Franz Xaver von Baader

tt=18 German philosopher, born at Munich, 1765; died at the same place, 23 May, 1841. I. The idealistic stream of German philosophy which started with Kant and culminated, in two divergent branches, in Hegel and Schopenhauer, encountered on the one side an opposing current of empirical realism setting back from Herbart, and on the other a partly reactionary, and yet partly concurrent movement originating in certain Catholic thinkers. Prominent among the latter was Baader. Having entered the University of Ingolstadt at sixteen and taken his doctorate at nineteen, he continued his medical studies two years longer at Vienna and then assisted his father, who was court physician. He soon gave this up, however, for mining engineering and after considerable travel in Germany he spent about five years in England (1791-96), where he became acquainted with the mysticism of Bhme and with the extremely opposite empiricism of Hume and Hartley. The work of William Godwin, "Enquiry concerning Political Justice", not only called his attention to moral and social questions but also led him to German philosophy, especially to that of Kant. Baader had a temperamental sympathy for the German Protestant mystic Bhme, but for Kant's philosophy, especially its ethical autonomism, viz.: that human reason alone and apart from God is the primary source of the supreme rule of conduct, he had nothing but disgust. This he calls "devil's morality" and fiercely declares that were Satan visibly to reappear on earth it would be in the garb of a professor of moral philosophy. For the English sceptics he had both a natural and an acquired aversion. Reared and educated as a Catholic, though holding some decidedly un-Catholic notions, he could find no satisfaction in reason divorced from faith. Passing through Hamburg on his return from England he met Jacoby, with whom he long lived in close friendship. Schelling likewise counted him as a friend and owed to him some of the mystical trend of his system. On his return to Germany Baader was made Superintendent of the Bavarian mines and was subsequently raised to the nobility for his services. He was awarded a prize of 12,000 gulden given by the Austrian Government for an important discovery relating to the use of Glauber salts instead of potash in the manufacturing of glass. Retiring from business in 1820 he soon afterwards published his "Fragmenta Cognitionis" (1822-25), and at the opening of the University of Munich, in 1826, he was appointed professor of speculative theology. His philosophicoreligious lectures (published as "Speculative Dogmatik", 1827-36) attracted much attention. In 1838, however, a ministerial order prohibiting laymen from lecturing on such subjects obliged him to restrict himself to anthropology. Vigorous in body and in mind he pursued his intellectual work until his final illness. II. Baader's "Tag und Studien Bcher" (Diary), printed in the first volume of his works, affords an insight into the vicissitudes of his mind and the development of his ideals. It was primarily to his early religious training under his domestic tutor, Sailer, subsequently Bishop of Landshut, that he owed the convictions with which he combated the prevailing rationalism by appealing to innate experience and the subjective necessity of faith. Religious reading supplemented by prayer strengthened his natural tendency towards mysticism. Then, too, his eagerness to comprehend Christianity more thoroughly than the

rationalistic theology succeeded in doing -- the hope of finding the key, as he says, to the world of mind by putting himself in direct correspondence with the ideal -- drew him, in an age poor in positive theology, towards a mystical literature which had combated, if not successfully, at least with earnestness and good intent, both German and the French rationalism. Saint-Martin's "Philosophe inconnu", which fell into his hands in 1787, carried him back to Bhme and thence to the whole theosophic tradition which this German mystic had given to the modern world -- to Paracelsus, Meister Eckart, Eriugena, the Cabbala, and the earlier Gnostics. He encountered on his way back to the past a tangible theology, notably in the works of St. Thomas upon which he comments in his Diary, but also in the Fathers and especially in the Bible. Since, however, it was alien doctrine which had led him to the Catholic, the authority of the latter remained more or less confounded with that of the former. Moreover, his study of the English empiricists and of Kant's rationalism gave a critical cast to his thought if it did not add to his ideas. In placing theogonic speculations at the basis of his physical and moral ideas, and in seeking from mysticism an answer to the riddles of the universe, he thought to reach a solution of the fundamental problems of his time and realize the dream of his youth -- a religious philosophy. Joining the contemplations of mysticism to the exactness of criticism he endeavoured to justify the appeal to both. Mysticism was to fructify criticism and criticism authorize mysticism. He aimed thus at opposing the negative with a positive rationalism. The transcendental truths (metaphysical, and especially theological concepts declared unknowable by Kant) were to find their justification and verification in the human, but at the same time Divinely impressed, consciousness. Reason and feeling separated by Kant were reunited by Baader. Jacoby's appeal to emotion for the certitude of transcendental truth Baader saw to be, at best, but a negative, an irrational escape, while Fichte, by making such truth the creation of the Ego, failed to account for the Ego itself. The Hegelian logomachy of the Ego and the non-Ego could no more satisfy Baader than could Schelling's assertion of the absolute identity of subject and object. He had seen from the start the sterility of Schelling's principle and had confuted its pantheism. Baader's aim was a theistic philosophy which would embrace the worlds of nature and of spirit and afford at once a metaphysical solution of the problem of knowledge (science) and an understanding of the Christian idea and the Divine activity as manifested by revelation. Whatever be thought of this ambitious endeavour, and the Catholic student must recognize its variance both with philosophy and theology, Baader's system surpasses both in depth and in breadth all the other philosophies of his time. He owes this pre-eminence not only to a deeper penetration, but likewise to a broader survey which embraced and estimated many of the facts and truths of Christianity and the science of the past. Unfortunately the false mysticism derived from Bhme led him into a fanciful interpretation of the mysteries of faith, while his attempt at rationalizing those mysteries was often hardly less bizarre. His system, therefore, if it may so be called, had the misfortune, on the one hand, of being ignored because of its purpose to synthesize Christian faith and revive the old philosophy and theology; and, on the other, of being rejected because it disfigured Christian teaching by its rationalizing spirit. It consequently may be said to have exercised an intensive and transitional, rather than an extensive and definitive, influence on the movement of thought. English sensism having resulted logically in scepticism, and Kant's critical effort to save some certainty by purely subjective scrutiny having hopelessly lost the mind in a maze of

its own spinning, Baader saw that the only salvation lay in a return to the traditional line of philosophy which had been broken off by Descartes. Unfortunately in resuming that line Baader unwound some of its essential strands and inwove others of less consistent fibre wherewith the remaining threads would not cohere. But in this very harking back to a saner past Baader was influential in hastening the healthier revival which was more definitely effected by his countrymen Kleutgen and Stckl. Moreover, in so far as Baader opposed the prevailing rationalism and defended Christian truth, his influence is declared by so unprejudiced a writer as Robert Adamson to have extended beyond the precincts of Baader's Church. Rothe's "Theologische Ethik" is thoroughly impregnated with his spirit, and among others, J. Mller's "Christl. Lehre von der Snde" and Martinsen's "Christl. Dogmatik" show evident marks of his influence. III. It is extremely difficult to give any satisfactory conception of Baader's system within narrow limits. Baader was a most fertile writer but threw out his thoughts in aphorisms, some of which indeed he subsequently collected, but most of which received their development in reviews and personal correspondence. Even his two principal works, "Fragmenta Cognitionis" and "Speculative Dogmatik", are really mosaics and one has to seek long before discovering any unifying principles. Moreover, he moves in leaps; his style lacks coherence and order. A suggestive expression, a Latin or Franch quotation gives an unlooked-for turn to a discourse. The reader is knocked about from one side to another. Now he may be driven from logic to metaphysics and again from theology to physical philosophy. The author's ideas often run into those of others leaving no line of demarcation. Add to this the uncertainty of his terminology, his equivocal and often bizarre use, or abuse, of words and the reading of Baader becomes no easy occupation. A summary of his system may be given as follows: (1) Man's knowledge is a participation in God's knowledge. The latter necessarily compenetrates the former which is therefore always con-scientia. Our knowledge is a gift, something received, and in this respect is faith which is therefore a voluntary acceptance of the known object from God's knowing in us and hence proceeds from the will. This, however, is preceded by an unvoluntary subjection, a necessitated desire -- Nemo vult nisi videns. We experience the Indwelling Presence soliciting us to faith. Faith however, in turn, becomes the basis of knowledge in which again faith reaches its completion. Faith is thus as necessary for knowledge as knowledge is for faith. Now the content of faith is expressed by technical formul in religious tradition. Hence as philosophy is necessarily connected with the subjective process of faith, so is it likewise with that of tradition. Only thus can it begin and develop. Hence all science, all philosophy, is religious. Natural theology, natural ethics, etc., strictly speaking, are impossible. Philosophy arose only when religious tradition called for explication and purification. Afterwards it divorced itself, but it thus led to its own dissolution. (2) But faith is not simply a gift (Gabe); it is also a responsibility (Aufgabe). It must be developed by reason, penetrated, vivified, and freed from the possibility of doubt. It is not memory, nor a mere relic of the past. It must cast off the temporary but retain the abiding; be permanent but progressive. Mysteries are not impenetrable, but only concealed truths: "Deum esse non creditur sed scitur" are twin truths. The whole content of religion must be

reduced to exact science. There is no closed truth just as there is no closed virtue. Science proceeds from faith, but faith is developed and recast by science. The hopeless confusion here manifest between knowledge as a natural or purely rational process, and faith, in the Catholic sense of a supernatural virtue, finds a parallel in Baader's ethics. With him the true, i.e. religious, and hence Christian, ethics knows that God Who gives the law also fulfils it in us, so that from being a burden it ceases to be a law. Fallen man has not the power to restore himself; hereditary sin, the seed of the Serpent, hinders him in this. Still he retains the "Idea", the seed of the woman, i.e. redeemableness. This possibility is actualized by God's becoming man, and thus realizing the moral law in "the Man", the Saviour, Who by overcoming temptation has destroyed evil at its centre and from within, and Who has crushed the Serpent's head. But evil, too, must be destroyed from without by constant mortification of ego-hood. In this task man cooperating with his fellows for the attainment of happiness is neither a solitary worker, as the Kantian would say, nor completely inactive, as Luther teaches. Like hereditary sin,grace propagates itself quasi per infectionem vitae. Prayer and the Eucharist place man en rapport with Christ, through Whom man, if he cooperate, will be restored to the spiritualized condition whence he fell by sin. This spiritualization thus becomes the final subjective end for the individual and society. The religious idea here appears as the source and the life of Baader's sociology. The law of love for God and neighbour is the unitive principle of all social existence, liberty, and equality; as the opposite principle of self-love is the root of all disunion, slavery, and despotism. God is the binding source of all law, from Him is all social authority. Hence Baader strongly opposes the might-makes-right doctrine of Hobbes, and the social contract of Rousseau, no less than Kant's autonomism, which regards religion as an appendage of morality. Now the religious idea and the moral and juridic law being inseparably conjoined, and neither having actual existence save in Christianity which is concrete in the Catholic Church, civil society (the State), and religious society (the Church), should co-operate. Baader apparently until towards the close of his life held that the Church should have direct -- not simply indirect -- authority even in civil affairs, and he was enthusiastic for a reinstatement, in a form adapted to his times, of the medieval relation between the two orders. But a change seems to have come over his mind -- occasioned very probably by some personal irritation which he felt at the criticism to which his theological teachings were subjected -- and he taught for a short time opinions concerning the constitution of the Church and the Papacy which were utterly irreconcilable with Catholic Faith, while the language in which these opinions was conveyed was as unbecoming the philosopher as it was his subject. Before his death, however, he retracted this portion of his teaching. While Baader's sociology maintains that religion is the very root and life of civil society, it takes account also of political and economic administration. Thus it contains his opinions favouring the organization of the classes, the revival of the medieval "corporations" or industrial associations, the political representation of the proletariat, and some wellreasoned objections to unlimited industrial competition and free trade. On the whole, his sociology is the wisest, strongest, sanest, and most practical part of his whole system, just as his technical theology is the weakest, the most bizarre, unsound, and impractical. The reason of the difference may not improbably be found in the fact that in the former the best

elements of his own mind and character were free to assert themselves, while in his theology they seem almost throughout to be under the spell of Bhme whose fanciful mysticism bore him away to a region as far removed from experience -- present and past -as from the world of reason and faith. Apart from theology Baader's teachings have a permanent value.

Sources
Smtliche Werke (Leipzig, 1851-60), XV, contains biography, XVI, an able sketch of the whole system by LUTTERBECK; HOFFMAN, Vorhalle zur spekulativen Lehre Baaders; Philosophische Schriften, 3 vols.; HAMBERGER, Cardinalpunkte der Baaderschen Philosophie; LUTTERBECK, Philosophische Standpunkte Baaders. See also Stckle, Geschichte der modernen Philos., Vol. II; BLANC, Histoire de la philosophie, vol III; ERDMANN, History of Philosophy (tr.), II; HAFFNER in Kirchenlexicon, I, s.v.; SCHMIDT in BACHEM, Staatslexicon, s.v.

The Mystical Dooyeweerd

The Relation of His Thought to Franz von Baader
by John Glenn Friesen Calgary, Canada

Dooyeweerd, Baader, neo-Calvinism, Kuyper, mysticism, Bhme, cosmic time, supratemporal heart, modalities, sphere sovereignty, Subject-Object relation, Gegenstand relation, intentional inexistence, autonomy, postmodernism
Abstract
Abstract The following key ideas of the Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd (18941977) can already be found in the nineteenth century German philosopher, Franz von Baader (17651841): religious antithesis, the law idea (Wetsidee) contrasted with autonomy of thought, Ground Motives in history, the method of antinomy, the use of Kants ideas to criticize Kants own Critique, cosmic time, the supratemporal heart, the prism analogy, modalities, sphere sovereignty, sphere universality, analogies of time, anticipation and retrocipation, Christ as the Second Root, pre-theoretical experience, the Subject-Object relation, the Gegenstand relation, theoretical synthesis, and cultural unfolding. A comparison with Baader helps to interpret Dooyeweerd.

1 Introduction
Herman Dooyeweerd has been praised as one of the most original philosophers of the Netherlands. [1] But many of Dooyeweerds most important ideas were first set out a hundred years earlier by the nineteenth century German philosopher, Franz Xaver von Baader (17651841). Dooyeweerd nowhere acknowledges the influence of Baader, but the

similarity of so many of their key ideas must be more than coincidental. A comparison with Baader can help to interpret many of Dooyeweerds ideas that have long been unclear. Dooyeweerds major work, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee was published in 1935; [2] it was later revised as A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. [3] But the Wetsidee, or the idea of the place of the law was first developed by Baader. And insofar as the New Critique was intended to be a critique of Kant (NC, I, 118), Baader had already given the same criticism of Kant, using much the same terminology. The following ideas of Dooyeweerd can all be found in Baader: (1) all philosophy is religious (2) the religious antithesis (3) the Wetsidee (4) the dogma of the autonomy of thought (5) idolatry as the absolutization of the temporal (6) Ground Motives in history (7) the four types of Ground Motives (8) the three ideas within each Ground Motive (9) the method of antinomy (10) the use of Kants ideas to criticize Kants own Critique of Pure Reason (11) cosmic time (12) the supratemporal heart (13) the analogy of the prism (14) modalities (15) sphere sovereignty (16) sphere universality (17) analogies of time (18) anticipation and retrocipation (19) Man [4] as the temporal root (20) Christ as the Second Root (21) the centrality of love (22) pre-theoretical experience (23) the Subject-Object relation (24) the Gegenstand relation (25) theoretical synthesis and (26) cultural development as an unfolding. Dooyeweerd says that he obtained some of these ideas from Abraham Kuyper (1837 1920). But Kuyper was himself influenced by Baader. Berkouwer quotes Kuyper as saying that he had been tempted to slide off into Baaders theosophic stream, entranced by its hypnotic spell and tempted by its ethical force. [5] Kuyper gives the impression that he had overcome this influence. But Kuypers ideas of the dogma of the autonomy of thought, religious antithesis, social organicism, sphere sovereignty, and the centrality of the heart are all ideas that are first found in Baader. Kuyper even quotes Baader with respect to the dogma of the autonomy of thought.

