Postwar Japanese Nationalism

Shoichi Koseki Dokkyo University Japan

In discussing Japanese nationalism with a western audience there are several premises that should be examined. The first of those is the problem of language. Japanese use the three words nation, nationality and people without drawing much distinction between them. If we take an example that is easily understood, such as the Japanese Constitution, and look at the phrase All of the people before the law the word used the Japanese version is kokumin and in the phrase The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law, the word national is translated into Japanese as kokumin. However, it is not much of a problem between scholars. Several years ago I made an examination of this as a problem (S. Koseki 1988), but there was little interest in it, so I dropped the consideration of it as a problem. There are those who translated the word nation in nation-state to kokumin and there are those who translate it as minzoku the Japanese meaning of which is closer to ethnic or ethnicity. Here, too, people do not seem to recognize it as a problem. As Ernest Renan says in What is a Nation, the confusion in meaning between nation and race occurs everywhere, not just in Japan. But, in the case of Japan, several western scholars including E.J. Hobsbawm (1992), R.J. Holton (1998) and W. Connor (1994) have pointed out that Japan is one of a set of extremely rare examples of historical states with a population that is entirely or almost entirely, ethnically homogeneous. When we examine nationalism in Japan, we next have to look at the way in which modernization took place. Modernization is said to have begun in 1869 with the inception of the Meiji Restoration. Prior to that time, the policy of Japans shogunate government was to shut the country off from the rest of the world, but Britains Opium War against China and the United States placing of pressure on Japan moved the country to abandon its isolation policy and begin the formation of a modern state. That was when they began to adopt the more advanced systems from Europe and the United States. Among those systems was the concept of sovereignty and form of government from the Prussian Empire

that required the establishment of a highly centralized state. Before then, Japan was a sort of federal state with its basic unit being the feudal clan. From then on more and more Japanese began to be aware of themselves as Japanese, and they started to call themselves Japanese. That means that they no longer regarded themselves as people belonging to a clan, but as members of a Japanese nation, which stood in juxtaposition to people and things that were not Japanese. The desirable political ideal, not just for political leaders, but for influential intellectuals as well, then became one of extricate Japan from Asia and make it part of Europe. However, this did not mean that Japanese intended to make thoroughly westernize themselves. It means that they would study western political systems and technology. There was a latent awareness among Japanese that they were not white but that as an issue of identity they saw themselves both culturally and spiritually superior to all other countries. Japanese culture from early on was strongly influenced by that of Korea and China but with the Meiji Restoration, Japan began to think that China and Korea were its cultural inferiors. The extricating ourselves from Asia was a way in which the Japanese asserted their cultural superiority over the Asian nations. This is when the thinking of Japanese spirit with Western learning or Western Technique; Japanese Spirit as it is usually translated in the English language resources, arises. In the 1930s, Japan adopted imperialism wholeheartedly and invaded East and Southeast Asian countries under one of its slogans at that time, Liberate the Asian People from the Western Powers. John Dower has called the second world war in the Pacific between the United States and Japan, a racial war without mercy (Dower, 1986), and Saburo Ienaga say that aggression against Asia at the same time racial war called the liberation of inferior Asian peoples. (Ienaga, 1978). Pre-1945 Japanese nationalism was extremely unstable and ambivalent and formed in an exceedingly short period of time between the threat from western nations and the notion of superiority toward Asian nations. The central focus of my report today is to examine whether defeat in the Second World War really changed these pre-1945 national sentiments.

The conservative political leadership and most Japanese of that time believed that their defeat in August 1945 was attributable to insufficiencies of power, or more importantly of military power. One of Japans leading political thinkers, Masao Maruyama, saw the cause

