Project Management Report
Project Management Report
Project Management Report
SUBMITTED TO
NS Hamza Ahmed - 128 NS Warda Naeem - 173 NS Adnan Raza -115 NS Umer Sheerdil Paracha -163
History
The Dam site at Khjori was first envisaged by four British officers of the Royal Corps of Engineers in 1898 and surveys were carried out. The Government of Pakistan approved the construction of the dam in August 1963 and preparatory work was commenced. In 2001, the local Provincial Minister Aminullah Gandapur brought the delay in the construction of the dam to the notice of the then President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, who ordered its construction. The groundbreaking ceremony was held on 14 August 2001.
Objective
1) The purpose of the dam is to minimize the recurring floods. The project will also generate electricity which will provide sufficient electricity to more than 25000 household in area. 2) Another objective of the project was the construction of the Waran Canal System. This canal is constructed in Tank, District of KPK province. The purpose of the canal was to bring 28,000 acres of land under permanent irrigation. The construction of the canal will irrigate 28,000 acres land in the district which would increase crop sowing in the area from 26 percent to 87 percent and harvesting intensity from 9 percent to 80 percent. 3) The dam would ultimately uplift the social status of the residents of this backward area by providing job opportunities, land irrigation opportunities resulting in a decrease in militancy, poverty and an overall social uplift.
Scope
The scope of this project includes design and construction of 133 meters high roller compacted concrete curved gravity Dam. Hydropower installation of 17.4 MW is also to be carried out and irrigation system commanding 66000 hectares will be constructed.
Initial Cost
Component wise cost is as under: Component Design Service Dam and Spillway Hydropower Transmission line Irrigation and Flood Control Total Cost in Million USD 3.352 34.305 10.910 4.223 20.114 72.904 Cost in Million PKR 202 2065 657 254 1211 4389
Details
The Chinese contractors abandoned the project because of the abduction of their two engineers and the worse security position at project site. After this, Economic Coordination Committee rewarded the contract to M/s F.W.O from Pakistan. Contract price of US $ 171 million (Rs 10401 million) was accepted and scheduled time for completion was quoted to be 3 years and 4 months. FWO was responsible for security arrangements and maintenance of 34 km access road to Dam site. Work resumed in 2007. F.W.O hired as sub-contractors China's state-owned Sinohydro Corporation to complete the dam, and Turkey's Tekser to finish irrigation works. The total cost of the resumed project is as follows:
S. No 1. 2. 3.
Description of Works Dam and Powerhouse Irrigation System and Flood protection Security and Miscellaneous
Afterwards new problems arose and the total cost of the project went further to about 13000 million Pakistani rupees.
Total Cost Overrun= (13-4.389) = 8.611 Billion PK Rupees. Which becomes 196% Cost Overrun International Aid
In July 2010, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) announced it would provide funding for the dam. In January 2011, USAID signed an agreement with WAPDA to provide $40 million to help complete the under-construction Gomal Zam Dam and powerhouse. The first tranche of $20 million was released to WAPDA in February 2011. Another $20 million were provided to complete the main dam and the powerhouse. Another $40 million are also being provided by the USAID for completion of the irrigation and flood protection component of the project. On 12 September 2012, WAPDA and USAID signed an agreement for the construction of Waran Canal System in Tank district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Under the agreement, USAID will provide $12 million funding for construction of the 164 km long Waran Canal system to bring 28,000 acres barren land under permanent irrigation.
Schedule
The date of commencement for the project was July 15 th 2002 and the scheduled date of completion was September 28th 2006. That is the total time for the completion of projects was planned to be 4 years and 76 days. But significant delays caused the project to be operation in August 2013. A brief timeline of events is presented as under;
Timeline
Project Activity
Approval of the project Interference due to Indo Pak war Construction of the dam Abandoning of Chinese contractors Handling the project to F.W.O USAID Funding
Time
August,1963 September, 1965 August, 2001 October, 2004 August, 2007 July, 2010
Floods in Pakistan 90% completion of construction work Completion of dam construction Completion of irrigation and flood protection component Power house completion Production of electricity Official Inauguration
2010 October, 2010 April, 2011 January, 2013 March, 2013 April, 2013 12 September, 2013
Total Time Overrun= (April, 2013) (September 28th 2006)= 5 years and 4 months Equal to 125% overrun
The Gantt chart below shows how badly the project was behind schedule when the Chinese company abandoned the project. Afterwards no significant effort was made to speed things up.
2. Security Reasons
The work halted in October 2004 when two Chinese engineers were kidnapped by Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan militants. One was later rescued but the other killed in the attempt. The Chinese company abandoned the project fearing the safety of its employs. The interruption in work resulted in the cost going up from Rs4.388 billion to Rs13 billion.
