Egypt in Transition: Jeremy M. Sharp
Egypt in Transition: Jeremy M. Sharp
Egypt in Transition: Jeremy M. Sharp
Egypt in Transition
Summary
On February 11, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak resigned from the presidency after 29 years in power. For 18 days, a popular peaceful uprising spread across Egypt and ultimately forced Mubarak to cede power to the military. In the wake of Mubaraks resignation, a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)made up entirely of military officers who enjoyed leading positions under Mubarakhas exercised executive authority directly and via an interim cabinet. The SCAF oversaw a March 2011 referendum that approved amendments to Egypts constitution, issued a constitutional declaration, and has also issued new laws on the formation of political parties and the conduct of parliamentary elections. The amended constitution lays out a transition framework in which the elected Peoples Assembly and Shura Council will, in conjunction with the SCAF, select members for a 100-person constituent assembly to draft a new constitution subject to a referendum. How Egypt transitions to a more democratic system in the months ahead will have major implications for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and for other countries in the region ruled by monarchs and dictators. This report provides a brief overview of the transition underway and information on U.S. foreign aid to Egypt. U.S. policy toward Egypt has long been framed as an investment in regional stability, built primarily on long-running military cooperation and sustaining the March 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Egypts government as a moderating influence in the Middle East. U.S. policy makers are now grappling with complex questions about the future of U.S.-Egypt relations, and these debates are likely to influence consideration of appropriations and authorization legislation in the 112th Congress.
Egypt in Transition
Contents
Egypt in Transition: The Military and Muslim Brotherhood Forge a Tentative Trail to Civilian Rule................................................................................................................................. 1 Domestic Politics: Islamists in Parliament ................................................................................ 3 Domestic Politics: Egypts 2012 Presidential Election ............................................................. 4 The Economy: Urgent Need for International Lending................................................................... 4 Foreign Policy: Relations with Israel............................................................................................... 5 Egypts Role as a Peace Broker?......................................................................................... 5 Security in the Sinai Peninsula............................................................................................ 6 Islamists and Israel .............................................................................................................. 6 Foreign Policy: U.S.-Egyptian relations .......................................................................................... 7 U.S. Foreign Aid to Egypt Since the February 2011 Revolution .............................................. 8 Egypts Raids on NGOs and Possible Cuts to U.S. Aid ...................................................... 9 U.S. Aid to Egypt: Options for Congress .......................................................................... 10
Figures
Figure 1. Map of Egypt.................................................................................................................... 2
Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Egypt, FY2010-FY2012..................................................................... 11 Table 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt..................................................................................... 11 Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1946-1997 ................................................................. 12
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 14
Egypt in Transition
Egypt in Transition: The Military and Muslim Brotherhood Forge a Tentative Trail to Civilian Rule
To date, Egypts year-old transition from military to civilian rule has been anything but smooth. Popular protests, sectarian violence, and clashes between police and demonstrators have all at one time or another threatened to derail the process. Since the resignation of former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak last year, nearly 800 people have died as a result of constant political unrest. Many indicators suggest that Egypt is far worse off economically now than a year ago. In this tense political atmosphere, minor disputes can trigger major unrest, and many analysts are cautiously watching Egypts domestic politics for signs of potential instability. However, it appears that in the short term, the two most powerful forces in Egyptian politicsthe victorious Islamist political parties led by the Muslim Brotherhood and the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces or SCAFare negotiating, often behind the scenes, to bring about a transition to civilian rule by the summer of 2012. According to the latest transition timeline (which has changed multiple times in the past year), in the months ahead, the new Islamistdominated Peoples Assembly will elect a 100-person Constitutional Assembly, which will then draft a new constitution. Should this document be written and then approved by popular referendum, presidential elections will be held in the summer of 2012, though the presidential campaign and the constitutional drafting will most likely overlap due to the short time allotted for each. If presidential elections run smoothly and the process goes as planned, Egypts military will then step aside from day-to-day governance, and a civilian administration will resume executive authority, as defined by a newly revised constitution. This SCAF-Muslim Brotherhood understanding is the direct result of political brinksmanship by both sides that had narrowly avoided unleashing prolonged mass unrest in