Allison Lukanich

201 S. Brightleaf Blvd., Ste 4

Smithfield, NC 27577
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Ofce fr Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Ojjice of the Clerk
5/07 lccsb1rg Pike, S1ite 2000
fll. Church. Virginia 2 :41
OHS/ICE Ofice of Chief Counsel - SOC
146 CCA Road
Lumpkin, GA 31815
Name: SANCHEZ-VAZQUEZ, BRYAN A 205-213-774
Date of this notice:
8/30/2013
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Mullane, Hugh G.
Sincerely,
Do CtV
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Userteam: Docket
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Cite as: Bryan Sanchez-Vazquez, A205 213 774 (BIA Aug. 30, 2013)

SANCHEZ-VAZQUEZ, BRYAN
A205-213-77 4
146 CCA Road
Lumpkin, GA 31815
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Ofce fr Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals
Office of the Clerk
5107 leesb11rg Pike, S11ite 2000
Falls Clwrch. Virginia 22041
OHS/ICE Ofice of Chief Counsel SOC
146 CCA Road
Lumpkin, GA 31815
Name: SANCHEZ-VAZQUEZ, BRYAN A 205-213-774
Date of this notice: 8/30/2013
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision in the above-refrenced case. This copy is being
provided to you as a courtesy. Your attorey or representative has been served with this
decision pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 1292.S(a). If the attached decision orders that you be
removed fom the United States or afrms an Immigration Judge's decision ordering that you
be removed, any petition fr review of the attached decision must be fled with and received
by the appropriate court of appeals within 30 days of the date of the decision.
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Mullane, Hugh G.
. P W
Sincerely,
Dcn c t
fff ff . Wf.....
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
:;ctiNzir:A
Useream: Dot;kct
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Cite as: Bryan Sanchez-Vazquez, A205 213 774 (BIA Aug. 30, 2013)
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Ofce fr Immigation Review
Decision of the Board oflmmigation Appeals
Falls Church, Virginia 22041 ,
File: A205 213 774 - Lumpkin, GA
Date:
In re: BRYAN SANCHEZ-VAZQUEZ
I REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL
ONBEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Allison Lukanich, Esquire
ON BEHALF OF DHS: Diane Dodd
Assistant Chief Counsel
CHARGE:
AUG 3 0
2013
Notice: Sec. 212(a)(6)(A)(i), I&N Act [
8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(
6)(A)(i)] -
Present without being admitted or paroled
APPLICATION: Voluntary departure
The Deparment of Homeland Security ("DHS") appeals fom the Immigation Judge's
March 29, 2013, decision granting the respondent's application fr voluntary departure. Section
240B(a)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229c(a)(l). The respondent, a
native and citizen of Mexico, opposes the appeal. 1 The appeal will be dismissed.
We review fr clear eror the fndings of fct, including the determination of credibility,
made by the Immigration Judge. 8 C.F .R. 1003 .1 ( d)(3 )(i). We review de novo all other issues,
including whether the parties have met the relevant burden of proof, and issues of discretion.
8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3)(ii).
We afr the Immigation Judge's grant of voluntary departure under safeguards to the
respondent. We disagree with the DHS that the Immigration Judge imperissibly shifed the
burden of proving that the respondent's conviction fr maintaining a place fr controlled
substances in violation of section 90-108(a)(7) of the North Carolina General Statutes was fr an
aggravated felony. There is no dispute that it is the respondent's burden to establish eligibility
fr the relief that he seeks ad thus to show that he was not convicted of an aggavated flony
(Respondent's Reply Brief at 4-5). See 240(c)(4) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4); 8 C.F.R.
l 240.26(b )(I )(i)(E).
1 The respondent contends that the DHS did not properly sere him its appeal brief and
consequently requests summary dismissal of the DHS's appeal. We conclude that sumary
dismissal is not warranted as a result of this procedural iregularity in this instance but gat the
respondent's request to accept his late reply brief.
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Cite as: Bryan Sanchez-Vazquez, A205 213 774 (BIA Aug. 30, 2013)
A205 213 774
We afn the Immigation Judge's conclusion that te respondent met his burden i tis cae.
Te record of conviction refects that the respondent was convicted of a misdemeaor (Exh. 2).
The DHS asserts that the respondent's ofense is a drug taffcking aggavated felony because it
is equivalent to a flony under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, specifcally 21 U.S.C.
856(a). See Lopez v. Gonales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006); see also section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Act,
8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(B).
