Ukrainian Crisis Summary

There are two competing stories about whats happening in Ukraine. Theyre both right.
By Max Fisher, Updated: February 21 at 2:46 pm

You may have noticed that there are two distinct ways that people tend to mostly talk and write about the three-month crisis in Ukraine. Experts and observers and journalists typically settle on one of those two narratives, use it to explain what's happening and then go on to talk about how the other version of events must therefore be wrong. The two Ukraine storylines are indeed very different, they cast what's happening in very different lights, and people often argue about which one is right. But here's the thing: They can both be simultaneously true, and in fact there's a strong case to be made that they are. Here are those two narratives, how they explain events, who favors them and why they can both be true. The human story: Angry citizens and a strongman president This is probably the version you're more familiar with. It portrays the crisis as prodemocracy, pro-European protesters challenging an increasingly corrupt and authoritarian government. This story is much easier to understand (that doesn't make it wrong, of course), particularly if you don't happen to have a lot of background knowledge about Ukraine, which most people don't. It conveys the crisis in human, relatable terms. This narrative is most favored by activists, both within Ukraine and abroad, and by Western conflict journalists covering the protests. The story goes like this: In 2004, a Ukrainian politician named Viktor Yanukovych ran for president and "won" amid allegations of fraud, sparking international pressure to re-do the vote and wide protests which became known as the "Orange Revolution." Yanukovych lost in the second round of voting. But he ran again in 2010, won, and has been increasingly seen as corrupt and with worrying authoritarian tendencies. In November, Yanukovych surprised the world by rejecting a deal for greater integration with the European Union, instead accepting a $15 billion "bailout" from Russian President Vladimir Putin, with whom Yanukovych is quite friendly. Lots of Ukrainians in the west of the country, where he has less support, already saw him as corrupt and autocratic. They believed Yanukovych had sold out their country to the Kremlin with the Russia deal, so they started protesting. In mid-January, as demonstrations swelled, Yanukovych signed a set of "anti-protest" laws that severely restricted everything from free speech to the media. Activists called them "dictatorship laws," and not without reason. Protests grew again, including in the more pro-Russian east, and persisted even after the laws were mostly repealed. Police crackdowns started getting really violent this week. Yanukovych, his popularity declining rapidly, looked more and more like an authoritarian mini-Putin,
to Ukrainians and to the Western world. Members of his own party started bailing on him, with parliament voting to end the crackdown, which had clearly gone too far. He's on the brink of being brought down by his own abuses of power and by courageous Ukrainian protesters who have braved state violence and the threat of death. It's an inspiring story, truly. And there is a great deal of truth to it. But there is also truth to the other predominant narrative. The structural story: Demographics and an identity crisis This version of events is less exciting and more complicated, but it takes a much wider and more systematic view, which is probably why it's most often expressed by political scientists and analysts. Here's the idea: Ukraine has been divided by a national identity crisis since its 1991 independence. Partly this divide is demographic (see the map above), but it has much more to do with figuring out what kind of country Ukraine wants to be. Ukrainians themselves disagree on this; that disagreement has shaped their politics, up to and including this current crisis. The story of Ukraine's national identity crisis has its roots in Russian conquests about 250 years ago. Russian rulers from Catherine the Great to Joseph Stalin wanted to "Russify" the eastern half of Ukraine, which is rich in natural resources and fertile farmland, by shipping in lots of ethnic Russians and passing laws to encourage people there to speak Russian rather than Ukrainian. The effect of all that Russifying is that lots of Ukrainians speak Russian as their first language, particularly in the country's east, where people also tend to have fonder feelings for their historical and cultural links to Russia. In the mostly Ukrainianspeaking west, though, lots of people remember the brutality of Russian rule and they would much rather their country identify with Europe than with Russia. So the division is about much more than language. This divide plays out in Ukrainian politics all the time. Every presidential election splits the country between a pro-Russian candidate, who wins lots of support in the east, and a pro-European candidate, who wins support in the west. Of course, the elections are about much more than this, and domestic issues play the biggest role. But the effect of the national-identity-crisis division is to divide elections along the same lines. You can see that in these maps: Yanukovych is from the east; Russian is his native language. When he was elected in 2010, it was largely by people in the more Russian-speaking, Russia-leaning east of the country. That divide came out again in November, when the current crisis began with Yanukovych rejecting the E.U. deal and instead taking Moscow's bailout. You may be surprised to learn that only about 43 percent of Ukrainians wanted the E.U. deal, according to opinion polls, which show 30 percent support for joining the Russian-led trade union instead. So Yanukovych's decision against the E.U. deal did have a base of popular support, almost entirely among eastern Ukrainians who had voted him into office. In a way, it was a democratic decision, even if it was poorly executed. But it badly exacerbated
that national identity crisis. It infuriated Ukrainians in the pro-European west of the country, who hadn't voted for Yanukovych in the first place. They weren't just protesting the president or his decision, though; they were protesting the Russialeaning direction that he and his millions of Ukrainian supporters wanted to take the country. (And yes, they were definitely protesting his well-earned record for corruption and strong-hand tactics as well.) If and when the current crisis ends, it will not have actually resolved the deeper issue: a national identity crisis about whether Ukraine considers itself part of Europe or linked to Russia. This problem predated Yanukovych and his crackdown and it will still be there when he leaves, something that only Ukrainians can resolve as a nation. Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/21/there-aretwo-competing-stories-about-whats-happening-in-ukraine-theyre-both-right/. 2 March 2014 Last updated at 15:42 GMT
Ukraine crisis: What next for both sides?