November 2011. That month, SCAF spokesmen had attempted to interfere with the appointment of members to the constitutional assembly, a privilege specified for parliament according to the March 2011 constitutional referendum. The Muslim Brotherhood, which had anticipated an electoral victory and perceived the SCAFs move as a threat to their own power, responded by bringing tens of thousands of protestors back into the streets of Cairo on November 18. A day later, Islamists withdrew from the demonstrations content with their show of strength, but thousands of other Egyptians continued protesting, clashing with police when the latter attempted to clear Tahrir Square. Police-protestor confrontations then dramatically escalated, resulting in several deaths, condemnation of the SCAF, and a subsequent concession by the military to accelerate the timetable for transition to civilian rule from 2013 to the summer of 2012. The SCAFs concession combined with the start of elections cooled public tensions. This key episode demonstrated how the SCAF had clearly miscalculated the degree of opposition to any drastic changes to the transition plan, and the events of November-December clearly indicate that their room for maneuver is limited. Moreover, this new timetable aligns with public expectations. According to Gallup polls, 82% of Egyptians believe that the military will relinquish power to a civilian government after they elect their next president and a 63% majority think it would be bad for the military to remain involved in politics after the presidential
Egypt in Transition
election.1 Furthermore, nearly 9 in 10 Egyptians say delaying the presidential election, expected to take place before June 30, 2012, would be a bad thing for their country. Figure 1. Map of Egypt
In the months ahead, SCAF-Brotherhood agreement over the powers of the military once civilian rule is established will be critical to stabilizing Egypts domestic politics. According to former President Jimmy Carter, who met with Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi in January 2012, I dont think the SCAF is going to turn over full responsibility to the civilian government. There are going to be some privileges of the military that would probably be protected. Reportedly, both sides are negotiating the terms of immunity for the military for deaths that occurred at the hand of security services following former president Hosni Mubaraks resignation in February 2011. SCAF may desire that all current and retired military officers be tried only in military courts for alleged crimes committed during the transition. In order to improve its public perception in the midst of crucial behind-the-scenes negotiations, the SCAF announced that the Emergency Law, which it extended until the end of June 2012, would be applied only to cases of thuggery. It also
1
"Egyptians Expect Military to Hand Power to Elected Gov't," Gallup, January 25, 2012.
Egypt in Transition
released hundreds of detained protestors and a prominent blogger and critic of the military (Maikel Nabil). Overall, the exact nature and details of the separation of powers in Egypts emerging political system are unclear. Going forward, the military may retain certain powers after the transition is complete, particularly in the realms of national security, war powers, foreign affairs (specifically Egypts relationship with Israel), and the defense budget. These powers may either be enshrined constitutionally or assumed as extra-constitutional principles. The newly elected Peoples Assembly may create a special limited national security committee (called the National Defense Council) that oversees the details of the defense and intelligence budgets with only the full Parliament able to review the total size of the military budget.2 The status of other military interests, such as their vast land holdings and corporations, is unclear.
Egypt in Transition
Many experts expect the FJP to differentiate itself from the Salafist opposition by being more pragmatic, especially when it comes to the economy. The party may focus on promoting private investment, recovering lost revenue from land deals reached during the Mubarak era, creating jobs, boosting the agricultural sector, and reducing income inequality through redistributive tax policies. However, many Islamists from both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salfist Nour party share general goals of inserting certain Koranic prohibitions into civil law, such as bans on interest-based banking and consumption of alcohol. Though both sides may differ on the implementation, according to one expert, no matter how generously one interprets the sharia, certain prohibitions are unavoidable -- and the Brotherhood's parliamentarians vow to push those prohibitions into law.5
Egypt in Transition
this benefit may face staunch public opposition.7 Nevertheless, the IMF could require the government to reduce energy subsidies as a condition for its assistance. According to one banker, Egypt lost out on quite a significant opportunity by rebuffing the IMF. Whatever they would offer will come with much more conditionality than six months ago.8 In rejecting an earlier IMF loan offer last year, Egypts military leaders may have calculated that the wealthy Gulf Arab states would make up the difference; they were wrong. Instead of a promised $10 billion by Gulf Cooperation Council members, only $1 billion$500 million each from Saudi Arabia and Qatarwas delivered. The Gulf states may actually want Egypt to participate in an IMF program in order to enforce fiscal discipline before delivering more funds. Qatar has stated that it will provide more money for Egypt once power is handed over to a civilian government. Accepting IMF credit may be a divisive issue in Egyptian politics. The Salafist Nour party in the opposition rejects foreign borrowing, and the SCAF may choose to pass the issue off to the new civilian government after presidential elections. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, The FJP has not taken a clear position on the IMF issue, but it is unlikely to raise objections unless it considers that the loan carries conditions that would inhibit the party's ability to pursue its policy goals.
