aber du hast es nicht be-
griffen.
Ndas:
Nicht begriffen, ja. Gut, dass du es jetzt zumindest sagst.
Frage:
Sie haben Zweifel angemeldet, ob die Freiheit, die man jetzt nutzen kann, die Mg-
lichkeit, sich ohne Probleme zu besuchen und kennenzulernen, wirklich zu einem
besseren wechselseitigen Verstndnis fhrt. Nach meiner Erfahrung ist das aber
so. Ich habe als Student in meiner Zeit in Amsterdam Menschen aus Slowenien
und Polen und Tschechien gut kennengelernt, was unter den frheren politischen
Verhltnissen nicht mglich gewesen wre. Dieses Kennenlernen hat mir ein bes-
seres Verstndnis dieser Lnder und ihrer Gesellschaften erffnet. Auch die Kon-
ferenz, zu der wir uns hier versammelt haben, findet ja in diesem Geiste statt, nm-
lich dass Dialog zu Verstndigung fhrt.
Ndas:
Natrlich ist das eine sehr groe Hoffnung. Es ist auch die einzige Mglichkeit.
Das ist ja gerade, was Freiheit ausmacht, diese Option, zu reisen und sich auszu-
tauschen. Im Laufe der Zeit fhrt das sicher auch zu Vernderungen. Das bedeutet
aber nicht, dass die historischen Unterschiede, von denen wir gesprochen haben,
einfach so verschwinden werden, denn das sind strkere Einflsse. Dennoch, wenn
die Unterschiede zumindest berbrckt werden und man sich verstndigen kann,
dann ist das schon eine sehr groe Leistung. Und fr einen jungen Menschen wie
Sie ist es das Natrlichste berhaupt.
Frage:
Das Desinteresse, das Sie angesprochen haben, ist das wirklich etwas, das typisch
fr die west-stliche Dimension ist, oder handelt es sich dabei nicht doch um ein
allgemeineres Problem, das sich auch innerhalb des Westens manifestiert? Meiner
Beobachtung nach interessieren sich die Menschen hier genauso wenig fr das, was
Herr Berlusconi in Italien treibt, wie dafr, was Herr Orbn in Ungarn macht. Das
ist doch eine hnliche Konstellation, aus meiner Sicht zumindest.
Ndas:
Ich habe sehr frh die Erfahrung gemacht, bereits 1968, dass die historischen
Entwicklungen in ganz Europa recht hnlich ablaufen, unabhngig davon, in wel-
cher Materie sie sich abspielen. Es ist berhaupt kein Zufall, dass in ganz verschie-
denen Gesellschaften zur gleichen Zeit kleine Diktatoren mit sehr hnlichen Cha-
rakterzgen auftauchen. Man knnte in diesem Zusammenhang auch die Namen
Sarkozy und Putin anfhren. Wir haben es mit sehr hnlichen Charakteren zu tun,
die aber in Gesellschaften mit ganz unterschiedlichen Voraussetzungen in Erschei-
nung treten. Diese Parallelen sind sehr interessant.
Auch das Verhalten der einfachen Brger ist in diesem Zusammenhang her-
vorzuheben. Italien und Griechenland das sind Urlaubslnder. Die Menschen
fahren dorthin, um sich zu erholen, um sich zu amsieren. Sie wollen sich von
dem, was in diesen Lndern vonstattengeht, nicht dabei stren lassen. Und das ist
das gute Recht dieser Menschen, denn sie haben ihren Urlaub bezahlt, drfen also
mit einem Gegenwert rechnen. Wer in diesen Lndern gerade Ministerprsident ist,
das ist diesen Menschen gleichgltig. In diesem Sinne hat jeder auch persnliche
Verantwortung und diese Verantwortung kann nicht auf Regierungen oder Par-
teien abgeschoben werden.
Frage:
Herr Ndas, knnten Sie die Vorstellung, dass Freiheit auch Klte bedeutet, noch
ein bisschen konkreter erlutern?
Ndas:
Das diesbezgliche Zitat aus der Zwiesprache stammt eigentlich von Richard. Al-
lerdings hatte ich damals schon eine gewisse Vorstellung, was damit gemeint ist.
Der Begriff der Freiheit hat zwei Seiten. Einerseits bezieht er sich auf die innere
Freiheit, andererseits auf die politische Freiheit. In beiden Fllen aber geht Freiheit
mit individueller Verantwortung einher, die nicht aufgegeben werden kann. Bei
politischen Entscheidungen bertragen wir diese Verantwortung auf Parteien,
Regierungen, Gemeinderte und so weiter. Aber diese bertragung verantworten
wir selbst, dem knnen wir nicht entkommen. Das impliziert auch, dass wir uns
den Folgen zu stellen haben, unabhngig davon, wie diese aussehen. Diese Kon-
frontation mit der eigenen Verantwortung kann sehr hart sein. Das ist hnlich wie
im Protestantismus, wo Gott diese Verantwortung auch nicht einfach von uns
nimmt. Luther und Calvin hatten diesbezglich verschiedene Vorstellungen in den
Details, aber in den Grundfragen waren sie sich einig. Hier in Deutschland sind
sogar die Katholiken von dieser Vorstellung beeinflusst worden.
Frage:
Herrn Swartz, Sie haben den Faktor Zeit mehrfach angesprochen. Wie viel Zeit,
denken Sie, hat die junge Generation, um das friedliche Projekt Europa weiter
voranzutreiben?
Swartz:
Ich kann, will und darf hier nicht als Lehrer der Jugend auftreten. Ich war gestern
jung, heute bin ich es nicht mehr. Alles geht so furchtbar schnell. Das ist das Ein-
zige, was ich dazu sagen kann. Oder vielmehr, ich knnte das mit einer Anekdote
beleuchten:
Als die Franzosen 1989 den 200. Jahrestag ihrer Revolution feierten, gab es eine
groe Konferenz von Experten in Paris. Zu den Teilnehmern zhlte auch ein chi-
nesischer Historiker, ein lterer Herr, der in Fachkreisen sehr berhmt war. Jedoch
hat er sich tagelang berhaupt nicht geuert, whrend seine Kollegen auf dem
Podium dies und jenes ber die Revolution gesagt haben. Am letzten Tag der
Konferenz ist dann der Vorsitzende an ihn herangetreten mit der Bitte, doch auch
etwas zum Thema beizusteuern. So hat er dann, sehr hflich, das Wort ergriffen
und gesagt, dass er mit groem Interesse die Beitrge seiner Kollegen zur Franz-
sischen Revolution verfolgt und dabei auch sehr viel gelernt habe. Dann fgte er
hinzu: Ich selbst mchte mich aber nicht zu diesen Dingen uern, denn in mei-
nem Land sind 200 Jahre eine viel zu kurze Zeit, um ber ein solch wichtiges Er-
eignis irgendetwas zu sagen.
Frage:
Wenn wir versuchen, das Transkulturelle auf der persnlichen Ebene zu verorten
und auf das eigene Erleben schauen, wie sich Identitt da immer wieder verndert
und neu bestimmt, wie sehen Sie selbst heute diese Vorstellung von Ostmenschen
und Westmenschen, wie sie in Ihrem damaligen Gesprch anklang? Wirkt dieser
Gegensatz noch in Ihnen fort? Oder hat sich in der langen Zeit seit 1989, zuhause
oder auf Reisen, nicht doch eine Vermischung der Identitten eingestellt?
Swartz:
Dieses Begriffspaar Ostmensch-Westmensch hatte damals vor allem die Funkti-
on einer Provokation, um bestimmte Dinge besser zu verstehen. Allerdings denke
ich, dass diese Gegenberstellung auch recht tauglich ist. Diese Unterschiede exis-
tierten damals und sie leben auch weiter fort. Es gibt kleine Regungen, filigrane
Reflexe des Herzens oder des Bewusstseins, die in der Tat auf die grundverschie-
denen historischen Erfahrungen der Menschen zurckgehen. Nach meiner Ein-
schtzung werden diese Unterschiede da sein, solange ich lebe. Wie es sich diesbe-
zglich bei der jngeren Generation verhlt? Die Hoffnung ist natrlich, dass diese
Unterschiede bei Auffassungen und Reaktionen im Laufe der Zeit verschwinden
werden. Aber, um diesen Aspekt noch einmal anzusprechen, solche Umstellungen
dauern sehr, sehr lange. Ich wage nicht vorauszusagen, wie lange junge Menschen
in Europa noch mit solchen Phnomenen leben mssen. Das wei ich ganz ein-
fach nicht. Jedoch sind die Voraussetzungen geschaffen, um sie zu berwinden.
Ndas:
Wir hatten diese Begriffe Ostmensch und Westmensch in Anfhrungszeichen
gesetzt und ironisch verwendet. Sie sind nicht bierernst zu verstehen wie etwa
politische Fachtermini. Die Zwiesprache fand zwischen zwei Menschen statt, die
sich nahestanden, die gelegentlich also auch grobe Begriffe verwendeten, um etwas
provokativ zu veranschaulichen. Ich wrde diese Begriffe heute eigentlich nicht
mehr in den Mund nehmen wollen, auch aus pdagogischen Grnden. Sie wirken
wie eine faule Ausrede, mit der man eigene Unfhigkeit verschleiern will.
Swartz:
Man kann es so machen wie meine kroatische Frau und ich, wenn wir miteinander
zanken, auf Englisch oder auf Kroatisch oder auch auf Schwedisch. Dann sagt
einer von uns beiden zwangslufig irgendwann: Ja, du bist auch einer von denen!
Das ist geographisch und damit historisch nicht so spezifisch wie Ostmensch und
Westmensch und daher vielleicht ein wenig neutraler.
Ndas:
Im Gegensatz dazu ist das Begriffspaar Ossi-Wessi, wie es in Deutschland ver-
wendet wird, berhaupt nicht harmlos oder ironisch oder leichtfig. Es ist viel-
mehr sehr ernst zu nehmen und wird natrlich auch falsch verwendet. Obwohl
die Unterschiede noch heute vorhanden sind. Berlin besteht bis heute aus zwei
Stdten.
Raabe:
Ich mchte mich herzlich bei Pter Ndas und Richard Swartz fr diese Fortset-
zung Ihrer Zwiesprache aus dem Jahr 1989 bedanken. Es war ein manderndes,
schnes, lebendiges, spontanes Gesprch, auf seine Weise transkulturell und euro-
pisch. Was einen wirklich in die Verzweiflung treiben kann, das klang mehrmals
an, ist nicht nur die Schutzlosigkeit, sondern vor allem die Dummheit. Gegen die
Dummheit gibt es ein Mittel: Lesen. Lesen Sie die Bcher von Pter Nds und
Richard Swartz!

European identity contested?
Bassam Tibi
1.
Let me start my reflections with an anecdote: In 1995, I was Visiting Professor at
India International Centre in Delhi. As a farewell the institution arranged a party
for me the night before I was leaving. The Director of the Centre asked me:
Where are you going tomorrow? As I was heading to Cairo to continue my work
at Al-Ahram Strategic Center, I replied: Im heading to the Middle East. He
started laughing, laughing in a way that his glass fell down and broke. People
looked around and asked: What is going on? He said: Professor Tibi is lousy in
geography. And I said: Why? Im going to the Middle East. He said: But you
are in India right now and so you are going west, you are not going east. If youd
go east, youd go to Japan. But going to Cairo means you are going west.
By then I realized in that awkward situation that my perspective on the world
was shaped by a Eurocentric geography. My country of origin, Syria, is West Asia,
whereas Egypt is Africa. I am West Asian, I am Muslim and Arab and I claim to be
a European citizen. Im a German citizen and I believe the European identity is as
model inclusive. Im critical of exclusion and I argue instead for an inclusive identi-
ty. In principle European identity is inclusive and not ethnic. In this sense, ethnici-
ty and citizenship are contradictions. A model which is based on the ethnicity of
individuals contradicts the realities in our age of globalisation and global migration.
In reality, however, Europe is ethnic and does not match with the ideals of its uni-
versal inclusive citizen identity.
1

When you walk through a city like Frankfurt, you see Asians, Africans, Middle
Easterners and very few Germans. When I had first come to Frankfurt in 1962,
there were maybe only one thousand foreigners in the city at the time and most
of them were Greeks and Italians, meaning Europeans. Today, 35% of the people
who live in Frankfurt are not ethnic Germans. Imagine this, 35%! And they come
from 165 nations. So Germany, but also Europe as a whole, is changing as a result
of globalisation and global migration. Is Europe in a position to deal with these

1
See the contributions to Ethnic Europe. Mobility, Identity, and Conflict in a Globalized World, ed. Roland
Hsu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010) in particular my chapter The return of Ethnicity to
Europe via Islamic Migration? The Ethnicization of the Islamic Diaspora, 127-156.
new realities? Is it able to adjust to the changed conditions? This is not meant as a
rhetorical question. If an inclusive European identity cannot plausibly be defined in
terms of ethnicity, what is the alternative? My proposition is a model based on the
concept of civilisation and bridging. I shall explore this idea in the course of the
present article and try to answer the question whether this concept is compatible
with the changes we observe in the age of globalisation.
2.
At this conjunction let me start with addressing the ideology of multiculturalism,
which is often brought up in these debates. Professor Will Kymlicka is one of the
prophets of multiculturalism in the world. His perspective is a Canadian one, not a
European. I am very critical of multiculturalism, because the term is not clearly
defined. If you say: Ich bin gegen Multikulti. I am against multiculturalism in Ger-
many, then you run the risk to be viewed as a person who is against foreigners and
against migration. In response, I say in Arabic: Astaghfiru li Allah. I ask God for
forgiveness. How could I be against migration, how could I be against foreigners?
I am a migrant, I am a foreigner myself, of course with a German citizenship. The
point is that I draw a clear distinction between multiculturalism and cultural plural-
ism. This point is not well understood in the common debate. People of different
cultures can live together peacefully. Of course they can, why not? However, there
is one requirement. The requirement is that they need to accept a house order for
living together. If you live in a house and you have no order for the house, the
tensions would follow and conflict emerges. And the house order, in academic
terms, has to be based on a consent to core values. This is my understanding of
value conflicts and cross-civilisational bridging as a conflict resolution.
2

Multiculturalism is cultural relativism that argues: Anything goes. Like Prof.
Kymlicka does. When we were in Jerusalem five or six years ago, he started arguing
for multiculturalism of anything goes including Sharia. Then I questioned his
knowledge about the Sharia and I asked him: Can you be more specific? His
response was amazing. I gave him a lesson in the Sharia, because Im an expert in
this field. Then he realised it wouldnt work. If you want to live in Europe and you
want to practice the Sharia, you would get into a value conflict with all European
constitutions on all levels. That is why there must be some boundaries. The differ-
ence between multiculturalism and cultural pluralism is this: cultural pluralism ap-
proves diversity. However, you need to add that diversity has to be combined with
the consent to universal crosscultural core values. These core values are actually
very limited: civil society, freedom of belief, gender equality and so on. In the Is-
lamic Sharia, there is no gender equality. So if somebody says: It is part of my

2
For more details see Bassam Tibi, Islam in Global Politics. Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging (Lon-
don/New York: Routledge, 2012).
faith not to consider a woman as equal. I can only reply: Okay, you can do that in
private at home. But when you enter the public square, woman and man are equal.
You cannot deny gender equality, if you want to live as a citizen in Europe. The
ideal of European identity is based on universal human rights. This is an accom-
plishment nobody is allowed to deny.
When we talk about European identity, then what are we talking about? And
where do we go from here? My mother tongue is Arabic. I was educated in Da-
mascus in school in French and then in English. When I came to Germany in
1962, I spoke not a word of German. But I learned German and it became one of
my beloved languages. After all, I have written thirty books in German ever since.
When I published my book Europa ohne Identitt
3
, I added many terms to the Ger-
man language. Im very proud of doing that. The term Parallelgesellschaft, parallel
society, did not exist before, I added it. I also added the notion Leitkultur. There
was a huge debate in this country about Leitkultur from October to December
2000. For three months, all media, all politicians were talking about Leitkultur every
day. Since I am the one who coined the term in the cited book, I was at the centre
of this debate. That is why Angela Merkel by then leader of the CDU opposition
party, in a press conference in Berlin in October 2010, quoted me as source of the
term. But people got me wrong. They allege that Leitkultur, das sind deutsche Sitten
und Bruche, encompasses German customs and traditions. My response was: My
god, no! By Leitkultur I mean a consensually accepted value system of a civil soci-
ety. There are many German Sitten und Bruche, which I disapprove and they could
never inspire my model. In short: Leitkultur is a European value system. These are
not national values. Deutsche Werte are national values, they might be good for some
Germans, but definitely not for all of them, who prefer to be Europeans and clear-
ly prefer European values. European values are civilisational and European iden-
tity is based on civilisational values. Universal arguments against the relativism of
multiculturalism approve a cross-civilizational bridging in an effort to establish
shared values of people of different cultures.
3.
At this point there is a need to introduce the notion of civilisation and differentiate
it from the tainted one used by Samuel Huntington the late distinguished Harvard
professor. He was actually the one who brought me to Harvard in 1982. We were
friends, but we were also in disagreement and critical of one another. One should
speak with respect about people who passed away, but it is simply true that he did
not know much about civilisations. Still, his most successful book was The Clash of

3
Bassam Tibi, Europa ohne Identitt? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft (Mnchen: Bertelsmann,
1998).
Civilizations
4
preceded by an article of ten pages in Foreign Affairs in 1993, called A
Clash of Civilizations
5
, sparked an international debate. Within six weeks, it had
been translated into 36 languages. A publisher offered him to develop the ten pag-
es into a book. So the term clash of civilisation became very famous. But this
was not Huntingtons true field of expertise. Civilisation is a classic term in the
humanities, one that has been debated on the highest intellectual level for a long
time. I mention only a few of the most important protagonists of this debate. Their
most significant contributions, such as Will Durant do not appear in Huntingtons
book.
The man who coined the term civilisation is an Islamic philosopher. His name
is Ibn Khaldun. He wrote a Prolegomena, in Arabic Al Muqaddimah, in the fourteenth
century. He claimed to be the founder of ilm al-'umran. which means science of
civilisation. French scholars discovered his contribution as late as the 18
th
century.
Another main protagonist in the academic debate on civilisation is Will Durant. He
was an American Jew, who, together with his wife, published twelve volumes: The
Story of Civilizations.
6
The Frenchman Fernand Braudel wrote a History of Civiliza-
tions. And, finally, one of the greatest European historians, Arnold Toynbee, estab-
lished the study of civilisation as an own discipline.
When you talk about civilisational identity and relate this to Europe, the thing
you have to realise is that there are different levels of building identity. Everyone
has an individual identity. I have an individual identity: My name is Bassam. This
personal identity is unfolded in in a socialization process in family and education.
But I also have a professional identity as an academic. I have a citizenship identity
as a German citizen. There is also a pattern of a civilisational identity. For Muslims
civilisational identity is Islam. Can one though be also a European, which means
averting a conflict between Islam on the one hand, and the West and Europe on
the other? This is why most of my academic life has been devoted to harmonising
Islam, as a civilisation, not as a faith, with Europe as a civilisation in order to pro-
mote a Euro-Islam. Civilisation indeed is a major notion. When I talk about Euro-
pean identity, I speak of it in terms of a European civilisation. Such a thing does
exist. European civilisation is an idea, an idea that is documented in the history of
ideas, yes, but it is also a reality in history of a European civilisational identity.
In my teaching years in Germany (1970-2009), I made the experience that
maybe 90% of my German students and 95% of my American students claim:
The West has always been there. This is not true. European civilisation actually

4
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1996).
5
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? The Next Pattern of Conflict, Foreign Affairs
72.3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.
6
The Story of Civilization, eds. Will Durant and Ariel Durant, 12 volumes (New York: Simon & Schus-
ter, 1935-1975).
has a date of origin: It was born in the age of Charlemagne. There is a German
book called Einladung in das Mittelalter
7
, where it says: Karl der Groe ist der Be-
grnder Europas the founder of Europe and the founder of European civilisation.
There are two big epochs of European civilisation. The first epoch lasted from
Charlemagne until the beginning of the Renaissance, meaning the sixteenth centu-
ry. This first big epoch of European civilisation is defined by the term Christliches
Abendland, Christendom in English. However, we should be more precise about
this. The term should actually be Western Christendom, because Eastern Europe,
which is also Europe, had a different civilisation. There is a civilisational boundary
between Western and Eastern Europe, and the history of both entities is different.
Western Christendom later split up into Catholicism and Protestantism, but it is
still represented in one civilisation, distinct from the Eastern European civilisation.
The second epoch of Western European civilisation, lasting to date, is das skulare
Zeitalter, the secular age. Europeans remain Christians, but the values of their civili-
sation have been secular since the Renaissance. These values are based on Human-
ism, on Enlightenment, on the ideas of the French Revolution and on modern
democracy not on Christianity. It is very important to underline this point, be-
cause we have entered a period where the paradigm of secularity is being ques-
tioned. Charles Taylor recently published a book called The Secular Age, where he
challenges some of our basic notions about the retreat of religion and the domi-
nance of a secular worldview.
8
What lies ahead, I do not know. But to date, Eu-
rope is definitely a secular civilisation. Its values are secular as well. The notion of a
post-secular society is a mere construction.
4.
What are the ingredients of European identity? West Europeans have a common
history, they share some core values. Of course, diversity exists. Italy is not Swe-
den, though both belong to Europe. The same actually applies to Islam. I have
lived in Senegal in West Africa and also in Indonesia in South-East Asia. I know
both countries very well. The Senegalese people are Muslims and they are black
and the Indonesians are Asians. But both share not only the belief of Islam but
also being members of the Islamic civilisation as Islamdom. People ask: You really
want to put Italians and Swedes in the same boat? Well, civilisationally, yes. The
fact is that, within each civilisation, there is a great diversity, so we encounter both
unity and diversity. I again refer to the example of Islam: 1.7 billion people are
Muslims and they exist throughout the world and they share the core values of
Islamic civilisation. But these values of Islamic civilisations developed historically

7
Horst Fuhrmann, Einladung ins Mittelalter (Mnchen: Beck, 1987).
8
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007); German edition: Ein skulares Zeit-
alter, translated by Joachim Schulte (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012).
and are not identical with Islamic faith, though of course both are interrelated.
Europe is secular and European values are secular. And within Europe, there is
diversity on all levels, but there is also a unity in this, the unity of secular values.
How does Europe survive as a civilisation in the age of globalisation? I shall
unfold here a major idea, which has occupied my mind for the past fifteen years or
so. The idea sounds odd, but I shall explain it to you. I contend that there is simul-
taneity, Gleichzeitigkeit, of globalisation and fragmentation. And this is what affects
European identity at the present in the age of crossing civilisational borders.
I elaborated on this idea in a contribution to the two-volumes Handbook of
Global Communication, edited by Robert Fortner. Chapter 4 of that book is of mine,
and the title of the chapter is The Simultaneity of Globalization and Fragmenta-
tion.
9
The argument is that Europe is now embedded in a global structure. Glob-
alisation means the shrinking of the world. People have a high degree of mutual
awareness nowadays. When you leave after this lecture ends, you go home and may
turn on the TV or the radio and you can find out what is going on in the world, for
example in countries of the Arab Spring. The Spring has turned into a nasty winter
marked by the killing going on in Syria and Libya and elsewhere. You can learn
about the crisis in Greece. You can know what is happening in other parts of the
world, even without being there. This is a mutual awareness, an interconnectedness
that has never existed before in world history to this extent. This is globalisation,
but it only covers the structures, the economy, the sphere of politics and media.
We have a world economy, we have an international system of states, we have
global communication. Despite all of this there is no global culture, there is no
Weltkultur. This shrinking of the world does not in itself create a unity of outlook.
People have a worldview, but it is not shared with the worldview of people of
other cultures. Everybody has his or her own worldview. And there is also a civili-
sational worldview. Civilisational worldviews differ from one another just as much
as personal ones do. Higher civilisational awareness of the other does not mean
that people share the same value system. And what may follow is inter-civilisational
value conflict. Please do not confuse this notion with a clash of civilisations. If you
clash with somebody, you cannot talk to one another, because you are at war. But
if two parties have a conflict and both are rational, they sit down and negotiate and
reach a conflict resolution. Conflicts can be resolved. And in international rela-
tions, conflict resolution is one of the basic areas of research and also an important
aspect of scholars consulting politics. Nonetheless, Huntington speaks of a clash
of civilisations and he is wrong on this. He contends that there is a clash between
Islam and the West. I do not share this view.

9
Bassam Tibi, Global Communication and Cultural Particularisms: The Place of Values in the
Simultaneity of Structural Globalization and Cultural Fragmentation, in The Handbook of Global
Communication and Media Ethics, 2 volumes, eds. Robert S. Fortner and P. Mark Fackler (Chichester,
West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), volume 1, 54-78.
Among the most gratifying occurrences in my professional life is that the President
of Germany, Roman Herzog, awarded me the Cross of Merit 1
st
Class, Bundesver-
dienstkreuz Erster Klasse, in 1995. A few years after the ceremony, Roman Herzog
asked me to contribute to his book Preventing the Clash of Civilizations
10
, which is a
book against Huntingtons thinking. Despite all odds, Huntington was such a fine
person that, when the book came out in New York in 1999, he gave me a phone
call and said: Bassam, I need to talk to you. And I said: Of course. We went to
the Harvard Faculty Club. And before even saying Hello, how are you?, he said:
What is your problem? What is the problem of your President Herzog? I said:
The problem is, we are in disagreement with you. And then we had a glass of
wine and said toast. But people defame me in Germany, saying: Professor Tibi is
an adept of Huntington. This is nonsense. I disagree with the late Huntington,
but I refuse to join any vilification in loyalty to the culture of a free debate.
I coined the term inter-civilisational conflict, and my major contribution in
English on this topic is: Islam in Global Politics: Conflict and Inter-Civilizational Bridg-
ing.
11
I received the Bundesverdienstkreuz from President Herzog for my mediation
and bridging, Brckenbau, between the civilisations. It is possible to do that. If
you take European identity as a model at face value, it is possible to engage in
bridging. And so the idea that I present to you is the following: Cultural fragmenta-
tion means that people are not in agreement with regard to values. The world is
globalised. There is a shrinking of the world, structurally and in terms of commu-
nication. But in terms of values, there is no agreement, there are no shared univer-
sal values. Not even human rights are shared. There is a Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, but rights are not shared. In 1993, the United Nations organised a
huge conference in Vienna to commemorate the Declaration of Human Rights of
1948. People were in disagreement in arguing: There are claims for the existence
of Asian human rights, Islamic human rights, African human rights. These claims
are expressions of cultural fragmentation. How can one deal with these cultural
tensions? I think that we can do the job in engaging in dialogue and by bridging. In
this way one can reach a conflict resolution.
5.
In the addressed context the question arises: Can Europe maintain its identity in an
age of globalisation without risking the exclusion of migrants? Among these new-
comers are Muslims, but people also come to Europe from all over the world. In
the past I have visited different countries in West Africa, one of them is the former

10
Bassam Tibi, International Morality and Cross-Cultural Bridging, in Preventing the Clash of Civiliza-
tions: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, ed. Roman Herzog (New York: St. Martins Press,
1999), 107-126.
11
Tibi, Islam in Global Politics.
Belgian Congo. People there know everything that is going on in the world
through the media. Once you leave Kinshasa, after a hundred kilometres you are
already in a jungle. And there you cannot pay with money, so you exchange cloth-
ing for wooden artefacts, wonderful sculptures Also in Senegal, I encountered
young boys: I give you three shirts and you give me four sculptures and we are in
agreement. I gave them the three shirts. And one of them said: Monsieur, vous tes
raciste. Mister, you are a racist. I said: I am sorry, how can you accuse me of an
evil like that? He said: You are thinking Im an African, Im not well informed.
Your shirts are old-fashioned. I said: I didnt know that. But he knew that the
colour was not modern. They read the relevant magazines, so they know stuff like
this. This is globalisation. The knowledge of these people about Europe and about
the prosperity here becomes a source of will to migration. How can Europe man-
age this?
People want to come to Europe. At least 40 to 50% of the new migrants are
Muslims. They flee poverty in their home countries, and also despotic rule. The
number has been increasing. In 1950, there were less than one million Muslims
living in Western Europe. Today, there are 25 to 30 millions. By the middle of the
century, there will be 50, maybe 60 million Muslims living on the continent. Will
Europe be able to digest this migration and continue to be European in terms of
identity? This is the core question. I participated in a symposium at Berkeley
named Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe. We published a book on our
findings, under the title Euro-Islam or Muslim Europe?
12
This book title refers to two
scenarios: either Muslims become European and Islam will be Europeanised in the
process, or Europe could actually be gradually Islamised in one hundred years as
some Islamists envision the future.
Which one is it going to happen? I plead for a Leitkultur as a way for Europe to
both accommodate in an inclusive manner immigrants and to maintain its identi-
ty. Leitkultur does not refer to a homogeneous culture nor to hegemony. Leitkultur
is rather a guiding culture, based on a cross-cultural consensus between migrants
and Europeans over five core issues: democracy, separation of religion and politics,
human rights, civil society and religious pluralism.
However, what is actually happening in Europe today is that there is an ethni-
cisation of Islam. To be sure, Ethnicity runs counter to the idea of integration and
citizenship.
13
I am a Muslim from Syria. I am different from a Turkish Muslim or a
Senegalese Muslim or a Bengali Muslim. We dont have the same ethnicity. You
can share citizenship, but you cannot be Kurdish and Turkish at the same time.

12
Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, ed. Nezar Alsay-
yad, symposium Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe, Berkeley, 1998 (Lanham, Md, Oxford:
Lexington, 2002).
13
See the reference in note 1 and my article on this subject-matter: Bassam Tibi, Ethnicity of Fear?
Islamic Migration and the Ethnicization of Islam in Europe, Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism
Vol.10, 1 (2010), pp.126-157.
You cannot be African and European in the ethnic sense at the same time. But you
can share values, you can share citizenship. Although Muslims do not create an
ethnicity there is a progressing ethnicisation of Islam in Europe becoming poten-
tially a source of an ethnicity of fear, because it could indeed lead to violent con-
flicts
14
. There was a warning signal for that. In 2005, there was an uprising in the
banlieues, the suburbs of the major French cities, which are basically inhabited by
Muslims of North and West Africa. It was in fact a Muslim ethnic upheaval, but
people refused to take this seriously. Even the French government said that the
uprising had nothing to do with Islam. People refused to acknowledge the ethnic-
ity of fear, as well as the related conflicts.
6.
The conclusion I draw as an international relations scholar, is that Europes out-
look in the future, is a difficult one. So if you ask me: What is the future of Euro-
pean identity?, my answer would be: It depends on ethnic Europeans and on
migrants, including Muslim migrants. What is going to happen to Europe in the
future? Will people fight each other or will they find a basis of agreement for living
together in cross-culturally sharing a value system of a civil society that serves as a
Leitkultur? I have indicated the alternatives that are presenting themselves as re-
gards Europes future identity in the title of my chapter in the Cornell Research
Project book Religion in an Expanding Europe: I coined the formula Europeanizing
Islam or the Islamization of Europe
15
in that book published by Cambridge Uni-
versity press. Lets hope the best for Europe in the 21
st
century.

Bibliography
Alsayyad, Nezar, ed. Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in
the Age of Globalization. Lanham, Md, Oxford: Lexington, 2002.
Durant, Will, and Ariel Durant, eds. The Story of Civilization, 12 volumes (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1935-1975).
Fuhrmann, Horst. Einladung ins Mittelalter. Mnchen: Beck, 1987.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

14
Ibd.
15
Bassam Tibi, Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: Political Democracy vs. Cultural
Difference, in: Religion in an Expanding Europe, ed. Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 204-24.
The Clash of Civilizations? The Next Pattern of Conflict, Foreign Af-
fairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49.
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2007.
Ein skulares Zeitalter. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012.
Tibi, Bassam. Ethnicity of Fear? Islamic Migration and the Ethnicization of Islam
in Europe. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 10, no. 1 (2010): 126-157.
Europa ohne Identitt? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Mnchen: Ber-
telsmann, 1998.
Europeanizing Islam or the Islamization of Europe: Political Democracy
vs. Cultural Difference. In Religion in an Expanding Europe, edited by Timothy
A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein, 204-24. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006.
Global Communication and Cultural Particularisms: The Place of Values
in the Simultaneity of Structural Globalization and Cultural Fragmentation. In
The Handbook of Global Communication and Media Ethics, 2 volumes, edited by
Robert S. Fortner and P. Mark Fackler, volume 1, 54-78. Chichester, West Sus-
sex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011.
International Morality and Cross-Cultural Bridging. In Preventing the Clash
of Civiliza-tions: A Peace Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, edited by Roman Her-
zog, 107-126. New York: St. Martins Press, 1999.
Islam in Global Politics: Conflict and Cross-Civilizational Bridging. New York:
Routledge, 2012.
The return of Ethnicity to Europe via Islamic Migration? The Ethniciza-
tion of the Islamic Diaspora. In Ethnic Europe. Mobility, Identity, and Conflict in a
Globalized World, edited by Robert Hsu, 127-156. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2010.

How (Not) to Fix European Identity?
Lars Klein
Does European Identity Matter?
Throughout the European sovereign debt crisis, there has been much debate
about how to best handle this crisis politically, but little mention of the deeper
reasons for why people in other European countries should be prepared to cover
the debts of Greece or other troubled states. Politicians have been tending to ex-
plain the entanglements of national economies, the dynamics of the currency mar-
ket and the sheer necessity to come to a European solution. One either might take
it as a good sign that there did not seem to be any need for further explanation. Or
one might see that many chances have been missed all these years to solidify the
basis of European politics. This basis has previously been discussed under the label
European identity, prominently in the course of the Iraq War of 2003 and the
failed referenda on the European Constitution.
This article discusses the debate on European identity in a historical perspec-
tive and outlines the ways in which a common identity could be sensed or dis-
missed. The title refers to both the attempt to pinpoint a European identity and to
restore it, as there has arguably been some damage done to the European unifica-
tion process.
1
The question raised will be: How to trace and to define a common
European identity? What for? Would a clear idea of a European identity help to
overcome the alleged democratic deficit of the European Union? Or would it be
better not to fix any European identity and to leave its meaning open for debate?
No Function beyond Bookkeeping?
The breakdown of the master-narratives and the reclaiming of histories and iden-
tities have been major issues of postmodern and postcolonial theories.
2
The con-
cept of identity has been coined by philosophers, social scientists and psycholo-

1
Whenever I speak of European identity here, I understand it according to the definition of identi-
ty given in: Simon Clarke, Culture and Identity, in The Sage Handbook of Cultural Analysis, ed. Tony
Bennett and John Frow (Los Angeles: Sage, 2008), 510.
2
The term master-narrative is used according to: Jean-Franois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
gists and has been considered a growth industry in the academy.
3
It has been
deconstructed, claimed to be fragmented or damaged, even dismissed as such.
Although one thus might easily have the impression that this term is a soft one, it
is actually nothing the like.
Since its appearance on the European stage in the 1970s, identity has been ra-
ther a hard than a soft topic. Independent of all academic debates, the idea to es-
tablish a European identity in politics has been pursued as a means to further es-
tablish Europe as a world actor.
4
The enforcement of such an identity in the 1970s
can be considered a consequence of globalization, as the world struggled with the
oil crisis and the financial system experienced major shifts with the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods system. European statesmen like the French President Valry
Giscard dEstaing and the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt sought to find
solutions on European and international levels. And with an eroding political
legitimacy at the national level during the neoliberal 1980s, [i]dentity became the
concept in this search for compensation.
5
Ultimately, the twin notions of civili-
zation unity and cultural diversity, which have later been translated into unity in
diversity, gained importance.
6

The European Union has largely achieved the immediate aims of the European
unification process the reconciliation of nations, security, mobility and, within
limits, prosperity. As these achievements are being turned into a lived reality, it is
held that Europeans got used to them to such a degree that the EU loses its inte-
grating powers.
7
This raises the question about the role the EU can play for Eu-
rope as well as beyond. A Europe that has no function beyond bookkeeping,
Adolf Muschg has warned as early as 2003, loses its basis as a society of solidari-
ty.
8
Faced with the ways in which Greece has been forced to cut costs in order to
comply with the demands of European and financial institutions, one would have a
hard time disagreeing with those who consider the EU a purely economic endeav-
our or speak of a Europe that was built in Brussels and Strasbourg as a a sort of

3
Linda Martin Alcoff, Whos Afraid of Identity Politics? in Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the
Predicament of Postmodernism, ed. Paula M. L. Moya and Michael R. Hames-Garcia (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2000), 312.
4
Aurlie lisa Gfeller, Imagining European Identity: French Elites and the American Challenge in
the PompidouNixon Era, Contemporary European History 19.2 (2010): 146.
5
Bo Strth, A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept, European Journal of Social
Theory 5.4 (2002): 390.
6
Gfeller, Imagining European Identity, 149.
7
Bettina Thalmeier, Mglichkeiten und Grenzen einer europischen Identittspolitik, in Europische
Identitt: Voraussetzungen und Strategien, ed. Julian Nida-Rmelin and Werner Weidenfeld (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 2007), 175.
8
Adolf Muschg, Core Europe: Thoughts about the European Identity, in Old Europe, New Europe,
Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, ed. Daniel Levy et al. (London: Verso, 2005), 21.
civilizing power that imposes a certain way of life on indigenous peoples.
9
In a
similar vein, Jrgen Habermas warned of the success of neoliberal orthodoxy,
10

which seemed to be achieved with the initiatives by Angela Merkel and Nicolas
Sarkozy during the European sovereign debt crisis. He called for reclaiming po-
litical creative powers on the supranational level.
11

On the European level, the financial crisis overshadowed the revolts in many
Arab countries, which, interestingly, left European politicians passive, at times
helpless in their reactions and again divided. Though these issues raised the ques-
tion of the underlying principles of European politics, recent debates were less
concerned with values and identity but rather with political bodies and ways to
enable the EU to deal with the still unfolding crisis. Here, Habermas aimed for a
strengthening of democratic institutions and has once again called for speeding up
the process of integration.
12
His ideas, however, were in sharp conflict with those
of the political elite as represented by Merkel and Sarkozy. Nevertheless, Habermas
again underlined his vision of an EU-Europe that stands for an important step in
the development of a cosmopolitan world domestic politics.
13

Searching for a Basis of European Integration
Most often when a fostered integration is called for, it is by referring to a Europe-
an identity, which supposedly still is not strong enough to carry a Europe of 27.
But what is it that defines Europe; that gives a hint of its identity? And why would
it be relevant anyhow to define it? Postmodernists may consider Europe a telling
example of the breakdown of master-narratives, as there are 70 plus languages
spoken
14
on a continent that has always had many centres and many peripheries.
15

Wolfgang Schmale speaks of a discourse on Europe that was a quest for historical
roots that would be the consequence of a long history rather than its aim or re-
sult.
16
In other words, writes Willfried Spohn, the evolutionary thesis of the
making of a European identity states a crucial long-term trend, but this trend has

9
These words were meant ironically. See Thomas Mergel, Europe as Leisure Time Communication:
Tourism and Transnational Interaction since 1945, in Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary
Histories, ed. Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger (New York: Berghahn, 2007), 133.
10
Jrgen Habermas, Ach, Europa: Kleine politische Schriften XI (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008), 85
(own translation).
11
Ibid., 86.
12
Jrgen Habermas, Wir brauchen Europa! Die neue Hartleibigkeit: Ist uns die gemeinsame Zu-
kunft schon gleichgltig geworden? Die Zeit, 20 May 2010.
13
Jrgen Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011), 39-96.
14
Anssi Paasi, Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and
Identity, European Urban and Regional Studies 8.1 (2001): 9.
15
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, Modernity and the Construction of Collective Identities, International
Journal of Comparative Sociology 39.1 (1998): 140-3.
16
Wolfgang Schmale, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europischen Identitt (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2008),
32.
to be contextualized in the complex, contradictory and by no means, predeter-
mined movement of European [] integration.
17

One context in which identity is of major relevance for the EU is its democratic
deficit. In his smirking text Brussels, the Gentle Monster or The Disenfranchisement of
Europe, Hans Magnus Enzensberger holds that the democracy deficit has been
understood as a chronic deficiency disease that seemingly is not easy to cure,
while it had never been a medical mystery in the first place but rather an intention-
al policy decision.
18
The voter turnout at European parliament elections does not
seem to point to a strong interest of the people in their European representation.
But these figures alone do not suffice to substantiate a mere disinterest in Europe.
According to Eurobarometer 71 from 2009, 53% of all European citizens consid-
ered EU membership of their respective countries a good thing. That was at least
10% more than the voter turnout at the elections for the European Parliament of
the same year. In 2010, and thus before the implementation of the European Sta-
bility Mechanism and subsequent actions, Europeans had more confidence in the
EU with regard to handling the financial crisis than in other national or interna-
tional bodies; 82% wanted the EU to play an even bigger role.
19
Michael Bruter,
among others, has shown that a European identity was actually unfolding.
20
Eu-
rope has been identified by a common currency and easy mobility, travels, com-
munication.
This feeling of Europeanness by the Europeans was much-discussed in 2003,
when the European Convention presented its draft for a European Constitution.
At the same time, a fierce debate on the necessity of a new Iraq War unfolded.
Drawing on both, Jrgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida started their famous initi-
ative on What Binds Europeans Together and suggested a definition of Europe against
an other, namely the United States.
21
Processes of othering have a long tradition
in transatlantic relations and their (mis)understandings as well. In this sense, this
idea was not new, neither in form nor in content. Did it get us closer to a defini-
tion of European identity? Habermas and Derrida proposed to widen national

17
Spohn is referring to Eastern European integration in his text. See Willfried Spohn, National
Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe, in Collective Memory and European Identity:
The Effects of Integration and Enlargement, ed. Willfried Spohn and Klaus Eder (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2005), 13. Cf. Schmale, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europischen Identitt, 178.
18
Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Sanftes Monster Brssel oder Die Entmndigung Europas (Berlin: Suhrkamp,
2011), 52 (own translation).
19
Eurobarometer 74: ffentliche Meinung in der Europischen Union, Autumn 2010, ed. Europe-
an Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_de_de_nat.pdf (accessed 5 March
2011).
20
Michael Bruter, Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005).
21
For the text cf. Jacques Derrida and Jrgen Habermas, February 15, or What Binds Europeans
Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe, Constellations 10.3
(2003): 291-7.
identities so that they could encompass a European dimension.
22
John McCormick
further elaborated on the features it might entail in his discussion of Euro-
peanism.
23

Indeed, Europeans seemed united in their opposition against a looming war in
Iraq. In order to make their voices heard on 15 February 2003, millions protested
against a looming war, among them an estimated one million people in Rome,
10,000 in Zagreb, half a million in Berlin and in London, up to two million in Ma-
drid, 100,000 in New York, and about thirty people in Budapest.
24
The figures
point at least to two conflicting positions that were based on different experiences:
Many, including Joschka Fischer and others, referred to the Second World War in
order to explain why they could not easily go out there and tell my people: Well,
lets go to a war.
25
For others, including the authors of the Letter of Eight,
26
it
seemed more pressing not to alienate the United States that had been guaranteeing
European freedom for decades. The initiative proved Isaiah Berlin right in his
diagnosis of a nave craving for unity and symmetry at the expense of experi-
ence.
27

How to deal with this situation? The concept of core Europe might offer a
way out, a concept that was originally outlined by two protagonists of the German
Christian Democrats in 1994, Wolfgang Schuble and Karl Lamers.
28
Habermas
and Derrida elaborated on their idea and suggested to focus on those countries
that were most likely to adhere to common positions already. This core Europe
was meant to consist of Germany, France and the Benelux countries. Other mem-
ber states were welcome to join policy-making processes once they were ready to
accept the agreed European positions. Eastern European intellectuals in particular
felt excluded and reacted with disbelief and anger. To them, talking of core Eu-
rope meant to cancel the search for a common basis to European politics.
29

22
See: Craig Calhoun, Cosmopolitan Europe and European Studies, in The Sage Handbook of Euro-
pean Studies, ed. Chris Rumford (London: Sage, 2009), 647.
23
John McCormick, Europeanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
24
The figure for Budapest stated according to Esterhzys own counting. For the figure and his
remarks, see Pter Esterhzy, How Big is the European Dwarf?, in Old Europe, New Europe, Core
Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, ed. Daniel Levy et al. (London: Verso, 2005), 76.

25
Joschka Fischer (paper presented at the Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany, 8 Febru-
ary 2003).
26
Published on 30 January 2003, written by the heads of state of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the United
Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark. See: Jose Maria Aznar et al., Lead-
ers Statement on Iraq: Full Text, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2708877.stm
(accessed 5 March 2012).
27
Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 5.
28
The paper was issued on 1 September 1994. See Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schuble, berlegun-
gen zur europischen Politik, http://www.cducsu.de/upload/schaeublelamers94.PDF (accessed 5
March 2012).
29
Esterhzy, How Big is the European Dwarf?
Would that mean to not only have a core group of states but also European fea-
tures that are to be added to national identities, so that they overlap here and
there? Willfried Spohn argues against any dualistic model where one either feels
European or is more attached to the nation. He emphasises the constant interac-
tion between many different identities.
30
Bo Strth adds that Europe, the nation
and the region,

constitute three levels of abstraction, which in practice and in politics are en-
tangled. [] Ideas of belonging are overlapping, inclusive and exclusive in
complex and contradictory patterns, where it would be far too simple to put
a European identity against national ones. Europe has been and is both an
active element of national, and of other identifications and, at the same time,
something different and separate from national and other identifications.
Europe is both We and the Other.
31

Building on a new conceptualization of culture and feelings of belonging
We are left with the diagnosis that although much has been done in terms of estab-
lishing a common European identity both bottom-up and top-down , a com-
mon conscience of European identity has not been established. What was seen
positively by Strth is formulated in negative terms by Gerard Delanty. He holds
that Europeans were not

particularly united among themselves. It is unlikely that they will unite
against an Other. If there is not a European self or subject, there cannot be
an easily defined Other. There is neither a European state nor a European
people, although there do appear to be Europeans. The newly articulated
European self-understanding [] cannot be seen as a unified collective
identity based on a pre-existing community linked by a hyphen to the shared
political community of the liberal public sphere.
32

As much as a European public sphere is considered a precondition for an evolving
European identity, as much are the difficulties in establishing it overestimated. A
minimalist version would mean for national public spheres to open for each other
in osmotic ways.
33
This opening, of course, rests on the interest for the other
and for a European view.
If we understand the difference between political and cultural identity to be
similar to Aleida Assmanns division into political and cultural memory, one could
consider political identity as a top-down approach and cultural identity as a more

30
Spohn, National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Europe, 4.
31
Strth, A European Identity, 390.
32
Gerard Delanty, What Does It Mean to Be a European?, Innovation 18.1 (2005): 19.
33
Habermas, Ach, Europa, 108 (own translation).
democratic, the bottom-up approach.
34
Identity is worked on from both ends and
it is their interplay that counts and that is not yet achieved. The democratic defi-
cit cannot be levelled out by attaching core values to the EU and its constitutional
treaties. In contrast, not fixing a European identity would not equal giving up on
Europe but could mean accepting diversity, acknowledging different experiences
and different conclusions from them. The basis for European politics thus would
be the mere willingness to cooperate out of choice and necessity at the same time,
to do so in a way that allows for diversity and in the understanding to aim for unity
and peace. These are conditions under which to collaborate that need to be reiter-
ated and substantiated, not by politicians but by the producers of cultural memory:
writers, academics, intellectuals. During the European sovereign debt crisis, their
lacking engagement has been met by the clear choice of politicians to enforce elite
decisions. Implicitly, Habermas has diagnosed the silence of intellectuals, when he
claimed that there had to be a sense of what is missing and could be different,
some fantasy to sketch alternatives and the courage to polarise.
35

This form of a European identity can only be based on a new conceptualiza-
tion of culture and feelings of belonging that Bo Strth refers to, of which
[a]mbivalence, transition and being more historically informed are some key ele-
ments.
36
Openness on the margins, the ability to think of and practice borders in
a non-linear way, to understand them as spaces of crossover, of mediation and
translation, these are the features Wolfgang Schmale names with reference to
Etienne Balibar in an eminently positive fashion as Europes strengths.
37
There
needs to be an arena for an open debate about Europe, for an ongoing search for
equilibrium in unstable niches,
38
which would be based on restlessness in the
attempt to find the common disquieting element, as Pter Esterhzy writes.
39
If
this basis is taken seriously, it cannot be met by a true financial government but by
strengthening the European Parliament, by elections, referenda and most of all by
open debates.

34
Aleida Assmann, Memory, Individual and Collective, in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political
Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 210-24.
35
Habermas, Ach, Europa, 84.
36
Strth, A European Identity, 399.
37
Schmale, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europischen Identitt, 178.
38
Muschg, Core Europe: Thoughts about the European Identity, 27.
39
Esterhzy, How Big is the European Dwarf?, 79.
Bibliography
Alcoff, Linda Martin. Whos Afraid of Identity Politics? In Reclaiming Identity:
Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism, edited by Paula M. L. Moya and
Michael R. Hames-Garcia, 312-44. Berkeley: University of California Press,
2000.
Assmann, Aleida. Memory, Individual and Collective. In The Oxford Handbook of
Contextual Political Analysis, edited by Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly, 210-
24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Aznar, Jose Maria, et al. Leaders Statement on Iraq: Full Text. BBC News,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2708877.stm (accessed 5 March 2012).
Berlin, Isaiah. Historical Inevitability. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
Bruter, Michael. Citizens of Europe? The Emergence of a Mass European Identity. Basing-
stoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Calhoun, Craig. Cosmopolitan Europe and European Studies. In The Sage Hand-
book of European Studies, edited by Chris Rumford, 637-54. London: Sage, 2009.
Clarke, Simon. Culture and Identity. In The Sage Handbook of Cultural Analysis,
edited by Tony Bennett and John Frow, 510-29. Los Angeles: Sage, 2008.
Delanty, Gerard. What Does It Mean to Be a European? Innovation 18.1 (2005):
11-22.
Derrida, Jacques, and Jrgen Habermas. February 15, or What Binds Europeans
Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Eu-
rope. Constellations 10.3 (2003): 291-7.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. Modernity and the Construction of Collective Identities.
International Journal of Comparative Sociology 39.1 (1998): 138-58.
Enzensberger, Hans Magnus. Sanftes Monster Brssel oder Die Entmndigung Europas.
Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011.
Esterhzy, Pter. How Big is the European Dwarf? In Old Europe, New Europe,
Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, edited by Daniel Levy et al.,
74-9. London: Verso, 2005.
European Commission, ed. Eurobarometer 74: ffentliche Meinung in der Eu-
ropischen Union. Autumn 2010.
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_de_de_nat.pdf
Gfeller, Aurlie lisa. Imagining European Identity: French Elites and the Ameri-
can Challenge in the PompidouNixon Era. Contemporary European History 19.2
(2010): 133-49.
Habermas, Jrgen. Ach, Europa: Kleine politische Schriften XI. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 2008.
Wir brauchen Europa! Die neue Hartleibigkeit: Ist uns die gemeinsame
Zukunft schon gleichgltig geworden? Die Zeit, 20 May 2010.
Zur Verfassung Europas: Ein Essay. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011.
Lamers, Karl, and Wolfgang Schuble. berlegungen zur europischen Politik. 1
September 1994. http://www.cducsu.de/upload/schaeublelamers94.PDF
Lyotard, Jean-Franois. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
McCormick, John. Europeanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Mergel, Thomas. Europe as Leisure Time Communication: Tourism and Trans-
national Interaction since 1945. In Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contempo-
rary Histories, edited by Konrad H. Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger, 133-53.
New York: Berghahn, 2007.
Muschg, Adolf. Core Europe: Thoughts about the European Identity. In Old
Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, edited
by Daniel Levy et al., 21-7. London: Verso, 2005.
Paasi, Anssi. Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place,
Boundaries and Identity. European Urban and Regional Studies 8.1 (2001): 7-28.
Schmale, Wolfgang. Geschichte und Zukunft der Europischen Identitt. Stuttgart: Kohl-
hammer, 2008.
Spohn, Willfried. National Identities and Collective Memory in an Enlarged Eu-
rope. In Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and En-
largement, edited by Willfried Spohn and Klaus Eder, 1-14. Aldershot: Ashgate,
2005.
Strth, Bo. A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept. European
Journal of Social Theory 5.4 (2002): 387-401.
Thalmeier, Bettina. Mglichkeiten und Grenzen einer europischen Identittspoli-
tik. In Europische Identitt: Voraussetzungen und Strategien, edited by Julian Nida-
Rmelin and Werner Weidenfeld, 169-96. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007.

Cosmopolitanism and European Identity
John McCormick
Introduction
The idea of cosmopolitanism has been revitalized since the mid-1990s as one of a
multitude of explanations for contemporary society, taking its place alongside (and
overlapping with) such concepts as globalization, multiculturalism, postmodern-
ism, post-industrialism, and late capitalism.
1
Much has been said in particular about
the cosmopolitan qualities of the European Union (EU), which Archibugi de-
scribes as the the first international model which begins to resemble the cosmo-
politan model.
2
Roche claims that Europe is leading the world in the construc-
tion of a globally relevant regional international and trans-national order and gov-
ernance system,
3
and Delanty argues that to be European is less about culture and
politics and more about an orientation to the world that fits with the cosmopolitan
spirit.
4

And yet the debate about the cosmopolitan qualities of the EU has to date
been almost entirely theoretical,
5
and little effort has been made to apply cosmo-
politan notions to the practical realties of European integration. A modest excep-
tion to the rule is offered by Frith, who makes an attempt to see how cosmopoli-
tan principles are reflected in gender issues in the EU and concludes that the issue
of gender equality offers further evidence that cosmopolitan democracy should
not be dismissed as simply utopian dreaming [].
6
However, cosmopolitan ideas

1
For background, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Kant and Cosmopolitanism, in Perpetual Peace: Essays
on Kants Cosmopolitan Ideal, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1997), 25-57; Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democ-
racy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
2
Daniele Archibugi, Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, in Re-imagining Political Community:
Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, ed. Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Khler (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1998), 219.
3
Maurice Roche, Cultural Europeanization and the Cosmopolitan Condition: European Union
Regulation and European Sport, in Cosmopolitanism and Europe, ed. Chris Rumford (Liverpool: Liver-
pool University Press, 2007), 128.
4
Gerard Delanty, What Does it Mean to be a European?, Innovation: The European Journal of Social
Sciences 18.1 (2005): 11-22.
5
See, for example, Daniele Archibugi and David Held, eds., Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a
New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Jacques Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness
(London: Routledge 2001); Luis Cabrera, Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the
World State (New York: Routledge, 2004); Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, eds., The Political Philos-
ophy of Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Patrick Hayden, Cosmopolitan
Global Politics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Robert Fine, Cosmopolitanism (London: Routledge, 2007).
6
Robert Frith, Cosmopolitan Democracy and the EU: The Case of Gender, Political Studies 56.1
(2008): 231.
are clearly at the foundation of European positions on human rights, the environ-
ment, capital punishment, and conflict resolution, and can also help us better un-
derstand European perceptions about the dynamics of the international system and
the way that Europe conducts its collective foreign policy. By living for so long so
closely to other cultures with other languages and histories and by having learned
so expensively the costs of nationalism, Europeans perhaps more than the peo-
ples of any other societies have been obliged to learn how to cooperate and to
respect differences.
This article is an attempt to apply cosmopolitan ideas to the realities of the
European experience, focusing on two areas in which those ideas are relatively
clear and in which Europe is distinctive from other parts of the world. The first
area concerns attitudes towards patriotism, where the idea of love of country has
been sullied by its association with war and conflict and Europeans have moved
away from association with states towards association instead with ideas (otherwise
known as constitutional patriotism). The second example of cosmopolitan ideas at
work in Europe is offered by its preference for multilateralism in international
affairs. Regional integration has helped move Europeans away from realist ideas
about the self-interest of states and an anarchic global system more towards the
idea that states can and should define and defend common interests.
Understanding cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolites hold that all humans belong to a single community, in which they
are subject to the same moral standards and have a responsibility for other hu-
mans. Local and global concerns cannot be separated or divorced and, rather than
the world being separate from the community or state in which each of us lives, it
is in fact the only community that matters. Cosmopolites accept the foreign hospi-
tably, argue that all humans should be treated equally, and emphasize the im-
portance of drawing on different traditions and cultures and of remaining open to
other ways of life.
7
David Held defines it as a moral and political outlook which
builds on the strength of the liberal multilateral order, particularly its commitment
to universal standards, human rights and democratic values, and which seeks to
specify general principles on which all could act and that could serve as the guid-

7
See discussion in Margaret C. Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early
Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), Introduction; Thomas W.
Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, in Ethics 103.1 (1992): 48-75. Simon Caney, Justice beyond
Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6.
ing ethical basis of global social democracy.
8
For Beck, it is about issues of global
concern becoming part of the everyday local experiences of ordinary people.
9

Cosmopolitanism has conventionally been portrayed as little more than an ide-
al, compelling in theory (to some) but essentially impractical and impracticable (to
others). There were many from Diogenes and the Stoics to Renaissance and
Enlightenment thinkers, Voltaire, Bentham, Kant and Marx who reflected upon
the community of mankind and the duties that humans had to all other humans.
With the rise of 19
th
century nationalism, however, cosmopolitan ideas were mar-
ginalized and were to remain largely dormant until the second half of the 20
th
cen-
tury when they were given new life by the cumulative effects of two world wars
and the subsequent threat of nuclear and environmental destruction.
10
Cosmopoli-
tan principles were at the heart of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
its focus on rights as the entitlement of all, regardless of race, gender, religion,
national or social origin, or the political, jurisdictional, or international status of the
country or territory to which people belong. They also underlay the concept of
crimes against humanity, whose origins are conventionally traced through the 1907
Hague Convention to the postwar Nuremburg and Tokyo trials.
The end of the Cold War and the widening awareness of the effects of globali-
zation have brought cosmopolitanism to a wider audience, although it is a concept
still debated more by philosophers and sociologists than by political scientists or
economists. It has been associated with a belief in global political institutions, but
this idea of world government is controversial; rather than implying the surrender
of sovereignty or security, cosmopolitanism instead expects world citizens to place
the welfare of human society above the more narrow pursuit of national interests.
In terms of international relations theory, it stands in clear distinction to realism,
and is based on what Caney describes as a society of states approach, which
maintains that a just global order is one in which there are states and the states
accept that they have moral duties to other states.
11

That Europe is not yet more routinely discussed in cosmopolitan terms is
probably due to unresolved questions over the identity and meaning of Europe
and over the character and personality of the EU. The many doubts pertaining to
the achievements of European integration have diverted the debate away from the
prospects for the kind of supra-European society that cosmopolitanism implies.
And yet many Europeans even if they are not yet necessarily cosmopolites on a
global scale are becoming cosmopolites on a regional scale. Increasingly, they

8
David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 171-8.
9
Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies, Theory, Culture and Society 19.1-2 (2002):
17-44.
10
Derek Heater, What Is Citizenship? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 136.
11
Simon Caney, Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
10.
believe that local, state, and regional European concerns cannot be separated or
divorced and that Europe is as important for their political and economic welfare
as the communities or states in which Europeans live or the nations with which
they identify. As the hold of the European state declines, as the meaning of nation-
alism is redefined, and as the focus of citizenship and patriotism changes, so the
loyalty of Europeans is shifting away from an exclusive focus on the state or the
nation, and is moving towards identity with the ideas and values that Europeans
have in common.
Patriotism
If there is one area in which many Europeans have clearly adopted cosmopolitan
qualities, it is in regard to patriotism. Defined generally as love of country, patriot-
ism can be value-based (driven by support for the merits and achievements of a
country) or egocentric (driven rather less rationally by a personal association a
patriot loves his or her country simply because it is theirs).
12
It has far from disap-
peared in Europe: in France the tricolour is omnipresent and presidents repeatedly
speak of the importance of national pride; in Britain almost any anniversary involv-
ing the monarch is an opportunity for an explosion of patriotic fervour; and inter-
national sporting contests inevitably lead to much flag-waving. There have also
been repeated instances of economic patriotism as Europeans debate the sale of
national business and corporations to foreign buyers, and particularly in the
wake of the economic downturn of 2007-2009 much evidence of the ambiva-
lence that many Europeans feel about globalization.
But with such exceptions, there are few Europeans today who are willing to
wear patriotism on their sleeves in the way in which their forbears once did. Patri-
otism has been sullied in Europe by its historical association with nationalism and
by it co-option in recent decades by assertive nationalists using national symbols to
express their opposition to immigration. So far has this gone in Britain, for exam-
ple, that the British Union Jack has absurdly come to be associated in the
minds of some with racism, nationalism, and opposition to multiculturalism. More
tellingly, however, patriotism has been weakened by the declining allegiance of
Europeans with the states that have for so long been the cradles and the nurseries
of patriotism.
Polls reflect the distinctive views of Europeans. The World Values Survey in
2003-04 found that less than half the residents of most European states were very
proud of their nationality
13
, and when a Pew Global Attitudes survey presented
the statement Our people are not perfect, but our culture is superior to others,
only 33-40 % of Germans, Britons, and French agreed, compared to 60 % of

12
Igor Primoratz, ed., Patriotism (New York: Humanity Books, 2002).
13
World Values Survey 2003-04, at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org (accessed June 2009).
Americans.
14
Where Americans are more patriotic and repeatedly describe their
country as the greatest on earth, the one most blessed by God, and the one where
democracy and the free market allow ordinary people to achieve more with their
lives than is possible anywhere else, this comparative and superlative element is
almost entirely missing from the utterances of most Europeans. They may take
pride and comfort in being Polish or French or Swedish, but they will rarely claim
that they have greater opportunities or are more blessed by God.
Patriotism is also often criticized for being too parochial and for encouraging
the promotion of state or national interests at the expense of broader and more
universal interests. Europeans now not only debate patriotism, but they also debate
the object of such patriotism. Against the background of a declining attachment to
the state and a growing attachment to the nation, what are the prospects for a new
European patriotism? The answer depends upon the extent to which Europeans
can be convinced that they have enough in common and that their self-identity
need not rest alone on association with states or nations. In this respect, constitu-
tional patriotism holds potential as a means to understanding European perspec-
tives. This is understood as a belief that the universal principles of the democratic
constitutional state are the only acceptable basis for identification with a state.
15

While it has been dismissed by some
16
as a useful way of understanding the Euro-
pean experience, it has not yet been explored in more than theoretical terms.
Would it be better to not fix any European identity and to leave its meaning open
for debate?
Multilateralism
The European Security Strategy included a call for an international order based on
effective multilateralism, a phrase that sparked something of a minor firestorm
of academic and political debate. The keys to effective multilateralism are rules,
cooperation, and inclusiveness as well as the building of a sustainable consensus
among states.
17
Since the EU is by definition a multilateral institution, Europeans
are familiar with most of its possibilities and pitfalls, and while the results have not
always been ideal, to the extent that we learn from our mistakes, Europeans have
had much opportunity to learn.

14
Pew Global Attitudes Project, Views of a Changing World (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center
for the People and the Press, 2003), T59.
15
Daniel Levy, Max Pensky and John Torpey, Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Rela-
tions after the Iraq War (London: Verso, 2005), xv.
16
Mattias Kumm, Why Europeans Will Not Embrace Constitutional Patriotism, International Journal
of Constitutional Law 6.1 (2008): 117-36.
17
See discussion in John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, Interna-
tional Organization 46.3 (1992): 561-98; idem, Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institu-
tional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
In contrasting American and European perceptions and approaches, Kagan argues
that the former are less inclined to act through international institutions, less likely
to work cooperatively with other nations to pursue common goals, and more scep-
tical about international law []. By contrast, he claims, Europeans are quicker to
appeal to international law, international conventions, and international opinion.
18

One of the contrasts is evident in the way in which European leaders have placed a
premium on cooperation and on the promotion of values rather than of interests.
In their approach to numerous problems, including terrorism, arms control, non-
proliferation, international trade, the environment, and human rights, the Ameri-
cans have emphasized self-interest while the Europeans have worked to be more
inclusive.
Europeans are also distinctive from Americans in their reluctance to use their
militaries other than in situations for which an international mandate preferably
one arranged through the United Nations has been achieved. To be sure, the
United States has worked to build multinational coalitions, as in Korea and during
the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis, but it has also indicated its willingness to deploy its mili-
tary even in the face of international opposition; the case of Vietnam comes to
mind, as does the US willingness to invade Iraq in 2003 with or without the back-
ing of the UN and thus of the international community. Most EU states rejected
the idea of invasion without the backing of a UN Security Council resolution and
the Greek presidency issued a statement arguing that it was committed to the
United Nations remaining at the centre of the international order and that the
primary responsibility for dealing with Iraqi disarmament lies with the [UN] Securi-
ty Council. Once the invasion was under way, the EU demanded a central role for
the UN in the rebuilding of Iraq. Indeed, the EU-UN relationship has become a
key feature in the dynamics of international relations, Eide going so far as to sug-
gest that the EU is in many ways becoming the UNs main Western partner.
19

Patrick notes the importance of American calculations of exceptionalism (the
belief that the US must stand as an example and either encourage others to follow
its lead or else go it alone), its domestic institutional structure (with the mandate
shared between President and Congress making it harder for the US to assume
multilateral obligations), and its sheer power (making it more inclined to lead than
to cooperate, and to pursue self-interest where needed).
20
On all three counts, the
European view is markedly different: there is no longer a prevailing sense of Euro-

18
Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf,
2003), 4-5.
19
Espen Barth Eide, Effective Multilateralism: Europe, Regional Security, and a Revitalised UN (London:
The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 3. See also the essays in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E.
Smith, eds., The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006).
20
Stewart Patrick, Multilateralism and its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of US Ambiv-
alence, in Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement, ed. Stewart Patrick and Shepard
Forman, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
pean exceptionalism, nor a sense that Europe has a mission to change others in its
image; parliamentary government makes it easier for executives to win the support
of legislatures for new treaties or strong positions in international organizations;
and Europes self-doubt about its power has combined with the effects of Europe-
an regional integration to encourage it to work to achieve a consensus rather than
rocking the boat.
It has only been relatively recently, notes Maull, that the EU has paid much at-
tention to thinking through how multilateralism can best be promoted at a global
level, the key qualification for success, he believes, being the ability to form and
sustain broad-based coalitions.
21
For Brenner, effective multilateralism requires
not only broad international support and legitimacy but also the capacity to gener-
ate initiatives and the political leadership to set the agenda, define deadlines, mobi-
lize resources, and promote effective implementation.
22
As the tradition of Euro-
pean Cold War deference to external powers fades into history, so the EU in par-
ticular is showing its willingness and capacity to pursue all these qualities.
Supporting multilateral cooperation is a basic principle of EU foreign policy,
declared the European Commission in 2003, and the UN is regarded as the core
channel for pursuit of that principle: the EU should consider itself a driving
force in pursuing UN initiatives on sustainable development, poverty reduction,
and international security (while also giving new impetus to UN reform).
23
Eide
argues that one of the EUs greatest strengths in recent years has been its ability
to co-opt, enhance and gradually reshape other international organizations. After
having seemed to be at odds with many of those organizations in the 1990s, he
suggests, it has since come to be accepted as a positive force by reworking the
capacities and goals of bodies such as NATO, the African Union, and the Organi-
zation for Cooperation and Development in Europe. These advances have given
the EU a strategic reach far greater than its [] assets warrant.
24

Because the conventional view is to see power in terms of state interests, and
since states have a near-monopoly over the maintenance and deployment of mili-
tary power, we find it hard to appreciate the possibility that suprastate arrange-
ments might exert significant influence. Multilateralism, in particular, because it
demands international agreement and thus the watering down of state positions in

21
Hanns W. Maull, Europe and the New Balance of Global Order, International Affairs 81.4 (2005):
786.
22
Michael Brenner, Introduction, in NATO and Collective Security, ed. Michael Brenner (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1998), 1-5.
23
European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, of
10 September 2003 The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism (Brussels:
European Commission, 2003), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003DC0526:EN:HTML (accessed 4 April
2012).
24
Espen Barth Eide, Effective Multilateralism: Europe, Regional Security and a Revitalised UN (London:
The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), iii.
the interests of reaching collective agreement, is portrayed by hawks as weakness
and as a slippery slope to appeasement. But the new dynamics of the international
system, in which interests are defined less in state or territorial terms and increas-
ingly in collective terms, fits centrally with and has been most actively promoted
by Europeanist perceptions about the most effective means for managing and
deploying influence. Those means place the emphasis on the tools needed to
achieve a democratic and positive peace.

Conclusions
Cosmopolitanism offers considerable possibilities as a means of tying down and
better understanding the European experience. As noted earlier, however, the bulk
of the academic discussion has been purely theoretical, with few attempts to move
out of the ivory tower into the practical realities of life on the ground for ordinary
Europeans. This is unfortunate, not least because of the many questions posed in
regard to European identity and of what it means to be European. This paper of-
fers a modest attempt to illustrate cosmopolitan ideas in regard to ideas about
patriotism which illustrate changing Europeans notions about identification with
the state and to ideas about multilateralism which illustrate changing European
notions about the dynamics of international relations.

