This matter is before this Court on Plaintiffs, Kendle Jenkins, Motion for

Summary Judgment, filed April 10, 2012. Defendant, the State, filed its Memorandum in
Opposition on April 24, 2012. Plaintiff then filed his Reply on May 1, 2012. Defendant
then filed its own Motion for Summary Judgment on June 15, 2012. Both Motions are
now ripe for decision.
The following facts are not in dispute. This action arises from an indictment and
subsequent conviction of Kendle Jenkins, hereinafter Plaintiff, based on drug
possession charges that eventually led to a dismissal due to constitutional violations. In
July 1994, federal agents obtained a package containing cocaine that was intended to
be delivered to Plaintiff. After agreeing to work with the federal agents, Plaintiff left the
state and moved to Texas. In March of 1995, a Grand Jury indicted Plaintiff on one
count of aggravated trafficking. Thirteen years later, on December 11, 2008, Plaintiff
was arrested. Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the long delay violated his
right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury eventually found
Plaintiff guilty of attempted aggravated trafficking. Plaintiff was sentenced to six to
fifteen years in prison. Plaintiff then filed his appeal claiming his right to a speedy trial
had been violated. The appellate court agreed and vacated the conviction, remanding
the case to the trial court. The trial court then granted Plaintiffs motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff has since brought this wrongful imprisonment action against the state. Plaintiff
now asks this court to grant summary judgment on his wrongful imprisonment claim.
The state has also filed, in its response, a motion for summary judgment. The Court will
now consider both of these motions.
[SUMMARY JUDGMENT HERE]
This case turns exclusively on the interpretation of R.C. 2743.48(A), the wrongful
imprisonment statute. That statute allows for an individual to recover monetary
damages from the state if they satisfy the five requirements set forth in the statute.
Those requirements are as follows:
(1) The individual was charged with a violation of a section of the
Revised Code by an indictment or information prior to, or on or
after, September 24, 1986, and the violation charged was an
aggravated felony or felony,
(2) The individual was found guilty of, but did not plead guilty to, the
particular charge or a lesser-included offensive by the court or jury
involved, and the offense of which the individual was found guilty
was an aggravated felony or felony,
(3) The individual was sentenced to an indefinite or definite term of
imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of
which the individual was found guilty,
(4)The individuals conviction was vacated or was dismissed, or
reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case cannot or
will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and
no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be
brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director of law, village
solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation
against the individual for any act associated with that conviction.
(5) Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to
imprisonment, an error in procedure resulted in the individuals
release, or it was determined by a court of common pleas that the
offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all lesser-
included offenses, either was not committed by the individual or
was not committed by an person.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2743.48

The Court will consider the first three prongs quickly as there appears to
be no dispute between the parties as to whether or not Plaintiff satisfies them.
The first prong requires the plaintiff be charged with a felony or
aggravated felony in violation of the Revised Code by an indictment. Plaintiff was
indicted, on March 30, 1995, for possession of cocaine a hundred tons or
greater. This is a felony charge and therefore Plaintiff to meets the first prong.
Second, Plaintiff must have been found guilty, without pleading guilty to,
the particular charge or a lesser-included offense that is also at least a felony or
aggravated felony. On April 8, 2009, Plaintiff was found guilty on an Attempted
Aggravated Trafficking charge, a lesser-included offense that is also a felony
charge. Plaintiff therefore satisfies the second prong.
Third, Plaintiff must have been sentenced to an indefinite or definite term
of imprisonment in a state correctional institution for the offense of which the
individual was found guilty. On April 8, 2009, Plaintiff was sentenced to a term of
6-15 years of incarceration for attempted aggravated drug trafficking. Plaintiff
satisfies the third prong.
The Court will now turn to the primary dispute between the parties, the
interpretation of the fourth and fifth prongs and whether or not Plaintiff satisfies
them. In order for Plaintiff to satisfy the fourth prong, his conviction must have
been vacated or dismissed, or reversed on appeal and the prosecuting attorney
in the case cannot or will not seek further appeal and no criminal proceeding is
pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney. Plaintiff
argues that this prong is virtually undisputed as well. Plaintiff claims that the
State had 30 days after the dismissal of the case by the Common Pleas Court to
appeal and chose not to do so. Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that the statute of
limitations on possible charges stemming from the incident against Plaintiff has
run, and that no other charges relating to this incident can be brought against
Plaintiff. Plaintiff further argues that due to the nature of the reversal, that even if
a charge did exist that could be brought, it would also fall victim to the Sixth
Amendment violation. That is, no charge brought by the state could be sustained
because it would be in violation of Plaintiffs right to a speedy a trial.