"Economic Crisis Adds Dangers on Egypts New Political Path," New York Times, January 24, 2012. "Egypt Goes Back to the IMF for Loan," Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2012.
Egypt in Transition
Israelmay not accept a foreign policy that is as adversarial to Hamas. Many analysts suggested that when Israel completed the prisoner exchange with Hamas to return Gilad Shalit from captivity, it did so in part in anticipation that Egypt would not be willing or able to broker such deals in the future due to Egyptian Islamist support for the Hamas cause. For the United States, the possible loss of Egypt as a reliable broker limits its options when trying to corral regional support for renewed negotiations. Recent talks between Israelis and Palestinians in Amman suggest that Jordan may try to fill this vacuum, though the small kingdom does not carry the same political weight as Egypt.
Policy Forum Report Sinai: The New Frontier Of Conflict? Policywatch #1872, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,November 21, 2011. 10 Available online at http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29291&ref=search.php
Egypt in Transition
At the same time, Muslim Brotherhood leaders have signaled their intent to maintain peace with Israel. In an interview with Tom Friedman of the New York Times, Essam El Erian, vice chairman of the FJP, said that This [peace treaty] is the commitment of the statenot any group or party and we have said we are respecting the commitments of the Egyptian state.11 However, many Brotherhood members have said that the peace treaty may be reviewed. One spokesperson for the Salafist Nour party said, We will abide by the treaty, but this does not mean accepting a number of clauses which the Egyptian people are clearly and unanimously against, such as exporting gas to Israel.
"Political Islam Without Oil," New York Times, January 10, 2012.
Egypt in Transition
political party, the Freedom and Justice Party. After meeting with FJP officials, Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Robert D. Hormats said that the FJP members he met with were very pragmatic. They understand, they're the majority party now in the parliament. They are going to be the primary political party in Egypt. They need to deliver results.12 As the United States reaches out to new political actors, many experts question the degree of U.S. leverage in post-Mubarak Egypt, particularly as U.S. resources for foreign policy overall may be shrinking given national budgetary constraints and domestic priorities. Many experts suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood, to the extent that it can dictate Egypts foreign policy, will try to move Egypt away from the United States and return the country to the non-aligned, more independent foreign policy course it followed during the 1960s and early 1970s. Even under Mubarak, Egypt has always been strongly nationalistic, and anti-colonialism is a powerful narrative there. Others suggest that while Islamists may not hold the United States in high esteem, economic realities will force Egypt, at the least in the short term, to maintain relations with the West, particularly as it seeks lending from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to stabilize its stalled economy.
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within the region; build on existing agreements to promote integration with U.S. and European markets; and open the door to freer trade for countries that adopt high standards of reform and trade liberalization to construct a regional trade arrangement. Overall, Congress has supported new Obama Administration proposals for Egypt but with conditions. P.L. 112-74, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, provides the full request for Egypt ($1.55 billion), authorizes debt relief, and authorizes and appropriates funding for the creation of an enterprise fund to promote private sector investment. However, Section 7041 of P.L. 112-74 specifies that no funds may be made available to Egypt until the Secretary of State certifies that Egypt is meeting its obligations under the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. It further specifies that no military funds be provided until the Administration certifies that Egypt is supporting the transition to civilian government, including by holding free and fair elections and by implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law. These certifications may be waived by the Administration under certain conditions. In addition, conferees directed the Secretary of State to submit a report to the Committees on Appropriations, not later than 60 days after enactment of the act, outlining steps that the government of Egypt is taking to protect religious minorities, including Coptic Christians; prevent sectarian and gender-based violence; and hold accountable those who commit such acts.
Egypt in Transition
personally called Field Marshall Tantawi, the head of the SCAF, to remind him that the FY2012 Appropriations Act contains a certification requirement (see above) before any military aid may be released, though Tantawi did not believe him.16 As a result of these developments, many lawmakers are calling for a suspension of military aid to Egypt. On February 6, Egyptian authorities charged 43 people, including the Egypt country directors of NDI and IRI, with spending money from organizations that were operating in Egypt without a license. Nineteen Americans, including Sam LaHood, the son of U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood, face criminal charges. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said shortly before the charges were announced that she had warned Egyptian officials that the investigation of NGOs had cast doubt on the delivery of U.S. aid, saying We are very clear that there are problems that arise from this situation that can impact all the rest of our relationship with Egypt.17 On February 8, Egyptian investigative judges said that the 43 employees who have been charged could face up to five years in prison for working at unlicensed organizations, failing to pay taxes, entering the country on tourist visas, and training political parties.18
Obama warns Egypt that military aid is at risk, International Herald Tribune, January 28, 2012. "Egypt Defies U.S. by Setting Trial for 19 Americans on Criminal Charges," New York Times, February 5, 2012. 18 "NGO Workers could face 5 years in Prison, Egyptian Judges say," Washington Post, February 8, 2012. 19 Section 7011 of P.L. 112-74 limits the availability of unobligated FMF to the one fiscal year unless otherwise specified.