Bibliography
Archibugi, Daniele. Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy. In Re-imagining Polit-
ical Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, edited by Daniele Archibugi,
David Held and Martin Khler, 198-228. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.
Archibugi, Daniele. The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democra-
cy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Archibugi, Daniele, and David Held, eds. Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a
New World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
Beck, Ulrich. The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies. Theory, Culture and
Society 19.1-2 (2002): 17-44.
Brenner, Michael. Introduction. In NATO and Collective Security, edited by Mi-
chael Brenner, 1-5. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998.
Brock, Gillian, and Harry Brighouse, eds. The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Cabrera, Luis. Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State.
New York: Routledge, 2004.
Caney, Simon. Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Delanty, Gerard. What Does It Mean to Be a European? Innovation: The Europe-
an Journal of Social Sciences 18.1 (2005): 11-22.
Derrida, Jacques. On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London: Routledge, 2001.
Eide, Espen Barth, ed. Effective Multilateralism: Europe, Regional Security and a Revi-
talised UN. London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004.
European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, of 10 September 2003 The European Union and the United Nations:
The Choice of Multilateralism. Brussels: European Commission, 2003.
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52003DC0526:EN:HT
ML (accessed 4 April 2012).
Fine, Robert. Cosmopolitanism. London: Routledge, 2007.
Frith, Robert. Cosmopolitan Democracy and the EU: The Case of Gender. Polit-
ical Studies 56.1 (2008): 215-36.
Hayden, Patrick. Cosmopolitan Global Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
Heater, Derek. What Is Citizenship? Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.
Held, David. Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washing-
ton Consensus. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.
Jacob, Margaret C. Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early
Modern Europe. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.
Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order.
New York: Knopf, 2003.
Kumm, Mattias. Why Europeans Will Not Embrace Constitutional Patriotism.
International Journal of Constitutional Law 6.1 (2008): 117-36.
Laatikainen, Katie Verlin, and Karen E. Smith, eds. The European Union at the United
Nations: Intersecting Multilateralisms. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Levy, Daniel, Max Pensky and John Torpey. Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe:
Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War. London: Verso, 2005.
Maull, Hanns W. Europe and the New Balance of Global Order. International
Affairs 81.4 (2005): 775-99.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Kant and Cosmopolitanism. In Perpetual Peace: Essays on
Kants Cosmopolitan Ideal, edited by James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-
Bachmann, 25-57. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
Patrick, Stewart. Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Conse-
quences of U.S. Ambivalence. In Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambiva-
lent Engagement, edited by Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman, 1-44. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
Pew Global Attitudes Project. Views of a Changing World. Washington, DC: Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press, 2003.
Pogge, Thomas W. Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty. Ethics 103.1 (1992):
48-75.
Primoratz, Igor, ed. Patriotism. New York: Humanity Books, 2002.
Roche, Maurice. Cultural Europeanization and the Cosmopolitan Condition:
European Union Regulation and European Sport. In Cosmopolitanism and Eu-
rope, edited by Chris Rumford, 126-41. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,
2007.
Ruggie, John Gerard. Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution. Internation-
al Organization 46.3 (1992): 561-98.
Ruggie, John Gerard, ed. Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institu-
tional Form. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Individual, Collective, Social
Identity as (Most) Contested Social Science Concept
in the Symbolic Interactionism Perspective

Grzegorz Poarlik
The Theory
Conceptualising identity in social science seems a mission impossible as its onto-
logical and epistemological status is subject to a sometimes fierce dispute among
scholars representing well-established disciplines such as psychology, sociology,
anthropology, political science or international relations. Identity is, therefore, both
a contested and a crucial social science concept.
1
It is too complex, too dynamic to
be captured within a single theoretical paradigm and it is too important to be given
up in scientific inquiry as it appears to be an existential imperative of the human
condition to have identity as well as to understand identity as a fundamental
dimension of a given form of social order.
2
Marilynn B. Brewer is particularly out-
spoken in illustrating the ambiguity of identity as a social science concept:

If one navely enters a bibliographic database in the psychological and social
sciences and searches on the keyword social identity, the result is a dizzying
array of citations to books and articles from dozens of different literatures
from psychoanalytic theory to the sociology of social movements. It quickly
becomes clear that the term has no single, shared meaning; the problem with
trying to extract any common definition is that the term is integrally embed-
ded in separate theoretical structures and literatures with little or no cross-
citation or mutual influence. As a consequence, one needs some kind of a

1
For further discussion of this problem, see for instance: Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper,
Beyond Identity, Theory and Society 29.1 (2000): 1-47; Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Gie-
sen, The Construction of Collective Identity, European Journal of Sociology 26.1 (1995): 72-102; Lynn
Jamieson, Theorising Identity, Nationality and Citizenship: Implications for European Citizenship
Identity, Sociolgia 34.6 (2002): 507-32; Richard Jenkins, Social Identity (London: Routledge, 1996).
2
Ireneusz Pawel Karolewski and Viktoria Kaina, EU Governance and European Identity, Living
Reviews in European Governance 4.2 (2009): 12.
roadmap to negotiate among the different associative paths that lead to and
from the concept in its different manifestations.
3

As it seems evident that we need some kind of such a conceptual roadmap to be
able to integrate and synthesise constructively different theoretical approaches to
identity studies, one must clarify what is the common ontological and epistemolog-
ical denominator of such inquiry. Thus, symbolic interactionism could be intro-
duced here as an inclusive and coherent analytical framework for an in-depth in-
quiry on identity construction as seen from an interdisciplinary perspective.
What makes symbolic interactionism a particularly valuable analytical proposi-
tion when studying identity construction in contemporary society, taking into ac-
count cognitive ambiguity of the concept? An answer to this question could be
found precisely in the condition of contemporary society in this sense post-
modern society with emphasis given to fluidity, ongoing re-interpretations of
norms, values, patterns of behaviour that constitute social order. Living in a socie-
ty, which does not provide a safe haven from pressure of answering the daily exis-
tential question of who I am, reinforces temporality and an open-ended character
of identity construction. Thus, identity is being formed in a process of permanent
redefinition of symbolic meanings of categories, which serve as frame of reference
of self-identification. As Stuart Hall argues:

[I]dentity is actually something formed through unconscious processes over
time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always
something imaginary or fantasized about its unity. It always remains in-
complete, is always in process, always being formed. [...] Thus, rather than
speaking of identity as a finished thing, we should speak of identification, and
see it as an ongoing process. Identity arises, not so much from the fullness
of identity which is already inside us as individuals, but from a lack of
wholeness which is filled from outside us, by the ways we imagine ourselves
to be seen by others. Psychoanalytically, the reason why we continually search
for identity, constructing biographies which knit together the different parts
of our divided selves into a unity, is to recapture this fantasized pleasure of
fullness (plenitude).
4

Symbolic interactionism with its emphasis on changeability and the interactive
character of identity construction bridges the gap between behavioural and social
sciences in the sense that it integrates the subjective construction of meanings
related to self-understanding with the objective (inter)action in the process of de-
fining the self through relation to the other. This relation becomes an ever more

3
Marilynn B. Brewer, The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political Psychology,
Political Psychology 22.1 (2001): 115.
4
Stuart Hall, The Question of Cultural Identity, in Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies, ed.
Stuart Hall et al. (London: Blackwell, 1996), 608.
Individual, Collective, Social 79
important pattern of identity construction in a society within which spatial and
symbolic mobility becomes a dominant way of life and walk of life. This is espe-
cially true for European society. As we may argue:

[T]he ongoing process of transnationalisation of economic, political, social
and cultural patterns of everyday life in contemporary societies in Europe
with a decisive role of European citizenship based on individual freedom of
movement within the EU reinforces the need to adopt a thin identity dis-
course as more relevant in understanding the scope and meaning of identity
transformations. This brings us to the imperative to redefine the balance be-
tween the individual and the collective dimensions of identity.
5

Consequently, adopting a symbolic interactionism perspective on studying identity
formation enables us to move beyond the ontological dilemma that is exemplified
in the nominalism versus holism discourse on identity. Opposition between the
individual and the collective ontology of identity is transcended by the introduction
of the social as a space where the individual and the collective meet, merge and
transform each other. The social is the space where the individual and the collec-
tive gain concrete meaning as they emerge as a consequence of social role playing.
According to Sheldon Stryker, followed by Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, the
individual is always deeply embedded in a given social structure within which self
and other or we and them come into being through recognition of self and
other as actors playing different roles within society.
6

Thus, self as reflection of society
7
finds its epistemic explanation in the sym-
bolic construction of identity as a process negotiating meanings attached to con-
crete forms of behaviour. The interactionist credo could be summarised as follows:
identity is a process. It is a form of symbolic activity.
8
Consequently, as we may
assume after Tomasz Leszniewski:

[T]he source of identity is placed in the interactive area shared with others. It
emphasises a social character of the identity structure and a total dependence

5
Grzegorz Poarlik, La citoyennet europenne, nouvelle construction sociale: Implications pour la
dveloppement dune identit collective dans lEurope contemporaine, in Citoyennet et Nationalits en
Europe, ed. Gilles Rouet (Paris: Editions LHarmattan, 2011), 125-6.
6
Sheldon Stryker, Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version (Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings,
1980), cited in Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity, in
Handbook of Self and Identity, ed. Mark R. Leary and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford Press,
2003), 134.
7
Ibid.
8
Zdzisaw Mach, Symbols, Conflict and Identity: Essays in Political Anthropology (New York: SUNNY
Press, 1993).
of an individual on the social environment. [] The basis of activity is in the
framework of human relations.
9

Arguing in a similar tone is Alexander Wendt, who explains the interdependence
between the specific role-playing by an individual and the constitution of self-
understanding which emerges in the social web of interactions:

Social identities are sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while
taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object. [...] [In this sense
social identities take the form of] cognitive schemas that enable an actor to
determine who I am/we are in a situation and positions in a social role
structure of shared understandings and expectations.
10

One more important aspect of this very debate on the ontological and epistemo-
logical dimension of identity formation needs to be taken into account, namely the
problem of multiplicity of identity formations. This problem has been conceptual-
ised in the scholarly debate as the one identity versus many identities dilemma.
11

Related to this dilemma is Piotr Sztompkas diagnosis that in late modernity
social structure is in a state of constant flux. The society cannot be analysed in
terms of a fixed and replicable matrix of bonds, a set of common norms or values.
Therefore late-modern or better post-modern society is in a state of permanent
becoming rather than being.
12

As we cannot reduce identity formation in late modernity to a single identity
narrative, identity has become multidimensional, multi-layered, differentiated. It is
produced as personal construction built of a multiple repertoire of options. People
craft themselves, rather than receive themselves ready-made.
13

This introduces the problem of an order or hierarchy of identities. The sym-
bolic interactionist perspective emphasises the definitional lack of a durable hierar-
chy of identities as identity is a social construct that is constituted within the realm
of ongoing social interactions. In this sense, identity cannot be acknowledged as
social fact in the meaning that it was introduced by mile Durkheim, who claimed
that social fact could be acknowledged as a form of acting both ritualised and
ephemeral, which sets boundaries within which both the individual and the society

9
Tomasz Leszniewski, Tosamo jednostki w zmieniajcym si spoeczestwie [Identity of the Individual in a
Changing Society] (Toru: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikoaja Kopernika, 2008), 356.
10
Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, American Political
Science Review 88.2 (1994): 385.
11
For further discussion of this problem, see for instance: Jamieson, Theorising Identity.
12
Piotr Sztompka, Socjologia: Analiza spoeczestwa [Sociology: An Analysis of the Society] (Krakw: ZNAK,
2010).
13
Piotr Sztompka, From East Europeans to Europeans: Shifting Collective Identities and Symbolic
Boundaries in the New Europe, European Review 12.4 (2004): 493-4.
are constrained but at the same time are self-aware of their unique character, which
in turn enables them to perform the roles of independent actors.
14

The multiple characters of identity construction result in yet another funda-
mental cognitive dilemma that researchers face when trying to grasp the full com-
plexity and dynamics of identity formation. The conceptual interdependence be-
tween identity and identification constitutes a major dilemma in identity studies.
This dilemma has been present in numerous studies on European collective identi-
ty especially.
15
A convincing, as it may seem, answer to this dilemma was suggested
by Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper. Following their argumentation, we may
acknowledge identity as a particular state of reflection of the subject, which defines
symbolic boundaries of a self-other or an in-group-out-group relation. Conse-
quently, identification would denote a process of internalisation of rules of conduct
that constitute a frame of reference for actual behaviour.
16

and Its Application
Irrespectively of scholarly disagreement as to the ultimate meaning of the very
concept of identity, which is also clearly observable within the symbolic interac-
tionist environment, we may emphasise that this analytical perspective offers a
valuable explanatory platform especially for the empirical investigation of crucial
social processes such as consequences of migration and professional mobility on
identity transformations in contemporary European society.
One example of applying the symbolic interactionism perspective to the empir-
ical inquiry of the interplay between migration and identity transformation is a
monograph by Dariusz Niedwiedzki, who analysed implications of the so-called
pendulum migration of Polish workers to Belgium after the Eastern enlargement
of the EU in May 2004 on the dynamic of their identity transformation.
17
The
author attempted to conceptualise the interplay between three closely interwoven
dimensions of identity transformation among pendulum migrants. In doing so, he
analysed the dynamics of transformation of meanings attached to pendulum mi-
grants to the symbolic meaning of social habitat of the place of origin, the place of
work and residence and the symbolic world constituted by pendulum migrants for

14
mile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. Steven Lukes (New York: Free Press, 1982), 50-
9.
15
See for instance: Gerard Delanty, The Quest for European Identity, in Making the European Polity:
Reflexive Integration in the EU, ed. Erik Oddvar Eriksen (London: Routledge, 2005), 127-42; Cathleen
Kantner, Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding: The Case of the Emerging Euro-
pean Identity, European Journal of Social Theory 9.4 (2006): 501-23; Klaus Eder and Wilfried Spohn,
Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of Integration and Enlargement (Aldershot: Ashgate Pub-
lishing, 2005).
16
Poarlik, La citoyennet europenne, 126.
17
Dariusz Niedwiedzki, Migracje i tosamo: Od teorii do analizy przypadku [Migration and Identity: From
Theory to Case Study] (Krakw: Nomos, 2010).
themselves and by themselves. In conclusion of his work, Niedwiedzki argues
that

the concept of pendulum migration is an indispensable instrument for de-
scribing and understanding phenomena occurring in contemporary devel-
oped societies. These phenomena include dynamic forms of socialisation.
[...] These types of socialisation signify the cohabitation of different peoples
and cultures, their intermingling and encounters that occur in a multifaceted
social space. [...] Migration has an effect on the self-identification of those
moving as well as on how they identify others.
18

Apart from a wide applicability of symbolic interactionism to the study of migra-
tion and its impact on identity transformation, one should also underline profes-
sional mobility and its influence on identity transformation as yet another area
where we find symbolic interactionism a valuable explanatory perspective. Here
research on identity transformation of Erasmus students seems particularly inter-
esting and promising. One of the empirical works we should mention in this con-
text is Vassiliki Papatsibas analysis of the political and cultural impact of Erasmus
mobility on identity formation of Erasmus students.
19
Having surveyed evaluation
reports submitted by Erasmus students, Papatsiba finds a relatively visible impact
of Erasmus mobility on the individual sense of European identity. However, this
transformation does not constitute a fixed orientation. As he concludes:

[A]cquiring a feeling of belonging in an enlarged Europe, enriching national
identities with the desired European dimension remained a somewhat ran-
dom result of experiential learning. This type of learning depends on situa-
tions, on encounters, as well as on the individuals psychology. In the reports
that were analysed, its potentialities but especially its limited effects for an
important number of students were observed.
20

Another example of the applicability of the symbolic interactionist perspective to
identity studies is Ulrike Lieberts analysis of European identity formation in the
context of German identity transformation.
21
In her analysis of German elite dis-
course based on the public intellectuals debate on European identity, Ulrike
Liebert points at the German self-understanding in the post-national constella-
tion as a key process framing two co-existing major projects of European identity

18
Ibid., 353.
19
Vassiliki Papatsiba, Political and Individual Rationales of Student Mobility: A Case-Study of
ERASMUS and a French Regional Scheme for Studies Abroad, European Journal of Education 40.2
(2005): 173-88.
20
Ibid., 183.
21
Ulrike Liebert, Two Projects of European Identity, in Collective Identity and Democracy: The Impact of
EU Enlargement, ed. Magdalena Gra and Zdzisaw Mach (Oslo: ARENA 2010), 29-60.
discourse in contemporary Germany.
22
The first project refers to democratic con-
stitutional European identity
23
as conceived by Jrgen Habermas, who builds his
argumentation upon the assumption that

[a] shifting of legitimation from the side of results to that of the co-
determination of political programmes that affect citizens of all member
states equally, though not necessarily in the same ways, will not be possible,
without the development of an awareness of shared belonging to a political
community that extends across national boundaries.
24

The second project refers to European cultural identity based on a community of
values
25
, which challenges the Habermasian ideal of European identity as a post-
national identity rooted in post-national constitutional patriotism. Here Kurt
Biedenkopf is cited by Liebert as the most visible proponent of a pre-existing
community based upon a historical and cultural background of European we-
feeling constituted by adherence to a common set of values.
26

A sort of third way project of European identity is suggested by Liebert in
conclusion of her discussion of German discourse on European identity. Lieberts
idea is very much constructed in line with symbolic interactionist premises. Doing
Europe seems more accurate than only debating European identity, so the ar-
gument goes.
27
More precisely:

The negotiation of what under conditions of complexity holds Europe-
ans together, that is which democratic and constitutional principles and
which common values form their common core involves multiple sites
and agents, among which not only European presidencies and national gov-
ernments but also parliaments, civil society and public spheres are indispens-
ible.
28

Conclusion
By way of conclusion of this brief analysis of the symbolic interactionism perspec-
tive and its applicability in contemporary identity studies, it should be emphasised
that it offers a relatively wide window of opportunity to go beyond well-
established, thus limited, theoretical and methodological paradigms of researching

22
Ibid., 33.
23
Ibid., 41.
24
Jrgen Habermas, The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 70, cited in Liebert, Two
Projects of European Identity.
25
Liebert, Two Projects of European Identity, 47.
26
Ibid., 47.
27
Ibid., 54.
28
Ibid.
identity. More specifically, it allows us to overcome reductionism of orthodox
nominalism and holism by placing identity in the social as an interactive space
where the self is reflected in the society and the society is reflected in the self. This
seems to be a valuable explanatory perspective on studying identity transformation
in contemporary European society.

Bibliography
Brewer, Marilynn B. The Many Faces of Social Identity: Implications for Political
Psychology. Political Psychology 22.1 (2001): 115-25.
Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. Beyond Identity. Theory and Society
29.1 (2000): 1-47.
Delanty, Gerard. The Quest for European Identity. In Making the European Polity:
Reflexive Integration in the EU, edited by Erik Oddvar Eriksen, 127-42. London:
Routledge, 2005.
Durkheim, mile. The Rules of Sociological Method. Edited by Steven Lukes. New
York: Free Press, 1982.
Eder, Klaus, and Wilfried Spohn. Collective Memory and European Identity: The Effects of
Integration and Enlargement. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah, and Bernhard Giesen. The Construction of Collective
Identity. European Journal of Sociology 26.1 (1995): 72-102.
Habermas, Jrgen. The Divided West. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.
Hall, Stuart. The Question of Cultural Identity. In Modernity: An Introduction to
Modern Societies, edited by Stuart Hall et al., 595-618. London: Blackwell, 1996.
Jamieson, Lynn. Theorising Identity, Nationality and Citizenship: Implications for
European Citizenship Identity. Sociolgia 34.6 (2002): 507-53.
Jenkins, Richard. Social Identity. London: Routledge, 1996.
Kantner, Cathleen. Collective Identity as Shared Ethical Self-Understanding: The
Case of the Emerging European Identity. European Journal of Social Theory 9.4
(2006): 501-23.
Karolewski, Ireneusz Pawel, and Viktoria Kaina. EU Governance and European
Identity. Living Reviews in European Governance 4.2 (2009): 1-26.
Leszniewski, Tomasz. Tosamo jednostki w zmieniajcym si spoeczestwie [Identity of the
Individual in a Changing Society]. Toru: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu
Mikoaja Koprnika, 2008.
Liebert, Ulrike. Two Projects of European Identity. In Collective Identity and De-
mocracy: The Impact of EU Enlargement, edited by Magdalena Gra and Zdzisaw
Mach, 29-60. Oslo: ARENA, 2010.
Mach, Zdzisaw. Symbols, Conflict, and Identity: Essays in Political Anthropology. New
York: SUNNY Press, 1993.
Niedwiedzki, Dariusz. Migracje i tosamo: Od teorii do analizy przypadku
[Migration and Identity: From Theory to Case Study]. Krakw: Nomos, 2010.
Papatsiba, Vassiliki. Political and Individual Rationales of Student Mobility: A
Case-Study of ERASMUS and a French Regional Scheme for Studies Abroad.
European Journal of Education 40.2 (2005): 173-88.
Poarlik, Grzegorz. La citoyennet europenne, nouvelle construction sociale:
Implications pour la dveloppement dune identit collective dans lEurope
contemporaine. In Citoyennet et Nationalits en Europe, edited by Gilles Rouet,
125-126. Paris: Editions LHarmattan, 2011.
Stets. Jan E., and Peter J. Burke. A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity.
In Handbook of Self and Identity, edited by Mark R. Leary and June Price
Tangney, 128-152. New York: Guilford Press, 2003.
Stryker, Sheldon. Symbolic Interactionism: A Social Structural Version. Menlo Park: Ben-
jamin/Cummings, 1980.
Sztompka, Piotr. Socjologia: Analiza spoeczestwa [Sociology: An Analysis of the Society].
Krakw: ZNAK, 2010.
From East Europeans to Europeans: Shifting Collective Identities and
Symbolic Boundaries in the New Europe. European Review 12.4 (2004): 481-96.
Wendt, Alexander. Collective Identity Formation and the International State.
American Political Science Review 88.2 (1994): 384-96.

Part Two
Postcolonial Europe

Zeichen als Wunder?
Eine der Geschichte entnommene Anekdote
Bill Bell
Seitdem Homi K. Bhabhas Zeichen als Wunder: Fragen der Ambivalenz und
Autoritt unter einem Baum bei Delhi im Mai 1817 erstmals als Artikel im Critical
Inquiry im Jahr 1985 erschienen ist, hat sich dieser Text zu einem locus classicus post-
kolonialer Studien entwickelt.
1
Als wichtiges Dokument aus dem Fundus des Post-
kolonialismus unserer Zeit wurde der Essay unter anderem 1994 als Kapitel in Die
Verortung der Kultur sowie in zahllosen Anthologien und Sekundrwerken abge-
druckt. Darber hinaus wurde der Text in mehrere Sprachen bersetzt. Homi K.
Bhabha begrndet einen Diskurs, dessen Hauptwortschpfungen Hybriditt,
schlaue Hflichkeit, Mimikry sich im Verlauf der vergangenen 25 Jahre
dermaen weit verbreiteten, dass sie die postkoloniale Imagination geradezu kolo-
nisiert haben und das mit einer einfallsreichen Energie, wie sie in der schngeisti-
gen Welt der Kulturtheorie selten zu finden ist.
Ich habe an dieser Stelle nicht die Absicht, die eindrucksvolle und dynamische
Darbietung europischer Kulturkritik zu rezitieren, die Bhabhas Essay prgt, der-
weil er sich geschickt und pflichtgetreu durch die kumene der Koryphen
Freud, Foucault, Lacan und Derrida hindurch bewegt, noch will ich die subtile
Weise thematisieren, in der der Essay auf Konzepte zusteuert, die inzwischen als
gngig gelten drfen. Stattdessen mchte ich aufzeigen, wie der Essay, insbesonde-
re im Hinblick auf seine anekdotische Geschichtsschreibung, mehr Probleme auf-
wirft, als Bhabha in diesem Rahmen absehen oder gar auflsen kann.

Ich bin all jenen Kollegen dankbar, mit denen ich dieses Essay vor seinem Erscheinen diskutiert
habe, im Besonderen Georgia Axiotou, Peter Cudmore, John Frow, Gladson Jathanna, Michelle
Keown, Anca-Raluca Radu, Kirsten Sandrock, Barbara Schaff und Peter van der Veer. Ganz beson-
deren Dank schulde ich Rosinka Chaudhuri und Abhijit Gupta dafr, dass sie ihre aus eigener Unter-
suchung des Gegenstands gewonnenen Erkenntnisse mit mir geteilt haben.
1
Homi K. Bhabha, Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a
Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817, Critical Inquiry 12.1 (1985): 144-65. Die Originalfassung des vorlie-
genden Artikels zitiert Bhabas Essay durchgehend in der Version, in der es in The Location of Culture
(London: Routledge, 2010), 145-74, erschien. Eine deutschsprachige Fassung des Essay ist: Zeichen
als Wunder: Fragen der Ambivalenz und Autoritt unter einem Baum bei Delhi im Mai 1817 in Die
Verortung der Kultur (Tbingen: Stauffenburg, 2000), 151-80. Die Zitate aus The Location of Culture
entstammen der deutschen bersetzung, die Zitate aus Sekundrwerken und aus historischen Quel-
len erscheinen hier in neu bersetzter Fassung. Anm. d. .
Seit dem Erscheinen von Bhabhas Essay ist die Beziehung zwischen Kritik und
Geschichte und im Besonderen der Einsatz historischer Anekdoten zum Zwecke
der Polemik in verstrender und ungelster Weise in der kritischen Praxis pr-
sent geblieben. Carolyn Porter beobachtet in der Verwendung der isolierten Anek-
dote, wie sie bei Bhabha blich ist, eine Tendenz hin zum kolonialen Formalis-
mus, der sich die seltsamen Dinge, die man jenseits des Literarischen finden
kann, aneignet, derweil der gesellschaftliche und historische Hintergrund, der sie
hervorgebracht hat, ausgeblendet wird. Solch eine Herangehensweise, argumen-
tiert Porter, bedeute ganz unmittelbar ein Plndern und Auslschen jener dis-
kursiven Praktiken, auf die sich das Argument beruft.
2
Mit dem Ansprechen der-
selben Tendenzen, wie sie sich in Bhabhas einflussreichem Essay manifestieren,
will ich nicht eine Rckkehr zum grand recit der Geschichte heraufbeschwren.
Vielmehr mchte ich drei Gegengeschichten unterbreiten, die eine Reihe von Fra-
gen aufwerfen, die in jenem paradigmatischen Diskurs, der sich nahtlos und selbst-
sicher zwischen theoretischer Stellungnahme und historischer Behauptung hin und
her bewegt, unter den Tisch gefallen sind.
1 Und worin liegt die Bedeutung der Bibel?
Bhabha whlt als Ausgangspunkt seiner Argumentation die folgende Episode, wie
sie 1818 im Missionary Register erschien und die Unterhaltung zwischen einem ein-
geborenen Katecheten und 500 seltsamen Konvertiten in einem heiligen Wldchen
in der Nhe von Delhi beschreibt. Es handelt sich um eine Anekdote, auf die
Bhabha in seiner Argumentation an strategischen Momenten zurckkommt und
auf deren Grundlage die pauschaleren historischen und theoretischen Behauptun-
gen des Essays aufbauen. In der ersten Maiwoche des Jahres 1817, schreibt
Bhabha, reiste Anund Messeh, einer der ersten einheimischen Missionare Indiens,
hastig und aufgeregt von seiner Missionsstation in Meerut zu einem ganz in der
Nhe von Delhi gelegenen Wldchen.:

Dort fand er etwa 500 Menschen im Schatten der Bume sitzend vor, Mn-
ner, Frauen und Kinder, die, genau wie man es ihm geschildert hatte, in Lek-
tre und Gesprch vertieft waren. Er wendete sich einem der lter ausse-
henden Mnner zu und sprach ihn an, worauf es zu folgendem Gesprch
kam.
Wer um Himmels willen sind all diese Menschen, und wo kom-
men sie her? Wir sind arm und niedrig, und wir lesen und lieben dieses
Buch. Was ist das fr ein Buch? Das Buch Gottes Lasst mich
doch einmal einen Blick darauf werfen. Als Anund das Buch ffnete, wurde
er gewahr, da es das Evangelium unseres Herrn war, das in die hindustani-

2
Carolyn Porter, Are We Being Historical Yet?, South Atlantic Quarterly 87.4 (1988): 743-86 (799).
Zeichen als Wunder? 91
sche Sprache bersetzt worden war und von dem die Menge eine reichliche
Anzahl von Exemplaren zu besitzen schien: einige waren GEDRUCKT, an-
dere hatten die Leute selbst aus den gedruckten Ausgaben ABGESCHRIE-
BEN. Anund wies auf den Namen Jesu und fragte: Wer ist das? das ist
Gott! Er gab uns diese Buch. Wo habt ihr es bekommen? Ein Engel
vom Himmel gab es uns, auf dem Markt von Hurdwar. Ein Engel? Ja,
fr uns war er der der Engel Gottes: aber er war ein Mensch, ein gelehrter
Weiser. (Bei diesen bersetzten Bibeln kann es sich nur um die Bcher ge-
handelt haben, die vor fnf, sechs Jahren von der Missionsstation in Hurd-
war verteilt worden sind.) Die handgeschriebenen Bcher schreiben wir
selbst, da das unsere einzige Mglichkeit ist, mehr von diesem gesegneten
Wort zu bekommen. Diese Bcher, sagte Anund, lehren die Religion
der europischen Sahibs. Es ist IHR Buch; und sie haben es in unserer Spra-
che gedruckt, damit auch wir daran teilhaben. Ah! Nein, erwiderte der
Fremde, das ist unmglich, denn sie essen Fleisch. Jesus Christus, sag-
te Anund, lehrt, da es ohne Bedeutung ist, was man isst oder trinkt. ES-
SEN ist nichts vor Gott. Nicht das, was in den Mund eines Menschen hineingelangt,
besudelt ihn, sondern das, was aus dem Mund herauskommt, das besudelt den Menschen:
denn die Niedertracht kommt aus dem Herzen. Aus dem Herzen kommen
bse Gedanken, Morde, Ehebrche, Hurerei, Diebsthle; und diese sind es,
die die Menschen besudeln.
Das ist wahr; aber wie kann es das Buch der Europer sein, wenn
wir doch glauben, da es Gottes Geschenk an uns ist? Er schickte es uns, in
Hurdvar. Gott gab es vor langer Zeit den Sahibs, und SIE sandten es
uns. Die Unwissenheit und Einfalt vieler Leute ist sehr verblffend,
denn sie haben noch nie zuvor von einem gedruckten Buch gehrt, und sein
bloes Erscheinen war fr sie wie ein Wunder. Das auf diese Weise erwor-
bene, immer weiter wachsende Wissen lste grte Erregung aus, und alle
waren sich der Anerkennung der berlegenheit der Doktrinen diese Heili-
gen Buchs gegenber allem, was sie bisher gesehen oder gehrt hatten, einig.
Bald zeigte sich Gleichgltigkeit gegenber den Kastenunterschieden, und
die Einmischung und die tyrannische Autoritt der Brahmanen wurden als
immer drckender und unertrglicher empfunden. Schlielich beschlossen
sie, sich von ihren brigen Hindubrdern zu trennen und selbst aus ihrer
Mitte eine Gruppe der vier oder fnf Leute auszuwhlen, die am besten le-
sen konnten, damit sie die ffentlichkeit aus diesem neu erworbenen Buch
unterrichteten. Anund fragte sie: Warum seid ihr alle wei gekleidet?
Die Gott ergebenen Menschen sollen weie Gewnder tragen, war die
Antwort, als Zeichen dafr, da sie rein und ihrer Snden ledig sind.
Anund bemerkte: Ihr solltet GETAUFT werden, im Namen des Vaters,
des Sohnes und des Heiligen Geistes. Kommt nach Meerut: Dort gibt es ei-
nen christlichen Pater, und er wird euch zeigen, was ihr tun soll. Sie ant-
worteten: Jetzt mssen wir zur Ernte nach Hause; aber da wir die Absicht
haben, uns einmal im Jahr zu treffen, werden wir vielleicht nchstes Jahr
nach Meerut kommen. Ich erklrte ihnen das Wesen des Sakramentes
und der Taufe, worauf sie antworteten: Wir sind bereit, uns allen anderen
Bruchen der Christen zu fgen, aber nicht dem Sakrament, denn die Euro-
per essen das Fleisch der Kuh, und das ist fr uns unmglich. Darauf ant-
wortete ich: Diese WORT stammt von Gott und nicht von den Menschen
und wenn ER eure Herzen verstehen lt, dann werdet ihr es RICHTIG be-
greifen. Sie antworteten: Sobald unser ganzes Land dieses Sakrament emp-
fngt, werden wir es auch tun. Darauf bemerkte ich: Die Zeit ist nah, wo
alle Lnder die WORT empfangen werden! Sie antworteten: Das ist
wahr!
3

Der zentrale Tropus, um den herum Bhabha seine Lesart dieses seltsamen Augen-
blicks ausformuliert, ist einer, der sich, so argumentiert er, im 19. Jahrhundert so
bestndig wiederholt, dass er triumphal eine Literatur des Empire begrndet,
nmlich die pltzliche, zufllige Entdeckung des englischen Buchs. Sobald die
Bibel in Erscheinung tritt, steht sie fr Bhabha im Einklang mit einer von ihm als
koloniales Begehren und Disziplin
4
bezeichneten Abstraktion, welche geradezu
auf eine Begegnung mit Indern wartet, in der sie verndert, anverwandelt, hybridi-
siert wird.
Die Bibeln, die in Hardwar verteilt wurden, enthielten sehr wahrscheinlich
Ausgaben des Neuen Testaments in Hindi, angefertigt in der baptistischen Missi-
onsdruckerei in Serampore.
5
William Carey, jener Missionar und Drucker, welcher
ihre Herstellung beaufsichtigt hatte, war zu einem Zeitpunkt in Indien eingetrof-
fen, um dort seine Druckerei aufzubauen, als die britische Kolonialpolitik der Pr-

3
Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 151. Bhabha transkribiert den Bericht aus The Missionary Register,
Januar 1818: 18-9.
4
Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 152.
5
Chamberlain htte in Hurdwar keine Ausgaben der Heiligen Schrift in Braj-Bhakha verteilen kn-
nen, wie Bhabha spekuliert (166). Erst als er dort angekommen war, im April 1814, erhielt er ein
Paket aus Serampore, in dem er die ersten Druckfahnen seiner bersetzung des Neuen Testaments in
Braj-Bhakha vorfand. Siehe: William Yates, Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain (London: Wightman and
Cramp, 1826), 347. In einer aus Kalkutta stammenden Depesche vom 21. August 1817 wird behaup-
tet, dass man bei den Pilgern von Delhi lediglich 2 oder 3 gedruckte Ausgaben vom Neuen Tes-
tament in Hindustani vorgefunden habe. Auf einem dieser Bcher wurde der Name von Mr.
Chamberlain gefunden. Demgem kam man dahinter, dass Mr. C. der Engel gewesen war. Er hatte
ein paar Ausgaben beim Jahrmarkt von Hurdwar verteilt. Siehe: American Baptist Magazine, Mrz
1818: 298. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass es sich dabei um Ausgaben von The New Testament of Our Lord
and Saviour J.C.; translated into the Hindustanee (Hindi) Language by the Missionaries at Serampore handelte,
erstmals 1811 von der Serampore Mission Press verffentlicht; von Henry Martyn unter der Beihilfe
von Mirza Fitrat und anderen gelehrten Eingeborenen revidiert und 1814 von der Serampore Press
neugedruckt. Siehe: J. T. Zenker, Bibliotheca orientale (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1861), 429-30.
John Chamberlain scheint auch eine Vielzahl anderer Druckwerke aus Serampore beim Jahr-
markt in Hurdwar verteilt zu haben. Im Jahr 1818 entdeckte man, dass sich im Besitz der hier fragli-
chen Pilger 11 Ausgaben des Evangeliums nach Matthus und eine Ausgabe des Evangeliums nach
Markus befanden (Missionary Register, Mai 1818: 205), obwohl diese womglich auf anderem Wege
erworben worden waren. Ein weiterer Missionar berichtet, dass zwei Brahmanen kostenlos Ausgaben
des Evangeliums nach Lukas in Hindi und von The Gospel Messenger erhalten hatten, letzteres ein
Traktat mit bengalischen Versen von Ram Ram Basu, zusammengestellt von Chamberlain und eben-
falls in Serampore gedruckt. Siehe: Thomas Smith, The History and Origin of the Missionary Societies (Lon-
don: Kelly and Evans, 1824), 523; John Murdoch, English Translations of Selected Tracts Published in India
(Madras: Scottish Press, 1861), ix-x.
senz von Missionaren auf dem Subkontinent ganz offen feindselig gegenberstand.
Sie drohte sogar damit, jeden Missionar zu verhaften, der das Territorium der
[Ostindien-]Gesellschaft unerlaubterweise betritt. Da er ihn als eine Gefahr fr
die ffentliche Sicherheit ansah, hatte der Generalgouverneur Carey im Jahr 1799
untersagt, seinen Druckereibetrieb in Kalkutta einzurichten. Angesichts des Aus-
bleibens einer Genehmigung der Briten fand Carey Zuflucht in Serampore, das
damals unter dnischer Kontrolle stand und wo er frei von der Behelligung durch
die britischen Behrden war.
6
Dort vollzog sich, trotz der Einmischung von Re-
gierungsstellen, die bersetzung und der Druck jener Bcher.
Aber aus Sicht der britischen Behrden war kaum jemand so lstig wie John
Chamberlain, jener Missionar, welcher tatschlich die Bcher auf dem Jahrmarkt in
Hardwar verteilt hatte. Als er im April 1814 in dem am Ufer des Ganges gelegenen
Hardwar einem bedeutenden Wallfahrtsort fr Hindus, Muslime und Sikhs
eintraf, hatte er sich nicht vorstellen knnen, welcher Erfolg auf ihn warten wrde.
Innerhalb von zehn Tagen, so beschreibt es ein Augenzeuge, war seine Gemeinde
auf viele tausende angewachsen. Sie saen herum und horchten mit einer Auf-
merksamkeit, die einer christlichen Zuhrerschaft zur Ehre gereicht htte. Als sich
der Missionar allabendlich zurckzog, begleiteten ihn die Ovationen der Massen:
Mge der Padree (beziehungsweise Geistliche) ewig leben.
7
Der Erfolg von
Chamberlains geistlicher Ttigkeit fhrte zu seiner Ausweisung aus dem Bezirk
auf Anweisung des Generalgouverneurs und vollzogen durch bewaffnete Sicher-
heitskrfte. Die britischen Behrden, die seine Anwesenheit als politisch gefhrlich
ansahen, reagierten schnell und der Engel, der die Ausgaben des Neuen Testa-
ments auf dem Jahrmarkt in Hardwar verteilt hatte, sah sich gezwungen, nach Se-
rampore zurckzukehren.
8

Derartige Vorkommnisse sollten uns nachdenklich stimmen, wenn wir die Fra-
ge beantworten wollen, ob dieselben Bcher Teil einer konzertierten und koordi-
nierten Kampagne von Missionaren und Vertretern der Behrden gewesen sind
oder nicht. Saurabh Dube konstatierte in diesem Zusammenhang eine bsartige
Binsenweisheit unter Historikern und Theoretikern des kolonialen Diskurses, nach
der die Konstruktion wirkungsmchtiger Bilder des nichtwestlichen Anderen durch
eine geeinte und siegreiche koloniale Elite mit einer gleichfrmigen westlichen

6
John Clark Marshman, The Life and Times of Carey, Marshman, and Ward, Embracing the History of the
Serampore Mission (London: Longman, 1859), Bd. 1, 120-2.
7
Yates, Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain, 350.
8
Zum Zeitpunkt seiner geistlichen Ttigkeit in Hardwar agierte der Missionar unter der Patronage
und dem Schutz von Begum Samru, der kaschmirischen Herrscherin des Frstentums von Sirdhana.
Nach Chamberlains Entlassung befahl sie ihren eigenen Soldaten, ihm bewaffneten Schutz zu gewh-
ren, und richtete mehrfach erfolglose Appelle an die Kolonialregierung, Chamberlain den Verbleib in
Sirdhana zu erlauben. Siehe: William Carey, Oriental Christian Biography (Kalkutta: Baptist Mission
Press, 1850-2), Bd. 2, 228. Siehe ebenfalls: Baptist Missionary Magazine, Mrz 1818: 298; Lucius Edwin
Smith, Heroes and Martyrs of the Modern Missionary Enterprise (Providence, RI: Potter, 1856), 98.
Mentalitt erfolgte.
9
So offeriert Bhabha die folgende, kurze geschichtliche Zu-
sammenfassung:

Es waren Grants Wahl in den Aufsichtsrat der Ostindischen Kompanie
1974 und ins Parlament 1802 und sein energisches Eintreten fr die missio-
narischen Ideen der Clapham-Sekte, die zur Wiederaufnahme einer Frm-
migkeitsklausel in die Satzung der Ostindischen Kompanie im Jahre 1813
fhrten. 1817 betrieb die Kirchliche Missionsgesellschaft bereits einund-
sechzig Schulen, und 1818 arbeitete sie den Burdwan-Plan aus, einen zent-
ralen Lehrplan fr den Unterricht in der englischen Sprache. Das Ziel dieses
Planes nimmt fast wrtlich Thomas Macaulays berchtigte Minute on Edu-
cation vorweg: einen Stamm gut ausgebildeter Arbeiter zu schaffen, die
das Englische so weit beherrschen, da sie als Lehrer, bersetzer und Ver-
fasser ntzlicher Werke fr die Masse der Bevlkerung wirken knnen.
Anund Messehs monotones Widerholen von Kapiteln und Versen und seine
kunstlose bersetzungstechnik sind Bestandteile einer der kunstvollsten
Technologien der kolonialen Macht.
10

Die Vorstellung, wonach die missionarischen Bestrebungen in Indien vor und nach
1813 ein kulturelles Unternehmen gewesen sind, das in Komplizenschaft mit der
offiziellen Regierungspolitik stand, wre mit den Erfahrungen von Carey und
Chamberlain nicht in Einklang zu bringen gewesen. Und sie standen in dieser Hin-
sicht nicht alleine. Eine Reihe von Forschern beschreibt die tiefgreifenden Mei-
nungsunterschiede ber die Rolle missionarischer Ttigkeiten lange Jahre nach
Inkrafttreten der Frmmigkeitsklausel und verweist darauf, dass zahlreiche
Chargen in der Kolonialverwaltung am liebsten den Missionaren den Zutritt ver-
weigert und Sitten und Bruche Indiens unbehelligt gelassen htten.
11
Gauri Vis-
wanathan merkt in diesem Zusammenhang an, dass, obwohl die Satzung von 1813
als ein Sieg der Missionare erscheinen mag, diese bestrzt auf die anhaltende
berwachung ihrer Aktivitten reagierten, die in unertrglicher Weise an Strenge

9
Saurabh Dube, Travelling Light: Missionary Musings, Colonial Cultures and Anthropological
Anxieties, in Travel Worlds: Journeys in Contemporary Cultural Politics, hrsg. Raminder Kaur und John
Hutnyk (London: Zed, 1999), 36. Auch Bart Moore-Gilbert stellt fest, dass Bhabhas einheitliche
Konzeption des kolonialen Untertanen [.] der historischen Wirklichkeit nicht gerecht wird.
Siehe: Bart Moore-Gilbert, Writing India, 1757-1900: The Literature of British India (Manchester: Man-
chester University Press, 1995), 202. Fr meine eigene, revisionistische Interpretation der monologi-
schen Sichtweise des Empire siehe: Bill Bell, Commentary: Selkirks Silence, Times Literary Supple-
ment, 18. Mrz 2011: 14-5.
10
11
Martin Ballard, The Age of Progress, 1848-1866 (London: Methuen, 1971), 47. Siehe auch: Penelope
Carson, An Imperial Dilemma: The Propagation of Christianity in Early Colonial India, The Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History 18.2 (1990): 169-90; John L. Comaroff, Images of Empire, Con-
tests of Conscience: Models of Colonial Domination in South Africa, in Tensions of Empire: Colonial
Cultures in a Bourgeois World, hrsg. Frederick Cooper und Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997), 163-97; Karen Chancey, The Star in the East: The Controversy over Chris-
tian Missions to India, 1805-1813, The Historian 60.3 (1998): 507-22.
zunahm.
12
Im Jahr 1822 erklrte Thomas Munro, der Gouverneur von Madras, in
unmissverstndlicher Weise: In jedem Land, jedoch besonders in diesem, wo die
Herrschenden so wenig an der Zahl und von anderer Rasse als die Bevlkerung
sind, ist es das Gefhrlichste berhaupt, sich in die religisen Befindlichkeiten
einzumischen.
13

Macaulays berchtigtes Memorandum zur Bildung und dessen Aufruf zur
Frderung der englischen Sprache in Indien ein Gegenstand, auf den viele post-
koloniale Interpretationen der indischen Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert zurck-
greifen mgen in Schulen und Universitten, die der Kolonialverwaltung unter-
standen, umgesetzt worden sein. Aber in den Missionsschulen der Auenbezirke
wurden mit Nachdruck weiterhin einheimische Sprachen und Religionen gelehrt.
Wie auch immer die erklrten Ziele des Burdwan-Planes lauteten, nicht alle stan-
den rckhaltlos zu der Verpflichtung, die englische Sprache zu verbreiten: So gab
es im Jahr 1828 zehn Schulen in und um Burdwan, in denen rund 1000 Kinder
die bengalische Sprache gelehrt wurden.
14
Die Rolle, die Englisch in Indien ein-
nahm, beschftigte Carey bei der Vorbereitung seiner bersetzungen sehr. Wie er
spter selbst schrieb: Es war sprbar, dass die staatliche englische Bildungspolitik
zweifellos unbeabsichtigt, aber mit diesem Ergebnis zur Abkhlung der auf-
blhenden Andacht und Hingabe sowie der religisen Empfindungen der Schler
fhrte.
15
Davon berzeugt, dass Sanskrit (das er als Vater aller stlichen Spra-
chen bezeichnete) eine grere Affinitt zum Griechischen der Bibel als zum
Englischen besa, versammelte Carey in Serampore eine Gruppe einheimischer
Wissenschaftler, um antike religise Texte aufzubereiten, die einer Vielzahl von
Traditionen und einer Bandbreite von Dialekten entstammten. In einem Schreiben
an Careys Cousin hinterlie William Ward 1811 die folgende, lebhafte Beschrei-
bung der Betriebsamkeit in der Druckerei:

12
Gauri Viswanathan, The Beginnings of English Literary Studies in British India, The Postcolonial
Studies Reader, hrsg. Bill Ashcroft et al., 2. Aufl. (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 376.
13
George Robert Gleig, The Life of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro (London: Colburn and Bentley,
1830), Bd. 2, 118. Zu den gefhrlichen Folgen, fr die Munro und andere der Einmischung durch
Missionen die Schuld zuschoben, gehrt der Sepoy-Aufstand von 1806. Jahrzehnte spter sollten
viele hnliche Vorwrfe gegenber christlichen Missionaren im Zusammenhang mit den ethnischen
Spannungen erheben, die den Aufstand von 1857 entfacht hatten. In den folgenden Jahren blieben
die Konflikte zwischen britischen Christen und der offiziellen Politik der Regierung bitter. Ein aufge-
brachter Kommentator merkte 1862 in der Calcutta Review an: Warum werden die heiligen Bcher
der Hindus und der Koran [] in den Universitten der Regierung gelesen, derweil die Bibel []
ausgeschlossen bleibt? Warum duldet man, dass der Direktor fr Volksbildung aus englischen Schul-
bchern alle Andeutungen auf das Christentum, wie vage sie auch sein mgen, entfernen lsst, wh-
rend die bengalischen Textbcher, die von der Regierung fr diejenigen ausgewhlt wurden, die ihre
Prfungen in der Landessprache bestehen mchten, weiterhin in unaussprechlicher Weise Obsznit-
ten und Schmutz enthalten? (217).
14
Charles Williams, The Missionary Gazeteer (London: Westley and Davies, 1828), 19.
15
George Smith, The Life of William Carey (London: John Murray, 1885), 456.
Wenn man eintritt, sieht man Ihren Cousin, in einem engen Raum sitzend
und bekleidet mit einer weien Jacke, beim Lesen oder Schreiben oder wie
sein Blick durch das ganze Bro schweift, das mehr als 170 Fu lang ist.
Dort kann man Inder beobachten, die mit der bersetzung der Heiligen
Schrift in die verschiedenen Sprachen oder mit der Korrektur von Druck-
fahnen beschftigt sind. Man nimmt Notiz von in Ksten ausgelegten
Schrifttypen in Arabisch, Persisch, Nagari, Panjabi, Marathi, Chinesisch,
Oriya, Burmesisch, Kanaresisch, Griechisch, Hebrisch und Englisch. Hin-
dus, Muselmanen und indische Christen alle sind sie beschftigt mit Ab-
fassen, Korrigieren, Verteilen. Als nchstes kommen vier Mnner, die die
Bgen mit der Heiligen Schrift in den verschiedenen Sprachen drucken; an-
dere falten diese Bgen und liefern sie in dem groen Lagerraum ab; und das
Binden erfolgt durch sechs Muselmanen.
16

Genauso wie man christliche Schriften in einer Vielzahl von Sprachen reproduzier-
te, druckte der Betrieb in Serampore auch eine beachtliche Anzahl von indischen
religisen Texten. Shivanath hat auf die Bedeutung von Careys Unternehmen fr
das frhe Aufblhen der indigenen Literatur verwiesen.
17
Swapan Majumdar be-
merkt in diesem Zusammenhang, wie Carey, dadurch dass er Panditen fr Sansk-
rit und Munshis fr das Persisch-Arabische zusammenbrachte, um die bengalische
Prosa nachhaltig zu verndern, ein Zentrum zur Frderung der indischen Litera-
tur schuf: Von Religionsgesprchen und populren Geschichten, Chroniken und
Legenden bis hin zu mageblichen Ausgaben literarischer Texte.
18

Fr Carey war sein Druckereiunternehmen Teil eines greren Engagements
zur Frderung der einheimischen Sprachen angesichts dessen, was er als feindli-
chen englischen Einfall ansah. In dem Manifest, das er fr die Mission in Serampo-
re abfasste, argumentierte er, wie wichtig es sei, dass die religisen Gemeinden von
Indern geleitet wrden, die in der Lage wren, das religise Anliegen viel eher als
zur eigenen Nation gehrig zu kennzeichnen. Wie die reformorientierten Hindus,
mit denen er Bndnisse schmiedete, kmpfte Carey gegen kastenbedingte Un-
gleichheit, gegen das Tten von Kindern und gegen Witwenverbrennungen (Sati)
bei deren Verbot im Jahr 1829 er eine bedeutende Rolle spielte , aber betreffs der
unschuldigen Sitten der Menschheit vertrat er (genau wie jene reformorientierten
Hindus) die Sichtweise einer strikten Nichteinmischung:

Wir haben es als unsere Pflicht angesehen, die Namen von eingeborenen
Konvertiten nicht zu ndern, hierbei aus der Heiligen Schrift ablesend, dass
auch die Apostel die Namen der ersten Christen nicht abnderten, die sich

16
S. Pearce Carey, William Carey, 6. Aufl. (London, 1925), 283.
17
Shivanath, Modern Dogri Literature, in Modern Indian Literature: An Anthology, hrsg. K. M. George
(Neu-Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1992), Bd. 1, 96.
18
Swapan Majumdar, Literature and Literary Life in Old Calcutta, in Calcutta, the Living City, hrsg.
Sukanta Chaudhuri (Kalkutta: Oxford University Press, 1990), Bd. 1, 107-9.
vom Heidentum abgewandt hatten. [] Wir denken, dass das berragende
Ziel [] nicht darin besteht, die Namen, die Bekleidung, das Essen und die
unschuldigen Sitten der Menschheit zu verndern. [] Genauso wie es nicht
angemessen wre, die Namen heidnischer Gtter unter Christen zu bewah-
ren, ist es weder notwendig noch vernnftig, jedem einzelnen Mann nach
seiner Konversion einen neuen Namen zu geben, da hierdurch die Ablufe
in Familien, zwischen Nachbarn usw. unntig gestrt wrden.
19

Die Ausgaben der christlichen Bibel bersetzt aus dem Koine des Griechischen in
die verschiedenen indischen Mundarten , die 1814 von Chamberlain auf dem
Jahrmarkt in Hardwar verteilt wurden, waren nicht ganz jenes Sinnbild eines
konzertierten Vorhabens der Englnder, welches sich Bhabha vorstellt. bersetzt
von einheimischen Gelehrten, gedruckt von einem kolonialen Exilanten, verteilt
von einem politischen Aufrhrer, war dem englischen Buch das Phnomen der
komplexen kulturellen Begegnung keineswegs fremd und eigentlich war es auch
berhaupt nicht englisch. Die Bibeln aus Serampore waren hybrid, als sie in Hard-
war eintrafen.

2 Sag mir, wer sind all diese Leute?
Man stelle sich die Szenerie vor, schreibt Bhabha:

die Bibel bersetzt vielleicht in einen nordindischen Dialekt wie das Brig-
bhasha, kostenlos oder fr den Preis einer Rupie verteilt inmitten einer Kul-
tur, in der im allgemeinen nur Hindus mit Kastenzugehrigkeit ein
Exemplar der Geheiligten Schriften besitzen wie sie von den Einheimi-
schen ehrfrchtig sowohl als Neuheit als auch als Hausgottheit in Empfang
genommen wird. [] Worin besteht bei der Offerierung der Hindi-Bibel der
Wert des Englischen? Er besteht [] damit die Einheimischen sich dem
brahmanischen Wissensmonopol widersetzen und sich aus ihrer Bindung
an die eigenen religisen und kulturellen Traditionen lsen[.]
20

Ein grundlegendes Problem dieser Analyse besteht darin, dass die Eingeborenen,
denen wir in dieser Anekdote begegnen, nicht wirklich praktizierende Hindus wa-
ren. Anand Messehs Frage, als er den 500 mysterisen Fremden zum ersten Mal
begegnet Sag mir, wer sind all diese Leute? und woher kommen sie? bleibt in
der Erzhlung des Katecheten unbeantwortet. Aber zwei Monate spter wurde das
Geheimnis gelftet. Am 14. Juli 1817 berichtete der Missionar Henry Fisher, diese
armen Fremden, die uns so beschftigt haben, werden als Saadhs bezeichnet. Bei
weiteren Nachforschungen entdeckte Fisher in mindestens fnf Drfern in der

19
Smith, Life of William Carey, 448.
20
Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 173-5.
Umgebung von Delhi Mitglieder dieser Sekte, die einer monotheistischen Konfes-
sion verpflichtet waren und sich vor langer Zeit vom Hinduismus abgespalten
hatte. Als Folge davon waren sie, so die Beobachtung von Fisher, Ausgestoene,
die fortwhrenden unerbittlichen Verfolgungen ausgesetzt waren, einschlielich
regelmiger Zchtigungen und Erpressungen durch die Brahmanen.
21

Die Sekte hatte sich im Jahr 1543 von der Hauptstrmung des Hinduismus ab-
gespalten, als sie von einem religisen Propheten namens Birbhan gegrndet wor-
den war, einem Mann, den die Saadhs als das personifizierte Wort Gottes ansahen.
Um das Jahr 1658 herum nahmen sie die Lehren des Jogi Das an, der einige der
Kernvorstellungen des Christentums in die Sekte einfhrte, die ihm mglicher-
weise durch jene frhen katholischen Missionare vermittelt worden waren, die
damals in Indien wirkten.
22
Von da an hatten die Saadhs ihren Glauben an den
Einen Gott (Satnam), an Monogamie und an die Ablehnung aller Kastenunter-
schiede bewahrt. Ihre religisen Hauptschriften, Pothis (das Buch), wurden auf
ffentlichen Versammlungen whrend einer alljhrlichen Wallfahrt verlesen, deren
Hauptzweck darin bestand, ein Forum zur Beilegung interner Zwistigkeiten und
zur Klarstellung der Politik und Doktrin der Gemeinschaft zu schaffen. So erklrt
sich auch, warum sie sich 1817 in dem Wldchen in der Nhe von Delhi, einem
traditionellen Wallfahrtsort der Saadhs, aufhielten. Die Kernelemente des Geba-
rens und des Glaubens der Saadhs waren in Form von zwlf Geboten (Hukms)
niedergelegt, die in den von Jogi Das vermittelten Schriften festgehalten waren,
den Adi Updesh (oder Ersten Maximen), in denen wir offensichtliche jdisch-
christliche Elemente entdecken knnen:

1. Erkenne nur einen Gott an, der dich geschaffen hat und dich vernichten
kann, ber dem niemand steht und dem allein Verehrung gebhrt; nicht
der Erde, noch Stein, noch Metall, noch Holz, noch Bumen, noch ir-
gendeinem geschaffenem Ding. Es gibt nur einen Herrn und nur das Wort
des Herrn. Derjenige, der ber Falschheit nachsinnt, bt bereits Falschheit
aus und begeht eine Snde, und wer eine Snde begeht, strzt in die Hlle.
2. Sei bescheiden und demtig, richte deine Liebe nicht auf Weltliches, folge
treu deinen Glaubensstzen, und vermeide Verkehr mit allen, die anderen
Glaubens sind, esse nicht das Brot eines Fremden.
3. Lge niemals, noch spreche zu irgendeiner Zeit bles zu oder von irgen-
detwas, das der Erde oder des Wassers ist, oder Bumen oder Tieren. Lass
die Zunge damit beschftigt sein, Gott zu preisen. Stehle niemals, noch
Reichtum, noch Lndereien, noch Tiere, noch Weideland. Unterscheide
zwischen deinem eigenen Eigentum und dem eines anderen, und sei zu-
frieden mit dem, was du besitzt. Male dir niemals Bses aus. Lasse deinen

21
Missionary Register, Mai 1818: 204-5.
22
F. E. Keay, Kabir and his Followers (Neu-Delhi: Aravali, 1997), 164.
Blick nicht auf unziemlichen Dingen ruhen, noch auf Mnnern, noch auf
Frauen, noch auf Tnzen, noch auf Darbietungen.
4. Lausche keiner blen Unterhaltung, noch irgendetwas anderem denn Lob
fr den Herrn, noch Erzhlungen, noch Klatsch, noch Rufmord, noch
Musik, noch Gesang auer religisen Liedern; aber dann darf die einzige
musikalische Begleitung im Geiste sein.
5. Begehre niemals irgendetwas, weder Gegenstnde noch Reichtum; nimm
einem anderen nichts weg. Alle Dinge werden von Gott geschenkt, sofern
du Vertrauen in ihn hast, wird dir gegeben werden.
6. Wenn man dich fragt, was du bist, sage du bist ein Sadh, spreche nicht von
Kasten, ergehe dich nicht in Streitigkeiten, halte fest in deinem Glauben,
leg deine Hoffnungen nicht in Menschen.
7. Trage weie Kleidung, benutze keine Farbstoffe, noch Kollyrium, noch
Zahnpasta, noch mehndi (Henna), noch lege Markierungen auf deine Per-
son oder deinen Kopf, die dich in Gruppen einteilen, noch trage Perlen-
schnre oder Rosenkrnze oder Schmuck.
8. Esse und trinke niemals berauschende Stoffe, noch kaue pan, noch rieche
an Duftstoffen, noch rauche Tabak, noch kaue oder rieche Opium; erhebe
deine Hnde und beuge deinen Kopf nicht in Gegenwart von Gtzenbil-
dern oder von Menschen.
9. Nimm nicht das Leben von anderen, noch drohe persnliche Gewalt an,
noch lege ein verdammendes Zeugnis ab, noch nimm irgendetwas mit
Gewalt zu dir.
10. Lasse einen Mann eine Ehefrau und eine Frau einen Ehemann nehmen,
lasse einen Mann nicht die Essensreste einer Frau zu sich nehmen, aber
eine Frau darf dies mit denen eines Mannes, so wie es Sitte sein mag. Lasse
die Frau dem Manne gehorchen.
11. Nimm nicht die Tracht eines Bettelmnches an, noch erbitte Almosen,
noch nimm Geschenke an. Hab keine Furcht vor Nekromantie, noch ma-
che Gebrauch von ihr. Lerne kennen, bevor du vertraust. Die Treffen der
Glubigen (Sadhus) sind die einzigen Sttten zur Wallfahrt, aber verstehe,
wer die Glubigen (Sadhus) sind, bevor du sie grt.
12. Lass den Sadhus nicht aberglubisch hinsichtlich der Tage, noch der Mond-
lufe, noch der Monate oder des Geschreis beim Auftauchen von Vgeln
oder Tieren sein; lasse ihn nur nach dem Willen Gottes streben.
23

Fishers ursprnglicher Eindruck war im Groen und Ganzen korrekt. Mehr als
drei Jahrhunderte lang waren die Saadhs Ausgestoene gewesen, die alle Formen
von Polytheismus sowie die heiligsten Rituale und Glaubensvorstellungen der
Brahmanen zurckgewiesen hatten. Seit der Grndung hatte der Saadhismus als
strengglubige monotheistische Sekte fortgelebt, deren Angehrige einen asketi-
schen Lebensstil pflegten, was eine Reihe von Europern dazu veranlasste, sie mit

23
Mohammed Taher, Encyclopedic Survey of Islamic Culture (Neu-Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1998), Bd.
10, 224-5.
der Gesellschaft der Freunde in Verbindung zu bringen, mglicherweise weil sie,
wie die Quker, der Vorstellung einer fortschreitenden Erweckung offen gegen-
berstanden: Jedem Saadh, der annimmt, unter dem Einfluss desselben gttlichen
Geistes zu stehen, von dem sie glauben, dass er auch ihren Grndervater beseelt
hat, so die Beobachtung Fishers, steht es absolut frei, eigene Gedanken bei ihren
religisen Versammlungen ffentlich vorzutragen und wiederholen zu lassen. []
Solange diese nicht im Widerspruch zu ihren berlieferten berzeugungen stehen,
wird niemand daran Ansto nehmen.
24

Die Antworten, welche die Saadhs Anand Messeh gaben, scheinen zu besttigen,
dass sie glaubten, die Bibeln, die sie in Hardwar erhalten hatten, seien mit demsel-
ben gttlichen Geist durchdrungen. Warum sonst htten sie sich der mhevollen
Arbeit unterzogen, sie von Hand zu kopieren? Ihre Antwort dass dies nicht eu-
ropische Bcher seien, sondern dass vielmehr Gott sie gesandt habe war kein
Akt von spektakulrem Widerstand, wie Bhaba es sich ausmalt, sondern viel-
mehr die einfache Entgegennahme einer von Gott eingegebenen Schrift, die
ohne die Vermittlung von Menschen auskam (2 Tim 3, 16). Die Vorstellung der
Saadhs, wonach die belesenen Gelehrten, die ihnen die Bcher ausgehndigt
hatten, gleichzeitig Engel waren, erscheint zudem als wrtliche Wiedergabe einer
Bibelstelle, in der davon die Rede ist, dass Gott engelsgleiche Boten ausgesandt
habe, um die in alle Winde verstreuten Auserwhlten an einem Ort zu versammeln.
Gastfrei zu sein vergesset nicht, hatte der heilige Paulus geschrieben, denn
dadurch haben etliche ohne ihr Wissen Engel beherbergt. (Hebr 13, 2) Noch
hatten die Saadhs, wie Bhabha uns nahelegt, irgendeine beliebige Hausgottheit in
ihrer Bibel erkannt eine Vorstellung, die auf fundamentale Weise mit ihrem strik-
ten Monotheismus im Konflikt gestanden htte , sondern es war das genaue Ge-
genteil: die Besttigung eines bereits tief verankerten Glaubens an den Einen Wah-
ren Gott und ihre Anerkennung der Bibel als Gottes Geschenk fr uns eine
weitere Etappe in der Entwicklung einer Religion, deren Anhnger, vor vielen
Generationen bereits, der Brahmanen und ihrer Hausgtter abgeschworen hatten.
Daher ist es wenig verwunderlich, dass diese armen Eingeborenen einen Text
wertschtzten, der ihre eigenen traditionellen Glaubensvorstellungen besttigte
und das in einer von Verboten und Kastenunterschieden bestimmten Welt, einer
Welt, in der lediglich eine Elite heilige Schriften besitzen konnte, vom Lesen der-
selben gar nicht zu reden. Das Nachlassen des Einflusses der traditionellen religi-
sen Fhrer Indiens zum Teil die Folge des Wirkens von Christen und ihres Bu-
ches stellte entrechteten Gruppen wie den Saadhs eine grere Legitimation in
Aussicht. Am Ende erscheint es, als ob ihre Reaktion auf eine Bibel, die sich auf
unproblematische Weise mit ihrer eigenen Weltsicht in Einklang bringen lie, we-
niger damit zu tun hatte, dass weie Menschen sich zwischen die indische Landbe-

24
Asiatic Journal and Monthly Miscellany, Juli 1819: 74.
vlkerung und ihre religisen Fhrer drngten, sondern vielmehr aus der dankba-
ren Erkenntnis entsprang, dass der Feind eines Feindes ein Freund ist.
25

In seinem Eintreten fr eine Abkehr von den Unbestndigkeiten der Inter-
pretation hin zu was er als diskursive Transparenz bezeichnet, bergeht Bhabha
die komplexe Dynamik des Lesens.
26
. Und dadurch dass er eine Frage stellt und
gleich auch beantwortet Und wie sah der Diskurs der Einheimischen aus? Wer
knnte das sagen?
27
, umgeht er das Problem, wie und was die Saadhs tatschlich
an jenem Tag gelesen haben mgen. Stattdessen verlsst sich Bhabha auf eine kru-
de berinterpretation der Absichten der Eingeborenen, um sie jenen theoretischen
Konzepten anzupassen, die a priori und durchgehend seine Lesart der Episode
bestimmen: Durch die merkwrdigen Fragen der Einheimischen hindurch kn-
nen wir im historischen Rckblick sehen, wogegen sie durch das Hinterfragen der
Prsenz des Englischen [] Widerstand leisteten [] Wenn die Einheimischen
eine indische Version des Evangeliums verlangen spannen sie die Krfte der Hyb-
riditt fr sich ein, um sich der Taufe zu widersetzen und das Projekt der Bekeh-
rung in eine unmgliche Lage zu bringen.
28
Auf das Ende seiner Argumentation
zusteuernd, schlgt Bhabha vor, dass die Geschichte gelesen werden sollte als
Frage der kolonialen Autoritt, ein agonistischer Raum, bestimmt von Augenbli-
cken brgerlichen Ungehorsams [] Zeichen spektakulren Widerstands. [] War
es dieser Geist schlauer Hflichkeit, der die einheimischen Christen dazu brachte,
so lang mit Anund Messeh zu disputieren, um sich dann, bei der Erwhnung der
Taufe, hflich zu entschuldigen: Jetzt mssen wir zur Ernte nach Hause viel-
leicht werden wir nchstes Jahr nach Meerut kommen (179-180).
Viel eher als das Erforschen der Geschichte eines einzelnen Treffens, bei der
ein Katechet das englische Buch mit Leuten aus einem Dorf diskutierte, so
schreibt ein Kritiker von Bhabhas Essay, wre es hilfreich gewesen, eine strker
historische Analyse der Reaktionen der Landbevlkerung zu unterbreiten.
29
Der
Hinweis, dass die Saadhs, dadurch, dass sie sich artig entschuldigten, einen Akt
schlauer Hflichkeit vollzogen, mag den Zwecken von Bhabhas Argument ent-
sprechen, aber ein genaueres Verstndnis des Kontextes, in dem dieser Austausch
ber Taufe stattfindet, legt den Schluss nahe, wo die diskursive Transparenz
tatschlich liegt. Anfang Mai, zur Hochzeit der Erntesaison, htte es fr den Kate-

25
In ihrer hellsichtigen Kritik von Bhabhas Essay nhert sich Rosinka Chaudhuri dem Problem aus
der Perspektive einer anderen Klasse indischer Leser an, nmlich jener Gebildeten aus der Mittel-
schicht, die sich fr einen ausgeweiteten Zugang zu europischer Bildung aussprachen, was in Ein-
klang mit ihren eigenen gesellschaftlichen Bestrebungen stand. Siehe: Rosinka Chaudhuri, Gentlemen
Poets in Colonial Bengal: Emergent Nationalism and the Orientalist Project (Kalkutta: Seagull, 2002), 10-7.
26
Bhabha, Die Verortung der Kultur, 154-5.
27
Ibid., 179.
28
Ibid., 175.
29
David Jefferess, Postcolonial Resistance: Culture, Liberation and Transformation (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2008), 40-1.
cheten wenig Veranlassung gegeben, den Worten dieser armen Subsistenzbauern,
die sich nach Hause begeben mussten, um dort ihre Ernte einzubringen, keinen
Glauben zu schenken. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Wallfahrt ihnen auferleg-
te, 80 Meilen hin zur Missionsstation und zurck zu reisen dies mglicherweise
zu Fu, ohne angemessene Verpflegung und zur heiesten Zeit des Jahres , ist es
kaum verwunderlich, dass sie zgerlich waren, Anands Vorschlag aufzugreifen.
Nichtsdestotrotz fhrt Bhabha fort, indem er argumentiert, die Weigerung der
Pilger, die Kommunion zu empfangen, sollte ebenfalls als ein Modus diskursiver
Strung betrachtet werden, welcher die logische Ordnung des Diskurses der
Autoritt herausfordere.
30
Im Indien des 19. Jahrhunderts lag nichts besonders
Subversives in der Weigerung, die Eucharistie mit den Missionaren mit zu feiern,
weil die Europer das Fleisch von Khen essen. Der tatschliche Diskurs der
Autoritt, von dem die Antwort der Saadhs Zeugnis ablegt, war der Kodex der
Brahmanen zu Reinheit und Verboten. Die zwei unverzeihlichen Snden in der
hinduistischen Gesellschaft bestanden darin, Rindfleisch zu essen und, daraus fol-
gend, mit jenen zusammen zu speisen, die dies tun. Beide Handlungen waren An-
lass genug fr den vlligen Ausschluss aus der Kaste. Htten sie zusammen mit
den Missionaren die Kommunion eingenommen, wren die Saadhs Gefahr gelau-
fen, die wenigen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Rechte zu verlieren, die sie besaen.
Ihre Zurckweisung des Sakraments war weniger Widerstand gegen die wunder-
same quivalenz von Gott und Englndern
31
als ein Ausdruck echter Angst
Angst vor wirtschaftlicher Exilierung, sozialem Ausschluss und physischer Gewalt.
Wie einer der Saadhs spter bemerkte: Wir werden schon genug verfolgt [,]
aber wenn wir auch noch Rindfleisch und Schweineblut en, was wrde dann aus
uns werden?
32

Angesichts solcher Spannungen brachten viele koloniale Verwaltungsbeamte
ihre Ablehnung der Einfhrung christlicher Rituale zum Ausdruck, welche zur
Unterminierung einheimischer Hierarchien fhren knnten. Derweil war das Re-
gelwerk der Missionare, welches die Verabreichung der Kommunion ordnete und
ihr Legitimation gab, weit entfernt davon, genau festgelegt zu sein. Einige christli-
che Gemeinden nahmen eine liberale Haltung bezglich der Bewahrung von Kas-
tenunterschieden und des Verbots des Kommensalismus (Tischgemeinschaft) ein,
whrend andere auf der Abschaffung des Kastenwesens unter Glubigen beharrten
und fr eine strker inklusive Kommunion eintraten. Andere wiederum betrachte-

30
31
Ibid., 174.
32
Missionary Register, Mai 1818: 206. Diese letzte Aussage knnte auf anti-christliche Propaganda der
Brahmanen verweisen, die zu dem Gercht fhrte, die Eucharistie schliee den Verzehr von Rind-
fleisch und Schweineblut ein. Fr eine umfassende Errterung der Kontroverse siehe: Duncan B.
Forrester, Commensalism and Christian Mission: The Indian Case, in id., Forrester on Christian Ethics
and Practical Theology: Collected Writings on Christianity, India, and the Social Order (Farnham: Ashgate,
2010), 125-34.
ten das Problem nur als einen zivilrechtlichen Unterschied und machten Vor-
kehrungen, wonach die Konvertiten aus verschiedenen Kasten [] nicht einmal
gemeinsam am Abendmahl teilnhmen. Solche adaptiven Praktiken wurden von
Richard Heber toleriert, als dieser 1823 Bischof von Kalkutta wurde, whrend sein
Nachfolger Daniel Wilson eine hrtere Gangart gegenber Kastenunterschieden
und getrennter Kommunion einnahm.
33
Kurz gesagt, zu keiner Zeit hatte es eine
einheitliche Herangehensweise bezglich der praktischen Anwendung der Eucha-
ristie in Indien gegeben. Zu behaupten, die Sakramente seien Teil einer logi-
sche[n] Ordnung des Diskurses der Autoritt
34
gewesen, kommt der Nichtbeach-
tung jener heftigen konfessionellen Konflikte gleich, welche jahrhundertelang die
Bedeutung der Kommunion in Europa umgeben hatten, Konflikte, die sich auf
anderen Kontinenten und in anderen Kontexten fortsetzen sollten.
Ein letztes Problem bei Bhabhas Interpretation dieses Moments in der Anekdote
hngt mit deren massiver Verkrzung zusammen.
35
Bhabhas elliptische Bearbei-
tung des Textes fasst das Geschehen so, dass der Eindruck entsteht, der Austausch
ber das Sakrament habe sich in Gegenwart der 500 Pilger am gleichen Tag abge-
spielt. Tatschlich enthlt die ursprngliche Anekdote, so wie sie in The Missionary
Register erschien, zwei Episoden. Der abschlieende Austausch (berliefert in ei-
nem von Anand spter selbst verfassten Bericht) fand eine Woche nach dem ur-
sprnglichen Treffen statt, das heit, als die 500 sich bereits in verschiedene Rich-
tungen verstreut hatten und der Katechet einige wenige Zurckgebliebene in
einer benachbarten Ortschaft auffand. Es ist genau dieser Kontext, in dem wir die
folgende Antwort wiederfinden: Wenn unser ganzes Land dieses Sakrament an-
nimmt, dann werden wir es auch tun. Mit anderen Worten: Htte der Austausch
am ersten Tag stattgefunden whrend der jhrlichen Versammlung, bei der die
Saadhs Fragen bezglich ihrer Doktrin entschieden
36
dann wre der Sprecher
unter Umstnden tatschlich in der Lage gewesen, die Bedingungen von Anands
Offerte zu akzeptieren.
Einige Saadhs kamen schlielich tatschlich nach Meerut. Zu ihren christlichen
Konvertiten zhlte der Stammeslteste David Jysingh, der von Fisher am 1.
Weihnachtstag des Jahres 1818 getauft wurde und anschlieend in seinem Heima-
tort Kowallee als Bibellektor und Lehrer fungierte. In Ermangelung eines amtie-
renden Geistlichen integrierten die Mitglieder der Gemeinde derweil eigene For-
men der Taufe und Kommunion in ihre religise Praxis.
37
Im darauffolgenden Jahr

33
Missionary Chronicle, Jg. 6 (1838), 72.
34
35
Neben der Auslassung von Textstellen enthlt Bhabhas Transkription der Episode nicht weniger
als sechs Abweichungen, zumeist orthografischer Art, von dem ursprnglichen Bericht aus dem
Missionary Register.
36
John Evans, A Sketch of the Denominations of the Christian World (Amherst: Adams, 1832), 228-30.
37
Die Unterhaltungen mit ihnen offenbarten fortwhrend, wie sie der Herrschaft menschlicher
Furcht unterstanden, obwohl es sich um arme und unwissende Landbevlkerung handelte. Was

organisierte Fisher, mithilfe von Geldmitteln, die von wohlgesonnenen indischen
und europischen Spendern stammten, den Bau einer Schule und einer Kapelle
auf Grundlage eines festen Plans, dadurch eine neue Siedlung absteckend, wel-
cher die Saadhs spter in Andenken an ihren Schirmherren den Namen Henree-
pore verliehen.
38
In Henreepore schickten die Saadhs ihre Kinder zur Schule,
nahmen sonntglich am Gottesdienst in der Kapelle teil und lebten weiterhin unter
dem Schutz der Church Missionary Society. In den folgenden Jahren scheint das
Verhltnis zwischen den Saadhs in Henreepore und den europischen Christen
von gegenseitigem Respekt und von Dialog geprgt gewesen zu sein, was den
Saadhs hohes Ansehen unter jenen Missionaren einbrachte, mit denen sie in Kon-
takt kamen.
39
Ihre anhaltende berzeugung, dass die christliche Bibel mit ihren
eigenen heiligen Schriften vereinbar war, ist verstndlich. Mehr als anderthalb
Jahrhunderte zuvor hatten sie durch den Adi Updesh christliche Doktrin aufge-
nommen. Als sie beim Jahrmarkt von Hardwar das ehrwrdige Geschenk des Mis-
sionars erhielten, stellten sie lediglich eine Verbindung zu ihrer eigenen religisen
Vergangenheit wieder her. Ihr Diskurs war ebenfalls einer, der bereits hybrid war.