By Bridget Kendall, Diplomatic correspondent, BBC News The wider picture could hardly be more serious. On Saturday President Vladimir Putin moved to get parliamentary permission to use Russian troops not just in Crimea, but in Ukraine as a whole. This takes this crisis to a disturbing new level. Russian diplomats say he may not use those powers "immediately" - but that does seem to imply they may be used before long. President Putin has said he will do what is necessary to "protect Russian citizens and compatriots". Already there are disturbances in towns in eastern Ukraine. And Russian troops are on combat alert on the border, as part of the massive training exercise being carried out this week. 'Neo-fascist coup' Both Russia and the West say they want a peaceful resolution, but they are at polar opposites on the fundamental question of who is the legitimate authority in Ukraine. Western powers say it is the new interim government in Kiev, authorised by the Ukrainian parliament. Russia says Kiev is in the hands of an illegitimate government of "far-right extremists" with "xenophobic, anti-Semitic and neo-fascist" views, installed as the result of a "coup d'etat", which deposed President Victor Yanukovych illegally.
Mr Putin wants the West and Kiev to go back to the defunct agreement signed with Victor Yanukovych on 21 February to hold discussions about constitutional reform to satisfy the demands of all parties and regions - presumably shorthand for reforms to turn Ukraine into a federation, with more self-rule for Russian-speaking regions and Crimea. But that would effectively mean recognising that Mr Yanukovych is still president and that the new Ukrainian government is therefore illegitimate. The West is not going to agree to that. The conflict is on a knife edge. The deployment of Russian troops in Crimea has not yet led to bloodshed. But if that widens into a Russian military intervention into other parts of Ukraine, it is hard to see how violent clashes could be avoided. Appeal for help Eastern Ukraine is not a separate geographical entity like Crimea. There is no easy way to define where Russian-speaking regions end and Ukrainian-speaking parts of the country begin. The Kiev authorities have so far shown maximum restraint - but for how much longer? As for Russia's intentions, President Putin showed in Georgia in 2008 that he is fully prepared to go to war. And Ukraine matters to him much more. Kiev has appealed for outside help. But the fact is that the West's options look limited. Nato is convening emergency meetings. EU foreign ministers meet in emergency session on Monday. The US has already accused Russia of invading Ukraine and violating the UN charter. US Secretary of State John Kerry has warned that unless Russia took immediate and concrete steps to withdraw, the effect on US-Russia relations and on Russia's international standing would be profound. But how might the West respond? There must surely be little appetite for Nato to react militarily. Possibly, it might take steps to secure the Polish-Ukrainian border. More likely the West would look to take diplomatic and economic measures to isolate Russia and suspend co-operation with it. But even if the West did impose sanctions or other measures, President Putin may gauge that - as with Georgia - it would not last.
In a year or two, Western governments would change and new leaders would repair relations with Moscow, recognising that Russia is too powerful and dangerous, and too crucial to international stability to have as an enemy for long. Think no further than the impact a new East-West hostility would have on the Iran nuclear talks, the war in Syria, or the precarious uncertainty over North Korea. High stakes In any case would, say, Iran-style sanctions even be an option? Possibly Russia is too intertwined economically with Western partners, especially in Europe. After all, Russia could always in theory retaliate with the Gazprom card - Europe's reliance on Russian gas makes it vulnerable. What is so dangerous about this confrontation is that unlike Georgia in 2008, the stakes are so much higher on both sides. For Western powers, this is not just about standing up for a small country in the faroff Caucasus. It is a military crisis taking place on Europe and Nato's border. For President Putin, this is not just a geopolitical battle for influence over a country in Russia's backyard. It is to protect land which for him is, historically and culturally, an essential part of the idea of Russia. Kievan Rus was where, over 1,000 years ago, the Russian state and the Russian Orthodox faith began. That is why he will do his utmost not to let it go, whatever the cost. In Georgia, the Tbilisi government lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia when they were occupied by Russian troops - supporting pro-Russian separatists - and de facto annexed by Moscow. Though unrecognised as separate new countries by most of the rest of the world, the two territories have effectively moved from Georgia to Russia's control. UN talks to try to resolve the dispute have got nowhere. So in Ukraine is that what Russia intends to do too? Take Crimea and Russian speaking regions under its control, effectively dividing Ukraine in half? Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26407604.

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There are two competing stories about whats happening in Ukraine. Theyre both right.

By Max Fisher, Updated: February 21 at 2:46 pm

Ukraine crisis: What next for both sides?

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