for defeat in a political system that was based on the emperor system and although this theory was highly influential with many intellectuals of the time, it did not become a majority opinion. One of Japans leading political scientists Masao Maruyama, searched for the cause of the defeat in the political system based on the emperor system and that had a large effect on many intellectuals of the time Maruyama, 1969it did not become a majority view. Be that as it may, many people supported the policies of demilitarization and democratization set forth by the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers: GHQ/SCAP. This was caused, more than anything else by a people exhausted from 15 years of war that had begun with the aggression on Manchuria in 1931 and who were eager to be freed from militarism and authoritarianism. (Dower, 1999) GHQ/SCAP conducted its occupation through the emperor and the Japanese government. Emperor Hirohito and the conservative government did not oppose GHQ/SCAPs policies for demilitarization and democratization. This does not mean, however, that they gave those policies wholehearted support. One example is that of MacArthurs closest partner in the Japanese government, prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Yoshida is considered by many to be postwar Japans greatest politician. He cooperated actively with the occupation policy, but one of his favorite jokes was to tell people that GHQ stood for Go home quickly, an indication of how much he really cared for GHQ/SCAP democratization. (E.Takemae, 2002) In this report, I would like to examine the feelings of the Japanese people toward the United States in regard to the Constitution that was promulgated at the beginning of the occupation and the peace and security treaties that were agreed to at the end of the occupation. In the early months of the occupation, SCAP suggested to the Japanese government that it write a new constitution. The government came back with a draft that was merely a SCAP refused to accept it, and in their general revision of the Meiji Constitution.

determination it was simply too conservative, The governments revision said that the sovereignty of the state lies in the emperor and it also differed little with the Meiji Constitution in that guarantees of human rights would be within the scope of the law. This clearly shows that the Japanese government had no idea that the causes of Japans defeat in war were in its political system. That is why General MacArthur decided that the Japanese government was incapable of

drafting a modern constitution and why he ordered the SCAP Government Section to secretly draft a constitution. Their draft proposal was not simply an outline, it was a finalized text of a constitution. That is what was handed over to the Japanese government. What the GHQ proposal showed to the Japanese government were things they could never have expected, it was a shocking event. For the conservative government of that time, the fact that the nations constitution was to be created by foreigners, even though Japan was a country under occupation, was an extreme insult. GHQ/SCAP was also forbidden from making the document public. Thus, the fact that GHQ/SCAP had drawn up the drafts of the Japanese Constitution remained a secret in Japan until after the end of the occupation. The specifics were made public after the occupation ended by those involved in the negotiations with GHQ. So that these facts would be widely known, the conservative government determined that the constitution had been forced on them by GHQ/SCAP. They have continue to argue up to this day that since the constitution was forced upon Japan that it must be revised. However, there has been no such revision because the conservative advocacy of revision is one of maintaining military self-defense power, strengthening the authority of the emperor and limiting human rights, It is generally thought, what they advocate is anti-GHQ/, or that it is anti-American but they continue to be Japans most pro-American forces. This is the key to the riddle of nationalism in relation to the United States on the part of the Japanese conservative powers. The House of Peers and the House of Representatives were the bicameral legislative bodies established in the Meiji Constitution and it was they who deliberated on the postwar Japanese constitution. When the Representatives adopted the constitution not one conservative opposed it. The opposition came from eight members of the Communist Party. This idea that the constitution was forced on us defeated the ideal of the constitution. This was a second defeat in war (Koseki, 1997). However, the conservative regime was humiliated by the power of the United States. Thus, even thought they say that the constitution was forced on us when they are talking to Japanese, they will definitely not say that when they are talking to Americans. Since 1960, or since the high-rate of growth economy that started in the 1960s, the reason that Japanese political leaders have been extremely pro-American lies within the Japan-US Security treaty that has been the foundation of relations between the United States and Japan since the end of World War II. The security treaty is considered to be a military treaty. Of course that is true, but the background against which this treaty was drawn up