The State appears to have an argument in regards to the fourth prong, but
this Court has had a hard time in understanding what that argument is. In its
memorandum in opposition, the State argued that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the
fourth prong because Plaintiff did in fact engage in criminal conduct. However,
the state cites to virtually no relevant authority that gives the States argument
any weight. When the Court reads this prong, it is hard pressed to discover
where the Plaintiff is barred from recovering because they engaged in criminal
conduct. It simply isnt there. The States argument seems to be better suited
towards the fifth prong, and it is there that the Court will fully address the merits
of it. As to the fourth prong, the Court agrees with Plaintiff. There seems to be no
other charge that could be brought and sustained by the State relating to this
incident and the State has already waived its right to appeal. Therefore, the Court
believes the Plaintiff has satisfied the fourth prong.
Finally and most importantly, the Court will address the matter of Plaintiffs
satisfying/failing the fifth prong. In order to satisfy the fifth prong, Plaintiff must
show that either he was innocent of the offense of which he was found guilty or
that an error in procedure resulted in his release. Plaintiff argues that he was, in
fact, released due to a procedural error. The Fifth Appellate District overturned
Plaintiffs conviction, finding his right to a speedy trial had been violated. On
remand, the trial court dismissed the charges against Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues
that a dismissal and subsequent release based on a violation of the right to a
speedy trial is an error in procedure that satisfies the fifth element. To support
this argument, Plaintiff cites to Nelson v. State (2009), Ohio 3231 (10th Dist.). In
that case, the trial court had found that dismissal on speedy trial grounds was an
error in procedure. On appeal, the Tenth District noted that the trial court had
examined all five prongs of R.C.2743.48(A)(1-5) and had found the Plaintiff to
satisfy all of them. The Tenth District did not reverse the trial courts finding that
the Plaintiff satisfied the fifth prong by showing an error in procedure via a right to
a speedy trial violation.
The State, however, argues that the procedural error language in the
statute isnt meant to allow those who engaged in criminal conduct to be receive
compensation for wrongful imprisonment. The State claims that to do so would
be to interpret the statute incorrectly and would strain credibility by
compensating someone who was released due to an error in procedure. The
State cites to an Ohio Supreme Court case, Gover v. State of Ohio (1993), 67
Ohio St. 3d 93, to support its argument. There, the Court ruled that the wrongful
imprisonment statute was intended to separate those who were wrongfully
imprisoned from those who merely avoided criminal liability. The State claims
that Plaintiff in this case is one who just merely avoided criminal liability. The
State argues that Plaintiff, by engaging in criminal conduct, was not a person the
legislature intended to be afforded compensation via the wrongful imprisonment
statute.
The Court does not buy the States line of reasoning. The majority of the
States argument rests on legislative intent versus actual text. The State relies on
authority that pre-dates the 2003 amendment to the statute which introduced the
procedural error language. At the time Gover was decided, the Supreme Court
was right in its assessment of the statute. Lower courts were tasked with the job
of separating those who were actually innocent from those who merely avoided
liability. The Court believes that has since changed with the passage of the 2003
amendment. The State argues that if the legislature intended to change the
Courts interpretation of the statute in Gover, it could have had language added
to include those who merely avoided criminal liability. But, as the Plaintiff points
out in his Reply, this is exactly what the legislature did. To agree with the State
would be to render the 2003 amendment completely null and void. If the
legislature intended for the statute to remain exactly as the Court in Gover
interpreted it, it would have made far more sense to simply not amend it at all.
The amendment was enacted for a reason. The States argument is basically that
the amendment has no meaning. The Court believes the argument by the State
strains credibility.
In summation, the Court believes that the Plaintiff, as a matter of law,
satisfies all five prongs of the statute. The Court does not believe the States
argument that a Plaintiff who engaged in criminal conduct is therefore barred
from recovering under the statute. Furthermore, the Court believes that the 2003
amendment did have a legitimate impact on the statute and that a person can fall
within the statute by showing that a procedural error resulted in their release. The
Court believes that this is utterly separate from a showing of actual innocence
and stands on its own. If a Plaintiff can show a procedural error led to his
release, he has satisfied the fifth prong regardless of whether or not he actually
engaged in criminal conduct. To find otherwise would be to render the amended
language useless. For the forgoing reasons, the Court believes Plaintiff is entitled
to Summary Judgment, and the State is not.