A New Era For Justice Sector Reform in Haiti - Faculty Research Working Paper Series
A New Era For Justice Sector Reform in Haiti - Faculty Research Working Paper Series
A New Era For Justice Sector Reform in Haiti - Faculty Research Working Paper Series
Christopher Stone
Harvard Kennedy School
www.hks.harvard.edu
WorkingPaperson CrimeandCriminalJustice
ANewErafor JusticeSectorReforminHaiti
ChristopherStone July2010
www.hks.harvard.edu/criminaljustice
PROGRAMINCRIMINALJUSTICEPOLICYANDMANAGEMENT HARVARDKENNEDYSCHOOL 79JFKSTREET,CAMBRIDGE,MA02138|6174955188
Additionalcopiesavailableathttp://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/
ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti
ChristopherStone * I. CouldtheruleoflawandtheadministrationofcriminaljusticebeenteringanewerainHaiti,evenas thenationbeginstorecoverfromthedisastrousearthquakeofJanuary2010?Thisis,surprisingly,a reasonablehope.Aftermanyyearsofhaltingandoftendisappointingreform,thejusticesectorwas showingsomesignsofimprovementintheyearbeforetheearthquake.Systemsofpoliceaccountability werecomingintoplaceincludingamassiveprogramtovetallpoliceofficers;theMinistryofJusticehad, inMay2009,inauguratedafirstratetrainingfacilityforjudges,theEcoledelaMagistrature,andraised thesalariesofjudicialofficers;andtheprisonswhileappallinglyovercrowdedreportedlywentafull yearwithoutasingleviolentdeath,fromAugust2008toAugust2009.1 Theearthquakedecimatedtheseedsofreform,evenbeforemanyobserversnoticedtheywerethere. Thedevastationoftheearthquakeisdifficulttocomprehendinthemostbasichumanandphysical terms,withwellover200,000deaths,morethanaquartermillioninjured,morethanamillionmade homeless,andmuchbasicinfrastructuredestroyed;butthefragilebeginningsofgoodgovernanceand hopeforamorejustsocietywerealsodangerouslydamagedinthequake.AfieldvisitinMarch2010in preparationofthispaperfoundpoliceandprisonsthrownbackintorelianceonroughjustice,thecourts closed,andthenewtrainingfacilitycommandeeredtohouseothergovernmentfunctions.Senior governmentofficialswereclearlydefensive,anticipatingthatcriminalprosecutionorworsecouldend theircareersiftheywereblamedforoneoranotherofthepostquaketravesties,whilefrontlinestaff
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GuggenheimProfessorofthePracticeofCriminalJusticeandfacultychairofthePrograminCriminalJustice Policy&ManagementatHarvardUniversitysJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment.NatalieBlack,AurelieOuss, andAmiaTriggservedasresearchassistantsandconductedfieldworkforthispaperinPortauPrinceinMarch 2010.ChristineColeandBrianWelchatthePrograminCriminalJusticeprovidedinvaluablesupport.AryehNeier andSandraDunsmoreprovidedessentialcontactsinHaiti.ThankstoAlejandroAlvarez,DavidMarshall,Robert Pulver,andJasonReicheltalloftheUNfamilyforencouragingtheideaforthispaperandmakingitpractically possible.Thisisaworkingpaperfordiscussion.Pleasesendcommentstochris_stone@harvard.edu. 1 Informationaboutthevettingprocessandjudicialreformcamefrominterviewsconductedbytheauthorand researchassistantsinMarch2010inNewYorkandPortauPrince.Someobserverscautionthatimprovementsin thetrainingandcompensationofjudgeswhilerealmaynothaveimprovedthequalityofjusticebeforethe earthquakeandthattheresultsofthevettingweremixedatbest.Informationaboutviolentdeathsinprisons comesfromUnitedNationsRuleofLawIndicatorsProject:CountryReportHaiti,draftofFebruary28,2010,used bypermission.AccordingtothenarrativesummariestoIndicators85and107intheAppendix,thePrison Administration(DirectiondelAdministrationPnitentiaire,DAP)priortotheearthquakeannuallyproducedan IndexCardofDeathsinCustody(FicheInformativedesdtenusdcds),whichreportstheprisoninwhicheach deathoccurred;theoffenseforwhichtheprisonerhadbeenconfined;whetherthedeceasedwasasentenced inmateorpretrialdetainee;thecauseofdeath;theprisonersdateofdeath;andthejudgeassignedtothecase.A totalof184deathswererecordedbetweenJanuary2006andAugust2009.Duringthe12monthspriortoAugust 2009,therewere57deathsrecorded,noneofwhichwasviolent.Mostdeathswerecausedbymedicalconditions suchastuberculosis,chestpain,diarrhea,fever,hernia,cardiacarrest,pneumonia,HIV,andepilepsy.Therewere threedeathsfromunknowncauses,soitispossiblethatoneormoreofthesedeathswereviolent.Staffatthe VeraInstituteofJusticewhocompiledtheinformationfortheRuleofLawIndicatorsProject,cautionthattheydid notverifythisgovernmentsupplieddata.