Presuming that the conviction rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts
criminalized, we conclude that the minimum conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under
N.C. Gen. Stat. 90-108(a)(7) does not satisf the elements of the fderal sttute. See
Moncriefe v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 1684 (2013). To obtain a conviction under the
respondent's statute of conviction, te State must prove a defendant: ( 1) knowingly or
intentionally kept or maintained; (2) a building or other place; (3) being used fr the keeping or
selling of a controlled substance. State v. Fuller, 196 N.C.App. 412, 424, 674 S.E. 2d 824, 832
(2009). Thus knowingly, but not intentionally, keeping a place being used by another person,
but not oneself, fr merely "keeping" a controlled substance would meet the requirements of N.C.
Gen. Stat. 90-108(a)(7). However, this conduct flls short of the conduct that would sustain a
conviction under section 856(a)(l ) of Title 21, which requires that the individual personally
intend to engage in prohibited drug manufcturing, distibution, or usage but does not prohibit
mere keeping of a contolled substance and does not reach the conduct of others. Similarly, the
minimum conduct under N.C. Gen. Stat. 90- 108(a)(7) falls short of that required to sustain a
conviction under section 856(a)(2) of Title 21, which requires a "knowing[] and intentional[]"
mens rea. Accordingly, violation of the respondent's statute of conviction is not categorically an
drug trafcking aggavated flony ofense. See Moncrief v. Holder, supra, at 1685 n.4
(providing that the analysis required to detenine what a alien was convicted of is the same in
both the removability and relief contexts).
The record does not conclusively establish which of the ofenses encompassed by N.C. Gen.
Stat. 90-108(a)(7) is the basis fr the respondent's conviction, and thus under the modifed
categorical approach, it does not establish that the respondenfs conviction was fr an aggavated
flony. See Descamps v. US., 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013) (providing that the modifed categorical
approach is approprate when a statute of conviction is divisible). However, because the record
of conviction refects that the respondent's conviction was fr a misdemeanor, he has established
that his ofense is not equivalent to 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(2), which includes the mens rea of
"knowingly and intentionally." See N .C. Gen. Stat. 90-108(b) (providing that violation of this
section is a Class I misdemeanor, except that a violation commited intentionally is a Class I
felony). Moreover, the respondent presented a complete record of conviction, and the record
does not support the conclusion that other judicially cogizble documents exist that would shed
additional light on the respondent's conviction. We conclude that the rspondent has met his
burden by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not convicted of an
aggravated flony and therefre that he is not precluded fom otherwise establishing eligibility
fr volunt deparure.
The OHS does not challenge the Immigration Judge's fvorable exercise of discretion in this
case. Accordingly, the DHS's appeal will be dismissed and voluntary departure will be
reinstated.
2
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Cite as: Bryan Sanchez-Vazquez, A205 213 774 (BIA Aug. 30, 2013)
A205 213 774
ORDER: The appeal 'is dismissed.
FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the Immigration Judge's order ad conditioned upon
compliance with conditions set frth by the Immigration Judge and the statute, the respondent is
permitted to voluntarily depart the United States, without expense to the Goverent, within 30
days fom the date of tis order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the OHS.
See section 240B(a) of te Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1229c(a); see also
8 C.F.R. 1240.26(b), (f. In the event the respondent fils to voluntarily depart the United
States, the respondent shall be removed as provided in the Immigation Judge's order.
NOTICE: If the respondent fails to voluntaily depart the United States within the time
period specifed, or any extensions ganted by the DHS, the respondent shall be subject to a civil
penalty as provided by the regulations and the statute and shall be ineligible fr a period of 10
years fr ay fer relief under section 240B and sections 240A, 245, 248, and 249 of te Act.
See section 240B(d) of the Act.
WARIG: If the respondent fles a motion to reopen or reconsider prior to the expiration of
te voluntary departure period set frth above, the gant of voluntary departure is automatically
terminated; the period allowed fr voluntary departure is not stayed, tolled, or extended. If te
grat of voluntay departure is automatically terinated upon the fling of a motion, the penalties
fr failure to depart under section 240B(d) of the Act shall not apply. See 8 C.F.R.
1240.26(e)(l).
