Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets
Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets
Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets
Abstract
1. Introduction
950
5850 Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets 951
barriers. It is observed that the ‘capture theory’ applies even more to the
financial sector, where unbridled competition is seen as a major threat to the
primary goal of stability of the financial system. Hence, according to Van
Cayseele (1992), the emphasis has been more on stability than on efficiency by
limiting competition. As a result the financial sector more than other sectors
of the economy has been hit by the deregulation wave.
Second, the regulation debate has recently received renewed interest in the
economic literature by new insights from developments in the field of
information economics. Financial markets in particular are seen as imperfect
by definition characterized by asymmetric information, agency problems and
moral hazard. Markets are powerful coordination mechanisms, yet they do not
operate perfectly and cannot do so. However, government intervention does not
provide better coordination and therefore need not replace market mechanisms.
Government policies in the first instance have to create a framework for
satisfactory market operation, and only in the second instance do they have to
prevent and limit the consequences of some negative aspects of the operation
of the market mechanism. Hence, a delicate balance has to be struck between
the discipline of the market and coordination by government actions.
Moreover, the dynamic evolution of the financial system constantly presents
new challenges to the regulatory debate. Government measures to protect the
consumer such as deposit insurance coverage have in turn created new moral
hazard problems. They diminish the incentives for markets to discipline the
banks and induce excessive risk taking as has been documented recently, for
example in the widespread Savings and Loans crises in the US. Hence, in order
to complement market discipline a regulatory dialectic has developed in which
deposit insurance has become a major modern driving force behind the
supervision and regulation of banks.
In this evolutionary process there are no definite nor universal recipes to be
found and the balance between market and government may shift over time.
Rather than discussing ad hoc regulatory policies, it is important to specify the
general principles that have to determine the right balance between market and
government coordination. Therefore before moving into specific regulatory
issues such as regulatory instruments and regulating authorities, a more
fundamental analysis of the role and the nature of the financial system is in
order.
lender of last resort certainly does not have to intervene for financial problems
that do not contain the danger of leading to a systems crisis. For an
international financial crisis the question arises as to the need of an
international lender of last resort.
Finally, ensuring a stable payments system has been a principal concern of
public policy. Therefore financial regulation in a wider perspective contains
also a whole framework for controlling the volume of money in circulation, that
is a whole set of monetary policy instruments. Normally a stable and sound
financial system is a condition for an efficient monetary policy. Therefore in
financial law specific regulations determine for instance which institutions can
offer deposit accounts.
However, in the short run conflicts may also arise between money supply
control and the provision of additional liquidity under the lender of last resort
function.
5. Regulatory Instruments
stylized in Table 1 and further commented upon in the next sections. Protective
interventions in the form of the lender of last resort and deposit insurance
provisions do not involve such extensive regulation. Central banks can
significantly limit the occurrence of systemic crises by their role as a ‘lender of
last resort’. Central banks have been set up to control liquidity provision in the
economy. They are the ultimate source of credit to which financial institutions
can turn during a panic. By providing liquidity as a bankers’ bank they can stop
the contagious transmission of financial problems among financial
intermediaries.
Table 1
Preventive
measures
(ex ante) Structural Restrictions on entry and on
business activities
- product line restrictions
- geographic restrictions
As pointed out in Herring and Litan (1995, pp. 51-55), in some countries
central banks under certain conditions also guarantee the settlements risk
involved in the funds transfer system. By bearing the risk of non-payments by
participants they take the systemic risk out of the payments system. The same
role may also be taken up by private clearing houses, which have developed to
5850 Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets 961
banks rather than closing them relies upon this philosophy. When the
government provides such a safety net it tempts financial institutions to pursue
high risk investment strategies at the expense of the government. Also, when
they are covered by deposit insurance, depositors have less incentive to monitor
and discipline financial institutions. Hence, government safety nets help solve
risk problems only by creating other problems. Instead of spending substantial
amounts of GNP on rescuing ex post ailing financial institutions, preventive
government interventions by regulation and supervision may be in order to
counter ex ante these moral hazard effects.