ChristopherStone 2 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti wereimprovisingorparalyzed.Thepolicewerebracingthemselvesamidpredictionsofgrowingcivil unrest,prisonofficialsfacingrecriminationsovertheescapeofthousandsofprisonersfromtheNational Penitentiaryand,sincethen,allegationsofpostquakekillingsattheLesCayesprison.AsoneHaitian civiliandescribedthesituationtotheresearchers,thetwopillarsofHaitiansocietyhadcollapsedinthe quake:theChurch,withitsprincipalcathedraldestroyed,andtheGovernment,withtheWhiteHouse, MinistryofFinance,MinistryofJustice,andSupremeCourtleveledtotheground.Couldthese fundamentalinstitutionsofsocietyreassertthemselves,hewasasking,evenastheirbuildingslayin ruins? 2 Atthesametime,theinternationalresponsetotheearthquakeinHaitiisasourceofhope,makinga neweraforjusticereformfinanciallyconceivableandperhapspracticallypossible.Atthedonors conferenceonMarch31,2010,fiftyninenationsandmultilateraldonorspledgedmorethanfivebillion USdollarsin201011forrecovery,reconstruction,anddevelopment,withseveralofthenational representativesspeakingspecificallyaboutthejusticeandsecuritysector. 3 CantheHaitiangovernmentandcivilsocietytakeadvantageofthenewinternationalsupportto acceleratethereformprocess,buildingacredible,professional,effective,andrespectfulsystemof criminaljustice?Adoubledangerherehasbeenwidelyacknowledged,notconfinedtothejustice arena.Ontheonehand,therecoveryprocessneedstoavoidrebuildinginstitutionsthatwere themselvespoorlyfittedtotheHaitiancontextorwhichsimplycouldnotdeliverontheirpromises.On theotherhand,therecoverymustnotstartfromscratch.Aneweraforthejusticesectormustbuildon therealachievementsofthelastfewyearswithoutrebuildingstructuresthatthemselvesresisted progress.AsSecretaryStateHillaryClintonsaidatthedonorsconferenceon31March2010when pledgingmorethanabilliondollarsofassistanceoverthenextyear,Wecannotdowhatwevedone before.Shecontinued:
Wecannotretreattofailedstrategies.[T]hisisnotonlyaconferenceaboutwhatfinanciallywe pledgetoHaiti.Wealsohavetopledgeourbesteffortstodobetterourselvestoofferour supportinasmarterway,amoreeffectivewaythatproducesrealresultsforthepeopleofHaiti.
ThepictureobtainedduringtheMarch2010fieldworkisreinforcedbyassessmentsmadebyothers.Inparticular, see:MINSUSTAH,StrategicFrameworkforAssistancetotheHNPaftertheEarthquake12/01/10,(UnitedNations, March2010),hereinaftercitedasMINUSTAH,StrategicFramework. 3 TheCanadianMinisterofForeignAffairs(US$375millionin201011)spokeofbuildingHaitibackbetteron foundationsofsecurityandtheruleoflawamongothers.CatherineAshtononbehalfoftheEuropeanUnion (US$600millionin201011)spokeofanewsocialcontractforthemostvulnerable.ForFinland,RitvaKoukku Ronde(US$10millionin201011)spokeoftheneedforgoodgovernancetothewholecountry,includingruleof lawandrespectforhumanrights.PeterPower,MinisterforOverseasDevelopmentinIreland(US$17millionin 201011),describeditasvitalthatjusticeandsecurityisaddressed.TheUnitedKingdomstatementnotedthat theUKsStabilisationUnitisadvisingtheHaitianMinistryofJusticeonaprogrammeofprisonrebuilding.United StatesSecretaryofStateHillaryClinton(US$1.2billionin201011)pledgedsupportfortheHaitianplanfor securityandgovernance,notingthatsincetheearthquakesecurityisevenmoretenuous.Drugtraffickingisa halfabilliondollarayearindustryinHaiti[and]traffickinginhumanbeingsisalsorampant.FranciscoArias Crdenas,DeputyForeignMinisterofVenezuela(US$1.3billionpledgedin201011)expressedconcernabout excessivepresenceofforeignmilitaryforces.