2 Who was Baader?

Like Dooyeweerd, Baader is known for his Christian philosophy. It is said that he was the only Christian philosopher in the grand style that Germany ever had. [6] Baader was a Roman Catholic, but he believed that the Russian Orthodox Church represented the best Christian path. [7] He considered Protestantism to be too literal and rationalistic, and he found Catholicism too rigid and petrified. He was strongly opposed to any pietistic flight from rationality, but he was also opposed to the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Baader ignored the art of compromise, and his writings are very polemical. [8] For example, he invites his reader to take part in a war of life and death (Werke, I, 385). A similar polemical spirit can be found in Dooyeweerd:
It is a matter of life and death for this young philosophy that Christian scholars in all fields of science seek to put it to work in their own specialty. [9]

Baader was opposed to the Enlightenments mechanistic and atomistic idea of nature (Begrndung, 92, ft. 4). Because of this, Baader is often referred to as a philosopher of Romanticism, which emphasized the unmediated knowledge of intuition, and the importance of our experience. But Baaders Romanticism must not be understood as irrationalism or emotionalism. Nor should his emphasis on experience be misunderstood as a subjectivistic Erlebnis. Subjectivism is not compatible with Baaders view of the

Subject-Object relation. And unlike an irrationalist Romanticism, Baader emphasizes the importance of theory when it is seen in its proper relation to our experience. Baaders most important influences were Bhme, Eckhart and St. Martin. [10] He also studied Tauler, Suso, Ruysbroeck, Paracelsus, Kepler, Aquinas, Anselm, Eriugena, Augustine, the Church Fathers, Angelus Silesius, Oetinger and Swedenborg (Poppe, 126; Betanzos, 55). Baader derived his ideas not only from Christian sources, but from natural philosophy, hermetic and alchemical thought, and from the Jewish Kabbalah. [11] Baader was also familiar with the ideas of Freemasonry and the Rosicrucians, although he probably did not retain formal membership in these societies (Susini, I, 50). Baader is often referred to as a theosophist because of his views relating creation to an emanation from God. [12] But unlike some forms of theosophy, Baaders theosophy is not pantheistic; he emphasizes the separation of Creator and creature. He is also opposed to any idea that would ascribe evil to God; he says that evil is a result of our free choice. Baaders writings are extremely difficult to read, even for German readers. Although he was known as a brilliant conversationalist, his style of writing is so notoriously difficult that it became known even in his lifetime as the Baader style ( Baaderstil) (Poppe, 109). [13] Franz Hoffmann, who edited Baaders writings, acknowledges the difficulty of Baaders style (Werke, II, lxxviii; cited by Sauer, 20). Baaders sentences are much too long, with confusing linkages between clauses. He uses theosophical language, he frequently uses untranslated words from other languages such as French, and he sometimes invents new words. He often uses symbols and analogies. His writings are not systematic, but merely aphoristic. Baader said he did not mind if his work was regarded as unsystematic; he saw his own work in more organic terms, as ferment, or seeds ( Werke, I, 153f; Schumacher, 33). The title of his main work, Fermenta Cognitionis, reflects this view. Many of his ideas are only developed in personal correspondence or in his reviews of other works. Baader had an influence on his contemporaries Schelling, Hegel, Goethe, Jacobi, Novalis, Friedrich Schlegel, Jean Paul, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Clemens Brentano. [14] He visited Friedrich Schleiermacher several times (Werke, XV, 105; Betanzos, 72). The German jurist Friedrich Stahl comments favourably on Baaders mysticism. [15] Despite these influences on his contemporaries Baader became isolated towards the end of his life, and after his death was for a time nearly forgotten. His obscurity is partly due to the dispute that Baader had with Schelling late in life. After Baaders death, Schelling even tried to prevent publication of his collected works. Nevertheless, Baaders writings continued to exert an influence on later writers such as Max Scheler, [16] A.W. Schlegel, Kierkegaard and Berdyaev. [17] Susini reports that there was a renaissance of interest in Baader in the years following the World War I. [18] We must also include Kuyper and Dooyeweerd in the list of people who were influenced by Baader.

3 Religious Antithesis, Ground Motives, and the Wetsidee

(1) All philosophy is religious Baader relates religion and science. He speaks of the religiosity of science, and the scientific character of religiosity (Fermenta, p. 207). The title of one of Baaders works shows his concern to unite these two domains: ber den Zwiespalt des religisen Glaubens und Wissens als die geistige Wurzel des Verfalls der religisen und politischen

Societt in unserer wie in jeder Zeit (Concerning the conflict of religious faith and knowledge as the spiritual root of the decline of religious and political society in our time as in every time). Baader says that religion (the so-called spiritual domain), and science (the natural domain), have a common religious root. Baader also wants to overcome the opposition between religion and philosophy (Elementarbegriffe, 534), and the opposition between religious faith and knowledge (Zeit, 49). [19] He says that religion must penetrate to the most inner regions of thought (Begrndung, 57), and that faith and knowledge are not to be separated in history, in politics, in industry or in religion (Begrndung, 52). These are all ideas seen later in Dooyeweerd and in neo-Calvinism generally. Dooyeweerd and Baader also agree that, although all philosophy is religious, philosophy is not directed by theology. Theology is only one science among many ( Werke, V, 254; cited by Sauer, 13 and 128; NC, I, 4). (2) The religious antithesis One of the main ideas of both Kuyper and Dooyeweerd is the religious antithesis. Baader also says that our freedom as creatures can be used in two antithetical waysfor or against God. When we use our freedom against God, we are denying our creation in the image of God (Elementarbegriffe, 544, 545). This antithesis affects our knowledge. We know differently if our hearts are with God rather than against God:
How a man is related to God determines how he is related to himself, to other men, to his own nature and [to] the rest of nature. [20]

(3) The Wetsidee Both Baader and Dooyeweerd use the word subject in the sense of being subjected to Gods law. Dooyeweerd uses the French word sujetthe created being is subjcted to a law that does not originate from this subject itself (NC, I, 110; WdW , I, 76: onderworpen zijn). Baader speaks of being subject in this same sense. The creature must be subordinated under the Creator (Werke, VIII, 84). This subordination is a being subject. Baader speaks of subjection (Subjektion) and also coins new words here, subjicierender and subjiziert (Werke, IV, 47 ft; Weltalter, 162; Zeit, 56). Both Baader and Dooyeweerd speak of Gods law as a boundary between God and creation. Dooyeweerd says that the law limits and determines (begrenst en bepaalt) our selfhood (WdW , I, 14). Baader says that the law limits the creature; it is a Hemmung or limitation. The living creature finds himself or herself as living, acting and productive within such a limitation or boundary (Grenze). We are placed (gesetzt) in a magic circle (Zauberkreis) that cannot be crossed or broken through. This boundary is given to the creature as a holding fast, a placing (Setzenden), a bearing and a holding or nurturing (Begrndung, 28, 29). We are fitted or placed (Gesteztsein) in this magic circle or periphery. Baader derives the meaning of fitted (setzen) from the word for law (Gesetz) (Begrndung, 29 ft. 12). Each creature is set under its law, in a region or place in which it is to serve God. Our bliss is found only in fulfilling this law and serving God (Weltalter, 172, 178). The periphery is related to its supratemporal Center in an organic relation. [21] We have free movement of life in the periphery when we are related to the Center:

die Begriffe des Zentrums und der Peripherie hier in ihrem gegenseitigen Bezug in einem und demselven organischen Systeme zu nehmen sind. Denn in einem solchen bewirkt nur die Ruhe, das Gesetztsein (le posement) des Zentrums die freie Bewegung in seiner Peripherie (in seinem ueren), weil jede Bewegung nur aus dem Unbeweglichen hervorgeht( Zeit, 24 ft.4). [the concepts of the Center and of the periphery, in their reciprocal relation, are to be understood as an organic system. For only in such an organic system can the Stillness effect or cause the being fitted (le posement) by the Center of the free movement in its periphery (in its exterior), because each motion only goes from out of the Unmoved].

The Dutch language does not permit the same play on words between law and fitted. But Dooyeweerd uses a similar idea of being placed into the temporal world. He uses the word gevoegd, which is translated in the New Critique as fitted into the temporal world:
Het is een wereldsamenhang, dien de mensch wel in zijn zelfheid transcendeert, naar waarbinnen hij met alle schepselen, die met hem in denzelfden wereldsamenhang gevoegd zijn, in universeele gebondenheid aan den tijd verkeert (WdW , I, 36) [22] [It is a temporal coherence. Man transcends it in his selfhood, it is truebut within this coherence he exists in a status of being-universally-bound-to-time. Man is bound to time together with all creatures that are fitted with him in the same temporal order] (as translated in NC, I, 24). [23]

Baader says that it is only God who gives the law and who places or fits temporal beings:
Gott setzt nur und wird nicht gesetzt, der Mensch (jede Intelligenz) wird gesetzt und setzt nicht (Werke, II, 456). [God only places things under law and is not Himself under law; Man (each intelligence) is under law and does not place things under law].

Baader also emphasizes that God is independent from all creatures (Werke, XIII, 165, 191). Dooyeweerd makes the same pointGod is not subject to law:
As Sovereign Origin, God is not subjected to the law. On the contrary, this subjectedness is the very characteristic of all that which has been created, the existence of which is limited and determined by the law (NC, I, 99, ft. 1).

(4) The dogma of the autonomy of thought Baader says that if we do not freely accept being subjected to Gods law, we will attempt to set up our own law in an autonomous way. Such a person seeks the Origin in his or her own image, and not in the image of God. A person who denies God experiences a lawlessness (Anomie, Gesetzlosigkeit), or an inner lack of all laws. Such a person therefore attempts to give his or her own law (Selbstgesetzgebung or autonomy) (Zeit, 31). For example, Kant says that the ethical creature is the absolute giver of the law ( Begrndung, 34, ft. 20).

Kuyper specifically cites Baader in relation to this idea of autonomy, which he says is the human desire to rid itself of God:
In spite of his Praktisches Vernunft it was this desire which actuated Kant, of whom Baader correctly wrote, The fundamental error of his philosophy is that man is autonomous and spontaneous, as if he possessed reason of himself; for it transforms man to a god, and so becomes pantheistic. [24]

Baader says that we can choose to find our center either in God or in our own self. We either affirm the Central Unity or we deny it (Zeit, 24). As Sauer says, if our center is in God, then we understand ourselves as ordered (gesetzt), as participating in a previously given Ground. Or we can choose to deny our true center and attempt to find our ground in our own self (Selbstsetzung) (Sauer, 28, citing Werke, XIV, 61f). The foundation of our existence can be immanent, insofar as it is founded in oneself by oneself, or emanant founded in another being (Werke, II, 520). Dooyeweerd says that our power of thought is fallen and could never serve as the basis for autonomy (NC, I, 100). Similarly, Baader holds (contrary to Kant, Jacobi and Fichte) that the Fall affected our reasoning ability (Begrndung, 121). (5) Absolutization of the temporal as idolatry The denial of our true Center results in an absolutization of the temporal (Vergtterung oder Verewigung der Schein-Zeit) (Zeit, 23). The negation of God always results in idolatry or the absolutization of the temporal (Werke, I, 21). This is what the Bible refers to as the denying Spirit of Lies, and the Murderer in the Beginning. It is the original lie of Lucifer, the proton pseudos (Zeit, 25, 41 ft. 21). Dooyeweerd also refers to this proton pseudos or radical lie (NC, II, 561563). Dooyeweerd says that this absolutizing is the source of the many isms of thought, such as psychologism, historicism, etc. (NC, I, 46). (6) Ground Motives in history Dooyeweerd speaks of Ground Motives in history; they are the fundamental driving forces of our thought and experience. He uses the Dutch word grondmotief (WdW , I, 472, 476), although he uses other terms more frequently, like Ground Idea (grond-idee: WdW , I, vi, 39, 52, 54, 57, 61, 89, 140); or Ground Thought (grondgedachte: WdW , I, vi) or Ground Principle (grondprincipe: WdW , I, vii) or Ground Problem (grondprobleem: WdW , I, 467) or even Ground Antinomy (grond-antinomie: WdW , I, 465). Baader expresses a similar idea, using the term Grund-Prinzip or Ground Principle or Idea (Zeit, 60). Principles lie at the Ground (Grund) of our knowledge (theology, physiology, natural philosophy); these principles may be open or hidden (Werke, V, 254, cited by Sauer, 128). Baader also refers to Religious Ground Attitudes (Grundeinstellungen: Werke, II, 296; cited by Schumacher, 17) or root convictions (Wurzelberzeugungen or ides causes or mres: (Elementarbegriffe, 533). Baader says that when our belief and knowledge seem to be in conflict, it is really only one belief fighting another belief (Zeit, 54). Our choice of Ground Principle is therefore a matter of faith or belief, and this belief is like a motive, or motivating force. Our faith (Glaube) is the Ground for our seeing and perception (Schauen und Erkennen), just as our

motivation is the ground for the movement of our will. The motivation as ground and the movement on this ground are inter-related: just as we cannot move freely without holding onto a ground, so we cannot hold onto a ground without free movement. And so we cannot use our reason (Vernunft) without being free to believe, and we cannot believe without using our reason. Similarly, Dooyeweerd says that if there were not this battle of faiths, it should just be a matter of using logic and reason to convince each other ( NC, I, 36). And Baaders comparison of faith to a motive may explain why Dooyeweerd refers to Ground Principles as Ground Motives. Like Dooyeweerd, Baader sees these Ground Principles as historical forces. It is the task of philosophy to find the Principle for each epoch or stage in time. Ground Principles do not apply only to individuals, but also to entire nations and collectivities ( Volk) both in their normal and in their abnormal evolution, that is, either towards or away from God. Determining the Ground Principles therefore gives a theory of history and society (Elementarbegriffe, 560, 561). Baader says that there are two main principles that act against each other ( Werke, II, 484, s.25; cited by Susini, 318). There is a basic opposition of eternally irreconcilable Gound Principles (Begrndung, 46). Similarly, Dooyeweerd speaks of two primary Ground Motives: the biblical and the apostate; he subdivides the apostate Ground Motive into three subtypes: the Greek form/matter motive, the scholastic nature/grace motive, and the enlightenment nature/freedom motive. These three subtypes can also be found in Baader. All of these subtypes involve idolizing the temporal. Baader says that a person who idolizes the temporal becomes subordinate to that to which he should be superior. The person does this in order to fill his or her emptiness ( abme) (Fermenta, V, 15, 16). If I oppose Gods law and try to set up another law, then I experience within myself two opposed laws. Baader cites St. Paul: I am aware in my members of a law which is opposed to the good law [Weltalter, 178, referring to Rom. 7: 23]. When we try to understand space-time nature (or the creature) as something whole and complete in itself, we cease to experience a unity. Instead, a dialectic or antinomy is set up. This dialectical movement is caused by trying to hold onto a Dasein that is in itself groundless (Weltalter, 126, 127). Such a person places the pivot of his contemplation or admiration within the temporal; he then finds a second center, and opposes this to the first ( Fermenta, V, 15, 16). This causes an unceasing opposition a dualism or dialectic between these two centers, like the idol of Dagon that was always reversed (I Sam. 5: 3), or the two fighting snakes of Hermes. When we choose to absolutize one part of creation, the opposed pole (entgegengesetzten Pol) will arise (Zeit, 24, 25, 35, 37 ft 17). Dooyeweerd also holds that an apostate ground motive will necessarily have a dialectic. There is a polar tension between the first absolutized aspect, and its correlata (NC, I, 64). [25] This polar tension is not the same as the primary religious antithesis (NC, I, 123). (7) The four types of ground motives a) The Christian Ground Motive: Creation, Fall and Redemption For Baader, the content of religion is the relation among God, humans and the world (Schumacher, 33). This relation is set by God as Creator, who gives His law to which creation is then subject or subordinated. God is complete in Himself; He therefore did not have to create humans, but freely chose to do so. This is what is meant by creatio ex

nihilo. In the Fall, we separated ourselves from our relation with God, or what Baader calls our Principle (Zeit, 29, ft. 9). Redemption is now required to allow a full restoration and reintegration (Wiederherstellung oder Reintegration). Baaders fundamental idea of creation, fall and redemption corresponds with Dooyeweerds characterization of the Christian Ground-Motive. Baader says that the redemption and restoration is a fulfillment, not a destruction of nature. He cites Tauler: God is not a destroyer or hater of nature, but he fulfills [integrates] it (Begrndung, 32 ft. 17; Fermenta, IV, 8). Dooyeweerd also speaks of nature being restored or renewed, although he cites Calvin (NC, I, 516). b) The Greek form/matter Ground Motive Baader says that form and matter are not to be viewed dualistically (Weltalter, 109). The Ionian school of philosophy founded by Thales placed the principle of all things in matter; opposed to this was the school of Pythagoras, who wanted to ascend from earth to heaven (Werke, V, 48; Schriften, II, 171). For Plato, both spirit and matter (hyle) are eternal (Werke, VII, 262 and II, 380). There is therefore in Greek thought a dualism or separation between form and matter. In his article ber Starres und Fliessendes Baader says that when we see the static, fixed or the flowing as only that, then form and matter have been separated. The fixed is continuity; the flowing is the power of penetration. When we separate them in a dualism like Platos, we are separating two factors [aspects] of living substance. One factor then outweighs the other that is then suppressed; one factor is directed inwards, one outwards. But these factors are each half forces of nature, like the polarity in electricity and the power of gender. Instead of separating the two factors of form and matter, we need to combine and raise them up in a third that is higher. There is a hidden androgyny. There needs to be a coherence (Kohrenz) of the two factors, of the confluence of the flowing and of the penetrating (Begrndung, 1316). Baader emphasizes that Spirit needs to be embodied in the world (Verleiblichung des Geistigen). Sauer says that Baader is opposed to any hypostatized Platonic Idea that is totally Other from the world; such an hypostatized idea would be irrelevant for the necessary mediation and redemption of the world (Sauer, 119, citing Werke, IV, 338). Baader says that we must not hypostatize the sensory qualities that we experience (Schriften, II, 146). c) The scholastic nature/grace Ground Motive Baader also opposes a separation between nature and supernature (Zeit, 57). The scholastics make a distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge; they place Verstand above Vernunft (Weltalter, 128). These theologians try to give a theory of the world from a perspective of supernaturalism where power, glory and freedom are opposed to our powerless imprisonment in nature (Begrndung, 54). They separate the will from its unconscious drives, and they regard the creature as pure Intelligence, as a Will and a Reason without desires or senses (Begrndung, 34). But in making this distinction, they confuse the suprarational (the transcendent) with something that is against nature or against reason (Begrndung, 22, 34, 66). Supernaturalism sees spirituality as literally sense-less (Werke, IX, 64f; cited by Sauer, 35). This leads to a hyperasceticism; it is not a liberation of the senses, but a total absence of senses; it is like a self-castration ( Fermenta, II, 23; p. 97). Baader quotes Bhme: it is pure arrogant pride to want to be before God without a body (Weltalter, 199). Supernaturalism has made supernatural idols (Fermenta, III, I).