3 Wer war Anand Messeh?
Und wie verhlt es sich nun mit Anand Messeh, jenem Bibellektor, der im Mai
1817 berstrzt und erregt eine Reise von seiner Mission in Meerut antrat? Seit-
dem er der Vergessenheit entrissen wurde, hat dieser einfache Katechet mit seinem

werden alle unsere Brder sagen! Was werden die Nachbarn denken!, war als Antwort stets zur Hand
auf alle [von Anund vorgebrachten] Argumente. Eine Art Kompromiss wurde von ihnen vorgeschla-
gen. Du geh hin, sagten sie zu Anund, und predige den Gott Messias zu den Nachbarn im Dorf
und finde heraus, was sie denken, und komm zurck und berichte uns: und in der Zwischenzeit
werden wir Brot und Wasser zu uns nehmen und Christus gedenken; und da wir keinen Pater haben,
werden wir selbst unsere Stirn mit Wasser besprengen und feierlich geloben, an Christus zu glauben!
Missionary Register, Mai 1818: 205-6. Die Wasserkommunion wurde durch die gesamte Geschichte des
Christentums hindurch praktiziert, besonders in Abwesenheit amtierender Geistlicher und bei Min-
derheiten wie den Saadhs, bei denen Alkohol verboten war. Sie wird noch immer angewandt von
Unitariern, Methodisten und den Heiligen der letzten Tage. Siehe: Hans Leitzmann, Mass and Lords
Supper: A Study in the History of the Liturgy (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 202-3. David Jysingh beschrieb gegen-
ber Fisher, wie die Saadhs letztendlich die Eucharistie praktizierten: Am Abend wird das Brot auf
eine schmale Erhebung abgelegt und nach einem kurzen, im Stegreif vorgetragenen Gebet unter den
Anwesenden verteilt. Ein mit Brause geflltes Gef, als Schale der Brderlichkeit bezeichnet, wird
ebenfalls herumgereicht. Christian Herald and Seamanss Magazine, Jg. 6 (1819): 217.
38
Proceedings of the Church Missionary Society for Africa and the East 1819-1820 (London: R. Watts, 1820),
144-5; James Hough, The History of Christianity in India from the Commencement of the Christian Era (Lon-
don: Seeley and Burnside, Church Missionary House, 1839-1860), Bd. 5, 315-7.
39
Dies ist in Wahrheit eine heidnische Sekte, aber ihre Mitglieder bertreffen einige Christen der-
maen in der Milde ihres Gemts und in der Reinheit ihres Lebens, dass ihnen eine Erwhnung in
diesem Werk nicht verwehrt werden konnte. Evans, Denominations of the Christian World, 230.
Eifer, indische Landsleute zu taufen, in postkolonialen Studien eine Prsenz aus
zweiter Hand und von zweitem Rang angenommen. Mageschneidert dafr, die
Komplizenschaft von indischen Untertanen mit europischer Macht zu reprsen-
tieren, ist die Geschichte seines vermaledeiten Eifers seit seiner Wiederauferste-
hung von den Toten im Jahr 1985 immer wieder neu und anders erzhlt worden.
Ein Interpret erspht in der Anekdote den Beleg fr die Naivitt eines eingebore-
nen Konvertiten, welcher der Autoritt der Druckkultur und im speziellen der
europischen Form der Wissensvermittlung vollends zugestimmt habe.
40
Fr
einen anderen scheint die Figur des Anund Messeh das perfekte Beispiel dafr zu
sein, wie der Eingeborene sich danach sehnt, so wie der Kolonisator zu werden
in Kleidung, Sitten und Glauben , dadurch das vorgebliche Wohlwollen des Ko-
lonisators bekrftigend, derweil man in Wirklichkeit dessen berlegenheit bekrf-
tigt; Anund Messeh kann anglifiziert werden, ein Funktionstrger der englischen
Herrschaft, aber er kann nicht englisch werden.
41
Der arme Anand Messeh!
Nach seinem eigenen Zeugnis wurde Paramanand in einem Dorf in der Nhe
von Delhi geboren, womglich irgendwann in den 1790er Jahren. Benannt nach
einem der berhmtesten Dichterheiligen der Hindus aus dem 16. Jahrhundert,
42

war er ein frommes Mitglied der Kaste der Brahmanen, Indiens elitrer religiser
Klasse. Schon in jungen Jahren wurde er ein Gelehrter und fungierte als Geistli-
cher unter seinen Landsleuten. Spter lie er sich in Delhi nieder, wo er, im Ein-
klang mit seinem Amt, regelmig Lesungen aus den hinduistischen Schriften vor
seinen groenteils des Lesens unkundigen Anhngern abhielt, die hinduistische
Religion lehrte und als Geistlicher Trauungen und Beisetzungen leitete. So gefestigt
war er in seinem Glauben an den Brahmanismus, dass er vllig berzeugt war,
dass unsere Bildnisse wahre Gtter und alle anderen Religionen falsch seien.
43

Um das Jahr 1812 herum jedoch zeigte er sich in zunehmendem Mae unzu-
frieden mit der Religion, in die er hineingeboren worden war. In seinen Memoiren
beschreibt er den Augenblick seiner Ernchterung:

Der Ort lag nicht weit entfernt und ich eilte dorthin und bat um die Erlaub-
nis, diesen wundersamen Gott betrachten zu drfen. Die Brahmanen stan-
den um mich herum und befahlen mir, mich zurckzuziehen. Jedoch davon
berzeugt, dass, wenn dies wirklich Gott sei, seine Macht gro sein msse
und er dazu in der Lage wre, mein Herz zu reinigen und es wie pures Gold
zu machen, entschloss ich mich dazu, mich auf meine Strke zu verlassen

40
Vanessa Smith, Literary Culture and the Pacific: Nineteenth-Century Textual Encounters (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998), 95.
41
Jefferess, Postcolonial Resistance, 43.
42
Siehe: A. Whitney Sanford, Singing Krishna: Sound Becomes Sight in Paramanands Poetry (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2008).
43
Paramanands Memoiren sind wiedergegeben in: Michael Wilkinson, Memorials of an Indian Missionary
(London: Wertheim, Macintosh and Hunt, 1857), 187ff.
und allen Widerstand zu durchbrechen und ihn zu berhren. Das tat ich
auch, erreichte mein Ziel und rieb meinen Messingring ber das Gtzenbild,
jedoch war es immer noch ein Messingring. Ich erkannte, dass das Gtzen-
bild ein groer schwarzer Stein war, den man grob in eine menschliche Ge-
stalt mit vier Hnden gehauen hatte. Es war ungefhr zwei Fu hoch. Sechs
Monate lang jedes Jahr ist es fr gewhnlich mit Schnee bedeckt und
dadurch vor Blostellung geschtzt, aber in den wrmeren Monaten, dann
wenn die Sonne den Schnee hat wegschmelzen lassen, drngen sich tausende
aus allen Richtungen heran, um aus der Ferne einen Blick zu erhaschen, um
die blichen Tribute zu offerieren und um sich selbst einen eingebildeten
Nutzen durch das Betrachten zu verschaffen. Ich meinerseits war angewi-
dert, erledigt und von Erschpfung bermannt und ich kehrte mit einem
Gefhl der Enttuschung nach Hause zurck.
44

Es dauerte nicht lange und er wurde von John Chamberlain, einem baptistischen
Missionar in Sirdhana, als bersetzer eingestellt, derweil er sich immer strker zu
den Schriften der Christen hingezogen fhlte: Ich verharrte [] fr lngere Zeit
zwischen zwei Ansichten. Schlielich erffnete ich dem Missionar, dass ich ein
Christ werden wollte; aber ich erbebte, als ich das sagte, und innerhalb meiner
eigenen vier Wnde war ich ein strengerer und aberglubigerer Hindu denn je. Ich
frchtete die mglichen Konsequenzen des Zorns meiner eigenen Gtzen.
45
An-
schlieend suchte er mehrmals um die Taufe nach, was von Chamberlain wieder-
holt abgelehnt wurde, da dieser von den Glaubensgelbden seines einheimischen
Gehilfen nicht berzeugt war.
Noch am 10. Mrz 1814, nur einen Monat bevor Paramanand Chamberlain
zum Jahrmarkt nach Hardwar begleitete, hatte der Missionar weiterhin Zweifel:
Die Hindus werden sehr zurckhaltend, schrieb er, was mit Paramanunda zu-
sammenhngt, wie ich annehme.
46
Einen Monat spter wurde der Verdacht
Chamberlains zur Gewissheit:

Ich erinnere mich besonders an ein Vorkommnis, als wir, aus Hardwar zu-
rckkehrend, wo der Missionar gewesen war, um Bcher unter jenen Einge-
borenen zu verteilen, die jhrlich diesen Ort aufsuchen, zur Nacht Rast ge-
macht und unseren abendlichen christlichen Gottesdienst abgehalten hatten.
Ich suchte nach einer Mglichkeit, im Geheimen meine eigenen Gebete zu
verrichten und war, nachdem ich einen geeigneten Platz im Schatten gefun-
den, mein Gtzenbild gewaschen und gereinigt sowie es auf seinem Platz aufge-
stellt hatte, mit meinen Kniefllen und Gebeten beschftigt, als der Missio-
nar mich pltzlich inmitten meines Treibens berraschte. Ich war verwirrt
und beschmt, meiner eigenen Doppelzngigkeit und Torheit gewahr: Je-

44
Wilkinson, Memorials, 188-9.
45
46
Yates, Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain, 345.
doch von solcher Macht waren meine angeborenen Auffassungen, wonach,
falls die hinduistischen Gtzen tatschlich Gtter waren, ihre Rache fr
meine Missachtung ihrer Autoritt und Macht unertrglich sein werde und
sie mich mit schmerzhaften Krankheiten plagen oder mit Lepra berziehen
wrden. Daher nahm ich an den Morgen- und Abendgebeten des Missionars
teil und vollzog meinen eigenen Gtzendienst, bevor ich mich zur Ruhe be-
gab; daran glaubend, dass, falls ich durch den Kontakt mit Christen verun-
reinigt werde, dies meine Reinigung sichere.
47

Nachdem sie nach Sirdhana zurckgekehrt waren, schrieb der entnervte Chamber-
lain: Purumamunda hat mir Kummer bereitet, aber er erscheint reumtig und
wnscht, getauft zu werden; ich scheue jedoch davor zurck, ihn zu taufen.
48

Nach Chamberlains Weggang nach Serampore im spteren Verlauf des Jahres hielt
sich Paramanand an den CMS-Missionar Mr. Thompson, wiederum um die Taufe
bittend, was ihm abermals verweigert wurde. Kurz darauf erfuhr er die gleiche
Reaktion beim Kaplan in Meerut.
49

Im Jahr 1815 begegnen wir Paramanand als Angestellten unter der Oberauf-
sicht von Reverend Henry Fisher, einem Vertreter der Church Missionary Society
in Meerut. Da er die Verantwortung fr fnf Schulen im Bezirk trug, bezog Para-
manand ein grorumiges Quartier, das von der CMS oberhalb des Groen Tores
der Stadt zur Verfgung gestellt worden war, und hielt dort Bibelstunden fr die
lokale Bevlkerung ab.
50
Ein Jahr spter verwirklichten sich seine Ambitionen und
Fisher, der allen Grund sah, an die Aufrichtigkeit seiner christlichen Gelbde zu
glauben, taufte ihn am 1. Weihnachtstag des Jahres 1816, als er den Namen Anund
Messeeh annahm.
51

Am 6. Mai 1817 reiste Anand nicht, wie Bhabha glauben machen will, hastig
und aufgeregt von seiner Missionsstation in Meerut zu einem ganz in der Nhe

47
48
Yates, Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain, 353. Es ist anzunehmen, dass Chamberlains Befrchtung mit
der Tatsache in Verbindung stand, dass die britischen Missionare sich in zunehmendem Mae zu-
rckhaltend hinsichtlich der bernahme geistlicher mter in der Kirche durch einheimische Konver-
titen zeigten. Ein Jahrhundert zuvor waren jesuitische Missionare dadurch in Verruf geraten, dass sie
Massentaufen von Nichtglubigen abhielten in dem Versuch, ihren Erfolg in Indien und anderswo
herauszuheben. Im Jahr 1833 mahnte ein von einer Anzahl fhrender Mitglieder der Missionsgesell-
schaften unterzeichneter offener Brief an die Calcutta Review zur Zurckhaltung gegenber der Taufe
von Personen aus der Liebe zu einer Bereicherung und einem schlechten Ruf heraus. (Juli 1833:
330). The Wesleyan Missionary Register kehrte im Jahr 1860 auf dieses Thema zurck: Als die Briten
Ceylon in Besitz nahmen, gab es dort 500.000 getaufte Eingeborene, Mitglieder der hollndischen
Kirche. Man hatte sie fr ihre rein nominellen Gelbde zum Christentum mit weltlichen Hoffnungen
und mit weltlichen ngsten gewonnen. Lediglich getauften Einheimischen stand der Weg zu Stellun-
gen im ffentlichen Dienst frei und wenn ein Mann vom Christentum abfiel, kostete ihn dies etwas
mehr als seine Stellung. Wesleyan Missionary Notices, 25. Mai 1860: 107.
49
Wilkinson, Memorials, 193.
50
Missionary Register, 1818: 11.
51
Hough, History of Christianity in India, Bd. 4, 474-5.
von Delhi gelegenen
52
, sondern in Wirklichkeit machte er sich auf den Weg nach
Delhi, um seine Frau und Familie zu besuchen. Einige Zeit darauf hielt er sich bei
einem hinduistischen Tempel in der Stadt auf, wo er, im Schatten einiger Bume,
auf eine Anzahl von Fremden aus mehreren Ortschaften westlich von Delhi traf,
womglich einige derselben Saadh-Konvertiten, die er beim Jahrmarkt von
Hardwar getroffen hatte. Acht Monate spter erschien in der religisen Presse die
erste von mehreren bemerkenswerten Erzhlungen, welche der brahmanische
Konvertit angefertigt hatte. Nachdem man seit der Ankunft in Indien nur wenige
Bekehrungen hatte verbuchen knnen, ist es kaum berraschend, dass sich inner-
halb der Gemeinschaft der Missionare eine gewisse Begeisterung einstellte ange-
sichts der Erzhlung von den 500 seltsamen Konvertiten, die in der Ausgabe des
Missionary Register vom Januar 1818 abgedruckt wurde. Aber die Begeisterung war
kurzlebig, und sehr bald wurden schwere Zweifel hinsichtlich ihrer Authentizitt
angemeldet. Derweil er keinen Grund dafr hatte, die wesentlichen Punkte der
Erzhlung anzuzweifeln, sah sich Thomason (der sie dem Register ursprnglich
unterbreitet hatte) im Juli dazu gezwungen, Vorsicht anzumahnen, da er den Ver-
dacht hatte dass Anands Geschichte weniger bemerkenswert, als man es uns be-
deutet hatte, gewesen sei.
53
Auf Thomasons Bitte hin unterzog Leutnant Macdo-
nald, der in Delhi stationiert war, Anand im Juni einem Kreuzverhr ber die Vor-
kommnisse jenes Tages, musste aber mit Bedauern feststellen, dass er nicht in der
Lage, die Geschichte von den Saadhs selbst besttigen zu lassen und somit auer-
stande sei, ber die Angelegenheit exklusiv zu sprechen. Ohne solch eine per-
snliche Nachforschung fhlte auch er sich in keiner Weise kompetent den
Bericht ber die Vorkommnisse zu bewerten.
54
Ein Jahr spter war Anands Dem-
tigung komplett, als das Asiatic Journal enthllte, man habe ihn wiederholt ge-
warnt, sich nicht von seiner blhenden Phantasie zu bertriebenen Darstellungen
dessen verleiten zu lassen, was er der Aufmerksamkeit und der Mitteilung fr Wert
erachten mge.
55

Obwohl er fr die Church Missionary Society mglicherweise peinlich werden
konnte, blieb der erste brahmanische Konvertit nichtsdestotrotz eine wertvolle
Trophe und wertvoll auch auf andere Weise fr die Missionare, die ermuti-
gende Erzhlungen von Bekehrungen Eingeborener in einer Zeit, da die Resultate
mager waren, bitter ntig hatten. In den darauffolgenden Jahren hatte Anand noch

52
53
Missionary Register, Januar 1818: 20.
54
Im Mai 1818 unterrichtete der Herausgeber des Missionary Register seine Leser: Wie in unserem
frheren Artikel zu diesem Gegenstand nachzulesen ist, hat Mr. Thomason vorgeschlagen, Vorsicht
walten zu lassen dabei, diesen Informationen Glauben zu schenken, zumindest in vollem Umfang, bis
die Einzelheiten genauer bekannt seien. In einem Brief, welcher der jngsten Botschaft beigefgt war,
weist er auf diese Vorsicht erneut hin; und er stellt fest, dass [.] diese in einigen Punkten von jenen
abweicht. Missionary Register, Mai 1818: 206.
55
Asiatic Journal, Juli 1819: 75.
spektakulrere Geschichten zu erzhlen, in denen er von seiner Verfolgung durch
Hindus und Moslems berichtete und darber, wie er ber viele Eingeborene, mit
denen er ber das Christentum sprach, rhetorisch triumphierte. Es scheint, als
habe er sich in Meerut groe Mhe gegeben, Fisher davon zu berzeugen, dass er
sich von seinen alten Sitten abgewandt habe. Fisher beschreibt, was nach einer von
ihm gehaltenen Predigt ber die grausamen Strafen, welche von Brahmanen aufer-
legt wurden, geschah:
Ich fragte meine kleine Gemeinde, was sie von all dem hielten. Sie saen
still, die Augen niedergeschlagen und schwer seufzend. Nach geraumer Zeit
wandte sich Anund an Matthew Phiroodeen und, seine Arme um seinen
Hals schlingend, rief mit einem tiefberhrenden Ausdruck von Zuneigung
und Dankbarkeit gegenber Gott aus: Ach, mein Bruder! mein Bruder! sol-
che Teufel waren auch wir einst! aber jetzt (und er erhob seine Augen zum
Himmel und richtete seinen ganzen Krper auf), Jesus! Jesus! mein Gott!
mein Retter! Es war sehr bewegend.
56

Zweifelsohne ermutigt von solch exemplarischen Verhalten wiewohl Fishers
ambivalente Wortwahl affecting (bewegend/affektiert, Anm. d. .) hier interes-
sant ist , grndete Fisher um das Jahr 1820 herum das Saadh-Dorf Henreepore,
wo er Anand mitsamt Familie im neuerrichteten Missionshaus einsetzte.
57
Doch
schon bald schielte Anand nach hheren Weihen. Im Dezember 1824 wurde er
Reginald Heber vorgestellt, dem Bischof von Kalkutta. Als Fisher den Bischof
darum bat, seinen eingeborenen Katecheten die Weihe zu verleihen, zeigte sich
Heber alles andere als beeindruckt: Er ist ein hochgewachsener, grobschlchtig
aussehender Mann, dessen Gesichtszge kaum auf besonderen Intellekt hindeu-
ten.
58
Anfang des Jahres 1826 begegnen wir Anand als einem Lehrer von Einge-
borenen in Delhi, wo er der strikten berwachung von Fishers Sohn unterstand,
der dort als Kaplan wirkte. Doch schon bald darauf erregte er abermals das Miss-
fallen des Klerus und wurde nach dem etwa 70 Meilen nrdlichen gelegenen Kar-
nal abgeschoben, auf Betreiben des Co-Kaplans in Kanpur: in der Hoffnung, dass
wir von hieran beobachten knnen, dass sich ein gnadenvoller Zweck durch die
Wandlung seiner Bestimmung ausdrcke.
59

Im Laufe des folgenden Jahrzehnts scheint Anand das Vertrauen der Amtskir-
che zurckgewonnen zu haben. Am 21. Juni 1836 schrieb Bischof Wilson, der
Nachfolger von Heber, aus Simla, dass er bei seinem Besuch in Meerut das eigen-
tmliche Vergngen gehabt habe, Anand zu befragen, und er hielt ihn nun fr

56
C. M. S. Report 21, 181. Missionary Register 1821: 471, 472.
57
Hough, History of Christianity in India, Bd. 5, 315-7.
58
Reginald Heber, Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India (Philadelphia: Carey, 1828),
Bd. 1, 441.
59
Missionary Register, Februar 1828: 100.
einen sehr auergewhnlichen Mann; gewandt, stark, einfach in seiner Hingabe zu
Christus, gut unterwiesen in der Bibel, demtig. Bei diesem Treffen unterbreitete
der Katechet einen Brief des verstorbenen Bischof Heber, angeblich im Jahr 1824
geschrieben, der mich tief berhrte. Er schloss damit, Anand, im Falle meines
Todes, wem auch immer mir als Bischof von Kalkutta folgen mge anzuempfeh-
len. Wilson ordinierte Anand am 11. November, eine Feier, welche der Bischof
sehr bewegend fand, da er der erste Brahmane ist, der von unserer Kirche ordi-
niert wurde. Er ist eine ausgezeichnete, edle Gestalt, spirituell ausgerichtet, wohlbe-
lesen in der Heiligen Schrift, voller Schlichtheit und Hingabe zu Christus, derweil
tapfer wie ein Lwe. Er hat so wenig von den eingeborenen Fehlern des Dnkels
und des Mystizismus an sich, wie ich dies noch nie beobachtet habe.
60

Im Jahr 1842 wurde Reverend Messeh als Geistlicher der CMS in Meerut ein-
gesetzt, eine Stellung, die ihm und seiner Familie einen ansehnlichen Wohnsitz
garantierte, mglicherweise einen oder zwei Diener sowie ein regelmiges Ein-
kommen von 80 Rupien im Monat.
61
Innerhalb weniger Monate wurde er jedoch
erneut zur persona non grata. Schwerwiegende Vorwrfe, besttigt von der CMS,
wurden gegen ihn erhoben, was zu seiner Entlassung fhrte. Rckblickend be-
hauptete Bischof Wilson, womglich aus einem Anflug von Verlegenheit heraus,
dass er schon immer Vorbehalte gegenber Anands Ehefrau gehabt habe, die eine
Heidin blieb und ihr Einfluss war unheilvoll.
62
Es gibt Andeutungen in Wilsons
Bericht, wonach der Konvertit auf seine alten brahmanischen Sitten zurckverfal-
len war, wobei seine jngsten Verfehlungen beschrieben wurden als Folge des
groen Wagnisses, eingeborene Konvertiten als Anwrter auf heilige mter in
Vorschlag zu bringen, derweil ihre erwachsenen Kinder und Familienmitglieder
Heiden bleiben. Zudem warnte Wilson vor der Zweckmigkeit, eingeborenen
Geistlichen rztliche Ttigkeiten zu erlauben und sie unbegleitet mit der Absicht
herumreisen zu lassen, das Evangelium zu verbreiten, wenn die anfallenden Kos-
ten der Reise nachtrglich von der Gemeinschaft getragen werden mssen.
63

60
Bishop Wilsons Journal Letters, hrsg. Daniel Wilson (London: Nisbet, 1863), 182, 199.
61
Raj Bahadur Sharma, Christian Missions in North India, 1813-1913: A Case Study of Meerut Division and
Debra Dun District (Delhi: Mittal, 1988), 87-8.
62
Josiah Bateman, The Life of Rev. Daniel Wilson (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1860), 491.
63
Der Verweis auf eine rztliche Ttigkeit deutet mglicherweise auf eine Opiumabhngigkeit hin, die
viele Jahre spter ans Licht kam, als ein Missionar, der Anand beschftigt hatte, um von ihm Hindi zu
lernen, die Royal Commission davon unterrichtete, dass Paramanund [.] ber viele Jahre hinweg,
derweil er noch Anhnger des Hinduismus war, die Angewohnheit der Einnahme von Opium hatte.
Jede erdenkliche Anstrengung wurde unternommen, um ihn von der Angewohnheit zu heilen, aber
alles war vergebens. Ich habe ihn oftmals dabei beobachtet, wie er mit geschlossenen Augen an
meiner Seite schritt, und nur unter grten Anstrengungen gelang es mir, ihn wachzuhalten, whrend
er mich in der Sprache unterrichtete. Er selbst hat oft gesagt, dass ihm die Schande seiner Lage tief-
bewusst sei, dass er aber unter gar keinen Umstnden ohne seine tgliche Dosis Opium leben kn-
ne. Zeugnis abgelegt von Thomas Evans in Kalkutta am 23. November 1893: The First Report of the
Royal Commission on Opium (London: HMSO, 1894), II: 46.
Im Jahr 1845 war er abermals als amtierender Geistlicher eingestellt, diesmal in
Agra, nachdem sein Ansehen zum wiederholten Male wiederhergestellt worden
war, ehrwrdig in seinem Alter und, obwohl nicht in der Lage, besonders aktiv
Dienst zu verben, [] eine Zierde fr seinen heiligen Charakter. Alle frheren
Verfehlungen waren wiederum vergeben und es wurde berichtet, dass die Hoff-
nungen hinsichtlich Anands spiritueller Standfestigkeit sich nun im berma
erfllt htten.
64
Jedoch im Mai 1857, als die Groe Meuterei um sich griff und
die anderen Missionare Zuflucht in der Festung von Agra fanden, hatte Anand
ganz andere Absichten. Der letzte Bericht, den wir besitzen, findet sich in einer
Depesche vom 26. Juli: Sie werden mit Bedauern vernehmen, dass die meisten
unserer einheimischen Christen in beklagenswerter Weise im Angesicht der ge-
genwrtigen Prfungen versagt haben. Ich hatte die schmerzliche Pflicht, Parama-
nund, einen unserer Prediger, auszuschlieen, nachdem er die Tracht eines Byragee
bzw. eines heiligen Hindu angenommen hatte! Und er hat Christus abgeschwo-
ren!
65
Es sieht so aus, als ob er sich von Agra aus auf den Weg zur Geburtssttte
von Krishna in Mathura machte, wo, wie der Baptist Missionary Herald berichtete,
Paramanands Annahme der traditionellen Tracht ihn nicht vor Verrat schtzte
und es wird behauptet, er sei, von der Hand eines grausamen Moslems erschlagen,
ums Leben gekommen.
66

Die Verhaltensregeln der Mimikry scheinen tatschlich an jenem Tag in dem
Wldchen bei Delhi in Kraft gewesen zu sein, aber nicht dergestalt, wie Bhabha es
sich ausmalt. Knnte es nicht sein, dass der Katechet, der den biblischen Dis-
kurs seiner englischen Herren anwandte, im Endeffekt der wahre Imitator gewe-
sen ist? Waren seine wiederholten Bekundungen zu christlichem Glauben im End-
effekt Teil einer vier Jahrzehnte andauernden Kampagne schlauer Hflichkeit,
sein Verlangen nach Taufe und Ordination eine uere Zurschaustellung, welche
eine tieferliegende Verbundenheit mit jener Religion verschleierte, in die er hinein-
geboren worden war? Wenn das der Fall ist, dann erscheint seine Antwort gegen-
ber den Saadhs im Jahr 1817 Diese Bcher lehren euch die Religion der euro-
pischen Sahibs. Es ist IHR Buch pltzlich weitaus weniger als Ausdruck von
Glauben an die Religion der weien Mnner, eher wie eine Verlautbarung des reli-
gisen und kulturellen Skeptizismus. Knnte es nicht sein, dass der Mann, der
schon als kleiner Junge im Erzhlen mysteriser Geschichten ber wundersame
und umkehrbare Verwandlungen geschult worden war Geschichten, welche dazu
bestimmt waren, auf den Seiten des Missionary Register wieder aufzutauchen , die
ganze Zeit ber nur eine Jahrhunderte alte Praxis imitierte, die er von seinen
brahmanischen Lehrmeistern ererbt hatte?

64
Hough, History of Christianity in India, Bd. 4, 475.
65
Brief von Thomas Evans, 26. Juli 1857. Missionary Herald, 1857: 725.
66
Missionary Herald, 1857: 72. Siehe auch: Thomas Evans, A Welshman in India: A Record of the Life of
Thomas Evans, Missionary, hrsg. David Hooper (London: Kingsgate, 1908), 252.
Das Letzte, was wir von Paramanand erfahren, stammt aus der Feder des Missio-
nars Michael Wilkinson, der ihm die letzte Ehre in folgender Weise erwies: Sein
milder und friedfertiger Charakter brachte ihm einen Respekt ein, der das bliche
Ma bertraf. Vor allem unter den Sikhs wurde er wirklich verehrt. Mge er am
Ende Frieden finden!
67
Der Nachgeordnete kann als furchteinflende Figur
erscheinen, die dann wieder auftaucht und neue Geschichten vortrgt, wenn man
es am wenigsten erwartet. Und wie die Geschichte der Bibel, der Pilger und des
Katecheten zeigt, knnen die Erfahrungen der Vergangenheit unendlich komple-
xer sein, als sie im ersten Licht erscheinen.

4 Schlussfolgerung
Spielen die Lebensumstnde indischer Bauern im Jahr 1817 im Endeffekt wirklich
eine Rolle? Ich denke, sie tun es. Sollten Historiker sich mit der Frage auseinander-
setzen, was Ausgestoene vor zwei Jahrhunderten tatschlich ber die Bibel dach-
ten? Ich denke, sie sollten. Die Frage, die Anand Messeh gestellt hatte, wer sind
all diese Menschen? eine Frage, die aus dem Verlangen heraus, andere zu ver-
stehen, entstanden ist , ist es stets wert, gestellt zu werden. Diese der Geschichte
entnommene Anekdote ist nicht einfach, oder berhaupt, eine Erzhlung ber
arme Hindus, die schlaue Hflichkeit als ein Mittel kulturellen Widerstandes
anwenden, noch ber die Tendenz indigener Christen, fr ihre europischen Her-
ren zu sprechen. In einer Welt, in der sich Brahmanen selbst als Christen reinkar-
nieren, Inder in Furcht voreinander leben und Zeichen als Wunder angenommen
werden, knnen historische Details unbequem sein. Der gewaltsame Tod von Pa-
ramanand, jenem Christen, der ein Gtzenanhnger wurde, steht stellvertretend
nicht nur fr die Herausforderungen, mit denen sich Standardvorstellungen ber
die Komplizenschaft von Eingeborenen im Kontext kolonialer Autoritt kon-
frontiert sehen, sondern dient auch als Mahnung, dass wir, wenn wir theoretische
Abstraktionen wie Hybriditt, schlaue Hflichkeit und Mimikry anwenden,
aufpassen mssen, weder Individuen als geschichtslos erscheinen zu lassen, noch
eine Geschichte ohne ihre Akteure zu schreiben.

Aus dem Englischen von Jrg Zgel

67
Wilkinson, Memorials, 202.
Bibliographie

Ballard, Martin. The Age of Progress, 1848-1866. London: Methuen, 1971.
Bateman, Josiah. The Life of Rev. Daniel Wilson. Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1860.
Bell, Bill. Commentary: Selkirks Silence. Times Literary Supplement, 18. Mrz 2011:
14-5.
Bhabha, Homi K. Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Au-
thority Under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817. Critical Inquiry 12.1 (1985):
144-65. Wieder abgedruckt in idem, The Location of Culture, 145-74. London:
Routledge, 2010. Dt. Ausgabe: Idem. Zeichen als Wunder: Fragen der Am-
bivalenz und Autoritt unter einem Baum bei Delhi im Mai 1817. In idem,
Die Verortung der Kultur, 151-80. Tbingen: Stauffenburg, 2000.
Carey, S. Pearce. William Carey. 6. Auflage. London, 1925.
Carey, William. Oriental Christian Biography, Containing Biographical Sketches of Distin-
guished Christians Who Have Lived and Died in the East. 2 Bnde. Kalkutta: Baptist
Mission Press, 1850-2.
Carson, Penelope. An Imperial Dilemma: The Propagation of Christianity in Ear-
ly Colonial India. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 18.2 (1990):
169-90.
Chancey, Karen. The Star in the East: The Controversy over Christian Missions
to India, 1805-1813. The Historian 60.3 (1998): 507-22.
Chaudhuri, Rosinka. Gentlemen Poets in Colonial Bengal: Emergent Nationalism and the
Orientalist Project. Kalkutta: Seagull, 2002.
Comaroff, John L. Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience: Models of Coloni-
al Domination in South Africa. In Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a
Bourgeois World, herausgegeben von Frederick Cooper und Ann Laura Stoler,
163-97. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Dube, Saurabh. Travelling Light: Missionary Musings, Colonial Cultures and An-
thropological Anxieties. In Travel Worlds: Journeys in Contemporary Cultural Poli-
tics, herausgegeben von Raminder Kaur und John Hutnyk, 29-50. London:
Zed, 1999.
Evans, John. A Sketch of the Denominations of the Christian World. Amherst: Adams,
1832.
Evans, Thomas. A Welshman in India: A Record of the Life of Thomas Evans, Missionary.
Herausgegeben von David Hooper. London: Kingsgate, 1908.
Forrester, Duncan B. Commensalism and Christian Mission: The Indian Case.
In idem, Forrester on Christian Ethics and Practical Theology: Collected Writings on
Christianity, India, and the Social Order, 125-34. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.
Gleig, George Robert. The Life of Major-General Sir Thomas Munro. 3 Bnde. London:
Colburn and Bentley, 1830.
Heber, Reginald. Narrative of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India. Philadelphia:
Carey, 1828.
Hough, James. The History of Christianity in India from the Commencement of the Christian
Era. 5 Bnde. London: Seeley and Burnside, Church Missionary House,
1839-1860.
Jefferess, David. Postcolonial Resistance: Culture, Liberation and Transformation. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2008.
Keay, F. E. Kabir and his Followers. New Delhi: Aravali, 1997.
Leitzmann, Hans. Mass and Lords Supper: A Study in the History of the Liturgy. Leiden:
Brill, 1979.
Majumdar, Swapan. Literature and Literary Life in Old Calcutta. In Calcutta, the
Living City, herausgegeben von Sukanta Chaudhuri, Band 1: The Past, 106-117.
Kalkutta: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Marshman, John Clark. The Life and Times of Carey, Marshman, and Ward, Embracing
the History of the Serampore Mission. 2 Bnde. London: Longman, 1859.
Moore-Gilbert, Bart, Hrsg. Writing India, 1757-1900: The Literature of British India.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995.
Murdoch, John. English Translations of Selected Tracts Published in India. Madras: Scot-
tish Press, 1861.
Porter, Carolyn. Are We Being Historical Yet? South Atlantic Quarterly 87.4
(1988): 743-86.
Sanford, A. Whitney. Singing Krishna: Sound Becomes Sight in Paramanands Poetry. Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 2008.
Sharma, Raj Bahadur. Christian Missions in North India, 1813-1913: A Case Study of
Meerut Division and Dehra Dun District. Delhi: Mittal, 1988.
Shivanath. Modern Dogri Literature. In Modern Indian Literature: An Anthology,
herausgegeben von K. M. George, Band 1. Neu-Delhi: Sahitya Akademi,
1992.
Smith, George. The Life of William Carey. London: John Murray, 1885.
Smith, Lucius Edwin. Heroes and Martyrs of the Modern Missionary Enterprise. Provi-
dence, RI: Potter, 1856.
Smith, Thomas. The History and Origin of the Missionary Societies. 2 Bnde. London:
Kelly and Evans, 1824-5.
Smith, Vanessa. Literary Culture and the Pacific: Nineteenth-Century Textual Encounters.
Taher, Mohammed. Encyclopedic Survey of Islamic Culture. Neu-Delhi: Anmol Publica-
tions, 1998.
Viswanathan, Gauri. The Beginnings of English Literary Studies in British India.
In The Postcolonial Studies Reader, herausgegeben von Bill Ashcroft et al., 2. Auf-
lage. Oxford: Routledge, 2006.
Wilkinson, Michael. Memorials of an Indian Missionary. London: Wertheim, Macin-
tosh and Hunt, 1857.
Williams, Charles. The Missionary Gazeteer. London: Westley and Davies, 1828.
Wilson, Daniel, Hrsg. Bishop Wilsons Journal Letters. London: Nisbet, 1863.
Yates, William. Memoirs of Mr. John Chamberlain. London: Wightman and Cramp,
1826.


Empire at home
Janny de Jong
Introduction
In the 1970s, the study of colonial empires had become one of the deadest of
dead fields within history, one historian writes.
1
Another, describing her impres-
sions about the field of imperial history as an undergraduate at a British university
in roughly the same period, recalled that imperial studies seemed to be a very mas-
culine enterprise, centrally concerned with what chaps in the past, mainly of the
pale variety, did to, or for, yet more chaps who were often not pale. Linda Colley,
specialist in British history and the author of the last quote, then proceeds with
telling how very much the field has changed, and how mistaken she had been. Her
conclusion reads that imperial history is anything but a boring, musty and fairly
limited field. Quite the contrary: there were few subjects more indispensable for
forging a proper understanding both of this country and the world in general.
2

Colley does not simply mean the history of the impact of the British Empire and of
British inventions on the world.
3
Indeed, she puts forward that imperial history is
much broader than that. For, she argues, the world may be post-colonial, post-
imperial it is not. Imperial components and traditions are clearly visible in, for
instance, India, China as well as the United States.
4

The tremendous changes in the field of colonial and imperial history in the last
two to three decades are remarkable indeed. There has been a veritable burst of
scholarship on colonial and imperial issues. One of the most important changes is
the inclusion of other disciplines and diverse methodologies. Influences from es-
pecially cultural and social studies have had a large bearing on the focus and con-
tent of imperial and colonial history.

1
Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2005), 13.
2
Linda Colley, What is Imperial History Now?, in What is History Now?, ed. David Cannadine
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 132-4.
3
See Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Allen Lane, 2003) for an
example of a historian who argues precisely this point.
4
Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850 (Westminster, MD: Knopf, 2004),
378.
Since decolonisation, colonial history had become a somewhat tainted, old-
fashioned word. At many universities, the name of the specialisation changed into,
for instance, non-western history, world or global history.
5
The perspective devel-
oped from a predominantly Eurocentric focus to one centred on internal or re-
gional developments in the former colonies. What anthropologist Eric Wolf once
ironically called the people without history needed a closer look and, of course,
new, inclusive histories.
6
The area studies that were the result of this in due course
posed new problems with regard to the definition of the region or area, the relation
between the local and the broader contexts and the sometimes different perspec-
tives of native and non-native scholars.
7
And then, in the late 1980s and 1990s,
globalisation became a catchword. This had important consequences for historical
research as well.
8

Fresh insights were also called for with regard to the impact of colonialism and
imperialism at home. After all, these phenomena still cast their shadows on pre-
sent day life, culture and politics. Also, to understand the West-European mental
space of especially the 19
th
and the first half of the 20
th
century, as well as politics,
social issues and culture, it was deemed necessary to investigate the colonial history
once again. This article aims to sketch these developments to see what importance
these topics have for contemporary European studies.
Perception of Europe and European Transformations
This article originally was presented at a scientific conference in 2010, at which
some of the core questions of the Erasmus Mundus Master programme of Excel-
lence Euroculture: Europe in the Wider World were critically examined as a basis for
further scientific research. To my opinion, two of these questions are highly rele-
vant for colonial and imperial studies; namely, firstly, whether, to what extent and
in which forms a common and unique European culture exists and how this is
related to other regional or non-European cultures, and, secondly, how Europe

5
Janny de Jong, G Prince and Hugo sJacob, Niet-westerse geschiedenis: Benaderingen en themas (Assen:
Van Gorcum, 1998).
6
Eric R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
Wolfs book pointed already at the importance of multidisciplinarity in the field of non-western
studies and at ways to include the histories of peoples and regions without written sources or only
sources of outsiders.
7
One example may serve as explanation: Eric Thompson, Research and Regionalism in Southeast
Asia, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 165.4 (2009): 612-22 reviews 5 recent publications on
Southeast Asia and notes differences between American traditions of Area Studies in contrast to
international and an intra-regional field of scholarship. See pages 613 and 614.
8
See for an overview of these developments Janny de Jong, World History: A Brief Introduction,
and Globalisation as a Field of Study for Historians, in World and Global History: Research and Teach-
ing, eds. Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera and Andrew Dilley (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2011), 1-11 and
13-24.
Empire at Home 119
and how cultural transformations are perceived within Europe and from the
outside.
In the Master programme Euroculture, the first question is the point of depar-
ture for courses that study various cultural and political traditions within Europe as
well as global influences on these traditions. In colonial studies, as well as world
and global history, this same question leads to studies about the influence of Eu-
rope (or the diverse European colonial powers) on other regions and countries,
and the influence that the colonial relationship may have exerted on the policy,
status, economy and culture of the metropolis. This may range from a more gen-
eral view on the role of trade relations, to the particular form of colonial rule or the
introduction of western knowledge and technologies. Also one might think of
social studies that focus on familial ties and the importance of ruling families.
9
Of
course it should also be noted that there were many sorts of colonial settlements: it
matters whether the expansion abroad was meant to be temporary in tropical re-
gions, as was the case in, for instance, the Netherlands Indies, or permanent, like
the British and French settlements in North America or the Dutch and English
settlements in South Africa.
The second question, How is Europe and how are cultural transformations
perceived within Europe and from the outside? would in the field of colonial
studies involve the inquiry into a broad range of very different influences. Migra-
tion of people from the former colonies to Europe after decolonisation, content
and role of ethnographic museums as well as the changes in the way of presenting
these materials, colonial institutions and libraries, influences on art and architec-
ture, on food, music are just a selection of the wide range of influences. In the
master programme, these same issues might be addressed but obviously that field
is wider than just these influences alone.
Of course, an answer to the question how Europe is perceived abroad is not
simple to give. Nobody will even think that the perception of the various countries
in Europe, or the West for that matter, is the same in countries like Iraq, Kenya,
China, Japan, Mexico, India or Indonesia. It goes without saying that the different
political, social, economic, cultural and historical contexts need to be taken into
account. The following example illustrates that the context indeed is very im-
portant. In the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called world-system approach, especially
elaborated by Immanuel Wallerstein, was popular as a Marxist-inspired general
methodology to explain the history of the West (centre) and its relations with the
Third World (periphery) with a semi-periphery in between.
10
Yet, this approach

9
Julia Adams, The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Susan Legne, De Bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel: Japan, Java,
Tripoli en Suriname in de Negentiende-Eeuwse Nederlandse Cultuur van het Imperialisme (Amsterdam: Kon-
inklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, 1998); Jean Gelman Taylor, The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and
Eurasians in Colonial Indonesia, 2nd ed. (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009).
10
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
never gained any foothold in Japan, because it did not address the central issue of
the specific relations between Japan and the outside world. In other words, this
world-system model supposedly was global, explaining the development of trade
and commercial relations between various regions in the world, yet the point of
departure was Eurocentric. Japanese historians obviously did not envisage their
position as semi-periphery.
The idea of a semi-periphery as such seemed to marginalise people. World his-
torian Felipe Fernndez-Armesto, for instance, writes in his book Millennium: Part
of the mission of this book is to rehabilitate the overlooked, including places often
ignored as peripheral, peoples marginalized as inferior, and individuals relegated to
bit-parts and footnotes.
11
The East was not, and indeed has never been, simply a
passive bystander nor is this true for other parts of the world.
Eurocentrism and Power
Europe is often more a metaphor than a specific geographical place. As the Indi-
an historian, Dipesh Chakrabarty, wrote, it is a hyperreal Europe, even an imagi-
nary space. The problem was that Europe remained the sovereign, theoretical
subject of all histories, even if the topic was Chinese or Indian history.
Chakrabarty pointed, for instance, to the fact that third-world historians referred to
works in European history, but this did not work the other way round.
.
It simply
seemed impossible to avoid Europe. What needed to be done, therefore, was to
provincialise Europe, in other words, to show that Europe and the West are
simply one source of power and knowledge among others.
12

Chakrabarty is associated with a group of academics, especially from South
Asia, who practices what is loosely called subaltern studies. The idea behind it was
to give a voice to the people from below, whom in the former colonial and impe-
rial studies had not received enough attention. These studies formed part of the
broader field of postcolonialism theories and studies.
13

One of the most famous writers in postcolonial studies is Edward Said, whose
Orientalism (1978) focused on just how the contacts of Europe/the West were
permeated by colonialism and imperialism and what this meant for Europe itself.
Every European or American, Said stated, comes up against the Orient as a Eu-

11
Felipe Fernndez-Armesto, Millennium (London: Bantam Press, 1995), 8.
12
Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000); and his Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks
for Indian Pasts? in Representations 37, Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and Postcolonial Histories (1992):
1. See also: C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 470; he is in favour of a decentralisation of world history.
13
For an extensive overview see: Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001).
Empire at Home 121
ropean or American first, as an individual second.
14
Western scholarship on the
Orient was in his opinion inextricably tied to imperialist power.
Said paid no attention to the fact that there have been very different traditions
in Orientalist scholarship; many so-called orientalists did not have any direct rela-
tionship to any imperial power and studied, for instance, Islam purely out of intel-
lectual curiosity. But indeed anthropological knowledge, for example, often had
served to back up political domination of non-western peoples; anthropologist
Bernard S. Cohn, for instance, had demonstrated this earlier.
15

Through more emphasis on the culture of colonialism, literature, and social as
well as intellectual matters, the focus lay less on aspects related to economy, inter-
national politics and military power, that once had dominated imperial studies.
This was less the case in studies related to the concept of globalisation. Globalisa-
tion was, and is, often related to trading patterns and contacts. In an interesting
overview of the field of global history, Patrick O' Brien, a specialist in global eco-
nomic history at the London School of Economics, described the task for global
historians as follows: to craft new, more inclusive and persuasive general narra-
tives that might hold together without the fishy glue of Eurocentrism.
16

There are historians who have moved from colonial/imperial or area studies to
world or global history. One might mention the names of Christopher Bayly and
Jrgen Osterhammel here.
17
Taking a long-time perspective, such as is customary
in world history, makes colonial empires only one form of empires that have existed
in time. Historians Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, one specialised in Russian
history, the other a specialist on African history, for instance, maintain that the
focus on Europe and the West as uniquely powerful agents of change is mislead-
ing. For empires, the key question was how to maintain control over large geo-
graphical spaces. Various strategies (repertoires) were used to achieve that end.
Burbank and Cooper also put forward that the legacy of empires still is visible in
the contemporary world: though China, Russia and the United States do not usual-
ly refer to imperial images, imperial pathways made them what they are.
18

And then, interest revived as well in new forms of colonial and imperial stud-
ies. In other words, metropolitan history, politics and culture became once again
the point for departure.

14
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979), 5 and 11.
15
Bernard S. Cohn, An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays (Delhi: Oxford University
Press, 1987).
16
Patrick OBrien, Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of
Global History, Journal of Global History 1.1 (2006): 33.
17
C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden,
MA: Blackwell, 2004); Jrgen Osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhun-
derts, 5th rev. ed. (Mnchen: Beck, 2010).
18
Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 21.
Empire at Home: Eurocentrism as a Stimulus for Research
New studies that focus on metropolitan culture and politics have come to the fore.
Of course, the history of colonialism and imperialism is researched differently than
during the period of colonialism itself, for instance by taking into account the
chaotic pluralism of interests at home and allies and agents. The Empire Project
that British historian John Darwin started shows that the history of the British
Empire should be seen as a combination of various linkages of imperial politics.
19

The new research stresses the impact of the Empire at home. This has been
called the New Imperial History in Great Britain. These studies show, for instance,
how culture, identity and modernity were shaped in relation to the Empire (Kath-
leen Wilson), what role propaganda, popular culture and museums played (John
MacKenzie), what influence empire had on readers and politics, on constructions
of class, sexuality, citizenship and how it was narrated in histories (Catherine
Hall).
20
It had long been customary to think that the Empire had not had a major
impact on the domestic history. These studies argued against that perception. In
his study on the ideological origins of the British Empire, David Armitage shows
how long the pedigree of the neglect of empire actually was in British domestic
history. External contacts usually had been treated separately from the internal
history of Britain, in spite of the strong connection between the two.
21
The history
of colonial and imperial contacts may not always be a pleasant subject, but it is a
very important one to address. Colonial amnesia leads to a distorted view on histo-
ry.
The fact that only British studies in this field are mentioned above does not
mean that these are limited to Great Britain only. In various countries, for instance,
research has been done on colonial monuments and colonial heritage.
22
Issues
referring to cultural heritage, museums, the role of media, lobby groups, the imag-
ining of empire, the role of political organisations, political ideology etc. are all of
high relevance for a proper understanding of contemporary Europe. As are social
issues related to migration, immigration from former colonies and attitudes to-

19
John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11-7.
20
Kathleen Wilson, ed., A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire,
1660-1840 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kathleen Wilson, The Sense of the People:
Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);
Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); John M. MacKenzie, ed., Imperialism and Popular
Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986); John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire:
The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
21
David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000), 12-23.
22
See in particular Robert Aldrich, Vestiges of the Colonial Empire in France: Monuments, Museums and
Colonial Memories. (Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and his review of French
historiography on colonialism Imperial Mise en Valeur and Mise en Scne: Recent Works on French
Colonialism." The Historical Journal 45, no. 04 (2002): 917-36.
Empire at Home 123
wards the multicultural society. Therefore the study of colonial empires and their
consequences both in the world at large and at home certainly is not the deadest
of dead fields. It is a vibrant, important and challenging speciality.

Bibliography
Adams, Julia. The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Mod-
ern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Aldrich, Robert. Vestiges of the Colonial Empire in France: Monuments, Museums and
Colonial Memories. Gordonsville, VA, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Imperial Mise en Valeur and Mise en Scne: Recent Works on French Colo-
nialism. The Historical Journal 45, no. 04 (2002): 917-36.
Armitage, David. The Ideological Origins of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge
Bayly, C. A. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Compari-
sons. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.
Burbank, Jane, and Frederick Cooper. Empires in World History: Power and the Politics
of Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Differ-
ence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for Indian
Pasts? Representations 37, Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and Postcolonial Histories
(1992): 1-26.
Cohn, Bernard S. An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays. Delhi: Ox-
ford University Press, 1987.
Colley, Linda. Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850. Westminster, MD:
Knopf, 2004.
What is Imperial History Now? In What is History Now?, edited by David
Cannadine, 132-47. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2005.
Darwin, John. The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-
1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World. London: Allen Lane,
2003.
Fernndez-Armesto, Felipe. Millennium. London: Bantam Press, 1995.
Hall, Catherine, and Sonya O. Rose, eds. At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Cul-
ture and the Imperial World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Jong, Janny de. Globalisation as a Field of Study for Historians. In World and
Global History: Research and Teaching, edited by Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera and
Andrew Dilley, 13-24. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2011.
World History: A Brief Introduction. In World and Global History: Re-
search and Teaching, edited by Seija Jalagin, Susanna Tavera and Andrew Dilley,
1-11. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2011.
G Prince and Hugo sJacob, Niet-westerse geschiedenis: Benaderingen en themas.
Assen: Van Gorcum, 1998.
Legne, Susan. De Bagage van Blomhoff en Van Breugel: Japan, Java, Tripoli en Suriname
in de Negentiende-Eeuwse Nederlandse Cultuur van het Imperialisme. Amsterdam:
Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen, 1998.
MacKenzie, John M., ed. Imperialism and Popular Culture. Manchester: Manchester
Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984.
OBrien, Patrick. Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the
Restoration of Global History. Journal of Global History 1.1 (2006): 3-39.
Osterhammel, Jrgen. Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts.
5th rev. ed. Mnchen: Beck, 2010.
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979.
Taylor, Jean Gelman. The Social World of Batavia: Europeans and Eurasians in Colonial
Indonesia. 2nd ed. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009.
Thompson, Eric. Research and Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Bijdragen tot de
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 165.4 (2009): 612-22.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System. New York: Academic Press, 1974.
Wilson, Kathleen, ed. A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain
and the Empire, 1660-1840. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715-1785.
Wolf, Eric R. Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1982.
Young, Robert J. C. Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell,
2001.

Contesting Cultural Memory
Rethinking Postcolonial Identities in Europe
Introduction
Every year around the end of November, a sense of dj vu approaches me, when a
seemingly recurring event announces itself: the annual, national, albeit marginal
debate on the alleged racism of the figure of Zwarte Piet (Black Pete) in the
Dutch Sinterklaas celebrations.
1
In 2011, the debate promoted to a slightly more
centre-stage location after the rather violent arrest of two demonstrators at the
annual arrival of Sinterklaas, because they refused to remove t-shirts displaying the
text, Zwarte Piet is racisme.
2
The two arrested protestors, Quinsy Gario, a per-
formance poet, and Kno'ledge Cesare, a hiphop MC, were in fact carrying out an
art project with the intention to stimulate a public debate about racism and the
figure of Zwarte Piet in the Netherlands. This debate, on Zwarte Piet, racism, and
Dutch colonial history including slavery, usually fizzles away a few days after De-
cember 5
th
, as it did also this time.

1
The celebration of Sinterklaas is a national childrens festival, more or less an invented tradition
created by the end of the 19
th
century. Celebrated annually on the 5
th
of December, Sinterklaas is a
form of national theatre that stages the arrival of a good-natured old man sporting an impressive
beard and red mitre, a white horse, and a handful of black, fumbling and foolish helpers, all called
Zwarte Piet. For a historical overview, see Frits Booy, Op Zoek naar Zwarte Piet: Een Speurtocht naar de
Herkomst, de Ontwikkeling en de Betekenis van de Dienaar van Sinterklaas, 2nd ed. (Eindhoven: Stichting
Nationaal Sint Nicolaas Comit, 2008); Eugenie Boer and J. I. A. Helsloot, Het Sinterklaas Boek
(Zwolle: Waanders, 2009). For a more critical consideration of this tradition, see Mieke Bal, Travelling
Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Allison
Blakely, Blacks in the Dutch World: The Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern Society (Bloomington: Indi-
ana University Press, 1993).
2
Zwarte Piet is racism. Amateur visual images of the arrest were posted on the internet site
YouTube, see Schokkend Arrestaties Intocht Sinterklaas Dordrecht!!!! Amateur Beelden, YouTube
video, 3:05, amateur video taken on 12 November 2011, posted by justlikethischannel, 12 Novem-
ber 2011, http://youtu.be/8Qp6yUIPUTY (accessed 1 March 2012). Only after tweets about the
video footage on YouTube were posted, did the Dutch news media start reporting on the incident.
See Karlijn Van Houwelingen, T-shirt met Zwarte Piet is Racisme Verboden bij Intocht, Algemeen
Dagblad, 14 November 2011; Hans Beerekamp, Demonstreren tegen Zwarte Piet is Gevaarlijk,
NRC Handelsblad, 14 November 2011. For international commentary, see Jessica Olien, In Holland,
Santa Doesnt Have Elves: He Has Slaves, Slate, 1 December 2011,
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/holidays/2011/12/zwarte_piet_holland_s_favorite_racist_christ
mas_tradition_.html.
However, there seems to be a recent shift in the discourse about perceived racism
in the Dutch public debate which puts this Zwarte Piet protest in a rather differ-
ent light. An important impetus for this shift was the publication of the novel Al-
leen Maar Nette Mensen (Only Decent People)
3
, published in 2008. Both, the novel and
the Zwarte Piet incident, reveal how current-day European identities are informed
by historical narratives of a traumatic past, for instance colonialism and slavery.
Although it might seem obvious enough to keep the colonial past of many Eu-
ropean countries in mind when considering how European cultural identities are
formed and understood, it seems that when European identity formation is con-
sidered, one might just as well speak of the most canonized frame of reference
4
,
which only entails the internecine rivalries among European countries, the role of
the United States, and the bi-polar division of the world order embodied in the
Cold War.
5
A postcolonial Europe project, however, seeks to move beyond this
canonised frame of references to consider the current heterogeneous complexity of
migration and post-colonialism within the European context and its resultant ine-
qualities beyond the conventional residual figures to newly emerging identities.
6

Such a project demands closer scrutiny of how socio-cultural subject positions are
formulated and articulated in the light of the commemoration of problematic and
painful pasts.
In this article, a reworked and updated version of the paper given at the Eu-
roculture conference in 2010, I would like to consider this discourse on past trau-
ma (colonialism and slavery) within current-day, postcolonial Europe as a particu-
lar and important facet of research into the cultural dimensions of European inte-
gration.

The Case of Alleen Maar Nette Mensen
In an exhilarating form of modern-day Dutch, author Robert Vuijsje tells the com-
ing-of-age story of David, an identify-confused young Jew from Amsterdams fash-
ionable Old South quarter, who is constantly mistaken for being Moroccan. He is
in search of the love of his dreams, a shapely black woman. Frequently sojourning
between the richest and poorest parts of Amsterdam, Davids adventures take him
from Amsterdams posh Old South quarter to the Bijlmermeer, a region of derelict
high-rise flats populated by migrants from various parts of the global south and

3
Robert Vuijsje, Alleen Maar Nette Mensen (Amsterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar, 2008).
4
Peo Hansen, European Integration, European Identity and the Colonial Connection, European
Journal of Social Theory 5.4 (2002): 483.
5
Gurminder K. Bhambra, Postcolonial Europe, or Understanding Europe in Times of the Post-
colonial, in The Sage Handbook of European Studies, ed. Chris Rumford (London: Sage, 2009), 69-70.
6
Graham Huggan, Perspectives on Postcolonial Europe, Journal of Postcolonial Writing 44.3 (2008):
241-9.
Contesting Cultural Memory 127
remembered in cultural memory as the site of an El Al airplane crash in 1992. De-
scribed elsewhere as once a vibrant upper-middle class community, it had fallen
into a state of dereliction by the late 1990s and boasts the highest unemployment
and crime rates in the country.
7
The area was home to some of the citys poorest
and most marginal citizens until recent urban renovation projects were quite suc-
cessfully started. It is here, in the Bijlmer (short for Bijlmermeer), with its signifi-
cant population of migrants from former Dutch colonies (especially from Surinam
and the Dutch Antilles), that David hopes to find the elusive, but much desired
Sherida chain who is also an intellectual.
8
Dumped finally by both his Suri-
namese girlfriend Rowanda and his former girlfriend from school (Naomi, from a
similar proper background as himself), and disillusioned with Dutch middle-class
culture, David meets Naima, a Moroccan cashier from the local supermarket. She
is not an illiterate cave-dweller from the mountains, her family came from Casa-
blanca
9
, and the novel ends with the promise of a new relationship between the
two.
Even though the novel was already in its 25
th
print run less than two years after
its publication, the first months of the novels published life were rather unevent-
ful. A heated public debate on whether or not the book is racist and sexist, howev-
er, ensued when it was nominated for a Dutch literary award (the Libris literatuur-
prijs). This discussion was stirred further when the novel won an equally prestig-
ious Flemish literary prize (the Gouden Uil). The jury report on this text with
its short chapters, sms language, and staccato style added fuel to the fire with its
description of the text written in Dutch that swings like an African boob, a
rhythm that fits more tightly than a black ass in too small a tiger print legging
[].
10
When these accusations of sexism, racism, colonial attitude and such were
pronounced against Vuijsje, he responded with a reaction typical within the literary
field: it is not Vuijsje, the author, who should be held responsible for the pro-
nouncements in the novels, because its the character David (despite obvious auto-

7
Georgina Y. Stal and Daniyal M. Zuberi, Ending the Cycle of Poverty through Socio-Economic
Integration: A Comparison of Moving to Opportunity (MTO) in the United States and the
Bijlmermeer Revival Project in the Netherlands, Cities 27.1 (2010): 5.
8
Sherida chain is Davids metonymic description for a black woman who wears a golden chain
with a pendant with the name of the wearer in golden, curly letters. Sherida, according to David, is a
woman who has been living her whole life in the Netherlands, but whose existence is located entirely
outside of Dutch society. See: Vuijsje, Alleen Maar Nette Mensen, 36-7. This familiarity with Dutch
society but lack of participation in it is considered a desirable feature by David, who spurns the me-
diocre, middle-class qualities of Dutch society. Whether this lack of participation is the result of
agency or of structure is a problematic issue not considered by David. The Sherida chain refers to a
name necklace, with Sherida being a popular, female Suriname name. This kind of jewellery was
initially worn within hip hop circles, but became more mainstream after being worn by Carrie Brad-
shaw in the TV series, Sex and the City.
9
Ibid., 286.
10
Guy Mortier, Gouden Uil 2009, Leesplein.nl, http://www.leesplein.nl/assets/juryrapporten/uil-
volw-2009.html (accessed 9 March 2012).
biographical links between David and Vuijsje that have been pointed out by the
author himself) who takes this position.
11

Contesting Cultural Memory
Although restricted here to offer neither a detailed close-reading of the novel nor
closer scrutiny of the public reactions to the novels publication, I would like to
consider how the novel brings not only the historical moment of colonialism and
slavery into focus, but also that other European trauma: the Holocaust. This ena-
bles me to reflect on how cultural memory could be used to critically consider the
process of defining postcolonial, European cultural identity.
David, an avid diarist, offers without any motivation for penning down these
thoughts some observations on the Dutch multicultural society:

Blacks think about slavery every day. Except for blacks, no one ever thinks
about slavery.
Jews think about the Second World War every day. Except for Jews, no one
thinks about the Second World War.
12

A short while later, when David visits the home of his Surinam girlfriend, Ro-
wanda, for the first time, he engages in a discussion of some sort about slavery and
his own Jewishness with Rowandas mother, Janine. The mother argues that the
Dutch owe the Afro-Surinamese community costs of repair for slavery, because
Jews were paid such costs after the war. During dinner, David then poses the fol-
lowing two hypothetical questions to Rowanda:

What is worse? That your parents were slaves or being born in Africa. She
said that I should not nag. I (David) posed another hypothetical question.
What is worse? Massacring a whole race, or trading part of a race?
Now Janine did hear it. She cried: Slavery was actually much worse than the
war with the Jewish people. She hit with her hand against the blue tiles. We
were also massacred. And raped. Otherwise there would not be any half-
bloods.
13

11
Elsbeth Etty, Schrijvers Durven het Publieke Debat niet Aan, NRC Handelsblad, 3 July 2009. See
also: Thomas Vaessens, De Revanche van de Roman: Literatuur, Autoriteit en Engagement (Nijmegen:
Vantilt, 2009).
12
Vuijsje, Alleen Maar Nette Mensen, 10. At the time of writing this contribution, the novel has not yet
been translated into English nor has the rights been sold to an English publisher, because the book is
found to be too controversial (according to a telephone conversation with the authors literary
agent on 12 March 2012). Translations are my own.
13
Ibid., 68.
The reader is here confronted with rethinking how histories of trauma and victimi-
sation are understood within different communities and how such histories inter-
connect with each other not only in the past, but also and crucially, I might add,
in the present within the context of memory culture. The danger implied in the
quotation from Only Decent People is a memory culture delineated along ethnic lines,
and within current-day European context the problems entailed with ethnicity-
based processes of identification and identity construction need not be expounded.
Michael Rothberg, in Multidirectional Memory (2009), addresses this dilemma of
seemingly competing memory cultures by turning specifically to Holocaust and
slavery memory and asking what happens when different histories confront each
other in the public sphere?
14
As Rothberg explains, there are a number of possible
ways of dealing with the phenomenon when social actors bring multiple traumatic
pasts into a heterogeneous and changing post-World War II present.
15
One op-
tion is that the interaction of different memories in contemporary multicultural
society stimulates a competition of victimhood, where one memory, the dominant
one, comes to replace the other, competing memories. The other option, suggests
Rothberg, is that of resonance. This resonance approach entails that instead of
pitting memory as a zero-sum struggle over scarce resources, memory is to be
considered as multidirectional: as subject to ongoing negotiation, cross-
referencing, and borrowing.
16
Memory culture as site of identification, argues
Rothberg, need to be considered in terms of elements of alterity and forms of
commonality with others.
17

It is exactly this lack of envisioning alterity and commonality with others that
Only Decent People addresses. In a newspaper interview, Vuijsje summed up the cul-
ture of victimisation in the Netherlands as follows:

The Surinamese cry out how terrible it is that they once were slaves.
Moroccans bemoan the fact that they cannot find internships. Then I
say, we Jews were killed. I find it ridiculous, this bidding against each
other, but I think that I understand the tendency toward victimhood
among minorities better than a regular blond Dutch person.
18

The seeming inability of a regular blond Dutch person to understand the per-
ceived victimhood among minorities as more than simply knee-jerk reactions of
political correctness display itself remarkably in the public discussion around

14
Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 2.
15
Ibid., 4.
16
Ibid., 3.
17
Ibid., 5.
18
Elsbeth Etty, Zwart, Sexy en Gevuld, NRC Next, 5 January 2010. Translation my own.
Zwarte Piet specifically and the treatment of Dutch colonial history encompass-
ing slavery more generally.
19
Referring to a recently broadcast TV series on slavery,
where a white presenter explained slaverys history to a black actor and comedian,
who then embarks on a search for his roots, economist and historian Sandew Hira
compares this specific representation of slaverys history as if the Germans would
tell the Jews what the Holocaust was and that it was not so bad.
20
On the Inter-
net, various comments can be found on forums linking the Sinterklaas tradition
and Holocaust memories. Two online examples will suffice. Example one com-
pares the Sinterklaas festival, and by extension slavery, to the Holocaust:

Slavery is for black people what the Holocaust is for the Jews. Imag-
ine that the Jewish community would be reminded of the horrible
past because of an age-old tradition. Would we accept that? Slavery is
not less serious because it happened longer ago. It is crazy that a chil-
drens festival (i.e. Sinterklaas) is characterised by a very flat represen-
tation of our dark past.
21

Example two considers the lack of a critical public debate on slavery in compari-
son to the taboo on Holocaust denial: During our colonial past a large group of
minorities were also treated inhumanely and killed but about that you may
say/find/disagree/deny anything. Why is that different from the Holocaust?
22

Although these remarks clearly reflect the typical forum logic of many Inter-
net commentary, lacking nuance and complexity, their mere utterance suggests the
semiotic necessity to investigate the articulation of memory and the representation
of an array of traumatic events (the Holocaust, slavery, colonial legacies, genocide)
through complex sign systems that have in their essence no meaning themselves,
but obtain meaning as a result of the context(s) in which they are read.
Conclusion
A project on the relation between cultural memory and constructions of cultural
identity within current-day Europe is the kind of endeavour that fits the bill of the
Euroculture programme well. In fact, a Euroculture student recently undertook

19
See for example: Chris van der Heijden, De Zwarte Canon, De Groene Amsterdammer, 7 March
2012.
20
Sandew Hira, De Slavernij: Het Witwassen van Een Zwarte Bladzijde uit de Nederlandse Geschiedenis (Den
Haag: International Institute for Scientific Research, 2011), 5.
21
Wolf, Zwarte Piet: Racistisch of Niet?, Debat Op 2, 2 December 2011,
http://debatop2.ncrv.nl/nieuwsblogs/zaterdag-zwarte-piet-racistisch-of-niet (accessed 1 March
2012). Translation my own.
22
Triple S, Die Leip Net by Powned +ontkennen Holocaust, Forum.Fok.nl, 24 November 2011,
http://forum.fok.nl/topic/1742693 (accessed 1 March 2012). Translation my own.
just such a kind of research programme, which resulted in a thesis on the topic of
how second and third generations of Turkish migrants in Germany perceive the
Holocaust.
23
Her research, an empirical sociological investigation, resonates well
with the kind of questions one may pose to works of art, such as Vuijsjes novel.
Both projects pick up on circulating sentiments regarding cultural memories in a
postcolonial European context, untangling the discourse on racism, trauma, and
memory that constitute conceptions of European identity.

