Emotion 2001, Vol. 1, No.

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Copyright 2001 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 1528-3542/01/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//1528-3542.1.3.249

Emotional Intelligence or Adaptive Emotions?

Carroll E. Izard
University of Delaware R. D. Roberts, M. Zeidner, and G. Matthews (2001) challenged the adequacy of the psychometric properties of the principal performance measure of emotional intelligence (EI). They raised doubt about the existence of emotion-related abilities that influence behavioral outcomes and social competence after controlling for general intelligence and personality. I agree with Roberts et al. that demonstrating the discriminant and predictive validity of a measure of EI in the context of rival predictors will require more research. I agree with the proponents of EI that emotion-related abilities do exist and show that such abilities in children account for unique variance in measures of adaptive behavior and social competence. However, evidence from developmental and clinical research suggest that these emotionrelated abilities and their influence on socioemotional competence stem more from the direct effects of emotions than from a special form of intelligence.

The developers of the construct of emotional intelligence (EI; Salovey & Mayer, 1990) have made broad claims for it, declaring it the basis of emotional skills, emotional achievements, and emotional competencies and a good goal for a democratic culture (Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p. 16). Mayer and Salovey thought it likely that EI includes teachable skills, but they added the caveat that the potential gains from teaching emotional intelligence will need to be considered with caution (p. 18). Apparently, many have thrown this caution to the wind (undoubtedly to the dismay of the developers of the construct), and their efforts to teach and apply the construct in the workforce have resulted in a growing EI industry (Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). Moreover, somewhat independent of these adult-oriented activities, techniques related to the EI construct, particularly to the emotion perception or emotion knowledge (EK) component, have become part of school-based preventive interventions. Such interventions affect the lives of tens or perhaps hundreds of thousands of children and their families every year. Roberts et al. (2001) presented rather robust data that raised serious questions about the current measurement of EI. They showed that the consensus- and expert-based methods of scoring the principal perfor-

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carroll E. Izard, Department of Psychology, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware 19716-2577. Electronic mail may be addressed to izard@udel.edu.

mance measure of EI (Multi-Factor Emotional Intelligence Scale; MEIS; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999) yield disparate and conflicting results. For example, Roberts et al. found that the consensus-based scoring procedure currently recommended by the developers of EI shows that people who score high on emotion perception (the first branch of the conceptual model of EI), are somewhat unintelligent though agreeable and extraverted (Roberts et al., 2001, p. 226). Whereas Roberts et al. reported a number of predicted and meaningful correlates of the various components of EI, they noted that its proponents have not yet clearly demonstrated predictive validity after statistically controlling for intellectual ability and personality. Roberts et al. (2001) remarked that the psychometric problems that beset the current performance scales for measuring EI might prove amenable to further research. This will prove true, however, only to the extent that the conceptualization of EI separates it sufficiently from other broad constructs (intelligence, personality) that relate to adaptation. To solve the psychometric problems, EI proponents will need to show that measures of the construct account for significant variance in adaptive behavior in the context of rival predictors. So the questions concerning the measurement of EI seem highly linked to questions concerning the conceptual status of EI and its relation to other broad constructs, including emotion-related constructs (Roberts et al., 2001). The idea of EK, which emerged in research on emotional development in the early 1970s (Izard,

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1971) and became a hot topic in the 1980s and 1990s (Denham, 1998), represents one such construct. Roberts et al. (2001) focused on EI and its measurement and thus did not discuss the developmental research on the related construct of EK. Yet EK overlaps conceptually and operationally with the emotion perception branch of EI (Mayer, DiPaulo, & Salovey, 1990). A considerable body of developmental research bearing on EK (for a review, see Denham, 1998) appears to give it a stronger empirical base than that reported for the MEIS by Roberts et al. One could interpret evidence of the validity of EK as having positive implications for EI. Most of the evidence relating to the validity of EK comes from developmental research on the perception and labeling of emotion signals or cues in expressive behavior or provocative situations. One could also interpret emotion perception, which forms the basis for emotion labeling and several other aspects of EK, as something other than an intelligence. I agree with the developers of the EI construct that conventionally defined intelligence and personality do not represent all the human abilities or characteristics involved in social competence and adaptive behavior. I also agree that humans have a domain of abilities that relate to the emotions. In the following sections, I define the broad construct of EK (studied mainly in developmental research with children) and note some relations to the construct of EI (studied mainly in adults). Then I focus on its core components, emotion perception and emotion labeling (EPL), which one can also interpret as the core components of EI. Then I present evidence supporting a more optimistic view of the efficacy of EPL, than EI Roberts et al. (2001) did for EI in predicting behavioral outcomes for EI. Finally, I review evidence showing that emotions do not always depend on knowledge or cognitive mediation, that emotions make independent contributions to individual and social functioning, and that the emotion-related abilities and processes involved in these independent contributions may best be represented by the construct of emotional adaptiveness (EA).