d) The Enlightenment Ground Motive of nature/freedom Baader says that Kant gave the supernaturalists new grounds to separate ethics from nature. If with Kant we name nature as all that is perceivable by our senses, then there is in nature not only a lack of ethical goals, but an actual opposition to such goals. The concept of freedom must then be posited over against the outer necessity of nature ( Begrndung, 22, 4244). Freedom is then viewed as Spirit or Geist that is opposed to the mechanism of nature. But Baader says that nature and Spirit must not be seen as dualistic principles (Werke, IV, 34; Begrndung, 57). Spirit is not a fleeing from nature (naturflchtig) (Sauer, 119). Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel also believe a dualism between non-intelligent nature and intelligence [Spirit] to be primitive, constitutive, and unexplainable (Elementarbegriffe, 544). In other words, these philosophers use this dualism as a basic Ground Principle. Such a primal dualism (Urdualismus) leads (leitet) their explaining thought process. Schellings thought is based totally on this polarity; he sees a darkness even in God. But we cannot explain this apparent dualism unless we acknowledge our subordination to a higher being, and our subjection to Gods law (Begrndung, 26). The dualism is not original and constitutive, but is caused by ones wish to remain in ones own center (Zeit, 34, ft. 14). When we make a dualism between freedom and nature, then morality is built on the concept of a pure autonomy. Morals are divorced from both God and nature. The supernaturalists, in opposing the naturalism that they hate, also end up with an ethic separated from nature. When ethics are separated from physics, ethics become groundless, godless, atheistic and irreligious. Instead, we should acknowledge the necessity of the embodiment in nature (Naturwerdung, Leibwerdung) of the ethical life and principles. There should be a coherence (Zusammenhang) of physics and ethics, of nature with Spirit. The failure to understand this coherence causes our ethics to be devoid of life. It also results in the idea that Spirit is only a ghost, and that the body is a corpse. Supernaturalists make the same mistake (Begrndung, 34, 35, 49). (8) The three ideas within each ground motive Dooyeweerd says that each Ground Motive provides an answer to three transcendental ideas: Coherence, Totality and Origin (Arch). These transcendental ideas must have more than the merely regulative sense given to them by Kant (NC, I, 89). Baader makes the same objection to Kants use of the transcendental ideasfor Kant, the ideas are only regulative and only concern morality. These transcendental ideas must also illuminate the natural world as well as our actions in physics. A theory of epistemology must also include a theory of creation (Begrndung, 24, 25). One of Baaders main themes is the necessity of a coherence between the natural and the Spiritual [Geistlich]. He emphasizes the coherence between Intelligence and Nature (Elementarbegriffe, 550) and between ethics and physics (Begrndung, 23, 49). Sometimes Baader uses the word Zusammenhang (e.g. Weltalter 68the coherence of all things in the All). Elsewhere he uses the word Kohrenz. The true coherence is an embodiment which shows itself in the temporal region in the array ( Ordnung) of the periphery (Zeit, 36). This order of the periphery corresponds to Dooyeweerds coherence of temporal functions (aspects or modes). Baader also refers to the idea of Totality. The Central Totality is different than just the sum of all the peripheral points (Peripherie-Punkte); rather, the Center stands as essence

(Inbegriff ) over them. Just as the sum of all creation does not constitute a creator, so the Center is more than the sum of the periphery (Begrndung, 63 ft. 7). Similarly, Dooyeweerd says that the religious Center of our existence expresses itself in all modal aspects of time but can never be exhausted by these (NC, I, 58). Baader identifies Man as the mirror of Totality (Schumacher, 57). Although Man is the mirror of Totality (as the image of God), ultimately God is the absolute Origin and absolute Center of creation. (9) The method of antinomy Dooyeweerd uses the criterion of antinomy to distinguish one modal aspect from another. Antinomy means contradiction between laws. The laws of different modal aspects may not contradict one another, but this is what happens when we absolutize certain aspects. Antinomy is distinguished from contrariety within a modal sphere, as in logical contradiction (NC, II, 37). In a similar way, Baader sees dualistic Ground Principles (or antinomies) arising whenever we absolutize one part of creation.
So wie man versucht die Materie (das Zeitlich-Rumliche) als etwas in sich Ganzes (Absolutes) zu begreifen, wird man die dialektischen Fortbewegung aus ihr inne, welche sich jedem Vereint- und Festhalten- (zum Standbringen-) Wollen des in sich Veruneinten und also Bestandlosen widersetzt. [] Diese Materie weist uns hiermit auf eine Anomie und Antinomie, welche ihrem Entstehen und Bestehen unterliegt, und wie sie nur zufolge einer Differenzierung zum Vorschein kommt, so mu sie mit der ingetretenen Reintegration des in Differenz Gekommenen wider verschwinden (Werke, II, 488: Schriften, II, 103). [If one tries to understand matter (the temporal-spatial) as something whole or absolute in itself, then one brings forth the dialectical movement out of the inner [nature], which is opposed to every attempt to unify and hold fast (to bring to a firm state) that which is disunified and transitoryWith this, this matter exhibits an anomie and antinomy underlying its origination and its continuance, and as it comes into appearance as a result of a differentiation, so must this difference again disappear in the coming reintegration.]

Any attempt to absolutize the periphery (the temporal), or to attempt the coordination of points on the periphery without their subordination to the Center will result in a polar dualism or antinomy (Weltalter, 331). (10) The use of Kants ideas to criticize Kants own Critique of Pure Reason The Encyclopedia of Philosophy says that Baader turned the critical method he had learned from Kant against criticism itself. [26] Baader says that the first work of philosophy must be to seek out the mediations and limitations under which humans attain to the free use of their faculty of knowledge (Werke, I, 324). This sounds like Kants transcendental critique. But Baader says that these limitations are given by Gods law to which creation is subject. The law is a structural a priorithe law must always precede the finite being as its true a priori (Zeit, 32, 33 ft. 14). Sauter says that Baader took Kant at his own word: the Critiques are only a Propdeutik to a positive philosophy; we must take the step from a transcendental to a transcendent philosophy. [27]

Dooyeweerd also applies Kants transcendental critique against Kant (NC, I, 118). This is why Dooyeweerds work is A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Kant sought to show the conditions under which thought is at all possible. But these conditions must show the possibility of the self itself that is thinking. There are conditions for the thinking that Kant takes for granted. The structure of our thinking experience has an a priori character. This is different from the Kantian notion of the a priori as meaning only non-empirical. The a priori is ontical; it precedes thought as well as empirical investigation ( NC, II, 550). Like Baader, Dooyeweerd says that the transcendental direction of theoretic thought presupposes the transcendent (NC, I, 88). Critical theory must lead to the genetic relativity of meaning (NC, I, 9).

4 Cosmic Time and the Supratemporal

(11) Cosmic time Why does Dooyeweerd speak of cosmic time instead of just time? It may be because cosmic time is more than merely physical, astronomical or even psychological time; cosmic time encompasses all these analogies. [28] Although this is true, cosmic time means more than this, and it is only when we compare it to Baaders theory of time that we can understand Dooyeweerd. Baader distinguishes three kinds of time (Zeit, 19). [29] True time is the eternal or the supratemporal (berzeitliche); it encompasses a past, present and future. Our heart, the religious root, exists in this supratemporal, or true time. The time of our temporal world or cosmos is what Baader calls appearance time (Scheinzeit). This cosmic time has only a past and a future, but no present (Werke, II, 27). There is only a present-less and separated one thing after and out of another (nacheinander und auseinander) in the periphery outside of the Center (Zeit, 57). Finally, there is false time, the subtemporal, in which the demons live. It has only a past. According to Baader, God has a different relationship to each region of time. In eternity, there is an indwelling (Inwohnung) by God, as love. In cosmic time, there is a bydwelling (Beiwohnung), when the intelligent agent cooperates with God, and acts as Gods organ. And finally, where God has been rejected, God still has a presence, but only as a throughdwelling (Durchwohnung). This is Gods presence through His power alone; God treats beings in this region as mere instruments. This last category includes inanimate nature and those free agents who resist God (Werke, I, 283 ff; II, 38; IV, 348; V, 355; VIII, 317; IX, 171 ff; X, 294; XIV, 71ff, 120; Betanzos, 90; Weltalter, 163, 344). Only the supratemporal (eternity) is true time. Eternity is not just infinitely protracted time. Spinozas idea of a temporal eternity confuses the Creator with the creature in a pantheistic way (Elementarbegriffe, 538). The supratemporal is the now, the simultaneous Present, nontemporal and permanent. It is permanent in the sense that once we achieve it, we do not fall back into cosmic time. [30] But the supratemporal must not be seen as permanent in a static sense:
Irriger Weise hat man also bisher die Ewigkeit als eine unbewegliche und starre Gegenwart vorgestellt, indem man nicht einsah, dass in dieser Gegenwart die zwei anderen Zeiten, die Vergangenheit und die Zukunft, mit einbegriffen werden mssen( Zeit, 21).

[Eternity has previously been mistakenly represented as an unmoving and static present; this mistake was because it was not seen that this present must also include two other times, the past and the future]

Our mistaken view of eternity is caused by our abstraction, which views rest ( Ruhe) as static and lifeless (Elementarbegriffe, 535). Eternity should instead be seen as always resting in its movement and always moving in its Rest, as always new and always the same. There is a dynamism even within God, in the generation of the persons of the Trinity. God is eternal Life, eternal Being and eternal Becoming at the same time, an eternally proceeding Process (Schriften, I, 149; Weltalter, 139). Dooyeweerd also emphasizes that the supratemporality of the heart must not be understood in this Greek metaphysical sense:
This, however, is not to say that the religious centre of human existence is found in a rigid and static immobility. That is a metaphysical-Greek idea of supra-temporality. It found, for example, sharp expression in Parmenides conception of the eternal divine form of being and in Platos original conception of the transcendental world of the and of the immortal soul, enclosed entirely in the pure form of theoretical thought (cf. Platos Phaedo) (NC, I, 31 ft. 1)

Baader says that natural philosophers falsely assume that temporality, materiality and change are primitive and constitutive. But cosmic time was not intended from the beginning of creation; it is a result of the Fall. The origin of cosmic time is in a pre-worldly Ereignis; our existence within time is that of Dasein (Elementarbegriffe, 541, 543). The Ereignis is again achieved at the end of cosmic time (Zeit, 39, ft 19). [31] Cosmic time is a suspension of the eternal. Time involves a sacrifice, and that is why the Scriptures speak of a Lamb that offers itself since the beginning of time (Elementarbegriffe, 561; Werke, IV, 53). Cosmic time begins with the cessation of the true present, and it ceases with the cessation of this cessation (Susini, 417). The continuation of cosmic time is only the appearance of a continual renewal moment by moment ( Weltalter 217). Cosmic time breaks up unity into nonunity, and into the elements of ones being. Everything temporal is therefore not whole and not integral. Only Man was not originally destined for this brokenness within cosmic time (Zeit, 28, ft.9). This is why Man longs for the integration of wholeness or holyness (Begrndung, 105). Everything proceeding out of eternity, has its time, and must make its way through time in order to return to eternity. The return to eternity is the reintegration of a being in its Principle. Our experience of temporal reality is therefore restless ( Unruhe); there is a movement towards the other side, towards integrity, fullness and the enjoyment of being (Elementarbegriffe, 537539). Like Baader, Dooyeweerd speaks of cosmic time as the result of the fall. In the fall, the human selfhood fell away into the temporal horizon (NC, II, 564). Dooyeweerd also refers to the restlessness of temporal reality (NC, I, 11). Baader says that cosmic time is a half-reality. It has an ambiguity ( Zweideutigkeit) and an undecided nature (Unentschiedenheit). Time allows a creature to be initially neither for

nor against God, but to choose. We have the freedom to build our own heaven or hell. We have been given the power of the keys to open the supratemporal and to keep the subtemporal closed (Elementarbegriffe, 546549). The temporal cosmos is therefore an evil, but it is also a blessing. Time is a gift as well as a punishment (Werke, XII, 417; cited Betanzos, 286). Time prevents the possibility of a total fall into nothingness, and it offers the possibility of redemption. Time has been given us so that we will become free of time (Werke, XII, 419; cited by Betanzos, 280). Redemption is in cosmic time, which permits humanity to recover what was lost, although in fragmented and successive stages. [32] Our evolution (towards or away from God) must continue in time, and time gives us the opportunity to develop to our completed being. But not to progress is to regress (Begrndung, 7; Werke, I, 27). At the end of cosmic time, we will find ourselves in our completed state either for or against God. In between the two extremes of being grounded in ones supratemporal Center or finding oneself in the temporal periphery with a total loss of center, is the third situation, which Baader calls movement in the periphery (Zeit, 25). In this situation, one is not grounded in ones true Center, nor has ones Center totally disappeared; instead, there is a movement in the periphery, and that is the appearance-time (Schein-Zeit). (12) The supratemporal heart Dooyeweerd says that the turning point for him was the discovery of the idea of the supratemporal heart (NC, I, vix). This idea is also found in Baader. The supratemporal heart is the center of Man. In Biblical language the heart is called the inner man, and it speaks of good and bad thoughts of the heart (Begrndung, 79 ft. 9). Baader cites Tauler:
There is in our hearts, as Tauler says, a center in which no creature can fathom (eindringen) (Elementarbegriffe 534).

Creature here must be understood as meaning temporal reality, as distinct from the heart, which is supratemporal. Baader makes a distinction between our inner and outer being. The inner (or higher) is the central heart; the outer is our temporal, creaturely, bodily, or earthly reality. He also refers to the outer being as the peripheral reality. Dooyeweerd says the earthly cosmos is transcended by Man in his full selfhood where he partakes in the transcendent root (NC, II, 593). It should be emphasized that this distinction between inner and outer, between central heart and temporal earthly functions, is not to be understood as a dualism. The entire focus of Baaders work is to counter any ideas of dualism. He describes the relation between center and periphery as an organic unity. (13) The analogy of the prism Dooyeweerd uses the analogy of a prism to explain how cosmic time breaks up reality into temporal diversity. He says that the prism is a very old symbol ( NC, I, 101). But he does not indicate from whom he obtained the analogy. Plotinus and Eckhart use the symbol, but only in the sense of a variety of rays of light coming from one source, and not in the sense

of a spectrum of independent colours. The analogy of the prism must post-date Newtons discovery that a prism breaks up light into the spectrum. [33] Baader also uses the analogy of a prism breaking light into colours. He says, Das klare Licht der Gottheit bricht sich in einer Vielfalt von Farben (Werke, VIII, 82; cited by Schumacher, 41). He also says that Wisdom is the magic mirror that contains all colours and forms (Werke, I, 186). (14) Modalities Dooyeweerd says that temporal reality is experienced in modes of being. These modes are hows and not the concrete what of things ( NC, I, 3 ft. 1). Baader also says that the temporal is only a mode (Weise) of production of the Absolute; the temporal is a mode or quality of the inexistence [34] of what has been produced by the Absolute (Elementarbegriffe, 540; Werke, V, 81). He also refers to the mode (le modus, la manire) of our existence (Fermenta, V, 13). Usually, Baader refers to different modes of production as elements or factors. For example, he refers to elements and factors of perception. In their central inner sense, these elements are identical; in their outer sense the temporal world there is only a composition of elements which are put together (zusammengesetzt) into temporal beings (Werke, IV, 100). Temporal beings are a result of the breaking up of the supratemporal unitythey are not an integral unity, but a non-unity (Nichteinheit); temporal things are put together and subject to dissolution (zusammengesetzt und auflsbar). (Elementarbegriffe, 538, 538). Temporal things have individuality only in time; their temporal life must lead to Death. But Man was not destined to remain in the region of brokenness (Zeit, 28 ft. 9). Dooyeweerd also speaks of the transcendent identity of the modal functions that is experienced in the religious root of our existence (NC, II, 479). Dooyeweerds view of temporal beings is also similar to Baaders view of things being put together (zusammengesetzt) in time. Structures of individuality are given by time and are wholly temporal. Temporal things are perishable; they do not have a supra-temporal selfhood; their thing-identity is only that of a temporal individual wholea relative unity in a multiplicity of functions (NC, III, 65). Temporal beings have an individuality structure based on a temporal ordering of the modes, and this is what gives temporal things their duration in time (NC, III, 79). Sometimes Baader refers to these modes as different spheres (Begrndung, 17 ft. 6). He says that if we make a division between belief and knowledge in our religion, it will also infiltrate into all the other spheres of our knowledge, belief and action ( Zeit, 53). He refers to particular modalities or spheres of consciousness ( Fermenta, IV, 13). His clearest statement referring to spheres is:
Jeder Theil einer solchen systematischen Erkenntnissder Philosophieist somit, wie jedes Glied des Organismus, ein Ganzes, ein in sich sich-schliessender Kreis, oder die eine Idee ist darin in einer besondern Bestimmtheit. Der einzelne Kreis durchbricht darumwie diess jedes einzelne Glied des Organismus thus,die Schranken seines Elementes oder seiner Sonderung, weil er, in sich Totalitt ist und das Ganze auf seine Weise reprsentirt, und er begrndet hiemit eine weitere Sphre, d.h. er erstreckt sich virtuell in die Gesammtsphre des organischen Systems, und dies stellt sich daher als ein Kreis dar von einander deckenden, obschon gradweise unter sich

unterschiedenen, in einander begriffenen Kreisen, deren jeder ein nothwendiges bleibendes Moment is, so, dass das System ihrer eigenene Elemente oder Besonderheiten die ganze Idee ausmacht, die ebenso in jedem Einzelnen erscheint. Totum in Toto, et totum in qualibet parte. (Weltalter, 104). [Each part of such a systematic knowledge-philosophy-is, just like each limb of an organism, a whole, a sphere enclosed in itself; the one Idea is therein as a particular determination. Just like each individual limb of an organism, each individual sphere therefore breaks through the bounds of its elements or of its separation, because within it is Totality, and it represents the All in its mode, and in doing this it founds a further sphere, that is, it extends itself virtually in the combined spheres of the organic system. The system is arranged as a sphere comprised of other spheres congruent with each other, although distinguished by degrees among themselves and comprised in each other, of which each [sphere] is a necessary continuing moment. From its own elements or particularities, the system constitutes the whole Idea, which also appears in each individual part. Everything in the whole, and the whole in each part.] [35]