Bibliography
Bal, Mieke. Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2002.
Beerekamp, Hans. Demonstreren tegen Zwarte Piet is Gevaarlijk. NRC Han-
delsblad, 14 November 2011.
Bhambra, Gurminder K. Postcolonial Europe, or Understanding Europe in
Times of the Postcolonial. In The Sage Handbook of European Studies, edited by
Chris Rumford, 69-85. London: Sage, 2009.
Blakely, Allison. Blacks in the Dutch World: The Evolution of Racial Imagery in a Modern
Society. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Boer, Eugenie, and J. I. A. Helsloot. Het Sinterklaas Boek. Zwolle: Waanders, 2009.
Booy, Frits. Op Zoek naar Zwarte Piet: Een Speurtocht naar de Herkomst, de Ontwikkeling
en de Betekenis van de Dienaar van Sinterklaas. 2nd ed. Eindhoven: Stichting
Nationaal Sint Nicolaas Comit, 2008.
Etty, Elsbeth. Schrijvers Durven het Publieke Debat Niet Aan. NRC
Handelsblad, 3 July 2009.
Zwart, Sexy en Gevuld. NRC Next, 5 January 2010.
Hansen, Peo. European Integration, European Identity and the Colonial Connec-
tion. European Journal of Social Theory 5.4 (2002): 483-98.
Heijden, Chris van der. De Zwarte Canon. De Groene Amsterdammer, 7 March
2012.
Hira, Sandew. De Slavernij: Het Witwassen van Een Zwarte Bladzijde uit de Nederlandse
Geschiedenis. Den Haag: International Institute for Scientific Research, 2011.
Houwelingen, Karlijn Van. T-shirt met Zwarte Piet is Racisme Verboden bij
Intocht. Algemeen Dagblad, 14 November 2011.

23
Katherina Nolte, What do they know? The German Turks and Their Perception of the Holo-
caust, unpublished MA thesis, submitted at the University of Groningen and Jagiellonian University
in Krakow, 2012. See in this regard also the work by Yasemin Yldz, for example Governing Euro-
pean Subjects: Tolerance and Guilt in the Discourse of Muslim Women, Cultural Critique 77.1
(2011): 70-101.
Huggan, Graham. Perspectives on Postcolonial Europe. Journal of Postcolonial
Writing 44.3 (2008): 241-9.
Mortier, Guy. Gouden Uil 2009. Leesplein.nl.
http://www.leesplein.nl/assets/juryrapporten/uil-volw-2009.html (accessed 9
March 2012).
Nolte, Katharina. What Do They Know? The German Turks and Their Perception of the
Holocaust. Unpublished MA thesis, submitted at the University of Groningen
and Jagiellonian University in Krakow, 2012.
Olien, Jessica. In Holland, Santa Doesnt Have Elves. He Has Slaves. Slate, 15
December 2011.
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/holidays/2011/12/zwarte_piet_holland_s
_favorite_racist_christmas_tradition_.html (accessed 10 March 2012).
Rothberg, Michael. Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of
Decolonization. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.
Schokkend Arrestaties Intocht Sinterklaas Dordrecht!!!! Amateur Beelden. Amateur video
posted by justlikethischannel on YouTube, 12 November 2011.
http://www.youtu.be/8Qp6yUIPUTY (accessed 1 March 2012).
Stal, Georgina Y., and Daniyal M. Zuberi. Ending the Cycle of Poverty through
Socio-Economic Integration: A Comparison of Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) in the United States and the Bijlmermeer Revival Project in the Neth-
erlands. Cities 27.1 (2010): 3-12.
Triple S. Die Leip Net by Powned +ontkennen Holocaust. Forum.Fok.nl, 24
November 2011. http://forum.fok.nl/topic/1742693 (accessed 1 March
2012).
Vaessens, Thomas. De Revanche van de Roman: Literatuur, Autoriteit en Engagement.
Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2009.
Vuijsje, Robert. Alleen Maar Nette Mensen. Amsterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar, 2008.
Wolf. Zwarte Piet: Racistisch of Niet? Debat Op 2, 2 December 2011.
http://debatop2.ncrv.nl/nieuwsblogs/zaterdag-zwarte-piet-racistisch-of-niet
(accesed 1 March 2012).
Yldz, Yasemin. Governing European Subjects: Tolerance and Guilt in the Dis-
course of Muslim Women. Cultural Critique 77.1 (2011): 70-101.

Entering the Third Dimension
A CMM (Coordinated Management of Meaning)
Analysis of Transculturalism in Inter/Action
Elizabeth M. Goering
Introduction
This story begins on a Sunday morning. I am listening to a radio interview with
Vincent Harding, a key figure in the American civil rights movement. A bit later in
this article, it will become obvious why Im choosing to share my experience with
you in narrative form, but for now I would ask you to just listen to my story. I had
just received the call for papers for the conference where this article was to be
presented, so in the back of my mind, I was thinking about the theme for the Eu-
roculture Intensive Programme, Europe: Space for Transcultural Existence? with
that troubling question mark at the end, as well as the topic for this conference,
Gauging European Transcultural Dimensions. I have to admit that I had been
perplexed by Angela Merkels death knell for multiculturalism and her claim that
multiculturalism has utterly failed
1
, a verdict that since has been reasserted by the
Prime Minister of Britain
2
and the President of France
3
. So on this Sunday morn-
ing, I am lying in bed, listening to this interview, and here on the radio is Vincent
Harding asking similarly disquieting questions about the multicultural experi-
ment of America. Is America even possible? he asks.
4
And in his answer, he
evokes a stanza from a poem by the American poet Langston Hughes: O, let

1
Kate Connolly, Angela Merkel Declares Death of German Multiculturalism, The Guardian, 17
October 2010, Main section.
2
British PM: Multiculturalism Has Failed David Camerons Remarks on Wests Policy Draw Fire
from Muslim Community, msnbc.com, last modified 6 February 2011,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41444364/ns/world_news-europe/t/british-pm-multiculturalism-
has-failed/.
3
Frances Sarkozy: Multiculturalism Has Failed, CBNNews.com, last modified 11 February 2011,
http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/February/Frances-Sarkozy-Multiculturalism-Has-
Failed/.
4
Vincent Harding and Krista Tippett. Civility, History, and Hope On Being Podcast, 51 min, 9 sec.; On
Being, MP3, http://www.publicradio.org/tools/media_player/popup.php?name=being/
programs/2011/02/23/20110224_civility_history_hope_128.
America be America againThe land that never has been yet
5
It is almost
enough to make those of us who would like to believe in the possibility of spaces
for transcultural existence throw up our hands in despair.
But, I am optimistic enough to still believe in spite of the sceptics that
transcultural spaces are, indeed, possible. I am also realistic enough to know that
they are very difficult to achieve and likely can only be spotted in fleeting mo-
ments. Also, given my own disciplinary background in the field of communication
studies, I am convinced that if transcultural spaces are possible, they must be con-
structed through interaction, through our talk. That led me to this research project,
in which I am exploring the following research question: How are transcultural
spaces communicatively constructed?
To answer this question, I needed to identify moments where one might
glimpse efforts to create transcultural spaces, and I found the artefacts for my
analysis in film. Movies are a logical choice for this analysis because, as some
scholars suggest, they are equipments for living.
6
Brummett explains this notion,
suggesting that movies do not merely pose problems, they suggest ways and
means to resolve the problems insofar as they follow discursively a pattern that
people might follow in reality.
7
In this paper, I will analyze one particular film, The
Class, a French movie released in 2008 under the original title Entre les Murs. This
movie captures in near documentary style the interaction in a culturally diverse
classroom in a tough Parisian neighbourhood.
8
By focusing on this one film, I
am hoping to demonstrate transculturalism in action or, perhaps more accurately,
in interaction and to identify some of the discursive patterns that may equip us for
living in a culturally diverse world. But first, I want to introduce you to the theoret-
ical perspective that informs my work: Coordinated Management of Meaning.
Coordinated Management of Meaning
Coordinated Management of Meaning (CMM) is a communication theory first
introduced by W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen in the 1970s.
9
The per-
spective is almost more of a worldview and a set of tools than a well-formulated
theory. One of the foundational assumptions made by CMM is that communica-
tion is constitutive. In other words, we create and give meaning to the world in

5
Langston Hughes, Let America Be America Again, in The Collected Poems of Langston Hughes, ed.
Arnold Rampersad (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 189.
6
Stephen Dine Young, Movies as Equipment for Living: A Developmental Analysis of the Im-
portance of Film in Everyday Life, Critical Studies in Media Communication 17.4 (2000): 448.
7
Barry Brummett, Burkes Representative Anecdote as a Method in Media Criticism, Critical Studies
in Mass Communication 1 (1984): 164.
8
The Class (Entre les Murs), DVD, directed by Laurent Cantet (2008; Culver City, CA: Sony Pictures
Home Entertainment, 2009).
9
W. Barnett Pearce and Vernon E. Cronen, Communication, Action, and Meaning: The Creation of Social
Realities (New York: Praeger, 1980).
Entering the Third Dimension 135
which we live through our interaction. As Barnett Pearce puts it, [w]e consist of
a cluster of social conversations, and [...] patterns of communication constitute the
world as we know it.
10
A second key assumption of this perspective is that com-
munication episodes, or clusters of social conversation, are the central processes
whereby we humans co-create our social worlds. Furthermore, the theory recog-
nizes that communication episodes are patterned. In other words, the reality that
is constituted through our interaction is not random; rather it is constructed
through patterned sequences of interaction. Sometimes the constructed reality is
desirable, but often we get stuck in unwanted repetitive patterns, or URPs.
11

By analyzing communication patterns, we can see the world we are co-
creating. With its emphasis on the constitutive function of communication, CMM
invites us to ask: What are we making together? What do we want to make to-
gether in the future? CMM is interested in how communication calls into being
better social worlds.
12
If we are stuck in URPs, CMM invites us to reconstitute
our world. If multiculturalism has utterly failed, CMM invites us to analyze the
communication patterns that have constituted that failure and imagine ways to
reconstitute our reality.
The Communicative Constitution of Transcultural Spaces
In his contribution to this collection of articles, Martin Tamcke suggests that trans-
cultural communication is possible if we recognize that I am not you, as you are
not me. Yet I am not just separated from you, as you are not just separated from
me. There is something of you in me, as there is something of me in you. There-
fore, when we have to interact, I deal with you in me, as you deal with me in you
for a better understanding of each other, as a value in itself. So let us examine the
communication patterns in the culturally diverse space of The Class and see wheth-
er they succeed in creating a space for transcultural communication.
A Pattern is Born
The movie begins at the start of another school year in a diverse high school in a
rough Parisian neighbourhood. In the first scene we will analyze, the teacher,
Franois Marin, is calling his students to order by tapping on his desk and urging
the students to Calm down now! Mr. Marin begins to establish some ground

10
W. Barnett Pearce, Communication and the Human Condition (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Press, 1989), 11.
11
Vernon E. Cronen, W. Barnett Pearce and Lonna Snavely, A Theory of Rule-structure and Types
of Episodes and a Study of Perceived Enmeshment in Undesired Repetitive Patterns (URPs), in
Communication Yearbook 3, edited by Dan Nimmo (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979).
12
J. Kevin Barge and W. Barnett Pearce, A Reconnaissance of CMM Research, Human Systems 15.1
(2004): 16.
rules for the class, stating Remove your hood, please and Stop stirring things
up. These reminders are followed by a lecture on how much time the students
will waste over the course of the school year if they take 15 minutes to settle down
each day. We lose thousands of minutes, he argues. The teacher then proceeds
to compare this class to other schools that do the full hour. Imagine how far
ahead they get in a year, he observes. The students response is to challenge the
teacher, pointing out: We never do an hour. You always say that. Teachers say we
do an hours class, but we never do. [...] 8:30-9:25 doesnt make an hour. Stop say-
ing other schools do an hour. They dont.
In this opening episode, the students and their teacher begin establishing
communication patterns that constitute the day-to-day experience in this class-
room. The teacher acknowledges that the student is right about the hour not being
a full 60 minutes. After admitting that the students are right (All right, its 55
minutes. Thats an important point. All Im saying is that we waste time. Like
now.), Mr. Marin seeks to redirect the conversation by asking students to take
out a sheet of paper and make name plates for themselves. However, the pattern
established in the initial interaction is repeated as one student immediately chal-
lenges the teacher: Why write our names? [...] You know us. We had you last
year. The teacher calmly and logically explains: Esmerelda, half the kids here are
new. Be happy. That way people will know your name. Esmerelda, however, does
not back down and refuses to follow the teachers directive: Im not doing it. I
wont if you wont. In the end, the teacher gives in, acknowledging: Youre right.
For those of you who dont know me, Im Mr. Marin.
In this scene, it is easy to see the origins of communication patterns that are
counterproductive to transcultural communication. One glaring pattern is particu-
larly apparent in this classroom. It begins with the teacher issuing a directive,
which is immediately followed by a student challenging the teachers power. The
teacher calmly, but often in a patronizing tone, explains his request or rule, general-
ly admitting the legitimacy of part of the students claim. In the end, the students
reluctantly accept his explanation until the pattern repeats itself on another issue.
We see this pattern emerge right from the start, and throughout the film, the stu-
dents challenge the teacher on nearly everything from simple requests to word
choices to whether he can require them to read in class. This pattern is quickly
becoming an unwanted repetitive pattern a URP.
A Reified URP
While the first scene allows us to see the birth of an unwanted repetitive pattern,
this next scene illustrates that this URP has, indeed, become reified within this
group. Furthermore, we see that the communication pattern has implications for
identity and for the possibility of creating a transcultural space within this class-
room.
In this clip, Mr. Marin is trying to explain the meaning of the word succulent. He
writes the sentence Bill enjoys a succulent cheeseburger on the board, and the
immediate response from one of the students, in keeping with the pattern de-
scribed above, is Cheeseburgers stink. After a brief discussion about the relative
merits of cheeseburgers, another student proffers another challenge: Whats with
the Bills.... The name Bill. You always use weird names.... Why dont you use
Assata or Rachid or Ahmed or...? Another student chimes in: You always use
whitey names. Consistent with the pattern that has become institutionalized with-
in this group, the teacher seeks to logically explain his position. First he notes that
Bill is not such a weird name; after all: A recent U.S. President was called Bill.
Then he takes on the challenge about his choice of whitey names, arguing:
Khoumba, if I start choosing names to suit all your origins, itll never end. In the
end, he backs down, asking: What do you suggest?
At this point, the class seems to be so trapped in this unwanted repetitive
communication cycle that one wonders if learning can take place at all. Further-
more, the cosmopolitan, transcultural space one might have hoped could be creat-
ed in this richly diverse classroom seems increasingly illusory.
Remember, though, that one of the fundamental assumptions of CMM is that
humans co-create their social worlds. That means that if we are co-constructing
undesirable realities, we can re-construct them. But how? How do we break out
of URPs?
To help us answer that question, let me introduce you to another important
concept in CMM: CMM assumes that communication consists of practices and
resources.
13
Practices are behaviours, what we do, and resources are the materials,
such as language skills, personality traits, or technology, that inform practice. Prac-
tice and resources are essentially reflexive building blocks. We act in ways that our
resources allow. And research shows that we tend to continue acting in repetitive
cycles until resources are put at risk. To break out of URPs, we must put re-
sources at risk. One way to do that is through restorying, and to understand that,
I need to explain the role of stories in coordinating meaning.
We shape meaning through the intermingling of stories lived and stories
told.
14
As we enter any new experience, we do so with expectations that are
shaped by the stories that have been told to us by others about the experience and
by our own lived stories. We interpret the stories told through frames con-
structed by our stories lived, and as we live the experience, new stories will be
told to us, new stories will be lived, and meanings will emerge from the blending of
those stories. In seamless iteration, stories told are processed through stories lived,
and meaning is constructed and reconstructed.

13
Pearce, Communication and the Human Condition, 23.
14
W. Barnett Pearce, Some Personal Reflections, Human Systems 15.3 (2004): 206.
Indeed, stories have a great deal of power when it comes to the management of
meaning! In particular, they have the power to disrupt unwanted repetitive pat-
terns. Transcendent storytelling can be used to create fertile turbulence that can
give interactants a chance to rewrite their story.
15

Reconstituting Social Worlds through Restorying
In The Class, Mr. Marin assigns each student to write and tell his/her self-
portrait, or story. In this next clip, Esmeralda, a student who has played a key role
in constituting the URPs that are the communicative reality of this group, shares
her story: My name is Esmeralda Ouertani. Im 14. I live on Alle du Pre Dhuit
Paris 20 with my two parents and my three brothers and sisters. Later, Id like to
be a policewoman because people say all policemen are bad and so we need good
ones. If not, Id like to be a rapper.
The next student to share his story is Wei, a 15-year-old Chinese immigrant.
Wei discloses: My hobby is playing video games, at least four hours a day. I find it
hard using French correctly. Its so hard expressing myself that others dont under-
stand me. Thats why I dont communicate much. I hardly ever go out. Nothing
much interests me outside. The environment doesnt suit me here since Im allergic
but I dont know to what.
Of course, sharing stories involves risk. Rabah, the next student Mr. Marin
calls on to share his self-portrait, is hesitant to read his story, but he does: My
names Rabah. Im 14. I listen to rap. I love my village in Kabylia and go there
every year. [] I have two brothers but I dont like school. I dont like tramps. I
like Zidane. I like to talk and I like Psy 4 de la Rimes videos.
Now, do not get me wrong. Sharing stories is not a panacea that magically re-
constitutes undesirable communication patterns. In fact, one student responds
dismissively to Weis story: Allergic to yourself, thats what. But stories do plant
the seeds that allow social worlds to be reconstituted as the participants in an inter-
action get to know one another better. By sharing their stories, the students open
the possibility of transcultural connection.
Glimpses of Transcultural Communication
Later in the film, the students meet in the computer room to finish up their stories,
and it is at this point that we catch a glimpse of successful transcultural communi-
cation. One student, Souleymane, has chosen to tell his story through photos, and
the teacher suggests he add legends to his photos. Mr. Marin asks: What could

15
W. Barnett Pearce and Kimberly A. Pearce, Transcendent Storytelling: Abilities for Systemic
Practitioners and Their Clients, Human Systems 9.3-4 (1998): 167-85. For an intriguing analysis of
transcendent storytelling, see Liliana Castaeda Rossmann, Remembering the Alamo: Cosmopolitan
Communication and Grammars of Transcendence, Human Systems 15.1 (2004): 33-44.
you put? Who is she? My mother, the student replies. You could say shes
your mother. Then you could explain why shes making this gesture to the photog-
rapher, suggests the teacher. The student explains: Theyd pissed her off. [...] She
hates photos. The teacher recommends: So write that. My mother hates having
her photo taken. Thats a legend. Understand? Do that with all the photos and
youre set.
When Souleymane is finished, the teacher posts the photos for all to see: If
youve finished, come and take a look at Souleymanes masterpiece. As the stu-
dents look at the pictures, there is no doubt that they have found the you in me
and the me in you that makes transcultural spaces possible.
Conclusion
So what lessons can we learn about creating transcultural spaces from this analysis?
First, this analysis suggests that it is possible to create spaces for transcultural
communication, at least fleetingly, if we are willing to put resources at risk and
create fertile turbulence through the exchange of personal stories. Furthermore,
to create transcultural spaces through the exchange of stories, we need to be
thoughtful about interpreting lived stories, telling our own stories, and listening to
stories told by others. The movie also highlights the importance of creating a cli-
mate in which people feel comfortable sharing their stories. Finally, this analysis
reveals that the creation of transcultural spaces is episodic. It is not that an un-
wanted repetitive pattern is fixed one time and all is well. In fact, in this film, the
class falls back into its URPs, culminating in an episode where a student is injured,
and Souleymane, the student responsible, is called to a hearing where he will likely
be expelled. But, for a fleeting moment, this class was able to create a space that
facilitated transcultural communication. Our challenge is to identify the communi-
cation patterns that made that possible and recreate them in our own inter/actions.

Bibliography
Barge, J. Kevin, and W. Barnett Pearce. A Reconnaissance of CMM Research.
Human Systems 15.1 (2004): 13-32.
British PM: Multiculturalism Has Failed David Camerons Remarks on Wests
Policy Draw Fire from Muslim Community. msnbc.com. Last modified Feb-
ruary 6 2011. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41444364/ns/world_news-
europe/t/british-pm-multiculturalism-has-failed/(accessed 1 July 2012).
Brummett, Barry. Burkes Representative Anecdote as a Method in Media Criti-
cism. Critical Studies in Mass Communication 1 (1984): 161-76.
The Class (Entre les Murs). DVD. Directed by Laurent Cantet. 2008. Culver City,
CA: Sony Pictures Home Entertainment, 2009.
Connolly, Kate. Angela Merkel Declares Death of German Multiculturalism.
The Guardian, 17 October 2010, Main section.
Cronen, Vernon E., W. Barnett Pearce and Lonna Snavely. A Theory of Rule-
structure and Types of Episodes and a Study of Perceived Enmeshment in
Undesired Repetitive Patterns (URPs). In Communication Yearbook 3, edited by
Dan Nimmo, 225-240. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979.
Frances Sarkozy: Multiculturalism Has Failed. CBNNews.com. Last modified 1
February 11 2011. http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2011/February/
Frances-Sarkozy-Multiculturalism-Has-Failed/(accessed 1 July 2012).
Harding, Vincent, and Krista Tippett. Civility, History, and Hope On Being Podcast;
51 min., 9 sec. On Being. MP3. http://www.publicradio.org/tools/
media_player/popup.php?name=being/programs/2011/02/23/20110224_
civility_history_hope_128 (accessed 1 July 2012).
Hughes, Langston. Let America Be America Again. In The Collected Poems of Lang-
ston Hughes, edited by Arnold Rampersad, 189. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1994.
Pearce, W. Barnett. Communication and the Human Condition. Carbondale, IL: South-
ern Illinois University Press, 1989.
_____ Some Personal Reflections. Human Systems 15.3 (2004): 205-8.
Pearce, W. Barnett and Kimberly A. Pearce. Transcendent Storytelling: Abilities
for Systemic Practitioners and Their Clients. Human Systems 9.3-4 (1998):
167-85.
Pearce, W. Barnett, and Vernon E. Cronen. Communication, Action, and Meaning: The
Creation of Social Realities. New York: Praeger, 1980.
Rossmann, Liliana Castaeda. Remembering the Alamo: Cosmopolitan Commu-
nication and Grammars of Transcendence. Human Systems 15.1 (2004): 33-44.
Tamcke, Martin. On the Path to Transculturality. In Europe Space for Transcul-
tural Existence, edited by Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong, Lars Klein and
Margriet van der Waal. Gttingen: Gttingen University Press, 2013.
Young, Stephen Dine. Movies as Equipment for Living: A Developmental Analy-
sis of the Importance of Film in Everyday Life. Critical Studies in Media Com-
munication 17.4 (2000): 447-68.

Part Three
Towards a Transcultural Europe?

On the Path to Transculturality
Martin Tamcke
Introduction
Whenever a student in my department enters the academic field of intercultural or
interreligious coexistence or interaction, she or he will come across a text I wrote
some years ago. While in intercultural interaction, this phrase should be present in
the discussions of my students:

I am not you,
as you are not me.
Yet I am not just separated from you,
as you are not just separated from me.
There is something of you in me,
as there is something of me in you.
Therefore,
when we have to interact,
I deal with you in me,
as you deal with me in you
for a better understanding of each other,
as a value in itself.

Interactions between cultures and religions always go this way, and there is always
both: On the one hand, it can lead to a deeper understanding; on the other hand,
when restricted or stopped at an early stage, it can lead to tensions. But everything
that has happened in this interaction is present all the time in both directions,
and often somewhere in between. But where I find you in me and where you find
me in you, there is the starting point of a next step on the path from intercultural
interaction to transcultural existence.
A Historical Example
In 1909, the German missionary Detwig von Oertzen met two Muslims, two
older Mohammedan spiritual figures, who had wrapped the green scarf of the
Prophets offspring round their long kaftan.
1
Von Oertzen briefly outlines the
course of the conversation and mentions that the two were brothers. They had,
he said, already identified themselves as followers of Christ. The elder used to
be for a long time the leader of a Mohammedan dervish monastery, whereas the
younger was a very well educated expert on Islam, a so-called Mderri, a title
equivalent to that of Doctor of Theology, as von Oertzen explains to his read-
ers. Von Oertzens report goes as follows: While studying the Islamic writings
opposing Christianity, they both got to study the Bible, became visibly convinced
of the biblical truth and confessed it publicly. In order to be won back for Islam,
they were sent to Arabia. But the attempt failed. At their return, their belief was
even stronger, and so they had to flee. They sought protection in Bulgaria. But the
Bulgarian government agreed to give them protection only if they would enter a
Bulgarian orthodox monastery. Considering the local Muslims, the government
could not help them further.
2
But since they intended to work in society, with-
drawing in a monastery was out of the question. Von Oertzens concluding judge-
ment illustrates his point of view: To our opinion, they were completely con-
vinced in their minds of the truth contained in the Holy Scripture and the Christian
message; but I could not tell to what extent their hearts are now revived.
Another missionary describes them on 23 March 1909, in a publication in
Germany, as Mullahs from Macedonia who, after intense research, got to
acknowledge the truth of the Gospel.
3
What a pity! This is closer to the reality, at
least regarding the geography, but it still misses the intentions of the two men,
because the missionary wanted to show that they were won now for the Christian
side, which to him was also the European side. Like von Oertzen, this missionary
also needed a success-story and did not take into account the real position of the
two men.
From 1909 onward, Mehmed Nesimi and Ahmed Kessaf had started to write
for journals issued in Bulgaria articles which stirred quite a sensation. This led to a
strong reaction on the side of the Bulgarian Muslim media. Both were born in
Pashmakli (Smolyan), southwest of Plovdiv. Nesimi obtained the Mderri diploma
at a medrese; therefore he was an educated teacher of religion. Up to his arrival in
Plovdiv, he held sermons at the mosque in Paschmakli. Kessaf attended the me-
drese only for a short time, joining the army afterwards as a military spiritual guide
and serving in the 18
th
reserve regiment of the Second Army in the Greek-Turkish
War. After six years, he was discharged and started working as a miller in his
hometown. He was registered as sheik of the Rifaiye order. In 1907, they travelled

1
Detwig von Oertzen, Ein Christuszeuge im Orient (Gieen: Brunnen, 1961), this and the following
quotations 67-8 (translation my own).
2
Ibid., 68 (the following as well).
3
Gabriel Goltz, Eine christlich-islamische Kontroverse um Religion, Nation und Zivilisation: Die osmanisch-
trkischen Periodika der Deutschen Orient-Mission und die Zeitung Balkan in Plovdiv 1908-1911 (Mnster: Lit,
2002), 15 (translation my own).
via Edirne to Izmir, where they got into trouble because of Nesimis sermons and
sailed afterwards to Jeddah, which was the next step of their planned pilgrimage to
Mecca. Interrupting the journey in Beirut, they came into contact with Maronite
Christians and finally travelled to Damascus. However, they never reached Mecca.
After the restoration of the Constitution, they returned to Bulgaria via Izmir, Edir-
ne and Thessaloniki. Meanwhile, they wanted to come closer to Christianity, and
for that reason they appealed to the Metropolitan of Plovdiv. But here they were
discouraged in their enterprise and advised to go to Sofia. However, the Armeni-
ans in Plovdiv led them to Awetaranian, a Turkish convert from Islam to Christi-
anity, who took for himself an Armenian name after his baptism. Both Mullahs
attracted international attention later on. Between 1909 and 1910, they taught Is-
lamic studies at a seminar in Potsdam Nesimi taught Arabic and Quranic inter-
pretation, and Kessaf Sufism and Sufi philosophy. Later, they worked at the de-
partment of manuscripts of the Royal Library. Ahmed Kessaf died on 8 September
1912, Nesimi on 5 February 1942. Their truly comprehensive literary work has not
been thoroughly explored yet, but it aroused great interest on the side of the aca-
demics of their time, for instance Martin Hartman, the founder of the German
Society for Islamic Studies, who refers several times in his Opus Magnum The Is-
lamic Orient to their work
4
, or William Henry Temple Gairdner, the director of the
Church Missionary Society in Cairo at that time, who used their texts.
5

The argumentation of Nesimi and Kessaf is at a first glance simple and sche-
matic.
6
They constantly distinguished between progress and civilisation on the one
hand and backwardness and savageness on the other hand. They were interested in
what is useful or damaging. Thus, this progress is related to liberty and equality. In
their opinion, backwardness was obvious where, for example, women were exclud-
ed from public places.
7
The hermeneutical criterion would be a sort of benefit-
oriented interpretation which promotes the inner truth. An independent process of
making a legal decision would rely on reason and on the Quran. Religion should
be reformed and fit the time. Both scholars spoke against a basic opposition be-
tween Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Religions could be adjusted to one another
by means of interpretations.
It is noteworthy that none of them used the Bible, but both argued on the ba-
sis of certain Quranic verses and Prophets traditions, using at the same time Is-
lamic theological and juridical works. Both scholars were called apostates, who

4
On Hartmann, see: Gotthard Jschke, Islamforschung der Gegenwart: Martin Hartmann zum
Gedchtnis, Die Welt des Islams 23 (1941): 111-21.
5
On Temple Gairdner, see: Constance E. Padwick, Temple Gairdner of Cairo (London: Society for
Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1929); Michael T. Shelley, Temple Gairdner of Cairo Revisited,
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10.3 (1999): 261-78.
6
Goltz, Eine christlich-islamische Kontroverse, 86-91.
7
Ibid., 98-101.
deserted their religion by their Muslim opponents.
8
The two offended men denied
having become Christians. They pointed to the freedom of conscience as some-
thing that should be entirely normal in a civilised society. By reason of the equality
principle, no religion can be disdained. Therefore, they equally loved Muslims,
Christians and members of other religions. Unlike them, they were striving to
acknowledge the truth irrespective of religion and to preserve the mysteries of all
religions in their hearts. They understood themselves as healed of the religious
fanaticism sickness and serving now the friendship and love among all people.
But they shared in their own manner a moral founded on western values. The
background question referred to was what was necessary for the survival of the
Ottoman Empire. The content of their argumentation basically corresponded to
the Islamic reformatory speech. However, their approach of a truth prevailing over
religions, their religiosity independent of a specific religion and the challenging
analogy between the slogan of the French Revolution and the Christian knowledge
naturally attracted the accusation of atheism. They both had their roots in the Mus-
lim mystical milieu of the Balkans. Their concept of the unity of being originated
from Ibn Arabi and it played an important role in the context of the Second Con-
stitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire; both declared to have studied Ibn Arabi.
They and their liberal-mystical contemporaries were all concerned with a religious
synthesis, but also with a synthesis between the modern scientific knowledge and
the religious understanding.
No wonder, then, that in Germany, because of their views, their Christianity
was contested. The dominating view of the Protestant missionaries in Bulgaria
included them both in the field of interculturality in such a manner that they ap-
pear as alienated from one side and incorporated in the other. Because of their
mingling with Christian or Western ideas, the Muslim view of their opponents in
the controversy excluded them from Islam. Unlike these perspectives, the two
scholars document the dream of transculturality in an impressive way. It is this
reality which will open up the transcultural space that can mainly be studied today
on the basis of individual migrants biographies.
Outlook on the Academic Discourse
I am not you and you are not me, but I can see something in your life which ap-
pears to be something from my life, and furthermore I explore what unifies you
and me.
Can I face you in a manner that I am allowed to learn from you, so that I can
absorb what belongs to you and not to me? Can I overcome our differences to-
wards what unifies you and me, without neglecting our respective characters? How
can I preserve the new that arises when I have to combine two cultures in one

8
Ibid., 118-20.
identity, e.g. if I am a Turkish Muslim in Germany or an Oriental Christian in the
Islamic world? Can I only understand the other if I convert to his or her religion
or culture? What happens to me after this conversion, when I come back, with a
new perspective, to my own position? Do I have to re-convert? Are patchwork-
identities the only thing possible? How can we preserve the respective individuali-
ties and yet be open for a deeper understanding of the Other? Freedom, love, jus-
tice, equality: these are keywords that are never definitely defined but always in
flow, proved in life. They are always illusion and yet reality. Religion and culture
can shape the meaning of these values but also have to match themselves with
them.
In their recently published book Interkulturalitt, Hamid Reza Yousefi and Ina
Braun define transculturality like this: transculturality is a common culture beyond
cultural peculiarities.
9
They refer to Wolfgang Welsch who holds that the complex-
ity of particularistic culture and hybridity are adequately reflected in the concept
transculturality, in order to overcome those separate entities which are implied in
the concepts of interculturality and multiculturality.
10
However, Welschs thesis
provoked massive critique. For example, Ralf Elm states that the concept of
transculturality does not capture the collective deep structures and basic orienta-
tions;
11
Bernhard Waldenfels claims that there is no space beyond cultures []
that can be called transcultural;
12
Christoph Antweiler simply called Welschs
approach badly idealistic.
13
All critics are more or less concerned with separation,
differentiation and diversity within cultures. This is what Yousefi and Braun also
demonstrate in a straightforward comment on Welsch: What is ignored here are
the enduring differences.
14
They ask the rhetorical question: Those Turks who
helped to build up Germany 50 years ago and who are a part of this society today,
are they transcultural?
15

I would answer: Yes, they are. Of course, they are not completely transcultur-
al; they are also intercultural, bi- or poly-cultural, hybrid, often highly particularis-
tic, sometimes multicultural. When the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Er-
dogan, speaking to the Turks in Germany, declared that assimilation is a crime

9
Hamid Reza Yousefi and Ina Braun, Interkulturalitt: Eine interdisziplinre Einfhrung (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011), 108 (translation my own).
10
Wolfang Welsch, Transkulturalitt: Zwischen Globalisierung und Partikularisierung, Jahrbuch
Deutsch als Fremdsprache 26 (2000): 330 and 336 (translation my own).
11
Ralf Elm, Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Anstze einer interkulturellen Philosophie: Grundbedingungen eines
Dialogs der Kulturen (Bonn: ZEI, 2001), 14 (translation my own).
Ralf Elm, Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Anstze einer interkulturellen Philosophie: Grundbedingungen eines
Dialogs der Kulturen (Bon
n: ZEI, 2001), 14 (translation my own).
nterkultureller Ethnologie (Nordhausen: Bautz, 2007), 91 (translation my own).
14
Yousefi and Braun, Interkulturalitt, 109 (translation my own).
15
Ibid.
against humanity,
16
or when German politicians announced that this country has
reached the limits of integration, these statements demonstrate human short-
comings which result from particular interests.
17
They say, however, nothing about
the potential for transcultural existence, which transcends these very particular
interests and focuses on those aspects which are common for all people. Is Europe
already as senile as thinking and acting only in its own interest, regardless of its
responsibility for the world? Does Europe lack visions and ideas for its future, so
that it settles for doing only the least manageable things? Transcultural existence
does not mean an existence beyond all cultural peculiarities, as the critics say. It is
more like a passage through all particularism and interaction toward a common
ground or a common aim firstly with a look on the region or place where we live,
secondly with a look on the entire globe.
Transcultural existence is not a vision, nothing that politics is supposed to
bring about; rather, it is a reality that has always been noticeable in human life (at
least from the outer view). In any case, when concepts or theories claim to univer-
sally explain reality, their inventors are certainly blind to the richness and fullness
of life and world. In contrast, the concept of transculturality adheres to the single
and united reality of all humans, which is probably not achievable at all, yet always
effective. Transculturality is never simply given but always effective when there is
the possibility to evolve.
One author who thought and wrote about these issues with deep insight was
Albert Schweitzer. He coined a phrase that I think is as profound as it is simple: I
am life that wants to live among life that wants to live.
18
Is this idealistic? I dont
mind. For I think it is above all this: human and visionary and beneficial for the
shaping of Europes and the worlds future.

16
The speech is documented online: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/erdogan-rede-in-koeln-
im-wortlaut-assimilation-ist-ein-verbrechen-gegen-die-menschlichkeit-1.293718 (in German transla-
tion, accessed 29 March 2012).
17
Cf. the debate after Erdogans speech, as summarized, e.g., by Helen Pidd, Germany Hits Back
after Turkish PM Erdogan Tells Immigrants to Resist Assimilation, The Guardian, 28 February 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/28/turkish-pm-addresses-immigrants-germany (ac-
cessed 29 March 2012).
18
A valuable resource for further reading in Schweitzer is Albert Schweitzers Ethical Vision: A Source-
book, ed. Predrag Cicovacki (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
Bibliography
Antweiler, Christoph. Grundpositionen interkultureller Ethnologie. Nordhausen: Bautz,
2007.
Elm, Ralf. Notwendigkeit, Aufgaben und Anstze einer interkulturellen Philosophie: Grund-
bedingungen eines Dialogs der Kulturen. Bonn: ZEI, 2001.
Erdogan-Rede in Kln im Wortlaut: Assimilation ist ein Verbrechen gegen die
Menschlichkeit. Sddeutsche Zeitung, 13 February 2008,
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/erdogan-rede-in-koeln-im-wortlaut-
assimilation-ist-ein-verbrechen-gegen-die-menschlichkeit-1.293718
Goltz, Gabriel. Eine christlich-islamische Kontroverse um Religion, Nation und Zivilisation:
Die osmanisch-trkischen Periodika der Deutschen Orient-Mission und die Zeitung Balkan
in Plovdiv 19081911. Mnster: Lit, 2002.
Jschke, Gotthard. Islamforschung der Gegenwart: Martin Hartmann zum Ge-
dchtnis. Die Welt des Islams 23 (1941): 111-21.
Oertzen, Detwig von. Ein Christuszeuge im Orient. Gieen: Brunnen, 1961.
Padwick, Constance E. Temple Gairdner of Cairo. London: Society for Promoting
Christian Knowledge, 1929.
Pidd, Helen. Germany Hits Back after Turkish PM Tells Immigrants to Resist
Assimilation. The Guardian, 28 February 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/28/turkish-pm-addresses-
immigrants-germany (accessed 29 March 2012).
Shelley, Michael T. Temple Gairdner of Cairo Revisited. Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations 10.3 (1999): 261-78.
Waldenfels, Bernhard. Grundmotive einer Phnomenologie des Fremden. Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 2006.
Welsch, Wolfang. Transkulturalitt: Zwischen Globalisierung und Partikularisie-
rung. Jahrbuch Deutsch als Fremdsprache 26 (2000): 327-51.
Yousefi, Hamid Reza, and Ina Braun. Interkulturalitt: Eine interdisziplinre Einfh-
rung. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011.

Here We Go Again
The Supposed Failure of Multiculturalism
in Historical Perspective
Janny de Jong
Introduction
Here we go again. That was the weary reaction of a British official to the speech
British Prime Minister David Cameron held on 5 February 2011 at the Munich
Security Conference about the need to change British policy towards minorities in
Great Britain.
1
State multiculturalism had encouraged different cultures in Brit-
ain to live different lives, Cameron had argued, while failing to provide a sense of
togetherness and a vision of society to which these cultures want to belong.
2

This by no means constituted a new insight in the supposed problem of separate-
ness, and anything but a fresh solution to it. Indeed, the stress on Britishness, the
need for patriotism and common values were hobbyhorses of the Labour Prime
Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown as well. Though in all fairness Cameron
also propagated to build a stronger pride in local identity, these more subtle
tones were lost in the heavy media attention the speech received.
Proclaiming multiculturalism dead seems to have become the favourite pastime
of leading politicians in Europe. After all, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel had uttered similar statements. The most
common approach towards the perceived failure of multiculturalism is the
strengthening of a sense of national belonging and collective identity. For ethnic
minorities, integration now often seems to imply assimilation.
This is paradoxical if one considers the official motto of the European Union
(EU): unity in diversity. The motto is best known as an antidote to the fear that
national identities will be eclipsed by Europe. Yet, the slogan has also been ap-
plied to minorities. The year 2008, for instance, was proclaimed European Year of
Intercultural Dialogue; the poster used for the annual celebration of Europe Day

1
David Camerons Muddled Speech on Multiculturalism, The Economist, 11 February 2011,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/02/britain_and_multiculturalism (accessed 29
December 2011).
2
PMs Speech at the Munich Security Conference, 10 The Official Site of the British Prime
Ministers Office, 5 February 2011, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-
security-conference/(accessed 29 December 2011).
on the 9
th
of May that year showed a boy and a girl, each of different complexion,
painting a globe while the caption read it is not them and us, it is you and me.
3

However, increasingly the theme of diversity has become unpopular in the national
context, especially since the rise of rightist populist parties playing the anti-
multiculturalism card. Already in 2001, Finnish social geographer Anssi Paasi used
the expression political dynamite when referring to the links between bounded
space, culture and identity. He mentioned the substantive growth of rightist parties
in this respect. In the meantime, this development has only gained more momen-
tum: no longer can the support of rightist parties in, for instance, the Netherlands
or Finland be described as close to zero, as Paasi in 2001 was still able to do.
4

Though these more recent rightist parties and movements all have their own char-
acteristics, they agree upon the dislike of foreigners, especially Muslims.
This does not mean that criticism on the supposed failure of integration of
ethnic minorities is limited to rightist parties only. Indeed, in the Netherlands, it
was a social democratic sociologist, researcher at the Wiardi Beckman Foundation
5
,
who in 2000 published an op-ed called The Multicultural Tragedy in the quality
national newspaper NRC Handelsblad. It inspired a large debate on the merits of the
multicultural society both in the media and in parliament, though his ideas about a
fundamentalist Islam and the costs of mass immigration as well as his pleas for a
more assertive nationalism by then already were not exceptional.
6
A more recent
example is the German Social Democratic Party member Thilo Sarrazin, who stat-
ed without much ado in Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen:
[W]e do not want national minorities. Muslim immigrants often poorly educat-
ed and with large families made Germany more stupid, he claimed. From the
outset, this utterly polemical book drew much attention and it broke selling records
of non-fiction books immediately. With 13 editions and a total number of 1.5 mil-
lion published copies, it unsurprisingly ended in position number one on the 2010
top-selling list.
7

3
Europa Official Website of the European Union, no date, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-
may/gallery/2008/index_en.htm /(accessed 29 December 2011).
4
Anssi Paasi, Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and
Identity, European Urban and Regional Studies 8.1 (2001): 18.
5
The Wiardi Beckman Sichting voor de Sociaal-Democratie is the scientific institute closely related to the
Dutch social democratic party Partij van de Arbeid.
6
Leo and Jan Lucassen point to a number of predecessors, mainly Social Democrats, in their Win-
naars en Verliezers: een Nuchtere Balans van Vijfhonderd Jaar Immigratie (Amsterdam: Bakker, 2011), 25-31.
For the article see Paul Scheffer, Het Multiculturele Drama, NRC Handelsblad, 29 January 2000,
http://retro.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Multicultureel/scheffer.html (accessed 6 January 2012). See also Paul
Scheffer, Het Land van Aankomst, 3rd ed. (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2007).
7
Sarrazin bricht Verkaufsrekord, Spiegel Online, 29 October 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/
kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,726206,00.html; Thilo Sarrazin, Alle Artikel und Hintergrunde, Spiegel
Online, no date, http://www.spiegel.de/thema/thilo_sarrazin/ (both accessed 30 December 2011).
See also: An Immigration Row in Germany: Sarrazin vs the Saracens, The Economist, 1 September
2010, http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/09/immigration_row_germany (accessed
30 December 2011).
Here We Go Again 153
How should this flood of negative news on immigrants, asylum seekers and the
supposed failure of the multicultural society be explained? In order to provide an
answer to this question, a historical perspective may be helpful, also to explain the
different approaches within Europe. Firstly, however, the term multiculturalism
should be examined more closely.
Multiculturalism versus Assimilation
The term multiculturalism came into use in the 1960s and 1970s. In the academic
literature on multiculturalism, Canada plays an important role because the Canadi-
an government at an early stage, in 1971, officially announced a multicultural policy
to meet issues of ethnic and cultural diversity. Diversity in Canada already was
institutionalised because of the English-French duality; this circumstance helped to
address the issue of meeting the challenge that the growing number of ethnic mi-
norities of immigrant origins posed. In 1971, at the official launch of the policy,
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau put forward that the various immigrant groups
should not be required to assimilate and in this process lose their own ethnic iden-
tity. The idea was that keeping ones ethnic identity would actually enhance the
social cohesion in the state, provided that social inclusion and participation of the
immigrants were assured as well.
8
The importance of these last provisions is often
overlooked.
Multiculturalism was devised as an alternative for and protest against the idea
of assimilation. Assimilation is often seen as typically French, because ideally there
is only one, French culture which every French citizen must adhere to. This
French policy was already dominant in the 19
th
century, when colonies such as
Algeria were proclaimed an integral part of France (1848). Citizenship for indige-
nous Algerians was possible, but only if they renounced Islam. Therefore, the re-
publican conception of citizenship in France is closely connected to a radical secu-
larism (lacit). French citizenship does not allow, at least in theory, any body of
citizens to be differentially identified, for example as Arab, writes sociologist
Tariq Modood. Lacit implies that religion should not be part of politics and the
public sphere.
9
The charter drafted by Frances High Council for Integration
(HCI), that applicants for French nationality need to sign as of January 2012, con-
tains for example the following statement: [A]pplicants will no longer be able to

8
Jeffrey G. Reitz, Assessing Multiculturalism as a Behavioural Theory, in Multiculturalism and Social
Cohesion: Potentials and Challenges of Diversity, ed. Jeffrey G. Reitz et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 6.
9
Tariq Modood, Muslims and European Multiculturalism, OpenDemocracy, 15 May 2003,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-europe_islam/article_1214.jsp (accessed 3 January 2012).
claim allegiance to another country while on French soil.
10
Dual nationalities are
possible, though this unsurprisingly has also come under attack.
Of course the French idea of assimilation is not the only reading of what assimila-
tion entails. In settler societies, such as, for instance, the United States, early re-
search has been conducted on how the various immigrants could merge into one
nation. In this respect, the metaphor of the melting pot has been used. One could
also mention the four stages scheme of sociologist Robert E. Park (1926) (con-
tacts, competition, accommodation and eventual assimilation) that supposedly
structures race relations.
11
Parks theories, also about the so-called marginal man,
were quite influential.
The point is not only that the ideas of both multiculturalism and assimilation
are not clear-cut and mean different things in different contexts; there is also fuzz-
iness about what integration entails. In a recent article on Turkish integration in
Germany, the definition of what constitutes the most successful integration reads
as follows: [I]immigrant communities resemble the upper and middle classes of
the majority society; members become blended almost seamlessly, leaving behind
their cultural differences.
12
In this definition, the most successful or perfect inte-
gration therefore means assimilation.
The idea behind multiculturalism, however, is that integration is possible with-
out dropping all cultural differences. Integration is a dynamic and two-sided pro-
cess of change, the Annual Report Integration 2008 of the Dutch government agency
Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (Netherlands Institute for Social Research) states: it
starts with the willingness to build opportunities to acquire a position in society.
Successful integration does not necessarily imply that all norms and values or be-
haviour of the majority population are copied. On the other hand, there are also
limits to multicultural accommodation.
13
The question thus is how to accommo-
date cultural diversity and strengthen the democratic state at the same time.
The issue has become more complex because of the attacks on the World
Trade Center in 2001 and the bombings in Spain (2004) and England (2005). In
Great Britain, a government Preventing Violent Extremism programme, for in-
stance, solely concentrated on Muslims. In 2010, a report of the House of Com-

10
France Makes It Harder to Become French, France 24, 30 December 2011,
http://www.france24.com/en/20111229-france-tightens-screws-immigration-election-looms-
sarkozy-gueant-citizenship (accessed 3 January 2012).
11
Assimilation, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 1968, Encyclopedia.com,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045000060.html (accessed 3 January 2012).
12
Ahmet Ykleyen and Gke Yurdakul, Islamic Activism and Immigrant Integration: Turkish
Organizations in Germany, Immigrants & Minorities 29.1 (2011): 64.
13
Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, ed., Jaarrapport Integratie 2008 (Annual Report Integration 2008) (The
Hague and Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2008). See also Michael Murphy, Multicultural-
ism: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2012), chapter 7.
mons on this programme criticised this one-sided focus as unhelpful and stig-
matising.
14

The focus preferably should shift to integration in relation to citizenship.
15

Proper education plays a key role here because it promotes social mobility. This
policy is not sexy, though, or in any case not sexy enough to sell it to the public.
Therefore, there is more stress on the idea of national identity, unity, history, patri-
otism and national values. In France, for instance, a Ministry of National Identity
was set up in 2007, in an attempt, writes Tzvetan Todorov, to capture part of the
popular vote. Todorov, Director of Research at the Centre National de la Recher-
che Scientifique in Paris, is himself a naturalised Frenchman whose country of
origin is Bulgaria. He neatly makes a distinction between civic rights and identity.
Of course a newcomer to a country can be required to respect its laws, but public
duties and private feelings, and values and traditions are not all on the same level.
Only totalitarian states make the love of ones country obligatory.
16

Yet, various European countries have now installed exams for prospective citi-
zens, in which values play a distinctive role. New citizens should be able to show
that they are capable of understanding the way of living in their prospective coun-
try. In the Netherlands, these exams use elements that refer to the Dutch public
performance of sexual identity, such as gay marriages. Values also play a role in the
criticism of the head scarf and more recently the niqaab and the burkha. In the
Netherlands, it is not so much the secular society on which the debate is centred,
like in France, but (sexual) liberty and gender issues.
17
In 2011, the same motiva-
tion was used in the bill to ban clothing (such as the burkha) that covers the face.
The Dutch cabinet argued this general ban was necessary to protect the character
and good habits of public life in the Netherlands.
18

Citizenship, Migration and Globalisation
Citizenship is, of course, closely related to the state. Multiculturalism as well as
assimilation can be described as strategies to ensure a cohesive state. This question
has grown in importance because the evolution of global international migration

14
House of Commons, Community and Local Government Committee, ed., Preventing Violent Extrem-
ism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10 (London: The Stationary Office, 2010), 3.

15
Ruud Koopmans, Paul Statham and Marco Giugni, Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural
Diversity in Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).
16
Tzvetan Todorov, The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations, translated from the French
by Andrew Brown, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 80-1.
17
See for an elaboration on this issue Peter van der Veer, Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the
Politics of Tolerance in the Netherlands, Public Culture 18.1 (2006): 111-24.
18
Ministerraad Stemt in met Wetsvoorstel Verbod Gelaatsbedekkende Kleding, press release of the
Department of Internal Affairs, 16 September 2011,
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bzk/documenten-en-publicaties/persberichten
/2011/09/16/ministerraad-stemt-in-met-wetsvoorstel-verbod-gelaatsbedekkende-kleding.html
(accessed 26 February 2012).
has increased the ethnic diversity, especially in modern industrial societies. No
longer is immigration limited to traditional settler societies such as the United
States, Australia, New Zealand or Canada. Approximately 200 million people
worldwide do not live in their country of origin. In this respect, multiple identities
seem the natural form.
19

Though globalisation encourages migration and immigration, this does not mean
that a mass migration process is going on in every European country. In fact, one
should be differentiating between the various countries and various migration
flows. There is, for instance, a large difference between former colonial powers of
Western Europe that all have significant numbers of repatriates and migrants from
their former colonies, and the countries who did not have a colonial empire and
are situated in Central and Eastern Europe. There also no longer exists such a
thing like mass migration. The OECD Factbook 2011 showed that in fact the net
immigration rate in many European countries reduced in the last decennium, main-
ly because of a more severe immigration policy (Figure 1). Yet, debates in (social)
media and politics seem to suggest that the numbers of migrants as well as the
problems are increasing. There is, in other words, a growing rift between the actual
reality and the perceived image. Media play a distinctive role here.

19
See for recent figures on migration worldwide: OECD Factbook 2011: Economic, Environmental and
Social Statistics (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932502923 (accessed 10 January 2012); In Praise of a Second (or
Third) Passport: Multiple Identities Are Natural. Citizenship Laws Should Catch Up, The Economist,
7 January 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21542413 (accessed 10 January 2012).

Net migration rate
Per 1 000 inhabitants, annual average

Figure 1
20

The Public Debate and the Role of the Media: The Dutch Case
The Dutch case illustrates that public debates have also become more and more
aggressive in tone. Where in the 1970s and 1980s the tone in public debate was
very careful and politically correct, offensive and even insulting remarks are now
accepted to a high degree as a normal pattern.
In the international debate on multiculturalism, the Netherlands plays an im-
portant role. The country that once was pictured as a prototype and role-model of
a tolerant nation, where various religions and political convictions co-existed har-
moniously, proved to be not the multicultural heaven after all. Migration historians
Leo and Jan Lucassen aptly call the period from 1975 to 1990 the multicultural
myth. They point out that the idea to foster the cultural identity of the newcomers
only formed a rather small element in the policy towards ethnic minorities: since
the first official government report, published in 1979, the core business was to
ameliorate the social and economic conditions of ethnic minorities, as well as to
ensure legal equality. It is ironic that especially the Social Democrats were hesitant
and careful with regard to policies to safeguarding the cultural identity of migrants.

20
OECD Factbook 2011: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932502961 The three-year averages referred to concern the years 2007
to 2009 (end of period); and 1997 to 1999 (beginning of period).
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
3-year average at end of period 3-year average at beginning of period
In addition, cultural identity policies were meant to be temporary as a transition to
full integration.
21
What is important, however, is that a taboo existed on discussing
negative consequences of immigration, or issues that could be used as ammunition
by right-wingers.
The murders of the flamboyant populist politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (by an
animal activist) and of the controversial filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim
activist in 2004 fuelled an already very aggressive debate. The political arena
seemed to have changed in the time span of only a few years. The rosy myth of
tolerance was traded in for a bleak vision of a society where the core values were
seemingly threatened by hordes of immigrants and newcomers. A particularly
negative role in this whole was played by Islam. Islam became the unifying sym-
bol of unwelcome foreigners, whether these were asylum seekers or former guest
workers.
22
Yet, Islam in reality can hardly be the common denominator, not only
because there are many different groups and subgroups; it is also not the religion
of all immigrants.
A couple of publications investigated the change in tone in Dutch public de-
bate as well as whether multicultural policies really had failed. British-Dutch Ian
Buruma wrote an intriguing report on his inquiry into the reasons for the apparent
changes in tolerance and multicultural policies. In Murder in Amsterdam, he particu-
larly pointed to the role of the memory of the Second World War and the sad story
of the Jewish minority, as an important impetus to defend the multicultural ideal.
23

Others, like journalist Frans Verhagen, tried to give a balanced view on what can
be considered a success and what still needs improvement. A long historical per-
spective was taken by Lucassen and Lucassen, who investigated the main claims
held against immigration. Interestingly, both Verhagen and Lucassen and Lucassen
used the word nuchter in their respective titles.
24
The English translation, estab-
lishing the hard facts, misses the double meaning: nuchter in the meaning of
without fuss traditionally scores very high in the self-image of Dutch culture.
It is not only the tone; the framing of the public debate is also very important.
Especially Geert Wilders, leader of the anti-immigrant PVV (Partij voor de
Vrijheid, Freedom Party), is very apt at getting much media attention with very
simple methods like tweets and fierce rhetoric. By giving attention to these tweets,
media play a very significant role in keeping this party in the public attention. Qual-
ity newspapers like NRC Handelsblad, Trouw, and the Volkskrant all publish or
comment on these tweets, because, as one editor of Trouw explained, Twitter has

21
Lucassen and Lucassen, Winnaars, chapter 2.
22
Van der Veer, Pim Fortuyn: 116.
23
Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerance (New York: Pen-
guin, 2006).
24
Frans Verhagen, Hoezo Mislukt?: De Nuchtere Feiten over de Integratie in Nederland (Amsterdam: Nieuw
Amsterdam, 2010); Lucassen and Lucassen, Winnaars.
become a form of political drama
25
, just like debates on television or radio. But
there is more to it than that. De Nederlandse Nieuwsmonitor, of the Dutch Scientific
Institute for Journalism, investigated in 2011 how many tweets were quoted in
newspapers. The report warned that the PVV leader was given a kind of luxury
position in the Dutch news. Because he only uses Twitter as a transmitter of politi-
cal messages and accepts no invitations for interviews, it is one-way traffic without
the possibility of posing critical questions or entering debate. In addition, because
the PVV supported the Dutch minority government but did not form a part of it,
it was not possible to force the PVV leader to comment on these issues in parlia-
ment.

Not surprisingly, the most quoted tweet of Wilders was about the multicul-
tural society in which the Social Democratic Party was congratulated with the
mass immigration to the Netherlands and the import of many criminals and
underprivileged.
26

Very instructive for the way a populist party like the PVV operates and is able
to influence public opinion was the establishment of a registration point in Febru-
ary 2012, where problems with and complaints about migrants from the Eastern
part of Europe could be filed online. Of course, the economic malaise since 2008
has had its impact here as well. Earlier, in the provincial elections, the Polish
community had also been accused by the PVV of crime, drunkenness and stealing
away jobs, thus reinvigorating the old fear of the Polish plumber. Immediately,
the Embassy of Poland protested and the PVVs initiative sparked a lot of atten-
tion. Media subsequently reported the rise of support for the PVV in polls. This
media coverage in itself again strengthens the electoral position of the party, be-
cause research has demonstrated that voters are most attracted to news that refers
to the competition between parties and in elections tend to favour winners over
losers.
27

Conclusion
Multiculturalism has become framed in the public debate as a failure, as a soft ap-
proach to real problems. Even though it is fairly easy to show that this perception
is not correct, this does not mean that this bad image will disappear all of a sudden.

25
Tweet van Wilders was Onzin, maar Nieuwswaardige Onzin, Trouw, 15 January 2012,
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4328/Opinie/article/detail/3121720/2012/01/15/Tweet-van-Wilders-
was-onzin-maar-nieuwswaardige-onzin.dhtml (accessed 22 February 2012).
26
Politiek 2.0: Debatteren in 140 Tekens, De Nederlandse Nieuwsmonitor, 28 December 2011,
http://www.nieuwsmonitor.net (accessed 22 February 2012). Unsurprisingly, Twitter also has led to
alternative forms of political lobbying. Ethical norms of journalism do not count. See Tom Jan
Meeus, Dankzij Twitter is de Commentator ook Lobbyist, NRC Weekend, February 25/26 2012, 27.
27
Job Cohen in het Nieuws: van Gedoodverfde Premier tot Grote Gedoger van de Premier, De
Nederlandse Nieuwsmonitor, 21 Februari 2012, http://www.nieuwsmonitor.net (accessed 22 February
2012).
The problems connected to the public discussions about immigration and Islam
are very significant because they reflect upon the values of a democratic society.
To a large degree, playing the immigration/Islam card is a way of getting atten-
tion: it seems to work as a simple method to gain political support. Media play a
significant and active role, especially by using tweets as news. Internet and social
media in particular change the ways news are gathered and digested. Social media
have grown into an alternative news source, with their own rules. Twitter especially
is not suited for a deliberate and nuanced debate: it encourages polarisation and
strong views.
History is important in this respect, not so much to produce a patriotic vision
of the nation but to show how immigration and migration developed and, by doing
so, to create a more balanced view on migration and the role that this phenome-
non has played and still plays in society. Populism will hardly help creating solu-
tions to the big issues that are at stake. Clarity of what democracy stands for is
crucial, especially in the period of economic crisis that evolved since 2008.
28
In the
end, the spectacle democracy may constitute one of the gravest dangers for society.

Bibliography
Assimilation. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 1968. Encyclope-
dia.com. http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045000060.html (ac-
cessed 3 January 2012).
Buruma, Ian. Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerance
New York: Penguin, 2006.
David Camerons Muddled Speech on Multiculturalism. The Economist, 11 Febru-
ary 2011.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/02/britain_and_multicult
uralism (accessed 29 December 2011).
France Makes It Harder to Become French. France 24, 30 December 2011.
http://www.france24.com/en/20111229-france-tightens-screws-
immigration-election-looms-sarkozy-gueant-citizenship (accessed 3 January
2012).

28
See for an interesting analysis of the global economic crisis and the consequences for democracy in
advanced democracies Charles A. Kupchan, The Democratic Malaise: Globalization and the Threat
to the West, Foreign Affairs 91.1 (January/February 2012): 62-7.
House of Commons, Community and Local Government Committee, ed. Preventing
Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009-10. London: The Stationary Of-
fice, 2010.
An Immigration Row in Germany: Sarrazin vs the Saracens. The Economist, 1
September 2010.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/09/immigration_row_g
ermany (accessed 30 December 2011).
In Praise of a Second (or Third) Passport: Multiple Identities Are Natural. Citi-
zenship Laws Should Catch Up. The Economist, 7 January 2012.
http://www.economist.com/node/21542413 (accessed 10 January 2012).
Job Cohen in het Nieuws: van Gedoodverfde Premier tot Grote Gedoger van de
Premier. De Nederlandse Nieuwsmonitor. 21 February 2012.
http://www.nieuwsmonitor.net (accessed 22 February 2012).
Koopmans, Ruud, Paul Statham and Marco Giugni. Contested Citizenship: Immigration
and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2005.
Kupchan, Charles A. The Democratic Malaise: Globalization and the Threat to
the West. Foreign Affairs 91.1 (January/February 2012): 62-7.
Kymlicka, Will. Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversi-
ty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Lucassen, Leo, and Jan Lucassen. Winnaars en Verliezers: een Nuchtere Balans van
Vijfhonderd Jaar Immigratie. Amsterdam: Bakker, 2011.
Meeus, Tom Jan. Dankzij Twitter is de Commentator ook Lobbyist. NRC Wee-
kend, 25/26 February 2012.
Ministerraad Stemt in met Wetsvoorstel Verbod Gelaatsbedekkende Kleding.
Press release of the Department of Internal Affairs, 16 September 2011.
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/bzk/documenten-en-
publicaties/persberichten/2011/09/16/ministerraad-stemt-in-met-
wetsvoorstel-verbod-gelaatsbedekkende-kleding.html (accessed 26 February
2012).
Modood, Tariq. Muslims and European Multiculturalism. OpenDemocracy, 15
May 2003. http://www.opendemocracy.net/faith-
europe_islam/article_1214.jsp (accessed 3 January 2012).
Murphy, Michael. Multiculturalism: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge, 2012.
Oostindie, Gert. Postkoloniaal Nederland: Vijfenzestig Jaar Vergeten, Herdenken, Verdrin-
gen. Amsterdam: Bakker, 2010.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ed. OECD Factbook
2011: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. Paris: Organisation for Econom-
ic Co-operation and Development, 2011.
Paasi, Anssi. Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place,
Boundaries and Identity. European Urban and Regional Studies 8.1 (2001): 7-28.
PMs Speech at Munich Security Conference. 10 The Official Site of the Brit-
ish Prime Ministers Office, 5 February 2011.
http://www.number10.Gov.uk/news/pms-Speech-at-Munich-Security-
Conference (accessed 29 December 2011).
Politiek 2.0. Debatteren in 140 Tekens. De Nederlandse Nieuwsmonitor, 28
December 2011. http://www.nieuwsmonitor.net (accessed 22 December 2011).
Reitz, Jeffrey G. Assessing Multiculturalism as a Behavioural Theory. In Multicul-
turalism and Social Cohesion: Potentials and Challenges of Diversity, ed. by Jeffrey G.
Reitz et al., 1-47. Dordrecht: Springer, 2009.
Sarrazin bricht Verkaufsrekord. Spiegel Online, 29 October 2010.
http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/0,1518,726206,00.html (accessed 30
December 2011).
Scheffer, Paul. Het Land van Aankomst. 3rd ed. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 2007.
Scheffer, Paul. Het Multiculturele Drama. NRC Handelsblad, 29 January 2000.
Silj, Alessandro, ed. European Multiculturalism Revisited. London: Zed, 2010.
Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, ed. Jaarrapport Integratie 2008. The Hague/Heerlen:
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2008.
Thilo Sarrazin, Alle Artikel und Hintergrunde. Spiegel Online, no date.
http://www.spiegel.de/thema/ thilo_sarrazin/ (accessed 30 December 2011).
Todorov, Tzvetan. The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations. Translated
from the French by Andrew Brown. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010.
Tweet van Wilders was Onzin, maar Nieuwswaardige Onzin. Trouw, 15 January
2012.
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4328/Opinie/article/detail/3121720/2012/01/1
5/Tweet-van-Wilders-was-onzin-maar-nieuwswaardige-onzin.dhtml (accessed
22 February 2012).
Veer, Peter van der. Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the Politics of Tolerance
in the Netherlands. Public Culture 18.1 (2006): 111-24.
Verhagen, Frans. Hoezo Mislukt?: De Nuchtere Feiten over de Integratie in Nederland.
Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 2010.
Ykleyen, Ahmet, and Gke Yurdakul. Islamic Activism and Immigrant Integra-
tion: Turkish Organizations in Germany. Immigrants & Minorities 29.1 (2011):
64-85.