ChristopherStone 3 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti TheefforttoproducerealresultsforthepeopleofHaiticanbegreatlyassisted,atleastinthe justicesector,throughafortunatecoincidence.Inthemonthsprecedingtheearthquake,Haiti wasoneofonlytwocountriesintheworldservingasapilotsiteforanewsystemofassessing theadministrationofcriminaljustice:thepolice,thecourts,andtheprisons.TheRuleofLaw IndicatorsProject,jointlysponsoredbytheUnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeeping OperationsandtheOfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights,aimstocreatea standardsystemformeasuringchangeintheruleoflawinpostconflictsocieties,anditssystem ofindicatorswas,inlate2009,beingtestedinHaiti.Whilethefullsystemofindicatorsitselfis stillunderdevelopment,itsearlytestinHaitimeansthatthereisanespeciallyrichcollectionof dataontheactualstateofthepolice,courts,andprisonsjustbeforetheearthquake.Thispaper takesadvantageofthattreasuretroveofmeasurementtoexaminethepossiblefutureofjustice reforminHaiti.4 TheVeraInstituteofJusticecollecteddatainHaitifortheRuleofLawIndicatorsfromAugustto October2009,drawingonawiderangeofsources,includingtheresultsoftworigoroussurveys designedspecificallyfortheproject.Thefirstwasapublicsurveythatinterviewed1,250people intheirownhomesinthreeareas:PortauPrince,Gonaives,andHinche. 5 Thesecondwasan expertsurveyforwhichresearchersinterviewed81people,includingHaitiangovernment officials,membersofcivilsocietyorganizations,employeesofMINUSTAH(theUNstabilization andpeacekeepingmissioninHaiti)andotherUnitedNationsagencies,andexpertsemployedby otherinternationalorganizations. 6 Inadditiontothetwosurveys,thedataincludeddirect observationsbyresearchersaswellasadministrativedatasuppliedbyMINUSTAHandseveral
TheRuleofLawIndicatorsweredevelopedandtestedinHaitiandLiberiafortheUnitedNationsbytheVera InstituteofJusticeworkingwithitspartnersintheAltusGlobalAlliance.Thispaperdrawsheavilyonadraftreport onthetestinHaiti,especiallytheAppendixtothatreportwhichreportstheresultsofdatacollectiononmore thanahundredindicators.ThatdraftreportwaswrittenfortheUNbyAprilBang,BesikiKutateladze,JimParsons, MonicaThornton,andAminouYaya.IrelyonthatdraftreportwithpermissionfromitsUNsponsorsandits authorsattheVeraInstitute.I,myself,previouslyservedasdirectoroftheVeraInstitute(19942004)andaschair ofAltus(20032008),butIwasnotformallyassociatedwitheitherVeraorAltusduringtheirworkontheUNRule ofLawIndicatorsProject.IdidserveasanadvisortoDPKOandOHCHRduringthedevelopmentandtestingofthe Indicators.FormoreinformationonVera'sinternationalindicatorworksee http://www.vera.org/topics/international. 5 ThesurveywasconductedinHaitianCreole.Accordingtothereport,Allinterviewswereconductedwithina30 kmradiusofthecentreofthedepartmentcapital.Withineacharea,anumberofcensusunits(orzones)were selectedrandomly(foratotalof116zones).Withineachzone,onesettlementwasselectedrandomlyandwithin eachsettlement,approximately10respondentswererandomlyidentifiedandinterviewed.Ifarespondentwas nothome,interviewersreturnedtotheselectedhouseholdlaterthatdaytoconducttheinterview.Nearly everyonewhowasapproachedtotakepartinthesurveyagreedtoparticipate(99.8%).Themajorityof respondentsweremen(54.7%).Intermsofreligion,thesampleconsistedofCatholic(52.6%),Protestant(34.2%), Voodooist(3.7%),andAdventist(2.3%)respondents. 6 The expert survey was conducted in person in French (57) and English (24). According to the report, The majorityofexpertswerebasedinPortauPrinceandOuestdepartment(53)withsomerepresentationfromthe Norddepartment(13),Artibonite(7)andSudest(8).
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ChristopherStone 4 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti bodieswithintheHaitiangovernment. 7 Inshort,thedataprovideinvaluablebenchmarks againstwhichtoplanandassesspostearthquakerecoveryanddevelopmenteffortsinthe police,courts,andprisons. Thispaperdrawsonthesebenchmarks,observationsbyresearchersinMarch2010,andvariouspost earthquakeassessmentstoconsiderfourfundamentalquestions: WhatisthegoalofjusticesectorreforminHaitiandhowwouldweknowifweareachievingit? Fromwhoseperspectivewillspecificreformstothepolice,courts,andprisonsbeprioritized? HowisthepoliceenforcementmissionchanginginHaitiinthepostquakeperiod,andwhatare theimplicationsforthecourtsandprisons? Wherearetheimmediateopportunitiesforsignalreforms:thosethatcanbeachievedquickly anddemonstratetoawideaudiencethedirectioninwhichlongertermreformsareheading?
Idonotanswerthesequestions,butinsteadIattempttofleshthemoutusingpreandpostearthquake reviewsofthejusticesector,framingthequestionsfordiscussionamongmembersofHaitis government,civilsociety,andinternationalpartners. II. WhatisthegoalofjusticesectorreforminHaitiandhowwouldweknowifweareachievingit? Effortstoimprovecriminaljusticedonotalwayssitcomfortablywitheffortstoreducepoverty.In contrasttofieldssuchaseducationorhealthwherethedesiredoutcomesforthepoorestcitizens(more education,lessearlymortality)arewidelyagreedandrelativelyeasytomeasure,thebenefitsof criminaljusticereformforthepooraredifficulttodefineandoftencontested.Forexample,arelatively lowproportionoftheHaitianpopulationwasincarceratedjustbeforetheearthquake(83per100,000 population,ranked152ndamong217countriesworldwide). 8 YettheprisonsinHaitipriortothe earthquakewerehorriblyovercrowded,andtherateofincarcerationhadbeenrisingrapidlyoverthe
Governmentsources,accordingtothereport,included:theOfficeofJudicialAffairsattheMinistryofJustice (DirectiondesAffairesJudiciaires,DAJ),courtsoffirstinstanceTribunaldePremireInstance,localprosecution offices,theHaitianNationalPolice(DirectionGnraledelaPoliceNationaledHati,DirectionCentralede lAdministrationetdesServicesGnraux,InspectionGnraledelaPoliceNationaledHati),thePrisons AdministrationDirectorate(DirectiondelAdministrationPnitentiaire,DAP),andindividualprisons.Thedirect observationsincluded,accordingtothereport,policestations,prisons,andcourthousesinPortauPrince,Cap Haitien,Gonaives,andJacmel.ThepolicestationobservationsincludedvisitstoeightstationsinPortauPrince, twoinGonaives,threeinCapHaitien,andoneinJacmel.ThestationsrangedinsizefromtheCapHatiensous commissariatduPort,whichwasstaffedby10officers,tothePtionVillecommissariatwithastaffof192officers. Judicialsystemobservationswereconductedinfivecourts:twoinPortauPrince,oneinCapHaitien,onein Gonaives,andoneinJacmel.Courtroomobservationsincludedfourfirstinstancecourtsandonecourtofthe peace. 8 InternationalCenterforPrisonStudies,WorldPrisonBrief,availableat http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief/(accessedforthispaperon23May2010).