Baader also refers to modalities as functions. Each member of the Organism is given its function (Schriften, I, 89). Our sensory functions are not the same as our thinking functions; nor are the senses the source and origin of our thinking. Both functions are part of a total process of living (Werke, V, 53; cited by Sauer, 31). Like Dooyeweerd, Baader says that our capacities and faculties in the temporal region are not to be regarded as separate beings (or whats) (Fermenta, V, 23). Our feelings, imagination and concepts are functions and not substantial beings (als erstarrt gedacht) (Werke, II, 223; cited by Sauer, 46). My sensory functions must not be abstracted from my own self (Werke, XII, 104; XI, 364; cited by Sauer, 32). Baader does not provide a list of all fifteen modes or aspects as distinguished by Dooyeweerd. But Baader refers to some of the modes. Number and language are abstracted analogically (Fermenta, V, 11). He refers to thought, word and art (Fermenta, I, 23). He speaks of various different sciences (Wissenschaft): mathematics, geometry, experimental (physics) and the study of religion (Religionswissenschaft) (Begrndung, 92, ft. 4). Baader also refers to the political, physical, ethical senses, and to the aesthetic ( Weltalter, 241, 396). (15) Sphere sovereignty Baader uses the analogy of an organism to show the relation between the supratemporal unity and the temporal multiplicity of the cosmos. This analogy comes from Ephesians 1:10, where St. Paul speaks of the relation of the head to the limbs of the body. The head is the center and the limbs are the periphery; the limbs are subordinate to the head. The individual limbs or members can only relate to each other to the extent that they are unified with the head (Werke, IV, 232; V, 372). Baader uses this analogy to show (a) the relationship between the supratemporal heart and its temporal functions and (b) the interrelationship of different societal institutions, and their supratemporal Center. Both uses of the idea are very much related to Dooyeweerds (and Kuypers) idea of sphere sovereignty. [36] Baader emphasizes the importance of institutions. Society is not just the sum of its members. Real social power is not exercised by the individual human person, nor by an aggregate of individuals, but rather where humans form themselves in social organizations, family, tribe (Stamm) people (Volk/Zunge), or the church (Begrndung, 59; Schriften, II,

369). Elsewhere, Baader refers to the institutions of the church, the state and universities (Werke, I, 150) as well as to guilds and corporations (Werke, II, 289; V, 276ff, 290). Baader says that each societal organization (Gemeinschaft) has its own laws to which it is subjected. And each organization is independent with respect to other organizations, although all organizations are subordinate to the Center:
Hat man nun aber die organisch-assozierende Funktion der Vernunft, so wie ich sie hier zwar nur mit kurzen Zgen darstellte, begriffen, so sieht man auch ein, da, so wie die wechselseitige Freiheit und Selbstndigkeit jedes einzelnes Gliedes eines Organismus von und gegen jedes andere (unbeschadet ihrer relativen Subordination und Koordination, weil durch diese eben vermittelt) mit ihrer Einigung (ihrem Verband oder Zusammenhang) identisch ist, dieselbe Identitt des Einverstndnisses und der wechselseitigen Selbstndigkeit auch fr die Gemeinschaft der Intelligenzen in ihrer Subordination und Koordination gilt( Begrndung, 61; Werke, I, 39f). [If one has understood the organic-associating function of reason, as I have briefly set out, then one also sees that, just as the reciprocal freedom and independence of each member of an organism with respect to each other member (notwithstanding their relative subordination and coordination through which they are mediated) is identical with their union (their association or coherence), the same identity of agreement and reciprocal independence also applies to the community of intellectuals in their subordination and coordination].

Each member of the Organism therefore has a reciprocal freedom and independence (Selbstndigkeit) with respect to the others. This Selbstndigkeit is only a relative autonomy, because each limb of the societal organism is subordinated and coordinated with the unity and coherence of all limbs (Werke, VI, 80; XIV, 104). Christianity emphasizes this organic view of subordination and coordination, and in this way it has freed society. Baader cites Tertullian in support of this assertion (Werke, II, 51; Weltalter, 259). Not only our social institutions, but also our intellectual pursuits (the sciences, or the community of intellectuals) have a similar relation of subordination and coordination, of Center and periphery. Although they are also coordinated, each member of the intellectual community is independent of other members. But the members of an Organism are identical in their coherence and union (Begrndung, 61). The different members of the Organism are factors of life that have been separated in their [temporal] embodiment. These factors have a twofold circulationamong each other but also directly with the unfolded Unity. There is a dynamic reciprocal play (Wechselspiel) among them; this determines their freedom with respect to each other. (Schriften, I, 87; Werke, II, 5). But each of these factors, or periphery-points (Peripherie-Punkte) also has a relation to the Center (Begrndung, 61, 63 ft. 7). Dooyeweerd relates each of the special sciences to the investigation of a separate modality. Each science is independent and cannot be reduced any others, because of the sphere sovereignty of the modalities they investigate. But although we cannot unify or reduce one mode to another, the modes are identical in their supratemporal coherence ( NC, II, 479). Dooyeweerds idea of sphere sovereignty, as applied to social relationships, has sometimes been criticized as a conservative view of society. Is it not a justification of nineteenth century bourgeois Dutch or German life? But Baader does not support such a conservatism. In fact, Baader was the first German to refer to the working class as the

proletariat. In his 1835 article on the Proletariatsproblem Baader pleads for justice on behalf of the exploited proletariat. Christian love forbids economic exploitation of the weak. Baader proposes the representation of the working classes in the legislature. He also expresses concern about the exploitation of wage earners by business, and he advocates trade unions. The priests should care for the poor classes. Betanzos sees this as anticipating the later idea of worker-priests. Betanzos points out that Baaders Christiansocial ideas predate the social analysis of Karl Marx, although different solutions are suggested. [37] Baader specifically disagrees with the views of Adam Smith, whose works he had read while in England (Betanzos, 63). The ideas of stock, loan and credit display an atomized reason (Werke, VIII, 202f; Schumacher, 247). Dooyeweerd does not develop these social ideas to the same extent. But as Goudzwaard points out, Dooyeweerd does make a plea against the exploitation of the proletarian worker in modern capitalism. [38] (16) Sphere universality Dooyeweerds emphasis on sphere universality is also to be found in Baader. Baader says that the Center is also in the periphery; the points on the periphery communicate with each other via the Center (Fermenta, VI, 1). The Center is the intermediary between two peripheral points; the Center inhabits, perhabits and cohabits the periphery (Fermenta, 250, note o). The Center is present in every single point, both as filling it and as containing it. The whole is placed in each part of the organism. Totum in toto et totum in qualibet parte (Werke, I, 74; VIII, 74; cited by Sauer, 172). (17) Analogies of time Dooyeweerd suggests that he was the first to raise the issue of the analogical relations among the various modalities, and the use of these analogies in different branches of science (NC, II, 55). To be sure, Dooyeweerd has expanded the ideas of analogy. But he does not acknowledge the previous ideas of Herder, St. Martin, and Baader. [39] Baader says, Everything reveals the grand process of analogy ( Werke, XI, 127128). Analogy is the universal key unlocking the one model in the universe ( Weltalter, 56, 66). Everything acts by analogy (Werke, XI, 77). And Everything produces itself in nature by analogy (Werke, XI, 98). For Dooyeweerd, analogies are based on ontological realities. As van Peursen says, analogies are not just linguistic jokes. Dooyeweerds idea is therefore opposed to modern text theory, postmodernism and cultural relativism. [40] This ontological basis for analogy is also evident in Baaderanalogy is related to the idea of diversity coming from an original unity. Although the modalities are independent or sovereign, they have a relation to each other because they all come from one supratemporal unity. Unity exists behind multiplicity; because of this, the truth in one sphere cannot contradict truth in any other. All are subject to the same law and truth. Because there is one plan in the cosmos, there are correspondences; analogy permits us to pass from one domain to another. Every living being is, as one, at the same time many (Werke, I, 145, 196; cited by Betanzos, 84). For Baader, analogies are anthropomorphic. This is because things do not exist except insofar as they are related to Man; we should therefore explain things by ourself and not ourself by things around us. [41] There is a pre-established harmony between Man and nature, microcosm and macrocosm. To interpret nature, we start with ourselves and use a

method of analogy. Sensible or material nature is only a symbol or a copy of our interior or spiritual nature. Likewise, we can speak of sacred things because the spiritual finds its symbol in the sensible (Werke, XI, 11, 72, 75, 78, 88, 127; Susini, 106110). In analogy, we animate nature; we consider it as a living person. That is why we can feel ourselves in each thing; each thing finds its source in us; we vivify all things with our feeling. Without us everything around us would be only a dead shell without life and without inner spirit (Werke, XI, 41, 78; Weltalter, 49). An example of analogy is taken from mathematics. Baader says, We begin with one and we end with the One (the Totality) (Werke, III, 319; cited by Sauer, 134). When we refer to the Totality as One, we should not think that the Totality is a number. We are using the word in an analogical sense, by an idea that points towards the Center. Even the idea of the Center should not be seen as a mathematical point, but rather as the productive inner One in contrast to the external, phenomenal many (Werke, XII, 211; cited by Betanzos, 113). (18) Anticipation and retrocipation Our concepts refer to one another because our concepts all relate to the Central Unity. Baader says that our concepts do not build a row, but a circle; you can start wherever you want, as long as you go through to the Center. This idea is in contrast to linear thought that regards one individual thought as merely arrayed next to another thought and not understood. Baader says that if the concept cannot be shown to relate to the center, it is meaningless (Begrndung, 109; Werke, XV, 160). When it is brought back to the Center, each concept leads and points to other concepts as either retrocipatory or anticipatory:
Da die wahrhafte Gnosis keine Reihe von Begriffen, sondern einen Kreis derselben bildet, so kommt es weniger darauf an, von welchem dieser Begriffe aus man im Vortrage der Wissenschaft anhebt, wohl aber darauf, da man jeden derselben bis ins Zentrum durchfhrt, aus welchem dieser Begriff notwendig sodann auf all anderen regressiv oder antizipierend wieder weiset und fhrt, welche Durchfhrung darum allein als die systematische in der Tat und im Wesen sich erweist. ( Werke, VIII, 11, cited by Sauer, 27) [Because true gnosis is a circle and not a row of concepts, it matters little from which concept we begin our theory; it is more important that each concept must be related to the Center, from which this concept then necessarily points to other concepts in a regressive (retrocipatory) or anticipatory way; this relation to the Center therefore shows itself in act and essence as the only systematic relation].

and elsewhere Baader says,

True gnosis is a circle, which one does not really grasp little by little but rather all at once. Here, one thing always leads to every other, and whoever has understood one thing well will soon have grasped the whole. There is no cause for wonder, then, when, in part, one concept constantly refers back to another and also when, while holding on to one concept, we have to anticipate others. For it is precisely therein that the systematic character of gnosis manifests itself, since every single concept leads to and points to the Center and the Center in turn, to all other concepts ( Werke, XIV, 160; translated by Betanzos, 80).

Sauer refers to this idea of retrocipating and anticipating concepts as a double heuristic principle. The retrocipating concept is a kind of anamnesisa looking back, a

remembering of what has already come. This remembering is by turning within. Sauer uses the phrase rckfragende sich er-innern (a questioning back by going within); this is a play on the word erinnern, which means to remember and er-innernto go within (Werke, IV, 105; Sauer, 65). It is our selfhood that allows us to remember; remembering is a making present (Vergegenwrtigung) (Werke, IV, 105). Baader says that consciousness is the work of memory (Gedchtnis). Time is measured in our soul (Gemth) not by succession of ideas, but by consciousness. It is only because of the permanence of our selfhood that we can experience change and the passing of time. Not to measure time is the situation of dreams (Weltalter, 90, 91). Baader praised Fichte for describing the mechanics or instinctive operation of the human mind in its struggle for awareness (preservation of consciousness) within the temporal flow of what is transient ( Werke, III, 244; translated by Betanzos, 41). Sauer says that, in contrast to retrocipation, which looks to the past in memory, anticipation seeks the coherence and reintegration that will occur in the future (Sauer, 123). When we anticipate the future, we attempt to shorten time (Elementarbegriffe, 555). Time is the winter of eternity. As good gardeners, we can bring forth passing blooms of eternity, anticipating paradise. We anticipate outwardly what we already anticipate inwardly (Weltalter, 242). This fits Dooyeweerds use of the terms. As we shall see, he describes pre-theoretical experience as composed solely of retrocipatory analogies. This experience is made possible by our supratemporal selfhood, which stands above the flow of time, and is able to form a unity of these passing functions. Dooyeweerd says that we have a sense of time only because eternity is set in our heart. [42] Retrocipatory moments are therefore a kind of looking back to what has occurred. In contrast, the anticipatory moments look to what is yet to be unfolded in the temporal world. And the final aspect in the anticipatory direction is the aspect of faith, which points beyond the temporal to the supratemporal fullness.

5 Man as the Temporal Root and Christ as the Second Root

(19) Man as the Temporal Root Dooyeweerd says that the image of God is the radical unity of all the different modalities in which they coalesce (NC, III, 69). The whole meaning of the temporal world is integrally (i.e. completely) bound up and concentrated in this unity (Roots, 30). Our temporal world, in its meaning differentiation and coherence, is bound to this religious root of humanity; it has no meaning and therefore no reality apart from this root (WdW , I, 65). To say that the temporal world has no reality apart from its root in humanity means that it can be said have inexistence (or what Baader refers to as Inexistenz). To understand what Dooyeweerd means, we need to look at the roots of the word existence. It comes from the Latin ex-sistere, meaning to stand out, or in French, sortir de. This standing out is in relation to a background. Humans have a pre-given essence given by God from which they emerge into existence. They are therefore ex-sistent beings. Although he does not speak in terms of essence, Dooyeweerd refers to our tendency towards an Origin as the ex-sistent character of our heart. He says that religion is the exsistent condition in which the ego is bound to its true or pretended firm ground. Even our absolutizing shows this ex-sistent character of the religious center of our existence. In the

state of apostasy we attempt an autonomous ex-sistere. We need to be pulled out of (extrahere) this state by God in order to regain our true ex-sistent position (NC, I, 58, 59). It is our religious center or supratemporal heart that has this ex-sistent character. Only humans have such a religious center, so in this sense, only humans are truly existent.
It is only man who can have cosmic and cosmological self-consciousness because only mans cosmic temporal structure is founded in an individual religious root transcending time, viz. his selfhood. (NC, II, 480)

Because we are the temporal root, creation fell along with humanity in the Fall. Since the Fall, the image of God is only revealed in its true sense in Jesus Christ ( NC, III 69). These same ideas of selfhood as temporal root, and the substitution of Christ as the new religious root had been previously developed by Baader. Baader also speaks of our Existenz, and the fact that we have no being in ourselves. Our existence relates to a coming forth (Hervorgehens) and to a Ground (Begrndung, 26, 29). Baader also says that this Existenz cannot be found in temporal reality itself. Anticipating Dooyeweerds later criticism of Heidegger, Baader objects to Schelling and Hegel. These philosophers ought to be searching for Sein itself beyond the relativity of Dasein. The idea of analogy is also foreign to them. But existence cannot be used univocally of God and creatures (J. Sauter: Baader and Kant, 548 ft., cited by Betanzos, 44). Baader says that our Existenz relates to our central being that is free of time and space (Elementarbegriffe, 560). Man is the rootunity (Wurzel-Einheid) of nature. Man is not just a postscript to the rest of creation (Weltalter, 280). We are Gods final creation (Schlussgeschpf ) (Werke, I, 299, 432; IV, 33). The idea of religious root is related to the fact that we are the image of God ( Weltalter, 184). St. Paul says that Heaven and earth live and move and have their being in God [Acts 17:28]. Because our central, supratemporal selfhood is the image of God, humans are truly the center of the material world (Werke, V, 31; XI, 78; Begrndung, 48). For Dooyeweerd, our supratemporal reality is not individual, but is the root of individualization:
de integrale tijdelijke uitdrukkingsvorm van den geest des menschen die zich uit geen der modale aspecten ven den tijdshorizon laat uitsluiten. Zoals het zonlicht door het prisma gebroken wordt in de zeven kleurengammas van het lichtspectrum, zo breekt zich de geestelijke wortel-eenheid vans menschen existentie door den tijdshorizon in de rijke verscheidenheid van modale aspecten en individualiteits-structuren van het lichamelijk bestaan. [43] [the integral temporal expression of the spirit of Man that does not let itself be excluded from any of the modal aspects of the temporal horizon. Just as the sunlight is broken by the prism into the seven colours of the spectrum, so the spiritual root-unity of human existence is broken by the temporal horizon into the rich diversity of modal aspects and individuality structures of bodily existence]

What is noteworthy here is that Dooyeweerd uses the prism analogy to show not only the different modal aspects of our life, but also of individuality itself, and the emergence of individuality structures from a central unity. [44] Baader also uses the prism analogy to say that true humanity is not individual. No individual is completely and perfectly Man. The true humanity, or the divine within us, is divided among all. The one divine ray is broken into millions of colours; these are only fractions of the same Oneness and Image of

God (Weltalter, 52). Each individual being is like a central point, receiving from all the other beings outside of the infinite periphery that constitutes his horizon, all that he can receive, and he sends in turn all that he can send. But for all the different particular centers, there is a general center, and a principal ray uniting each the first to the second. All the force of the influences of each individual on the others is channeled in the ray towards the center and then sent again to the points. Everything that is emanated from God is directed eternally towards Him, and nothing perishes of what He has expressed, and He is all in all (1 Cor. 15:28) (Werke, XI, 42). (20) Christ as the Second Root Man was created in Gods image, with a task to perform as the root of the rest of creation. In this first state, Man was above time and space. Humans were destined to have direct and full community with God (Zeit, 39). Man was placed in a nature that was already disturbed due to the previous fall of Lucifer. The human assignment was to free this nature and to reunite it. This responsibility gave to humans an incomprehensible dimension (unbersehbare Ausdehnung) within time (Elementarbegriffe, 551). As the root unity of the temporal world, Man was given stewardship (Verwaltung) over the temporal domain.
Das ursprngliche zeitliche Werk des Urmenschen war, all Strahlen dieser zentralen Aktion (des Wortes) nach und nach in seinem Wesen zu vereinigen und also das Wort in sich Mensch werden zu lassen. Ein Menschwerdung, welche, wie man wei, Gott selbst bernahm, nachdem der Mensch sie vernachlssigte (Zeit, 39 ft. 20; Werke, II, 89) [The original temporal work of original Man was to gradually unite within its being all rays of this central action (of the Word), and therefore to let the Word become human in itself. A becoming human which, as we know, God Himself undertook, after humans neglected it.]