European Multiculturalism
Is It Really Dead?
John McCormick
Introduction
There has been considerable speculation in recent years regarding the alleged fail-
ure of multiculturalism in Europe. Much has been made, for example, of the asser-
tions in 2010 and 2011 by the leaders of three major European states regarding the
divisions within their respective societies. In October 2010, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel declared that multiculturalism in her country had failed utterly,
and that the suggestion that Germans and foreign workers could live happily side
by side with one another had been an illusion. In February 2011, British Prime
Minister David Cameron argued that 30 years of state multiculturalism in Britain
had failed because it had encouraged different cultures to live separate lives and
had weakened the collective identity of Britain. A few days later, French President
Nikolas Sarkozy declared multiculturalism in his country to have been a failure,
arguing that France had been too concerned about the identity of those arriving
from outside and not concerned enough about its own identity.
It is important to note that all three sets of comments were made by conserva-
tive political leaders in the context of recent Muslim immigration from outside of
Europe. For Merkel, the (unspoken) issue was guest workers (primarily Turkish
and Muslim) and for Cameron and Sarkozy the issue was the growing Islamic seg-
ments of their respective societies. Cameron was making a speech about national
security in the face of terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists, to which he
argued many young Muslims were drawn because of the question of identity.
They found it hard to identify with traditional Islam but also with Britain, because
Britain had allowed the weakening of our collective identity. Where Britain was
ready to criticize racism on the part of white citizens, Cameron continued, it had
been too cautious and fearful to stand up to objectionable views held by racial
minorities. What the country now needed was a lot less of the passive tolerance of
recent years and much more active, muscular liberalism involving the promotion
of values such as democracy and the rule of law.
1
His comments were immediately
criticized by many Muslim groups for placing too much of the onus on minority
communities to integrate while failing to say how the wider community might aid
in that process.
Given the context of the three sets of remarks, the choice of the term multi-
culturalism was unfortunate, not least because of the difficulties inherent in ac-
cording it a generally acceptable definition, and more particularly because the three
leaders were not in fact talking about culture at all, but were using the term as code
for religious and racial diversity. In other words, they were not so much bemoan-
ing the failure of multiculturalism as of multiracialism and of the assimilation of
Islam. But they could not have admitted that efforts to cross racial or religious
boundaries had failed without generating considerable controversy, and thus they
like many other observers opted for the softer and more politically correct no-
tion of multiculturalism. And yet Europe in truth has long had a tradition of effec-
tive and vibrant multiculturalism. Many Europeans may still identify with states
and nations, and may have limited tolerance of recent immigrants, but they have
rarely been able to isolate themselves from their neighbours and have long adapted
to the exchange of ideas and values that have come from the blending of their
cultures.
This article will argue not only that multiculturalism in Europe is not dead, but
that it is in fact central to the meaning and identity of Europe. It will contrast the
European experience with the melting-pot philosophy that has been central to the
experience of the United States and Brazil, and will argue that the European expe-
rience is more akin to that of Canada or Australia. It will suggest that the problems
often ascribed to the failure of multiculturalism are in fact a function of race and
religion rather than of culture, and that it is not the co-existence of different cul-
tures that has created tensions in Europe so much as racism and the difficulties of
blending European secularism with the preferences of its Muslim residents.
Defining Multiculturalism
The core problem with understanding the place of multiculturalism in Europe is
that the term is applied differently in different circumstances by scholars and poli-
cymakers
2
(assuming, that is, that they define it at all). A review of the literature
reveals that the term is applied not only to culture (a term which raises its own
definitional challenges) but also to race and ethnicity, and even occasionally to
gender, sexual orientation, religion, and social class. In the few cases where the
term is defined, it is often given a meaning that is specific to a particular circum-

1
PMs Speech at the Munich Security Conference, 10 The Official Site of the British Prime
Ministers Office, 5 February 2011, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-
security-conference/(accessed 28 December 2012).
2
Conrad William Watson, Multiculturalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000).
European Multiculturalism 165
stance. Thus Modood defines it as the political accommodation of minorities
formed by immigration to western countries from outside the prosperous West,
3

and notes his particular interest in political multiculturalism, which he defines as
the recognition of group difference within the public sphere of laws, policies,
democratic discourses and the terms of a shared citizenship and national identity.
4

He sees multiculturalism, then, as an issue of immigration rather than of culture.
For Kymlicka, efforts to understand multiculturalism are confused by the ambigui-
ty that exists between the notions of multinationalism and polyethnicity. He
associates the first with coexistence within a political unit of previously self-
governing societies, and the latter with immigration.
5

The absence of clear and consistent applications means that multiculturalism
can mean whatever we want it to mean, thus undermining its value as a conceptual
tool. This article uses it in the specific sense of a policy or practice based on toler-
ance and respect for the identities of different cultures within a society. In this
regard, it stands in contrast to monoculturalism, or the belief that societies should
have a single culture, and that efforts should be made to ensure its purity and to
exclude all other cultures. It also contrasts with assimilation, or the belief that dif-
ferent groups should be integrated into the dominant culture by denying and
quashing their distinctive qualities and values.
In the American and Brazilian contexts, assimilation is reflected in the melting
pot philosophy (or myth, as many would have it) through which attempts have
been made to fuse multiple nationalities, races and cultures, and to build homoge-
nous societies out of heterogeneous societies. In the American case, the term
melting pot was first used in the context of immigration from Europe, and was
equated with Americanization, or cultural assimilation and acculturation. For
Hirschman, it became the symbol of the liberal and radical vision of American
society [or] a political symbol used to strengthen and legitimize the ideology of
America as a land of opportunity, where race, religion, and national origin should
not be barriers to social mobility.
6
It was mainly concerned with the assimilation
of white Europeans into an idealized version of Anglo-America; race and religion
were marginal considerations. The racial diversity of the United States and the
persistence there of racism and racial inequality later led to numerous questions
about the achievements of assimilation, spawning the alternative metaphors of
mosaic or salad bowl to describe an arrangement in which different cultures mix
but remain distinct.

3
Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 5.
4
Ibid., 2.
5
Will Kymlicka, Social Unity in a Liberal State, Social Philosophy and Policy 13:1 (1996): 105-36.
6
Charles Hirschman, Americas Melting Pot Reconsidered, Annual Review of Sociology 9 (1983): 398.
In the case of Brazil, meanwhile, the evidence is clear that black Brazilians are po-
litically, economically and socially disadvantaged relative to their white peers.
7
The
term exclusion is often used to describe the status of blacks or the poor, connot-
ing the lack of social integration manifested in rules constraining the access of
particular groups or persons to resources or limiting their access to citizenship
rights.
8
The argument has long been made that Brazilians are stratified by class
and not by race, but disagreements with this analysis are growing, and the long-
held image of Brazil as a non-racial society is under review.
Multiculturalism recognizes and generally applauds cultural diversity, promot-
ing accommodation and inclusiveness, allowing intermingling to take place, wit-
nessing the borrowing and adaptation of ideas, allowing different cultures to retain
their distinctive qualities, and making efforts to encourage and sustain distinctions
by way of language, heritage, and the channels through which different cultures
can be expressed and understood, including art, traditions, cuisine, and social
norms. In this sense, its European form is similar to its application in Canada,
where efforts are made to make immigrants feel welcome, and where multicultural-
ism is constitutionally protected: the Canadian Charter of Freedoms and Rights
includes the proviso that it should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the
preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.
In some respects, multiculturalism is a conceptual cousin of cosmopolitan-
ism, or the idea that all humans belong to a single moral community that trans-
cends state boundaries or national identities. This has been identified as a useful
analytical tool for the European case.
9
The cosmopolitan view holds that all hu-
mans belong to a single community in which they are subject to the same moral
standards and have a responsibility for other humans, accepting the foreign hospi-
tably, and emphasizing the importance of drawing on different traditions and cul-
tures, and of remaining open to other ways of life.
10
As Beck puts it, if nationalism
is based on the principle of either/or, then cosmopolitanism is based on the
principle of both/and.
11
David Held defines it as a moral and political outlook

7
See Edward E. Telles, Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press: 2004).
8
Charles Gore and Jos B. Figueredo, ed., Social Exclusion and Anti-Poverty Policy: A Debate (Geneva:
International Institute for Labour Studies, 1997).
9
For example, see Daniele Archibugi, Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, in Re-imagining
Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, ed. Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin
Khler (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 198-228; Gerard Delanty, What Does it Mean to be a Eu-
ropean?, Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences 18:1 (2005): 11-22.
10
See discussion in Margaret C. Jacob, Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early
Modern Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), Introduction; Thomas W.
Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, Ethics 103:1 (1992): 48-75; Simon Caney, Justice beyond
Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6.
11
Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan Vision (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Ulrich Beck and Edgar
Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
which builds on the strength of the liberal multilateral order, particularly its com-
mitment to universal standards, human rights and democratic values, and which
seeks to specify general principles on which all could act.
12

Europe as a Multicultural Society
Europe has long been multicultural because it has long been a region of invaders
and immigrants who have repeatedly moved across cultural and political borders to
blend ideas and philosophies. This was initially a limited form of multiculturalism,
because feudalism, imperialism and later the class pressures of industrialization
meant that cultural exchange was based on physical or structural violence deter-
mined by leaders and elites; it was not until the end of World War II that most
Europeans began to personally experience different cultures. Furthermore, the
state and the nation have both long exerted a strong grip on European imagina-
tions, encouraging ordinary Europeans to define their identities according to the
experiences that were closest to them and that meant the most to them. Greater
social and personal mobility has combined since the end of World War II with the
easing and eventual near-removal of cross-border controls and the era of mass
tourism to greatly increase the opportunities for Europeans to experience other
cultures within the region, both directly and indirectly.
The habit among Europeans of integrating core values and features from al-
most every new group with which its cultures have come into contact has been
such that it is difficult anymore to be sure what constitutes a feature of the home
culture and what does not. Nineteenth century nationalism was based on the pro-
motion of the nation-state, and yet many European states remained both multi-
national and multicultural, and remain so today. The consequences are reflected in
the contemporary data: while there are only 40-44 sovereign states in Europe (de-
pending on how Europe is defined), there are according to Pan and Pfeil
13

nearly 340 indigenous national minorities, to which 105 million people or one in
seven Europeans belong. Within the EU member states alone, there are an esti-
mated 160 national minorities, the number having been greatly increased by eastern
enlargement. About one in ten EU citizens speak a minority language, and all but
the smallest of European states has at least three indigenous national minorities,
and in most cases many more.
14
Almost all European states, in other words, con-
sist of multiple cultures.

12
David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2004), 171, 178.
13
Christoph Pan and Beate Sibylle Pfeil, National Minorities in Europe (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue
University Press, 2004).
14
See also Panikos Panayi, An Ethnic History of Europe since 1945: Nations, States and Minorities (Harlow:
Longman, 2000).
Where the debate over multiculturalism in Europe has become confused is that in
almost all recent references, the term has been used in the context of immigrants
from outside the region (Turks to Germany, North Africans to France, South
Asians to Britain, and so on), and has thus focused on racial and religious minori-
ties. These make up a small number of the total population, in both absolute and
relative terms: only about 25 million of the legal residents of the EU (about 3-4 per
cent of the population) belong to an ethnic minority, a proportion that pales by
comparison to the United States (where such minorities make up 23 per cent of
the population), Russia (20 per cent), Canada (16 per cent), or China (8.5 per cent).
But multiculturalism in the European context is more appropriately and accurately
understood in regard to three groups of indigenous minorities:

National minorities who live in one state but are the kin of national major-
ities in neighbouring states. These include, for example, ethnic Hungarians
in Romania and Slovakia, ethnic Germans in Romania and Poland, ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, ethnic Poles in Belarus and Lithua-
nia, ethnic Czechs in Slovakia and vice versa, and ethnic Ukrainians in Po-
land. There are an estimated 25 million members of such minorities, along
with 23 million Russians living in the Soviet successor states.

Transnational minorities that are divided among two or more states but do
not form a majority in any. These include the Basques and Catalans of
Spain and France, and the Frisians of Germany and the Netherlands.

Indigenous minorities living within a single state, such as the Scots and the
Welsh of Britain, the Corsicans and Bretons of France, and the Galicians
of Spain.

There has been a growing debate about the meaning and definition of the notion
of national minority, which has confusingly spilled over into debates about eth-
nicity and national identity, and has been a particular focus of the work of both the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and of the Council of Eu-
rope. A Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was
adopted by the latter in 1995, taking the broad perspective of providing for respect
for ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious minorities.
Every European state has cultural minorities, ranging in proportion from lows
of about 4-7 per cent of the total population in Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy,
Poland, to highs of 17-20 per cent in Bulgaria, Switzerland, Slovenia, and the ex-
ceptional case of Belgium with its split between Flemings (58 per cent), Walloons
(31 per cent), and Germans (1 per cent). In spite of their generally much greater
proportions (relative to racial and religious minorities), these cultural minorities are
much less apparent on political or social radars, and they generally suffer far less
discrimination or hostility (notable exceptions being offered by the case of the
Roma and by the example of the post-Yugoslavia conflicts in the Balkans). In the
case of Britain, for example, residents of Scottish, Welsh and Irish heritage consti-
tute about 15 per cent of the population, but have become so much a part of the
social fabric that it is often difficult to distinguish among the different groups.
Much the same could be said for Spain, where about 11 per cent of the population
comes from national minorities, including Castilians, Leones, Catalans, Galicians
and Basques.
The debate about multiculturalism in Europe tends to overlook these groups, and
yet they are meaningful as an indication of the cultural diversity of the region, and
are not typically associated with the same tensions deriving from issues related to
racial and religious diversity. Many make demands for the preservation of their
languages and religions, to be sure, and may campaign for greater autonomy, but
their presence does not always lead to conflict (the problems of Northern Ireland
and the Basque country being among the notable exceptions). The rise of states,
rather than always recognizing national and cultural differences, usually had the
opposite effect of bringing multiple cultures and nationalities under a common
political authority. The rise of the European Union has further emphasized multi-
culturalism as Europeans have been freer to travel, and as the media have more
actively reported events and stories in other European states. All along, core as-
pects of multiculturalism including the right to practice different religions, to
celebrate holidays associated with different cultures, to run businesses catering to
cultural minorities, and to join religious and cultural organizations have mainly
survived unchanged.
That the rhetorical shift against multiculturalism in Europe has been driven
less by culture than by race and religion is reflected both in its timeline and in the
nature of the academic debate. Its origins are traceable to the arrival of the first
waves of non-white immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s; concerns grew in the wake
of the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London in 2001, 2004, and 2005;
Islamic militancy has been at the heart of the declarations of the failure of multicul-
turalism, and the dynamics of the debate are reflected in the titles of books such as
Londonistan
15
and The Coming Balkan Caliphate.
16

Laqueur bemoans the last days of Europe, arguing that the region is threat-
ened by a collision between falling birth-rates and uncontrolled immigration from
Asia, Africa or the Middle East.
17
Because few such immigrants have a desire to be
integrated into European society, he warns, there has been a continent-wide identi-

15
Melanie Phillips, Londonistan (Washington D.C.: Encounter, 2007).
16
Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).
17
Walter Laqueur, The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent (New York: Thomas Dunne,
2007).
ty crisis; immigrants have congregated in ghettoes, and widespread educational
failure has combined with religious or ideological disdain for the host country, and
with resentment and xenophobia among native Europeans, to create growing polit-
ical and social tensions and extremist violence. Caldwell makes similar arguments,
suggesting that Europe became a multi-ethnic society in a fit of absence of mind,
and notes that while governments have done much to accommodate the newcom-
ers, public opinion is reacting against these efforts.
18
Modood argues that multicul-
turalism as public policy is in retreat in Europe, as states assert that minority
groups either integrate or accept the dominant social and cultural mores as the
price of citizenship. He does, however, condition this statement by noting that the
obvious target is Muslims.
19

Racism and Islamophobia aside, to suggest that Europeans are open to multi-
culturalism should not ignore the long history of xenophobia and stereotyping in
which many Europeans have engaged. The examples of European-on-European
hostility run the gamut from the Anglo-French love-hate relationship dating back
centuries, historical tensions between Britain and Ireland, the residual animosity of
some of its neighbours towards Germany (particularly since the two world wars),
anti-Polish feelings in Germany in the first half of the 20
th
century, and anti-Polish
sentiment in France and Britain in the wake of the advent of the iconic Polish
plumber. It might also be found in the residual attempts of France to defend its
language against the inroads of English, but the latter seems to have been accepted
as a fait accompli in much of the rest of Europe.
As noted earlier, if anything has died or failed in Europe it is not so much mul-
ticulturalism as multiracialism and tolerance for Islam, and in this regard the prob-
lem is more one of recent non-white immigration than of movement across inter-
nal borders in the wake of the single market. The problem is reflected in the insti-
tution of language and civics training or tests for new immigrants or citizens in
Britain, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Germany, the ban on the wearing
of Muslim headscarves in some parts of Europe, and the adoption in the Nether-
lands of an explicit policy of assimilation. It is also reflected in the support given to
European anti-immigrant political parties, particularly in Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany and the Netherlands, and the growth of Islamophobia. Caldwell suggests
that the Islamic challenge stems from the strength and self-confidence of Islam,
which contrasts with the insecurities, malleability, and relativism of European cul-
ture; but this rather overlooks the deep divisions within Islam, its sensitivity and
the rapidity with which it takes offence, and gives little weight to the idea that Eu-
ropeanism is a growing political, economic, and social force.
20

18
Christopher Caldwell, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the West (London:
Allen Lane, 2009), 3.
19
Modood, Multiculturalism.
20
Caldwell, Reflections.
Writing about the dispute over headscarves in France, Bowen argues that it con-
ceals underlying concerns as varied as the role of religion in schools, the develop-
ment of separate communities, the threats posed by radical Islam, and gender dis-
crimination.
21
The rise of Islam certainly poses challenges to notions of European
secularism, with the need to meet demands for separate schools and recognition of
cultural norms regarding the family and the place of women in society while at the
same time protecting the principles of liberal democratic modernity. Ironically,
Islam is often criticized by Europeans for its treatment of women, and yet racial
and religious discrimination is alive and well in Europe, as reflected in a Pew Glob-
al Attitudes Survey that found negative views towards Muslims and Jews that were
notably higher in Europe than in the United States, and growing. Almost half of
Spaniards had unfavourable opinions about Jews, for example, as did 36 per cent
of Poles and 20-25 per cent of Germans and the French, compared to just 7-9 per
cent of Americans and Britons. As for Muslims, about half of Spaniards, Germans
and Poles had unfavourable opinions, as did 38 per cent of the French and 23 per
cent of Americans and Britons.
22

Conclusion
If culture is understood to mean the set of values, attitudes, tastes and expectations
shared by a group, and if it is associated primarily with national identity, then Eu-
rope is distinctly multicultural and multinational in character, and has been for
centuries. Europeans have not always agreed, and the region (or parts of it) was
regularly divided by war and conflict for most of its recorded history, until the
general peace achieved following World War II. But different cultures routinely
achieved accommodations with one another, learned from each other, and formed
shared and typically workable systems of government. While residual inter-cultural
tensions continue to be found in Europe today, they rarely lead to significant levels
of conflict, and indeed one of the great achievements of postwar Europe has
been the recognition of its cultural diversity, encouraged in most European states
by policies in which cultural differences have been revived, protected and celebrat-
ed, notably through the sustenance of minority languages. To suggest that multi-
culturalism in Europe is dead or has failed is, under the circumstances, absurd.
Where Europe has failed, however, has been in its efforts to assimilate racial
and religious minorities, specifically in the form of (mainly) postwar immigrants
from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and the Caribbean, and in the form of the
growing Muslim minority found in most European states. The failure to which

21
John R. Bowen, Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007).
22
Pew Research Center, Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe,
survey released 17 September 2008, http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/09/17/unfavorable-views-of-
jews-and-muslims-on-the-increase-in-europe/(accessed 20 January 2012).
Merkel, Cameron, Sarkozy and others have referred, then, is not one of culture but
of race and religion. The social tensions that Europe faces today are generated not
so much by concerns about cultural diversity, which has long been at the heart of
the European experience, but by racial and religious diversity.

Bibliography
Archibugi, Daniele. Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy. In Re-imagining Polit-
ical Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, edited by Daniele Archibugi,
David Held and Martin Khler, 198-228. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.
Beck, Ulrich. The Cosmopolitan Vision. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.
Beck, Ulrich, and Edgar Grande. Cosmopolitan Europe. Cambridge: Polity Press,
2007.
Bowen, John R. Why the French Dont Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public
Space. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Caldwell, Christopher. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam and the
West. London: Allen Lane, 2009.
Caney, Simon. Justice beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2005.
Delanty, Gerard. What Does It Mean to Be a European? Innovation: The Europe-
an Journal of Social Sciences 18.1 (2005): 11-22.
Deliso, Christopher. The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe
and the West. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007.
Gore, Charles, and Jos B. Figueredo, ed. Social Exclusion and Anti-Poverty Policy: A
Debate. Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1997.
Held, David. Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consen-
sus. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.
Hirschman, Charles. Americas Melting Pot Reconsidered. Annual Review of Soci-
ology 9 (1983): 397-423.
Jacob, Margaret C. Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early
Modern Europe. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006.
Kymlicka, Will. Social Unity in a Liberal State. Social Philosophy and Policy 13:1
(1996): 105-36.
Laqueur, Walter. The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent. New York:
Thomas Dunne, 2007.
Modood, Tariq. Multiculturalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007.
Pan, Christoph, and Beate Sibylle Pfeil. National Minorities in Europe. West Lafayette,
IN: Purdue University Press, 2004.
Panayi, Panikos. An Ethnic History of Europe since 1945: Nations, States and Minorities.
Harlow: Longman, 2000.
Pew Research Center. Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in
Europe. Survey released 17 September 2008.
http://www.pewglobal.org/2008/09/17/unfavorable-views-of-jews-and-
muslims-on-the-increase-in-europe/ (accessed 20 January 2012).
Phillips, Melanie. Londonistan. Washington D.C.: Encounter, 2007.
PMs Speech at Munich Security Conference. 10 The Official Site of the
British Prime Ministers Office, 5 February 2011.
http://www.number10.Gov.uk/news/pms-Speech-at-Munich-Security-
Conference (accessed 29 December 2011).
Pogge, Thomas W. Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty. Ethics 103.1 (1992):
48-75.
Telles, Edward E. Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Watson, Conrad William. Multiculturalism. Buckingham: Open University Press,
2000.

Multiculturalism versus Transculturality
European Film
Maria Pilar Rodrguez
Introduction
This article
1
offers an illustration of recent European films that contradict official
political discourses regarding the notion of multiculturalism by offering a closer
position to the concept of transculturality. After a recent political declaration in
which German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that attempts to build a multicul-
tural society in Germany had utterly failed
2
, British Prime Minister David Cameron
similarly condemned multiculturalism
3
, and French President Nicholas Sarkozy
joined the chorus of critics.
4
Such political discourses tend to emphasise the ethnic,
linguistic and religious assimilation of immigrants into the social and political struc-
ture of the nation, as well as the progressive abandonment of their native customs
and practices.
In the last decade, European countries such as France, Belgium, Denmark,
Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands have all witnessed the rise of a conservative
discourse that has shifted the gravitational centre of immigration politics toward
the right. While political discourses frequently ignore the supranational dimension
of the term European, contemporary film-makers adequately address the shift from
the national to the transnational that has occurred in European cinemas and socie-
ties. Such shift has been fuelled by, among other reasons, the long legacy of colo-
nialism, the ongoing process of European integration, the consequences of the
collapse of communism, continuing European mobility and contemporary diaspor-
ic displacements. As a result, European cultures and societies have witnessed a

1
A longer version of this article titled From the National to the Transnational: European Films and
Political Discourse can be found in Conjuctions and Disruptions: Communication, Information and Media
Studies in Europe, ed. Mara J. Pando Canteli, Bilbao: University of Deusto, 2011, 151-62.
2
Merkel says German Multicultural Society Has Failed, BBC News, 17 October 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451 (accessed 21 March 2011).
3
State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron, BBC News, 5 February 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 (accessed 21 March 2011).
4
Nicolas Sarkozy Declares Multiculturalism Had Failed, The Telegraph, 11 February 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicolas-Sarkozy-declares-
multiculturalism-had-failed.html (accessed 21 March 2011).
previously inconceivable diversification, fragmentation and hybridization.
5
In that
respect, certain contemporary European films have redefined our understanding of
European identity and represent a challenge to contemporary national political
discourses. There is a fundamental contradiction between Europes distinctive
diversity and the homogenising, official narratives that insist upon denying the
reality of a system based on coexistence and interaction.
Multiculturalism and Transculturality
As a political ideal, multiculturalism means equal opportunity accompanied by
cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.
6
Multiculturalism in gen-
eral is defined in terms of public acceptance of immigrants and minority groups as
distinct groups or communities, which are distinguishable from the majority with
regard to language, culture and social behaviour; and which have their own associa-
tions and social infrastructure. The words by David Cameron deserve a more de-
tailed comment in relation to Asian British cinema. Critical debate amply supports
the idea that, compared with other countries in Europe, Britain has produced some
of the most culturally dynamic and pleasurable examples of hybridity. Asian British
films such as Bhaji on the Beach (Gurinder Chadha, 1993), East is East (Damien
ODonnell, 1999), Anita and Me (Metin Hseyin, 2002), Bend it Like Beckham (Gu-
rinder Chadha, 2002), and Love + Hate (Dominic Savage, 2005) stand out as inter-
nationally recognised productions set in multicultural Britain narrated through a
social realist framework. Interviewed after the German premiere of Bend it Like
Beckham, director Gurinder Chadha happily claimed that she had a letter from To-
ny Blair saying how much he loved the film, and added, he enjoyed it especially
because it represented his Britain, a very diverse, multicultural Britain.
7
Blairs
words in 2002 stand out in sharp contrast to Camerons statement nine years later.
This contradiction is even more remarkable, if we explore critical interpretations of
the film which claim that, within Britain, multiculturalism is used for social control
through the masking of social injustice and the dilution of social protest. Rajeev
Balasubramanyam describes multiculturalism in Britain, as exposed by films such
as Bend it Like Beckham, in such merciless terms:

Multiculturalism does not refer to the ideology of liberalism or cultural ac-
ceptance, and it is not a simple description of British society. It is, instead, a

5
European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe, ed. Daniela Berghahn
and Claudia Sternberg (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), iv.
6
Eugenia Siapera, Cultural Diversity and Global Media: The Mediation of Difference (Oxford: Blackwell,
2010), 31.
7
Ellen Dengel-Janic and Lars Eckstein, Bridehood Revisited: Disarming Concepts of Gender and
Culture in Recent Asian British Film, in Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000+: New Perspectives in Literature, Film
and the Arts, ed. Lars Eckstein et al. (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2005), 45.
Multiculturalism vs Transculturality 177
technology of social control, racism, and the maintenance of the caste hier-
archy, an instrument of delusion, oppression, and censorship in contempo-
rary British society. Whilst multiculturalism masquerades as a celebration of
the defeat of racism, it is in fact its opposite a vehicle to suppress cultural
diversity in contemporary Britain.
8

He adds that such films rarely refer to contemporary social injustices in Britain, but
rather to past social injustices and in them British society usually represents pro-
gressiveness whereas Asian characters are always associated with backwardness and
grossly caricatured. In general, even in more benign readings of the film, there is a
shared agreement on the fact that Chadhas film ingeniously negotiates British
mainstream conservatism with artistic and commercial techniques extracted from
the moral universe of Bollywood, which appeal to the exoticism of English view-
ers.
9
This would explain the enthusiastic response by Tony Blair, whereas the rejec-
tion of multiculturalism by David Cameron (and other European leaders) is a re-
cent phenomenon which will require a much more detailed analysis.
In this article, I will follow the concept of transculturality as defined by Wolf-
gang Welsch, since it stresses the global and local interconnectedness of cultural
forms in a more comprehensive manner than multiculturality, which underlines the
problems which different cultures have living together within one society. Trans-
culturality encompasses a number of ways of life and cultures, which also interpen-
etrate or emerge from one another and which are in general characterised by hy-
bridization.
10
Along these lines, I will now very briefly analyse two films which will
facilitate an exploration of the notions of assimilation, integration and hybridiza-
tion as exposed in the first fictional film by Yasmina Benguigui titled InchAllah
dimanche (Inch Allah Sunday), which opened in 2001, and in Gegen die Wand (Against
the Wall), by Fatih Akin (2004). In both of them, a transcultural ideology can be
seen in such strategies as the presence of multilingual practices, the portrayal of
in-between, fluid and hybrid characters, and the elaboration of new urban and
domestic spaces created through interactions between cultures.
InchAllah Dimanche
InchAllah Dimanche is set in 1974 and tells the story of Zouina, who leaves her
native Algeria, with her three young children and domineering mother-in-law, to
join her husband in France, where he has lived and worked for the past ten years.

8
Rajeev Balasubramanyam, The Rhetoric of Multiculturalism, in Multi-Ethnic Britain 2000+: New
Perspectives in Literature, Film and the Arts, ed. Lars Eckstein et al. (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi,
2005), 42.
9
Dengel-Janic and Eckstein, Bridehood Revisited, 55.
10
City, Nation, Work, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1999), 194-213.

The opening of the film informs us about the immigrant family regrouping, which
took place in France around those years. In the aftermath of World War II, France
attempted to replenish its weakened workforce by recruiting men from the former
French colonies of North Africa. In the mid-1970s, the French government re-
laxed its immigration policy to allow the families of Algerian men to join them.
The director has often expressed her desire to recuperate the memories of Algerian
women, such as her own mother, who left when she was eighteen. At the opening
scene of departure, when Zouina leaves Algeria, torn between her mothers heart-
breaking appeal (dont leave me), and the advice provided by her sister (go with
your children), Benguigui chooses to recount the trauma of immigration and exile,
not through the eyes of men, as in second generation beur films of the 1980s and
1990s, but from a female perspective.
11

The film presents a conscious effort to establish a connection between French
and francophone African immigrant communities. Following Homi Bhabhas de-
scription, [w]e find ourselves in the moment of transit where space and time cross
to produce complex figures of difference and identity, past and present, inside and
outside, inclusion and exclusion,
12
I would like to explore the extent to which the
film represents an in-between or hybrid Franco-African experience. Through
imagery and metaphor, Benguigui challenges French hegemonic representations of
peoples of African descent and Frances representations of its own culture and
identity.
The hybrid nature of Zouinas experience starts with the title of the film itself,
which mixes two languages as well as two religious practices. This same notion
applies to the different characters: in the construction of subjectivities, the idea of
authenticity belongs to an obsolete past which only causes misery and stagnation,
whereas the ability to adapt and change according to new positions propitiates our
identification with the protagonist. Characters in the film can be divided into three
groups. The first one includes Madame Donze, the French neighbour, Acha, the
mother-in-law, and Malika, another Algerian woman who has been living in France
for the past fifteen years.
Madame Donze is the next-door neighbour, who, along with her husband, is
desperately obsessed with winning the competition awarded to the most beautiful
garden. She represents the stagnation of the French middle-class, who has re-
mained attached to old habits and does not appreciate any fluid transformation in
their lives. The beauty of the garden requires the encyclopaedic knowledge of the
old erudition which has to be found in old and dusty manuals, as well as the tran-
quillity and the daily cares of the couple. Immobility and surveillance are equally
essential to assure the preservation of the garden. To her horror, the arrival of the

11
Maryse Fauvel, Yamina Benguiguis InchAllah dimanche: Unveiling Hybrid Identities, Studies in
French Cinema 4:2 (2004): 148.
12
Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 2004), 7.
noisy Algerian family jeopardises her chances of winning the prize. She literally
sees the invader, the barbarian and the potential danger posed by this woman and
her children, who destroy her quiet haven with their noise, their laughter and their
games. As Maryse Fauvel says: Their cooking odours and exotic clothing disturb
their tranquillity and their version of Frenchness.
13
It is possible to extend such
notion even further, and apply Slavoj ieks idea suggested in the article Enjoy
the Nation as Yourself, in which he applies his metaphor of enjoyment to explain
the formulation of a national identity: In short, what bothers us about the other
is the peculiar way he organizes his enjoyment, precisely the surplus, the excess
that pertains to this way: the smell of their food, their noisy songs and dances,
their strange manners, their attitude to work.
14

It is not by coincidence that Madame Donze constantly uses a legalistic ap-
proach when voicing her complaints. When Zouina attempts to prepare the coffee
in the yard, Madame Donze cries: You dont have the right to do this here. Mad-
ame Donze reproduces what has been the assimilative discourse which the French
government has traditionally favoured over integration. As Emmanuel Ma Mung
explains, the integration of foreigners has been and still is thought of as the inte-
gration of future nationals rather than the integration into society of people who
retain their foreign character, and adds: The foreigner is tolerated only on condi-
tion that he/she disappears not physically by returning to his/her country of
origin, for example , but one could say, semantically, by abandoning his/her for-
eign character.
15
Madame Donze reminds the Algerian family that they are in
France now, and they should behave according to the regulations of the French-
ness that they represent.
Acha, the mother-in-law, is similarly drawn to the past and the authenticity of
her Algerian culture. She is there to perpetuate Algerian traditions and customs:
she sits in a sheepskin on the ground, waits for her daughter-in-law to serve her,
prays, and never leaves the house. Among her functions, she must prevent Zouina
to mingle with the French community. In sum, as Fauvel puts it, [s]he is an Alge-
rian guarantee against integration in France.
16
She is the one in charge of the
household; from the very beginning she addresses the immigration officers and
greets her son without letting Zouina intervene in either occasion. Malika is similar
in her preservation of past traditions and customs.

13
Maryse Fauvel, Yamina Benguiguis InchAllah dimanche: Unveiling Hybrid Identities, Studies in
French Cinema 4:2 (2004):154.
14
Slavoij iek, Enjoy the Nation as Yourself, in Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader, ed. Les Back
and John Solomon (London: Routledge, 2000), 596.
15
Emmanuel Ma Mung, French Immigration Policy during the Last Twenty Years, in Immigration in
Europe: Issues, Policies and Case Studies, ed. David Turton and Julia Gonzlez (Bilbao: University of
Deusto, 2003), 113-4.
16
Fauvel, Yamina Benguiguis InchAllahdimanche: 152.
The second group of characters is formed by French citizens who defy stereotypes.
They include Nicole, the divorced neighbour, the shopkeepers, the policeman and
the bus-driver. They are all open to dialogue and do not reject the immigrant fami-
ly because of their differences. Zouina acts as a catalyst for the evolving identities
of other characters, identities that move outside of fixed categories and hierarchies
that assume the existence of essential fixed identities.
17
Through them, the film
illustrates the articulation of hybrid cultures that occur when identity norms are
displaced between diverse groups.
Zouina represents the third group. Unlike the other Algerian women, she does
not stay cloistered at home, isolated from the outside world. Moreover, she quickly
becomes a member of the community of neighbours. She defies her husbands
authority by going out on Sundays when he is choosing a lamb for the celebrations.
She is curious about the world around her: she listens to the radio, imitates the
French shoppers and takes the bus alone. This provokes the anger of her mother-
in-law, who says: La France lui a tourne la tte. Elle veut faire comme les Fran-
aises. (France has gone to her head. She wants to act like the French.) Such an
accusation is only partly true, since the young woman negotiates her identity by
adopting certain characteristics of French women without renouncing her own
culture. She feels that what Nicole proposes, to go out alone dancing, is still a sin,
but talks to Malika (to her horror) about love and sexuality, which she has learnt
about from listening to the radio. The tensions between the different aspects of
her subjectivity are visually translated by two types of spaces and shots. The im-
prisonment that she experiences in closed spaces, such as the house and the yard,
is transmitted through close-medium shots, framed by the door and the windows,
whereas the freedom she experiences outdoors is filmed through long shots in
open spaces. In the final scene, after her illusion of finding a soul-mate is shattered,
she realises that she urgently needs to re-arrange her family situation. She imposes
her new will on her husband, and for the first time, exchanges a direct look with
him and tells her mother-in-law to keep quiet and to leave her alone. Her new
resolution, [f]rom now on I will be the one to take the children to school, is but
a small step in a long-term liberation plan, and with that perspective the film clos-
es. The film goes beyond the mere portrayal of Zouina and her family and insists
on the need to expose a new in-process situation regarding national identities for
France and other European countries, a situation which is aptly described by Ma
Mung: Immigrants are now increasingly demanding multiple belonging, not being
either from here or over there, but from here and over there. Integration can no
longer aim at incorporation into the nation French-style.
18

17
Ibid.: 155.
18
Ma Mung, French Immigration Policy, 124.
Gegen die Wand
Regarding the film Gegen die Wand, authors such as Fatih Akin, according to David
Coury, celebrate the diversity within Germany and through that diversity help re-
define German identity and the identity of German film. Coury adds:

Akin, himself a Turkish-German filmmaker, makes films that reflect what
Roland Robertson has termed the glocal, that is, films spatially grounded in
a local milieu (combining the global and the local, in this case the neigh-
bourhoods of Hamburg), that thematically take up global themes, quite of-
ten the clash of cultures between Germans, Turks and the in-between spac-
es negotiated by Turkish-Germans like himself.
19

Since the film has received both critical and commercial success, and many aspects
of the film have been sufficiently analysed, I will restrict my remarks here to a brief
commentary on the hybrid and fluid nature of the characters and spaces depicted
in the film, and the notion of multilingualism. The protagonists of the film, Sibel
and Cahit, meet for the first time in a psychiatric clinic, after having tried to com-
mit suicide; this is the beginning of a passionate love story marked by longing,
loneliness and loss, but especially by two German characters of Turkish descent
portrayed as dislocated subjectivities in a constantly fluid motion. They locate
themselves in such liminal places as hospitals and hotels (where part of the action
takes place), and their efforts to build a real home are frequently destroyed by their
own restlessness. The movie, as Karin Lornsen underscores, stresses the dissimilar-
ity of the two main characters, Sibel and Cahit, who appear polymorphic and an-
tagonistic despite a shared Turkish heritage, and adds: Their differences in age,
gender, language ability, social ties, and interests erode widespread notions of a
uniform, maladjusted post-migrant entity promoted by German media.
20
Lornsen
classifies characters in the film as German-German (G-G), German-Turkish (G-T),
Turkish-German (T-G) and Turkish-Turkish (T-T). The second letter represents a
switching (on any kind) to another culture, and the G-T and T-G categories en-
compass hybrid characters. This group, which characterises the protagonists, op-
poses conventions of either/or choices as well as a simple intermediate position.
21

In fact, Sibel and Cahit are constantly in transit, between life and death, leaving
homes and cities, switching languages, changing clothes and modifying habits,

19
David Coury, Contemporary German Cinema through the Lens of Cultural Studies, in
Basque/European Perspectives on Cultural and Media Studies, ed. Mara Pilar Rodrguez (Reno: Center for
Basque Studies, University of Nevada, 2009), 288.
20
Karin Lornsen, Where Have All the Guest Workers Gone? Transcultural Role-Play and Performa-
tive Identities in Fatih Akins Gegen die Wand (2004), in Finding the Foreign: Proceedings of the Thir-
teenth Annual Interdisciplinary German Studies Conference, ed. Robert Schechtman and Suin Roberts (New-
castle: Cambridge Scholars, 2007), 14.
21
Ibid., 17.
hairstyles and drug and alcohol addictions. Sibel seeks freedom from her Turkish
cultural heritage to end up returning to a certain kind of domesticity and order in
Istanbul after many excesses. Her final decision to remain with his family rather
than leave with Cahit very much contradicts her initial statements and actions in
Hamburg, where instant pleasure and gratification prevailed. Both characters- ex-
perience multiple physical and psychological transformations along the film, which
respond to the different shades of cultural expression which they experience.
Lora Markova claims that to a great extent the representation of multilingualism in
European cinema corresponds to the portrayal of transcultural identities and re-
flects European transnational hybridity; she mentions Fatih Akin as one of the best
representatives of such tendency.
22
In this film, linguistic shifts are an organic part
of the plot and the characters that he constructs. In Gegen die Wand, the characters
speak in German, Turkish and English; and in a combination of them. Some char-
acters always speak one language with one another, while others alternate them.
Sibel and her brother speak only Turkish with their parents, but use a mixture of
German and Turkish with each other; Sibel speaks in German with Cahit, but there
are two very relevant moments in the film in which English is used by Cahit; in
both of them he is liminally positioned by the spatial configuration and by his in-
terlocutor. In similar terms, the soundtrack is composed of both diegetic and non-
diegetic American, Turkish and European music; as in the dialogues, there are song
lyrics in English, Turkish, and German. After Nikos death (Sibels lover acci-
dentally killed by Cahit, who is subsequently imprisoned), Turkish music is more
frequently played by Sibel, anticipating her move to Istanbul in the second part of
the film.
23

Conclusion
In these films, as in many others, the audience is confronted with a multi-layered
reality formed by transcultural characters in which multilingualism is a constant
presence. The efforts by Angela Merkel and other political leaders to encourage
assimilation and to encourage monolingualism by the compulsory and urgent need
to learn the local language appear as an oversimplification in a world in motion, in
which hybridity reveals itself as a much more effective strategy. Against political
and institutional discourses, cinematic practices offer the viewers a dialogue about
the social and cultural fabric of societies across the world which revitalises the

22
Lora Markova, Falling in Love in English: On the Representation of Multilingualism in Contem-
porary European Cinema, unpublished paper.
23
For an excellent and detailed analysis of the soundtrack in the film, which includes a very percep-
tive reading of the musical interludes, see Deniz Gktrk, Sound Bridges: Transnational Mobility as
Ironic Melodrama, in European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe, ed.
Daniela Berghahn and Claudia Sternberg (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 215-34.

concept of European film and makes us aware of our own involvement and partic-
ipation in present European societies.

Bibliography
Balasubramanyam, Rajeev. The Rhetoric of Multiculturalism. In Multi-Ethnic
Britain 2000+: New Perspectives in Literature, Film and the Arts, edited by Lars Eck-
stein et al., 31-42.Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2005.
Ballesteros, Isolina. Immigration Cinema in/and the European Union. In
Basque/European Perspectives on Cultural and Media Studies, edited by Mara Pilar
Rodrguez, 189-215.Reno: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada,
2009.
Bergfelder, Tim. National, Transnational or Supranational Cinema? Rethinking
European Film Studies. Media, Culture & Society 27.3 (2005): 315-31.
Berghahn, Daniela, and Claudia Sternberg, ed. European Cinema in Motion: Migrant
and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge, 2004.
Carpenter Latiri, Dora. Rpresentations de la femme migrante dans InchAllah
dimanche. The Web Journal of French Media Studies 6 (December 2003).
http://wjfms.ncl.ac.uk/frframes.htm (accessed 24 March 2011).
Coury, David, Contemporary German Cinema through the Lens of Cultural Stud-
ies. In Basque/European Perspectives on Cultural and Media Studies, edited by Mara
Pilar Rodrguez, 277-93. Reno: Center for Basque Studies, University of Neva-
da, 2009.
Dengel-Janic, Ellen, and Lars Eckstein. Bridehood Revisited: Disarming Concepts
of Gender and Culture in Recent Asian British Film. In Multi-Ethnic Britain
2000+: New Perspectives in Literature, Film and the Arts, edited by Lars Eckstein et
al., 45-63. Amsterdam and New York, Rodopi, 2005.
Diehr, Brbel, Filming the British Compromise: British-Asian Cinema and Cul-
tural Hybridity. LiCuS: Journal of Literary Theory and Cultural Studies 2:3 (2007):
75-88.
Fauvel, Maryse. Yamina Benguiguis InchAllah dimanche: Unveiling Hybrid
Identities. Studies in French Cinema 4:2 (2004): 147-57.
Fenner, Angelica. Migration as Spatial Series: A Kristevian Reading of Yamina-
Benguiguis InchAllah Dimanche. Paper presented at the Colloque Interna-
tional AFECCA, La Fiction clate: Petits et Grands crans Franais et Fran-
cophones, Lyon, France, cole Normale Superieure, 6-8 July 2004.
Geddes, Andrew: Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe? Man-
chester: Manchester University Press, 2000.
Gktrk, Deniz. Sound Bridges: Transnational Mobility as Ironic Melodrama. In
European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary Europe, edit-
ed by Daniela Berghahn and Claudia Sternberg, 215-34. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010.
Guiraudon, Virginie. Les politiques dimmigration en Europe: Allemagne, France, Pays-Bas.
Paris: LHarmattan, 2000.
Lornsen, Karin. Where Have All the Guest Workers Gone? Transcultural Role-
Play and Performative Identities in Fatih Akins Gegen die Wand (2004).In
Finding the Foreign: Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Interdisciplinary German Studies
Conference, edited by Robert Schechtman and Suin Roberts, 13-31. Newcastle:
Cambridge Scholars, 2007.
Ma Mung, Emmanuel. French Immigration Policy during the Last Twenty
Years. In Immigration in Europe: Issues, Policies and Case Studies, edited by David
Turton and Julia Gonzlez, 113-25. Bilbao: University of Deusto, 2003.
Malik, Sarita. The Dark Side of Hybridity: Contemporary Black and Asian British
Cinema. In European Cinema in Motion: Migrant and Diasporic Film in Contemporary
Europe, edited by Daniela Berghahn and Claudia Sternberg, 132-51.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
Markova, Lora. Falling in Love in English: On the Representation of Multilingual-
ism in Contemporary European Cinema. Unpublished paper.
Merkel says German Multicultural Society Has Failed. BBC News. 17 October
2010. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451 (accessed 21
March 2011).
Nicolas Sarkozy Declares Multiculturalism Had Failed. The Telegraph. 11 February
2011.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8317497/Nicol
as-Sarkozy-declares-multiculturalism-had-failed.html (accessed 21 March 2011).
Siapera, Eugenia. Cultural Diversity and Global Media: The Mediation of Difference. Ox-
ford, Blackwell, 2010.
State Multiculturalism Has Failed, Says David Cameron. BBC News. 5 February
2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 (accessed 21 March
2011).
Welsch, Wolfgang. Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today. In
Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, Work, edited by Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash,
194-213. London: Sage, 1999.
iek, Slavoj. Enjoy the Nation as Yourself. In Theories of Race and Racism: A
Reader, edited by Les Back and John Solomon, 594-606. London: Routledge,
2000.

Envisaging Transcultural Realities
through Literature in Europe
The Case of Ireland
Asier Altuna-Garca de Salazar
Introduction
Mapping Irelands future is even more difficult because so many of the old land-
marks have disappeared, states Fintan OToole in his 2010 Enough is Enough. How
to Build a New Republic.
1
OToole ponders how Irish identity has become an orphan
of its main pillars twin towers he names them: Catholicism and nationalism.
2

Besides, in the Ireland of the 21
st
century, as Michael Cronin states, terms which
were previously attached to the reality of Ireland, such as anomalous, different,
exceptional, do not seem to stand the test any longer.
3
But what is meant by that?
Compared to other European countries, Ireland has not been affected differently
by the new economic, social, cultural and identitarian discourses that have emerged
and are still being reformulated on the island as a response to globalisation. The
exceptionality of the reversal of the stigmatising Irish emigration pattern into net
immigration, the miraculous economic boom of the Irish Celtic Tiger in the global
economy, the heartfelt Irish cad mile filte one hundred thousand welcomes to
all by Irish President Mary McAleese
4
, which represents indeed an extensive belief
in the politics of recognition and a new pluralist agenda
5
in Irish society before
recession and the bail-out, all these seem to avert a changing Ireland which is un-
dergoing the end of monoculturalism.
6
More importantly, this new Ireland is expe-
riencing an attendant shift and opening-out of concepts such as identity, eth-

1
Fintan OToole, Enough is Enough: How to Build a New Republic (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 3.
2
Ibid.
3
Michael Cronin, Small Worlds and Weak Ties: Ireland in the New Century, Journal of Irish Studies
22 (2007): 63-93.
4
Elisa Joy White, Youre Very Welcome: Considering the African Diaspora, Race and Human
Rights in the Republic of Ireland, Journal of Irish Studies 24 (2009): 15-26.
5
Gerard Delanty, Irish Political Community in Transition, The Irish Review 33 (2005): 17.
6
Marion Banks, Modern Ireland: Multinationals and Multiculturalism, Information Society and Justice
2.1 (2008): 63-93.
nicity, culture and nationalism.
7
What this article will address is what Michael Cro-
nin terms as the shift from extrinsic alterity to intrinsic alterity,
8
when concepts such
as identity, ethnicity and culture are examined. For Cronin, by doing so the critic of
any culture the Irish one in our case under study would pay greater attention to
those elements within the culture that speak of contact with the wider world ra-
ther than seeing foreignness, difference or alterity as elements without, or external
to, the culture.
9
This article will analyse how new realities are envisaged in current
Irish literature. It will follow very much Wolfgang Welschs approach to transcul-
turalism in its two main levels: the macro level in which contemporary cultures are
multiply characterized by hybridization;
10
but, especially, the process of transcul-
turalism at the micro level of individuals in todays Europe as it can be seen in Irish
writing.
For many, an inter- and multicultural Ireland was the plausibly politically correct
current picture to be projected to the world. The myriad of peoples, national affili-
ations, cultures and languages that have coloured the Emerald Isle over the last
two decades have made it possible for many to assert that multicultural Ireland is
here to stay.
11
However, time has shown that issues such as multiculturalism and
even interculturalism do not seem to have provided a valid answer for the emerg-
ing realities in Europe, as the public statements and reactions by German Chancel-
lor Angela Merkel or French President Nicholas Sarkozy attest. With a perspective
of two decades, the same can be said of Ireland when these concepts are thorough-
ly analysed. Gavan Titley highlights that, whereas in the case of Ireland multicul-
turalism seemed to provide a cosy way of managing cultural difference as in many
other European countries one would add , there was no real examination of the
assumption that cultures and identities are not static, and that social synergies and
dynamism in a global age were producing new social, identitarian and even national
discourses.
12
In truth, Ireland has not been any different or anomalous in this re-
spect. Titley sees culture as a free-floating signifier, which has become the main
rhetoric through which debates over identity, belonging, legitimacy and entitlement
are refracted.
13

7
Jennifer Todd, Trajectories of Identity Change: New Perspectives on Ethnicity, Nationality and
Identity in Ireland, Field Day Review 3 (2007): 107-17.
8
Cronin, Small Worlds: 70.
9
Ibid.
10
Wolfgang Welsch, On the Acquisition and Possession of Commonalities, in Transcultural English
Studies: Theories, Fictions, Realities, ed. Frank Schulze-Engler and Sissy Helf (Amsterdam and New York:
Rodopi, 2009), 7.
11
Banks, Modern Ireland: 90.
12
Gavan Titley, Everything Moves? Beyond Culture and Multiculturalism in Irish Public Dis-
course, The Irish Review 31 (2004): 14.
13
Ibid.: 13.
Envisaging Transcultural Realities through Literature in Europe 187
The purpose of this article is to consider, through the analysis of some instances of
Irish literature, how a transcultural individual can be envisaged in todays Ireland.
Ultimately, this analysis of transculturalism at the micro level will question the
validity of a traditionally staunch Irish monoculturalism and the belief of an eter-
nally fixed Irish identity. At macro social, cultural and political levels, transcultural-
ism is finding it difficult to establish its meaning and scope not only in Ireland and
Europe but also in the wider world. From the topical concepts of us and the other,
there arises not only the need to address how national, nationalist, postnational and
transnational realities can be envisaged, but, also, how those former pillars of
Irishness referred to above are transgressed, reformed and newly accommodated.
The brief analysis of writings by Irish writers Roddy Doyle, Margaret McCarthy
and Hugo Hamilton, which dwell on issues such as dysfunction, dislocation, trau-
ma, cultural and linguistic awareness, will highlight the portrayal of a transcultural
Irish reality that is no disconnected or hybrid conglomerate of features. Instead,
these instances address transculturalism in Ireland at the macro and micro levels
and represent an exemplar of a current social, cultural and identitarian phenome-
non that finds expression in literature at a European level. This article will ap-
proach how transculturalism, which is very much here to stay, represents a synergy,
an interaction and an evolutionary process within the social, the political, the cul-
tural and identitarian macro and micro discourses intrinsic to an Ireland in the era
of globalisation.
How Irish Should You Be? The Filte Score
Approaching nationality and monoculturalism in 21
st
century Ireland shows how
inadequate methods and myths from the past are. What once were the main check-
list features of Irish nationality do not seem to stand the test any longer. As former
Irish President Mary McAleese stated in her foreword to a booklet on multicultur-
alism north and south of the border, we are gradually moving away from the ho-
mogeneity and old certainties which have traditionally been the hallmarks of Irish
life.
14
But this is no anomalous development as such; rather, it is the confirmation
that 21
st
century Ireland participates in globalisation and, as Gerard Delanty states,
that the Global Ireland points to a conception [] different from National Ire-
land.
15
The global character of Irish society and economy, together with immigra-
tion patterns that have opened the island to a myriad of languages, traditions and
cultures, as it is the case with other neighbouring European countries, have fos-
tered a new way of defining nationality. Far from being the imagined or invented
results of 18
th
and 19
th
century ethnic and national constructions and the Irish Ire-

14
Mary McAleese, Foreword, in Multi-Culturalism: The View from the Two Irelands, ed. Edna Longley
and Declan Kiberd (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001), viii.
15
Delanty, Irish Political Community: 13.
land drive of the beginning of the 20
th
century, or the product of the somewhat
static and isolated multicultural discourses, todays Irish nationality exudes trans-
culturalism.Roddy Doyles short story 57% Irish was first published in the multi-
cultural online and paper magazine Metro ireann and then collected and released in
book format under the title of The Deportees and Other Stories (2007). Doyles stories
reflect a concern for the ensemble of diversity in Ireland. 57% Irish represents a
serious fictional exemplar of the need to deconstruct so as to better comprehend
an Irish-only consciousness. With Doyles humour throughout, the story ap-
proaches the very futile definition of Irish nationhood and citizenship in terms of
percentage. It shows how those check-list features of what being Irish traditionally
stood for cannot be valid any longer. The main task of the protagonist, Ray Brady,
is to design a method to measure nationality. Awarded a research grant for his
project Ol Ol Ol Football and the Road to Irishness, his goal is to measure
love of country in todays Ireland.
16
Rays research reaches a turning point when he is
required by the Minister for the Arts and Ethnicity (ironically the former Minister
for the Arts and Tourism) to make it harder to be Irish although Ray has to
make it look easier. The reason behind the Irish governments interest is to
comply with Europeanisation, or, as the Minister stated, Fucking Europe. Euro-
pean ministers are not happy with the Fortress Europe tag. It keeps them from
their sleep. So, the walls are coming down.
17
Accordingly, Ray Brady creates a
measuring tool to indicate the proper level of Irishness: The Filte Score. But
what could be the items to ask for at a time when everyone knows more about
Irish culture than ever before because of global Ireland and the commodification
of Irish culture? This was the real issue for a quiz on Irishness to be designed: U2,
James Joyce, Guinness, Riverdance, Brian Boru, the Irish Tenors, the GAA cen-
tenary tape, The Best of Eurovision, the Popes mass in Galway, The Commitments, even
Anal Nation, Once Again, an instance of Irish porn
18
, are all burnt onto one CD and
then exposed to various individuals strapped to a chair and screened thoroughly to
measure and record any reaction to those items; a repository of Irishness in 21
st

century Ireland. The results puzzle Ray Brady. His brothers score, 19%, turns out
to be a failure; he could not even be considered Irish. His mother scores only 38%;
even the Minister gets a 57%, a feckin C minus,
19
the Minister retorts; the aver-
age mark, Ray replies, which makes the Minister the average Irishman. But his
experiment also provides the highest score of all, 97%, the most Irish man in the
country: a Ghanaian. Even Rays Russian girlfriend scored 83%. Far from being
dislocated or the other, these newcomers to Ireland do not feel strangers in
their own country. Originally designed to hamper the naturalisation of deportees,

16
Roddy Doyle, The Deportees and Other Stories (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007), 101.
17
Ibid., 105.
18
Ibid., 109-10.
19
Ibid., 115.
exiles and immigrants, Rays test proves otherwise. Eventually, the Irish govern-
ment of the story could not handle the results nor Irish ethnicity any longer and
decided to merge the ethnicity component of the new ministry with the Depart-
ment of the Marine. Doyles 57% Irish represents a clear stance of the lack of
validity of former constructs and pillars of Irish identity. Besides, he poignantly
denounces the failure of the governmental institutions (the macro level) in under-
standing and accepting the reality of the new Irish nation (the individuals at the
micro level); a reality that can neither be acculturated nor assimilated. In this vein,
Doyles portrayal advocates the necessity of re-shuffling identitarian and national
discourses and validating the politics of recognition and pluralism of 21
st
century
Ireland so as to extend a wider acceptance of citizenship, both in cultural and polit-
ical terms, as it is the case with many other nations in Europe nowadays.
These new discourses are here to stay and have come to blur and redefine the
idea of the nation-state and the distinctiveness of individual societies.
20
Indeed,
Doyles 57% Irish represents not only an attempt to categorise new concepts
that may enable the approach to these new realities but also the necessity to do
away with what Yolanda Onghena terms as the fear to refer to diversity as some
sort of disturbing other, an intruder with the capacity to destabilise our security,
21

i.e. our solid and monolithic monocultures. To overcome this fear, Ireland should
come to terms with the recognition of transculturalism as the very opposite re-
sponse to static, solid monocultures and fixed identities and see it as a useful tool
for the recognition of identity reformulation processes.
This is why I say there is no in-between state
In the introduction to My Eyes Only Look Out, Margaret McCarthy states that she
believes that at the outset of the Millennium and in the cases of race and immigra-
tion in Ireland, it is difficult to predict the future beyond speculation and careful
optimism.
22
McCarthy advocates that, despite the disproportionate amount of
attention that has been focused on the arrival of asylum seekers and other immi-
grants, Ireland still seems to remain more or less monocultural.
23
Her collection
summarises overall reactions to a hyphenated reality (Irish-something or some-
thing-Irish), nationhood, patriotism, nationalism and language accent. McCarthy
collects thus reactions produced by the protagonists of the accounts as well as by
those who surround them in a volume that points to transculturalism, showing the
failure of the much-celebrated multicultural mosaic and inter-culturality, of which

20
G. Honor Fagan, Globalization and Culture: Placing Ireland, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 581 (2002): 134.
21
Yolanda Onghena, Transculturalism and Relation Identity, Quaderns de la Mediterrnia 31 (2008):
182.
22
Margaret McCarthy, My Eyes Only Look Out (Dingle: Brandon, 2001), 10.
23
Ibid.
these mixed-race Irish are the most evident result. Among the many accounts we
find Luzveminda OSullivans, crowned Rose of Tralee in August 1998, Sen gs,
Gaelic football and hurling star, Ians, the first coloured guard in Ireland, or Curtis
Flemings, a black Irishman football player for Middlesborough and Crystal Palace.
Proud of their Irishness through their personal accounts which recollect trauma,
dysfunction and cultural awareness these Irish reject in-betweenness, which for
some is nonexistent as it is only a facile reduction of their physical appearance and
place of birth. These Irish are what Welsch terms cultural hybrids which are nei-
ther determined nor defined by a single nation,
24
nor by culture, one would add.
Most of these biographical instances exude a transcultural stance in which to
define a new arena for analysis. But their responses also show the difficulty faced
by these Irish in coming to terms with their, lets say, internal and external alterity.
Even if they are and feel truly Irish, in order to find self-esteem in society they
have to resort to answers such as Im International,
25
Im Irish even though I
dont look it,
26
I am no in-between state,
27
to me, there is no middle ground
28

and there is something out there for me.
29
Others are deeply concerned by their
constant need to succeed more than what is usually expected, as people are always
watching and assessing them. McCarthy denounces the failure of assimilative accul-
turation in Ireland, as it is the case in other European nations. Instead, these ac-
counts exude transculturalism so as to reformulate the foundations of Irish society.
These accounts advocate, as Onghena states, that a new, composite and complex
reality emerges; a reality that is no mechanical mixture of characters, nor mosaic,
but instead a new original and independent phenomenon.
30
McCarthy envisages
the representation of this transcultural reality and synergy as a way to promote the
interaction and commonalities Welsch demands from a future transcultural society
in Europe and also in the wider world.
31

From walking on the wall to I can feel the touch of solid ground
under my feet
As a final instance, this article will briefly consider Hugo Hamiltons novels The
Speckled People (2003) and The Sailor in the Wardrobe (2006). The novels are biograph-
ical accounts of Hamiltons own, somewhat dysfunctional, childhood and youth.

24
Wolfgang Welsch, Transculturalism the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today, in Spaces of Culture:
City, Nation, World, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1999), 194-213.
25
McCarthy, My Eyes, 111.
26
Ibid., 31.
27
Ibid., 162.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid., 233.
30
Onghena, Transculturalism: 183.
31
Welsch, On the Acquisition, 33.
Although born in Dublin, the young Hamiltons world is characterised by entan-
glement at many levels: personal, cultural and linguistic. Hamiltons father is a
staunch Irish nationalist, who shamefully hides in his wardrobe a fathers past in
the British army and wants his children to speak only Irish and live in Gaelic cul-
ture. His mother, on the other hand, is a German immigrant who has escaped
from a Nazi past, and talks to them only in German, not wanting her children to
forget their German ancestry. The young Hugo Hamilton, addressed as Hanno in
the novels, wants to be free to choose between cultures and languages, desiring at
times to speak English, the language of connection to a world of popular culture
and modernity; but only in his mind can he be free, as youre still free to go any-
where you like inside your own head.
32
His transcultural individuality clashes with
a social discourse, a macro level, as he does not want to be special: out there in
Ireland you want to be the same as everyone else, not an Irish speaker, not a Ger-
man or a Kraut or a Nazi.
33
For Hamilton, his is not a special but a new reality
that is appearing in Ireland. His is a synergy into the social, the cultural and identi-
tarian:
My father says we have nothing to worry about because we are the
new Irish. Partly from Ireland and partly from somewhere else, half-
Irish and half-German. Were the speckled people, he says, the brack
people, which is a word that comes from the Irish language, from the
Gaelic as they sometimes call it. My father was a schoolteacher once
before he became an engineer and breac is a word, he explains, that
the Irish people brought with them when they were crossing over in-
to the English language. It means speckled, dappled, flecked, spotted,
coloured. A trout is brack and so is a speckled horse. A barm brack is
a loaf of bread with raisins in it and was borrowed from the Irish
words bairn breac. So we are the speckled Irish, the brack-Irish. Brack
home-made Irish bread with German raisins.
34

But Hamilton wants to depart from a hyphenated reality and be truly transcultural,
so as to understand and comprehend cultures beyond ones own cultural construc-
tion and that of the other. The young Hannos world progresses from the inner
security of his dysfunctional home (Irish and German only) where he can be him-
self and out there, where there is a different country.
35
His you cant love two
countries
36
, exclaimed under his fathers influence, turns into doubt about his
own identity and nationality. At the end of The Speckled People, Hanno comes to the

32
Hugo Hamilton, The Speckled People (London: Fourth State, 2003), 122.
33
Ibid., 3.
34
Ibid., 7.
35
Ibid., 8.
36
Ibid., 120.
understanding that maybe your country is only a place you make up in your own
mind
37
and he decides to walk metaphorically on the wall of identity, most proba-
bly knowing that he could fall on either side, but nobody can stop him and he is
intent on going ahead.
Hamilton begins his second novel pondering on the original sin we are all born
with, i.e. your inheritance in terms of identity, historical past, language. Hamilton
does not believe we are born innocent. Instead, he follows his mothers wise words
and has to earn his own innocence; Hanno has to grow up and become inno-
cent.
38
His identity construction process undergoes deconstruction to start anew.
He has to un-remember everything. To live transculturally, a partial deculturation
paves the way to new cultural phenomena.
39
Hamilton surpasses English, Irish and
German to become himself. What is central for him is not staunchly differentiated
mosaic diversity but merging and interaction. Hamilton decides he is not going to
be kept in the wardrobe
40
and un-becomes his threefold identities, thus becoming
transcultural. The young Hanno becomes fully himself and participates in a dis-
course that frees him from staunchly monolinguistic and monocultural frame-
works, thus allowing him to communicate freely around meanings, languages and
cultures. From walking on the wall Hanno feels now the touch of solid ground
under [his] feet
41
at the end of his second novel. He transcends all the static sys-
tems of reference and turns into a transcultural citizen of the world.
Transculturalism together with cosmopolitanism in the political and communi-
ty spheres are the alternatives to staunch positions of the past, both in Ireland and
the rest of Europe. As Delanty argues, one can simultaneously be Irish, European
and member of an ethnic community if ones identity is articulated through dis-
cursively mediated identities and critical dialogue.
42
What is at stake when identi-
ties, and the Irish one in particular for our case here, are reformulated is the trans-
concept. Whether transnational or transcultural identities at the micro level and
nations at the macro level are being reformulated, always bearing in mind the es-
sence of free-floating signifiers, transformation and intrinsic alterity. In the end, a new
social imaginary is needed, that will question who participates in what, how and
why.
43
In todays Europe, transculturalism seems the answer to the moribound
ideology of the nation-sate.
44
As with the case of Ireland analysed here, Europe

37
Ibid., 295.
38
Hugo Hamilton, The Sailor in the Wardrobe (London: Harper Perennial, 2006), 1.
39
40
Hamilton, The Sailor, 110.
41
Ibid., 263.
42
Delanty, Irish Political Community: 21.
43
44
Graham Huggan, Postcolonialism, Globalization, and the Rise of (Trans)cultural Studies, in
Towards a Transcultural Future. Literature and Society in a Post-colonial World, ed. Geoffrey V. Davis et. al.
(Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2004), 31.
should also advocate the reformulation of identity, culture and a new social order
under a transcultural prism.

Bibliography
Banks, Marion. Modern Ireland: Multinationals and Multiculturalism. Information,
Society and Justice 2.1 (2008): 63-93.
Cronin, Michael. Small Worlds and Weak Ties: Ireland in the New Century.
Journal of Irish Studies 22 (2007): 63-73.
Delanty, Gerard. Irish Political Community in Transition. The Irish Review 33
(2005): 13-22.
Doyle, Roddy. The Deportees and Other Stories. London: Jonathan Cape, 2007.
Fagan, G. Honor. Globalization and Culture: Placing Ireland. Annals of the Ameri-
can Academy of Political and Social Science 581 (2002): 133-43.
Hamilton, Hugo. The Sailor in the Wardrobe. London: Harper Perennial, 2006.
The Speckled People. London: Fourth Estate, 2003.
Huggan, Graham. Postcolonialism, Globalization, and the Rise of (Trans)cultural
Studies. In Towards a Transcultural Future: Literature and Society in a Post-colonial
World, edited by Geoffrey V. Davis et. al., 27-35. Amsterdam and New York:
Rodopi, 2004.
McAleese, Mary. Foreword. In Multi-Culturalism: The View from the Two Irelands,
edited by Edna Longley and Declan Kiberd, vii-ix. Cork: Cork University Press,
2001.
McCarthy, Margaret. My Eyes Only Look Out. Dingle: Brandon, 2001.
Onghena, Yolanda. Transculturalism and Relation Identity. Quaderns de la Medi-
terrnia 10 (2008): 181-4.
OToole, Fintan. Enough is Enough: How to Build a New Republic. London: Faber and
Faber, 2010.
Titley, Gavan. Everything Moves? Beyond Culture and Multiculturalism in Irish
Public Discourse. The Irish Review 31 (2004): 11-27.
Todd, Jennifer. Trajectories of Identity Change: New Perspectives on Ethnicity,
Nationality and Identity in Ireland. Field Day Review 3 (2007): 107-17.
Welsch, Wolfgang. On the Acquisition and Possession of Commonalities. In
Transcultural English Studies: Theories, Fictions, Realities, edited by Frank Schulze-
Engler and Sissy Helff, 3-36. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2009.
Transculturalism the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today. In Spaces of
Culture: City, Nation, World, edited by Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash,
194-213. London: Sage, 1999.
White, Elisa Joy. Youre Very Welcome: Considering the African Diaspora, Race
and Human Rights in the Republic of Ireland. Journal of Irish Studies 24 (2009):
15-26.