and the meaning that the treaty has for Japan in the postwar period is something greater than just a military treaty. The security treaty was created in 1951 with the US as the central entity and as a combined package with the peace treaty. A revolutionary government had been created in China, the Cold War was well underway, the Korean War had started, and to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union into Asia, the United States placed its priorities in policy toward Japan on economic recovery, reconstruction and remilitarization. The peace treaty with Japan makes absolutely no mention of Japans responsibilities in causing the second world war, but it also determines that the Allied Powers will make no request for indemnification for damages incurred during the war with Japan. remilitarization of Japan. From the time the security treaty was adopted up to the early 1960s, an opposition movement against it and US military and naval installations became strongly rooted. Up until the beginning of the 1960s after the security treaty had been issued, United States military and naval installations opposition movements continued to become more strongly rooted. The movement was organized around the socialist political parties, labor unions and students but when the security treaty was revised in 1960 with the border as the large scale opposition struggle the fires burned low from around the time that the economy got on the track to high growth rates. Based on the Japan-US security treaty, the Japan-US status of forces agreement was concluded which determined that US armed forces could be stationed within Japan, and there has been almost no change in this pact since 1951. Most of the present US installations are concentrated in Okinawa quite a distance separate from the main Japanese islands. There are continuing crimes here by the US armed forces. In 1995, a marine raped a young girl, and large-scale opposition movements have arisen on Okinawa, while on the main islands there is almost no opposition movement. The Status of Forces agreement says that if a member of the United States armed forces commits a crime off the installation, that the Japanese police can arrest that person, but he or she cannot be detained or interrogated by the Japanese police. The Japanese police have to hand the suspect over to the US military police. Okinawa prefecture has been working on the central government to have these regulations revised but the central government has made no positive moves in that regard(Oota, 2000). Conversely, the many reparations treaties concluded with Asian countries in the latter half of the 1950s contributed greatly to Japans economic recovery. Not just the Japanese But the security treaty calls on Japan to recognize the stationing of American forces in Japan and the

political leaders, but many Japanese people have thus come to support the political system created by the security treaty. So much so that Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda said in the 1970s, Japan has prospered because of the Japan-US Security Treaty."

Peace Treaty between Japan and the Allied Powers does not touch on Japans responsibilities for the Second World War and the fact that it did not recognize request for reparations or indemnities has been the cause for a great deal of disappointment from the Asian and Pacific nations. The Philippines and Indonesia signed the treaty but their legislatures did not ratify it. The Philippines did not ratify until a voluntary reparation agreement was signed in 1956 and Indonesia did not ratify until 1959 when it signed the same type of agreement with Japan. Neither North nor South Korea signed the peace treaty; they were liberated countries, not members of the Allied Powers. John Foster Dulles, the USs roving ambassador and the man who would become secretary of state two years later, proposed to Prime Minister Yoshida that South Korea be named a concerned country, but Yoshida turned the idea down. The normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan did not take place until 1964 when the two countries concluded the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty with the Republic of Korea. The Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union were not invited to the treaty conference. The United States was the country that devised the idea that Japan would not be required to acknowledge its responsibility for the second world war and that it would not have to pay reparations. The Philippines, as one example, requested that Japan pay it eight billion dollars in reparations, but Dulles turned down President Quirinos demand and gave the reason that Our efforts in bringing about the rehabilitation of Japan were not caused by love of the Japanese but rather were due to our belief that a stable and healthy Japan would be to the interest of all in this part of the world. Dulles explained that in his opinion Japan is one of the key areas desired by the Communists and that if the industrial potential and manpower resources of Japan were added to the Soviet and Chinese Communists, the Philippines would be in grave danger. (FRUS, 1951) This was Cold War theory. The US had selected Japan as a bridgehead in the war against communism. The result was the Japan-Philippines Reparation Agreement of July 1956, which gave reparations of 800 million dollars or one-tenth of, what the Philippines had first requested. Treaties of this same type were concluded between the mid-1950s to the

mid-1960s with other Asian countries such as Indonesia, Burma and South Vietnam as well as the Philippine. When Peace Treaty denied other countries the right to get reparations from Japan, Japan made an enormous profit. At that time, Prime Minister Yoshida welcomed the treaty for its non-punitive nature but because of it Japan lost any chance of friendly relations with the other countries of Asia. However, what was even more serious is that the opposition parties and the intellectuals had no interest in Japans responsibility for the Second World War and relations with Asia. When the Diet was deliberating the reparations pact with the Philippines one of the opposition parties, the Social Democratic Party put out an announcement that it was upset because these reparations would increase the burden on the taxpayer, The concept of extricating Japan from Asia and make it part of Europe was alive and well behind postwar democratization. That was not all. The policies of the Cold War forced Japanese view reality from either the perspective of the US or that of the USSR. The peace treaty placed Japan in the US camp. Therefore, the group that was opposed to this camp expressed great interest in the fact that a peace treaty with the Soviet Union had not yet been signed; they had no interest in the Asian countries. What is even more important is they had lost perspective on the human rights of each and every individual who makes up a nation. Let me cite an example from my own experience. When the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and Korea was signed in 1964, many people in both countries were opposed to it. I was an undergraduate at the time and was opposed to the treaty because of the clause that says, It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195 (III) of the United Nations General Assembly. Even in the latter half of the 1960s, there was no critical view in