But Gods central action occurs above time; this is the central action of the Word. [45] It produces rays (Strahlen) within temporal reality. The original human task was to return those rays into their unity. [46] This task was not done, and a new root was required. In its present temporal state, there is no focus point, and the dispersed light does not warm (Weltalter, 97). Similarly, Dooyeweerd says that apostate humanity has lost the focus (brandpunt) of its existence (WdW , I, 25, 26). Creation fell with Man just as a kingdom falls with its king. Baader cites Romans 8:1922, where Paul speaks of all creation groaning for redemption (Susini, 286). This redemption can be done only by God Himself, because only God himself can unite us again with our root (Wurzel) (Werke, XII, 226; cited by Betanzos, 124). Because the center of creation was Man, redemption required a new human root was required; this is the reason for Christs incarnation (Weltalter, 188). (21) The centrality of love Baader says that cosmic time is a suspension of eternity. This suspension of eternity is related to Christs suspension of His power and glory in his kenosis (Phil. 2: 6,7). The Center itself submitted to a humbling or a descent. The beginning of time is therefore related to sacrifice: it is a suspension of a higher beings full and integral existence (Elementarbegriffe, 556). Time always involves the descent of a higher being into a lower and narrower region (Zeit, 27, ft. 7). Christ was reduced to the humble state of the germ or

root, in order to seed Himself into fallen beings. By this seed, the fallen being is given the possibility to ascend again (Wiederaufsteigung) or of growth (Wachstum). In this way, the fallen beings are united again within the Center and are lifted up into true time. The dispersed powers are united, and the suppressed powers of potential growth are led on high (Zeit, 30). [47] For Baader, Christianity is the foundation of all love (Fermenta, V, 311). Baader cites St. Therese: love is the general law of every manifestation of a superior in or by an inferior. (Schriften, II, 396). Christs kenosis is a demonstration of this love. The redemption or reintegration of creation is within time itself. The Mediator is in this world. Love becomes temporal with her erring children (Zeit, 29). And from the moment that we enter into time, this Mediators presence can be seen, like the Thread of Ariadne. You just have to open your eyes (Weltalter, 33). Baader frequently uses the phrase amor descendit ut elevet or Love descends in order to raise up (Zeit, 30). In the kenosis, the Center, the inner One, descends to the level of Organism or periphery without ceasing to be the Center or Principle. [48] Love descends from God to humans, it extends from ourselves to fellow humans [horizontally], and it descends from man to nature (Susini, II, 560, citing Fermenta, V). The downward aspect of love from humans to nature is expressed in our theoretical thought. Baader devotes a great deal of attention to how love is expressed between humans. Betanzos gives an excellent summary of this horizontal aspect of love. Love is expressed by our cohabitation with others; such cohabitation is mutual subordination ( Werke, II, 227). Baader emphasizes that mutual subordination is a very different basis for ethics than that given by Kant. Kant defines love as inclination to that which gives an advantage. Baader says that Kants reasoning about love is like a blind person speaking of colour (Susini, II, 525).
As a person, I cannot, of course, immediately possess or enjoy another person as such, for that would be to degrade him to the level of an impersonal chattel or thing. Thus, materia is from mater, and in this sense, every self-giving to a lover is a self-offering to the lover. Without insight into this constant mutual interpenetration and withdrawal of personal self into impersonal nature (of course in a different sense than that used by the Naturphilosophen), without insight into this self-realizing and self-emptying process, one does not understand a thing about either [person or nature] (Werke, IV, 194; translated by Betanzos, 272)

Love is a reciprocal embraceof me in your embrace, and you in mine (Begrndung, 83 ft. 14). But what I give up in my union with others is only my incompleteness and the lack of truth in my existence alone (Vorlesungen ber speculative Dogmatik, Book 5, number 17, Werke, IX, 261; cited by Betanzos, 273). Dooyeweerd also says that love is the central command of the law. Central love is love in its religious fullness. It is different from love in its temporal modal meaning ( NC, II, 152). This radical love can be found only in the imago Dei (NC, III, 71). Gods law is refracted by cosmic time into the rich diversity of cosmic law spheres. But love finds its religious rootunity in the central love-commandment that is directed to our heart. [49]

6 Pre-theoretical Experience and Theoretical Thought

(22) Pre-theoretical Experience Dooyeweerd says that our pre-theoretical experience is directed towards full reality. This experience is systatic, integral, and has factual immediacy. [50] It grasps reality in its plastic structure (NC, III 36). In pre-theoretical experience, we experience the continuity of cosmic time (NC, II, 4). Dooyeweerd uses the word enstasis to describe our pre-theoretical experience (NC, II, 479). Enstasis means standing within. In pre-theoretical experience, we stand within our supratemporal selfhood, which allows us to experience the continuity of time. Enstasis refers to a resting, pre-theoretical intuition, which we possess by virtue of our supratemporal selfhood:
In the resting pre-theoretical intuition we have an enstatic conscious Erleben of the full temporal reality as it presents itself in the typical structures of individuality and their relations. This conscious Erleben or hineinleben into reality primarily unfolds itself in the integral experience of temporal reality to which any kind of theoretical meaning-synthesis is still alien. ( NC, II, 474). [51]

Baader also refers to the resting in our selfhood as an enstasis; he contrasts it with the movement into the temporal world of extasis. Our resting selfhood is an Ineinandergestrtz-Sein of the Center, as opposed to the becoming (werden) of the peripherie (Begrndung, 58). Our theory requires a movement outwards, and this requires an act of imagination, which is a movement from enstasis to ek-stasis (Susini, I, 378, 379). Baader distinguishes between a passive, contemplative knowledge, and a more active knowledge (Susini, II, 30). Our passive knowledge is the Subject-Object relation, where we contemplate, or are spectators of objects above and below us. Baader uses the words anerkennen, kennen and Wahrnehmen for this passive knowledge. Our active knowledge is erkennen. It is an active work, an effort of grounding (ergrndung) and a battle (kampf ). Baader also expresses the difference between our passive and our active knowledge as a difference in direction of our thought. In passive knowledge the direction is centrifugal; we sink into our Center. In active knowledge our thought goes in a centripetal direction, and we fly past the center (Elementarbegriffe, 546). The same distinction is made by Dooyeweerd; the Gegenstand-Relation is a divergent direction of consciousness as opposed to the concentric direction of consciousness that is directed towards the Center ( NC, I, 57, 58). (23) The Subject-Object relation Both Baader and Dooyeweerd refer to pre-theoretical experience in terms of the SubjectObject relation. They use the terms subject and object differently than we are accustomed to in Western philosophy. As we have seen, they use the word subject in the sense of being subject to Gods law. The word object is also used differently. In the British empiricist tradition, an object is something that exists independently of us, and that we then perceive by our senses. The object has certain primary qualities that exist whether it is perceived or not. There are then certain secondary qualities that are perceived by us subjectively, but that do not inhere in the thing itself. Both Baader and Dooyeweerd reject the possibility of a thing existing in itself (Ding an sich). Dooyeweerd says that the so-

called secondary qualities are object functions within the thing itself. His rejection of any idea of a Ding an sich is related to the view of Man as the temporal root:
In contrast to mankind, neither the inorganic elements nor the kingdoms of plants and animals have a spiritual or religious root. It is man who makes their temporal existence complete. To think of their existence apart from man, one would need to eliminate all the logical, cultural, economic, aesthetic, and other properties that relate them to man. With respect to inorganic elements and plants, one would even need to eliminate their capability of being seen (Roots, 30).

Dooyeweerd rejects the nave realist view of sensation (NC, III, 22). So does Baader, who says that objects are not to be seen as the source of sensory impressions working upon a separate thinker (Weltalter, 48, 364). Our sensations are not the source and cause of our thinking function (Werke, V, 53). As Sauer says, there are for Baader no positivistic facts that are not already involved in the universal process of sensation, knowing and understanding (Sauer, 21). Baader says that not all beings are subjects in the same way. There are different realms of being. In addition to humans, there are the realms of minerals, plants and animals (Fermenta, I, ft. m; Werke, IV, 150). The Subject-Object relation therefore concerns how subjects such as myself relate to other beings that are subject to Gods law. Baaders idea of the Subject-Object relation has to do with the I and the Not-I. There is the Not-I above me, the Thou that is opposite me (gegenber), and the Not-I that is below me (Schriften, I, 57 ft.; Werke, VIII, 66). Baader distinguishes between created and emanated beings. Man was breathed out by God, or emanated, in distinction to the world that was created ( Zeit, 40). Humans have a supratemporal center, but animals do not. Because of this, an animal does not perceive time like we do; this also means that animals do not become bored (Elementarbegriffe, 553; Zeit, 27 ft.7). [52] We share with the animals what Baader calls purely outer seeing. Animals do not share with us the inner seeing related to our central being ( Zeit, 56). [53] For Dooyeweerd, a key part of our pre-theoretical experience is the ability to distinguish between these same different realms of being (NC, III, 33). He distinguishes the material or inorganic, the vegetative or organic, the animal, and the human; the first three realms are each qualified by a different pre-logical aspect of temporal reality (NC, III, 83). But humans are not qualified by any aspect. Humans participate in all aspects, but their supratemporal center goes beyond all aspects (NC, I, 51; III, 88). Humans are the religious root and only humans have existence in the sense of ex-sistere. And Dooyeweerd says that only humans can enter enstatically into time by means of their intuition. Other creatures are entirely lost in time(NC, I, 32). They are ex-statically absorbed by their temporal existence (NC, II, 480). The human ex-sistere is therefore also related to enstasy, in the sense of a standing-within our supratemporal center. (24) The Gegenstand relation Dooyeweerd says that theoretical thought is based on what he calls the Gegenstand relation; the Gegenstand relation is not to be confused with the Subject-Object relation. Baader makes the same distinction. [54] a) Gegenber/tegenover

The word Gegenstand is often translated as object. It literally means that which stands over against. Dooyeweerd says that ever since Kant, the object of our thought has been identified with the Gegenstand. Kant viewed the Gegenstand as purely sensory; this sensory manifold is then formed by our thought in a logical act of the understanding ( NC, II, 368). Neither Baader and Dooyeweerd accept Kants view of the Gegenstand; they use the word, but in a different way. Baader says that our theory is based on a Gegenstand: Philosophy is thinking or reflection over a Gegenstand (Werke, VIII, 36; cited by Sauer, 23). Since Kant and Fichte, the word object has been used in the narrow sense of that which finds itself in front of me. Baader says it should apply equally to that which is above and below meto that to which I am subordinated and that which is subordinated to me. Fichte has completed reduced the concept of object to an enemy obstacle (Fermenta, V, 7). Our knowledge differs depending on which realm we are consideringthe supratemporal, or one of the temporal realms [animal, vegetable, mineral]. The manner in which God knows Man, or in which Man knows an animal, are not the ways in which an animal knows Man or Man knows God). Our knowing cannot be used in the same sense when the knowing subject finds itself face to face with (gegenber) the known object, as when the subject stands above or below it. Knowing, insofar as it is downwards from a higher to a lower, is a fathoming and a founding (Ergrndung und Begrndung), and also an understanding and a circumscribing (Begreifen und Umgreifen) (Susini, II, 30, 31, citing Werke, I, 51, s.2; Weltalter, 116). We are not normally face to face with the realms of minerals, plants and animals. But in the Gegenstand relation we attempt to place ourselves on the same level, to become gegenber these other realms. We may compare this to Dooyeweerds view that theoretical thought involves a tegen-overstelling (WdW , I, 21). This expression has been translated as opposed to, meaning a kind of logical opposition or antithesis. It is perhaps better viewed as standing opposite. For Baader, the Gegenstand relation demands a movement out of our supratemporal center to the realm of temporal reality in order to stand opposite it. The reason for moving into temporal reality is in order to act as a center for temporal beings which were previously unmediated. We make this movement out of love, in order to save those beings, just as Christ was incarnated in order to save us. Dooyeweerd also speaks of theory as a movement out of oneself. As we have seen, he characterizes nave experience as an enstasis, a resting. In contrast to this, thinking is a going outside of ourself; it involves an ek-stasis and a divergent direction. I understand this as an entering into cosmic time by the self whose Center stands outside of cosmic time. b) Descent to and penetration of the temporal All nonhuman realms are what Baader refers to as nonintelligent being; these realms are bound with Man in his unstable condition since the Fall, and they share in Mans corruptibility (verderblichkeit). Humans must win and confirm in God the stability of these nonhuman realms. This is done if humans freely choose to be mediators for these nonintelligent beingsthat is, to act as their center (Elementarbegriffe, 541, 544). Becoming the center of such nonintelligent beings is a mediation of the unmediated (Vermittlung des Unvermittelten). The superior being descends to the inferior and forms its foundation or support. That which is the center is the superior being; that which is

centered is inferior; by being center, I reduce the being to my will, power and domination (Werke, I, 42; Susini, II, 31). My true knowledge makes me the support, the pivot of the object known. Just as God is able to be immanent in temporal reality, so we are to penetrate cosmic time. This penetration does not involve a mixture of identitiesBaader refers to Bhmes saying that Spirit can penetrate nature just as light penetrates fire (Fermenta, IV, 14). There are different ways of penetrating the animal, plant and mineral realms ( Fermenta, I, 13; note m). All understanding or knowledge is a penetration (durchdringung) of a perception (Werke, XII, 84). In the penetration of the temporal object, we understand its structure. But this penetration and domination is not to be done in an egotistical way. If I seek only my own pleasure, then I am subordinating the object to myself, and annihilating its objectivity. Love for the object is then only love for myself, the contrary of true love (Fermenta, I, 18). The penetration is to be an inhabitation, not a perhabitation. Inhabitation is knowledge in an immanent manner; it is a kind of participation or coexistence. I become interior to the being, and become a center for it. The knowing subject becomes inherent in the known object, like an artist in his work; like a father in his child and like God in Man. Such inhabitation is contrasted to perhabitation, where there is no essential link, but only an accidental, exterior juxtaposition or meeting with the thing; one only crosses the object without stopping (Susini, II, 57). Our love for nature must also not be confounded with industrial or rational exploitation of nature. (Susini, II, 562, citing Fermenta, V). Baader says that we are to be mediators for the nonintelligent world just as Christ was a mediator for us. In his kenosis, Christ suspended his own glory and self-sacrifice. Similarly, as helping beings we ourselves must enter into the other beings, and must ourselves become conceivable (Sichsatzlich-machen), to embody ourselves (einverleiben) or to seed ourselves (einsen) into the beings that are still bound. Just as God descended into the temporal through Christ, so we descend into the temporal. To do this requires that we acknowledge our solidarity and sympathy with those beings that require our help (Elementarbegriffe, 554559). I know that which I love in a different way than that which I do not love (Schriften, II, 140). Theoretical knowledge demands a double subjectiona subjection (Subjicirung) to God above as His creature, and a subjection to that which stands below. This double subjection gives us the ability to go out of our Center as well as to sink into itboth a centrifugal as well as a centripetal direction. Only as I subject myself to a Higher, do I have the power to subject that which is under me. Only serving can I rule. And only ruling do I serve. The Son of Man came into the world to give witness to the truth. That is the destined end for Man, too, as the image of God (Weltalter, 221, 222, 361). Our love is an affirmation of the Gegenstand by a denial of our self. The purpose of our theorizing is therefore to restore the fallen temporal world. In each stage of our own evolution (towards or away from God), we have the ability to fulfill the law for such a temporal being and through this fulfillment to obtain the power or to create the moment of its existence that it needs in order to go into a higher law and so to ascend. If we do not fulfill this obligation, we begin to feel the law as a burden ( Elementarbegriffe, 553). Dooyeweerd also speaks of our penetration of the temporal world, and he relates this to theory. The supra-theoretical knowledge of the heart must penetrate the temporal sphere

of our consciousness (NC, I, 55). Dooyeweerd contrasts this penetration with pretheoretical thought.
Nave analysis does not penetrate behind the objective outward appearance, and cannot embrace the functional laws of the modal spheres in an inter-modal synthesis of meaning (NC, II, 470).