Acknowledgment: The author thanks the Spanish funding agency Ministerio de
Economa y Competitividad for its generous support with this article as part of the
project FFI2011-23941

Transcultural Encounters
in Re-Inscribing Identity
European Memories and
Ethnic Writing in Canada
Anna Pia De Luca
Introduction
In the light of new migrant literary studies, concepts of tranculturality and transcul-
turalism, according to Sabrina Broncato, contribute to an awareness of the pro-
cesses of formation of cultural identity in all of their complexity, because they
place emphasis on the dialectical nature of cultural influences, in tending towards
a conceptualisation of interaction where nothing is ever completely other (foreign
and unknown).
1
Furthermore, as underlined by Welsch, transculturality implies a
culture and society whose pragmatic feats exist not only in delimitation, but in the
ability to link and undergo transition.
2
Within this framework of mobility, trans-
formation and cultural interaction, cultural identities resist any form of fixity and
become fluid, pliable and open to redefinition and reconstruction. By attempting
to understand transculturalism as framework, the purpose of this paper is to ana-
lyse the ways in which the inscription and contextualisation of ethnic identity (and
European memory) is achieved and represented in migrant literary writings in Can-
ada.
In 1971, Canada became the first country in the world to officially adopt a
multiculturalism policy. The term multicultural dates back to the 1970 report of the
Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, arriving in 1988 with the
passing of Bill C 93, known as the Canadian Multiculturalism Act. The Canadian
experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony
and cross-cultural understanding. The mapping of a Canadian identity, in constant
flux as a result of Canadas kaleidoscope of multicultural, multiracial and multilin-
gual enclaves, has generated a polyphonic literature in which the so-called ethnic

1
Sabrina Broncato, Glocality and Cultural Identity, This Centurys Review 4 (2006),
http://history.thiscenturysreview.com/gloacality.html (accessed 9 January 2011).
2
City, Nation, Work, ed. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: Sage, 1999), 200.
writers can give voice not only to personal perspectives of displacement and aliena-
tion but above all to new and original literary forms which underline their cross-
cultural experiences such as communication with alterity, plurilinguism, self-
translation, autobiography, myth and intertextual symbolism, which interact with
what Frank Schulze-Engler defines as the transcultural imaginary
3
of our mod-
ern global world.
The main frame of reference found in Canadian ethnic minority texts is the re-
current shift between cultures, and as their juxtaposition frequently intimates, the
characters find themselves on the borderline of conflicting loyalties, which often
creates a sense of helplessness and anxiety. These shifting perspectives, which
foreground the multiplicity and ambiguity of identity, are often reflected through
an irony which both cultivates and exposes differences and contradictions. In this
way, irony becomes a destabilising factor to avoid the affixation of a single particu-
lar meaning to the events depicted in the texts. In Splitting Images, a critical study on
ethnic literature, Linda Hutcheon in fact affirms: Irony is one way of coming to
terms with this kind of duplicity, for it is the trope that incarnates doubleness.
4

Second-generation writers analyse the difficulties faced by immigrant parents who
were socially marginalised in a new world where the language was alien, but in
particular where it had created a generational gap between parents and children in
conflict over the diversity of cultural views and speaking languages. For these chil-
dren, the private space of the family, which includes relatives and villagers, be-
comes a battlefield for their own physical and emotional struggles, and the public
sphere, with its social pressures from peer groups, becomes the space for conflicts
inherent in a definition of identity, always in tension between new and old world
values and where concepts such as displacement, dislocation and confrontation are
often reiterated. The authors are placed on the threshold of both worlds where
they reveal those asymmetric dualisms that characterise their daily living.
Cross-cultural Spaces of Food
In defining ethnic and cultural spaces, literature has always assigned to food an
interesting and significant role, in particular to the very act of eating a meal which
can generate a series of values that range from the social to the human. Besides
giving nourishment to the body, food can take on an infinite number of meanings.
For immigrants, the sharing of food underlines the cultural and ethnic identity of
the family and its cross-cultural experiences in the new world. Thus the dishes that
revolve around immigrant tables have an aura of historical memories of their home
communities, of rituals, values, beliefs and also their transformations in the new

3
Frank Schulze-Engler, Transnationale Kultur als Herausforderung fr die Literaturwissenschaft,
ZAA: Zeitschrift fr Anglistik und Amerikanistik 50.1 (2002): 79.
4
Linda Hutcheon, Splitting Images: Contemporary Canadian Ironies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1991), 49.
Transcultural Encounters in Re-Inscribing Identity

197
world. As underlined by Enoch Padolsky, food has long been regarded as a useful
and important ethnic marker, particularly in terms of identity issues.
5
From an
ethnic perspective, the assumption has been that ones identity can be induced
from the foods that significantly reflect an ethnic language, culture, history, tradi-
tion and religion. However, if food locates us geographically and physically, it also
locates us in specific and sometimes limited cultural spaces that, from a cross-
cultural perspective, can be either very satisfying or very ambivalent.
For authors such as Fred Wah, a writer born in Canada of Chinese, Scottish,
Irish and Swedish hybrid roots, food becomes a powerful narrative and symbolic
element. In his biographical memoir Diamond Grill, the narrative core and setting of
the short sections of his larger story is the Chinese restaurant of the same name
opened in 1950 in Nelson, British Columbia, by the authors father. From this
habitat, where the family works and grows, Wah converts food into a metaphorical
medium to explore, through memory, his anxiety and torment caused by an obses-
sive difficulty in accepting his hybrid ethnic identity. The restaurant becomes a
stage where Wah acts out his various identities, while the swinging doorway, which
separates the Chinese cooking area at the back from the fundamentally white Ca-
nadian dining area in the front, serves as a threshold for that in-between space
where Wahs identity is moulded and reshaped. Emblematic are his opening words
as he hurries to the kitchen to bring an order to a customer: I pick up an order
and turn, back through the doors, Whap! My foot registers more than its own im-
print, starts to read the stain of memory.
6
In this effervescent atmosphere, the
Chinese language/culture at the back is tangibly juxtaposed to the one at the front,
as Wah audibly and easily moves across the threshold, calling attention not only to
his perception of marginalisation and cultural diversity, but at the same time to a
capacity to negotiate and understand his own personal ethnicity. In preparing the
mixed grill, Wah adds, blends, combines and incorporates different ingredients as
he mixes and cooks everything together, thus literally and metaphorically recon-
structing a variegated cultural identity in order to gain the self-perception and self-
esteem necessary to accept and defend his multiracial and transcultural identity.
Thus, in the end, the Diamond Grill restaurant becomes a place of cultural and
ethnic discoveries and recoveries, where Wah, as understood by Beauregard, en-
deavours to theorize Canada as a hybrid cultural space,
7
but where hybridity is
not a random choice but rather cross-cultural contact.

5
Enoch Padolsky, You Are Where You Eat: Ethnicity, Food and Cross-cultural Spaces, Canadian
Ethnic Studies 37.2 (2005): 19.
6
Fred Wah, Diamond Grill (Edmonton: NeWest, 1996), 1.
7
Guy Beauregard, Rattling a Noisy Hyphen, review of Diamond Grill, by Fred Wah, Canadian Litera-
ture 156 (Spring 1998): 172.
Language and Doubleness
In the works of many ethnic writers, the relationship between language and dou-
bleness is a recurrent pattern, both on a structural and on a thematic level. The
language of the immigrant is often neither idiomatic to his or her homeland nor to
his or her host country, but to somewhere in-between. Consequently, in their
search for an identity, the immigrants struggle, as it were, with two childhood lan-
guages, that of their past and that of their present. But this dichotomy is also often
enriching, since many writers mould and come up with different languages and
make use of diverse syntactical, semantic and phonological indicators or dialect
languages to give voice to their experiences.
Within the context of Italian-Canadian literature, recent works by female writers
are of particular interest, firstly because women of Italian descent often had to
struggle against class, gender and ethnic status. In addition, living within the con-
straints of a patriarchal family, they were rarely able to achieve complete emotional
and social independence, often relying on the use of subterfuge to elude the role of
passive and submissive daughter imposed upon them by a stringent authoritarian-
ism within their ethnic community. Female writers like Gianna Patriarca, Mary di
Michel and Genni Gunn experiment with plurilinguistic texts, using Italian or di-
verse dialects which aim to recuperate a lost language or identity. Patriarcas poetry
is fundamentally written in English, but many of her poems reach a finer level of
lyricism with her inclusion of Italian titles, words, verses and self-translations,
which give emphasis to her linguistic and cultural duplicity.
In mapping the boundaries of Torontos Little Italy, Patriarca takes on the role
of distant female observer, analysing the power relations that take place between
men and women, parents and children, young and old, within families, friendships
and diverse ethnicities. The spaces her women inhabit are private spaces: those of
the kitchen, the basement apartment, the church, a sick room in a hospital, Villa
Colombo for the elderly and social clubs in Little Italy where paesani (fellow coun-
try neighbours) meet to talk and pass their time in female crafts. The main themes
of Patriarcas early poetry unfold in her first two collections, Italian Women and
Other Tragedies and Daughters for Sale, where she underlines the conflicts that arise
from a patriarchal ideology that seeks, through the mechanisms of female submis-
sion, to suffocate even the voices of those who are determined to be heard. Patri-
arca travels through the past, recalling experiences as an immigrant daughter, sto-
ries and anecdotes of family, memories linked to old photographs and letters, but
in particular she moves through the collective memories of all those women and
children who had suffered at the hands of immigration sponsors without scruples
or fathers and husbands too drunk or violent to show any form of compassion.
In the first poem, Italian Women, which gives the title to the collection, Pa-
triarca offers a double-edged challenge to stereotyped male visions of oppressive
Italian women in black. The narrating voice, the i (eye) that scrutinises with suffer-

199
ance, but also with ironic distance, creates an ambiguous tension between self and
other:

these are the women
who were born to give birth

they breathe only
leftover air
and speak only
when deeper voices
have fallen asleep

i have seen them bleed
in the dark
hiding the stains inside them
like sins
apologizing

i have seen them wrap their souls
around their children
and serve their own hearts
in a meal they never
share.
8

Patriarcas depiction of the older immigrant women from Italy is one of sympa-
thetic understanding and poignant insight. Some are guilt-ridden and self-effacing
women whose dreams of a better life burn in the lit candles offered to marbled
saints in local Catholic churches. Her female world view is always bifocal: religious
rites are juxtaposed with pagan beliefs, thus we find the pious with the irreverent,
saints with devils, the good with the bad, joy with sadness, past with present, but
always conditioned by the art of story-telling. In her poems, she is able to meta-
phorically present the two extremes of a female world based on silence and yearn-
ing but also on hope and tenderness. It is the voice of the poet who remembers,
protects and transmits with compassion but never with contempt.
Particularly intent are also her poems that tell stories of older women both in
Italy and Canada, such as Paesaggi, where Patriarca affectionately observes an
Italian woman left behind, waiting for a husband who has emigrated and who may
never return. The shade of her face, like the endless waves that distance her from
her husband, are of fine white marble. And sun bleached are also the cobbled
stones, where her husbands steps had left no prints, as if he had never left or
had furtively escaped. But like Mariana in the poem by Tennyson, unrelentingly
for a thousand seasons, she waits for him to appear by the gate, in the morning

8
Gianna Patriarca, Italian Women and Other Tragedies (Toronto: Guernica, 1994), 9.
/ in the evening / when the rain came / from the ocean into silence.
9
Though
seemingly antithetic, even the fate of the mail-order bride was not dissimilar to that
of the women left behind, as can be understood in the poem Daughters for Sale,
where Rosaria, a widow in a resting home, recalls the period when, after the war,
she had married the photograph of a man recognisable only from the waist up,
sent from across the ocean, a man in an envelope. She believed that this man
was to become her passport, her ticket to paradise. But now, as she sits alone
by the fountain at Villa Colombo and waits for sons too busy to visit her, she re-
members only her husbands very large hands, which nonetheless were not
large enough to touch me. What remains of her life of solitude are her memories
of the Sicilian sun and the way it walked on my flesh / warm like an angel and
sometimes with the / fiery steps of a devil, while, in the virtual spaces of this
perfect garden of cement and wrought iron constructed to resemble an Italian
piazza, she knows that the sun wears shoes.
10

A consideration, at this point, must be made with regards to those writers of
second-generation immigrant families who already had a sense of their Canadian-
ness, but lacked or lost the perception of their Italianness. Often the process of re-
appropriating their submerged identity occurs after a long postponed return visit to
Italy. The theme of the journey, represented in ethnic texts either in autobiograph-
ical form or as a metaphor for self-discovery, gives the authors a retrospective view
regarding their sense of displacement and becomes the catalyst whereby they can
reconsider their immigrant experience and the nature of their identity. Mary di
Michele, one of the most prominent Italian-Canadian writers whose works have
been anthologised in diverse Canadian mainstream publications, sees such a jour-
ney as a rite de passage where the spiritual, psychological and cultural consequences
are evident in her later works. The power politics of the gaze, which according to
feminist critics renders the observed female frustrated and powerless, however, has
a double edge in her poems. Throughout her works, di Michele, as the speaking
subject, guides the reader into the threshold of perception to observe the poet
observing herself. It is the reader who is encouraged to be the voyeur. Films, fami-
ly snapshots, cameras and mirrors reflect back that desirable other, so that the read-
ers attention shifts back and forth in a tentative search for truth under the surface
of the unreliable narrating voice. The collection Mimosa, published in 1981
11
, is a
perfect example of this authorial interpolation, where a series of monologues be-
tween two sisters in opposition, Marta and Lucy, and an elderly immigrant father,
Vito, call into question not only family values and concepts of authority, but above
all the emotionally ambivalent feelings each have for the other and which the two

9
Ibid., 12-3.
10
Gianna Patriarca, Daughters for Sale (Toronto: Guernica, 1997), 15-7.
11
Mary Di Michele, Mimosa, in Mimosa and Other Poems (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press/Valley
Editions, 1981), 1-16.

201
sisters, though not without feelings of guilt, try to explain. The correlation between
language and transcultural values permeates much of the poems, while the formal
juxtaposition of the three points of view affords a three-dimensional perspective
on the experience of immigration and its ensuing sense of fragmentation. The texts
are filled with irony, culminating in the fact that while Marta, the obedient and
respectful daughter resentfully demanding attention, is not loved by Vito, on the
other hand his favourite, Lucia, though a poet, is unable to express her sincere love
for him. As underlined by Linda Hutcheon, the title poem is not only about dou-
bleness and fragmentation, about the ideal and the real, past and present, but
above all through the three points of view, the fathers, Martas and Lucias, the
reader is confronted with how Martas overt dependence on hypocrisy conditions
any interpretation
12
one may have of family relationships. However, it could be
argued that the identities of the two sisters seem to fuse to become that of one
woman narrating her schizophrenic tension between female desire and filial duty.
Masking Identities
Unlike Patriarcas or di Micheles literary works, those of Genni Gunn
13
are atypi-
cal in that Gunn refuses to be labelled as Italian-Canadian with its confining and
limiting effects, but prefers rather to assume the mask of a cryptic identity,
14
as
eloquently testified both by the choice of camouflaging her real name, Gemma
Donati, and her exclusive use of the English language. In her poetic works, in par-
ticular, the question of ethnic identity is never the focal point of her attention, just
as the transcultural dimension of her writings is never limited to the rescue of the
cultural heritage of her Italian origins. Her attention is centred on universal themes,
on blending and embracing diverse geographic, psychic and interior spaces in order
to create metaphoric sequences and mythological cross-references which establish
links both inter- and transcultural with the various cultures of the world.
In her most recent collection of poems, Faceless, Gunn explores the theme of
the mask and its multiple possibilities of exposing the dilemma between being,
appearing and regenerating. The genesis of the series of poems in the cycle Face-
less, which gives the title to the collection, is the amazing chronicle of the first
facial transplant carried out in 2005 on a French woman whose dog had disfigured
her in its attempts to awaken her from a suicidal sleep induced by an over-dose of

12
Linda Hutcheon, Splitting Images, 58.
13
The following sections of this paper, regarding the writers Genni Gunn and Janice Kulyk Keefer,
were part of a previously published article but which are here shortened and revised. See Anna Pia
De Luca, Migrant Women: Transnational/Transcultural Identities across Borders in Canadian Fe-
male Writing, in Migration and Fiction: Narratives of Migration in Contemporary Canadian Literature, ed.
Maria Lschnigg and Martin Lschnigg (Heidelberg: Universittsverlag Winter, 2009), 65-7 and 70-1.
14
The term is taken from an essay by Linda Hutcheon, A Crypto-Ethnic Confession, in The Anthol-
ogy of Italian-Canadian Writing, ed. Joseph Pivato (Toronto: Guernica, 1998), 314-23.
sleeping pills. The traumatic experience of the woman, who awakens with a man-
gled face, becomes the backdrop for subsequent poems where the poet explores
the paradox inherent in hiding behind various masks which shift or change accord-
ing to the situation or convention. Faceless, she is unable to recognise herself:
without your face / you could be no one.
15
Even the futile attempt of the wom-
an to camouflage herself under layers of make-up and brand-name clothes in order
to be noticed and accepted by others, paradoxically makes her more anonymous
and invisible, as evinced by Gunns metaphoric and intertextual reference to Hun-
Dun, a faceless bird-like entity, and a representation of Chaos
16
in Chinese my-
thology, who eventually died when the gods of the periphery, in trying to create
order from chaos, drilled seven holes to restructure his face.
Particularly striking is the final vision of the woman with half a face, like the
grotesque statues on display at the Body Worlds exhibit in Los Angeles, statues
with skinless bodies:

through which we glimpse the gears
the turning of our motor hearts
no wonder we dont recognize
our selves without our skins
17

This vision of self as half, however, initiates a catharsis in the woman who finds
herself obliged to put aside her usual disguises and look deep into herself for the
first time. By accepting to mask herself behind the transplanted face of another
suicidal victim, the woman finally obtains redemption, for she acknowledges that
everyone wears multiple masks, masks of self which make us what we are: whole
and authentic. As underlined by Deborah Saidero, the parable of the woman with-
out a face, which Gunn presents in these poems, seems particularly relevant to the
traumatic experience of the migrant woman, who, because of her geographic, cul-
tural and linguistic dislocation/relocation, finds herself donning a series of diverse
masks to protect herself from derision and prejudice.
18
The difficult process of
recuperating and reconstructing a new identity, therefore, implies a need to recon-
sider the restrictive borders of ones own ethnic condition in wider terms that are
both transcultural and interrelated.

15
Genni Gunn, Faceless (Winnipeg: Signature Editions, 2007), 32.
16
Peter Allen and Chas Saunders, Hun-Dun: Ancient God of Chaos and Creation, The Gods of
Chinese Mythology, http://www.godchecker.com/pantheon/chinese-mythology.php?deity=HUN-
DUN (accessed 9 January 2011).
17
Gunn, Faceless, 33.
18
Deborah Saidero, Le maschere dellio: identit transculturale nella poesia italo-canadese, Oltreo-
ceano 3 (2009): 88.

203
Trauma and Memory
The reliance on narrative devices as memoirs and oral tales is also present in Janice
Kulyk Keefers The Green Library, where the chronicling of a half-century of
Ukrainian history from 1941 to 1993 and the trauma of dislocation for the DPs
who ended up in Canada after the Second World War is achieved through the
fragmented reconstruction of Eva Chowns unknown family history, which is
gradually disclosed to her as she pieces together the various stories she hears from
the people who reappear from her past. In recalling the troubled history of the
half-starved DPs who, after the war, were brought in all the way from Germany,
on boats, just like cattle
19
to work in Canadas lumber camps and, when no longer
needed, were dismissed to a life with few possibilities of survival, investigates the
departure-arrival-return motif which informs the experience of diaspora and
which explores the difficulties and hardships of immigrant assimilation versus the
desire to return home. Thus the return journey pattern of this ethnic novel tries
to dissipate the haunting obsession with returning to a place which is no longer
home but which continues, nevertheless, to hinder the experience of fully belong-
ing in the new nation. Within the novel, the intermingling of private memories and
public history undermines the clichs of historical representation and points to-
wards a somewhat mythical approach to history, where meaning exists only in
relation to other stories offered by other people in other places and in different
times. The relationship between the ordinary and the extraordinary, between the
normal and abnormal, functions to undermine the power of historical stereotypes
to shape the characters lives and to debase imposing truths which have been made
to appear as normal. When Eva finds the cut-out photo of a boy who strikingly
resembles her son Ben, mysteriously slid through her front door, her ordinary life
is suddenly disrupted together with her normal identification of herself as Eva
Chown, the daughter of a well-off, upper middle-class Torontonian couple. Her
descent journey into an unknown and unsuspected past discloses an utterly differ-
ent and unreal world, constructed upon stories that never tell the whole truth
20

and that, at times, modulate almost imperceptibly into lies. Yet, despite her aware-
ness of the inherent fictionality of the stories she hears and the unsanctioned his-
torical documents she reads, it is through these that Eva slowly comes to
acknowledge the past as something that inexorably keeps bleeding into the pre-
sent and wont be staunched.
21

As Eva follows the trail of memory and unearths her family secrets and cultur-
al roots, past, present and future fuse, making her the receiver and the bearer not
only of the untold and repudiated stories of all those Displaced Persons who im-
migrated to Canada, leaving their identities behind, but also of those, who, like her

19
Janice Kulyk Keefer, The Green Library (Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996), 49.
20
Ibid., 197.
21
Ibid., 198.
Ukrainian grandmother Lesia Levkovych, were victims of the Nazi suppression of
the Ukrainian language and culture, or of those who, in present-day Ukraine,
struggle to construct their future after centuries of subjection to Tsarist and Soviet-
style imperialism. In addition, by resisting victim/victimizer oppositions, The Green
Library presents the Ukrainian people as both oppressed and oppressors, thus un-
derlining both the painful and brutal historical events of Ukraines colonial past
and precarious present as well as acknowledging their equally leading role in diffus-
ing anti-Semitism within and outside national borders. In revoking the countrys
innumerable invasions and conquerors, the author admits the part of responsibility
that Ukraines aristocracy and intellectuals had in starving the peasants to death. In
a similar manner, she acknowledges the Ukrainians as collaborators of the Nazis in
the persecution of the Jews who were sent off to die at Babyn Yar. The recognition
of historical similarities among different peoples, who have ambivalently been both
the oppressed and the oppressors, functions to deconstruct savage disagreements
and expose the treachery of power relations where victims can turn into victimizers
and perpetuate hierarchical relations.
Evas vertical journey into the past, thus, discloses an important sense of con-
nection with others. Although Evas physical and psychic journey ultimately leads
her to discover the identity of her biological father, a bohunk
22
with whom her
mother had had a brief affair, it is above all through a host of female characters,
which includes her half-senile mother Holly, her parents former Ukrainian house-
keeper Mrs. Moroz, her ex-schoolmate Oksanna and her grandmother Lesia, that
she becomes aware both of her identity as a woman and of the importance of her
ethnicity for self-definition: their lives, their stories she carries them in her
bones, in whatever she makes of herself.
23

Conclusion
For Canadas many immigrants, the postulation within these many texts of a post-
national concept of home has far-reaching consequences, since it enables them to
develop a sense of belonging to their Canadian homeland, without obliging them
to deny their other homes in the process. Thus a far better logo for Canadas mul-
ticultural inhabitants who, like her reference to Janus, the Roman God of thresh-
old and doorways
24
, are split between here and there, the new iconographic
model proposed by Kulyk Keefer points towards a transcultural experience which
challenges the fixed and fragmented separation of the multicultural mosaic and
urges the crossing of all borders and boundaries, not only between self and other

22
Ibid., 77.
23
Ibid., 261.
24
Ibid., 12.

205
or between past and present, but also between the different selves that co-exist
within a persons variegated and constantly changing identity.
As a final consideration, the retrieval of a lost cultural heritage and ancestry
has enabled these Canadian writers to establish a meaningful sense of connection
with the people who had inhabited their adolescent memories. The writing of eth-
nicity on the part of Canadas writers, which Kulyk Keefer in her article Coming
Across Bones has fittingly termed historiographic ethnofiction, involves a per-
sonal struggle between the past and the present, history and memory, between
stories and real life experiences. Thus writing and reading ethnicity becomes a
means to foster comparative awareness and to acknowledge and explore, as
Kulyk Keefer underlines, the connective differences between us.
25
Here a liminal
space of understanding is created and accepted, a space which rejects the stereo-
typical markers of ethnicity. The re-appropriation of the histories, myths, minority
languages and cultures of these hyphenated immigrants aids the process of re-
inscribing self and coming to terms with personal identity, which in the Canadian
multicultural context is created through borrowings, crossings and repositioning of
boundaries that once marked difference but now offer infinite possibilities of crea-
tive transcultural identity.

Bibliography
Allen, Peter, and Chas Saunders. Hun-Dun: Ancient God of Chaos and
Creation. The Gods of Chinese Mythology.
http://www.godchecker.com/pantheon/chinese-mythology.php?deity=HUN-
DUN (accessed 9 January 2011).
Beauregard, Guy. Rattling a Noisy Hyphen. Review of Diamond Grill, by Fred
Wah. Canadian Literature 156 (Spring 1998): 171-2.
Broncato, Sabrina. Glocality and Cultural Identity. This Centurys Review 4 (2006).
http://history.thiscenturysreview.com/gloacality.html (accessed 9 January 2011).
De Luca, Anna Pia. Migrant Women: Transnational/Transcultural Identities
across Borders in Canadian Female Writing. In Migration and Fiction: Narratives
of Migration in Contemporary Canadian Literature, edited by Maria Lschnigg and
Martin Lschnigg, 59-72. Heidelberg: Universittsverlag Winter, 2009.
Di Michele, Mary. Mimosa and Other Poems. Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press/ Valley
Editions, 1981.

25
Janice Kulyk Keefer, Coming Across Bones: Historiographic Ethnofiction, Essays on Canadian
Writing 57 (Winter 1995): 100.
Gunn, Genni. Faceless. Winnipeg: Signature Editions, 2007.
Hutcheon, Linda. A Crypto-Ethnic Confession. In The Anthology of Italian-
Canadian Writing, edited by Joseph Pivato, 314 -23. Toronto: Guernica, 1998.
Hutcheon, Linda. Splitting Images: Contemporary Canadian Ironies. Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1991.
Kulyk Keefer, Janice. Coming Across Bones: Historiographic Ethnofiction.
Essays on Canadian Writing 57 (Winter 1995): 84-104.
Kulyk Keefer, Janice. The Green Library. Toronto: HarperCollins, 1996.
Padolsky, Enoch. You Are Where You Eat: Ethnicity, Food and Cross-Cultural
Spaces. Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal 37.2 (2005): 19-31.
Patriarca, Gianna. Daughters for Sale: Poetry and Prose. Toronto: Guernica, 1997.
Patriarca, Gianna. Italian Women and Other Tragedies. Toronto: Guernica, 1994.
Saidero, Deborah. Le maschere dellio: identit transculturale nella poesia italo-
canadese. Oltreoceano 3 (2009): 87-93.
Schulze-Engler, Frank. Transnationale Kultur als Herausforderung fr die
Literaturwissenschaft. ZAA: Zeitschrift fr Anglistik und Amerikanistik
50.1(2002): 65-79.
Wah, Fred. Diamond Grill. Edmonton: NeWest, 1996.
Welsch, Wolfgang. Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today. In
Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, Work, edited by Mike Featherstone and Scott
Lash, 194-213. London: Sage, 1999.

Social Capital of Migrants in
Transcultural Europe
Marcin Galent
Introduction
The situation of migration is in many respects a tremendously interesting field of
society which organises the dynamic processes of the reconstruction of social iden-
tity of the people who become entangled within in it. It is a unique testing ground
through which run complex interests, cultural determinants and collective identifi-
cation. The challenges posed to migrants in the contemporary world increasingly
expose the element of social reality which in theoretical terms is described as life in
a world in which the collective basis for the construction of social identity is be-
coming more numerous, more diverse, irregular, incoherent and of a fragmentary
nature. As a result, the foundations are becoming increasingly heterogeneous but
also more open to redefinition than ever before.
1

It has been tried to explain this fluidity of social life in relation to numerous
metaphors stemming from the phenomenon of liquid modernity.
2
The identity
of the modern migrant seems to be the quintessence of these variables of identity,
where the explicit nature of the typical adaptation strategies adopted by migrants of
the last 20 years has been influenced by political change, changing technology and
culture to become its current weakened state. European integration has opened up
an even bigger workplace for migrants, while cheap and large scale transportation
and communication links have increased their mobility range to an unprecedented
level. This in turn has led to an increasingly mobile society and culture, where the
borders delineated by the reality of the nation have become even less adequate for
millions of Poles and other Europeans.
The challenge for this article is to contribute to the theoretical, as well as em-
pirical, discourse on issues closely related to migration and identity reconstruction
and their implications for understanding Europe as a transcultural space where
what needs to be recognized, therefore, is [] the dialogical nature of all identi-

1
Matthias L. Maier and Thomas Risse, Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public Discourses (IDNET
Final Report), 2003, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~atasp/texte/030625_risse_idnet.pdf (accessed 12
April 2012).
2
Zygmunt Baumann, Pynna rzeczywisto (Krakw: Wydawnictwo Literackie 2006).
ties and, consequently, that different cultural identifications can and will, in a mul-
ticultural society, cut across each others reified boundaries.
3
Studying migrants
lives leads us to understanding a crucial aspect of the current condition of the
world where the intermingling, transculturality and overlapping of different
groups in a multicultural society show us the fact that cultures mutually, yet une-
qually, influence each other, continuously evolving and reconfiguring themselves.
This is why it is important to remember that social identity should be regarded as a
frequent and never-ending process where something happens rather than as some-
thing one possesses.
This article is based on a research project conducted in 2008 in Leuven (Bel-
gium) by the Institute of European Studies of the Jagiellonian University and the
Modernity and Society 1800-2000 Unit at the University of Leuven. The research
consisted of 40 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Polish migrants of all ages
and social classes, dozens of informal conversations and one month of participant
observation.
Social Capital in the Life of Migrants
One can identify many reasons why the role of social networks, regulated by de-
fined norms, should be treated as an important aspect of the social integration of
migrants. What is most important for this article is the fact that it has been often
observed that the quantity and quality of social contacts determines the reconstruc-
tion of the social identity of migrants.
4
This happens mainly because people are
simply influenced by the society surrounding them. This influence is defined best
as the process which leads to a change in behaviour, opinions and feelings of an
individual who is influenced by what others do, how they think and what they
feel.
5
People simply imitate the behaviour of others, they give in to real or imag-
ined pressures or they conform to those who they consider to have power or au-
thority. This is the process that is best described by the saying Tell me who your
friends are, and I will show you who you are.
That is why the latest theoretical reflections on social capital of migrants have
brought a significant distinction of its two functional types: bridging and bonding
capital. In this context, many researchers point to the fact that in the attempt to
define the significance of social capital in pluralistic societies, that which is of most
importance is not the amount of social capital but its quality: if it is bridging or
bonding. Where bonding capital is understood as inward-looking, reinforcing ex-

3
Gerd Baumann, The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities (London and
New York: Routledge, 1999), 119.
4
Dariusz Niedwiedzki, Migracje i tosamo: Od teorii do analizy przypadku (Krakw: Zakad
Wydawniczy Nomos, 2011), 199-265.
5
Bogdan Wojciszke, Czowiek wrd ludzi: Zarys psychologii spoecznej (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
Naukowe Scholar, 2002), 246.
Social Capital of Migrants in Transcultural Europe

209
clusive identities and a homogenous group, bridging capital, on the other hand, is
outward-looking, linking heterogeneous groups together. The ultimate ideal of
bridging social capital is the transcendence of different identities, as Putnam com-
ments: To build bridging social capital requires that we transcend our social and
political and professional identities [].
6
This distinction is of significant im-
portance in reference to research on the reconstruction process of the dynamics of
the social identity of migrants, where the mere fact of having social capital, without
defining its character, says little about their sense of group belonging, loyalty and
identification.
Migrants build and maintain networks of social relations with members of the
host society and this has a great influence on the strategy of their adaptation, the
process of acculturation and the trajectory of reconstruction of social identity. The
shape and condition of a migrants social capital is of great importance not only for
them but also for the host society. It can, to a large extent, be an indicator of their
process of social and cultural integration.
The experience of migration is first and foremost a change in the social frames
of reference which organise the life of migrants. As it is known, identity cannot be
devoid of context, without a mirror in which the subject of interaction can see
him- or herself, interpret the meaning of these interactions and through them rein-
terpret the image of the self. It exists in a state of constant dialogue between the
individual and the partners of interactions. As a result of this dialogue, the image
or imagination of the self is constantly being redefined. This essential assumption
of the procedural and contextual mechanism of constructing identity is, in this
research, the basis of understanding the changes that take place in the social identi-
ty of migrants, which is dependent on the quantity and quality of social capital
which they have access to. The more contact they have with members of the host
society, the quicker the process of internalisation of new modes of behaviour, sys-
tems of norms, values and meanings can be. The creation of cultural capital in the
host society, as well as its reproduction in the sending society, is a long-term pro-
cess, full of tension, conflicts and opposing pressures.
Investment in certain networks of contacts may, on the basis of conversion,
bring advantages in other types of capital. Each migrant has a limited pool of re-
sources that he can take advantage of in the process of building own social capital.
Some resources have a reconstructive character, such as money. Social encounters
are often tied up with the spending of money; therefore not everyone can afford to
develop a social life. Other resources cannot be reconstructed: the decision to
spend a holiday with one set of friends automatically excludes a holiday with oth-
ers. Amongst migrants in Leuven, the distribution of these resources occurred in a
space dictated by two important dimensions. The first dimension was brought

6
Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2000), 411.
about by the need to maintain contacts with social networks left behind in the
homeland and by the social reality in Leuven. The second dimension was set by the
tension connected with the need to build social capital amongst the host society on
the one hand and by upholding contacts with other Polish migrants on the other.
In other words, every migrant had to make a more or less conscious decision of
whether to uphold social relations in Poland or in Belgium and, when in Belgium,
whether contact with compatriots or with the inhabitants of Leuven were more
important.
The dynamics of tension between the two opposing poles, Leuven place of
origin, most often brought about the need to avoid the trap described in sociologi-
cal literature as the double absence.
7
The essence of this trap rests on the theory
that migrants, pendulum migrants included, often stop participating in social net-
works which they belonged to in their society of origin, while at the same time they
are not able to build the appropriate networks in the host society, by which they
experience a double exclusion. In their place of origin they are increasingly seen as
Belgians, whereas in the place of migration they are still considered as others.
This is where the double absence comes from, which according to Sayad may be
the main cause of psychological discomfort for the migrant. This process may of
course be double-sided. On the one hand, for the migrants the compatriots left in
the country of origin become increasingly more foreign with every visit home. On
the other hand, the reality of the host society never becomes a significant point of
reference; the process of acculturation was never completed, nor was there a feel-
ing of belonging and identification in the new environment and with the social
networks. The migrants remain suspended in a permanent liminal state.
8

The second dimension was determined with reference to different aspects of
the migrants reality: one is pragmatic, the other is in a sense phatic. The building
of social capital in the host society would often result in more or less quantifiable
effects: it increased the chances of a better paid job and accommodation, it gave
hope to the chance of finding a place in a nursery or pre-school for ones kids, it
provided the opportunity to learn the language quicker and more effectively, it
would often build the foundation on which one could feel settled and, because of
this, have a greater confidence in oneself. These utilitarian needs could, of course,
be met by depending on networks existing amongst Polish compatriots in the host
society. However, besides this purely instrumental dimension, all migrants talked
about the profound need to maintain contact with other Poles in order to satisfy
the purely phatic function of contact with people who share the same cultural base.
The value of the contact was simply the contact itself. What was valuable was the
reference to identical or very similar symbolic resources used in the process of
symbolic interaction. This purely phatic function seemed to be decidedly wide-

7
Abdelmalek Sayad, The Suffering of the Immigrant (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004).
8
Zdzisaw Mach, Niechciane miasta (Krakw: Universitas, 1998).

211
spread. Even those respondents who openly confessed that they avoided contact
with other Poles confirmed that from time to time they do meet with their com-
patriots, just because they would not be able to obtain the same satisfaction else-
where that results from the mere possibility to, for example, speak in their native
language. One of the reasons for seeking partners to form a network of contacts
based on their non-instrumental character were most likely the rather small social
distances within the community of migrants living in Leuven. What was decidedly
characteristic of these social networks was the wide range in the socio-economic
standing of the participants to be found within them. The variables which usually
are at the base of forming informal networks in the country of origin, namely age,
education, economic standing and career, played a much lesser role amongst the
migrants in Leuven. The most important variable was a common culture and simi-
lar experience, as well as the pure satisfaction of having the possibility to com-
municate easily in a system of natural cultural codes.
These two dimensions, indicating the poles of tension around which Polish
migrants built and reproduced their social capital, also indicated the framework of
their social activities as well as the strength of social affiliations and emotional
identification. The type of social capital that a migrant enjoyed often indicated the
strength of group belonging and collective identification.
Social Capital vs. Social Identity
The results of empirical research done on the community of Polish migrants in
Leuven allow us to formulate a thesis about the existence of a discernible relation-
ship between the quantity and the quality of pendulum migrants social capital and
the direction of change in the process of reconstruction of their social identity.
These relationships fall into a clearly regular pattern, whose essence is best formu-
lated by four ideal types, whose metaphorical names illustrate the situation that is
representative of the whole Polish migrant population in Leuven. These four types
are: residents, guests, commuters and diasporians.
9

Even though these types lack empirical ontic status, they can possess a very
concrete cognitive value. The names of the ideal types were chosen so that their
connotations could, in the most effective way, encompass the essence of the
modes of reconstruction of social identity. The names are not meant to be treated
in a literal way. At the onset, it is important to clarify that the names have nothing
to do with the length of migration or the frequency of visits back home. Therefore
commuters do not travel back and forth between their homes in Poland and Leu-
ven any more than the other types, while residents do not necessarily encompass

9
Marcin Galent, Idesbald Goddeeris and Dariusz Niedwiedzki, Migration and Europeanisation: Changing
Identities and Values among Polish Pendulum Migrants and their Belgian Employers (Krakow: Zakad
Wydawniczy Nomos, 2009), 45-83.

those who have been living in Leuven for the longest period of time. The research
clearly showed that the actual duration of the migratory period, as well as the fre-
quency of visits back to Poland, do not need to have a deciding influence on the
change of migrants social identity. Many migrants whose stay in the host society
was relatively short were able to very quickly make themselves at home in their
new environment. Others, due to the deficit of certain resources, competences or
because of strategic life plans or ideological choices, felt like strangers to Leuven,
even after more than ten years of migratory peregrination.
Residents
What makes residents different in a significant way to other Polish migrants is the
fact that they did not come to Belgium through the mechanism of chain migration,
but because these were their life plans, aspirations and conscious decisions. Many
of them had links to the university in Leuven; they had been there as Erasmus
students, doctorate students or young researchers. They stayed in Belgium not
because circumstances forced them to do so or because of financial reasons that
compelled them to, but because they decided that life and work there would guar-
antee them more opportunities for personal development, for achieving higher
qualifications and for furthering a career that would be more interesting and with
better prospects: prospects not only in terms of higher wages but also for making
use of their talents and intellectual potential. A common trait of residents was the
fact that their social identity was very weakly defined by territorial or national iden-
tification, Polish or Belgian. The activities of residents were not dictated by a
national framework but by their individual qualifications, competences, ambitions
and potential channels of their realisation. These activities are coupled with chang-
es in mentality. The consequence of these changes was the acceptance of their new
multicultural environment as a naturally ordered world where national and ethnic
diversity is simply one of the aspects of the lifeworld, or Lebenswelt,
10
and where
multiculturalism is one of the obvious and natural components of life and its eve-
ryday interactions. Polishness does not disappear from their lives, it is treated as
the kind of natural cultural baggage that everyone in the world carries, and not
something that is the basis of classification into us and them. The majority of
respondents treated their decisions as a natural and obvious consequence of living
in a unified Europe and a globalised world.
Guests
The second type of migrants are the guests. This type consisted mainly of those
migrants whose social capital was limited to acquaintances, friends or family who

10
Alfred Schtz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

213
helped to organise their lives abroad, but while living in Leuven were able to make
and maintain contacts with others, albeit mainly compatriots living in the city.
This type of social capital had a decidedly binding character right from the start,
but with time these bonds extended to certain Belgians, with whom relations start-
ed to be close and even intimate. The guests mechanism of building social capital
was determined mainly by practical factors, but with time these factors evolved and
were supplemented with purely social and disinterested relations. This ability to
develop close relations with inhabitants of Leuven resulted in a transformation of
social identity in the direction that can be best described as transnational. The re-
construction of social identity took place in a framework dictated by two national
cultures and thus somewhere in between what was broadly understood by the mi-
grants to be Polish and Belgian.
Commuters
The third type of migrant are commuters. Their patterns were characterised by
the most impoverished social capital, on the whole limited to their closest family
ties or a wider circle of Polish friends and, as a result, their social capital has an
unusually binding character. The life of the migrant is dominated by working for
savings, scrimping in a manner referred to as saving every penny, reducing ex-
penditure and activity outside of work to a minimum. The point of reference was
always the reality that was left in the country of origin. This was not, however, a
Poland treated as an imagined community,
11
but more a private homeland
12
rep-
resented by their home, family and friends in their country.
Diasporians
The fourth type of migrant which may be analysed, in terms of the change that
their social identity underwent in Leuven, are those referred to as diasporians.
What differentiated them completely from the other three types was open verbali-
sation and confirmation of different activities connected to Polishness, understood
as Polish national identity. What united them was a need to maintain and strength-
en the social networks amongst Poles. The character of their social capital has a
bridging nature, in the sense that whilst residents are not dependent upon institu-
tionalised relations with their fellow countrymen and guests and commuters tend
to function only amongst their own particular social networks, the diasporians are
motivated to create a network based on one criteria, namely nationality. However,
from the perspective of the whole of Leuvens society, the character of social capi-
tal created in this way has a decidedly binding nature. Diasporians try to create

11
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London:
Verso 1983).
12
Stanisaw Ossowski, O ojczynie i narodzie (Warszawa: PWN 1984).
and institutionalise a network of social relations mainly on the basis of belonging
to Polish culture, understood as a national culture. In a manner different to the
residents and guests, who do not regard Polishness as an integral, clearly defined
whole, in the consciousness of the diasporians it is reproduced as a precise and
obvious model. The aim of their activity in Leuven society became to reconcile
Polishness with emigration.
Conclusion
The results of the research presented here use as an indicator the scale and quality
of the social capital that characterises migrants. An obvious conclusion, in accord-
ance with what was mentioned earlier, is the diversity of the ways in which the
reconstruction of collective identity is not only illustrated by the migrant popula-
tion of Leuven but also in relation to how a given individual, in the course of his
career, may adhere to a greater or a lesser extent to these ideal types. It is very easy
to imagine that, for example, the commuter type may also change into one of the
other three.
The question connected to numbers and percentages also arises, namely how
many pendulum migrants in Leuven are residents, guests, commuters or di-
asporians? The experience we gained from our research is that those with greater
social capital are generally overrepresented in social research. They are people who
are generally more open, they do not shun contact with others, they trust that their
motivation will be in some sense useful.
The final aspect is the question of to what degree these four types may be ex-
tended to the wider world, to what extent they are limited to the microsociety of
Polish migrants in Leuven and to what extent they could be used to describe the
millions of migrants in Europe.


215
Bibliography
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983.
Bauman, Zygmunt. Pynna rzeczywisto. Krakw: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2006.
Baumann, Gerd. The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic, and Religious
Identities. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.
Galent, Marcin, Idesbald Goddeeris and Dariusz Niedwiedzki. Migration and
Europeanisation: Changing Identities and Values among Polish Pendulum Migrants and
their Belgian Employers. Krakw: Zakad Wydawniczy Nomos, 2009.
Mach, Zdzisw. Niechciane miasta. Krakw: Universitas, 1998.
Maier, Matthias L., and Thomas Risse, ed. Europeanization, Collective Identities and
Public Discourses (IDNET Final report). 2003.
http://cordis.europa.eu/documents/documentlibrary/82608121EN6.pdf
(accessed 12 April 2012).
Niedwiedzki, Dariusz. Migracje i tosamo: Od teorii do analizy przypadku. Krakw:
Zakad Wydawniczy Nomos, 2011.
Ossowski, Stanisaw. O ojczynie i narodzie. Warszawa: PWN, 1984.
Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
Sayad, Abdelmalek. The Suffering of the Immigrant. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004.
Schtz Alfred. The Phenomenology of the Social World. Evanston, IL: Northwestern
Wojciszke, Bogdan. Czowiek wrd ludzi: Zarys psychologii spoecznej. Warszawa:
Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2002.

The Neustadt in Strasbourg
A Space for Transcultural Identity Building?
Alexandre Kostka
Introduction
In 2012, Strasbourg was actively preparing the application for a UNESCO World
heritage label for an area which occupies a substantial amount of space of the inner
city: the so-called Neustadt, a term which designates the urban extension planned
and built mostly in the North Eastern part of the town between 1878 and 1918, at
a moment when Alsace-Lorraine was part of the German Reich.
1
The Neustadt is

1
This article owes much to the discussions in the framework of the research project Gense et
rception de larchitecture et des formes urbaines dans une rgion frontalire (1850-1950): Une his-
toire croise franco-allemande, which is being conducted since 2010 at the MISHA (Maison Interu-
niversitaire des Sciences Humaines en Alsace; Anne-Doris Meyer, Karine Dupr, Sophie Eberhardt,
Johannes Dahm). See: www.misha.fr/sites/5/File/li10-misha-web.pdf (accessed 5 April 2012).
The paper is also much indebted to Marc Schalenberg, Centre for Metropolitan Studies, Berlin,
for many research perspectives regarding the question of urban icons. In the limited space of this
contribution, many aspects can only be touched upon they will be developed more fully as the
research programme at MISHA unfolds.
The fundamental research on the question has been accomplished by Klaus Nohlen, Baupolitik im
Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen, 1871-1918: Die reprsentativen Staatsbauten um den ehemaligen Kaiserplatz in
Strassburg (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1982); French translation: id.: Construire une capitale, Strasbourg imprial de
1870 1918 (Strasbourg: Socit savante dAlsace, 1997); id., Strasbourg aprs 1870: rorganisation
des espaces, in Villes rattaches, villes reconfigures XVI
e
-XX
e
sicles, ed. Denise Turrel (Tours: Presses
universitaires Franois-Rabelais, 2003), 231-45.
The contribution also draws on many publications, which for reason of space are not always
mentioned specifically, but which are to be found in the bibliography: Franois Uberfill, Strasbourg,
capitale du Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen: la dcouverte de la Neustadt, Saisons dAlsace 45 (2010):
45-53; Strasbourg 1900: Naissance dune capital, ed. Rodolphe Rapetti (Paris: Somogy, 2000) (holds many
interesting individual contributions); Jean-Marie Perouse de Montclos and Brigitte Parent, Alsace: Le
dictionnaire du patrimoine (Strasbourg: La Nue Bleue, 2011); Jean-Pierre Beck, Guy Bronner and
Dominique Toursel-Harster, Dictionnaire des monuments historiques dAlsace (Strasbourg: La Nue Bleue,
1995); Denis Durand de Bousingen et. al., ed., Strasbourg: urbanisme et architecture des origines nos jours
(Strasbourg: Oberlin, 1996); Georges Foessel et. al., ed., Strasbourg: Panorama monumental (Strasbourg:
G4J, 2003; originally published in 1984); Francis Weidmann, Strasbourg, capitale du Reichsland et sa
nouvelle universit (Strasbourg: Oberlin, 1995); Conseil de lEurope. ed., Le projet urbain dans lhistoire de
Strasbourg: Actes du colloque des 30 et 31 octobre 1981 (Strasbourg: Conseil de lEurope, 1983); Angla
Kerdils Weiler, Limites urbaines de Strasbourg, volution et mutation (Strasbourg: Socit Savante dAlsace,

not yet a household name for specialists of urban planning. They are wrong. Turn-
ing the prestigious but somewhat provincial town on the Rhine into a regional
capital, even a showcase for German Kultur, was one of the most important urban
planning projects of the 19
th
century. Baron Haussmanns intervention on the still
mostly medieval tissue of Paris (1852-1870) and the construction of the Ringstras-
se (1857-1913, built in several phases) in Vienna were bigger in total size; but if one
takes as a measure the size of the original town, the construction of the Neustadt
ranks probably among the most profound restructurings of a traditional habitat,
since the Old town has approximately only one third of the size of its extension
(230 ha to 610 ha). If the addition is bigger than the original portion, a question
of hierarchy between old and new arises, which otherwise is relevant only in the
case of colonial towns such as the extension of Delhi to become New Delhi (inau-
gurated in 1913). One has to add another criterion, less visible, but which is at least
as important. Both Paris and Vienna had, at the moment of the re-engineering of
the city centre, vibrant outskirts which had flourished with industrialisation.
2
None
of this existed in Strasbourg, still mostly a town of merchants and notables, where
military reasons (the town was protected by a large ring which was to be flooded as
the enemy approached) forbade any construction for several kilometres around the
old fortifications.
What made this venture even more daring, was its transnational nature, since
on a multi-layered town existing since Roman times, the authorities of the newly
founded German Reich were aiming to construct a town that would not only pro-
claim military victory, but would appear to usher the medieval town directly into a
bright 20
th
century under a new tutelage with the clear desire to push the French
period (which had begun in 1681 with the formal annexation of Strasbourg until
then a free city under the protection of the Germanic emperor by the Sun King,
Louis XIV) into the shade.
Today, with the Franco-German rapprochement de facto being the motor of
European unification, with the cultural television channel ARTE being symbolical-
ly established at the border of the Rhine, it is a clear signal of a new era of transcul-
tural identity that a French border city like Strasbourg puts forward its Germanic

2005); Franois Loyer, Architecture et urbanisme Strasbourg, 1910-1930, thematic issue of Monuments
Historiques (Paris: Caisse nationale des monuments historiques et des sites, 1990); contemporanean
voices: Architekten und Ingenieur Verein fr Elsass-Lothringen, ed., Strassburg und seine Bauten
(Strassburg: Trbner, 1894); Charles Goehner and Emil Brumder, Geschichte der rumlichen Entwicklung
der Stadt Strassburg (Strasbourg: Heitz & Co., 1935). There are many historical narratives of Strasbourg,
the most recent are: Benot Jordan, Histoire de Strasbourg (Paris: Gisserot, 2006); Guy Trendel, Racontez-
moi Strasbourg (Strasbourg: La Nue Bleue, 2006).
2
The control of a potentially menacing proletarian suburb even was one of the central preoccupa-
tions after the riots of 1848. In Vienna, where the centre housed a vulnerable aristocratic society
which had been blockaded; in Paris, it was rather the control of an equally menacing overpopulated
city centre that preoccupied Napoleon III. None of these motivations for new city planning exist in
Strasbourg.

219
cultural heritage in order to receive a UNESCO world heritage label. One has to
remember that this venture is transnational in itself and thus reflects perfectly the
ultimate aim of UNESCO, which is not to give out good points to any given
particularly meriting nation but to distinguish and protect a cultural good for the
sake of humankind as such.
Yet, somewhat surprisingly, it is impossible to find a single street in the city
centre or the Neustadt itself that would be named after one of the mayors who
engineered the urban planning (Otto Back, Rudolf Schwander) or one of the main
architects responsible for this very large urban planning project (August Orth,
Hermann Eggert, Fritz Beblo, Paul Bonatz, Paul Schmitthenner, etc.).
3
Even the
architect who designed the original master plan, Jean-Geoffroy Conrath, although
a Frenchman appointed during the times of Napoleon III and despite the fact that
he was able to leave most of the French urban texture untouched, only got a mea-
gre little street in a commercial suburb!
4

It is even fair to say that until very recent times the Neustadt had been some-
what shunned by large parts of the Strasbourg population; its history was not
shared to the same degree as other central parts of the town in the collective
memory in the sense of the inventor of this much-used term, Maurice Halbwachs
who became professor at the University of Strasbourg in 1919.
5
One of its major
urban icons, the Emperors Palace (which now houses the Central Commission
for Navigation on the Rhine) was about to be torn down in the early 1950s, alt-
hough it had survived the war almost unscathed. The unofficial memory states that
the building owes its survival mainly to its sturdiness as it was made of massive
stone, with an impressive iron-concrete structure underlying, the authorities were
afraid it would be just too costly to blow it up and carry the debris outside the city
gates. One has to add that for more than one citizen of Strasbourg, this building
had not been the palace of the Emperor anymore (who, in any case, had had no
particular taste for the citizen culture of the city and had preferred to dwell in his
lofty Hohenzollern fairy-dream castle of Hohknigsburg) but of the terrible Nazi
Gauleiter Robert Wagner.
This clearly points to an identity problem, which, of course, cannot be ad-
dressed by this publication, but upon which some light can be shed by looking into
the complicated genesis of the Neustadt and by asking questions about its transna-

3
There are of course notable exceptions, that point to a shift of the place of the Neustadt in the
mental landscape of the city, see, for instance, Franois Uberfill, Rodolphe Schwander, maire
alsacien de Strasbourg sous le Reichsland (1906-1918), in Autour des Dietrich: Hommages Ady Schwan-
der et Edouard Schloesing, ed. Bernard Vogler (Reichshoffen: Association de Dietrich, 2008), 134-65.
4
A street named after him is located in the recently urbanised zone Parc des Poteries; the same
honour is shared by Otto Back, who was mayor when he was active (doing what?).
5
About collective memory, see Aleida Assmann, Erinnerungsrume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturel-
len Gedchtnisses (Munich: Beck, 1999); Jan Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedchtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und
politische Identitt in frhen Hochkulturen (Munich: Beck, 1997).
tional nature by making use of the theory of histoire croise forwarded by Michael
Werner and Bndicte Zimmermann, which seems most appropriate for under-
standing its specificity.
6
In particular, we will see how the urban space is punctuat-
ed by urban icons which try to connect different cultural spaces somewhat
loosely and incorrectly labelled as Germanic and French inside the city bor-
ders.
7
Altogether, these perspectives may help to gain a new understanding of an
important part of the Strasbourg cityscape that begins to regain its proper place in
the mental landscape of its inhabitants.
Town Planning and Building of National Identity
at the End of the 19
th
Century
The French monarchy, which had annexed Alsace Lorraine after the Treaties of
Westphalia in 1648, for reasons which we cannot address in the framework of this
paper, never tried to annex Alsace culturally.
8
This was particularly evident as far
as language was concerned. It was enough that a part of the social elites those
who would have to deal with tax collectors, judges, military commanders etc.
understood what was asked of them. Conversely, the civil administrators sent from
Paris, whatever their personal sympathies with Alsace might be (and there seem to
have been many), never bothered to learn the dialect of the region.
However, in order to show its newly acquired power, France took a stratagem
that was to have a long future: it created the first modern urban icon in the still
medieval cityscape: the bishops residence, the Palais Rohan. Named after one of
the families most closely connected to the royal household, the palace was built by
none other than the Premier architecte du roi, Robert de Cotte, between 1728 and
1741. Its clear, classical style was in sharp contrast with its surroundings; the
building site itself, which brought together some of the finest craftsmen of France
and Alsace, proved to be one of the principal design schools, which helped bring-
ing Strasbourg into the orbit of the latest Paris fashion. A generation after its con-

6
Michael Werner and Bndicte Zimmermann, Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croise and the
Challenge of Reflexivity, History and Theory 45.1 (2006): 30-50. Originally published in a larger
framework including case-studies: De la comparaison lhistoire croise, ed. Michael Werner and Bndicte
Zimmermann (Paris: Seuil, 2004).
7
The architectural critic Charles Jencks launched the term in 2005, in order to describe the star
architecture that followed the city branding by the construction of the Guggenheim Museum in
Bilbao by Frank O. Gehry (1997); see Charles Jencks, The Iconic Building: The Power of Enigma (New
York: Rizzoli, 2005); since, the discussion has broadened and has fallen on fertile grounds for earlier
periods, see Philip J. Ethington and Vanessa R. Schwartz, ed., Urban Icons, special issue of Urban
History 33:1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See the focus article by Celina Krebs,
Marc Schalenberg and Sandra Schrmann, Spektakel, Allheilmittel, Forschungsfeld: Perspektiven auf
Urban Icons, Informationen zur modernen Stadtgeschichte 2/2011: 7-16.
8
This seeming indifference contrasted with a quite pushy attitude towards Lorraine, which officially
joined France as late as 1766.

221
struction, in 1773, the young Johann Wolfgang von Goethe paid indirect homage
to the building, by choosing it as a backdrop in his propaganda for the glorification
of the Germanic genius of the supposed builder of the Strasbourg cathedral, Erwin
von Steinbach.
9

The French building policy did, of course, not rest on one single building; a lit-
tle later, in 1765, the famous architect Jacques-Franois Blondel presented the
project for a complete redesign of the city-centre a project that lacked funding
and political will, but which nevertheless brought about the destruction of the last
remnant of the status of Strasbourg as free city, the former town hall, and the
construction of the Aubette, a large rectangular building which was to house the
military commander of the citadel.
Thus when the Germans moved in to conquer the city, they found a surround-
ing that seemed not unlike the cityscape they could find in Nuremberg, Augsburg,
or other cities of the Southern part of Germany. On the other side, the Alsatians,
who had strong regional links with Baden, Wrttemberg, and the Palatinate, were
surprised that the Prussians did not resemble at all their peaceful neighbours.
The linguistic factor proved to be a false indicator and might have been re-
sponsible for much of the future misunderstandings (both in the symbolic and
concrete sense). Most of the population of Alsace and much of the population of
Lorraine spoke a German dialect (several, in fact, with regional differences as in
Switzerland). The Alsatian language has survived in parts until today, but it is far
from having the importance it had in the late 19
th
century, when only the upper
strata of society (i.e. those who were in touch with the authorities in Paris) were
completely fluent in high French.
10
This linguistic factor, together with the strong
presence of Protestantism in its Lutheran version (France is mostly Catholic and
the Protestant minority is of Calvinist obedience), contributed to persuading the
German political and military authorities that they would be able to convince the
inhabitants of the region to join the national framework Bismarck was establishing
after the victory of 1871.
At the outset, the attitude of the German authorities vis--vis Strasbourg was
quite moderate and they wished to avoid the impression that a hard yoke was im-
posed upon the population. The Germans also felt they had to make good for the
heavy destructions they had inflicted upon the town during a siege which had de-
generated into one of the first massive destructions of cultural heritage in Europe
since the Napoleonic times. Indeed, the German armies under General von

9
Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Von deutscher Baukunst: D.M. Ervini a Steinbach, originally published in Von
Deutscher Art und Kunst: Einige fliegende Bltter, ed. Johann Gottfried Herder (Hamburg: Bode, 1773).
10
On the strong links of the cultural elites in Strasbourg with France, see Anne-Doris Meyer, Au
service de lAlsace: lettres dHugo Haug Henri Albert, 1904-1914 (Strasbourg: Publications de la Socit
savante dAlsace, 2010); Bernard Vogler, Histoire culturelle de lAlsace: Du Moyen Age nos jours Les trs
riches heures dune rgion frontire (Strasbourg: La Nue bleue, 1994).
Werder, knowing the symbolic value of a conquest of Strasbourg, wished not to
lose time and during the shelling of the heavy fortification many historical build-
ings such as the cathedral got badly damaged while the Art Museum and the Li-
brary (containing a very precious Medieval manuscript, the Hortus Deliciarum) as
well as the Opera house were destroyed. In the years following the conquest, the
Germans simply repaired what they had destroyed, rebuilding the Opera house
and various churches and civil buildings, which had suffered from the bombarding,
just as they had been before.
At a time when the German Empire thought to establish itself as a Kulturstaat,
Strasbourg became a showcase. Culture was the magical word, which would allow
for making forget the violent conquest of the city and would also give meaning to
Bismarcks politico-military establishment of the nation-state (which would soon
be ridiculed in Nietzsches Untimely Considerations). As soon as summer 1871, the
University was at the centre of preoccupation, a library was founded and generous-
ly funded, and an art gallery was established which took as its model the prestig-
ious Berlin museum.
11
This soft approach was also in line with a general policy,
which might be described as functionalist (if one admits a loose definition): as
more and more opportunities would arise in the political and economic realm and
spaces for decisions would progressively be shifted to local authorities, it was
hoped that Alsatians would take the chance to participate, even that the social
elites themselves would take initiatives in order to show their new solidarities. In
the past, had not the neighbouring German regions of Baden, Wrttemberg, and
the Palatinate shown their political sympathies with Paris by adopting the latest
French styles, going as far as to invite the architects of the king in Versailles to
draw up their chteaux (Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Solitude close to Stuttgart, etc.)?
For many reasons, it soon became clear that, if Strasbourg would have to live
up to its new function as regional capital of the new German state of Alsace-
Lorraine, it had to be equipped accordingly and that the initiative had to come
from outside. In 1873, the German authorities took direct charge of municipal
administration, disbanded the city council and imposed Otto Back as caretaker
municipal administrator (for which the German language holds the delicious ex-
pression of Brgermeistereiverwalter). Back proved to be an energetic administrator,
slowly gaining the respect of the citizens he was administering. This move lead to
the establishment of the Neustadt, or German town, not as an extension of the
Old, culturally multi-layered Strasbourg but as a side-by-side venture of a model
city which was erected on formerly virgin grounds.

11
Bernadette Schnitzler, Histoire des muses de Strasbourg: des collections entre France et Allemagne (Stras-
bourg: Muses de la Ville de Strasbourg, 2009); Tanja Baensch, Un petit Berlin? Die Neugrndung der
Straburger Gemldesammlung durch Wilhelm Bode im zeitgenssischen Kontext: Ein Beitrag zur Museumspolitik
im deutschen Kaiserreich (Gttingen: V & R unipress, 2007).

223
How to Connect a New City to Its Urban History?
Figure 1
12

Figure 2
13

12
AVCUS (Archives de la Ville et de la Communaut Urbaine de Strasbourg).
13
Ibid.
As soon as 1871, the military engineers started to think about a possible extension
of the city, which was conditioned to the structure of the fortification.
14
Since the
17
th
century, the city had been defended according to a plan designed by the archi-
tect of the iron belt, Vauban.
15
The improvement of the artillery made this strate-
gy obsolete and the German military designed a new line of outpost forts, which
were to block approaching armies far enough away to prevent a bombardment
such as the one they themselves had inflicted. Only in 1875, when this line was
completed, could a new urban planning be seriously considered: in Metz, the main
fortress against France, the German military prevented any new construction until
1902! It was only a direct order from Wilhelm II, given in his capacity a supreme
commander of the armed forces, that opened the way.
16

This still left unanswered the question of how to construct the new German
city, a question which was of course loaded with heavy political implications.
In 1877, two projects were submitted for final decision by the authorities: one
by the Berlin architect August Orth and one by Jean-Geoffroy Conrath, the archi-
tect in chief of the city, who had been appointed in the days of Napoleon III and
who had chosen to stay and work together with the German authorities.
Interestingly, it is the solution suggested by the Berlin architect Orth that bears
most witness to the influence of the plans developed by Baron Haussmann in Paris
one could almost speak of the return of a French design via Germany to the
border region separating the two countries. Orth suggested a complete redesign of
the city in order to connect the new city to the old, which would have completely
altered not only the central part of the French period from the 18
th
century, the
Place Broglie, but would also have destroyed a large part of the urban habitat da-
ting from the German period of the 16
th
and 17
th
century (figure I). This echoes
the way Haussmann moved through large parts of the medieval Paris, especially in
the Ile de la Cit, where few stones were left unturned.
In contrast, the plan of Conrath (figure II) appeared to be quite moderate, as
he suggested to keep the existing town intact, with very few alterations only where
the two towns were to be connected (on the site of the former north western forti-
fication, where several old bridges had to give way to new structures).
Instead of connecting the old and the new towns by means of designing large
avenues prolonging the New City into the Old as Haussmann had done in Paris,
whose example Orth was ready to follow , Conrath suggested that the two parts
of the future Strasbourg should be held together by an optical reference to the one
iconic building upon which the Alsatian bourgeoisie and the Germans could all

14
See Nohlen, note 1.
15
Roland Recht, Georges Foessel and Jean-Pierre Kelin, Connatre Strasbourg (Strasbourg: Alsatia,
1988), and references note 1.
16
Jean-Jacques Cartal, Dominique Laburte and Paul Maurand, Les villes pittoresques: tudes sur
larchitecture et lurbanisme de la ville allemande de Metz entre 1870 et 1918 (Nancy: C.E.M.P.A., 1981).

225
agree: the Cathedral.
17
Though the Cathedral is universally known, it might be
necessary to remind the reader that its spire was the tallest historical building in
Christendom until the tower of the Cathedral of Ulm received a metal contraption
in 1890 which made it slightly higher than Strasbourg. Very astutely, Conraths
plans were designed in such a way that the tower of the Cathedral should be visible
from almost any central point of the Neustadt.
Using the Cathedral as urban icon, Conrath would be able to respect both the
contract of connecting the Old and the New towns and to respect the cultural
multi-layer structure that has given the town its very special transcultural identity
up to now.
With a very small majority, it was Conraths design that was finally agreed upon
by the authorities. One has to bear in mind, however, that already at that moment,
the discussion was not polarised around national issues but rather by a techno-
cratic way of thinking, which focused around a book such as Reinhardt Baumeis-
ters Urban Extension in Technical, Security and Economical Aspects, which was published
in 1876 and had received a large reception.
18
Baumeister was even one of the
members of the jury, who gave the contract to Conrath. It is thus fair to state that
besides national considerations (which were of course present) there is another
discourse that is parallel, which is the discourse of the expert who is not linked to
a particular nation but to a field of competence. This transnational expert
knowledge is one of the aspects that current historical presentations of urban
planning, which are too nation-focused, have frequently underestimated.
This left open the question in what style the New City was to be constructed.
At the time of nation-building, stylistic options were never simply a matter of aes-
thetics.
19
Especially in Germany, the new nation state thought to establish itself by
means of a patriotic Gothic, or rather neo-gothic, style. Later on, when it became
common knowledge that the Gothic style was actually of French origin, it was the
Roman style that was mostly chosen for official buildings such as schools, post
offices, barracks, and railway stations and the case of Metz bears witness to this
(sometimes very loud) message in stone. It is therefore surprising to notice that in
Strasbourg this visual language is almost absent. With some notable exceptions
such as the Central Post Office (1899, Neo-Gothic) and the Central Synagogue

17
The number of books on the cathedral of Strasbourg alone testify to its iconic status, see: Stras-
bourg: La grce dune cathdrale, ed. Mgr Joseph Dor (Strasbourg: La Nue Bleue, 2007), which contains
an extensive bibliography.
18
Reinhardt Baumeister, Stadterweiterungen in technischer, baupolizeilicher und wirtschaftlicher Beziehung (Ber-
lin: Ernst & Korn, 1876). See also the very influential book of the architect in charge of the almost
contemporanean Neustadt of Cologne (1881, doubling the size from 400h to 800h), Joseph Stbben,
Der Stdtebau: Handbuch der Architektur (Darmstadt: Bergstrasser, 1890), which was to become a text-
book for urban planning, republished in several editions until 1924.
19
Ekkehard Mai and Stephan Waetzold, ed., Kunstverwaltung, Bau- und Denkmal-Politik im Kaiserreich
(Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1981).
(1896, Neo-Roman, demolished during the Nazi occupation in 1940-41), the Neu-
stadt is built in a heteroclite association of styles, combining mostly Neo-
Renaissance (both in its Italian and South-German version) and Neo-Baroque,
but also associating elements of Orientalism
20
, Art Nouveau
21
, and even frequent
allusions to such typically French styles as Louis XIII and even the sober French
baroque favoured under Louis XIV. It frequently happens, as in the case of the
headquarter of the former insurance company Germania (1885, subsequently
named Gallia), that a single building exhibits even a multi-layer style, where
German Renaissance with its use of brick and stone alludes to the French Louis
XIII style.
22

The Neustadt and Its Stylistic Heterogeneity:
A Discussion about Transnational City Building?
The history of architecture is itself a tributary to national stereotypes.
23
Since build-
ing is considered to be the most symbolic gesture of sovereignty, historians of
architecture have a natural tendency to apply this criterion to the urban projects
they consider. Thus they tend to overestimate the impact of the nation-state on
building policies, which pervade not only the state architecture (like the Palace of
the Emperor, the University, etc.) but also a large quantity of private buildings
which obey to a different agenda. These entrepreneurs did not want to fulfil a pat-
riotic programme but tried to keep their options open, in order to attract patrons
which desired to live in a neutral setting. Including French styles (such as the
already mentioned Louis XIII) was also a way of indicating to potential Alsatian
patrons that they were welcome as well.
24
Looked upon closely enough, the homo-

20
The orientalizing style is for instance to be seen at the Egyptian house (Maison gyptienne, archi-
tect Franois Scheyder, decorator Adolphe Zilly), 10 Avenue du Gnral Rapp, constructed between
1905 and 1906.
21
See Shelly Hornstein, Tendance darchitecture Art Nouveau Strasbourg, PhD thesis (Strasbourg: Univer-
sit de Strasbourg, 1981).
22
Immeuble Gallia (1885, architects Heinrich Joseph Kayser, Karl von Groheim), 1 Boulevard de la
Victoire, Strasbourg. The building was said to be the most beautiful in Strasbourg; Kayser and von
Groheim established a successful office and belonged to the top league of the Berlin architects,
where they worked, for instance, alongside a giant such as Alfred Messel, for the Wertheim Depart-
ment store chain (Alexanderplatz building). Both Kayser and von Groheim were students of August
Orth, who had submitted one of the master-plans for the Strasbourg Neustadt (see above). They
were also the architects of many residential villas in the Tiergarten, the best address in Berlin.
23
Volker Gebhardt, Das Deutsche in der deutschen Kunst (Cologne: Dumont, 2004) (with bibliographical
references); Andreas Daum, Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban Spaces for the Nation, in
Berlin-Washington, 1800-2000: Capital Cities, Cultural Representation and National Identities, ed. Andreas
Daum and Christoph Mauch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-28.
24
Quite few Alsatian or French families seem to have accepted this offer, giving the Neustadt a quite
coherent Germanic sociological profile; for the relations between Germans and Alsatians, see the
standard work by Franois Uberfill and Pierre Aycoberry, La socit strasbourgeoise entre France et Alle-


227
geneously Germanic character gives way to a more flexible approach. One can go
as far as considering that the architecture of Strasbourg can be judged most accu-
rately against the background of an approach labelled histoire croise and developing
a special sensibility for aspects which are suppressed by a univocally national per-
spective.
25

This is one of the angles of a current research project which has been conduct-
ed under the supervision of Herv Doucet and the author since 2010 at the
MISHA (Maison Interuniversitaire des Sciences Humaines en Alsace).
26
For in-
stance, it is interesting to note and demands investigation that many of the
architects who were active in Strasbourg did not only work in Strasbourg but ra-
ther developed a regional identity that stretched out to the capital of the neigh-
bouring region of Baden, Karlsruhe, were many of them received professional
training. The same applies to many of the artisans, masons, bricklayers, or carpen-
ters, who moved from building site to building site according to the economic
situation, carrying with them certain styles and professional tendencies. Similarly, it
has to be asked how the buildings were perceived during the moment of their con-
struction, whether there was a specific intention and how this was being con-
veyed, and how the diverse categories of public responded to this offer. This
should also include the important yet total neglected question of how this
building project (one of the largest of the German Empire as a whole) was market-
ed.
27

In addition, the case of the Neustadt also shows that cultural historians have to
remember one of the central rules of their craft and be very careful about the pre-
cise date of the building that is considered; looked upon closely enough, the object
Neustadt tends to show several facets that do not necessarily totally overlap. Indeed,
the case of the Municipal Bath
28
(built 1904-1910), for instance, shows that this
building, although it is situated in the central perimeter of the official building pro-
ject, in immediate vicinity of the University and not too far away from the Central
Post Office
29
(both of which are emblematic buildings of the Reich), bears witness

magne (1871-1924): la socit strasbourgeoise travers les mariages entre Allemands et Alsaciens lpoque du
Reichsland Le sort des couples mixtes aprs 1918 (Strasbourg: Socit savante dAlsace, 2001).
25
See note 6.
26
See above, note 1.
27
See Thomas Biskup and Marc Schalenberg, Die Vermarktung Berlins in Geschichte und Gegen-
wart, in Selling Berlin: Imagebildung und Stadtmarketing von der preuischen Residenz bis zur Bundeshauptstadt,
ed. Thomas Biskup and Marc Schalenberg (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008), 9-21.
28
Bains Municipaux (1905-1908, 1910-11, architect Fritz Beblo), 10 Boulevard de la Victoire.
29
Htel des Postes (1897-1899, architects Ewald von Rechenberg and Ernst Hake), 2 Boulevard de la
Victoire. Initially, the building was supposed to be built in Neo-Renaissance; finally, on the insistence
of the Secretary of State von Stephan, the more Germanic Neo-Gothic was chosen, see Harry Franz
and Maryline Simler, 1899, lHtel des Postes de Strasbourg (Strasbourg: Socit dhistoire de La Poste et
de France Telecom en Alsace, 2009).
to a completely different spirit of organizing the urban space.
30
Its aim is certainly
not, as one might hastily consider, to bring the gift of German spirit of cleanliness
to a French public which supposedly too infrequently made use of soap. Rather, it
has to be seen against the backdrop of a new feeling of proud self-administration
of the municipal authorities under the leadership of the energetic left wing politi-
cian Rudolf Schwander, who, after the German authorities had transferred powers
back to the elected mayor, embarked on a vast series of enterprises showing the
initiative of the city. The building, designed by the municipal architect Fritz Beblo,
displays a style that could be located as a Neo-Baroque, which is also to be found
in other cities on the Rhine. For instance, the round entrance can also be found in
the castle Biebrich in Wiesbaden (1700-1750). But with its vast roof, besides being
close to the church of St. Thomas, it is also reminiscent of other constructions of
Beblo, such as his schools in Neudorf, which try to develop a specific Alsatian
regional style (Heimatstil).
31
This again can be seen against the backdrop of another
prominent building which was inaugurated in the same year not far from Stras-
bourg: the imperial castle of Hohknigsburg (Haut-Koenigsbourg), where the
Berlin architect Bodo Ebhardt, on the grounds of a former building dating from
medieval times, between 1901 and 1908 built a romantic interpretation of a Ho-
henzollern fortress.
Interestingly, in the course of the conception, the city council sent a group of
specialists to several German and Austrian towns in order to better understand the
latest techniques thus reinforcing the role of an expertise group that did not
obey to nationalist motives but rather to a new ideal of transnational savoir faire.
Conclusion
To summarise, we might say that the closer you look at the picture, the more com-
plicated it gets, since many intentions overlay each other. Only a hasty and preju-
diced view can summarise the very complex process of urban town planning under
the category of nation building. The process could better be understood as a con-
stant discussion between many groups: politicians, entrepreneurs, patrons, archi-
tects, builders, etc., who have different motivations at different times. Thus the
case of the Neustadt in Strasbourg is, namely because of its size and duration, very
different from similar enterprises in Metz or Colmar. Whereas the small city of

30
Didier Laroche, Larchitecture de Fritz Beblo (1872-1947), Stadtbaumeister de Strasbourg, in
Strasbourg 1900 (see note 1), 192-9; Liane Zoppas, Les Bains, mmoire de TPFE (Strasbourg: Ecole
darchitecture, 1997).
31
Interesting perspectives in Wolfgang Voigt, Acadmies et manuels de directives (Baufibel): les
manires franaises et allemandes pour imposer un style architectural lAlsace, Revue dAlsace 131
(2005): 209-17. See also Bauen auf Tradition: Fritz Beblo 1872-1947, Stadtbaurat in Strassburg und Mnchen,
exhibition catalogue (Munich: Stadtarchiv Mnchen, 1991).