Japan that a treaty had yet to determine the responsibilities we have toward those who were Japans victims in World War II.
Many of the Asian countries were, at that time, ruled by military dictatorships, and we can understand why reform- and democracy-minded people in Japan were opposed to better relations with those dictatorships, but more important than that is that these Japanese did not look at the situation from the perspective of protecting human rights beyond the framework of a nation. During the 1980s and the democratization of the Asian nations, many victims of the second world war in Asia appealed to Japan to redress the violation of human rights perpetrated on them in the war. These people are the comfort women i.e., women who were forced into prostitution by and for the Japanese army and navy, and the prisoners of war who had been brutalized and forced into slave labor. However, the Japanese

government made no effort to solve this problem.

And the Japanese people had no

interest in the problem as they had had no opportunity to learn and to ponder their responsibilities for the second world war.Hein and Selden, 2000 If the Japanese people could have overcome their nationalistic feelings toward Asia, which were cultivated in the process of modernization, they might have been able to have a perspective on human rights that would allow them to solve the problem as human beings, in a way that transcended nation. In this meaning, it is a very important event for the Japanese modern history that the Japanese citizen movement groups, even these are not so large groups, have been continuing their activities for supporting or cooperating with the Asian victims since the 1980s, though they have never seen in Japan before.

Japan is now rapidly building a military legal system. Japanese nationalistic feeling is rising, particularly toward the DPRK (North Korea) Even so this nationalism is quite different from the pre-1945 version, which centered on force of arms. . First, under the Japan-US security regime, there is no intention of exercising armed force against Europe and the West, particularly the United States. One thing that Japan did learn from the Second World War, if I may borrow the terminology used in government documents, was that there must be cooperation between Japan and the United States. However, rather than that being the feeling common to the Japanese people, it is an expression of the lessons learned by those in authority, who consider that it was the might of the United States that beat them in World War II. Therefore, from around the time that Japan is said to have become a major economic power in the 1980s, those authorities began to arrogantly declare that We have nothing more to learn from the West. That means that they believed Japan had reached its objective declared in the Meiji period (=1868-1912) that of Japanese spirit with Western learning and it was the declaration that Japan had won an economic war with the West. However, on the one hand, Japan still has not fulfilled its responsibilities nor has it taken any blame for its part in war on Asia. In that sense the concept since Meiji of extricate Japan from Asia and make it part of Europe, may have undergone various transformations since 1945, but today it remains basically the same as it always has.

References Connor, W., 1994, Ethno-nationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press. Dower, J. W., 1986, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, Pantheon Books. Dower, J. W., 1999, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W.Norton. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol.VI, Pt. 1, 1977. Hein, Laura & Selden, Mark eds., 2000, Censoring History, Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, M.E. Sharp. Hobsbawm, E.J., 1992, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge University Press. The author also uses China and Korea for his studies. Holton, R.J.,1998, Globalization and the Nation-State, MacMillan Press In addition to Japan, the author uses Iceland and Norway case studies. Ienaga, S., 1978: The Pacific War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931-1945, Koseki,S., 1997, The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution, Westview Press. Maruyama, M.,1969, Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics, Oxford University Press. Although only partially translated into English, almost all of Maruyamas works written in Japanese have been compiled in the Maruyama Masao Shu (Collection of Maruyama Masaos Works), 16 volumes, Iwanami-Shoten Publishers (Tokyo) ,1996. Oota, M.,2000, Essays on Okinawa Problems, Yui Shuppan Co(Okinawa). The author is a professor emeritus at the University of the Ryukyus, and was governor of Okinawa prefecture from 1990 to 1998. He is now a member of the Diet, in the House of Councilors. Takemae, Eiji, 2002, Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy, Continuum. Pantheon Books. Koseki, S. 1988, ' Japanizing the Constitution', The Japan Quarterly, Vol.35, no. 3.