Dooyeweerd also speaks in terms of sacrifice, although he does not link it to theory. Veritable religion is absolute self-surrender (NC, I, 58). Love is self-surrender (NC, II, 149). c) Intentionality Dooyeweerd stresses that the object (Gegenstand) of our theoretical thought does not have a real (ontical) existence. It is only intentional, and does not correspond to the structure of empirical reality (NC, I, 39, 40). What does only intentional mean? Dooyeweerds view of intentionality, and of the Gegenstand relation generally, have been seen as connected with his acknowledged dependence on Husserls phenomenology (NC, I, v). [55] For Husserl, intentionality is related to his idea of epoch, which is an attempt to get at the things themselves. But Dooyeweerd specifically rejects Husserls epoch (NC, II, 73). We must therefore look to a different meaning of intentionality than that of Husserl. The concept of intentionality is a central point of Franz Brentanos ontology of mind. Brentanos classic statement of intentionality (Intentionalitt) is found at: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874):
Jedes psychische Phnomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die Intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir, obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrcken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realitt zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente Gegenstndlichkeit nennen wrden. Jedes enthlt etwas als Object in sich, obwohl nicht jedes in gleicher Weise. In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in dem Urtheile ist etwas anerkannt oder verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hasse gehasst, in dem Begehren begehrt, u.s.w. Diese intentionale Inexistenz ist den psychischen Phnomene ausschliess-lich eigenthmlich. [56]

This has been translated as:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence of an object, and what we would call, although not in entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are not to understand a reality), or an immanent objectivity. Each one includes something as an object within itself, although not always in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in hate [something] is hated, in desire something is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is exclusively characteristic of mental phenomena. [57]

This statement has caused much discussion among phenomenologists. In particular, the meaning of intentional inexistence has been unclear. I believe that part of the confusion

has been caused by the English translation, which does not distinguish between Gegenstand and object. A further confusion has been caused by the fact that most of the discussion of intentional inexistence has centered on our ability to imagine fictitious objects as such unicorns, or the gold mountain or even of impossible objects, such as the round square. But although intentionality includes such fictional objects, that is not the main point of the meaning of Inexistenz. Brentanos point is that all objects of thought have this quality of intentional inexistence. He applies it to every mental phenomenon. Brentano specifically says that by the object of thought we are not to understand a reality. It is an immanent Gegenstndlichkeit. This has frequently been seen as immanence within thought as opposed to an existence outside of thought. But immanence can also contrast our temporal existence to the transcendence of the supratemporal. This fits with Spiegelbergs interpretation of intentional inexistence. Spiegelberg says that the original meaning of intentional inexistence was not nonexistence but existence within something else. [58] Baader also relates Inexistenz to immanence. For example, he says that Inexistenz is a synonym of the immanence of all things in God:
Den Begriff der Immanenz oder Inexistenz aller Dinge in Gott (als omnipotens, weil omnitenens) vermengen diese Philosopheme pantheistische mit jenen ihrer Identitt mit letzterem (Elementarbegriffe, 535; Werke, 14, 31). [These philosophers mix up in a pantheistic way the concept of the immanence or inexistence of all things in God (as omnipotent because omnitenens or holding all) with the concept of their identity with God].

The temporal world as Inexistenz inheres in, dwells in, or subsists in our own existence. As existent beings, it is our mission to descend to the temporal world and to raise it up to its true existence. When we do that, the temporal world is eternally revealed to eternal creatures, such as the angels (Fermenta, VI, 17). [59] This interpretation of intentionality as a descent to temporal Inexistenz also fits with Dooyeweerds view of theory. He says that the Gegenstand of our thought does not have a real or ontical status because it is an abstraction from the full reality. In our theory, we must actively and freely [intentionally] make the movement from enstasis to exstasis, from our supra-temporal Existenz to that of immanent Inexistenz. None of the objects of our theoretical thought have real existence; they have a lower level of reality than our Selfhood, and we must make a conscious and intentional movement from the higher level to a lower level of being. d) Theory as abstraction Many of Dooyeweerds followers have rejected the Gegenstand relation, [60] and have replaced it with a view of theory as abstraction of the universal from the particular. [61] But Dooyeweerd does not see theory as the searching for universals in contrast to a pretheoretical perception of the individual. The isolation of the individual is already a theoretical act! Thus it is incorrect to say that the pre-theoretical is directed to the individual and the theoretical directed to the universal. [62]

by limiting my theoretical attention to this concrete natural thing [linden tree], I am actually engaged in a theoretical abstraction. In veritable nave experience, things are not experienced as completely separate entities. [] the simple only occurs in the full complexity of a universal interlacement of structures (NC, III, 54).

Similarly, Baader says that we ourselves make the individual parts by a division of the simple impression received by the soul. This division is an analytical act. Even in pretheoretical comparisons, our impression (Vorstellung) is all at once. We focus out attention on the impression and then another comes; in the moment of comparison, a third is present in the soul (Weltalter, 90). When Dooyeweerd says that theory is an abstraction, he means that it is an isolation of a part of the coherence of reality given in the continuity of cosmic time. In theoretical thought, there is an abstraction from the actual, entire ego that thinks. The ego is operating not merely in our thought, but in all the functions in which it expresses itself ( NC, I, 5). Theory is the abstraction from the full systasis of meaning of the modal aspects of human experience. What has been theoretically isolated is never the datum. The real datum is the systatic coherence of meaning (NC, II, 431433). Theory is therefore a dis-stasis. Dooyeweerd says that this dis-stasis is something given within the logical aspect of reality itself. Thus, the dis-stasis is not a result of the Gegenstand relation; theory only makes manifest a possibility in the logical aspect. But empirical reality itself functions in systasis (NC, II, 472). According to Sauer, Baader uses the word abstraction in this same sensethe merely theoretical (blo theoretische) removes part from out of a larger coherence. It abstracts from out of our concrete historical and community life (Sauer, 30, ft. 11, citing Werke, I, 323). Baader says that abstraction is when we do not understand in our Center ( Schriften, II, 140). The word abstraction means distortion, deformation, misstatement (Enstellung, Entstaltung, Verkehrung) (Werke, VIII, 356; cited by Sauer, 117). No abstract concept of God is therefore possible. Concepts are severed ( abgesondert und losgelst) from a larger whole. Concepts are to be contrasted with the idea of Totality which alone makes possible a meaningful interpretation and understanding of the world. [63] e) Resistance Dooyeweerd says that when we engage in theory, we experience a resistance (NC, II, 467). The separation of aspects into logical and non-logical causes this resistance, because the separated aspect continues to express its coherence with the remaining aspects. The resistance therefore occurs because of sphere universalitythe referring within each modal aspect to the other aspects. Baader also speaks of a resistance when we move into the temporal world:
Wenn also der Mensch, der seinem Ursprunge nach bestimmt war, ber dieser Zeit oder in dem Zentrum selbst dieser zeitlichen Hlle zu sein, indem er sich in ihrer Peripherie befindet, einen Widerstand und einen Widerspruch oder ein unaufhrliches Widerstreben in jedem Akte seines wahren Seins fhlt, wie gro mu also dieser Widerstand fr ein Wesen sein, welches, dazu bestimmt, in der wahren Zeit zu leben, sich sogar unter der Schein-Zeit oder in der falschen Zeit befindet (Zeit, 25, ft. 5)

[When therefore Manwhose original end was to be beyond this time or to be in the center itself of this temporal sheathfeels an opposition and a contradiction or a ceaseless resistance in each act of his true being, because he finds himself in the periphery, how much greater must this resistance be for a being who, also destined to live in the true time, finds himself in the appearance-time or the false-time.]

In a difficult passage Baader says that the resistance itself creates the Gegenstand. In theoretical thought, our thinking nature (Verstand) enters the temporal and this movement creates resistance. Just like a bird creates resistance by beating its wings in the air, so we create resistance by spreading our concepts. The resistance creates an other or Gegenstand for our thought. Baader calls it a mechanical Thou (because we relate as Thou only to objects to which we are opposite or gegenber). Our thinking function becomes aware of itself in this Gegenstand. The Gegenstand therefore supports our temporal thinking function. If [in apostate thought] we have lost our inner Ground Principle, we actually require such a Gegenstand for support. If we lose this supporting Gegenstand, this Thou that supports and carries us, we then lose our Self ( unser Ich). Losing ourselves in the colours and strange shapes, we are not aware of ourselves until we find something that mirrors our self-consciousness. That is why we are so overjoyed when such spontaneity shines through the Gegenstandfor example, in observing a scene of nature (Schriften, I, 56, 57). But it is possible to remain lost, and this is the temptation of theory. In supporting the self even in our apostate thinking, the resistance is there for our own goodto help us withstand the temptation of the temporal. The resistance is a weapon against this outer embodiment of ourselves. In setting up the polarity in apostate thought, it acts as a kind of common grace (Zeit, 3537). f) The temptation of theory Dooyeweerd says that theoretical thought has an antithetical nature: the logical aspect is opposed to [placed opposite?] the non-logical aspects (NC, I, 18, 39). This separation or antithesis of aspects is not a real antithesis. I believe that this means that we are to temporarily (i.e. in time) act as if there were such a separation between our logical function and our other functions. The logical function carries within it this very possibility of dis-stasis. Dooyeweerd says that in theoretical thought, the Gegenstand or object is not opposite our true Centerour supratemporal I-nessbut it is rather opposed to something within the temporal diversity of aspects (NC, II, 467). The correlate to the object of thought is therefore not our true selfhood, but something that stands for our true I. We are to temporarily act as if our logical function were our center. Dooyeweerd confirms that there is such a temporary separation of functions; there is an epoch involved in theoretical thought. He does not use this word in Husserls sense, but as meaning refraining from. In theoretical thought, there is a refraining from the temporal continuity of the cosmic coherence of meaning (NC, II, 468, 469). [64] When this epoch is cancelled, we fall back into the enstatic intuitive attitude of nave experience (NC, II, 482). Because of this refraining, we no longer experience time in its integral continuity. That is why Dooyeweerd says that theory can only approximate time (NC, I, 34). I believe that this means that we do not only abstract the Gegenstand from the fullness of temporal experience; we also abstract ourselves from the temporal coherence . But this suspension

is meant to be temporary. The dis-stasis of theoretical thought is to be followed by a synthesis with our selfhood operating in an integral way. Although we should proceed from the theoretical antithesis to the synthesis, we do not always do so. We are tempted to see our logical function as actually independent. This is the source of the dichotomistic belief of a distinction between body and soul:
the traditional dichotomistic conception of human nature as a composition of a material body and an immortal rational soul is doubtless connected with the misconception, that the antithetic relation in the theoretical attitude of thought answers to reality itself (NC, I, 44).

I also see this temptation as the source of the impairment to our pre-theoretical experience that Dooyeweerd says is caused by theory (NC, III, 145). Baader specifically refers to theory as a temptation (Versuchung) (Zeit, 27). Our freedom to be mediators for the temporal world can be used in two wayseither for or against God. Whatever we set free will continue to have either a liberating or a binding action (Elementarbegriffe, 544, 558). Thus, our theory can be used improperly. We can use our powers in an unlawful way, in order to hold inside ourselves what should remain outside (Zeit, 44 ft 25). We can give ourselves over entirely to the temporal. But the temporal world will then empty us like a bloodsucker, or a Heart-sucker (Herzsauger). Such a person ends up believing himself or herself to be as empty as the world (Zeit, 41 ft. 21; Werke, II, 89; Weltalter, 385). I believe that this is what Baader means by loss of Self. Although theory is a temptation, overcoming the temptation leads to a greater unity, and builds our character. A restored love is deeper than an untested love (Betanzos, 125). Like Dooyeweerd, Baader sees the Gegenstand relation as giving rise to a belief in a split between soul and body. He compares theorizing to a state of sleepwalking (somnambulism) or to dreams, where our inner sense becomes detached or dissociated from our outer senses (Werke, IV, 137; Susini, 378). There is an entzcken (enrapture), which is also felt as ecstasy. [65] This is a feeling of separation of body, spirit and soul; it is as if one were raised up by a charm (verzckt); transposed to a different world (hingeruckt) or partially absent (Werke, IV, 155). This state is contrary to nature; there is the danger that man may think he can be liberated from nature, from time and space (Werke, I, 265268). 25) Theoretical synthesis Dooyeweerd says that there is a dialectical method in theory. But the opposites are relative and not absolute, and we must search in theory for their higher synthesis ( Roots, 8). We cannot get beyond the antithesis in the Gegenstand relation unless it is directed above itself to a transcendent supra-temporal concentration point (NC, I, 31). [66] This is done with the help of our intuition, which should not be viewed as a separate metaphysical faculty, but as the temporal bottom layer of the analytical function. Our intuition relates the intermodal meaning synthesis to the transcendent identity of the modal functions that we experience in the religious root of our existence. In intuition we recognize the theoretical datum, the Gegenstand, as our own (NC, II, 475480). In other words, our intuition relates our theory to the experience of our supratemporal self. [67] For those who begin with a dualistic Ground Motive, no ultimate synthesis is possible; they are left with a primary religious dualism. Those caught in such a primary dualism may argue for the use

of a dialectical logic to attempt to overcome antithesis in starting points ( NC, II, 37). But this results only in a dialectical-logical unity, not a real unity (NC, I, 89). Baader also emphasizes the importance of synthesis of two opposed conceptual standpoints. The two opposed viewpoints are sublated (aufgehoben). Concepts have to be related back to their Center. Baader says that theory involves three steps. The first is the initial subordination or dissolution of true coherence, and our embodiment in the periphery [this is the abstraction in which we form the Gegenstand]. The second step is the collection (Sammlung) of the dispersed sparks in the temporal world, in order to reunite them in a higher order. The third step is when this unification or higher embodiment is completed; there is then death or dissolution of the lower embodiment; it is like the scaffolding that collapses after the house is built (Zeit, 36). Like Dooyeweerd, Baader emphasizes that there is a good and a bad dialectic (Weltalter, 129). The negative function of our abstracting, distinguishing Verstand is only a necessary moment in our thinking function; we must then restore the concrete ( Schriften, II, 217). Baader also stresses the importance of intuition. From our initial intuition ( Schauen) we move outwards in our theoretical abstraction; but we must return to this Schauen. [68] Otherwise, our thinking becomes an enemy; it then destroys and deadens our Spirit. The mistake in theory is not in the antithesis involved, in thought, but in failing to return to a synthesis. Dooyeweerd makes the same point. He says that that Kant and his followers opposed the logical function to the other modal aspects of the integral act of thought.
The only, but fundamental, mistake in their argument was the identification of the real act with a purely psychical temporal event, which in its turn could become a Gegenstand of the ultimate transcendental-logical cogito (NC, I, 50).

Kants mistake was trying to find the starting point for synthesis in the antithetical relation itself (NC, I, 54). In other words, Kant took the theoretical antithesis as fundamental, and regarded the antinomies as necessary. Kant did not take into account the synthesis with the supratemporal self. (26) Cultural development as an unfolding. Dooyeweerd and Baader agree that our pre-theoretical experience is limited. Dooyeweerd calls this experience nave. Baader refers to our everyday experienceour concrete factual and historical experienceas blind, unfree empiricism (blinden unfreien Empirie) (Werke, 1, 330; cited by Sauer, 30). Dooyeweerd says it is necessary to deepen our pre-theoretical experience in theoretical analysis (NC, II, 470). Our pre-theoretical experience participates in all aspects, but only in their retrocipatory analogies (NC, II, 373, 383). Nave experience is therefore not a completely integral experience, unlike the Romantic view of the pre-theoretical. In pretheoretical thought the logical aspect is only actualized in its retrocipatory structure ( NC, II, 120). Enstatical logical analysis is restrictively bound to sensory perception and can only analytically distinguish concrete things and their relations according to sensorily founded characteristics (NC, II, 470). [69] This is what makes the pre-theoretical experience nave! (NC, III, 31). In theory and the subsequent synthesis, we discover the anticipatory

moments. If anticipation means looking forward, this must be understood as a process that looks towards future wholeness or integration. The function of faith leads this opening process. The Christian idea of the opening-process is guided by faith in Christ as Redeemer. This does not mean an idealistic optimism, but recognizes a brokenness in spite of its direction towards the Root:
Only in its eschatological expectation of the ultimate full revelation of the Kingdom of God can Christian belief rise above this broken state without losing its relation to the sinful cosmos. For the same reason the Idea of the universality of each of the aspects within its own sphere cannot be conceived in a purely eschatological sense; it should also be related to our sinful cosmos (NC, II, 337).