Emotional Intelligence, Emotional Adaptiveness, and Emotion Knowledge

Mayer and Salovey (1997) defined EI in terms of a four-branch model. The lowest branch consists of the ability to accurately perceive the emotions or emotion signals in self, others, objects, and situations. This branch of EI also involves the ability to express emotions and emotion-related needs. One could argue that

EPL, the first and presumably major aspect of the lowest branch, forms the foundation for the rest of EI. Although its relation to the second branch (emotional facilitation of thinking) may be arguable, emotion perception or accurate emotion-signal detection and emotion labeling appears essential to the third branch of EIunderstanding and analyzing emotions and using emotion understanding effectively. EPL also appears necessary for realization of the fourth branch reflective regulation of emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth. EA stems from the core characteristics and functioning of the emotion systems and affects all other systems. Developmental researchers have operationalized it, or its influence on perception and cognition, through measures of EK. EK derives from certain emotion-related skills and abilities, some of which emerge primarily as a result of the functioning of the emotion systems and some as a joint product of the emotions and cognitive systems. All these abilities are influenced by personenvironment interactions (Izard, 1971; Izard et al., 2001). EK, knowledge of the expressions, labels, and functions of emotions, increases the probability that an individual can and will utilize the inherent adaptiveness in emotion arousal and emotion motivation. EK consists of many facets, including the ability to (a) accurately perceive emotion signals in facial and vocal expressions, behaviors, and various contexts (the most fundamental facet), (b) label emotion signals, (c) identify causes or activators of emotions in oneself and others, and (d) anticipate ones own emotions in expected or imagined situations. Other facets include the ability to recognize and label ones own emotions in varying circumstances, and to understand (a) relations between emotion, motivation, and behavior, (b) family and cultural norms for verbal and nonverbal emotion expressions, (c) norms for emotion feelings, (d) dissimulation, and (e) co-occurring emotions and ambivalence. These facets probably vary in the extent to which they derive from direct effects of the emotions on intelligence and personality on the one hand, or depend on cognitive development, individual experience, and social learning on the other hand. Empirical research has not yet determined whether these 10 facets constitute a homogeneous and interrelated set. The 2 most frequently studied facets of EK, defined together as EPL, do correlate moderately, and investigators have examined them both singly and as an aggregated index of EK. The abilities to perceive and label emotions represent the core processes in EA and facilitate the devel-

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opment of its other components. The considerable ability of young infants to perceive emotion signals, discriminate among them, and respond to them in meaningful ways suggest that EPL has heritability and some independence of cognitive development (Caron & Caron, 1988; Tronick, 1989). The ability to symbolize or label emotions involves inferential or interpretive processes that obviously depend on cognitive development, but accurate emotion labeling also depends on accurate emotion perception. EPL abilities are fundamental to emotion communication and normal social relationships (Bandura, 1986; Hobson, 1993). What also follows is that deficits in these abilities will contribute to deficiencies in other facets of EA and impede the development of social competence. EPL has content quite similar to that of the Emotion Perception factor of the MEIS, an index of the foundational branch of EI. In a factor analysis of MEIS (Roberts et al., 2001), the Emotion Perception factor accounted for 28% of the total variance, almost twice as much as the other two factors combined, but it had unexpected correlates (e.g., low intelligence) that researchers have not found with indexes of EPL in developmental and clinical research (e.g., Denham, 1998; Izard et al., 2001). Actually, normative studies of various components of EK show that the emergence of some its facets, such as the ability to predict others emotions on the basis of their beliefs or desires and understanding ambivalence, depend on age and cognitive development (Harris, 1994; Harter, 1986). Moreover, research shows that indexes of EPL relate to a number of the qualities similar to those attributed to EI. These qualities include sociability and positive emotionality as well as peer acceptance and other aspects of socioemotional competence (Denham, 1998).