17
16
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The disposition of future Egyptian governments toward the United States is unknown,20 as is the likely future separation of powers between the legislature, the executive, the military, and the judiciary in the emerging Egyptian political system. Egypts military rulers have indicated their intention to step down from power as soon as elections are held either in May or June of 2012, although they may retain significant financial and internal oversight authorities. The Administration and Congress may view that move as an opportunity to reach either a formal or informal understanding with any new Egyptian government, stipulating that U.S. assistance comes with certain conditions that reflect U.S. national interests and values, subject to the approval of Congress. This understanding could be enshrined in a memorandum of understanding or another type of agreement. Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Egypt, FY2010-FY2012
(regular and supplemental appropriations; current year $ in millions)
Account ESF FMF IMET INCLE NADR Total Source: U.S. State Department. a. Congress provided $260 million of Egypts total FY2010 FMF appropriation in P.L. 111-32, the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act. The remaining $1.04 billion was appropriated in P.L. 111-117, the FY2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act. FY2010 250.0 1,300.0a 1.900 1.000 2.800 1,555.7 FY2011 249.5 1,297.4 1.400 1.000 4.600 1,553.9 FY2012 250.0 1,300.0 1.400 .250 5.600 1,557.25
20 A recent Gallup poll noted that about 7 in 10 Egyptians surveyed in December 2011 oppose U.S. economic aid to Egypt, and a similar percentage opposes the U.S. sending direct aid to civil society groups. See, Most Egyptians Oppose U.S. Economic Aid, Gallup, February 6, 2012.
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Fiscal Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
Year 1946 1948 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Total 9.6 1.4 0.1 1.2 12.9 4.0 66.3 33.3 1.0 0.6 44.8 65.9 73.5 200.5 146.7 95.5 97.6 27.6 12.6
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Year 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 TQ 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
Total 1.5 0.8 21.3 370.1 464.3 552.5 907.8 943.2 2,588.5 1,167.3 1,681.2 1,967.3 2332.0 2,470.8 2,468.7 2,539.1 2,317.0 2,174.9 2,269.6 2,397.4 2,300.2 2,235.1 2,052.9 1,868.6 2,414.5 2,116.6 2,116.0 45,669.4
Military Grant 200.0 425.0 465.0 1,175.0 1,244.1 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,294.4 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 1,300.0 17,803.5
I.M.E.T Grant 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8 2.4 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 27.3.0
ESF Loan 194.3 150.0 429.0 600.0 617.4 250.0 280.0 70.0 2,620.7
ESF Grant 8.5 58.5 102.8 107.8 99.2 133.3 585.0 585.0 759.0 771.0 750.0 852.9 1,065.1 1,069.2 819.7 717.8 815.0 898.4 780.8 892.9 747.0 561.6 1,113.3 815.0 815.0 15,923.8
P.L. 480 I 9.5 104.5 201.7 14.6 196.8 179.7 230.7 285.3 272.5 262.0 238.3 237.5 213.8 217.5 191.7 153.0 150.5 203.0 165.0 40.4 35.0 4,114.3
P.L. 480 II 0.8 3.3 12.8 4.4 1.1 11.7 12.5 22.4 16.1 28.9 31.9 16.8 13.7 13.2 6.6 3.9 2.6 1.2 52.5 4.1 6.2 0.6 455.1
Notes: Totals may not add due to rounding. No U.S. aid programs for years 1947, 1949, 1950, 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971. P.L. 480 II Grant for 1993 includes $2.1 million in Sec. 416 food donations. TQ = Transition Quarter; change from June to September fiscal year * = less than $100,000 I.M.E.T. = International Military Education and Training UNRWA = United Nations Relief and Works Agency Surplus = Surplus Property Tech. Asst. = Technical Assistance
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Narc. = International Narcotics Control D. A. = Development Assistance ESF = Economic Support Funds P.L. 480 I = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title I Loan P.L. 480 II = Public Law 480 (Food for Peace), Title II Grant
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