The Christian opening process therefore has an eschatological element. This passage also confirms that sphere universality has an eschatological sense. [70] Baader also speaks of the successive unfolding of life, in which there is either a deepening or a closing (Zeit, 44 ft. 25). It is not sufficient to rest in the enstatic state. We must move ex-statically into the temporal world in order to co-create with God. If we do not do this we have failed our mission to dominate the world.
brigens ist es wesentlich, zu bemerken, da diese Verschlieung oder Vertiefung sukzessiv in der sukzessiven Entfaltung des Lebens eines Wesens geschieht (eine Enfaltung, welche seine Geschichte ausmacht), so da das, was in einer vorhergehended Epoche das Obere (den Gipfel) dieses Wesens ausmachte, in einer folgenden Epoche das Untere oder die Grundlage ausmachen mu. ( Zeit, 44, ft. 25). [Furthermore it is necessary to notice that this hidden mystery or deepening occurs gradually in the successive unfolding of the life of a being (an unfolding which makes up his history), so that that which was the highest (the peak) for a being in a previous era becomes the lower or the foundation].

Using Dooyeweerds language, I understand Baader to be saying that the retrocipatory functions were previously experienced as the highest. They now become the foundation of the unfolding process. In another passage, Baader speaks of some functions as leading other functions, and as accompanying other functions (als Leiter und Begleiter) (Schriften, II, 175). [71] And like Dooyeweerd, Baader sees faith as the function that opens our inner self (Weltalter, 278). For Dooyeweerd, the opening process involves the positivizing of principles; these principles are given only potentially and must be actualized ( NC, I, 105; II, 236, 335; II, 173). Baader also says that the law needs to be fulfilled in the finite being. Man has the power to fulfill the laws for creatures (Elementarbegriffe, 553). This response needs the cooperation of the finite being (Zeit, 32, 33). Man must organize and re-create the world; the laws are in the world but must be actualized. This is done by our perception (vernehmen, wahrnehmen) of the invisible laws that govern the earthly world. Nature is a book from which we decipher the divine characters or hieroglyphs in order to perceive the voice of God (Werke, XI, 29, 149). Similarly, Dooyeweerd says,
The powers and potential which God had enclosed within creation were to be disclosed by man in his service of love to God and neighbour (Roots, 30),

Positivizing is related to Baaders idea of active knowledge, or erkennen. Susini compares erkennen to Claudels idea of connaisance, or co-naissance. It is a giving birth to something, a constructive knowledge. [72] But this constructive knowledge should not be confused with constructivism in todays sense of the word. For Baader, erkennen is not a matter of inventing new principles, but of discovering them. It is a finden (finding), and not an erfinden (invention). The knowledge that we find derives from a source that dominates and founds this knowledge. (Susini, I, 432; Weltalter, 261).

7 Autonomy and Postmodernism

Both Baader and Dooyeweerd have challenged the dogma of the autonomy of thought. But if the theoretical Gegenstand relation involves moving into the temporal, and using our logical function as if it were separate, does this mean that Baader and Dooyeweerd have reintroduced the autonomy of thought? That is how Sauer interprets Baader. Sauer says that the Absolute is the transcendental ground that makes possible the autonomy of the subject (Sauer, 25). The existing conditions of our existence make possible our Selbstsetzung or autonomy. Sauer interprets Baader dialectically: he says that the two standpointsgrounded in God, gesetzt and autonomy (Selbstsetzung) limit each other. He interprets Baader in postmodern termsthat all our knowledge is therefore mediated through the temporal and the historical. Some of Dooyeweerds followers have tried to interpret Dooyeweerd in this postmodern wayas advocating the idea that all our thought is mediated by the temporal. [73] They will find new arguments in support of this interpretation in Sauers reading of Baader. But I do not believe that this kind of postmodern reinterpretation of Baader and Dooyeweerd is justified. The transcendental ground of our being is that which makes possible our autonomy, the idolization of the temporal (NC, I, 31 ft.1; Elementarbegriffe, 544). But autonomy is to be rejected; we must always move from analysis to the synthesis with our supratemporal experience. Sauer does not devote attention to cosmic time and the supratemporal Center. [74] The mediation of the unmediated does not refer to our mediated knowledge, but rather to our mediation of temporal beings in order to lift them up to the unmediated. Like Baader, Dooyeweerd says that, although we are bound to time, we are not limited to our temporal functions (NC, II, 561). All human experience, both in the pre-theoretical and in the theoretical attitudes, is rooted in the structure of the transcendent unity of self-consciousness (NC, II, 560). We have access to a transcendental self-reflection (NC, I, 7, 51; II, 491, 554). We can transcend theory in religious selfknowledge of God and self, which is rooted in the heart ( NC, I, 55). It is only by standing in the transcendent fullness of truth that we can direct our subjective insight into the temporal horizon (NC, II, 572). Those who attempt to interpret Dooyeweerd as a postmodern have also rejected his idea of the supratemporal heart. One reason for rejecting it is the belief that it implies a dualism, and involves a static view of eternity. [75] I have shown that this was not the intention of either Dooyeweerd or Baader. Others have raised the objection that to emphasize the Center is a sign of totalizing thinking. [76] But both Baader and Dooyeweerd say that our positivizations are fallible, and that those who do not share our Ground Motive can still discover truth. And neither Baader and Dooyeweerd believe in a static Unity or monism. It is true that they reject all dualisms. But non-dualism does not necessarily imply monism. [77] Their thought is entirely Trinitarian in emphasizing the respect for both unity and

diversity within both the temporal and the supratemporal; there is a dynamism even within God. Todays movements of postmodernism, hermeneutics and constructivism have their own metaphysical assumptions. To reject the possibility of an immediate experience of the supratemporal is itself a metaphysical assumption. The nature of time is by no means settled in philosophy, in physics, psychology or theology. In fact, Baaders ideas of cosmic time are still being debated. And many of the concerns of postmodernism come down to a question of the meaning of time. [78] Modern constructivist theories are still within a Kantian framework. [79] They are therefore still subject to the transcendental critique of Baader and Dooyeweerd. Dooyeweerd emphasizes that the idea of cosmic time is the basis of his philosophical theory of reality (NC, I, 28), and that the idea of the supratemporal selfhood must be the presupposition of any truly Christian view. [80] Furthermore, he says that we can have actual experience of the supratemporal. This is Dooyeweerds mysticism.

8 The Importance of Mystical Experience

Dooyeweerd rejects any mysticism that divorces itself from the temporal world. He is opposed to any idea of a supernatural cognition (NC, II, 561563). He also rejects any mysticism that fancies itself above Gods law (NC, I, 522). Mysticism is not something other than nature, but rather an insight into the true nature of reality. In the true religious attitude, we experience things and events as they really are, pointing beyond themselves to the true religious centre of meaning and to the true Origin ( NC, III, 30). I believe that this true religious attitude is itself a kind of mysticism, especially when we consider how it relates to the experience of our supratemporal heart to which we are related in our intuition. Dooyeweerd expressly describes the experience of the true religious attitude:
In the Biblical attitude of nave experience the transcendent, religious dimension of its horizon is opened. The light of eternity radiates perspectively through all the temporal dimensions of this horizon and even illuminates seemingly trivial things and events in our sinful world. In this attitude the experiencing I-ness is necessarily in the I-we relation of the Christian community and in the we-Thou-relation with God, Who has revealed Himself in Christ Jesus (NC, III, 29)

If this experience occurs in nave experience, it must be a nave experience that has been opened up by theory and subsequent synthesis, since there are no anticipations in pretheoretical experience. Dooyeweerds description of this Biblical attitude might be compared to Staces idea of extrovertive mystical experience. [81] It is not a mystical experience divorced from the world. It is also not a pure consciousness experience or nirvikalpa samdhi. It may be similar to what has been referred to as sahaja samdhi. [82] Dooyeweerds emphasis on the importance of experience is also evident in an eschatological sense: true Christian faith finds its fulfillment in the religious vision face to face (II, 298). [83] Baader speaks of a similar experience that he calls the Silberblick [Silver Vision]. In this experience, there is a reintegration of feeling and knowledge in self-transcendence; it is an unreflective reaching out (bergreifenden), an anticipation that manifests itself as a

transient Silberblick (Werke, 4, 114; cited by Sauer, 51). It is achieved when our intuition (Anschauen) moves in the anticipatory direction (Zeit, 58, ft. 14; Fermenta, I, 23). We then can see with a double lightfrom out of the Center but also into the periphery. There is a coherence of inner and outer seeing. Ecstasy is an anticipation of this integrity.
In der Ekstase als Antizipation jener Integritt blickt darum (wenn shon nur momentan) das himmlische Auge als Silberblick durch das blo uere Sehen, oder es blickt das infernale Auge durch. Shakespeare nennt diese Momente bedeutend: Eternal moments. Zeit, 58, ft. 14). [In ecstasy as anticipation this integrity is seen by the heavenly eye (if only momentarily) through the purely outer seeing, or it is seen through the infernal eye. Shakespeare calls these moments Eternal moments.]

I believe that this is what Baader refers to when he speaks of the mirroring of the Self in certain moments. But our glimpse of the supratemporal can also be a horror; this is when we see hell through our infernal eye. In both kinds of seeing, we are anticipating the final state to which we are evolvingeither with God or apart from God.

9 Conclusion
The similarities between Dooyeweerd and Baader will necessarily occasion a reevaluation of Dooyeweerd. I do not mean to deny all originality to Dooyeweerd; he has systematized many of Baaders ideas, and he has related these ideas to subsequent philosophers such as Husserl and Heidegger. Dooyeweerd has also more fully investigated the analogical relations in the modal aspects, and in the individuality structures. But I believe that Dooyeweerds ideas can only be understood in relation to how these ideas were first used by Baader. I hope that their ideas of cosmic time, the religious experience of the supratemporal self, the religious root, the nature of pre-theoretical experience and the Gegenstand relation will be examined again by those who have previously rejected these ideas. Unless these ideas are accepted, there is no ontological basis for the ideas of sphere sovereignty, sphere universality, and the analogical relation between the sciences. Dooyeweerds mysticism, and his emphasis on our central supratemporal experience can also provide a fruitful basis for ecumenical and inter-religious dialogue. And the idea of the Gegenstand theory as an act of love and kenosis can provide a basis for theoretical thought both for mystics (who too often have an acosmic view of reality), and for those scientists, who rightly want to reject the arrogant autonomy of modernism but who also want to resist the de-centering nihilism that is so characteristic of postmodernism. There is a structural a priori, and our theory is a discovery and a positivizing, but not our own construction. Our thought is original only insofar as it points back to our Origin.

10 Bibliography
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Dooyeweerd, Herman: Roots of Western Culture (Toronto: Wedge, 1979) [Roots]. Drucker, Peter: Friedrich Julius Stahl: Conservative Theory of the State and Historical Development (1933). Edwards, Paul (ed.): The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan, 1967). Friesen, John Glenn: Abhishiktnandas Non-Monistic Advaitic Experience (Doctoral Thesis, University of South Africa, 2001). Geertsema, Henk: Dooyeweerds Transcendental Critique: Transforming it Hermeneutically, in: D.F.M. Strauss and Michelle Botting (eds.), Contemporary Reflections on the Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000). Goudzwaard, B.: Dooyeweerds maatschappelijke opvattingen, in: J. De Bruijn, (ed.), Dooyeweerd Herdacht (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1995). Griffin, David Ray: Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time (State University of New York, 1986). Hart, Hendrik: Problems of Time: An Essay, in: K.A. Bril, K.A., H. Hart, J. Klapwijk (eds.), The Idea of a Christian Philosophy (Toronto: Wedge, 1973). Hart, Hendrik: Dooyeweerds Gegenstand Theory of Theory, in: C.T. McIntire (ed.), The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd (University Press of America, 1985). Hart, Hendrik: Notes on Dooyeweerd, Reason and Order, in: D.F.M. Strauss and Michelle Botting (eds.), Contemporary Reflections on the Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000). Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Harper & Row, 1962). Kuyper, Abraham: Pantheisms Destruction of Boundaries, The Methodist Review (July 1893) [ http://www.ucalgary.ca/~nurelweb/papers/other/panth-1.html]. McIntire, C.T.: Dooyeweerds Philosophy of History, in: C.T. McIntire (ed.), The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd (University Press of America, 1985) [Legacy]. Morbey, Michael M.: Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and the Reformational Vision: Theosophy reformed, Nuances (online journal, now discontinued). Olthuis, James: Dooyeweerd on Religion and Faith, in: C.T. McIntire (ed.), The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd (University Press of America, 1985). Olthuis, James: Of Webs and Whirlwinds; Me, Myself and I, in D.F.M. Strauss and Michelle Botting (eds.), Contemporary Reflections on the Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000).

Perovich, Jr., Anthony N.: Does the Philosophy of Mysticism Rest on a Mistake? in: Robert K.C. Forman (ed.), The Problem of Pure Consciousness (Oxford, 1990). Poppe, Kurt: Afterword to Franz von Baader: ber die Begrndung der Ethik durch die Physik und andere Schriften (Stuttgart: Verlag Freies Geistesleben, 1969). Puchinger, G.: Dooyeweerd: de figuur, in J. De Bruijn (ed.), Dooyeweerd Herdacht (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1995). Sandbothe, Mike: The Temporalization of Time, tr. Andrew Inkpin (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001; originally published 1998). Sauer, Hanjo: Ferment der Vermittlung: Zum Theologiebegriff bei Franz von Baader (Gttingen: Vanderhoek & Ruprecht, 1977). Scholem, Gershom G.: Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, 1961), Schumacher, Ferdinand: Der Begriff der Zeit bei Franz von Baader (Mnchen: Karl Alber, 1983). Smith, James K.A.: The Fall of Interpretation (InterVarsity Press, 2000). Spiegelberg, Herbert: The Context of the Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981). Stace, W.T.: Mysticism and Philosophy (London: MacMillan, 1960). Strauss, D.F.M. and Botting, Michelle: Contemporary Reflections on the Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000) [CR] Strauss, D.F.M.: The Nature of Philosophy, in K.A. Bril, K.A., H. Hart, J. Klapwijk (eds.), The Idea of a Christian Philosophy (Toronto: Wedge, 1973). Strauss, D.F.M.: The Order of Modal Aspects, in: D.F.M. Strauss and Michelle Botting (eds.), Contemporary Reflections on the Thought of Herman Dooyeweerd (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000). Steen, Peter J.: The Structure of Herman Dooyeweerds Thought (Toronto: Wedge, 1983). Susini, Eugne: Franz von Baader et le romantisme mystique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1942). Vander Stelt, John C.: Kuypers Semi-Mystical Conception, in: K.A. Bril, H. Hart, J. Klapwijk (eds.) The Idea of a Christian Philosophy (Toronto: Wedge, 1973). Van Peursen, C.A.: Dooyeweerd en de wetenschappelijke discussie, in: J. De Bruijn (ed.), Dooyeweerd Herdacht, (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1995). Wolters, Aly: The Intellectual Milieu of Herman Dooyeweerd, in: C.T. McIntire (ed.), The Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd (University Press of America, 1985).

Notes
[1] G.E. Langemeijer calls Dooyeweerd the most original philosopher Holland has ever produced, even Spinoza not excepted. Contemporary Reflections on the Philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd, ed. D.F.M. Strauss and Michelle Botting (Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), quotation on cover. I will refer to this work as CR. [2] Herman Dooyeweerd: Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1935) [WdW ]. [3] Herman Dooyeweerd: A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969; first published 1953) [New Critique or NC]. [4] Baader says that Man was originally an androgynous being. ber die Begrndung der Ethik durch die Physik (Stuttgart: Verlag Freies Geistesleben, 1969), 85 [Begrndung]. [5] G.C. Berkouwer: A Half Century of Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 196, 197. My attention was drawn to this quotation by Michael M. Morbey, Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and the Reformational Vision: Theosophy reformed, Nuances (online journal, now discontinued). Morbey says that Kuypers ideas are in the theosophical tradition, but his brief article does not specifically relate Dooyeweerd to Baader. [6] Hugo Ball, cited by Poppe, Afterword to Begrndung, 108. [7] It is interesting that Kuyper objected not to the mysticism but to the nationalism of the Russian church. He says that the Russian church has still not been able to separate itself from the national element, and therefore has not been able to produce a form of life of its own from the root of its mystical orthodoxy. Lectures on Calvinism, Calvinism as a life system, 17. [8] Susini, Introduction to Fermenta Cognitionis, 14, 21. See also David Baumgardt: Franz von Baader und die Philosophische Romantik (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1927), 43. Baader says that his work must be polemical because it is a refutation of irreligious views, ancient and modern (Werke, I, 155). [9] Herman Dooyeweerd, Foreword to WdW , reproduced in NC, I, vii. Puchinger comments on the polemical nature of Dooyeweerds own writings: Dooyeweerd: de figuur, in J. De Bruijn (ed.), Dooyeweerd Herdacht, 13. [10] Louis Claude de St. Martin (17431803) wrote under the name of the Unknown Philosopher (le philosophe inconnu). He was the author of Des erreurs et de la vrit and Le Tableau Naturel. The latter book showed the relations between God, Man and the universe. St. Martin is not to be confused with the Jewish mystic Martines Pasqualis, who also influenced Baader. [11] Baader had only a superficial knowledge of Kabbalah (Baumgardt, 35). Baader regarded the Sefer Yetsirah [The Book of Creation] as an original revelation to the Jews. Baaders references to these and other mystical sources may be one reason that Dooyeweerd does not specifically refer to Baader. This is especially so in view of the fact that the theological faculty at the Vrije Universiteit mistrusted Dooyeweerds ideas, leading to a ten year investigation of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven in the 1930s (Puchinger, Dooyeweerd Herdacht, 19). Today there is more openness to discussion of ideas such as the Kabbalah. [12] Scholem says that theosophy should not be understood in the sense of Madame Blavatskys later movement of that name. Theosophy postulates a kind of divine emanation whereby God, abandoning his self-contained repose, awakens to mysterious life; further, it maintains that the mysteries of creation reflect the pulsation of this divine life. Gershom G. Scholem: Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, 1961), 206. [13] Similarly, there are those who say that Dooyeweerds ideas are dark and unreadable (duister en zelfs onleesbaar), Puchinger, Dooyeweerd Herdacht, 15.