4. Corruption
Corruption remains as a constant cause of time and cost over runs of projects in Pakistan. Lack of transparency in utilization of funds is the root cause for corruption. Accountability is limited to the preparation and clearance of project documents. Once passed, in practice it seems to become irrelevant to the ultimate decisions that are taken in the field and the burden of credit by international lending institutions are left for our future generations. The monopoly of project records by the authorities is another cause. They monopolize the data concerning the project, making it extremely difficult for researchers and public interest groups to do a cost-benefit analysis of the project.
Following points can be presented to support our clam of corruption in this project: The hike in the prices of construction materials during the years does not justify such a hefty cost revision. The Chinese firm had already completed a significant portion of the project before it abandoned it in 2004.
2. 2010 Floods
The Project was also adversely affected due to the massive floods that came during the construction of the dam. As the area in which the dam was to be built is already in the heavy flood zone and adequate flood risk management was not done so the workers had to be rushed to safety and the construction site was abandoned for some time. It was also a momentous task moving the heavy equipment to safety. The damages during the floods also contributed to the cost overrun that occurred because such damages were solely responsibility of the Pakistani government. So the total capital and time invested in this project increased significantly.
3. Unsteady Funds
As is the problem with most of the Pakistani projects, funds are approved and promised but the government does not ensure steady and smooth cash flow. Environmental disasters and high rate of inflation also contributed to shortage of money which in turn resulted in slow pace of work. The Chinese demanded steady and timely payments which the Pakistani government was unable to deliver and work was delayed many times. Negotiations for the resumption of work started with the contractor started in January 2005 and concluded in December 2005. In these new negotiations work of irrigation components and transmission lines which was scattered over large area was excluded from contractors scope due to security reasons. The new project coast cost rose to US $ 85 million against US $ 48.567 million as per original bid. However the MoU Signed with the contractor was not approved and the contract was terminated on March 14th 2006. The project was re awarded to army's construction branch, the Frontier Works Organization in 2007 so this time from 2005 to 2007 was a dead waste.
4. Mismanagement of WAPDA
WAPDA was originally charged with allotting the project and afterwards keeping an eye on the progress of the work being done. WAPDA had some problems of its own regarding the management of the data being given back by the contractors thus making the effective tracking of project details difficult.
Recommendations
For Time Overrun
1) The contracts done with the service companies should have included some penalties ensuring that if the service company abandons the project in the middle, penalties would be imposed on the service company. 2) The chief reason that needs to be corrected is security. In the first point it was highlighted that that the Chinese engineers were abducted which halted the project. This dam is located in a place where situation of terrorism is at its worst. The government should have collaborated with the locals In order to establish its roots in such an area. Locals should have been hired as labors and tribal leaders were to be consulted so as to seek their advice and help. If the locals had been included in this project, the situation of security had been much better. 3) After the Chinese abandoned the project government should have made some soft policies enticing the foreign investors to invest in Pakistan.
4) Better risk management could have also helped to avoid the time and cost overruns. Risk management is basically the assessment and prioritization of risks. In Gomal Zam Dam project the labor, the cost, time; contractors could have been subjected to risk management. The working of the foreigner contractors in such an area was a potential risk. After the foreign contractors left, the locals or other parties could have been sought so that project did not get delayed. 5) Some rural area of Khjori Kach would have been sunk underwater if the dam was to be built. Due to this locals opposed the construction of the dam due to which it's construction was halted. What could have been done is that before starting the construction negotiations should have been carried with the locals telling them that dam was built for their own benefit. If locals were took into confidence these delays could have avoided. 6) After looking at the project, it is seen that the planners adapted quite an optimistic view towards the project schedule. The project time should have been calculated on a realistic bases to avoid time overruns. 7) If at all time overruns were to be faced, crashing of project activities should be done. But crashing should be done in such a way that the crashing cost does not increase too much. This can be done through proper planning by the planning commission.
project. The rise in fuel prices, the transport required and the rise in material prices must have had been kept in mind while planning to avoid the cost overrun. 5) Once the planning is done, the scope and design of the project should not be tempered with. This is because the change of design and scope in the middle of the project forced the contractors to demolish and build the project from some previous point. This in turn caused the Gomal Zam Project to get delayed. 6) Since Gomal Zam Project was built over a period of 10 years, the price of land during this time also escalated. Also the land mafia played its role in increasing the prices of land according to their wishes to increase their profits. Price of the land should have been kept in check to reduce the cost overrun. 7) During this time the value of Pakistani Rupee decreased, hence the material that had to be imported had to be bought on a higher rate causing cost overrun. Therefore the international currency should have been kept stable.
Conclusion
The time and cost overruns affect the national economy. For Pakistan, which is not a wealthy country these time and cost overruns are even more serious. Therefore, for a similar project in future above recommendations should be kept in mind which would then ensure that the project completes in time and in the estimated budget
References
www.wikipedia.org www.riport.org/gomal www.riport.org www.wapda.gov.pk/htmls/GomalZamDam23 www.tribune.com.pk industcards.com. Daily Times (Pakistan) The Express Tribune The Nation (Pakistan). PakTribune.