6. Structural Regulation
7. Prudential Regulation
8. Regulatory Structure
It follows from the previous discussion that the need for government
intervention as well as the choice of regulatory instruments depend on the
threat of the occurrence of systemic crises and on the need for individual
investors’ protection. The occurrence of these risks may differ among financial
institutions. Hence the need for regulating the different types of financial
institutions depends on the specific activities they engage in. In particular the
danger of systemic risk is seen as justifying a larger role for government. In this
respect the activities of the different financial institutions may be compared
according to three criteria: first the risks involved that may lead to their failure;
second the interconnections among intermediaries determining the contagion
affect; and finally their importance for the whole financial system and the real
economy.
According to these criteria, it is held by Mayer and Neven (1991) that
deposit taking, which is the core of banking, has been found to be especially
vulnerable to systemic risk. First, the maturity transformation sets the banks
apart from other financial intermediaries. The mismatch between the maturities
of their assets makes them vulnerable to decisions by depositors to withdraw
their funds. As the liquidation value of their investments is often smaller this
may amplify withdrawals to a bank run. Second, important interconnections in
bank relations means that even healthy banks are exposed to failures elsewhere
in the banking system. The externalities involved may lead to a contagious
collapse of the whole banking system. Third, the costs to the economy of bank
failures may be huge. Banks play a crucial role in the payments system and in
refinancing other financial intermediaries. Failures have wider ramifications
on the rest of the financial system and on the real economy. One may point also
to the danger that a banking crisis causes large and uncontrollable fluctuations
in the quantity of money and credit. Hence, the case for banking regulation not
only arises from the need of depositors’ protection, but more urgently from the
systemic risk of the collapse of the whole financial system.
The question arises whether failures of other financial institutions present
the same dangers of systemic crises.
Also investment firms are subject to interconnections that can lead to a
contagious loss of confidence. This is especially the case for market making
functions. There are, however, according to Herring and Litan (1995, pp.
72-73), key distinctions between banks and investment firms that make a
contagious transmission of shocks a less serious concern for systemic risk. First,
the nature of customer relations, debt contracts and maturity of assets involve
less liquidity risk. The funds of investors are kept in accounts that are
segregated from the institutions own assets what is not the case in banking.
Debt contracts by securities firms typically do not guarantee rates of return and
are not redeemable at par, so that customers have little to gain from a run on
5850 Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets 967
securities firms that are in difficulty. The portfolio of investment firms also
typically consists of marketable securities that can easily be evaluated and
transferred in the event of a failure. Second, the role of securities houses in
intermediating funds from savers to investors in many countries is much less
crucial. Hence, their failure is much less likely to cause significant harms to the
economy. Therefore the need for regulation of investment firms is less
compelling. However, there remain sound reasons for regulation. The activities
of investment firms involve information asymmetries and may require
regulation to protect investors against fraud and incompetence. In this respect
the regulation of portfolio managers has an affinity with the regulation of (free)
professions. In addition capital requirements similar to those for banks may be
imposed in order to avoid undermining confidence in the functioning of
markets in the event of a steep decline in asset prices.
In the insurance sector important interconnections exist through the
important role of reinsurers. In principle an insurance crisis may emerge when
many or all of the reinsurers simultaneously cut off reinsurance coverage, so
that primary insurers eventually have to cut back on the availability of
insurance. In practice major shocks in the insurance market have not entailed
such a collapse. Even if this might be called a systemic insurance risk,
insurance companies are not involved in payments and liquidity functions, so
that the consequences for the whole financial system and the real economy
would not be so dramatic as for a banking crisis. Protection of the individual
consumer against asymmetric information problems, however, may be more
compelling than in the rest of the financial sector. The reason is that those
insurance contracts generally are complicated, and involve not only financial
but also more technical actuarial risks.
The elaborate financial regulatory system is continuously questioned at
various levels.