229
Colmar does not leave enough room for a vast building project and the mainly
military character of Metz does not leave enough space for a municipal enterprise,
Strasbourg can truly claim to be a laboratory for transnational urban planning but
just as not every laboratory test is successful, in the case of the Alsatian capital, it is
equally not possible to state that the process was in each and every case convinc-
ing. This trial-and-error principle conduced to self-criticism, as was the case with
Beblo, who tried to develop a more human and historical approach for the last
phase of urban planning in Strasbourg before the Germans had to leave.
As already mentioned in the introduction, the Alsatians tended to prefer living
outside the Neustadt, leaving this area mostly to the newcomers from the Reich (for
which the term Altdeutsche was invented those who come from the old Germa-
ny). It is interesting to notice that even today, the Neustadt, which is adjacent to the
main European institutions (European Parliament, European Commission build-
ing, etc.) is housing a much higher proportion of transcultural inhabitants than
pure Alsatians. With a lapse of several generations, continuity (albeit not the one
initially intended) has prevailed.

Bibliography
Architekten- und Ingenieur-Verein fr Elsass-Lothringen, ed. Straburg und seine
Bauten. Straburg: Trbner, 1894.
Assmann, Aleida. Erinnerungsrume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulturellen Gedchtnis-
ses. Munich: Beck, 1999.
Assmann, Jan. Das kulturelle Gedchtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identitt in
frhen Hochkulturen. Munich: Beck, 1997.
Baensch, Tanja. Un petit Berlin? Die Neugrndung der Straburger Gemldesammlung
durch Wilhelm Bode im zeitgenssischen Kontext: Ein Beitrag zur Museumspolitik im
deutschen Kaiserreich. Gttingen: V & R unipress, 2007.
Baumeister, Reinhardt. Stadterweiterungen in technischer, baupolizeilicher und wirtschaftlicher
Beziehung. Berlin: Ernst & Korn, 1876.
Beck, Jean-Pierre, Guy Bronner and Dominique Toursel-Harster. Dictionnaire des
monuments historiques dAlsace. Strasbourg: La Nue Bleue, 1995.
Biskup, Thomas, and Marc Schalenberg. Die Vermarktung Berlins in Geschichte
und Gegenwart. In Selling Berlin: Imagebildung und Stadtmarketing von der
preuischen Residenz bis zur Bundeshauptstadt, edited by Thomas Biskup and
Marc Schalenberg, 9-21. Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008.
Cartal, Jean-Jacques, Dominique Laburte and Paul Maurand. Les Villes pittoresques:
tudes sur larchitecture et lurbanisme de la ville allemande de Metz entre 1870 et
1918. Nancy: C.E.M.P.A., 1981.
Conseil de lEurope, ed. Le projet urbain dans lhistoire de Strasbourg: Actes du colloque des
30 et 31 octobre 1981. Strasbourg: Conseil de lEurope, 1983.
Daum, Andreas W. Capitals in Modern History: Inventing Urban Spaces for the
Nation. In Berlin-Washington, 1800-2000: Capital Cities, Cultural Representa-
tion and National Identities, edited by Andreas Daum and Christof Mauch, 3-
28. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Dor, Mgr Joseph, ed. Strasbourg: La grce dune cathdrale. Strasbourg: La Nue
Bleue, 2007.
Durand de Bousingen, Denis, Jean-Pierre Klein, Jean-Louis Gyss, Simone Schultz,
Barbara Obrist, Thodore Rieger, Roger Lehni, Jean-Franois Wolff,
Gregory Lamarche. Strasbourg: urbanisme et architecture des origines nos jours.
Strasbourg: Oberlin, 1996.
Ethington, Philip J., and Vanessa R. Schwartz, ed. Urban Icons. Special issue of
Urban History 33:1. Cambridge und New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006.
Foessel, George, et al., ed. Strasbourg: Panorama monumental. Strasbourg: G4J, 2003.
Franz, Harry, and Maryline Simler. 1899, lHtel des Postes de Strasbourg. Strasbourg:
Socit dhistoire de La Poste et de France Telecom en Alsace, 2009.
Gebhardt, Volker. Das Deutsche in der deutschen Kunst. Cologne: DuMont, 2004.
Goehner, Charles, and Emil Brumder. Geschichte der rumlichen Entwicklung der Stadt
Strassburg. Strasbourg: Heitz, 1935.
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Von deutscher Baukunst: D.M. Ervini a Steinbach.
In Von Deutscher Art und Kunst: Einige fliegende Bltter, edited by Johann
Gottfried Herder. Hamburg: Bode, 1773.
Hornstein, Shelly. Tendance darchitecture Art Nouveau Strasbourg. PhD diss. Stras-
bourg: Universit de Strasbourg, 1981.
Jencks, Charles. The Iconic Building: The Power of Enigma. New York: Rizzoli, 2005.
Jordan, Benot. Histoire de Strasbourg. Paris: Gisserot, 2006.
Kerdils Weiler, Angla. Limites urbaines de Strasbourg, volution et mutation. Strasbourg:
Socit Savante dAlsace, 2005.
Krebs, Celina, Marc Schalenberg and Sandra Schrmann. Spektakel, Allheilmittel,
Forschungsfeld: Perspektiven auf Urban Icons. Informationen zur moder-
nen Stadtgeschichte 2/2011: 7-16.
Loyer, Franois. Architecture et urbanisme Strasbourg, 1910-1930. Thematic issue of
Monuments Historiques. Paris: Caisse nationale des monuments historiques et
des sites, 1990.
Mai, Ekkehard, and Stephan Waetzold, ed. Kunstverwaltung, Bau- und Denkmal-Politik
im Kaiserreich. Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1981.
Meyer, Anne-Doris. Au service de lAlsace: lettres dHugo Haug Henri Albert, 1904-
1914. Strasbourg: Publications de la Socit savante dAlsace, 2010.
Meyer, Anne-Doris, Karine Dupr, Sophie Eberhardt, Johannes Dahm. Lettre
dinformation no. 10, Fevrier 2011. Maison Interuniversitaire des Sciences Hu-
maines en Alsace. www.misha.fr/sites/5/File/li10-misha-web.pdf (accessed
5 April 2012).

231
Nohlen, Klaus. Baupolitik im Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen, 1871-1918: Die reprsentati-
ven Staatsbauten um den ehemaligen Kaiserplatz in Strassburg. Berlin: Gebr.
Mann, 1982.
Nohlen, Klaus. Strasbourg aprs 1870: rorganisation des espaces. In Villes ratta-
ches, villes reconfigures XVI
e
-XX
e
sicles, edited by Denise Turrel, 231-45.
Tours: Presses universitaires Franois-Rabelais, 2003.
Perouse de Montclos, Jean-Marie, and Brigitte Parent. Alsace: Le dictionnaire du pat-
rimoine. Strasbourg: La Nue Bleue, 2011.
Rapetti, Rodolphe, ed. Strasbourg 1900: Naissance dune capitale. Paris: Somogy, 2000.
Recht, Roland, Georges Foessel and Jean-Pierre Kelin. Connatre Strasbourg. Stras-
bourg: Alsatia, 1988.
Schnitzler, Bernadette. Histoire des muses de Strasbourg: des collections entre France et
Allemagne. Strasbourg: Muses de la Ville de Strasbourg, 2009.
Stadtarchiv Mnchen, ed. Bauen auf Tradition: Fritz Beblo 1872-1947, Stadtbaurat in
Straburg und Mnchen. Exhibition catalogue. Munich: Stadtarchiv Mn-
chen, 1991.
Stbben, Joseph. Der Stdtebau: Handbuch der Architektur. Darmstadt: Bergstrasser,
1890.
Trendel, Guy. Racontez-moi Strasbourg. Strasbourg: La Nue Bleue, 2006.
Uberfill, Franois. Rodolphe Schwander, maire alsacien de Strasbourg sous le
Reichsland (1906-1918). In Autour des Dietrich: Hommages Ady Schwander
et Edouard Schloesing, edited by Bernard Vogler, 134-65. Reichshoffen:
Association de Dietrich, 2008.
Uberfill, Franois. Strasbourg, capitale du Reichsland Elsass-Lothringen: la d-
couverte de la Neustadt. Saisons dAlsace 45 (2010): 45-53.
Uberfill, Franois, and Pierre Aycoberry. La socit strasbourgeoise entre France et Al-
lemagne (1871-1924): la socit strasbourgeoise travers les mariages entre Allemands
et Alsaciens lpoque du Reichsland Le sort des couples mixtes aprs 1918. Stras-
bourg: Socit savante dAlsace, 2001.
Vogler, Bernard. Histoire culturelle de lAlsace: Du Moyen Age nos jours Les trs riches
heures dune rgion frontire. Strasbourg: La Nue bleue, 1994.
Voigt, Wolfgang. Acadmies et manuels de directives (Baufibel): les manires
franaises et allemandes pour imposer un style architectural lAlsace. Re-
vue dAlsace 131 (2005): 209-17.
Weidmann, Francis. Strasbourg, capitale du Reichsland et sa nouvelle universit. Strasbourg:
Oberlin, 1995.
Werner, Michael, and Bndicte Zimmermann. Beyond Comparison: Histoire
Croise and the Challenge of Reflexivity. History and Theory 45.1 (2006):
30-50.
Werner, Michael, and Bndicte Zimmermann, ed. De la comparaison lhistoire croi-
se. Paris: Seuil, 2004.
Zoppas, Liane. Les Bains, mmoire de TPFE. Strasbourg: Ecole darchitecture, 1997.

Part Four
The Role of the State

Multiple Democracies
A Cultural-Sociological Approach to
Democratization and Europeanization
Paul Blokker
Introduction
In the last two decades, the study of democratization in the new European Union
member states has predominantly been concerned with the identification of the
emergence of stable democratic orders, i.e., the consolidation of liberal-democratic,
constitutional regimes. In a related way, it is widely accepted that democratization
is not only about legal-procedural institutions, but that well-functioning democra-
cies also need a democratic culture. In other words, democratic regimes do not
merely consist of a set of hard institutions (the constitution, separation of powers,
the rule of law), but also need a supportive cultural substratum of soft institutions
in the form of what is variably referred to as a background culture, political cul-
ture, civic, or public culture.
1

However, and this is the contention of this article, in most democratization
studies, the recognition of a cultural dimension to democracy tends to overlook a
plurality of possible understandings of democracy (in turn reflected in locally dis-
tinct political cultures), the open-ended nature of the democratic idea and the role
of imagination in democracy as well as the role of conflict in democratic (meta- )
politics. Research on the new democracies reflects little on issues such as the dif-
ferentiated development of cultural underpinnings of democracy, the dependence
of political cultures on the specific cultural contexts in which democracies emerge,
and the possible relation between contextual differences and different normative
models. There is a certain predominance of a one-dimensional, Schumpeterian
account of democracy. In this, the necessity of a supportive democratic political
culture is presupposed, but its nature is widely understood in an aprioristic sense.
2

1
Cf. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Dieter
Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Democratic Communities in Europe: A Comparison between
East and West, in Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann et al.
(London: Routledge, 2006), 25-66.
2
See, for instance: Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Significant excep-
tions are: John S. Dryzek and Leslie Holmes, Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses across

Here I argue that a pluralistic, cultural-sociological approach to democratic political
culture would positively influence our understanding of the cultural dimensions of
democratization. I therefore suggest a multiple democracies approach in analysing
the new EU member states, which understands Europeanization as including pro-
cesses of politico-cultural differentiation.
3
The approach and its rationale will be
briefly discussed below and some examples of the development of political cul-
tures in the new democracies in East-Central Europe will be provided.
Democratization and Political Culture
The conventional understanding of political culture relates democracy closely to a
liberal, representative democratic regime in which politics is largely confined to a
formalised political sphere, populated by political parties, and where political
culture takes the role of a background culture which reflects the normative
underpinnings of such an institutional order. On this view, political culture
comprises values and orientations that eschew sharp conflict and endorse
cooperation, moderation or self-restraint, trust, and lawful behaviour. A genuine
democratic political culture,
4
according to democratization theorists, embodies
high levels of interpersonal trust, a readiness to deal with political conflict through
compromise rather than coercion or violence, and acceptance of the legitimacy of
democratic institutions.
5

The close linkage between an institutional order that of a liberal-
representative democracy and a democratic political culture is, however,
problematic. Conventional analyses of democratic political culture ignore three
interrelated aspects that indicate the possibility of a differentiation of democratic
political cultures as well as a strenuous relation between political cultures and the
institutionalization of democratic politics:

the historical and contextual nature of really existing political cultures;
the dual rather than singular meta-imaginary of democracy on which
democratic political cultures are based (i.e., a rights-based, constitutional
imaginary, on the one hand, and a substantive, participatory, or

Thirteen Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Fuchs and Klingemann, Demo-
cratic Communities in Europe; Harald Wydra, Communism and the Emergence of Democracy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
3
See Paul Blokker, Multiple Democracies in Europe: Political Culture in New Member States (London:
Routledge, 2010).
4
Attila gh, Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans (Northampton, MA: Edward
Elgar, 1998), 22.
5
Bruce Parrott, Perspectives on Postcommunist Democratization, in The Consolidation of Democracy
in East-Central Europe, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 21.

237
emancipatory imaginary, on the other);
the inherent indeterminacy and contestability of modern democracy.

The risk of an a-historical, universalised, and one-dimensional perception of de-
mocracy lies in the negligence of the question of a significant variety between
democratic political cultures, ultimately based on differing combinations of the
dual dimension of constitutional order and civic participation/emancipation. A
monist view tends to equate democratic political culture with a national liberal
culture and in this to disregard historically contrasting pathways of democratization
(a good example here are the classical cases of France and the United States), as
well as the persistence of divergent perceptions of democracy within democracies,
available in both the public sphere and political society.
In contrast to a monist view, democracy as an idea and practice is multi-
interpretable and essentially contestable. Therefore, the analysis of democratic
political culture needs to go beyond a conceptualization that understands political
culture as a (passive) internalization of the political system in individual attitudes
and should be rather understood as involving the continuous (active) construction
of different views of what democracy is and ought to be about. Paul
Lichterman and Daniel Cefai provide a definition that can be a starting basis for
going beyond the limited focus on liberal-representative democracy to include a
variety of wider political claims. In their view, political culture consists of the sets
of symbols and meanings or styles of action that organise political claims-making
and opinion-forming, by individuals or collectivities. By culture, we mean patterns
of publicly shared symbols, meanings, or styles of action which enable and
constrain what people can say and do.
6

The idea of multiple democracies entails that democratic political cultures can
be conceptualised in different and sometimes mutually exclusive ways. Regarding
the political reality of the new democracies, not only can it be argued that a range
of perceptions of democracy and primary justifications among both elites and
masses have been playing a role in the democratization processes, but also that the
way democracies have been institutionalised remains potentially open to normative
critique. As, early in the 1990s, Michael Walzer has argued with regard to a dual
widespread commitment to both democratic government and to the politics of
difference in the region: [T]heir simultaneous success is bound to pluralize
democracy in a radical way. It will produce a number of different roads to
democracy and a variety of democracies at the end of the road a prospect
difficult to accept for those who believe that democracy is the single best form of

6
Paul Lichterman and Daniel Cefai, The Idea of Political Culture, in The Oxford Handbook of Contex-
tual Political Analysis, ed. Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006), 392.
government.
7

The delineation of a genuine democratic political culture as in the monist
understanding becomes then a chimera. Democratic political culture can be under-
stood as produced in particular political struggles in distinct historical situations,
based on cultural orientations ultimately grounded in the dual imaginary dimension
of democracy. Political cultures (and their reflection in institutional constellations)
rest upon the values and meanings that the relevant social agents invoke, repro-
duce as well as modify in the process. This, among others, means that any demo-
cratic political culture possibly also includes traditional, religious, as well as politi-
cal-ethical components, and ultimately is not reducible to a thin, liberal political
culture that is generally supportive of an objective liberal democratic order. But it
also means that any democratic regime is always open to claims for the further
democratization of democracy.
Multiple Democracies and Democratic Ethics
As observed by Alessandro Ferrara, democracy cannot persevere and flourish if
there is not also a spirit of democracy that sustains democratic politics.
8
Ferrara
elaborates on a number of basic democratic attitudes or cultural presuppositions of
democracy that would make up a spirit of democracy: a passion for the public or
the common good, a passion for equality, a passion for individuality, and a passion
for openness. The upshot of these basic predispositions is that democratic regimes
need their citizens and elites to pursue these passions to make democracy work
over time.
An important and related question then becomes: is there only one spirit of
democracy that reflects these passions or might we identify different spirits, or, at
least, different combinations and emphases of passions in distinct democratic spir-
its? It seems right to affirm the second observation, in that even in the heartland of
modernity, Western Europe and North America, differences in both a synchronic
and diachronic sense can be observed. In the works of Charles Taylor and Michle
Lamont & Laurent Thvenot, differences in emphasis regarding individuality,
ideas of market competition, and solidarity are elaborated with regard to France
and the United States.
9

What is more, it seems hard to deny that Western modern democracy has itself
changed over time, in terms of its emphases on distinct passions. Today, democra-

7
Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1994), ix-x; cf. Charles Taylor, Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy,
Public Culture 19.1 (2007): 117-50.
8
Alessandro Ferrara, Democrazia e apertura (Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2011), 48.
9
Taylor, Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy; Michle Lamont and Laurent Thvenot, ed.,
Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

239
cy is deemed to be in a moment of difficulty and this observation has led demo-
cratic theorists to look for new or renewed principles to re-invigorate democratic
politics. As is well-known, one dimension of renovation is identified in terms of
deliberation as a defining aspect of democracy. The latter can be related to Ferra-
ras passion for the public, that is, public reason as a fundamental element of dem-
ocratic societies. Another important shift in democratic thinking is the re-
interpretation of equality as recognition.
10

In my own work, I have proposed a political and cultural-sociological ap-
proach to the analysis of democratic political cultures, which is grounded in the
idea of a variety of ethics of democracy.
11
Democratic political cultures can be
identified on the basis of distinct patterns of cultural repertoires, themselves
grounded in specific ethics of democracy. Ethics of democracy can be seen as
orientating principles in two ways: in a normative sense as a guide to what is to be
valued in a democratic regime and in a cognitive sense as an organising/structuring
principle of democratic discourse, i.e., defining which political as-
pects/characteristics are relevant for realising a democratic regime. In my ap-
proach, I have derived these ethics from normative political theory, but they
should not be taken to be exhaustive. The suggestion is that these democratic eth-
ics are analytical ideal-types of modes of justification that will not be found in any
pure sense in actually existing democratic discourses. These ethics rather emerge
in distinct combinations and hybrid ways and will be hierarchised or ordered in
distinct ways in particular discourses as well as combined with other justificatory
ideas.
In the case of the processes of democratization in East-Central Europe, four
democratic ethics seem particularly relevant for an analysis of the political cultures
that have emerged since 1989: the ethics of rights, of identity, of solidarity, and of
participation. The first democratic ethic, the ethic of rights, is about the priority
of individual rights and the containment of political power by means of the rule of
law. This ethic is close to an identification of democracy with the liberal model of
constitutional democracy in its emphasis on individual rights, legal procedures, the
equality of citizens before the law, and the eschewal of collectivist elements. The
ethic of rights has clearly played a predominant role in the emergence of the new
democracies, not least due to its centrality in the discourse of dissidents as well as
in that of external actors, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe.
A second ethic is the ethic of identity, based on a priority of commonality in
terms of a defining historical, cultural, or linguistic identity or group boundaries
and a related understanding of the common good. In other words, identity or
commonality plays an important role in defining the in- and outsiders of a political
community and explicates what the former have in common. The democratic di-

10
Ferrara, Democrazia e apertura, 49.
11
Blokker, Multiple Democracies in Europe.
mension to identity is the idea that democratic politics can only work in a meaning-
ful way if there is a sufficient basis in terms of a shared set of norms, values, and
cultural capacities within a society.
This ethic of identity is invoked when a shared thick identity (i.e., as grounded
in language, common traditions, and history), and its continuous preservation and
flourishing is understood as a significant aim of a democratic polity. An ethic of
identity has been important in different ways in the emergence of all new democ-
racies. Discourses related to the nation and national sovereignty have played a very
important role in defining the novel identities of the political communities that
have replaced the communist regimes. However, while some notion of commonal-
ity seems indispensible for a democratic regime (hence discussions regarding a
European demos), this collectivist dimension can all too easily slip into a less dem-
ocratic mode. The recent events in Hungary, where democratic politics grounded
in a political culture emphasising liberal-legal aspects has been pushed into the
defensive by the current centre-right government which seeks recourse to an alter-
native, identity-based political culture, are a case in point. The protection and
strengthening of a distinct Hungarian identity and related notions such as nation-
al sovereignty, nationality, national culture and religion is professed to be the
overriding aim of the current government, while individual rights, the rule of law,
and constitutionalism have clearly become subordinated goals, threatening the
democratic nature of the Hungarian political order.
A third ethic is the ethic of self-rule, based on a priority of the idea of sub-
stantive participation. In the active, substantive conception of participation, popu-
lar sovereignty or democratic self-rule does not mean the transfer of sovereignty to
an administering state, but self-rule is rather grounded in society and seen as an
end in itself. In other words, a society is deemed democratic if there is a structural
and meaningful way for citizens to participate in the rule-making of that society.
This participatory dimension, which can in some ways be related to a republican
idea of democracy, has played a major role in the dissident endeavour in the 1970s
and 1980s and has had in different ways and to different extents some institu-
tional repercussions, not least regarding local forms of democracy in the region.
12

Finally, the fourth ethic, the ethic of distributive justice or solidarity, is based on
the priority of substantive, socio-economic equality and values such as equality for
democratic participation. The democratic dimension here implies that citizen
participation can be only meaningful if certain basic conditions have been fulfilled,
in terms of livelihood and security. The solidarity dimension has played a role in
the new democracies in that, for instance, social rights have been valued relatively
highly throughout the region

12
See: Paul Blokker, Dissidence, Republicanism, and Democratic Change, East European Politics and
Societies 25.2 (2011): 219-43.

241
In my research on East-Central Europe, plurality became clear from a concise
survey of political elite discourses in three countries in twenty years of democrati-
zation. The political cultural composites of three new democracies, as expressed by
political elites, can be concisely designated as a legalistic-communitarian one (Hun-
gary), a civic rights-religious one (Poland), and a communitarian-Europeanist one
(Romania). A democratic discourse informed by an ethic of rights could be found
in all three new democracies. In Hungary, the balance has now shifted, in that the
predominance of a rights-based discourse, grounded in the notions of a Rechtsstaat
and the rule of law, and also reflected in the constitution, is now the object of a
political counterproject, which is grounded in a culturalist-communitarian view of
democracy, with authoritarian overtones and with clearly negative repercussions
for the rights-based understanding of democracy. In Poland, a democratic dis-
course based on the ethic of rights has been continuously challenged by a commu-
nitarian-religious discourse emphasising an alternative grounding of fundamental
rights and democracy. But in the Polish case, there also seems to be potential for
compromise and the recognition of diversity. In Romania, while an ethic of rights
was clearly secondary to an ethic of identity in the early 1990s, by the late 2000s,
rights and the rule of law have clearly become more vigorous and there are signs of
their predominance as a democratic discourse.
Conclusion
The democratic ethics described above should not be taken as exhaustive. Indeed,
various ethics gaining in importance and visibility could be added, such as an ethic
of deliberation or an ethic of critique, indicating shifting priorities and justifications
in modern democracies. But, at the same time, the openness of democracy is clear-
ly also not unlimited. Modern democratic political cultures do refer to different
basic justifications for democracy. In this sense, by supposing a variety of demo-
cratic ethics at work, a multiple democracies approach highlights the pluralism in
European political culture and explores cultural patterns that combine elements on
which different political-cultural composites are based. By referring to different,
coexisting, and unevenly available ethics or cultural repertoires within national
societies, it is possible to establish patterns of repertoires that are more readily
available in some societies than in others. In this, a multiple democracies approach
proposes an interpretative theory of a variety of democratic forms and cultures.

Bibliography
gh, Attila. Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans. Northamp-
ton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1998.
Blokker, Paul. Dissidence, Republicanism, and Democratic Change. East Europe-
an Politics and Societies 25.2 (2011): 219-43.
Multiple Democracies in Europe: Political Culture in New Member States. London:
Routledge, 2010.
Dryzek, John S., and Leslie Holmes. Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discours-
es across Thirteen Countries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Ferrara, Alessandro. Democrazia e apertura. Milan: Bruno Mondadori, 2011.
Fuchs, Dieter, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. Democratic Communities in Eu-
rope: A Comparison between East and West. In Democracy and Political Culture
in Eastern Europe, edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann et al., 25-66. London:
Routledge, 2006.
Lamont, Michle, and Laurent Thvenot, ed. Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociolo-
gy: Repertoires of Evaluation in France and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge
Lichterman, Paul, and Daniel Cefai. The Idea of Political Culture. In The Oxford
Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, edited by Robert E. Goodin and
Charles Tilly, 392-414. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Parrott, Bruce. Perspectives on Postcommunist Democratization. In The Consoli-
dation of Democracy in East-Central Europe, edited by Karen Dawisha and Bruce
Parrott, 1-39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Taylor, Charles. Cultures of Democracy and Citizen Efficacy. Public Culture 19.1
(2007): 117-50.
Walzer, Michael. Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994.
Wydra, Harald. Communism and the Emergence of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge

The European Court of Justice between
Cosmopolitanism and National Identity
Herman Voogsgeerd
Introduction
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has had a dramatic influence on the creation
of European law. With its cases on the direct effect and supremacy of European
law, it really laid the basis for the autonomous character of this branch of the law.
This must have been an unintended consequence that even the authors of the
EEC Treaty did not foresee. Some academic authors submit that the ECJ was
acting at the brink of judicial activism.
1
Others maintain that the ECJ is not a polit-
ical actor.
2
In this article, I will try to find out whether the ECJ promoted some
specific cosmopolitan values and/or values related to national identity. In her re-
search on culture and European law, Craufurd Smith tried to answer the question
whether there are specific Community values and she maintains that particular
social values were embedded in the EEC Treaty from the start. She mentions
explicitly the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of nationality and the right
to equal pay for men and women.
3
Although I doubt whether these values are
specifically European, they have been defended rigorously by the ECJ. More gen-
erally, the law of the internal market has had an enormous influence on the cultural
and social values of the member states. According to Sauter and Schepel, the inter-
nal market is imposed by the ECJ on the member states.
4
This internal market law
has huge consequences for almost all areas. In my article, I will study the conse-
quences of this internal market law (and the law on European citizenship) for the
protection of cosmopolitanism on the one hand and that of national identity on
the other. Will it be possible to strike a balance between these two values?

1
Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Study in Judicial
Policymaking (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986).
2
Andreas Grimmel, Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice Is Not
a Political Actor, Les Cahiers Europens de Sciences Po. 03 (2011): 2-26.
3
Rachael Craufurd Smith, ed. Culture and European Union Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004), 45.
4
Wolf Sauter and Harm Schepel, State and Market in European Union Law: The Public and Private Spheres
of the Internal Market before the EU Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 11.
The Link between European Law and Identity?
Many authors have tried to forge a link between European law on the one hand
and the concept of identity on the other. Mayer and Palmowski stress the role of
EU institutions and European law through which European identities have come
to be expressed.
5
Because there is no meaningful common European historical
identification, the institutions and laws are almost the only source for attention.
These authors see a role for the EU institutions in the promotion of identifica-
tion(s) with the EU. The main mechanisms for this promotion they see are a dis-
tinctive European citizenship and the strengthening of supranational institutions
per se in Europe. Guild also focuses on European citizenship as a new legal ele-
ment of European identity.
6

In general, Mayer and Palmowski claim that European law, and therefore also
the decisions of the ECJ, express what Europe is and what it aspires to be.
7
They
even go a step further: in creating individual and fundamental laws, the ECJ has
become pivotal in helping to articulate substantive aspects of a European identi-
ty.
8
The authors assume that these rights are primordial in bringing about a sepa-
rate sense of European identity. The problem is that these rights are not used by
everybody. The number of workers enjoying the free movement of workers within
the EU got stuck between 2 and 3% of the working population. Other freedoms,
such as the right to establishment by independent persons and the right to posted
work within the framework of the free movement of services, are more popular.
Concerning these freedoms, some tensions arise between the persons enjoying
their free movement rights and the people who do not move and who stay in their
own member state.
In order to sustain the next stage in the building of a European identity, Perju
is of the opinion that a discursive turn in European law is needed. The link be-
tween European law and the European public in the member states in general
needs to be strengthened. This stage could be reached through a change of style of
the ECJ. The decisions of the ECJ will get more attention among the general pub-
lic if case debates on case-law are stimulated. According to Perju, this could be
done through the introduction of so-called dissenting opinions: individual judges
having another opinion than the majority.
9
While this last suggestion might be too
much of a break with the existing tradition, the argument of more discussion con-
cerning case-law of the ECJ is a correct one.

5
Franz C. Mayer and Jan Palmowksi, European Identities and the EU: The Ties that Bind the Peo-
ples of Europe, Journal of Common Market Studies 42.3 (2004): 573-98.
6
Elspeth Guild, The Legal Elements of European Identity: EU Citizenship and Migration Law (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 2004).
7
Mayer and Palmowski, European Identities and the EU, 587.
8
Mayer and Palmowski, European Identities and the EU, 589.
9
Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, Virginia Journal of International
Law 94.2 (2009): 338-44.
The European Court of Justice between Cosmopolitanism and National Identity

245
Former judge Koopmans was already in 1986 of the opinion that the role of law
in the next stage of European Integration could be different.
10
He means that the
role of law in European integration will be characterised more by the essential
peace-making function of the law than by the instrumental conception of the law.
Landmark decisions such as Van Gend & Loos (26/62) and Costa/ENEL (6/64) in
the beginning of the 1960s were, indeed, instrumental in bringing about a coherent
unitary common market. In the new stage, however, the interests of the member
states could also be protected in a better way.
This argument that the EU institutions and the ECJ have contributed to some
of the substantive aspects of European identity is interesting. By strengthening
their own prerogatives, the EU institutions promote identification of the peoples
with the EU. I agree with these statements. Law and identity are interrelated. Law
is communication that may easily enter the domain of culture. Now, after more
than sixty years of experience with European law, this branch of the law has be-
come part of the general discourse, at least among the elites. Culture itself can be
transformed by EU law.
The Role of Identity in the Original Doctrine of European Law
In the early years of the common market, it was not at all clear that there was a
relation between European Community law and a concept such as identity. One of
the most influential authors in European law has been the German professor Hans
Peter Ipsen. It is said that in formulating the basic concepts of direct effect and
supremacy of European Law, the ECJ has been influenced by his thoughts. Ipsen
sees the European Communities (EEC, ECSC and Euratom) as so-called special
purpose associations (Zweckverbnde). An important characteristic of these associa-
tions is their technocratic nature. The tasks and competencies attributed to the EC
level have to be handled in a technocratic and bureaucratic way. When member
states are not able anymore to fulfil certain tasks, a European bureaucracy is need-
ed. This technocratic way is also the most efficient.
11
According to Ipsen, there is
no need for the European construction to deal with difficult aspects like identity,
national anthems, flags etc.
12
The functions the Communities perform do not be-
long to the irrational field. Special purpose associations are not Gefhlsverbnde or
special emotional associations.
13

10
Tijmen Koopmans, The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integration, International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 35.4 (1986): 925-31.
11
Hans Peter Ipsen, Europisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Tbingen: Mohr, 1972), 1045.
12
Hans Peter Ipsen, Europisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984), 198.
13
See also Herman Voogsgeerd, A Reappraisal of H.-P. Ipsens Zweckverband: Unidentified
Finality as an Essential Element of a European Political Identity?, SPIEL: Siegener Periodicum zur
internationalen empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 21.2 (2002): 313-26.
Although it is difficult nowadays to continue to uphold the idea of Europe as a
technocratic, special purpose association that should not deal with difficult issues
such as identity, the idea is still interesting. The importance of the member states in
the idea of the single purpose associations implies that national identities should
not be harmed too much. Essential in the special purpose associations is a process
of disentanglement of the state, a progress in integration or doing things in com-
mon, and this leaves unimpaired much of the identity of the individual member
states. It is the view of Ipsen that the states open up, not that the identity of the
states is threatened.
14

After sixty years of experience with the common market, a rudimentary Euro-
pean identity did arise, however. Mayer and Palmowski emphasise the individual
and fundamental rights of citizens and the existence of the European institutions
as proof of a European identity. Essential in their concept is that the European
identity is a separate one from the identities of the different member states. Delan-
ty has tried to clarify the relationship between national and European identity;
according to this author, these identities are not inseparable.
15
In the same way as
Mayer and Palmowski, he tries to find some distinctive elements of a European
identity. One important element in the search of Delanty is the contrast between
particularism and universalism. National identity is particularistic and a European
identity is universalistic.
16

European law and the decisions of the ECJ play an important role in this re-
spect in that they open national laws and identities. These laws and identities be-
come permeable. Openness in this context refers to the lack of a finalit in the
European integration concept. It also refers to the possibility of a learning process,
if more people will make use of the four freedoms and go to work and/or reside in
another member state. This learning process is not directly caused but facilitated by
the decisions of the ECJ. The people who make use of one of the four freedoms
are the potential objects of this learning process. The ECJ at the most facilitates
this process. It is now time to look at some recent typical decisions of the ECJ
between cosmopolitanism and national identity. How is the balance between these
two established?
The Case-Law of the ECJ and Cosmopolitan Values and National Identity
Before I will analyse some cases of the ECJ, the notion of cosmopolitan values will
have to be addressed. Cosmopolitanism is the opposite of patriotism or national-

14
Hans Peter Ipsen, Europisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984,) 92
and 93.
15
Gerard Delanty, The Transformation of National Identity and the Cultural Ambivalence of Euro-
pean Identity: Democratic Identification in a Post-National Europe, SPIEL: Siegener Periodicum zur
internationalen empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 14.1 (1995): 23.
16
Delanty, The Transformation of National Identity, 29.

247
ism. Inclusiveness is important in this respect: people of all kinds of ethnic or reli-
gious communities are allowed to participate. Cosmopolitanism might need an
overarching structure such as a political community or an economic relationship.
In the EU, the internal market, the Economic and Monetary Union, could function
as such an overarching structure. Essential for cosmopolitanism is, however, to
acknowledge difference in society, especially with respect to cultural background.
17

It is in the fields of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality and Europe-
an citizenship that the ECJ has contributed enormously to the European integra-
tion process. The case law concerning the four freedoms, e.g. the free movement
of goods, persons, services and capital, has become the linchpin of the European
construction. Member-states authorities were forced to take into account the spe-
cial situation of migrant persons from another member state. The term substantive
or indirect discrimination was coined in this respect by the ECJ. Substantive dis-
crimination was introduced in the area of the free movement of goods and means
that equal treatment of unequal situations is also contrary to the principle of equal
treatment (on the basis of nationality). Later on, the concept of nationality was not
used anymore. The ECJ used a different criterion: discrimination or an obstacle to
free movement of goods or persons was supposed to be there in case a cross-
border situation was treated differently by a national measure than a purely nation-
al or sedentary situation.
18
This wide concept made it possible to detect many dif-
ferent kinds of hidden treatments of migrant workers.
Groenendijk is rather optimistic on forty years of free movement of work-
ers.
19
According to him, aliens have been transformed into co-citizens with rights,
thanks to the case-law of the ECJ. The ECJ focused on the integration of the mi-
grant worker and his family in the host state. Access to education in the host state
and social advantages of the host state for the worker and his family were rights
that were mentioned in regulations but widely interpreted by the ECJ. Groenendijk
thinks free movement of workers also has had a symbolic message and that the
public perception of migrants has become more positive.
20
Posting of workers
within the framework of free movement of services on the other hand sometimes
arouses tensions, because social dumping and cheap labour from Central and East-
ern Europe are not excluded. Full equal treatment with citizens from Western
European host member states is not necessarily safeguarded. The operation of the
European internal market as a whole is taken as a base of reference by the ECJ.

17
Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2004),
27.
18
See for example case C-349/87 (Paraschi) on social security.
19
Kees Groenendijk, Forty Years of Free Movement of Workers: Has It Been A Success and
Why?, in Rethinking the Free Movement of Workers: The European Challenges Ahead, ed. Paul Minderhoud
and Nicos Trimikliniotis (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009), 15.
20
Groenendijk, Forty Years of Free Movement of Workers, 19.
Craufurd Smith submits that the ECJ starts from the premise of advantages of
exposure to other cultures. Insulation of domestic traditions will not be permitted.
The consumers can choose themselves what sort of product or tradition they want
to buy.
21
The ECJ does not mandate cultural change, only openness to change. The
common market promotes a culture of consumer choice. Therefore, the influence
of the ECJ on identity can be considered as deep but indirect.
Recently, the topic of national identity has become more important in the cases
of the ECJ. According to the Treaty on the European Union, the EU has to re-
spect the national identity of its member states (art. 4, par. 2 TEU). This includes
the political and constitutional structures and the essential functions of the state in
the field of security and public order. Already in the 1990s, the ECJ respected a
wide margin of discretion for the authorities of a member state as regards, for
example, the control of lotteries. This line of argumentation became strengthened
in the Omega case (C-36/02), where a company in gambling machines operating a
laserdrome protested against a banning order from the mayor of Bonn. The
mayor reacted to opposition from the public against that specific machine playing
to kill people. According to the German court, this machine was against human
dignity, a concept derived from the first article of the German constitution. The
German court referred the matter to the ECJ. The ECJ accepted that the specific
circumstances which may justify recourse to the concept of public policy may vary
from one country to another and from one era to another (par. 31). Now that
only the game to kill humans was banned, this ban did not go too far and was
acceptable from the viewpoint of European law. On the one hand, the concept of
public policy is under the scrutiny of the ECJ. On the other hand, there is respect
for national traditions and identity in sensitive public order areas.
Even more straightforward is the case Sayn-Wittgenstein (C-208/09). Here, an-
other reference to the national constitutional identity was honoured. An Austrian
law on the abolition of the nobility was upheld against an Austrian national, who
got a title as princess recognized (by mistake) in Germany where she operated a
company in the luxury real estate sector and also resided. The ECJ accepts that the
law as an element of national identity is an important element to be taken into
account. After extensive references to the Omega case and art. 4, par. 2 of the TEU,
the ECJ does not deem the refusal of the Austrian authorities to recognise the
noble element of the name of Sayn-Wittgenstein to be a disproportionate measure.
Now that the Austrian law is of constitutional status and also implemented the
principle of equality in Austria, an important principle of European law as well, the
refusal was acceptable. This recent case-law implies that national (constitutional)
identity is a factor of importance, even in the situation of balancing internal market
rights with public interests. It is submitted that this looks like a change of focus in
the jurisprudence of the ECJ.

21
Craufurd Smith, Culture and European Union Law, 29-31.

249
Conclusion
The important and large body of case-law concerning the internal market and Eu-
ropean citizenship has changed Europe. It facilitated cosmopolitan values within
the internal market. Recently, we have seen increasing respect for national (consti-
tutional) identity, especially in the area of public order. The decision in the case
Sayn-Wittgenstein is certainly proof of this new approach, partly to be explained by
article 4, par 2 of the Treaty on the European Union and maybe partly by the Lis-
bon decision of the German Constitutional Court of 30

June 2009, in which re-
spect for cultural, historical and linguistic elements was demanded from the EU.
At the end of this contribution, it is possible to conclude that the decisions of
the ECJ concerning the internal market and European citizenship have triggered
several developments. Although these can only be seen from a long term perspec-
tive, it is possible to see examples of changes in European identities. The ECJ has
definitively contributed to these developments. In order to remain successful, the
ECJ must also pay attention to and respect national identities. It is dangerous to
juxtapose European and national identities. The social experimentation and the
learning process that is the consequence of a well-functioning internal market
bring about changes to these national identities. The ECJ has played a huge role as
a final broker in offering options to migrants and free-movers. In order to remain
influential and to safeguard successful diffusion of its decisions in the near future,
the ECJ will have to remain sensitive to to cultural pluralism within the EU.

Bibliography
Beck, Ulrich, and Edgar Grande. Das kosmopolitische Europa. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 2004.
Craufurd Smith, Rachael, ed. Culture and European Union Law. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
Delanty, Gerard. The Transformation of National Identity and the Cultural Am-
bivalence of European Identity: Democratic Identification in a Post-National
Europe. SPIEL: Siegener Periodicum zur internationalen empirischen Literaturwissen-
schaft 14.1 (1995): 23-37.
Grimmel, Andreas. Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European
Court of Justice is not a Political Actor. Les Cahiers Europens de Sciences Po. 03
(2011): 2-26.
Groenendijk, Kees. Forty Years of Free Movement of Workers: Has It Been a
Success and Why? In Rethinking the Free Movement of Workers: The European Chal-
lenges Ahead, edited by Paul Minderhoud and Nicos Trimikliniotis, 11-23. Nij-
megen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2009.
Guild, Elspeth. The Legal Elements of European Identity: EU Citizenship and Migration
Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004.
Ipsen, Hans Peter. Europisches Gemeinschaftsrecht. Tbingen: Mohr, 1972.
Ipsen, Hans Peter. Europisches Gemeinschaftsrecht in Einzelstudien. Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1984.
Koopmans, Tijmen. The Role of Law in the Next Stage of European Integra-
tion. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35.4 (1986): 925-31.
Mayer, Franz C., and Jan Palmowski. European Identities and the EU: The Ties
that Bind the Peoples of Europe. Journal of Common Market Studies 42.3 (2004):
573-98.
Perju, Vlad. Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice. Virginia
Journal of International Law 49.2 (2009): 307-77.
Rasmussen, Hjalte. On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative
Study in Judicial Policymaking. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986.
Sauter, Wolf, and Harm Schepel. State and Market in European Union Law: The Public
and Private Spheres of the Internal Market before the EU Courts. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009.
Voogsgeerd, Herman. A Reappraisal of H.-P. Ipsens Zweckverband: Unidenti-
fied Finality as an Essential Element of a European Political Identity? SPIEL:
Siegener Periodicum zur internationalen empirischen Literaturwissenschaft 21.2 (2002):
313-26.

Case-law of the European Court of Justice
European Court Reports (1991): page I-4501(Paraschi).
European Court Reports (2004): page I-6213 (Omega).
European Court Reports (2010): not yet reported (Sayn-Wittgenstein).

The United Kingdom and
the European Union
The Shaping of Public Opinion
Bianca Polo Del Vecchio
Introduction
As the scope and depth of European integration grows, it is increasingly necessary
to understand the impact of membership of the European Union on member
states a phenomenon known as Europeanization.
1
Europeanization is a dynam-
ic process, bringing change to domestic institutions, policies and politics.
2
The
impact of EU membership on member states is not uniform and the United King-
dom, like all EU member states, has a unique experience of membership. This
differential impact can be accounted for by the goodness of fit of domestic insti-
tutions, policies and processes with those of the EU, and by other variables specif-
ic to each member state.
3

Striking, in the case of the UK, is the overall reluctance of governments to ac-
cept further integration and the consistently low levels of public support for EU
membership. At a meeting of the European Council in December 2011, Prime
Minister David Cameron opposed treaty reform deemed necessary to bring an end
to the current sovereign debt crisis. This isolationist stance followed only two
months after his defeat of a rebellion from within his own Conservative Party,
which called for a referendum on the UKs membership of the EU. Eurobarome-
tre polls show that UK public attitudes towards the EU are among the most nega-
tive,
4
while the Eurosceptic Conservative Party and the anti-EU United Kingdom
Independence Party came first and second respectively in the 2009 European Par-

1
Markus Jachtenfuchs, The Governance Approach to European Integration, Journal of Common
Market Studies 39.2 (2001): 250.
2
Robert Ladrech, Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,
Journal of Common Market Studies 32.1 (1994): 70.
3
Tanja A. Brzel, Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States, in
The Member States of the European Union, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005), 50.
4
European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 76: Table of Results (2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_anx_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012).
liament elections.
5
With voter turnout at just 35%, these election results indicate
the UK public tends towards Eurosceptism but is also largely disinterested in the
EU.
One might think that this Euroscepticism results from a poor fit of the UKs
institutions, policies and processes with those of the EU, causing EU membership
to have a greater impact on it than on other member states. However, although
institutional and policy misfit is undoubtedly an important factor, there are a
number of variables specific to the UK that can account for a commonplace sense
of otherness. This paper seeks to rationalise negative public attitudes towards the
EU by considering key cultural, historical, political and economic particularities.
The Shaping of Public Opinion
David Eastons theory of support for political institutions identifies two dimen-
sions that can be used in order to explain attitudes towards European integration.
6

The affective dimension reflects support based on an ideological association with
the EU, while the utilitarian dimension reflects support based on a calculation of
the costs and benefits of membership. Matthew Gabel shows that, throughout the
EU, support is increasingly based on the utilitarian dimension, and this is particu-
larly so in the UK.
7
As emotional, affective factors seem to have little positive
bearing on UK public opinion, support for integration is more dependent on a
favourable utilitarian calculation.
Only one-third of the UK public feels that the benefits of EU membership ex-
ceed the economic costs.
8
Important to note, however, is the extent to which re-
spondents tend to over-estimate the UKs contribution to the EU budget. Only 1
in 10 members of the public correctly estimate the UKs financial contribution as
being equal to or under 3% of GNI. The remainder either over-estimate the
average estimation is 19% of GNI or have no knowledge of the size of this con-
tribution.
9
This is especially significant as there is a clear link between over-
estimation and consistently negative views on the EU.
10
A similar observation can
be made concerning the influence of the UK on EU decision-making. Although
almost half of respondents feel that the UK has a lot or quite a lot of political in-
fluence, if it were known that the UK always has a say over legislative outcomes

5
European Parliament, Results by Country (2009),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00082fcd21/Results-by-country-
(2009).html?tab=27 (accessed 1 March 2012).
6
David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
7
Matthew J. Gabel, Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union
(Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
8
European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 318: Attitudes Towards the EU in the United King-
dom (2010), 13, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012).
9
Ibid., 15.
10
Ibid., 16.
The United Kingdom and the European Union

253
almost 60% of the public would feel more positively about the UKs EU member-
ship.
11
Not only is the publics actual level of understanding of the economic and
political costs and benefits of membership low, they perceive their level of under-
standing of the EU to be low.
12
Again, this is of importance as there is a connec-
tion between low levels of perceived understanding and negative attitudes towards
the EU.
Of course relatively negative public attitudes towards the European Union are
not simply due to the results of utilitarian calculations made using erroneous in-
formation. The affective dimension can have a considerable impact on calculations
of the costs and benefits as the two dimensions are interlinked.
13
In a number of
ways, the UK differs notably from other EU member states and, when taken to-
gether, these differences can account for low levels of ideological, affective support
for the EU, and thus impact on overall attitudes towards the EU. Seymour Martin
Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) identify two political cleavages national-
territorial and transnational-socioeconomic which can account for the differing
interests and preferences of political actors.
14
Simon Hix suggests that, in the con-
text of the EU, national divisions are more relevant than socio-economic ones.
15

A key factor in understanding ideological association with the EU is identity.
Antonia M. Ruiz Jimnez et al. have shown that, in principle, even strong national
identities are compatible with a sense of European identity.
16
This is because,
whereas national identities tend to be defined in cultural terms, European identities
are usually based on instrumental, self-interested considerations. However, the
importance of pride and sovereignty to the strong British national identity make it
much less compatible with a complimentary sense of European identity. This in-
compatibility is reflected in survey results, which show that, whereas almost half of
EU respondents feel either very or a little attached to the EU, only 1 in 4 members
of the UK public feels in any way attached.
17
The geographical situation of the UK
as an island on the periphery of Europe is undoubtedly a contributing factor. UK
residents tend to have less frequent direct contact with other EU citizens, contact
which might allow them to discern similarities.

11
Ibid., 16-7.
12
Ibid., 64.
13
Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis.
14
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Cleavages Structures, Party Systems and Voter Align-
ments: An Introduction, in Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives, ed. Seymour
Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967).
15
Simon Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 2
nd
Ed. (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005), 148.
16
Antonia M. Ruiz Jimnez et al., European and National Identities in EUs Old and New Member
States: Ethnic, Civic, Instrumental and Symbolic Components, European Integration On-line Papers 8.11
(2004), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-011.htm (accessed 1 March 2012).
17
European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 68 (2008),
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf (accessed 1 March 2012).
The UKs status as a former dominant power has been fundamental in shaping its
identity and interests. Due to its economic strength, military force and political stabil-
ity, the UK was the dominant colonial power throughout the 19
th
century and it
emerged from the Second World War as one of the three big powers of the victo-
rious alliance.
18
The UK has sought to retain a strong global role, and the perceived
existence of alternative means to secure influence, through the Commonwealth
and in partnership with the United States, facilitated the UKs decision not to join
the Communities at the time of their founding. Since accession, successive gov-
ernments have been unwilling to choose between prioritising the UKs relationship
with the EU or with the US and have instead sought to satisfy and influence both,
which has impeded the UK from fully engaging in European integration.
19
Here,
again, the importance of the geographical situation of the UK should not be un-
der-estimated as it is partly as a result of its situation that, throughout history, the
UKs attention has often been focused on other continents.
Whereas World War II highlighted the failings of the nation-state for many in
Europe, for the UK the nation-state was strengthened. The founding member
states stood to gain more from the peace dividend that integration was to bring
since the human, physical and political costs of war had been greater for them than
for the UK.
20
With a long history of democratic stability, the UK did not rely on
integration to strengthen its domestic institutions.
21
In fact, as Jeffrey Anderson
shows, old democracies with strong institutions tend to be more resistant to
change.
22
And, as noted by Robert Rohrschneider, the perceived democratic deficit
of the EUs institutions tends to have a greater impact on public opinion in such
states.
23
Compared to the long-established and familiar institutions of the UK state,
the institutions of the EU are intangible and illegitimate in the eyes of the public.
A key political difference between member states is the majoritarian and con-
sensual characteristics of their political systems. Arend Lijphart identifies the fea-
tures of majoritarian and consensual regimes along two dimensions: the horizontal
executive-parties dimension and the vertical federal-unitary dimension, the UK
being strongly majoritarian on both dimensions.
24
Lijphart suggests that, as the EU
is a more consensual political system, member states with similar political systems

18
Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire (London: Abacus, 1994).
19
Michael Moran, Politics and Governance in the UK (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 34-7; Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 157.
20
Gabel, Interests and Integration.
21
Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 155.
22
Jeffrey J. Anderson, Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity, 1945-
2000, Journal of Common Market Studies 40.5 (2002): 814.
23
Robert Rohrschneider, The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-Wide Government,
American Journal of Political Science 46.2 (2002).
24
Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).

255
should experience less difficulty adapting to membership. It would follow, there-
fore, that the British political elite, accustomed to a majoritarian domestic political
system characterised by a small number of political parties and a tendency for sin-
gle party governments, and centralised power, should have greater difficulty adjust-
ing to the EUs consensual decision-making process.
Nevertheless, the UK Executive has adapted well to EU membership. This is
in line with George Tsebeliss theory of veto players, which holds that member
states with a low number of formal decision-makers adapt with greater ease to the
requirements of membership.
25
In the case of the UK Executive, adaptation has
been facilitated by the UKs centralized coordination system and the fact that sin-
gle party governments are the norm, lessening the need for domestic inter-
departmental bargaining.
26
The UK Parliament, on the other hand, has not easily
adapted to EU membership. Hussein Kassim shows that for this strong parliament
the absolute and relative loss of power has been considerable.
27
The impact on the
UK Parliament is compounded by the importance of the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty to the UK constitution, which conflicts with the principle of the su-
premacy of EU Law.
28

Hix shows that, in the UK, attitudes towards the EU are heavily influenced by
the position of the political party an individual supports, and therefore public opin-
ion has been heavily influenced by the increase in political Euroscepticism.
29
Par-
liamentarians, like all political actors, have interests and preferences they seek to
promote. Given the impact of EU membership on the UK Parliament, it is unsur-
prising that Members of Parliament tend to be at best hesitant in expressing their
support for European integration and at worst openly Eurosceptic. The absence of
informative public debate on EU membership has left a void that has been filled
by Eurosceptic discourse.
Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party, which had been marginalised
since the 1960s, was legitimised by Margaret Thatchers increasingly confrontation-
al approach to the EU from the mid-1980s. Eurosceptic sentiment was strength-
ened by the arduous ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the UKs humiliating
exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in the early 1990s.
30
Despite the evolu-

25
George Tsebelis, Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical
Analysis, American Political Science Review 93.3 (1999).
26
Moran, Politics and Governance in the UK, 100; Andrew Geddes, The European Union and British Politics
(Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 166.
27
Hussein Kassim, The Europeanization of Member State Institutions, in The Member States of the
European Union, ed. Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005),
298.
28
Troels B. Hansen and Bruno Scholl, Europeanization and Domestic Parliamentary Adaptation: A
Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the House of Commons, European Integration On-line
Papers 6.15 (2002), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-015.htm (accessed 1 March 2012).
29
Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 156.
30
Geddes, The European Union and British Politics, 195-205.
tion of the Labour Partys position during the 1980s from one of opposition to
membership to support for active engagement, the governments of Tony Blair and
Gordon Brown failed to make a convincing case to the public for a more positive
EU policy.
31
Thus, the Eurosceptic message of the Conservative Party, which is
reinforced by that of the increasingly popular UKIP, has been more forceful than
any pro-EU message of the Labour Party. Even in government, the pro-EU Liber-
al Democrat Party has failed to temper the typically Eurosceptic discourse of the
Conservative Party.
As a populous, wealthy member state, the UK is one of the main contributors
to the EU budget and also a net contributor. However, that the UK is a net con-
tributor can also be explained by the fact that a high proportion of the EU budget
is allocated to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), of which the UK is not a
major beneficiary due to the relatively small size of its agricultural sector.
32
The
CAP is perceived as a wasteful policy by many in the UK and this is a key reason
offered by successive UK governments, faced with mounting opposition from
other member states, to justify the continued payment of the rebate negotiated in
1984. The maintenance of this rebate is presented as a matter of vital national in-
terest, which serves to perpetuate the notion that the UK has less to gain from EU
membership than other states.
A further difference of the UK economy is the importance of its financial ser-
vices sector. The City of London has historically been a predominant financial
centre and successive governments have attached much importance to its interests,
resisting, in particular, increased regulation emanating from the EU. The UKs
former status as the leading global economic power, with the Pound Sterling as the
foremost international currency, has surely influenced opinion on Economic and
Monetary Union and the loss of sovereignty that participation entails. More recent-
ly, experience of the Exchange Rate Mechanism between 1990 and 1992 has rein-
forced negative attitudes of both the political elite and the public towards adoption
of the Euro.
33
Today, only 15% of the UK public supports a single currency
34
and
opponents feel their reluctance has been vindicated by the crisis engulfing the Eu-
rozone. Besides, Paul De Grauwe shows that there are certain key differences be-
tween the UK and Eurozone economies, including greater flexibility of the labour
market and heavier reliance on bond and equity markets for finance in the former,
which suggest that the UK might benefit less from adopting the Euro than other
states.
35

31
Ibid., 89
32
European Commission, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, The Com-
mon Agricultural Policy Explained, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf
33
Geddes, The European Union and British Politics, 143-5.
34
European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 76, 66.
35
Paul De Grauwe, Economics of Monetary Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 101-2.

257
A final particularity to be highlighted is the role of the UK press in shaping public
opinion. The high concentration of ownership and the relatively wide circulation
of national daily newspapers allow this medium great influence. Given the im-
portant role played by the daily press in fostering a sense of national unity
36
and in
light of the fact that four, generally Eurosceptic, newspaper groups produce three-
quarters of the 11 million national newspapers sold each day in the UK,
37
the abil-
ity of the press to accentuate perceived differences should not be underestimated.
Furthermore, most of the daily newspapers sold in the UK are tabloids that do not
offer in-depth analysis of EU affairs and rely on eye-catching and sometimes mis-
leading headlines to draw the publics attention in what is an increasingly competi-
tive market. The UKs island location means residents have less frequent experi-
ence of the day-to-day benefits of EU membership and thus their reliance on the
predominantly Eurosceptic press for information is greater.
Conclusion
The institutions, policies and processes of all member states are subject to pressure
for change as a result of EU membership, which might have a negative impact on
public attitudes towards the EU. The reaction of the UK public to EU member-
ship has, however, been particularly negative. It has been shown that, on the one
hand, the impact of and reaction to membership is, to a considerable extent, due to
substantial misfit of UK institutions, policies and processes with those of the EU.
On the other hand, it has been established that there are a number of factors quite
specific to the UK, which shape public opinion on the EU to a significant extent.
The publics lack of understanding of the functioning of the EU mars its ability
to assess the benefits of membership. The importance of pride and sovereignty to
the strong sense of British identity coupled with nostalgia for an era of global in-
fluence make it difficult for the UK public to connect with and to commit to a
European destiny. The publics attachment to the narrative of the UK as an old,
stable democracy with a historically strong and liberal economy leaves it suscepti-
ble to the increasingly Eurosceptic discourse of its politicians and the press. This
sense of otherness is further reinforced by the UKs geographical location on the
periphery of mainland Europe. All of these factors have contributed to what might
be considered as a stalled process of Europeanization in the UK.

36
Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995), cited in Andrew Geddes, The European Union
and British Politics (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 220.
37
Charles Grant, Why is Britain Eurosceptic? Centre for European Reform (2008), 3,
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_eurosceptic_1
9dec08-1345.pdf (accessed 3 March 2012).
Bibliography
Anderson, Jeffrey J. Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic
Polity, 1945-2000. Journal of Common Market Studies 40.5 (2002): 793-822.
Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 1995.
Brzel, Tanja A. Europeanization: How the European Union Interacts with Its
Member States. In The Member States of the European Union, edited by Simon
Bulmer and Christian Lequesne, 45-69. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005.
De Grauwe, Paul. Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007.
Easton, David. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1965.
European Commission. Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment. The Common Agricultural Policy Explained.
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf (accessed 3
March 2012).
European Commission. Flash Eurobarometer 318: Attitudes Towards the EU in
the United Kingdom (2010).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_318_en.pdf (accessed 1 March
2012).
European Commission. Standard Eurobarometer 68 (2008).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb68/eb_68_en.pdf
European Commission. Standard Eurobarometer 76: Table of Results (2011).
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_anx_en.pdf
European Parliament. Results by Country (2009).
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00082fcd21/Results-by-
country-(2009).html?tab=27 (accessed 1 March 2012).
Gabel, Matthew J. Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and
European Union. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998.
Geddes, Andrew. The European Union and British Politics. Basingstoke, Hampshire:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
Grant, Charles. Why is Britain Eurosceptic? Centre for European Reform (2008).
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/201
1/essay_eurosceptic_19dec08-1345.pdf (accessed 3 March 2012).
Hansen, Troels B., and Bruno Scholl. Europeanization and Domestic Parliamen-
tary Adaptation: A Comparative Analysis of the Bundestag and the House of
Commons. European Integration On-line Papers 6.15 (2002).
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-015.htm (accessed 1 March 2012).

259
Hix, Simon. The Political System of the European Union. 2
nd
Ed. Basingstoke, Hamp-
shire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Hobsbawm, Eric J. The Age of Empire. London: Abacus, 1994.
Jachtenfuchs, Markus. The Governance Approach to European Integration.
Journal of Common Market Studies 39.2 (2001): 245-64.
Kassim, Hussein. The Europeanization of Member State Institutions. In The
Member States of the European Union, edited by Simon Bulmer and Christian
Lequesne, 285-316. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Ladrech, Robert. Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The
Case of France. Journal of Common Market Studies 32.1 (1994): 69-88.
Lijphart, Arend. Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twen-
ty-One Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.
Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. Cleavages Structures, Party Systems
and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In Party Systems and Voter Alignments:
Cross-national Perspectives, edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan,
1-64. New York: Free Press, 1967.
Moran, Michael. Politics and Governance in the UK. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005.
Rohrschneider, Robert. The Democracy Deficit and Mass Support for an EU-
Wide Government. American Journal of Political Science 46.2 (2002): 463-75.
Ruiz Jimnez, Antonia M., Jaroslaw Jzef Grniak, Ankica Kosic, Paszkal Kiss,
and Maren Kandulla. European and National Identities in EUs Old and New
Member States: Ethnic, Civic, Instrumental and Symbolic Components. Euro-
pean Integration On-line Papers 8.11 (2004). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-
011.htm (accessed 1 March 2012).
Tsebelis, George. Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democra-
cies: An Empirical Analysis. American Political Science Review 93.3 (1999):
591-608.

From a Traumatic Past to
a Constructive Future
The Spanish Transition Period as a Case Study
Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz
Introduction: Armed Conflicts and Collective Trauma
Up to the second half of the 20
th
century, few areas around the globe have been as
full of discord and violence-ridden as Europe. Especially from the early modern
period on, the Old World has been swept and scarred by wars and conflict that
have had a definite influence on the positions, formation-processes, alliances, and
power relations among the different nations.
1
It is difficult, in fact, to find any
single historical moment in which Europe was completely at peace. Due some-
times to class inequalities, at other times to religious tensions, and still at others to
geo-political and ideological disputes, the truth is that human aggression has been a
constant in the history of the continent for at least as long as our memory allows
us to remember.
2
To name only a few of these sad historical occasions, one could
mention the War of the Roses (15
th
century.), the French Wars of Religion (16
th

century.), the Thirty Years War (17
th
century.), the French Revolution (18
th
centu-
ry.), the Italian Independence War (19
th
century.), or the two World Wars in the
20
th
century. These disruptive events usually took place on European battlefields
but, almost as often, they were also extended to faraway territories and involved
populations that had little knowledge of the origins and goals of the conflicts.
There is no question that the most dramatic consequences produced by armed
conflicts are usually gauged according to the number of casualties and the material
destruction they have caused among the contenders. However, as conflict and
trauma specialists have pointed out, violent events of this kind are also bound to
shatter the individual and collective sense of well-being and security of the partici-
pants. As a result, they are invariably going to make efforts to change the situation

1
Johan Galtung, Europe in the Making (London: Taylor & Francis, 1989), 7-21.
2
See Robert Gilpin, War and Changes in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
especially chapter 1. Gilpins views on conflict and power relations are deeply indebted to Edward
Hallett Carrs, particularly as they are articulated in The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction
to the Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1951).
that triggered these events or, alternatively, to try to forget them.
3
Neal notes
that, because the contenders in a conflict tend to become more reasonable once
the violence is over, traumatic events frequently lead to advances and progress.
4
In
his opinion, the very fact that a disruptive event has occurred [means that] new
opportunities will emerge for innovation and change.
5
The American Civil War
and World War II are often cited as examples of highly traumatic historical occa-
sions that fostered positive changes in some of the societies that suffered them.
Yet, it would be nave to assume that this recovery of stability indicates a complete
disappearance of the resentful memories and pent-up animosities that those violent
events generated. In this regard, Aguilar believes that the Spanish Civil War is a
case in point since, after two decades of willful forgetting, the democratic ma-
turity of the country and its capacity to absorb all those intense emotions are still
being tested.
6
According to Caruth, traumatic events are characterized by their
unassimilated nature and by the fact that they are unwittingly re-enacted by the
victims, even when those victims try to leave them behind.
7
Consequently, a socie-
ty or community can only aspire to look into the future unburdened by past re-
sentment and emotional restraints if it manages to restore objective memory by
lifting all sorts of social and psychological pressures that keep the traumatizing
events unavailable to the conscious mind. In the introduction to Postwar, Judt
maintains that some movements have been made in this direction these last four
decades in several European countries Germany, France, Poland, and Italy,
among them , in an attempt to provide a satisfactory closure to a historical period
and to push forward the process of European construction.
8

The main object of this article is to explore in some detail the trauma process
that Spain has undergone since the early 1970s, a process that has contributed
decisively both to healing some deep psychological wounds in the people and to
the incorporation of the country into the EU. The article dwells upon the im-
portant role that a profoundly revisionary historiography and the recent legislation
on historical memory have played in repositioning Spain regarding the Union. I
maintain that, although the revisions made and the laws passed were primarily
meant to assuage the pain and trauma caused by disturbing events that have kept
haunting two generations of Spaniards, it is also clear that these steps should be

3
See: Jeffrey C. Alexander et al., eds., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 2004); Ana Douglass and Thomas A. Vogler, eds., Witness and Memory: The Discourse of
Trauma (New York: Routledge, 2003).
4
Arthur G. Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century (Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 9-10.
5
Ibid., 18.
6
Paloma Aguilar, Polticas de la memoria y memoria de la poltica: El caso espaol en perspectiva comparada
(Madrid: Alianza, 2008), 53-4.
7
Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1996), 2.
8
Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2005), 1-10.
From a Traumatic Past to a Constructive Future

263
considered crucial in the process of integrating the country into the larger Europe-
an project. Like many other Europeans, Spaniards have employed the discourse of
trauma to describe what has happened, not only to themselves, but also to the
collectivity to which they belong.
9
As a result, they have felt that the scars left by
the Spanish Civil War and the unspeakable cruelties that followed it did not just
leave indelible marks upon their collective consciousness, but also forced them to
adopt a national identity with which they could not feel comfortable at all.
On the Wounds and Scars of the Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War has been described by historians and conflict specialists as
one of the most violent and heart-wrenching internal bellicose episodes of the 20
th

century. Scholars have found it difficult to explain what could have driven a coun-
try to so much carnage and so many casualties over 640,000, plus half a million
exiles , at a time when the Second Republic was trying to disseminate a modern
sense of community and democracy in the nation. The most popular explanation
for the brutality of the conflict has been the age-old schism between the so-called
dos Espaas (two Spains): one secular, regionalist, and liberal; the other Catholic,
unified, and very conservative. Any close scrutiny of the Civil War, however, soon
shows that this explanation proves excessively simple and reductive. In fact, there
were a variety of political, economic, socio-cultural, religious, and military factors
that need to be borne in mind, if one wishes to account with any rigor for the al-
zamiento (rising) in July 1936.
10
Some of these factors seemed rather contextual,
such as the liberal de-centralizing revolution of the Republic and the obsession for
unity of the military and political conservatives, but others had a structural charac-
ter, such as the long-standing tensions of the urban capitalists of the periphery and
the Madrid-based power or the high levels of illiteracy. All things considered, it
seems that the key contributing factor in the outbreak of the Civil War was the
challenge to the existing unitary conception of the state coming from the growing
regionalism. In Richards opinion, the army and political conservatives revealed
the depth of their hatred to separatism by claiming that even an Espaa Roja (a
Red Spain) would be preferable to an Espaa Rota (a Broken Spain).
11
It was
this irrational fear of the disintegration of the centralized state and the disruption
of a uniform national identity that was the mainspring of the bloodshed.