WARING: If, prior to departing the United States, the respondent fles any judicial
challenge to this administatively fnal order, such as a petition fr review pursuat to section
242 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1252, the grat of voluntary depae is automatically terinated, ad
the alterate order of removal shall imediately take efect. However, if the respondent fles a
petition fr review and ten departs the United States within 30 days of such fling, the
respondent will not be deemed to have departed under an order of removal if the alien provides
to the OHS such evidence of his or her deparure that the Immigation and Customs Enfrcement
Field Ofce Director of the DHS may require and provides evidence DHS deems sufcient that
he or she has remained outside of the United States. The penalties fr filure to depat under
section 240B(d) of the Act shall not apply to an alien who fles a petition fr review,
notwithstanding ay period of time that he or she remains in the United States while the petition
fr review is pending. See 8 C.F.R. 1240.26(i).
3
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Cite as: Bryan Sanchez-Vazquez, A205 213 774 (BIA Aug. 30, 2013)
(
(
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION COURT
LUMPKIN, GEORGIA
File: A205-213-774
In the Mater of
March 29, 2013
BRYAN SANCHEZ-VAZQUEZ
RESPONDENT
)
)
)
)
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
CHARGES: Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) - present without being admitted or paroled.
APPLICATIONS: Pre-conclusion voluntar deparure.
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ALLISON LUKINICH
ON BEHALF OF DHS: DIANE DODD
ORAL DECISION OF THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE
EXHIBITS
Exhibit 1, Notice to Appear; Exhibit 2, record of respondent's conviction; Exhibit
3, For 1-213; Exhibit 4, respondent's memorandum of law in suppor of his request for
voluntar deparure; Exhibit 5, respondent's prehearing brief; Exhibit 6, statement from
Detective Mao.
WITNESS
Respondent:
In arriving of my finding of facts and conclusions of law, I have considered all the
1
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documentar and testimonial evidence in this case. My failure to comment of a specific
exhibit or paricular testimony does not mean that I failed to consider it.
CREDIBILITY
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, I find respondent to be credible.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LW
Exhibit 1 was sered on respondent on October 5, 2012. On December 27,
2012, in accordance with the respondent's pleas, the allegations in Exhibit 1 were
sustained and respondent was fund by clear and convincing evidence to be removable
as charged in Exhibit 1. Mexico was designated as the countr of removal.
Respondent is not an arriving alien.
Respondent's request for voluntar departure is timely. Respondent has made
no additional requests fr relief. Respondent concedes removability and waived appeal
of all issues.
Respondent is not deportable under Section 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an aggravated
felon or under Section 237(a)(4) for security or related grounds. Although the
Deparment of Homeland Security argues that respondent is an aggravated felon, I am
unable to conclude that respondent has been convicted of any ofense related to
traficking in a controlled substance.
I find that respondent does merit a favorable exercise of my discretion in granting
voluntar deparure.
Respondent has a criminal histor which demonstrates a troubled childhood.
Respondent is now 19 years of age. Respondent admits that he has to convictions
involving drugs, one for possessing marijuana and one for possessing cocaine. Indeed,
respondent admits that he enjoys smoking marijuana. Exhibit 2 shows that
respondent's arrest for possessing cocaine was disposed of by his conviction for
A205-213-77 4 2 March 29, 2013
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(
(
maintaining a vehicle for purposes of a controlled substance. Respondent explained
that he was found possessing cocaine while traveling as a passenger in a car occupied
and driven by others.
Respondent was brought to the United States in 1993 when he was only two
months old. The United States is the only home that he has ever known. Respondent
has two aunts who are lawful permanent residents, several U.S. citizen cousins and a
15-year-old U.S. citizen brother.
Since the respondent has turned 18, he admits that he has been arrested twice.
Respondent has been convicted since he turred 18 for possession of an alcoholic
beverage, consuming alcoholic beverages and driving without a license. He has also
been convicted as shown in Exhibit 2.
Notithstanding respondent's criminal history, I conclude that as a matter of
discretion, respondent still warrants a voluntary departure in this case. I am mindful that
much of respondent's criminal encounters occurred while he was a juvenile and not as
an adult. I am also mindful of the fact that essentially respondent's criminal matters are
relatively minor in nature.
Accordingly, I am going to enter the following order:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED respondent's request for voluntar deparure is
granted. A writen order reflecting the above decision will be provided separately and
made par of the record.
signature
A205-213-77 4
Please see the next page for electronic
DAN TRIMBLE
Immigration Judge
3 March 29, 2013
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i

A20S-213.774 4 March 29, 2013
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//s//
Imigration Judge DAN TRIMBLE
trimled on May 2, 2013 at 11:28 A GMT
A205-213-77 4 5 March 29, 2013
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