ChristopherStone 5 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti previousfifteenyears. 9 Hasthedoublingoftherateofincarcerationsince2003beenagoodorbad resultforthepoorinHaiti?Andwouldafurtherdoublingoftheprisonpopulationinthenextsixyears (orless)beagoodorbadresultofreform? Inpartbecauseoftheambiguityofsuchoutcomes,assessmentsofdevelopmentprojectsinthejustice sectorhavetendedtofocusmoreonactivities(e.g.,numberofjudgestrained,numberofpolicestations built)thanonoutcomesthatmattertothepoor.ThereisnoMillenniumDevelopmentGoalforpublic safetyandcriminaljustice,andthis,too,hasalloweddevelopmentinstitutionstoevademeasuring outcomesinthissectormoreeasilythaninothers.Indeed,manydevelopmentprojectsinthejustice sectorproceedasifthebeneficiariesaremeanttobethepeopleworkingintheinstitutionsratherthan thecitizenswhoneedahigherqualityofjusticeandagreaterdegreeofsafety.Forexample,consider forwhosebenefitnewcourthousesareconstructed?Whilejudgessometimesjustifytheconstruction ofwellappointedcourthousesbyassertingthatthemajestyofthesebuildingshelpsbuildrespectfor thelaw,fewdevelopmentprogramsrequiretheresultingcourthouseconstructionprojectsto demonstrateincreasedrespectforthelawamonglitigantsinthesecourthousesoramongthepeople whostandintheirdocks. InHaititoday,thereisanopportunitytoestablishamoreambitioussetofgoalsforcriminaljustice reform,goalstoimprovetheoutcomesthatmattertothepublicinadditiontodeliveringwhatthe governmentinstitutionssaytheyneed.Followingadevastatingearthquake,courthousesclearlymust berebuilt,butitwilltakedisciplinetokeepthefocusonthepublicandtheirconfidenceinjusticeasthe beneficiariesofthesebuildingprojects,ratherthanthebureaucraciesandofficialswhowillinhabit them.10 Ortakeanotherexample.ThepeopleofHaitiappeartobequitedividedintheiropinionsofthequality ofthepoliceservicetheyreceive.Abouthalfofthepopulationlivingwithin30kmofthecapitalcenters ofPortauPrince,Gonaives,andHinchebeforetheearthquake(51%ofsurveyrespondents)believed thatitwaspossibletoavoidarrestbybribingapoliceofficer,andasimilarfraction(52%)believedthat thepolicearenotconcernedaboutthepeopleintheircommunities.Shouldnewinvestmentsin policinghavetheexplicitgoalofcuttingthoseproportionsatleastinhalf?Similarly,onlyabouthalfof theresidentsofthesameareas(48%ofsurveyrespondents)saidthatthepolicearecapableof preventingpeoplefromtakingthelawintotheirownhands.Thatmayhavefallensubstantiallyasa resultoftheearthquakeandwidespreadreportsofvigilantejusticeinthecampsthatnowfillmuchof PortauPrince.Shouldnewinvestmentsbeexpectedtobringthatfigurebacktoabout50percent,or
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ChristopherStone 6 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti evenraiseitto70or80percent?11 Thesewouldbeexamplesofoutcomesthatmakeadifferenceto peopleinpoverty. AparallelsetofoutcomesthatmattertomostHaitianscouldbeexpectedofcourtreformprojects.For example,justbeforetheearthquake,thevastmajorityofresidentsofPortauPrince,Gonaives,and Hinche(86%ofsurveyrespondents)believedthatjudgeswouldtreattwoindividualschargedwiththe samecrimedifferentlybasedontheirsocial,religious,orethnicbackground. 12 Whatarethe consequencesofthishighlevelofcynicismaboutthepossibilitiesofequaljustice?Should demonstratingsomeprogressinbreakingthisnearconsensusbeagoalforcourtreforminthepost earthquakeera? Investmentsinprisonscouldalsobejudgedbytheirresults.Consider,forexample,thequestionof escapes,amatterreceivinggreatattentionsincetheearthquake.Thereisnoquestionthatnew investmentsintheprisonsshouldaimtopreventescapes,butwhatnumberofescapeswouldrepresent animprovement?In2008,therewerefiverecordedescapeincidentsacrossalltheprisonsofthe country.Attheveryleast,thisprovidesaplausiblebaselineagainstwhichresultsin2011mightbe judged,avoidingtooharshajudgmentifthenumberofescapeincidentsthatyearturnsouttobetwo orthree. 13 Thisisnottosuggestthatpublicopinionandmediareportsshouldbetheexclusivebasisforjudgingthe successofjusticesectorreform.Reformprojectscouldalsousefullyaimtoincreasetheaccountability ofthepolice,courts,andprisons.Forexample,a1994lawrequirestheInspectorGeneralsOfficeto investigatecomplaintsagainstpoliceorprisonofficialsandsendtheresultsofthoseinvestigationsto theMinisterofJusticeandtheDirectoroftheHaitianNationalPolice.Immediatelybeforethe earthquake,theRuleofLawIndicatorsProjectfoundthatthisInspectorGeneraldoes,infact,produce publicaccountsofthenumbersofthesecomplaints,theabusescomplainedabout,andtheirresolution, suggestingthatabasiclevelofaccountabilitywasinplace. 14 Thedataraisedconcerns,however,about howaccessibletheInspectorGeneralsproceduresaretomostHaitians,andtheexpertsurveyresults suggestedthatmostHaitianshadgreaterconfidencein(oratleasteasieraccessto)varioushuman