Identifying Effects Specific to EPL

Researchers have repeatedly found correlations between EPL and verbal ability ranging from .16 to .63. Because of the assessment of both cognitive ability and EPL through language, some of their common variance may result from the common means of measurement or method variance. In any case, verbal ability is necessarily a determinant of current measures of EPL and probably of other facets of EK as well. At the very least, a child, for example, has to have the requisite receptive vocabulary (a component of intelligence) to understand and respond to EPL tasks. Thus, investigators evaluating the significance of EPL for social behavior clearly need to control for the effects of the verbal component of intelligence and probably other components as well. Theorists define

intelligence as the ability for adaptation in, as well as selection and shaping of, environments and as a construct that may include abilities for social and emotional functioning (Gardner, 1993; Sternberg, 1997). Intelligence not only correlates positively with EPL and adaptive behavior, it tends to correlate negatively with maladaptive behavior. Although numerous risk factors influence negative behavioral outcomes, intelligence accounts for unique variance after controlling for other variables (Werner & Smith, 1992). Thus, Roberts et al. (2001) correctly noted the need to control for cognitive ability in evaluating EI (and similar constructs). Validity studies that fail to do this may have little meaning. Evaluating the predictive efficacy of EPL or any other emotion-related ability also requires controlling for temperament or personality. Several studies have shown relations between the emotion systems and personality. Studies have found that even in infancy, emotion expression styles have considerable stability over time, and that toddlers expression styles predict behavioral outcomes in later years. A number of studies have shown that personality indexed as emotionality or temperament predicts behavioral outcomes (Lengua, West, & Sandler, 1998). Emotions, temperament, and personality are interrelated (cf. Goldsmith & Campos, 1982), and adaptation often appears as the key construct or criterion for evaluating and defining each of them. Theorists define emotions as inherently adaptive (Izard, 1971, 1989), as responses for adaptational encounters (Lazarus, 1991), and as the organizers and the motivational components of traits of personality (Malatesta, 1990). Theorists define traits of personality as influencing the choice of coping mechanisms and as determinants of well-being (Costa & McCrae, 1980). Theorists define well-being in terms of happiness or positive emotionality (Diener & Larsen, 1993). Research has shown that emotionality predicts childrens personality and social functioning (Abe & Izard, 1999b; Eisenberg et al., 1997). Such evidence of the interrelatedness of the constructs of emotionality and temperamentpersonality supports the Roberts et al. (2001) position that meaningful evaluations of emotion-related abilities require controlling for causal processes specific to temperamentpersonality.

The Predictive Efficacy of EPL After Controlling for Aspects of Intelligence and Temperament
Early studies showed that childrens EPL predicted positive behavioral outcomes (e.g., peer status and

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academic performance) after controlling for verbal and performance components of general intelligence (Garner, Jones, & Miner, 1994; Izard, 1971, ch. 14; see Denham, 1998, for a review). Several recent studies found that EPL predicted aspects of social competence after controlling for indexes of both intelligence and temperament. One study demonstrated that EPL had long-term predictive validity. Preschoolers EPL predicted adaptive social behavior and academic competence 4 years later, when the children were in third grade (Izard et al., 2001). Although the foregoing developmental studies of EPL have limitations, they stand in contrast to the assessment of EI by Roberts et al. (2001). The number of these developmental studies and the consistency of the findings suggest that we can measure EPL and that it plays a significant role in the development of socioemotional adaptiveness. High scores on EPL predict positive social behavior, and low scores on EPL predict behavior problems.

responses that facilitate good peer relations and socially competent behavior (cf. Salovey & Mayer, 1990).