[14] Baumgardt, 57. Baader introduced Hegel to the thought of Eckhart (Werke, XV, 159; Baumgardt, 34), and he introduced Schelling to the thought of Bhme, thereby changing Schellings orientation from pantheism to theism (Baumgardt, 41). But influence does not necessarily mean agreement; Baader disagreed with Hegel, Schelling, as well as others that he influenced. [15] See Peter Drucker, Friedrich Julius Stahl: Conservative Theory of the State and Historical Development (1933) [ http://www.peterdrucker.at]. Dooyeweerd devotes considerable attention to Stahls ideas. [16] Betanzos, 12, 25; Susini, 6. [17] Poppe, Afterword to Begrndung, 107, 108. Kierkegaard in his Concept of Dread refers to the customary power and validity of Baaders ideas. (Baumgardt, 7 and 398). Friedrich Heer thought that Berdyaevs ideas were based completely on Baader (Betanzos, 294). [18] Introduction to Fermenta Cognitionis, tr. Eugne Susini (Paris: Albin, 1985), 9. [19] Dooyeweerd had this same goalto relate the whole temporal cosmos, in both its natural and spiritual aspects (NC, I, v). [20] (Werke, XV, 469). Grassl summarizes Baaders thought: With God a man knows differently than against God. See H. Grassl (ed.), Franz von Baader: ber Liebe, Ehe und Kunst, 18; cited by Betanzos, 47, 48. [21] See my discussion of this analogy of organicism, infra. [22] See also WdW , I, 6: zin-samenhang, waarin wij met al onze functiesgevoegd zijn. See also WdW , I, 65 and NC, I, 4, 29, 40 ft. 1, 100; II, 468. [23] Thus, although we are bound to time, we are not limited to time. Baader makes this same distinction. [24] Abraham Kuyper: Pantheisms Destruction of Boundaries, tr. Hendrik de Vries, The Methodist Review (July 1893), 520535 [ http://www.ucalgary.ca/ ~nurelweb/papers/other/panth-1.html]. The online text incorrectly refers to pracische Bernunft. [25] McIntire asks why Dooyeweerd says that the religious dialectic must involve two poles and not a pluralistic religious dynamic of multiple poles (Legacy, 110). I believe that Baader provides the explanation for this dialectic. [26] The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Macmillan, 1967), I, 233. [27] Betanzos, 40, citing J. Sauter: Baader and Kant (Jena: Fischer, 1928). [28] That is C.T. McIntires explanation. Dooyeweerds Philosophy of History, in Legacy 84. But McIntire also says Cosmic time is not eternity, but it is not simply creaturely time either. [29] Baader obtained the idea of these three levels of time from St. Martin ( Fermenta, VI, 17). [30] God created all things good, but needed Mans free cooperation to remain in this integration. The creature is first labil[unstable]; it must win Illabilitt [the state where it cannot fall] (Elementarbegriffe, 541). [31] Both Dasein and Ereignis are terms later used by Heidegger. How these terms relate to Baaders ideas deserves further study. Heideggers also speaks of there being a primordial time. See Being and Time, (H 348, ft.) [32] Susini, Introduction to Fermenta, 15. [33] Even before Newton, Bhme (15751624) had a spiritual illumination that appears to have been caused by his viewing a spectrum. He saw sunlight reflecting off the water in a pewter dish. This caused an ecstatic vision in which he knew God to be the unmanifest unity reflecting Himself in His creation. [34] See my discussion of Inexistenz, infra. [35] I have translated decken as congruent See Weltalter, 340, where decken is used in this geometrical sense, where both centers cover themselves, or are congruent.

[36] Van der Stelt refers to Kuypers baffling and puzzling use of organic. He says that for Kuyper, organic and logical mean the same thing, and imply a dualism with the nonlogical (Kuypers Semi-Mystical Conception, The Idea of a Christian Philosophy, 183). But Kuyper should be understood in relation to Baader. Although his thought is certainly mystical, Baader does not absolutize the logical. Baaders organicism is intended to oppose dualism. Steen refers to organic analogies in the use of the terms root, unfolding, and differentiation. The figure of the organism shows the correlation of time and eternity (Steen, 185). [37] Betanzos, 76. In this connection, it is interesting that Leo Lwenthal, a member of the Frankfurt school, and a close friend of Marcuse, wrote his doctoral dissertation on Baader. [38] Vernieuwing en bezinning, 188; cited by Goudzwaard: Dooyeweerds maatschappelijke opvattingen, in: Dooyeweerd Herdacht (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1995), 27. [39] Baader refers to Herders emphasis on the grand law of analogy ( Werke, XI, 71). And Baader cites St. Martin who refers to the grand law of analogy that ranges across the world (Werke, XI, 127128; Susini, 100). [40] C.A. van Peursen: Dooyeweerd en de wetenschappelijke discussie, in Dooyeweerd Herdacht, 86. [41] St. Martin frequently refers to Bhmes idea that we must explain things through Man and not Man through things (Werke, XI, 233; 12, 88, 264, 371372). [42] Dooyeweerd: Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomien, Philosophia Reformata I, (1936) 6583, (and IV) (1939), 12; cited by Steen, 134. [43] Steen, 60 ft. 31 cites Dooyeweerd Individualiteits-structuur en Thomistisch substantie-begrip, Philosophia Reformata IX (1944), 33. [44] The idea of a Root that is the source of individuality is found in Plotinus: Enneads (Third Tractate) That which resumes all under a unity is a Principle in which all things exist together and the single thing is All. From this Principle, which remains internally unmoved, particular things push forth as from a single root which never itself emerges. They are a branching into part, into multiplicity, each single outgrowth bearing its trace of the common source. [45] This view of Gods Word as acting in a Central way is familiar in Dooyeweerd and in neo-Calvinism generally. [46] This statement relies on the analogy of the prism. The collection and return of rays to their source is an idea that is similar to Lurianic Kabbalah, with which Baader was familiar. [47] This image of a seed recalls Calvins idea of a semen religionis that is sown in our heart. (Institutes, Vol. I, Book I, c. 4, s. 1). It is cited by Kuyper in his Lectures on Calvinism, 46. [48] There are three levels: God is the principle of revelation, man is organ; nature is instrument (Werke, IV, 81; VII, 90 ff). [49] Herman Dooyeweerd: Introduction to Idea of a Christian Philosophy: Essays in Honour of D. H. Th. Vollenhoven, (Toronto: Wedge, 1973), 9. See also NC, I, 11; II, 552. [50] Kuyper relates this emphasis on ordinary experience to Kuypers defence of Christs little ones and the plain folk of the Christian community from attack by science (Steen, 273). But this ignores the influence of Baader on both Kuyper and Dooyeweerd. [51] Dooyeweerds use of the word Erleben here must not be understood as a merely emotional experience, as in Schleiermacher and Gadamer. Dooyeweerd refers to it as an Erleben or Hineinleben into reality; it primarily unfolds itself in the integral experience of temporal reality to which any kind of theoretical meaning-synthesis is still alien ( NC, II, 474). [52] Animals are not displaced (versetztes) beings. Humans are displaced, because although they have a supratemporal center, they also function in time.

[53] Insofar as Man is temporal, the three domains of mineral, plant and animal are matched in Mans temporal being by body, soul and spirit, which correspond to the three outer senses, touching, hearing, and seeing (Werke, IV, 153 and note 1). Baader refers to St. John who says, that which we have seen, heard, and touched with our hands ( Werke, VII, 245). Our inner sense corresponds to our supratemporal center. [54] According to Sauer, Baader rejects the nave realist model of knowledge because it leaves unexplained the Subject-Object relation. The Subject-Object Relation must be explained before the theoretical Gegenstand relation (Sauer, 31). [55] Wolters sees Dooyeweerds idea of nave experience as a radicalization of Husserls intentionality (Legacy, 13). But Dooyeweerd is very clear that it is only theoretical thought that is intentional, not the pre-theoretical or nave. [56] Franz Brentano: Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874), 115116. [57] Franz Brentano: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. ed. L.L. McAlister, translated by A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973). [58] Herbert Spiegelberg: The Context of the Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 26. I am indebted to Michael Morbey for this reference. [59] Baader relies here on Bhme, who says that the world was in eternal Wisdom as a figure invisible to intelligent creatures. The world reaches its true end only by Man (Fermenta, VI, 15). Whether Baaders ideas of Inexistenz influenced Franz Brentano (18381917) deserves further research. Baader did influence Franz Brentanos uncle, the poet Clemens Brentano (17781842). [60] These philosophers also reject the idea of the supratemporal heart, which is essential to understanding the Gegenstand relation. [61] See Hendrik Hart: nave knowledge is oriented to individuality, while science concentrates on the universal law-structures which individual reality has (Dooyeweerds Gegenstand Theory of Theory, Legacy, 160 ft. 25). D.F.M. Strauss says that abstraction involves the lifting out or identification of something or at least some property of it. Abstraction is not specific to theory, but theory focuses on the modal aspects. Pretheoretical abstraction is entity-directed; theoretical or scientific thought is directed to modal analysis (The Nature of Philosophy, The Idea of a Christian Philosophy, 272, 273). But Geertsema criticizes Strauss for identifying abstraction with analysis, which is the distinguishing of universal features which are identified. He says that Strauss therefore fails to do justice to abstraction from the continuity of cosmic time (Dooyeweerds Transcendental Critique: Transforming it Hermeneutically, CR, 88, 89). [62] Although Dooyeweerd sometimes speaks of pre-theoretical experience in terms of individuals, these are typical total-structures of individuality that are experienced not in isolation, but in interrelationships with other such structures (NC, I, 38). [63] Idea knowledge goes beyond conceptual knowledge. When we speak of our intuition, we are using an Idea instead of a concept (NC, II, 479). Wolters says that Dooyeweerd borrowed this distinction between concept and Idea from the neo-Kantians, especially Stammler (18561938) (The Intellectual Milieu of Herman Dooyeweerd, in: Legacy, 12). But Baader also makes the distinction. Baader refers to abstraction alone as the death of the Idea (Werke, I, 71; Sauer, 117). The Idea is a unity of the concept and of reality (Weltalter, 138). [64] Baader speaks of cosmic time as a suspension of eternity. Dooyeweerd says that cosmic time in its turn is suspended, or refrained from. [65] Ek-stasis (ecstasy) means detachment from a given base and displacement, transport to a different region (Weltalter, 375) When we are in a different realm, we are displaced or versetzt (Werke, III, 346) Usually, it is to a higher region. But as I understand Baader, this ecstasy can also be experienced when in theory, we move opposite the lower realm, and find our self mirrored in the inner nature of the Gegenstand. Only by means of such a

lower ecstasy can man desire a higher ecstasy (Schriften, II, 4). Extase is both a memory of the true stasis as well as an anticipation of the integration and centering of Man, without which creation cannot be integrated (Schriften, II, xxvii). [66] Steen observes the importance of the supratemporal heart for this synthesis (Steen, 28, 67). But Steen does not recognize the descent to the temporal that is involved in theory. [67] This means that for Dooyeweerd, there is an immediate experience of the supratemporal self. It is not correct to interpret Dooyeweerd as believing that all our knowledge is mediated through the temporal. Our intuition is the link between our supratemporal experience and our temporal functions. [68] Wolters comments on Dooyeweerds use of the archaic Dutch verb schouwen. Wolters sees parallels with Husserls intuition or Wesenschau (Legacy, 14). But Baader also used schauen in this sense. In a variant of Kant, Baader says, Schauen ohne Denken blind; Denken ohne Schauen sinnlos wre (Werke, I, 191; Sauer, 46). [69] Thus, in many ways, nave experience is similar to what Baader calls empiricism. [70] Dooyeweerds view of anticipation is similar to Smiths eschatological immediacy model of hermeneutics, which Smith associates with Pannenberg. The Fall of Interpretation (InterVarsity Press, 2000). [71] In this case, Baader speaks of the sensory functions as leading and accompanying, although not the source of our thought function. Dooyeweerd did not see the sensory functions as leading thought. [72] Claudel, Art potique, 82; cited by Susini, I, 31. [73] Olthuis refers to Derrida as being in line with Dooyeweerd, that knowledge is always located, mediated and referential. Olthuis says that our directedness to the Origin should be seen as always mediated through our temporal functions. Olthuis acknowledges that for Dooyeweerd our relation to the Origin is unmediated; but this unmediated relation is through the supratemporal self, which Olthuis rejects. But Olthuis posits love as a quasi transcendental. (Of Webs and Whirlwinds; Me, Myself and I, CR, 3238). Hart says that Dooyeweerd had postmodern impulses in opposing the autonomous thought of modernism, although he also refers to William Rowes contention that postmodernism has its own kind of autonomy (Notes on Dooyeweerd, Reason and Order, CR, 128, 132). Smith agrees with Caputo and Derrida that the quest for the unconditioned, unmediated, absolute Infinite is a dangerous and impossible dream (Fall of Interpretation, 29). Strauss speaks of the mediated immediacy of language (The Order of Modal Aspects, CR, 16). Geertsema is more cautious in accepting a postmodernist interpretation (Dooyeweerds Transcendental critique: Transforming it Hermeneutically, CR, 83 ff). [74] Schumacher says that Sauers interpretation of Baader in terms of a mediated immediacy (Vermittlungsbegriff) is inadequate. Sauer ignores Baaders Trinitarianism and view of God and creation. (Schumacher, 29). [75] Steen sees dualistic traces of the nature-grace Ground Motive in Dooyeweerds idea of supratemporality. Dooyeweerds colleague D.H. Th. Vollenhoven never accepted supratemporality. It was also rejected by C.A. van Peursen, J.M. Spier, Hendrik van Riessen, S.U. Zuidema and K.J. Popma (Steen, 7, 13, 24, 30, 126, 154). It is interesting that Vollenhoven was aware of Baader and characterizes his thought as semi-mystical, which was also Vollenhovens criticism of Kuyper (Bril, krt #49). Olthuis sees the supratemporal heart as dualistic: Dooyeweerd on Religion and Faith (Legacy, 21, 33, 34). Also McIntire (Dooyeweerds Philosophy of History, Legacy, 88) and Hart (Problems of Time: An Essay, The Idea of a Christian Philosophy, 41). Geertsema rejects the supratemporal heart on the grounds that it is anthropocentric (CR, 93, 97). [76] Olthuis criticizes the dominance of centering and unity metaphors in Dooyeweerd. Instead of the selfs relation to God described as central to Origin, and the selfs relation to the body as center and periphery, Olthuis proposes that there can be as many and as diverse ways of describing the relation to God and self as there is a diversity in human

experience. (CR, 3238). Goudzwaard speaks of totalizing in Levinas sense ( Dooyeweerd Herdacht, 35). Hart says that order needs to be conceptualized as less total and more dynamic (CR, 137). Smith says that he wishes to deconstruct the mono-logic of both a notion of immediacy and a correspondence theory of truth (Fall of Interpretation, 216 ft.) [77] Steen says there is more a duality than a dualism in Dooyeweerd because the unity is more original or basic. He refers to a monism with higher and lower contrasts in correlation (Steen, 56). For ways of conceptualizing nondualism in a non-monistic way, see my Abhishiktnandas Non-Monistic Advaitic Experience (Doctoral thesis, University of South Africa, 2001). [78] See Mike Sandbothe: The Temporalization of Time, tr. Andrew Inkpin (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001; originally published 1998), 1, 71. Sandbothe refers to Baaders idea of time as a new Archimedean point, unifying our everyday experience of self and of time as a substantial and subject-independent basic structure. It was this reference by Sandbothe that provided the impetus for me to read Baader. Other philosophers view time in a similar way to Baaderas a uniform universal base structure. See Griffins discussion of David Bohm and Ilya Prigogine in Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time (SUNY, 1986). Sandbothe opts for seeing time in an de-centered or temporalized way. He shows how this temporalization of time is related to Rorty, Levinas, Heidegger, and to Ricoeurs idea of narrative. [79] See Anthony N. Perovich, Jr.: Does the Philosophy of Mysticism Rest on a Mistake? in: Robert K.C. Forman (ed.), The Problem of Pure Consciousness (Oxford, 1990). [80] Herman Dooyeweerd: De Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer (Amsterdam: W. Ten Have, 1931), 113, cited by Steen, 79 ft. 53 and 153 ft. 46: voor iedere wezenlijk Christelijke beschouwing der tijdelijke samenleving. [81] W.T. Stace: Mysticism and Philosophy (London: MacMillan, 1970). But Staces view of enstasy is more what we might call pure consciousness, something that Dooyeweerd denies is possible. [82] See my Abhishiktnandas Non-Monistic Advaitic Experience. [83] Van Peursen comments on the mystical background to Dooyeweerds thought, especially in connection with his references to our religious choice in the face of the Origin of meaning, the face of God, the hidden Present One (Dooyeweerd Herdacht, 93).