DatafrombeforetheearthquakearereportedinthenarrativesummariestoIndicators23and24inthe AppendixtoUnitedNationsRuleofLawIndicatorsProject:CountryReportHaiti,draftofFebruary28,2010. Henceforthinthisreport,thesenarrativesummariesintheAppendixarecitedasUNRLIPnarrativesummariesby indicatornumber. 12 UNRLIPnarrativesummaryforIndicator76. 13 ThenumbersofescapeincidentsrecordedbytheAdministrationPnitentiaire,DAP,were21in2004,6in 2005,17in2006,and5inboth2007and2008.SeeUNRLIPnarrativesummaryforIndicator106. 14 ThereportontheRuleofLawIndicatorsforHaitiincludesthefollowinginformation:Accordingtothe2008 annualreportoftheHNP,therewere758publiccomplaintsreceivedbythepubliccomplaintsdepartmentSection PlainteoftheInspectorGeneralsoffice,amongwhich366weremadeinperson,376weresentbymail,and16 wereinternallyinitiatedorsaisinedoffice.Thetypeofviolationsincludesattemptedbribery,bribery,attempted murder,homicide,persistentnonsupport,violenceagainstindividual,rape,theftandextortion.Thereportalso statesthedispositionofthecasesfollowinginvestigations:59wereforwardedtothenationalheadquartersofthe policeDirectionGnraledelaPoliceNationaledHati,DGPNHforfollowup,267weredisciplined,24were forwardedtotheprosecutorsofficesandthejudiciarypolice(DCPJ),andotherswereeitherdismissedorunder investigationatthetimeofthereport.
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ChristopherStone 7 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti rightsgroupstowhichtheyweremorelikelytotakecomplaints.Moreover,theInspectorGenerals Officedoesnotuseitsauthoritytoproducepublicaccountsofdeathsinpolicecustodyordeathsthat resultfrompoliceaction.NosuchaccountswereproducedroutinelybythepoliceortheInspector Generalpriortotheearthquake. Intheimmediateaftermathoftheearthquake,theInspectorGeneralsOfficewascalleduponto investigatetheconductofprisonauthoritiesinrelationtovariousprisonescapesandattempted escapes.OneoftheattemptswasattheprisonatLesCayes,wherepolicereportedlyshotandkilleda numberofunarmedprisonersaftertheprisonwasretaken.TheInspectorGeneralreportedlyconcluded thattheheadoftheprisonhadliedaboutthedeathsoftheprisonersandthattheprisonershad actuallybeenkilledbythepolice.TheInspectorGeneralsreportapparentlyrecommendedthe demotionoftheprisoncommanderbutitdidnotraiseanyconcernsaboutthepolicekillings. 15 Together,theseinsightsintothefunctioningoftheInspectorGeneralsOfficesuggestthattheofficecan potentiallyplayameaningfulroleinassuringtheaccountabilityandintegrityofthepoliceandprisons, andthatithadachievedsomedegreeofoperationalcapacitybeforetheearthquake,buteventhenit operatedwithseveraldeficits.Whatshouldbeexpectedofthisofficeinthenewera?Isitstrong enoughtosurvivewithareputationforintegrity?Whateverelsethesedatasuggest,theyunderscore theimportanceofgoingbeyondmeasuresofwhethertheInspectorGeneralsquartersarerebuilt,and itsbureaucraticprocessesresumed.Somegoalsforaccessibility,independence,andqualitywouldseem necessaryaswell. Thesequestionsarenotmerelyaboutmeasurementanddemonstratingresults;theyarefirstand foremostaboutthespecificationanddesignofrecoveryprojects.Iftheprojectstorebuildandsupport thecriminaljusticesystemandtheruleoflawaretoaimatimprovingthepublicsconfidencethat policecareaboutthecommunitiestheyserve,orreducingtheproportionofpeoplewhobelievethat theycanbribeapoliceofficertoevadearrest,thiswillsuggestthatcertainprojectsbeprioritizedover others. III. Fromwhoseperspectivewillspecificreformstothepolice,courts,andprisonsbeprioritized? Considertheimmediateneedforpolicetrainingandequipment.Policeeverywheremustlearnto operateintwocontrastingmodes:sometimesworkinginsmallgroupsorindividuallywhenpatrolling neighborhoods,andothertimesworkinginlargeformationsunderthecommandseniorofficersonthe scene.Wheninsmallgroupsoralone,policearetypicallyonpatrol,investigatingrecentcrimesor suspiciousactivity,lookingforwantedcriminals,helpingtoresolvedisputesamongcitizens,orjust waitingforsomethingtohappen.Wheninlargeformations,policearetypicallycontrollingcrowdsand confrontingriotersormassivedisorder.Bothrequireskills,butdifferentskills.Thepatrol,investigation, andcommunitypolicingfunctionrequirescommunication,initiative,analyticabilities,andjudgment;
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DeborahSontagandWaltBogdanich,SignsofaCoverUpAfterKillingsinaHaitianPrisoninTheNewYork Times,May23,2010,pageA1.