In the last decades awareness has grown that regulation not only entails
benefits, but also imposes substantial costs on the economy. In this respect the
traditional public interest view of regulation has been challenged by the new
public choice approach. It implies the need for an evaluation of the externalities
and the incidence of regulatory measures.
Structural regulation that limits market competition may eventually convey
benefits to private financial institutions, by protecting them against outside
competition and by promoting confidence in financial intermediaries. However,
by restricting market entry it may involve substantial welfare costs to society.
In this respect regulators may be ‘captured’ by the regulated firms through
968 Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets 5850
Recently a debate has been launched about the regulatory structure. The rising
tide for market solutions implies an increasing role for self-regulation and
private regulatory bodies. Self-regulation will arise when clubs can be formed.
Clubs are professional organizations which regulate the behavior of members.
Self-regulation has the advantage of flexibility but the danger of capture by
members. Also outside private agencies, such as rating agencies may discipline
risk behavior as the rating of an intermediary affects its funding costs.
However, private regulatory failures may occur due to a collective action
problem. As a result of this debate, it is increasingly argued that the control of
risks, remains in first instance the task of individual institutions or of clubs of
institutions. The role of the government then has to be limited to supervising
these private regulatory systems.
In the same vein the traditional debate between rules versus discretion is
taking a different direction. Whereas rules can be crude and not adapted to the
situation at hand, discretion makes it a largely political matter. As argued by
Horvitz (1995) the need for discretion may be reduced, while allowing for
reasonably flexible regulation by a graduated system of interventions and
controls. In the US it works through the operation of various trigger points as
banks approach the critical area of balance sheet ratios. In this respect the
970 Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets 5850
recent Basle Agreements are being criticized as not providing such a graduated
response.
Moreover, the present system relying predominantly upon institutional
regulation is being questioned. Banks, securities firms, insurance companies
are being regulated and supervised by different regulatory bodies. In fact
systemic stability is seen as requiring the application of different rules to
different financial institutions. Institutional regulation becomes difficult to
implement when the different financial intermediaries widen the scope of their
financial activities, for example when universal banks engage in securities
activities. Maintaining institutional regulation and subjecting universal banks
to stricter capital requirements or providing a safety net also for their securities
activities conflicts with competitive neutrality of regulation. Similar issues arise
for financial conglomerates.
A level playing field may be promoted and regulatory efficiency maintained
by introducing a system of functional regulation. Regulation by function is
likely to emerge and regulation by institution to decline in the future as the
distinction between banks and other financial intermediaries is fading.
More fundamentally the philosophy of regulation is analytically being
reexamined in the new institutional economics literature. A strong analogy is
pointed out between banking regulation and loan agreement covenants in
‘corporate governance’. By relying upon contract theory the analysis of
financial regulation is becoming a true interdisciplinary law and economics
endeavor.
According to Richter (1990) the complex ongoing business relationships
between savers, borrowers and financial institutions can be analyzed as a
relational contract. By its nature it is an incomplete contract as analyzed by
Hart (1994) that eventually may be in need of further regulation.
In repeat business transactions one may relay upon private contract
enforcing mechanisms such as reputation, for example. Individual monitoring
in banking, however, suffers from a collective action problem. Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994, pp. 117-118) argue that unsophisticated and small claimholders
suffer from information asymmetries and have little incentive to invest in
monitoring due to a free rider problem. Active representation of depositors
must be provided by organizing ‘delegated’ monitoring. However, if no
mechanism of private representation is or can be set up, regulation may be
needed. It may take the form of private regulation by an independent
supervisory or regulatory firm. Public regulation of banks is a very complex
matter and therefore should limit itself to a complementary role by light-handed
regulation. More specifically, regulation must focus upon altering incentives,
for example for shareholders to discipline managers through higher capital
requirements. It should not impose rigid regulatory schemes to all
intermediaries, but introduce a number of options from which financial
institutions should be allowed to make a selection. To summarize the
5850 Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets 971
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