Emotional Adaptiveness
Although measures of the EPL component of EA in children and the performance measures of the Emotion Perception factor of EI have similar content, the conceptual representations of these two underlying constructs differ widely. EI is conceived as a form of intelligence; EA is conceived in terms of the functioning of the emotion systems and their distinct motivational properties. The subordinate construct of EPL is conceived as a joint product of the emotions and cognitive systems. Recent evidence suggests that temperamentpersonality and social environment contribute to the development of EPL. However, research on early emotional development suggests that the decoding component of EPL and infants expressive responses to the detection of emotion signals have innate determinants and are mainly a function of the emotion systems. The emotion perception and emotion expression systems in infants are highly preadapted to facilitate infantother communication (Magai & McFadden, 1995; Tronick, 1989). The questions created by popular appeal of the EI construct, the increasing efforts to teach EI or apply it in industry and education, the Roberts et al. (2001) critique of the principal measurement model of EI, and the contrasting positive results of developmental research on EPL should attract more attention to a central issue in psychological science: the nature of emotions and their roles in the development of social competence and in adaptative behavior across the life span. Consideration of this multifaceted issue may have profound implications for the construct of EI and for emotion science. The question as to what drives the perception, cognition, and action that give EI the adaptive advantages claimed by its proponents represents a fundamental aspect of this broad issue. Are the causal processes basically intellectual in nature or are they basically emotional? The proponents of EI have opted for an explanation in terms of intellectual processes, or an intelligence. Does this, in fact, amount to an underestimation of the role of emotions? My answer, Yes, comes in part from my interpretation of developmental data and in part from my intuition. I am aware that my intuition may be largely a direct effect of my emotion systems. In any case, a more definitive answer to the question awaits more experimental investigations of individual differences in the

How EPL Influences Social Behavior

The developmental data do not identify precisely the processes through which EPL influences social behavior. However, EPL relates conceptually and logically to emotion communicationthe decoding and encoding of emotion signals. Breakdowns in emotion communication affect social relationships adversely and may elicit negative emotions and withdrawal behavior in infants and children. Some of the problems in the social relations of autistic children may be due not to a deficiency in emotion expressions but to their timing and apparent lack of relation to context. Many studies also demonstrate that ones emotion expressions motivate responses in the observer. If the expression is contextually inappropriate, it is more likely to motivate socially dysfunctional behavior. I propose that like deficient emotion-expressive behavior, deficient EPL leads to contextually inappropriate or insufficient emotion communication and, hence, to behavior problems and delayed social competence. EPL and emotion communication are fundamental to empathy and sympathy, and these phenomena relate positively to prosocial behavior and negatively to antisocial behavior and aggression (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). If children lack sufficient EPL to interpret the expressive behavior of others and understand its causes, they are more likely to encode expressions that are socially discordant. More important, they will lack the information and motivation essential for the social communication and empathic

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functioning of emotions and their effects on both adaptive and maladaptive behavior. To consider the merits of EA as a construct, researchers need to show that emotion systems have the capacity to operate independently. Researchers also need to demonstrate direct effects of emotions on perception, cognition, behavior, and developmental processes and show the implications of these emotion effects for personal well-being and social adaptation.

The adaptiveness of a particular instance of emotion arousal depends on a number of factors, including cognitive antecedents (Crick & Dodge, 1996; Scherer, 1993), cognitive accompaniments (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), behavioral reactions, and contextual factors.

Defining EA
In the framework of differential emotions theory, the motivation for the processes involved in EA derive directly from the core characteristics of the emotions. In the past 3 decades, many theorists have agreed with Darwin, James, Plutchik, and Tomkins that emotions have motivational functions that give them critical adaptive qualities; for example, interest gives focus and selectivity to perception; fear and anticipatory shame protect from physical and psychological harm; guilt motivates moral reasoning, empathy, and reparation of damaged relationships; and joy works as an antidote for stress and a stimulus to social interaction and creative thinking. In contrast, the developers of the construct of EI have not explicitly ascribed motivational roles to the emotions and have indicated that EI does not depend on motivation as traditionally defined in nonemotional terms (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). A serious look at EA would mean directing more effort toward understanding the core characteristics and functions of the emotion systems and their relatively independent or distinct contributions to adaptation. This shift in conceptualizing causal processes in adaptation would require acceptance of the relative independence of the emotion systems. This shift also requires acknowledging the capacity of emotions to exert direct effects on behavior without cognitive mediation or the participation of an intelligence. The construct of EA implies that cognitively or noncognitively generated emotions may, for example, mediate the solution to a problem in choosing among behavioral alternatives (Izard, 1993) and that the emotion-determined choice may run counter to rational processes that point to a cognitively correct solution (cf. Loewenstein et al., 2001). Many scientists reject such emotional propositions for use in mainstream psychology or cognitive science, continuing to exclude emotion variables in studies of mental processes despite considerable evidence for direct effects of emotions on systems ranging from perception to personality.