ChristopherStone 8 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti thecrowdcontrolfunction,incontrast,requiresdiscipline,courage,restraint,andteamwork.Thefirst isconductedoutofsightofsupervisors;thesecondtakesplaceunderparamilitarycommandandinthe glareofthemedia.Notonlymustpolicebetrainedandequippedforbothofthesedifferentroles,but theymustalsobeabletoswitchbetweenthemonamomentsnotice. Thetwomodesofworkalsohavedifferentconstituencies.InHaiti,thegovernment,localelites,andthe internationalcommunityareparticularlyconcernedaboutmassivedisorderandpredictionsthatdire livingconditions,contentiouspolitics,andbadweathercouldcombinetocausecivilunrest.These concernssuggestahighpriorityontrainingandequippingthepoliceforcrowdcontrolandparamilitary policing.Atthesametime,massesofHaitiancitizens,especiallythepoor,arefacingaresurgenceof gangactivityintheaftermathoftheearthquakeandasharpincreaseinindividualdisputesover propertyandshelter,inevitablewhenhundredsofthousandsdiesuddenlyandamillionormoreare displaced.Theseconcernssuggestahighpriorityontrainingandequippingthepoliceforneighborhood patrol,disputeresolution,andotherelementsofcommunitypolicing.Twopilotsatellitepolicestations setupintwocamps,CitSoleilandPtionvilleClub,havebeeninitiallystaffedwithUNpoliceand femaleofficersfromtheHaitianNationalPolicespecificallytodealwithsexualassaultcases,butthese experimentsinpolicingclosetocommunitiescouldbebroadenedtoexploreapostearthquakebrandof communitypolicing.Thetaskhereisnottochooseoneoveranother,buttomaintainaclearfocuson both,notallowingeithertopushouttheother. Theindicatorsgatheredbeforetheearthquakecanhelpmakethesetwoprioritiesconcrete. Inordertoimplementcommunitypolicingeffectively,patrollingneighborhoodsindividuallyorinsmall teams,policeneedtobeincommunicationwiththeirhomebase.Yetevenbeforetheearthquake, communicationequipmentsupportingthiskindofcommunitypolicingwasrare.TheRuleofLaw Indicatorsreportedthattherewereonly70workingradiostosupportthe737policeofficersinthetest sites.16 Ifcommunitypolicingweretobeapriorityinthepostearthquakeera,equippingeachpolice officerwitharadioorgovernmentsuppliedcellphonewouldnotitselfachievethegoal,butitwouldbe anindicatorthatthismodeofpoliceworkwasbeingsupported.Whenariotthreatens,suchindividual communicationislesspracticalordesirable,withhundredsofpolicefacingthousandsofcitizens,and commanderscalculatinghowtorespondtothekeymessagestheyreceive.Communicationequipment formassdisorderworksintheotherdirection,withpolicecommandersrelyingoncommunication technologytomakeannouncementsandgivecommandstothecrowd. Thesamechoiceofperspectivewillshapeprioritiesforthecourts.Proceedingsinthecourtsare conductedinFrench,yetmostHaitiansspeakandunderstandonlyCreole.Priortotheearthquake,the courtsusuallyprovidedinterpretersforforeigncriminaldefendantswhospokeSpanishorEnglish,but theexpertsurveyconductedfortheRuleofLawIndicatorssuggeststhatthecourtsdidnotprovide interpretersforHaitianswhodidnotunderstandFrench,insteadrelyingontheirlegalrepresentativesor
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UNRLIPnarrativesummaryforIndicator11.