9
Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma, 2.
10
Stanley G. Payne, Antecedentes y crisis de la democracia, in La Guerra Civil: Una nueva visin del
conflicto que dividi Espaa, ed. Stanley G. Payne and Javier Tusell (Madrid: Temas de hoy, 1996), 17-
121.
11
Michael Richards, Collective Memory, the Nation-State and Post-Franco Society, in Contemporary
Spanish Cultural Studies, ed. Barry Jordan and Rikki Morgan-Tamosunas (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 40.
The research carried out on the internecine conflict has evinced that cruelties and
viciousness were habitual on both sides; nevertheless, it seems that the nationalist
side was much more brutal in its punishment and repression of any forces that
threatened the establishment after their victory. Preston may have stretched reality
a bit when he compares the crimes committed by Francos authoritarian regime to
those that Nazi Germany perpetrated against particular human groups.
12
Yet, as
Torres and Juli have shown, the Civil War and the early years of the dictatorship
were plagued with all kinds of mass executions, perimortem tortures and horrible
mutilations that speak of the victorious partys relentless efforts to do away with
any kind of dissent. Naturally, the repression displayed different forms and de-
grees, depending on the places where it was practiced, with class and cultural iden-
tity issues prevailing in some regions, whereas in others it was religious dissent and
political ideology that were more severely punished.
13
Some historians have argued
that, in fact, even more traumatic than the defeat in the armed conflict were those
years after the war almost two decades during which the systematic violence
against and repression of dissenters were inflicted.
14
As Scheper-Hughes and
Bourgois note, dirty wars in which governments turn their fury against those of
their own citizens suspected of harbouring the seeds of subversion are all the more
traumatic because here terror operates quietly and secretly, below and between
the lines, as it were, in the blatant contradiction between the official story and
what actually happens on the ground.
15

Paradoxically, although Francos regime dedicated abundant resources to strict
censorship and all sorts of repressive tactics, the regime also depended on the
preservation of selected memories. In order to legitimize itself, Francoism resorted
to its military triumph and the reinvention of the Civil War as a pseudo-religious
crusade to save the nation from the hands of communists and anarchists. There
was a need to convince Spaniards usually by manipulating history that the vic-
tors had succeeded in the conflict due to their faith and patriotism, and that they
retained the right to use violence whenever it was required in order to defend their
principles.
16

The struggle over collective memory became particularly virulent in those areas
of the country with a distinct regional identity (Catalonia, Asturias or the Basque
Country), for it was there that opposition to the regime became more apparent.

12
Paul Preston, The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain (London:
Harper Collins, 2008)
13
See Rafael Torres, Vctimas de la victoria (Madrid: Oberon, 2002), especially the introduction El
estigma de la derrota; Santos Juli, De guerra contra el invasor a guerra fraticida, in Vctimas de la
Guerra Civil, ed. Santos Juli (Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999), 11-52.
14
Torres, Vctimas, 4-6.
15
Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois, eds., Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2004), 47.
16
Richards, Collective Memory, 42.

265
Experts contend that traumatic experiences generally result in an ongoing process
of reverberation, in which survivors feel compelled to re-enact the painful events.
Something of this kind happened in these regions, where trauma functioned as a
social glue that helped to hold cultural and political collectives together and
helped them to see their identity reinvigorated by the persistence of the regimes
vengeance and the mystification of their persecution.
17
But, since those collective
memories of suffering and oppression remained only latent during the first decades
of the dictatorship, they could not take a definite and interpretable shape until
much later, when the apt conditions for their re-emergence were finally fulfilled.
18

Predictably enough, those conditions were first met abroad, and so the initial at-
tempts to bring back a silenced past came from foreign historians doing research
on the Civil War and the early years of Francos regime. The classic studies of the
conflict by Hugh Thomas (1961) and Gabriel Jackson (1965) inaugurated a period
of over 15 years in which foreign correspondents and researchers were those who
made the greatest efforts to restore objectivity to the key events of the fratricidal
war.
19
Although it is evident that these foreign scholars were generally prone to be
highly critical of the vicious ways of the victors in the civil conflict, it is also im-
portant to acknowledge that their impact within Spain was rather limited as a result
of the reduced dissemination of their work.
The Trauma Process in Spain and its Recent Acceleration
Francos dictatorial regime (1939-1975) succeeded in keeping the memories of the
traumatizing experiences silenced for a long time, even as they constantly returned
to torment the survivors. Curiously, however, a process of collective appeasement
began to gain momentum even before the dictators demise, as he came to realize
that he could not keep up the standards of repression that he had imposed during
the early decades after the armed conflict. As historians and political scientists have
noted, the incipient efforts to retrieve and tell the truth about the past of the na-
tion served not only to bring about the possibility of a collective reconciliation but
also to affect the emergence of a feeling of legitimization among Spaniards to be-
come members of a larger community.
20
In this sense, seeing how the European
Community was beginning to take shape in the 70s and early 80s must have been a

17
Cf. Douglass and Vogler, Witness and Memory, 12.
18
Caruth has spoken at some length about this inevitable delay in time between the experience of the
demolishing events and their reappearance, often in the form of haunting nightmares and ghostly
visions, in Unclaimed Experience, 3-4.
19
Hugh S. Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 3rd rev. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977); Gabriel
Jackson, The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1965).
20
Javier Tusell, La reconciliacin espaola, Claves de Razn Prctica 132 (2003): 32-9. See also Julin
Casanova, Una dictadura de cuarenta aos, in Morir, matar, sobrevivir: La violencia en la dictadura de
Franco, ed. Julin Casanova (Barcelona: Editorial Crtica, 2002), 1-50.
significant incentive to make Spain revise its past. Jelin and others have argued that
these procedures to retrieve and refashion the fragments of ones past in the form
of traumatic memories both arise and develop depending on the circumstances,
and are always anchored in the concerns, aspirations, and interpretative frames of
the present times.
21

In order to come to an understanding of the trauma process in Spain, it is very
convenient to consider some recent contributions that experts in historical
memory and trauma theory have made to the disciplines. These contributions are
useful because they highlight the importance of defining through cultural repre-
sentation, acts of commemoration, and societal mobilization collective means for
undoing repression, and allowing feelings of loss and mourning to be ex-
pressed.
22
The cathartic exercise of restoring memory and resisting political re-
pression started in Spain, as noted above, some time before the end of the dicta-
torial regime in the mid-1970s, with some decrees showing that the insane silence
could not be enforced for much longer. Juli explains that, although the Law of
Amnesty was not passed until October 1977, almost two years after Francos
death, a number of historians, journalists, lawyers, and political activists had al-
ready made sure that the country would not suffer from a bout of constitutional
amnesia in its transition towards democracy.
23
Graham, on the other hand, feels
the need to qualify that idea by stating that [t]he role of culture in keeping alive
the collective memory remains paramount as Spaniards continue to rediscover the
past that was taken from them under the dictatorship; but it coexists with a con-
verse urge to amnesia (desmemoria) which can be both a liberation from past trau-
mas and a refusal to face them.
24
In any case, if one looks closely into the histori-
ography and legislation produced in the 1970s and 80s, the conclusion to be drawn
is that, despite the explicit political consensus to willfully forget mutual hatreds of
the past, still legal and socio-cultural organizations were fighting intensely to obtain
some retribution for the victims.
25

Judt claims that the unexpected transformation undergone by some southern
European countries at this historical juncture derived from the fact that, although
their political structures had obviously lagged behind, their society had not, and a
new generation of politicians and businessmen had begun to compete for the sup-

21
Elisabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2003), 16. See also Michael Lambek and Paul Antze, Introduction: Forecasting Memory, in Tense
Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory, eds. Michael Lambek and Paul Antze (London: Sage, 1996),
xxii.
22
Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma, 7.
23
Juli, De guerra contra el invasor, 49.
24
Helen Graham and Jo Labanyi, eds., Spanish Cultural Studies An Introduction: The Struggle for Moderni-
ty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 313. See also: Richards, Collective Memory, 46.
25
For clear instances of this trend, the strong push given to legislation on war pensions, the return of
Republican war veterans or the dismantling of Francoist symbols could be mentioned.

267
port of voters and customers.
26
There is little doubt that Francos last years in
power saw a more open economic, religious, and even cultural policy that made the
initiation of the trauma process possible even if it was only during the Transition
Period that it would be fully consolidated. In Ferrndizs opinion, the acceleration
of the trauma process on the threshold of the new millennium was due to the real-
ization that the victims of the conflict had been betrayed and ignored for too
long and that their impending demise would mean a complete disappearance of
the collective memory of the country forever.
27
In this context, it is not surprising
that a remarkable number of artists, associations, and grassroots civil movements
should foster all kinds of initiatives to retrieve the memories of the defeated and to
establish the falsity of many of the official records. Novels such as La voz dormida
(2002) by Dulce Chacn and Veinte aos y un da (2003) by Jorge Semprn show
deep commitment to dig into those experiences that had been bracketed out of
history.
28
Only in this manner could a real process of healing and reconciliation
take root in a society that had been prevented from facing past traumas that fore-
stalled its natural development for too long.
Zaldvar and Castells explain that Spaniards have only very recently lost their
ancestral fear that the ghosts from the past might interfere with their future, and
have realized that their century-old isolation could finally be abandoned.
29
Yet,
with the Transition Period coming to an end in the late 1980s, it seemed clear that
the efforts to overcome past animosities and to learn tolerance were bearing some
fruit in terms of socio-political democratization and cultural renewal. For one
thing, the vanquished were given due recognition and concessions were granted
from the central government to let the historic regions play their part in national
politics.
30
By 1992, when Madrid was named European Cultural Capital and the
Olympic Games were held in Barcelona, it could safely be said that the country
had found the stability of a new identity and that it was ready to embark on the
more ambitious project of joining supranational organizations. Although it is true
that Spain had been a member of the United Nations, the OECD, and the Interna-
tional Labour Organization for a number of decades, it is also evident that Span-
iards did not see their country as a modern and democratic society that could hope
to get on the same train as other European nations. Interestingly, the effort made
these last two decades to come to grips with their troubling past has proved im-
mensely beneficial in terms of gathering the self-confidence and conviction to

26
Judt, Postwar, 756. The epilogue to his book, tellingly entitled, From the House of the Dead: An
Essay on Modern European Memory, discusses the importance of collective memories.
27
Francisco Ferrndiz, Exhumaciones y polticas de la memoria en la Espaa contempornea, in El
derecho a la memoria, ed. Felipe Gmez Isa (Bilbao: IDH Universidad de Deusto, 2006), 556.
28
Rafael Torres Victimas de la victoria also brings together numerous interviews with the survivors and
witnesses of the most traumatic episodes during the Spanish Civil War.
29
Carlos A. Zaldvar and Manuel Castells, Espaa, fin de siglo (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992).
30
Cf. Richards, Collective Memory, 44; Tusell, La reconciliacin espaola, 38.
believe that they were in a position to contribute to projects beyond their national
borders.
Closing Remarks: Centripetal and Centrifugal Purposes
This article has considered the critical role that efforts to restore historical memory
and to provide retribution to those most deeply affected by Francos repressive
regime have played in Spains recent history. Despite some scholars opinion that it
was a wilful amnesia after the dictators death that saved the country from getting
entangled in age-old disputes and rivalries leading nowhere, the fact is that groups
of survivors and witnesses, historians, lawyers, and political activists have done
their best to make the long-silenced stories of the past see the light. Lambek and
Antze cogently defend that retrieving traumatic experiences can sometimes be
remarkably empowering and often leads to collective organizing that may achieve
previously denied recognition.
31
No doubt names such as those of Ramn Tam-
ames, Fernando Fernn-Gmez, Santos Juli, Jorge Semprn, or Baltasar Garzn
are immediately associated in our minds today with those tireless attempts to bring
inner peace and social justice to those that had been erased from history. It must
be admitted that, as Primo Levi and others have noted, managing to finally come
to terms with the past and to give shape to memories that have been repressed for
such a long time is not an easy task.
32
Not only that, but there are always the at-
tendant dangers of commodifying those new narratives or sacralising them in such
a way that they may also end up distorting the truth. In spite of these inevitable
difficulties and risks, it must be said that the post-Transition Period in Spain has
been characterized mostly by a balanced restoration of the past that has helped
those who earlier on felt altogether excluded to perceive themselves as an integral
part of the country.
Likewise, besides that centripetal process of retrieval of and reconciliation with
ones own past, it is important to mention that an equally urgent centrifugal need
to project a more positive image of the country abroad has also contributed deci-
sively to the acceleration of trauma mobilization. Frey has written very lucidly
about how countries such as Germany and France felt compelled to carry out this
exercise of historical revisionism and reinterpretation of the past before they could
engage in the activity of determining their role in the process of European integra-
tion.
33
Nothing less should be stated about Spain, a nation doubly burdened by a
forty-year dictatorship that had fractured the society into rival factions and a highly
isolationist policy that had kept it apart from some of the converging dynamics

31
Lambek and Antze, Introduction, xxiv.
32
Primo Levi, Los hundidos y los salvados, trans. Pilar Gmez Vdate (Barcelona: Muchnik Editores,
1989), 32-60.
33
Hugo Frey, Historical Memory and the Boundaries of European Integration, Surrey University,
http://www.surrey.ac.uk/LIS/MNP/may2000/Frey.html (accessed 27 November 2009).

269
that had begun to take place in other countries. By the early 1990s, however, it was
evident that, thanks to efforts to overcome cultural trauma and to seek mutual
understanding between different socio-political groups, Spain was ready to embark
on supranational undertakings on a par with other European states. In Tusells
opinion, the path to national reconciliation has not been an easy one, but it has
definitely capacitated the country to embrace future projects that only a few dec-
ades ago would have been unthinkable.
34

Bibliography
Aguilar, Paloma. Polticas de la memoria y memorias de la poltica: El caso espaol en
perspectiva comparada. Madrid: Alianza, 2008.
Alexander, Jeffrey C., et al., eds. Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 2004.
Carr, Edward Hallett. The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study
of International Relations. London: Macmillan, 1951.
Caruth, Cathy. Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Casanova, Julin. Una dictadura de cuarenta aos. In Morir, matar, sobrevivir: La
violencia en la dictadura de Franco, edited by Julin Casanova, 1-50. Barcelona:
Editorial Crtica, 2002.
Douglass, Ana, and Thomas A. Vogler, eds. Witness and Memory: The Discourse of
Trauma. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Ferrndiz, Francisco. Exhumaciones y polticas de la memoria en la Espaa
contempornea. In El derecho a la memoria, edited by Felipe Gmez Isa, 549-67.
Bilbao: IDH Universidad de Deusto, 2006.
Frey, Hugo. Historical Memory and the Boundaries of European Integration.
Surrey University. http://www.surrey.ac.uk/LIS/MNP/may2000/Frey.html
(accessed 27 November 2009).
Galtung, Johan. Europe in the Making. London: Taylor & Francis, 1989.
Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981.
Graham, Helen, and Jo Labanyi, eds. Spanish Cultural Studies An Introduction: The
Struggle for Modernity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

34
Tusell, La reconciliacin espaola, 37-9.
Jackson, Gabriel. The Spanish Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1965.
Jelin, Elisabeth. State Repression and the Labors of Memory. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003.
Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2005.
Juli, Santos. De guerra contra el invasor a guerra fraticida. In Vctimas de la
Guerra Civil, edited by Santos Juli, 11-52. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999.
Lambek, Michael, and Paul Antze, Introduction: Forecasting Memory. In Tense
Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory, edited by Michael Lambek and Paul
Antze, xi-xxxviii. London: Sage, 1996.
Levi, Primo. Los hundidos y los salvados. Translated by Pilar Gmez Vdate. Barcelo-
na: Muchnik Editores, 1989.
Neal, Arthur G. National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American
Century. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1989.
Payne, Stanley G. Antecedentes y crisis de la democracia. In La Guerra Civil: Una
nueva visin del conflicto que dividi Espaa, edited by Stanley G. Payne and Javier
Tusell, 17-121. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1996.
Preston, Paul. The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century
Spain. London: Harper Collins, 2008.
Richards, Michael. Collective Memory, the Nation-State and Post-Franco Socie-
ty. In Contemporary Spanish Cultural Studies, edited by Barry Jordan and Rikki
Morgan-Tamosunas, 38-47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Scheper-Hughes, Nancy, and Philippe Bourgois, eds. Violence in War and Peace: An
Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004.
Thomas, Hugh S. The Spanish Civil War. 3rd rev. ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1977.
Torres, Rafael. Vctimas de la victoria. Madrid: Oberon, 2002.
Tusell, Javier. La reconciliacin espaola. Claves de Razn Prctica 132 (2003):
32-9.
Zaldvar, Carlos A. and Manuel Castells. Espaa, fin de siglo. Madrid: Alianza
Editorial, 1992.

Acknowledgment: I would like to thank my colleagues Paco Ferrndiz and Mara Jess
Cava for their time and invaluable insights into the issues discussed in this essay. My
gratitude also to Asier Altuna for his logistic assistance before the 2010 Euroculture
Conference in Groningen.

Identity, Memory and Belonging
The Friedland Transit Camp and the
Process of Admission to Post-War Germany
Sascha Schiel
Introduction
Friedland! The name alone is a promise for those who are coming a pledge and
therefore a commitment for us.
1
With these words, the Friedlandhilfe, an affiliation
of charity organisations working in the refugee camp Friedland near Gttingen in
Lower Saxony, began its appeal for donations in November 1957. By that time, the
Friedland camp, established by the British military administration in September
1945 as a small-scale refugee camp, was a crucial institution in the Federal Repub-
lic. What had at first been an emergency solution to a pressing problem developed
into an important transit camp where questions of identity and memory were dealt
with.
The main task of the Friedland camp throughout the years was to admit people,
who were coming to West Germany as a consequence of World War II, to Ger-
man citizenship. Of course, there were other tasks at hand, for example looking
after people heading east to the Soviet occupation zone in the immediate post-war
era or caring for refugees such as boat people from Vietnam who were granted asy-
lum by Lower Saxony in the late 1970s. But the most important function was to
deal with consequences of the war Germany had unleashed. Even today, the camp
does undertake this task, serving as the only transit camp for resettlers from East-
ern Europe, although other groups, for instance various groups of refugees and,
since the beginning of 2011, asylum seekers, outnumber the former by now.
Although various studies analyse Germanys dealing with its past,
2
the question
of what happened to people passing through a transit camp is rarely asked. Instead,

1
Charity appeal issued by the Friedlandhilfe from November 1957, in: BA Koblenz B 106/24502.
2
See, for example, Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of
Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Neil Gregor, Haunted City: Nuremberg and the
Nazi Past (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Mary Fulbrook, German National Identity after
the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Nobert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfnge der Bundes-
republik und die NS-Vergangenheit (Mnchen: Beck, 1996); Edgar Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundes-
republik Deutschland: Der Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948-1990 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaft-
liche Buchgesellschaft, 1999).
these studies mostly focus on discourses within post-war society and the political
decision-making processes regarding admission and integration. As a result, the
role played by newcomers and local actors in coming to terms with Germanys past
and shaping memories of, for example, war, flight, expulsion and war captivity are
more often than not neglected. Drawing on the example of the Friedland transit
camp, the Federal Republics most outstanding place to admit people to German
citizenship
3
, this article will highlight the implementation of West German policy
in transit camps and the interdependencies between post-war society, people ad-
mitted as German citizens, and local actors in the process of admission. This will
help to better understand how and by whom identity, memory and public com-
memoration were shaped in West German society at a practical level and how
discourses in this respect in turn influenced the process of admission. Because
these broader topics cannot be elaborated here appropriately, the focus will be on
questions of identity. What did newcomers experience when they were passing
through Friedland? Were they admitted to German citizenship from the beginning
or were they turned into Germans during their stay at the camp? Did a changing
perception of the war and a changing public commemoration led to a transfor-
mation in the process through which people were admitted as German citizens?
4

Looking after Refugees and Expellees: The Immediate Post-War Era
The first groups sheltered in Friedland were refugees and expellees. They were
members of German minorities or German citizens from former German or Ger-
man-occupied territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, who had fled from the ad-
vancing Red Army or were expelled as a consequence of the Third Reichs racial
war.
5
Refugees and expellees were now on their way towards the Western occupa-
tion zones. While flight and expulsion had not occurred simultaneously in Eastern
Europe, refugees and expellees had merged into one indiscernible group when they
arrived in the British or American zone. Other groups were also on the move after
the wars end, namely wartime evacuees, people in search of their families, former
soldiers who had discharged themselves, members of German occupation admin-
istrations and others who were stranded far from their homes at the end of the
war. They were mostly heading east to west and here joined refugees and expellees.
In the early stages, a smaller and rapidly decreasing number of people went west to

3
The only academic (but not widely published) study concerning the camps history is: Dagmar
Kleineke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland 1945-1955 (Gttingen: Universitt Gttingen,
1992).
4
This article is part of a broader PhD project concerning Germany's dealing with the consequences
of the war in postwar transit camps and the significance of the Friedland camp for the culture of
remembrance in the Federal Republic.
5
Wolfgang Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse, Folgen (Frankfurt
am Main: Fischer, 1985); Detlev Brandes, Der Weg zur Vertreibung 1938-1945: Plne und Entscheidungen
zum Transfer der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei und Polen (Mnchen: Oldenbourg, 2001).
Identity, Memory, and Belonging

273
east instead. A substantial proportion of these people on the move went through
one camp or more. It did take some time, however, until occupation administra-
tions were able to secure their borders, thus directing most of the people crossing
into their zone to one of the transit camps. At the Friedland camp, people arriving
were looked after and then hurriedly sent further on their ways. By the end of
1945, more than 500,000 people were registered in Friedland, another half million
people passed through the camp during the following year, most of them staying a
few hours or one night only.
6

Even though the camp represented the first station in the Western occupation
zones for many of those fleeing or being expelled from Eastern Europe, Friedland
did not gain the importance it had for some of the later groups. Questions con-
cerning identity were not really an issue and, if they were, there was no reason to
especially tie them to the Friedland camp. Above all, the Friedland camp was only
one of many similar emergency solutions established in the immediate post-war
era. In the British occupation zone, military officials founded nine camps in which
German administrations and welfare organisations were enabled to shelter and
provide for people passing through, whereas at the same time British officials had
at least in principle a tool to regulate the influx of people into their zone. Likewise,
transit camps were erected in the American and the Soviet occupation zones, while
refugee camps spread to many cities. Hence, refugees or expellees passing through
Friedland were likely to stay at other camps thereafter.
7
At a time when millions of
people were on the move in occupied Germany
8
, Friedland merely was a small-
scale solution for an urgent problem.
Furthermore, refugees, expellees and other groups passing through during the
immediate post-war period had more pressing matters to deal with: Where to go
next? What happened to family and friends? Where to find housing, food, work?
Besides, people heading to Friedland in the early years of the camps existence
were almost exclusively German citizens or could at least expect to gain admission
during the registration process. Although refugees and expellees were often re-
ceived coldly and perceived as foreigners in post-war Germany, these partly hostile,
partly ambivalent contacts were rather a consequence of the competition for scant
resources than a question of inclusion and exclusion.
9

6
For exact figures with differentiations regarding the various groups looked after in Friedland, see:
Kleineke, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland, 17-34.
7
For introductory remarks on refugee camps in postwar Germany, see Mathias Beer, Ich mchte
die Zeit nicht missen. Flchtlingslager nach 1945 als totale Institutionen?, Sozialwissenschaftliche
Informationen 29.3 (2000): 186-93; Volker Ackermann, Homo Barackensis: Westdeutsche Flchtlings-
lager in den 1950er Jahren, in: Anknpfungen: Kulturgeschichte Landesgeschichte Zeitgeschichte: Gedenk-
schrift fr Peter Httenberger, ed. Volker Ackermann et al. (Essen: Klartext, 1995), 330-46.
8
In addition to the aforementioned groups, former forced labourers and freed concentration camp
inmates, so-called DPs (displaced persons), were also looked after by allied occupation administra-
tions as well as the UNRRA and, from 1947 on, the IRO.
9
Local conflicts between refugees and locals are, for example, discussed in Paul Erker, Revolution

There was, however, one aspect in the Friedland camps early period directly con-
nected to questions concerning identity. Transit camps issued registration forms
that refugees and expellees needed when they arrived at the towns or cities as-
signed to them. As most of the people arriving at the Friedland camp did not pos-
sess identification cards or any personal documents verifying their identity due to
the circumstances of flight and expulsion, registration forms had to be issued bona
fide. Moreover, especially during the camps early period, a great number of forms
were issued in a very short time in somewhat chaotic surroundings. Thus names
were frequently misspelled or home towns understood the wrong way. These cir-
cumstances were a bargain for those in need of a new identity, for instance Na-
tional Socialist or SS leaders, Nazi occupation administration officials or, in gen-
eral, all those, who had good reasons to fear prosecution after the war was lost and
future developments were uncertain. Although this is speculative, some people
might also have seen an opportunity to leave their no longer wanted families or
their personal problems behind. For want of informative sources, it is, however,
barely possible to determine how many people did actually use one of the transit
camps to obtain a new identity, which reasons they had and how they experienced
this change of identity.
All things considered, the Friedland camp was a small wheel in a larger process
in which people had to come to terms with their past and adjust to the new cir-
cumstances they were facing. During the following years, Friedlands role was
about to change. While most of the provisional camps were closed within a few
years after the end of the war when more and more people were able to move into
new homes and the number of German refugees and expellees coming from East-
ern Europe had begun to dwindle down, a smaller number of camps remained.
The Friedland camp was one of them. It took over an increasing number of tasks
and became widely known throughout West German society.
10
In this respect,
questions of identity gained significance since the late 1940s. The two most im-
portant groups passing through Friedland after the Federal Republic had been
established were returning prisoners of war (POWs) from Soviet captivity and
resettlers of German origin from Eastern Europe.
Tor zur Freiheit: Friedland at the Centre of Public Attention in the 1950s
In public perception, the Friedland camp was strongly intertwined with the fate of
the POWs. Although returning POWs were a rather small group looked after at

des Dorfes? Lndliche Bevlkerung zwischen Flchtlingszustrom und landwirtschaftlichem Struk-
turwandel, in Von Stalingrad zur Whrungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, ed.
Martin Broszat et al. (Mnchen: Oldenbourg, 1988), 367-425.
10
The camp administration itself was also eager to gain public attention for Friedland and even tried
to influence newspapers. Various exchanges of letters in this matter can be found here: HStA Han-
nover Nds 386 Acc 16/83 No. 85/86.

275
the camp at that time, their arrival did nevertheless attract the highest attention any
group in Friedland received before or afterwards. In the 1950s, the return of
POWs stimulated important questions of identity, memory and belonging.
11

From August 1946 until the end of 1949, more than 300,000 POWs had passed
through Friedland, which was by then the only location in the Federal Republic to
discharge former Wehrmacht soldiers. While Western Allies had released almost all
their prisoners by then, the Soviet Union still held back an unknown number of
prisoners. The question of how to bring back home the prisoners still held in Sovi-
et captivity grew more and more important in the early Federal Republic. Many
families in Germany still hoped that their missing husbands, sons or fathers had
not been killed in action during the war but were being held in Soviet camps with-
out being able to write home.
12
Their hopes and worries were directly connected to
the Friedland camp, which by then, in the early 1950s, had become the key symbol
for the fate of former soldiers. At that time, the camp was widely known in post-
war society and, against the background of widespread anti-communist attitudes,
13

often portrayed as the mythically charged Tor zur Freiheit (freedom gate). Newspa-
pers, radio stations and newsreels constantly reported on events in Friedland and
were present whenever a major transport of home-comers arrived at the camp.
When eventually the last returnees arrived in late 1955 and early 1956, the
Friedland camp was the stage for iconic events in the Federal Republics history.
Thousands of people, politicians, state officials and the media went to Friedland to
welcome the home-comers with open arms as honourable heroes who had suf-
fered and overcome Soviet injustice. Theodor Oberlnder, the Federal Minister for
Expellees, told returnees in Friedland in his speech: You had to endure German
calamity till the end. You have suffered for us, for all of us. You have sacrificed
your youth, your health, your freedom for us.
14
The return of the last prisoners of
war did not evoke remembrance of a war of extermination in Eastern Europe ten
years earlier, but led to an affirmation of German victimhood. Accordingly, a vet-
erans association, the Verband der Heimkehrer,
15
erected a statue in Friedland in 1955
which was directly connected with these views. The statue portrayed a solemn man

11
Even today, Friedland is best known for the arrival of the last returnees from Soviet war captivity.
12
The fate of the POWs in Soviet captivity and their impact on postwar society are at length dis-
cussed in: Frank Biess, Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). See also: Albrecht Lehmann, Gefangenschaft und
Heimkehr: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion (Mnchen: Beck, 1986); Arthur L. Smith, Heimkehr
aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Die Entlassung der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-
Anstalt, 1985); Peter Steinbach, Jenseits von Zeit und Raum: Kriegsgefangenschaft in der Frhge-
schichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Universitas 45 (1990): 637-49.
13
Gesine Schwan, Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuitt und Wandel nach
1945 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999).
14
NWDR recording Friedland Reden von und vor Heimkehrern, undated (autumn 1955), in:
NDR-Hrfunkarchiv Hannover 6900468000.
15
Birgit Schwelling, Heimkehr Erinnerung Integration: Der Verband der Heimkehrer, die ehemaligen Kriegs-
gefangenen und die westdeutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft (Paderborn: Schningh, 2010).
overcoming war captivity as symbolised by barbed wire. Here barbed wire was not
linked to concentration camps or the Holocaust but to Soviet prisoner-of-war
camps. Likewise, the commemoration of German victims was far more prominent
in public memory than the remembrance of victims of German crimes.
16

In this regard, returning POWs were mainly perceived as a homogenous group.
Even though one-third of the homecomers were not POWs at all but political
prisoners arrested after the wars end in the Soviet occupation zone and now dis-
charged as well, the former soldiers almost exclusively became the focus of atten-
tion. Only a few returnees, such as obvious National Socialists or war criminals,
were excluded from these dominant discourses of German victimhood. While
politicians, media and the public did focus on POWs as a group, the stories of
individual returnees took a back seat. Their individual fates were not important for
the story; the groups fate in turn was a mere cipher representing the self-
victimisation of post-war society. Therefore, returnees individual wishes, hopes,
expectations or worries not fitting into these interpretations were rarely discussed
in press reports and seldom mentioned in speeches of politicians or dignitaries.
When these aspects were acknowledged, they did usually correspond to post-war
societys expectations regarding the POWs. Returning POWs had, however, to deal
with questions of identity which did not meet post-war societys expectations.
As a few examples indicate, returnees did face various problems in Friedland to
which they responded in different ways. The former Wehrmacht general Walther
von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was considered a turncoat and shunned by his comrades in
Friedland for his call for surrender in Stalingrad and his participation in the Ger-
man anti-Nazi organisations National Committee for a Free Germany (Na-
tionalkomitee Freies Deutschland) and League of German Officers (Bund deutscher Offi-
ziere) during Soviet war captivity.
17
Furthermore, post-war society received Seydlitz
reluctantly. In Friedland, Seydlitz at first tried to gain public attention and an-
nounced his interest in political activities, but he finally fell silent after his return
home.
18
In contrast to Seydlitz, Ernst Gnther Schenck, a former Wehrmacht physi-
cian and SS-Obersturmbannfhrer, who had conducted experiments on humans in the
Mauthausen concentration camp, led the so-called Vow of Friedland (Schwur von
Friedland) upon his arrival, whereby hundreds of returnees publicly pledged they
did not murder, disgrace or plunder during the war.
19
In comparison with men like

16
The complex history of the public commemoration in the Federal Republic had to be simplified
here. For detailed but competing studies concerning the public commemoration in the Federal Re-
public during the 1950s, see Moeller, War Stories; Gregor, Haunted City.
17
Seydlitz will sich politisch bettigen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 October 1955: 3.
18
Regarding Seydlitz role in the Wehrmacht and in war captivity as well as his homecoming, see the
biography by Julia Warth, Verrter oder Widerstandskmpfer? Wehrmachtsgeneral Walther von Seydlitz-
Kurzbach (Mnchen: Oldenbourg, 2006).
19
Ernst Gnther Schenck gave his own impressions in his memoirs; see Ernst Gnther Schenck, Nie
mehr nach Hause? Als Wissenschaftler, Strfling und Arzt 10 Jahre in Gefangenen-, Arbeits- und Besserungslagern
(Koblenz: Bublies, 1997), 465.

277
Schenck, other home-comers only wanted to see their families again or, to the
camp physicians unease, just to get a drink or maybe visit a prostitute.
20
However,
returnees voices remain somewhat silent in this regard.
By all means, home-comers did have to face the expectations of family, friends
and post-war society. They did also have to come to terms with what they had seen
or done during the war or while in captivity. Furthermore, home-comers had to
regain their role in their families, in their social environment and in post-war socie-
ty.
21
In addition, home-comers had not only to be discharged but also at least for-
mally to be accepted as German citizens. A returnee mentioned this aspect in a
radio interview in the autumn of 1955: You have to be stamped as a German
human again and therefore you have to receive tons of documents, which allow
you to return to this human existence in the first place.
22

After passing through the camp, many returnees expressed their sentiment re-
garding their experience in Friedland. A returnee wrote a poem shortly after his
stay at the camp, in the autumn of 1953: Friedland the home I found / Fried-
land the life I found / Friedland the love I found / Friedland thanks to
you.
23
Although returnees perceived their stay in Friedland absolutely positive,
this did first and foremost reflect the contrast to former captivity in the Soviet
Union. In addition, their reception in the Federal Republic exceeded any expecta-
tions they might have had prior to their return, therefore shining all the brighter.
The actual challenges for returnees did, however, begin after they had left the
Friedland camp.
Subsiding Importance: The Admission of Resettlers to the Federal Republic
From the late 1950s on, the nature of public commemoration slowly changed,
when trials against war criminals drew attention to German crimes during the war
and a new generation inherited offices, for example as public servants or in the
justice system. In the course of time, discourses regarding German victimhood
gradually made way for more complex and balanced perceptions of Germanys
past.
24
Consequently, public attention to the Friedland camp subsided over the

20
There are complaints about the last two aspects by the camps physician in his reports on 10 Au-
gust, 7 and 11 December 1953, in: HStA Hannover Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 No. 3 and No. 16. These
aspects are briefly mentioned in Kleineke, Das Lager Friedland, 123-9.
21
For a detailed discussion of returned POWs and their memories, see Svenja Goltermann, Die
Gesellschaft der berlebenden: Deutsche Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre Erfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Mnchen:
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2009).
22
NWDR recording Heimkehrer in Friedland, 7 October 1955, in: NDR-Hrfunkarchiv Hannover
6900454000.
23
Poem by Karl E. sent to the camps director on 17 October 1953, in: HStA Hannover Nds. 380
Acc. 62a/65 Nr. 527.
24
For further references, see again Moeller, War Stories; Gregor, Haunted City; as well as Fulbrook,
German National Identity.
next decades, as the camp was now no longer mainly perceived as a symbol for
German victimhood. This also caused changes for the groups the Friedland camp
was responsible for, most notably for resettlers of German origin.
25

Most studies concerning resettlers come from sociology, political science or re-
lated research areas and mostly focus on the Federal German policy of immigra-
tion and integration but usually omit historical aspects. Furthermore, most articles
concentrate on the 1990s, whereas the admission of resettlers during the 1960s or
1970s is casually touched upon at the most.
26
While Mnz/Ohliger and Dietz in-
clude a historical perspective, they mainly emphasise socio-structural aspects, for
example differences between resettlers and the West German population.
27
In
contrast, resettlers experiences at the transit camps or the interdependency be-
tween resettlers and the Federal Republics officials are rarely discussed.
In the Federal Republic, resettler (Aussiedler) had not been a category until the
wars end with its consequences for German minorities in Eastern Europe.
28
Fol-
lowing Germanys principle of ius sanguinis, the Federal Republics Constitution
(Grundgesetz) from 1949 did not only mention German citizens in its definition of
Germans but did also include people of German descent (deutsche Volkszugehrige).
The Federal Law of Expellees (Bundesvertriebenengesetz) from 1953 provided further
definitions for the latter.
29

In this regard, two aspects were crucial: Resettlers were, in part as former citi-
zens of the German Reich, living in former German territories east of the Oder-
Neisse line or they had been members of German minorities in Eastern European
states. Moreover, resettlers were those who had not been expelled, had not fled or
had not been able to flee at the end of the war or in the months thereafter, but
now wanted to emigrate to the Federal Republic. Even though their departure
from their former homes was part of a more regulated population transfer, it was
also a consequence of World War II. As their standing in Eastern European coun-
tries had drastically suffered due to Germanys crimes during the war and the oc-
cupation, German minorities found themselves marginalised and put under pres-
sure thereafter, which increased their wish to emigrate to West Germany. In the
Federal Republic, the legal regulations granted resettlers immediate admission to
German citizenship. From 1950 onwards, resettlers passed through a number of

25
This also applied to refugees and emigrants leaving the GDR, who to some extent also passed
through Friedland, even though the transit camps in Uelzen-Bohldamm and Gieen were formally
responsible for this group.
26
For example: Ruud Koopmans, Germany and Its Immigrants: An Ambivalent Relationship,
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25.4 (1999): 627-47; Marianne Takle, (Spt)Aussiedler: From
Germans to Immigrants, Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 17.2 (2011): 161-82.
27
Rainer Mnz and Rainer Ohliger, Privilegierte Migration: Deutsche aus Ostmittel- und Osteuro-
pa, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fr deutsche Geschichte 27 (1998): 401-44; Barbara Dietz, Zuwanderung und
Integration: Aussiedler in Deutschland, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fr deutsche Geschichte 27 (1998): 445-72.
28
Takle, (Spt)Aussiedler: 164.
29
Koopmans, Germany and Its Immigrants: 630-1.

279
transit camps in the Federal Republic and were since then by far the largest group
looked after in Friedland.
While resettlers were perceived as a homogenous group, they were primarily
linked by the requirements and circumstances which brought them to the Federal
Republic. Apart from that, resettlers distinguished themselves regarding the state
or region they had left, their former social status, their religion, morale codes and
traditions, the possibility to bring along parts of their belongings, their previous
links to western Germany and their view on their future home, the presence of
relatives in the Federal Republic and their knowledge of the German language. The
challenges resettlers were facing did also depend on the time they left their former
homes and arrived in the Federal Republic. It made a huge difference if resettlers
came to the Friedland camp and West Germany in the 1950s or 1960s or in the
late 1980s and 1990s. Because the opportunity or permission for resettlers to leave
did correlate with the relations between West and East as well as the local political
situation in the Soviet Union or in other Eastern European states, the number of
resettlers arriving at Friedland and other camps fluctuated over the decades.
30
Until
1987, about 1.4 million resettlers were admitted to the Federal Republic, albeit not
all of them passed through Friedland.
31
Due to glasnost, perestroika and finally the fall
of the Iron Curtain, resettlers could more easily emigrate to (West) Germany in the
late 1980s. Between 1988 and 1999, about 2.5 million resettlers came to the Federal
Republic.
32
As a consequence of restrictions in Eastern European states on speak-
ing German, many of these late resettlers (called Sptaussiedler in German) faced
linguistic problems in their new environment, whereas many of the former reset-
tlers spoke German fluently.
Even though resettlers gained German citizenship, questions of identity were
nevertheless an issue. The later resettlers arrived, the more fragile their status was.
As a result of the aforementioned changes in West Germanys public commemora-
tion since the late 1950s, resettlers were decreasingly perceived as Germans and
with that no longer admitted to the Federal Republic as German victims symbolis-
ing post-war societys perceived victimhood. Instead, public attention for resettlers
dwindled down. In the public perception, resettlers slowly turned into foreigners
and were, especially in later decades, called Poles or Rulanddeutsche (Russian
Germans). The Lutheran minister at the Friedland camp, Lippert, complained as
early as 1958 that even clerics and teachers did not possess enough knowledge as
to why resettlers were coming to the Federal Republic.
33
Consequently, questions
of identity grew more and more important. They were directly addressed in Fried-
land, as the camp was the most important place where resettlers were admitted as

30
See also Mnz and Ohliger, Privilegierte Migration: 406-8.
31
For the figure, see Koopmans, Germany and Its Immigrants: 627.
32
For the figure, see ibid.
33
Johannes Lippert, Friedland diary sheets, 6 October 1958, in BA Koblenz B 150/3304.
German citizens.
West German society admitted resettlers and granted them German citizenship
with full civic rights but had to lay down rules concerning the conditions and pro-
cedures of admission. During the 1950s and 1960s, transit camps like Friedland
were assigned a crucial but also ambivalent role in dealing with these questions. On
the one hand, resettlers arriving at Friedland were admitted, provided with food,
clothing, money and so forth, prepared for the life in the Federal Republic and
finally admitted as German citizens. On the other hand, transit camps like Fried-
land were an instrument to control and check resettlers and other groups upon
their arrival and during their stay. This became apparent in the process of registra-
tion and admission in Friedland, which had evolved into a more and more com-
plex and bureaucratic procedure since the late 1940s, taking two or more days to
complete. This process did not only include inevitable formal procedures but did
also highlight the uneasy relationship the Federal Republic had regarding the reset-
tlers. Even though resettlers were accepted as German citizens and rejection at this
point was rare, the extensive registration process illustrated they did not yet, while
they were at the camp, belong to West German society. Resettlers had in a sense to
prove themselves.
An internal memorandum the Friedland camp administration issued for their
staff in 1960 gave a guidance regarding the counsel and care a newcomer should
receive. It referred to refugees from the GDR but could, albeit this is not men-
tioned in the memorandum, be easily applied to resettlers as well. The memoran-
dums principle purpose was to urge camp advisors to refrain from promoting
political statements, but it did also show the ambivalent character these counsels
had. On the one hand, a refugee should feel that he is, with his experience under
communist rule, a valuable factor for the political life in the Federal Republic, on
the other hand, a civic instruction for these refugees was considered necessary.
34

The distance between the Federal Republics society and resettlers was also
clearly evident when it came to medical examinations. These examinations were
not merely restricted to a routine check-up, but during the 1950s did also include a
screening for venereal diseases. According to federal law, such screenings could
only be conducted if a person was already suffering from a venereal disease or was
strongly suspected to be infected. Neither was the case for resettlers or likewise
screened refugees from the GDR, whose infection rates were not higher than the
rate in the West German population. These screenings did obviously reflect older
patterns of thought, emphasising dangers for the racial body (Volkskrper). In this
regard, those who wanted to be admitted had first to show they did not pose any
sanitary threat to West German society. These proceedings did only change when
camp physicians from Sandbostel and Uelzen-Bohldamm themselves, indicating

34
Camp administrations memorandum, March 23th, 1960, in: HStA Hannover Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83
No. 1.

281
the infection rates, denounced these screenings as illegal in the late 1950s.
35
During
the 1960s, medical examinations apart from venereal screenings continued. A med-
ical report was required before federal and state officials allocated the resettlers
among the federal states.
As the latter procedure indicates, resettlers were not entirely free to decide in
which town or federal state they were going to live after their stay at the camp.
Only resettlers whose relatives already lived in the Federal Republic could express
their wish to reside near them. The rest had, at least for a start, to go where they
were sent, if they did not want to forfeit state financial aid. Federal state officials in
turn did choose resettlers they wanted to admit according to their particular eco-
nomic needs. If a resettler failed to match the economic profile which could
happen to a single mother with two or three children, for example, federal state
officials bargained until one of them eventually agreed to admit him or her to their
federal state.
36

Resettlers therefore found themselves in an intermediary state separating their
former and their forthcoming lives. They had already left their homes, family,
friends, work and so forth behind, but had not yet arrived in their new lives. The
process resettlers had to run through was somewhat similar to rites de passage. In
cultural anthropology, rites de passage are defined as a persons transfer from one
social status to another connected to ritual ceremonies. Usually three stages are
distinguished: separation, transition and reincorporation.
37
However, there is an
important difference between the process experienced by resettlers and the con-
cept of rites de passage. Here a person is separated from society but then, after the
ritual transition, reincorporated into his or her society. In contrast, people passing
through Friedland left their former society and social status behind, obtaining an-
other status during their stay at the camp. They did not, afterwards, return to their
former society but entered one which was as new and unfamiliar as the social sta-
tus they now obtained.
This does, of course, not imply that emigration to the Federal Republic and
admission at Friedland was necessarily a negative experience for resettlers. Admit-
tedly, some resettlers, especially since the 1990s, have not coped with the difficul-
ties related to adopting their new role and, leaving Germany, returned to their for-
mer homes. Even in the late 1950s, individual resettlers moved back to their for-
mer homes in Eastern Europe.
38
These cases indicate the difficulties experienced
by some resettlers. For other resettlers, however, their experience was completely

35
Several letters and reports on this topic can be found in: HStA Hannover Nds. 120 Hild. Acc.
111/77 8/2.
36
For this aspect, see HStA Hannover Nds. 120 Hild. Acc. 111/77, Nr. 32.
37
For a cultural anthropological introduction, see Arnold van Gennep, bergangsriten (Frankfurt am
Main: Campus, 1986).
38
One example for an early return can be found here: Internal memorandum issued by the camp
administration, 28 August 1958, in: HStA Hannover Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 No. 1.
different. For them, Friedland was the beginning of a new life and their stay at the
camp directly connected to their German identity. A resettler who arrived in 1956
wrote a Christmas card to the camp administration stating that Friedland will never
leave her mind. She remembered the first German preaching at the camp and
praised the camps excellent organisation: Especially before Christmas, I gratefully
think of Friedland it was with one word German.
39
Apart from such rather
individual voices, it is not easy to determine resettlers perceptions, as there are no
historical studies focussing on the aspect of transition or the questions of integra-
tion and admission from resettlers point of view.
In the early 1990s, the increasing number of resettlers as well as financial and
social problems regarding their integration led to an amendment of the Bundesver-
triebenengesetz. As a result, the possibility to be accepted as resettler to the Federal
Republic was restricted. Consequently, the numbers of resettlers drastically
dropped during the following years.
40
Although their number is still decreasing,
even today German resettlers from Eastern Europe are coming to Friedland. They
all have to pass the camp to be accepted as German citizens. Some of the resettlers
stay in Friedland for up to half a year and partake in so-called integration courses,
in which they can, amongst other things, learn German, if necessary.
Conclusion
Although their feelings, impressions, hopes and wishes remain somewhat specula-
tive due to a lack of sources or various difficulties linked with them, people passing
through Friedland did perceive their stay at the camp in manifold ways. For some
of them, the camp was no more than a stopover on their way to, in most cases,
West Germany; for other newcomers Friedland was the place where they felt free
for the first time in awhile after leaving communist domain. Still others perceived
the camp as a positive place because of the care and support they received there.
Thus on a personal level questions of identity or belonging were not always evi-
dent.
Nevertheless, since the late 1940s the Friedland camp was a threshold to a
physical, temporal and mental transition dealing with questions of identity, belong-
ing, memory and coming to terms with Germanys past for the Federal Republics

39
Christmas card to the camp administration sent by L.S., 22 December 1956, in: HStA Hannover
Nds. 386 Acc. 16/83 Nr. 1.
40
The political process as well as the legislative changes are discussed in Takle, (Spt)Aussiedler;
Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, Willkommene Deutsche oder tolerierte Fremde? Aussiedlerpo-
litik und -verwaltung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit den 1950er Jahren, in Migration steuern
und verwalten: Deutschland vom spten 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Jochen Oltmer (Gttingen: V
und R Unipress, 2003), 399-419. For the political background as well as the associated restrictions
regarding the right of asylum and the modifications of federal immigration legislation, see Ulrich
Herbert, Geschichte der Auslnderpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsarbeiter, Gastarbeiter, Flchtlinge
(Mnchen: Beck, 2001), 286-334.

283
society as well for those admitted as German citizens. These questions were some-
times directly addressed, for example when returning POWs were cordially wel-
comed and thereby incorporated into dominant discourses of self-victimisation in
the Federal Republic, but at times only hinted at, for instance in the camps proce-
dures of registration and admission. In any case, these aspects do reveal how im-
portant the perceptions of the war and its aftermath were for the processes of
admission in Friedland. With regard to the various actors involved, the often com-
peting perceptions did shape to a high degree how people were admitted to the
Federal Republic, in which historical or political context they were put, and to what
extent newcomers had the chance to actively participate in dealing with the afore-
mentioned questions of identity and memory.
Bibliography
Ackermann, Volker. Homo Barackensis: Westdeutsche Flchtlingslager in den
1950er Jahren. In Anknpfungen: Kulturgeschichte Landesgeschichte Zeitgeschichte:
Gedenkschrift fr Peter Httenberger, edited by Volker Ackermann et al., 330-46.
Essen: Klartext, 1995.
Beer, Mathias. Ich mchte die Zeit nicht missen. Flchtlingslager nach 1945 als
totale Institutionen? Sozialwissenschaftliche Informationen 29.3 (2000): 186-93.
Benz, Wolfgang, ed. Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursachen, Ereignisse,
Folgen. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1985.
Biess, Frank. Homecomings: Returning POWs and the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germa-
ny. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Brandes, Detlev. Der Weg zur Vertreibung 1938-1945: Plne und Entscheidungen zum
Transfer der Deutschen aus der Tschechoslowakei und Polen. Mnchen: Oldenbourg,
2001.
Dietz, Barbara. Zuwanderung und Integration: Aussiedler in Deutschland. Tel
Aviver Jahrbuch fr deutsche Geschichte 27 (1998): 445-72.
Erker, Paul. Revolution des Dorfes? Lndliche Bevlkerung zwischen Flcht-
lingszustrom und landwirtschaftlichem Strukturwandel. In Von Stalingrad zur
Whrungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, edited by Martin
Broszat et al., 367-425. Mnchen: Oldenbourg, 1988.
Frei, Norbert. Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfnge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-
Vergangenheit. Mnchen: Beck, 1996.
Fulbrook, Mary. German National Identity after the Holocaust. Cambridge: Polity Press,
1999.
Goltermann, Svenja. Die Gesellschaft der berlebenden: Deutsche Kriegsheimkehrer und ihre
Erfahrungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Mnchen: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2009.
Gregor, Neil. Haunted City: Nuremberg and the Nazi Past. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
Herbert, Ulrich. Geschichte der Auslnderpolitik in Deutschland: Saisonarbeiter, Zwangsar-
beiter, Gastarbeiter, Flchtlinge. Mnchen: Beck, 2001.
Kleineke, Dagmar. Entstehung und Entwicklung des Lagers Friedland 1945-1955. Gt-
tingen: Universitt Gttingen, 1992.
Klekowski von Koppenfels, Amanda. Willkommene Deutsche oder tolerierte
Fremde? Aussiedlerpolitik und -verwaltung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
seit den 1950er Jahren. In Migration steuern und verwalten: Deutschland vom spten
19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, edited by Jochen Oltmer, 399-419. Gttingen:
V und R Unipress, 2003.
Koopmans, Ruud. Germany and Its Immigrants: An Ambivalent Relationship.
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25.4 (1999): 627-47.
Lehmann, Albrecht. Gefangenschaft und Heimkehr: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjet-
union. Mnchen: Beck, 1986.
Moeller, Robert G. War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of
Germany. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.
Mnz, Rainer, and Rainer Ohliger. Privilegierte Migration: Deutsche aus Ostmit-
tel- und Osteuropa. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fr deutsche Geschichte 27 (1998): 401-44.
Schenck, Ernst Gnther. Nie mehr nach Hause? Als Wissenschaftler, Strfling und Arzt
10 Jahre in Gefangenen-, Arbeits- und Besserungslagern. Koblenz: Bublies, 1997.
Schwan, Gesine. Antikommunismus und Antiamerikanismus in Deutschland: Kontinuitt
und Wandel nach 1945. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999.
Schwelling, Birgit. Heimkehr Erinnerung Integration: Der Verband der Heimkehrer, die
ehemaligen Kriegsgefangenen und die westdeutsche Nachkriegsgesellschaft. Paderborn:
Schningh, 2010.
Smith, Arthur L. Heimkehr aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Die Entlassung der deutschen
Kriegsgefangenen. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985.
Steinbach, Peter. Jenseits von Zeit und Raum: Kriegsgefangenschaft in der Frh-
geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Universitas 45 (1990): 637-49.
Takle, Marianne. (Spt)Aussiedler: From Germans to Immigrants. Nationalism &
Ethnic Politics 17.2 (2011): 161-82.
Van Gennep, Arnold. bergangsriten. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1986.
Warth, Julia. Verrter oder Widerstandskmpfer? Wehrmachtsgeneral Walther von Seydlitz-
Kurzbach. Mnchen: Oldenbourg, 2006.
Wolfrum, Edgar. Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Der Weg zur bundes-
republikanischen Erinnerung 1948-1990. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft, 1999.

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank all participants of the conferences in Groningen
and Gttingen for their contributions.

Janny de Jong and Margriet van der Waal would like to extend a very warm thank
you in the first place to Ine Megens, who was part of the original organizing com-
mittee of the first Euroculture conference in Groningen in 2010. Secondly, their
gratitude goes to the coordinator of the programme, Marloes van der Weij, and to
Dieneke Niks, Aime Wijnacker and Marleen Folkerts, whose contribution to the
organisation of the conference in Groningen was invaluable. Special thanks go to
Robert Wagenaar, chair of the Euroculture Network, for his unstinting support in
initiating and pushing the Euroculture research agenda. Finally, the financial sup-
port provided by the ICOG (Groningen Research Institute for the Study of Cul-
ture) to host the conference is gratefully acknowledged.

Martin Tamcke and Lars Klein would like to thank the team of the Gttingen con-
ference 2011 for their ideas and enthusiasm, especially Marc Arwed Rutke, Nina
Lutterjohann and Daria Kulemetieva. Thank you to Ekaterina Ershova and Claire
Greenfield for their work in setting up the IP. Finally, we would like to thank Anja
Johannsen and the Literarische Zentrum Gttingen for realizing the Zwiespra-
che with us.

The editors would like to thank Tabea Heen, Sebastian Kramer and Jannika Khn
for their help in finalizing the publication. A special thank you to Jrg Zgel, with-
out whom the book would look much differently. He not only read and corrected
the texts of the volume, but also transcribed the Zwiesprache and translated the
text by Bill Bell into German. Finally, thank you goes to Jutta Pabst and Margo
Bargheer at Gttingen University Press for their help and support with this pro-
ject.

About the Contributors
Asier Altuna is a full-time lecturer in English at the University of Deusto, Bilbao
and director of the Erasmus Mundus Master of Arts in Euroculture. Basque Gov-
ernment fellow at the Centre for Irish Studies NUI Galway, Ireland and Deusto
University 2003-8. Visiting lecturer at UNAM, Mexico and Pune University, India.
European TUNING expert in the subject field area of English philology, and cur-
rently involved in the European Project SPEAQ on quality assurance and en-
hancement and a Ministerio de Economa y Competitividad project on the dys-
functional Irish family. He has published on 19th cent. Spain and the Basque
Country in Irish writing, and multicultural and transcultural Ireland. He has edited
Re-Writing Boundaries: Critical Approaches in Irish Studies (PPU, 2007) and New Perspec-
tives on James Joyce: Ignatius Loyola, make haste to help me! (Deusto UP, 2009).

Bill Bell is Professor for English Literature at Cardiff University. He founded the
Centre for the History of the Book at The University of Edinburgh in 1995, of
which he was Director until 2012. He has held visiting posts at The Australian
National University, The University of Ottawa, and St Johns College, Oxford,
Jadavpur University, and The University of Gttingen, where he currently is holds
a fellowship at the Lichtenberg-Kolleg. He is a member of the Council of The
Bibliographical Society and since 2008 has been Editor of the Societys quarterly,
The Library: Transactions of the Bibliographical Society. He is one of three editors
of Palgrave Studies in the History of Media and has served on the advisory boards of
several publications, including the American annual Book History

Paul Blokker is principle investigator in the project Constitutional Politics in
post-Westphalian Europe (CoPolis) in the department of Sociology, University of
Trento, Italy. His current research is on constitutionalisms, multiple democracies,
dissent, and democratic participation. He is a member of the International Editori-
al Board of the European Journal of Social Theory. Recent publications include: forth-
coming, 2013, New Democracies in Crisis? A Comparative Constitutional Study of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania, Routledge Advances in European
Politics; 2011, guest editor of special issue on Pragmatic Sociology. Theoretical
Evolvement and Empirical Application, European Journal of Social Theory, 14/3;
2011, guest editor with Robert Brier, special issue on Democracy after 1989: Re-
examining the History, Impact, and Legacy of Dissidence, East European Politics and
Societies; 2009, Multiple Democracies in Europe. Political Culture in New Member States,
London/New York: Routledge.

Marcin Galent is lecturer at the Institute of European Studies at the Jagiellonian
University in Krakow, Poland. He holds a PhD in Sociology from Jagiellonian
University and teaches courses in Sociology, Social Anthropology, and on topics
related to the social and cultural aspects of European integration, nationalism and
migration. His main research interests are migration, citizenship and multicultural-
ism in Europe. His current research focuses on relation between migration, Euro-
peanisation, and identity formation processes. He is co-author of the book Migra-
tion and Europeanisation. Changing Identities and Values among Polish Pendulum Migrants
and Their Belgian Employers (2009).

Elizabeth Goering is the Director of Graduate Studies and an Associate Profes-
sor in the department of Communication Studies at Indiana University Purdue
University Indianapolis. For the past three years, she has also taught classes in
intercultural communication to students in the Euroculture MA program at the
Georg-August-Universitt, Gttingen. Her teaching and research interests explore
the relationships between communication and culture in a variety of contexts, in-
cluding organizational, educational, and health care settings. Her most recent pub-
lications include articles in Communication and Medicine and Understanding Service
Learning and Community Engagement.

Aitor Ibarrola-Armendariz teaches courses in migrant fiction, ethnic relations
and film adaptation at the University of Deusto, Bilbao (Spain). He has published
articles on minority and immigrant life narratives, the pedagogy of literature and
cinema, and processes of cultural hybridisation. Currently, he is the director of the
MA Programme in Migrations and Social Cohesion and head of the Modern Lan-
guages and Basque Studies programme at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Hu-
manities at the UD. He has edited several volumes: Fiction and Ethnicity in North
America (1995), Entre dos mundos (2004), and Migrations in a Global Context (2007). He
is working at the moment on a collection of essays on trauma and ethnicity, and
two projects on religious diversity and accommodation.

Janny de Jong is associate professor of Modern History at the University of Gro-
ningen. She is Director of Studies of the MA Euroculture, University of Groning-
en since September 2009 and Director of the Center of Japanese Studies, since
October 2012. In 2008 she joined the Erasmus network Clioh-World (working
group world history). She has published widely on Dutch and European political
culture, colonial and imperial history, and Japanese history. Furthermore she was
involved in writing academic textbooks on non-western and world history. For a
list of her publications see www.rug.nl/staff/janny.de.jong/cv.
Lars Klein is lecturer (Akademischer Rat a.Z.) for Euroculture at the University of
Gttingen. He studied North American Studies and Philosophy at the FU Berlin
and in Basel and worked at the Kennedy-Institute, FU Berlin, and the University of
Braunschweig and the Berghof Research Center, Berlin. He has been a visiting

289
scholar at different universities, including Georgetown University, Indiana Univer-
sity and University of Pune. His research interests include history of the media and
war reporting, generational theories as well as European identity and memory.

Alexandre Kostka is professor of German and European cultural history at the
University of Strasbourg (France), and currently Director of Studies of the Stras-
bourg branch of the Euroculture MA Programme. He studied at the Ecole Nor-
male Suprieure (St Cloud), the Free University (Berlin) and at the College of Eu-
rope in Bruges. He is member of the Research Unit Socits, Acteurs, Gou-
vernement en Europe (SAGE, UMR 7363). Being the author of various contribu-
tions on Franco-German art relations in the European setting, his research focuses
on the circulation of art in Europe as well as on architecture as a means for the
constitution of national identity in the 19
th
-20
th
century.

John McCormick is Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Politics at the
Indianapolis campus of Indiana University in the United States, and was recently
Fulbright-Schuman Chair at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium. His publi-
cations include Europeanism (Oxford University Press, 2010), European Union Politics
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), and Why Europe Matters (Palgrave Macmillan, forth-
coming).
Pter Ndas, born 1942 in Budapest. After having studied Chemistry, he worked
as a photo-reporter and journalist. In 1967 he published his first short stories. His
first novel, The End of a Family Story was censored and only published 1977, five
years it was written. In 1986, his opus magnum Book of Memories was published.
Ndas received, amongst others prizes, the Grand Austrian State Award for Euro-
pean Literature (1991), the Kossuth-Preis (1992), the Leipzig Book Prize for Eu-
ropean Understanding (1995) and the Franz Kafka Prize (2003). He lives in Buda-
pest und Gombosszeg.
Mara Pilar Rodrguez obtained her PhD degree in Romance Languages and
Literatures at Harvard University (Cambridge, USA). Until 2002 she was a profes-
sor at Columbia University (New York, USA), and presently she teaches at Deusto
University in San Sebastian, Spain. She has published numerous books and articles
on literature, film, culture and gender studies. She is the winner of two national
essay prizes and she leads the research group on Communication at Deusto Uni-
versity. She is the editor of the volumes Cultural and Media Studies: Basque/European
Perspectives (2009) and Estudios culturales (2010).
Bianca Polo Del Vecchio is a PhD candidate in Political Sociology at the Univer-
sity of Strasbourg. Her research examines the shaping of elite and public attitudes
towards European integration, and focuses on mass-elite linkages in the United
Kingdom and France. She holds a Masters degree in International Relations and a
Bachelors degree in Law. Ms Polo Del Vecchio is a junior lecturer in European
Integration and is coordinator of a Masters programme in European Studies and
European Project Management.

Grzegorz Poarlik is senior lecturer at the Jagiellonian Universitys Institute of
European Studies in Krakow (Poland). He holds a PhD in Humanities from the
Faculty of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University. His doctoral thesis analysed
the Polish raison dtat in the context of the European integration processes. His
research focuses on international security in the Post-Cold War era, civil society
and public sphere in Europe, democratic deficit and legitimacy crisis in the EU,
and the symbolic construction of identity in the context of the EU enlargement.
His recent publications focus on the problem of dilemmas of collective identity
construction in an enlarging EU, as well as global asymmetry as a background for
the emergence of the Post-Westphalian paradigm in the international relations with
special emphasis given to the role of the EU as a global normative power.
Katharina Raabe, born 1957 in Hamburg, is lector for Eastern European litera-
tures at Suhrkamp, Berlin.
Sascha Schiel is research assistant at the Zeitgeschichtliche Arbeitskreis Nieder-
sachsen (ZAKN). From 2000 until 2006 he studied Modern and Contemporary
History, German Philology, and Political Science at the Universities of Gttingen
and Heidelberg. Since 2008 he has been conducting research on a museum project
at the Friedland transit camp. He is currently working on his PhD thesis concern-
ing the Friedland camp and its significance for the Federal Republic.

Richard Swartz born in Stockholm 1945, graduated at the Stockholm School of
Economics and at the Charles University in Prague. After leaving Prague in 1972
he joined the Swedish daily Svenska Dagbladet as the papers East European corre-
spondent from 1972 to 2006. Based in Vienna, he was a witness of all major politi-
cal upheavals in Eastern Europe leading to the downfall of Communism. He is
also a regular contributor to international magazines and newspapers, among them
the German daily Sddeutsche Zeitung. As a journalist and writer, he has received
several prices. His books are translated into a dozen languages; among them are
Room Service (1996) and A House in Istria (1999). His latest book in German is
Notlgen (Hanser, 2012).

Martin Tamcke is professor of Ecumenical Theology and Oriental Church- and
Mission-History, Director of the Institute of Ecumenical Theology, Director of
Studies of Euroculture and Intercultural Theology in Gttingen and Pro-Dean of
the Faculty of Theology. He has taught as Visiting Professor at numerous universi-
ties in Europe, Asia and the US. He is a member of the International Advisory

291
Committee of the World Congress of Middle Eastern Studies. From 1999 to 2003
he was External Examiner at the School of Historical Studies at the University of
Birmingham, UK. His interests include Christian-Muslim Coexistence, Oriental-
Occidental Interaction, and Christian-Orthodox Cultures.

Bassam Tibi born in 1944 in Damascus/Syria. He migrated to Europe in 1962
and from 1973 until his retirement in autumn 2009 he was Professor of Interna-
tional Relations at the University of Gttingen, Germany. Parallel to his tenure in
Gttingen, he was a visiting non-resident A. D. White Professor-at-Large at Cor-
nell University, USA. He held fellowships at universities such as Harvard, Prince-
ton and Ann Arbor in the US, NUS/Singapore and the Islamic Hidayatullah State
University of Jakarta in addition to other visiting positions in the world of Islam
(e.g. al-Ahram Center in Cairo). He is author of numerous books, including Political
Islam, World Politics and Europe (2008), Islams Predicament with Cultural Modernity: Reli-
gious Reform and Cultural Change (2009), Islamism and Islam (2012).

Herman Voogsgeerd holds degrees in EU law and in Contemporary History
from the University of Groningen (the Netherlands). He presently works as a sen-
ior lecturer in International Political Economy (Faculty of Arts) and in Company
and Labour law (Faculty of Law). He is also attached to the Centre for Japanese
Studies at this university. His research interests focus on global social and econom-
ic developments, corporate governance of large firms including worker involve-
ment and the rise of Asia.

Margriet van der Waal is senior lecturer at the Faculty of Arts, University of
Groningen (the Netherlands). She teaches in two programmes: the MA pro-
gramme Euroculture and in the BA programme of the department of Arts, Culture
and Media. Her research interests include postcolonial Europe, representations of
cultural identity, and the sociology of literature and culture. Currently, she is work-
ing on a project that investigates online comments on books and films as acts of
political deliberation through which political values are negotiated.

M
a
r
t
i
n

T
a
m
c
k
e
,

J
a
n
n
y

d
e

J
o
n
g
,

L
a
r
s

K
l
e
i
n
,

M
a
r
g
r
i
e
t

v
a
n

d
e
r

W
a
a
l

(
E
d
s
.
)

E
u
r
o
p
e

-
S
p
a
c
e

f
o
r

T
r
a
n
s
c
u
l
t
u
r
a
l

E
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
?

Universittsverlag Gttingen Universittsverlag Gttingen
E
urope - Space for Transcultural Existence? is the frst volume of the new se-
ries, Studies in Euroculture, published by Gttingen University Press. The se-
ries derives its name from the Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence Euroculture:
Europe in the Wider World, a two year programme offered by a consortium of
eight European universities in collaboration with four partner universities outside
Europe. This master highlights regional, national and supranational dimensions of
the European democratic development; mobility, migration and inter-, multi- and
transculturality. The impact of culture is understood as an element of political and
social development within Europe.
The articles published here explore the feld of Euroculture in its different ele-
ments: it includes topics such as cosmopolitanism, cultural memory and trau-
matic past(s), colonial heritage, democratization and Europeanization as well as
the concept of (European) identity in various disciplinary contexts such as law
and the social sciences. In which way have Europeanization and Globalization in-
fuenced life in Europe more specifcally? To what extent have people in Europe
turned transcultural? The trans is understood as indicator of an overlapping
mix of cultures that does not allow for the construction of sharp differentiations.
It is explored in topics such as (im)migration and integration, as well as cultural
products and lifestyle.
The present economic crisis and debt crisis have led, as side-result, to a public at-
tack on the open, cosmopolitan outlook of Europe. The values of the multicultural
and civil society and the idea of a peoples Europe have become debatable. This
volume offers food for thought and critical refection.
ISBN: 978-3-86395-062-0
ISSN: 2196-3851
Europe - Space for
Edited by Martin Tamcke, Janny de Jong
Lars Klein, Margriet van der Waal
Studies in Euroculture, Volume 1
1

EU Euroculture

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

EU Euroculture

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

EU Euroculture

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

M

You might also like