The Relative Independence of the Emotion Systems

I emphasize the notion of relative independence among the emotion, cognitive, and action systems. Relatively greater independence among systems characterizes infancy and early development because of the immaturity of some underlying brain mechanisms and pathways, but some independence continues through the life span (cf. Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996; Zajonc, 1980). Nevertheless, system interrelatedness and interdependence probably characterize most of the coping strategies of daily life. Indeed, I propose that the quality of overall adaptation to the social and physical environment depends on the effectiveness of the connections and communications among the major systems. For example, a connection between the feeling of anger caused by unjustified constraints and verbal self-assertion favors adaptation more than a connection between such anger arousal and violence. Intersystem connections constitute the crux of emotional development and enable the remarkable effects of the emotion systems on adaptation (Ackerman, Abe, & Izard, 1998). A prime example is the infant and toddler forming connections between emotion feelings and verbal labels that enable the symbolization of emotions in awareness and their linguistic expression. Such connections between the emotion and linguistic system eventually enable some cognitive control over the emotions. Although researchers agree that the emotion systems frequently interact with the cognitive systems, only a few have identified the independent operations of emotion as a significant problem for research (Izard, 1993; LeDoux, 1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Zajonc, 1980). There is some evidence supporting the idea that the emotions make independent contributions to perception, cognition, behavior, temperamentpersonality, and developmental processes. Although, as many theorists agree, emotion systems have adaptive functions, specific emotion experiences may prove adaptive or maladaptive.

Emotions Affect Perception

Anger induced through role-play tends to cause participants to perceive expressions of anger when

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exposed stereoscopically with expressions of joy (Izard, Wehmer, Livsey, & Jennings, 1965). Joy and sadness induced through music make the perception of emotion-congruent words faster and require less sensory data than emotion-incongruent words. Similarly, participants make judgments about faces more quickly when the expression on the faces match the participants emotion state (Niedenthal, Setterlund, & Jones, 1994). Aggressive children tend to attribute hostility to the actions of others (Crick & Dodge, 1996), and anger-prone children tend to perceive anger signals in facial expressions where none exist (Schultz, Izard, & Ackerman, 2000). Fear restricts the visual field and creates severe perceptual biases that limit the range and flexibility of cognitive processes (McNally, 1996).

quent experiences of intense emotions can place severe restraints on information processing. The compelling motivation generated by intense fear or social anxiety tends to drive escape behavior or avoidance. Such emotion states and behavior restrict the cognitive and linguistic processes necessary for forming the affectivecognitive structures that derive from labeling and articulating the emotion experience, its causes, and its consequences. A child with a highly reactive emotions system would also have great difficulty in appreciating the emotions of the peer who is the emotion-eliciting stimulus. An intense negative emotion experience would preempt appraisal processes, direct cognition and action toward defensive coping, preclude accurate interpretation of the peers signals of emotion, and retard the development of EPL and other facets of EK.

Emotions Affect Cognition

Research on the functions of emotions has demonstrated their substantial effects on performance tasks in learning, memory, problem solving, and creativity (e.g., Fredrickson, 1998; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). Emotions affect not only the verbal aspects of cognition but performance on spatial tasks as well (Thompson, Schellenberg, & Husain, 2001). Evidence from both behavioral research and neuroscience show that emotion arousal influences the content and increases the durability of memory (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Heuer & Reisberg, 1992).

Trait Emotions Affect Behavior

Trait emotions (e.g., shyness, fearfulness) characterize the temperament of some children and predispose them to attentional and behavioral problems, including social withdrawal (Kagan, 1994). Angerprone children tend to infer hostile intent on the basis of others actions and engage in aggressive behavior (Lochman & Lenhart, 1993). Individuals dispositionally prone to experience shame and anger tend to experience these emotions at a higher level of intensity than individuals with a different disposition, and the different levels of emotional intensity have consequences for behavior (Tangney, Wagner, Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). Characteristically happy people tend to engage in more social interactions (Diener & Larsen, 1993). Such influences of trait emotion on cognition and behavior affect ones adaptation to the social and physical environment.