ChristopherStone 9 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti otherspresentinthecourttohurriedlysummarizetheproceedingsforthem. 17 Fromtheperspectiveof Haitiansinpoverty,languageaccessmightbeahighpriorityinthecourtsinthisnewera. Therewerecertainlyotherneedsinthecourtsbeforetheearthquake,andofficialswithintheMinistry ofJusticecouldreasonablyhaveotherprioritiesnow.Thedestructionoftherelativelynewcourt buildinginPortauPrincedispiritedmanyworkingwithinthejusticesector.Thecountrysonlyjuvenile court,locatedinPortauPrinceandeventheninadequateforthenationalpopulation,wasalso destroyed. 18 Thequestionisnotwhetherornottorebuildthesecourthouses,butwherethepriorities willbewithinthedesignandequipmentforthecourtsandthetrainingthatwillaccompanythe rebuilding.TheRuleofLawIndicatorsfoundthatonlysomecourtadministratorskeptregulartrackof theirpendingandcompletedcases. 19 Judges,includingJusticesofthePeace,arerequiredbylawto holdalawdegree,equivalenttotheFrenchbachelorsdegreeinlaw(Licenceendroit),yetin2009the OfficeofJudicialAffairs(DirectiondesAffairesJudiciaires,DAJ)estimatedthatonly25percentof JusticesofthePeace(135outof537)heldsuchaqualification. 20 Therewillbechoicestobemade betweenprioritizingtrainingforadministratorsandjudicialofficers,orprioritizinglanguageaccess.The lattercouldbeachievedeitherbyrecruitingandtrainingacadreofFrenchCreoleinterpretersor holdingcourthearingsinCreole. Howhighapriorityshouldlanguageaccessbeinthepostearthquakeera?Fromtheperspectiveofthe professionalsinthecourt,otherfeaturesofcourtconstructionandsupportwouldmakemoreofa differenceintheirownabilitytohandlecases,butfromtheperspectiveofthepoorusersofthecourts, languageaccessmightbeahigherpriority.Reformersmightinsistthattheyarepursuingbothgoals equally,buthereiswherecontinuedmeasurementcanhelp,keepingtrackofwhetheroneortheother ofthesegoalsbeginstotakeprecedence. Thesameproblemofcompetingprioritiescanbeseeninthedecisionthatmustbetakenabouthowto rebuildtheprisons.Inanystatesplanning,thereisachoicetobemadebetweenkeepingprisoners neartheirhomesandfamiliesontheonehand,andmaximizingtheutilizationoftotalprisonspaceon theother.Keepingprisonersneartheirhomeshelpsmaintainfamilytiesandprovideseasieraccessto thecourts;butmovingprisonerswherespaceorspecializedservicesareavailableallowsformore efficientuseofavailablespaceandallowsprisonersrequiringcertainservicestobeconcentratedina singleprisonwherethosearemadeavailable. InthecaseofHaiti,however,thereisatleastoneadditionalconsideration:food.TheRuleofLaw Indicatorssuggestthattheprisonadministrationsuppliesprisonerswithonlyabouttwothirdsofthe minimumcaloriccontentthattheWorldFoodProgramrecommends.21 Prisonerssurviveinsteadon
17 18
ChristopherStone 10 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti foodbroughttothembyrelativesorsharedwiththembyprisonstaff.Asoneoftheexpertssurveyed fortheRuleofLawIndicatorsexplained,Familiesprovidethebulkofthefoodconsumedbyinmates. 22 Anyplanfortheprisons,therefore,musteitherprioritizekeepingprisonersneartheirrelativeswhocan supplementtheirdiet,ormustbecertaintogreatlyincreasethequantityandqualityoffoodservedby theadministrationtoprisoners. Thesethreechoicesbetweenpublicorderpolicingandcommunitypolicing,betweenlanguageaccess inthecourtsandimprovementsintheadministrativeefficiency,andbetweenhousingprisonersnear theirhomesorefficientlyusingprisonspaceonanationalbasisarenotnecessarilythemostimportant orthemostdifficultchoicesfacingjusticesectorreformers,buttheyarerepresentativeofthekindsof choicesthatmustbemadeasreconstructionandrecoveryproceeds.Theyremindusnotonlyofthe differentperspectivesthatinformthesedecisionsandtheimportanceofmeasuringtheresultsof reformfrommultipleperspectives,butalsooftheimportanceofkeepingsightoftheresultsthatwill mattermosttothepeopleofHaiti. IV. HowisthepoliceenforcementmissionchanginginHaitiinthepostquakeperiod,andwhatarethe implicationsforthereputationofthepoliceaswellasforthenationscourtsandprisons? Thesequestionsarisefortworeasons.Firstandmostobviously,theresourcesoftheHaitianNational Policeareabouttoexpandsubstantiallyasinternationalaidincreases.23 Second,thereisgrowing concerninsomequartersaboutthepossibilitiesforcivildisorder.Inanysociety,policingisnot somethingthatyoucansimplyscaleupbyaddingresources:youhavetodecidewhatalargerorbetter equippedpoliceforceisgoingtodo.InHaiti,whatthepolicedecidetodowiththeirincreasedresources willhavesubstantialeffectsontherestofthejusticesystemaswellasonthereputationofthepolice themselves. 24 Consider,forexample,thespectrumofintrusiveenforcementtactics.Inevenabriefperiodoffield work,researchersforthispaperobservedtheoperationofpolicecheckpointsandaggressivepatrols thatarereportedlybecomemorefrequent,andresearcherslistenedtodiscussionsamongpolice officialsabouttheneedtoincreasesearchesfor,andconfiscationsof,gunsthathavereappearedwith neighborhoodgangssincetheearthquake.Asmall,welltargetednumberofenforcementoperations can,intherighthandsandintherightcircumstances,allowpolicetoseizelargenumbersofweapons,
22 23
UNRLIPnarrativesummaryforIndicator110. JustbeforetheearthquakeinDecember2009,theHaitianNationalPolicenumbered9,409.Thepreearthquake reformplancontemplatedasubstantialexpansionoftheHNPto14,000bytheendof2011.See:MINUSTAH, StrategicFramework,p.6. 24 ThereformplanoftheHaitianNationalPoliceandtheassociatedbudgetsforinternationalassistanceinthe postearthquakeperiodareintendedtodomorethanreplacedamagedfacilitiesandprovideequipment.Asthe MINUSTAHassessmentputsthematter,theopportunitywillbeseizedtoreducethedevelopmentdeficitsofthe HNPandnottosimplyreplacedamagesandlosses.StrategicFramework,p.14.Nevertheless,despitesome referencestoprofessionalizingtheHNP,thereislittlediscussionoftheprofessionalskills,strategies,andtactics forwhichtheHNPistobetrainedandequipped.