Emotions Affect the Development of EPL

Emotionality, temperament, and environment can impede or facilitate the development of EPL and other facets of EK through a number of processes. For example, children who are dispositionally prone to experience negative emotions or who live in a harsh environment that frequently elicits strong negative emotions may have difficulty in regulating emotion arousal and in forming connections between these intense emotion feelings and the appropriate language for articulating them. Also, anger proneness or frequent anger experiences may contribute to externalizing aggressive behavior that is likely to elicit strong negative reactions from parents, siblings, and peers. The negative social feedback in these encounters could amplify the childs already intense anger and further impede the opportunity to acquire EPL and other facets of EK (Lochman & Lenhart, 1993). Low emotion thresholds (Izard, 1993) or a highly reactive emotions system (Davidson, 2000) and fre-

Emotions Affect Temperament and Personality

Both theoretical and measurement models of temperament and personality contain either discrete or dimensional emotion concepts (Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993). Patterns of emotion expression in toddlers predict their personality traits in preschool (Abe & Izard, 1999b). Frequency of experiencing particular emotions relates significantly to particular traits of personality (e.g., interest and joy positively relate to extraversionsociability, anger and contempt negatively to agreeableness). A broad pattern of negative emotions virtually defines the trait of neuroticism.

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Emotions Affect Human Development

From early infancy, when emotion expression serves as the primary means of social communication, through adolescence, emotions figure prominently in motivating developmental changes (Magai & McFadden, 1995). One can interpret many of the findings from research on the formative years as support for the notion that emotions have direct effects on developmental processes, differential effects in each major period of development (Abe & Izard, 1999a).

dividuals advantage. To accomplish this, researchers will need to examine the person characteristics, contextual factors, and levels of arousal that increase the likelihood that a particular emotion works effectively to enhance behavioral outcomes and the effectiveness of adaptation. Individual differences in emotion thresholds, emotionality, and emotional styles suggest that emotion effects on basic systems vary across persons.

Conclusion
In contrast to the rather pessimistic view of EI in Roberts et al. (2001), developmental studies have yielded consistent results attesting to the validity of emotion-related abilities and their role in achieving socioemotional competence. In contrast to the perspective of EI theorists, I have presented the view that emotions make direct contributions to the functioning of the perceptual, cognitive, and personality systems and to the development of socioemotional competence. Perhaps researchers should carefully weigh the need for balance in allocating research efforts to EI and EA. Research on the two constructs could lead us down either of two quite different pathwaysthe search for a new intelligence or the search for the direct effects of the emotions and the individual and contextual factors that determine the quality of these effects. These two pathways may cross in the domain of emotioncognition relations, junctures that may prove fruitful grounds for research. For example, proponents of either EI or EA may find it interesting to study the individual and environmental factors that contribute to an emotion perception bias and a deficiency in EK. To optimize research on the direct and relatively independent contributions of emotions to human development and adaptation, researchers may need to examine more closely and understand at a deeper (emotional) level our explicit and implicit allegiance to and dependence on the rational person ideology that flowered in the Age of Enlightenment. This ideology, and our penchant for explanations of adaptive behavior in terms of rational processes or some form of intelligence, still dominates psychology. Researchers readily acknowledge that effective adaptation requires intelligence and reason. Most researchers, however, remain reluctant to acknowledge that the functioning of the emotion systems themselves and their unique and compelling influence on other systems explain a significant part of our thought, our choices, and our actions.

EI or EA?
How do researchers describe these emotion-related effects on basic systems and developmental processes? The effects clearly have adaptive significance. Negative emotions serve protective and guidance functions in the physical and mental domains, including mediating advantageous decisions. Positive emotions greatly enhance an individuals resources and capacities for effective interpersonal interactions and intellectual endeavors. Apparently, the emotion systems themselves generate these effects, sometimes without cognitive mediation and sometimes despite rational processes that would lead to other outcomes. So, should researchers conceive these effects as stemming from an intelligence that draws from the emotions or as a type of adaptiveness that derives directly from the emotions themselves? How do researchers choose between the constructs of EI and EA? To choose, researchers need to decide whether (a) cognition is about knowledge and intelligence is about the ability to acquire and use it, and (b) whether emotion is about arousal, feeling states, and the motivation for what we actually choose, often on an emotional basis, to think and do. If one agrees with both (a) and (b), ones choice is EA, and thereby acknowledges that socioemotional competence is not so much a special kind of intelligence as it is a matter of sensing or perceiving emotion cues and signals in self, others, and contexts, and responding in accordance with the emotion motivation elicited by the perception. Perhaps studies that examine the effectiveness of EI in predicting social skills and achievements should also test alternative hypotheses relating to EA. Research on EA should seek to explain emotion-related effects on basic systems, interpersonal interactions, and adaptive behavior by studying the functions of emotions and their distinct motivational features. Such endeavors may profit from studies designed to determine when a specific emotion works to the in-

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Received June 21, 2001 Revision received July 4, 2001 Accepted July 6, 2001 s