ChristopherStone 11 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti executeoutstandingwarrants,andarrestmanyfugitives.Yet,thesetacticsinevitablyinconvenience, andsometimesinjure,alargernumberofinnocentpeoplewhoareraided,searched,ortakentoa policestationintheprocess.Especiallywhentheseinnocentpeoplearetreatedbadly,resentment againstthepolicegrows,sometimesovershadowingthebenefitsofhavingseizedcontrabandand makinggoodarrests.Whenpoliceresourcesexpand,commandersmayusetheirincreasedpersonnel andequipmenttoconductmoreraids,establishmorecheckpoints,andarrestmorepeople;yetmerely conductingalargernumberofintrusiveenforcementactionsshouldnotbethegoal.Anyadditional intrusionshouldbeoffsetbysubstantialadditionaldiscoveriesofweapons,fugitives,andoffenders, andeventhen,thevalueoftheseizuresandarrestsshouldbeweighedagainsttheexperienceof innocentpeopleinconveniencedormistreated. 25 InHaiti,theRuleofLawIndicatorsProjectreportsthatamongresidentslivingwithin30kilometersof thecapitalcentersofPortauPrince,Gonaives,andHinche,aboutfivepercenthadbeensubjecttoa policesearchintheyearbeforetheearthquake,andamongthosewithnocashincome,theproportion wasaboutsevenpercent. 26 Thosearealreadysubstantialproportions,andthesomewhatgreater percentageamongthepoorisawarning.Ifincreasedresourcesleadtoincreasesintheuseofthese intrusiveenforcementtactics,officialsshouldbesurethattheyyieldadditionalseizuresandthatthe experienceoftheinnocentpeoplesearcheddoesnotfurtheralienatethepopulationfromitspolice. Orconsiderthevolumeofarrests.Asresourcesincrease,sotoowilltheabilityofthepolicetomake arrests,andanyincreaseintheactualnumbersofpeoplearrestedwillhaveprofoundimplicationsfor thecourtsandprisons.Therewere,forexample,only109prosecutorsandassistantprosecutorsinHaiti intheyearpriortotheearthquake. 27 Moreovertheseprosecutorswerealreadyprovinginadequateto thevolumeofcriminalcasesbeforethecourts.Thesameistrueoftheprisons.AstheRuleofLaw IndicatorsProjectdocumented,allofHaitisprisonswereovercrowdedpriortotheearthquake. Accordingtothereportpriortotheearthquake:[T]heleastcrowdedprison,inLesCoteaux,isat230% ofofficialcapacityandthemostcrowdedfacility(Hinche)holdsmorethantentimesthenumberitwas designedtohold. Itmakeslittlesensetorestoreprosecutorialresourcesorexpandprisoncapacitytomeetthedemands ofpreearthquakepolicing.Instead,plansforprosecution,defense,magistrates,andprisonsneedto anticipatethedecisionsbeingmadenowabouthowthepolicewillusetheirincreasedresources, especiallytheuseoftheirarrestpowers.Fortheabilitytomakemorearrestsdoesnotnecessarilymean thattherewillbemorearrests.Anyactualchangeinarrestvolumeswillbetheresultofpolicydecisions,
25
ChristopherStone 12 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti notmerelyincreasedresources,andthisisespeciallytrueaboutpoliciesrelatingtothepolicingof disorder.Policecommandersexercisefarmorediscretionabouttheuseofarrestpowersinthefaceof civildisorderthantheydoinresponsetotheinvestigationofindividualcriminaloffenses.Public disordercanbemetwithpolicetacticsthatproducefewifanyarrests,or,attheotherextreme,with massarrests.Thepointhere,again,isthatthechoicehasimplicationsfarbeyondthepolicethemselves. Ifthepolicedochoosetomakegreateruseofarrestasatactic,therearestillchoicestobemadethat affectotherpartsofthejusticesystem.Forexample,increasedarrestsneednotrequireincreased prisonspaceifactionistakentoimplementaliberalsystemofpretrialreleaseandnoncustodial sentencing.Priortotheearthquake,thepenallawallowedjudgestoimposenoncustodialsentences, butinpractice,accordingtothereportoftheRuleofLawIndicatorsProject,therewasno institutionalizedsystemofprobationorparole,andtherewasnosystemofsupervisedpretrialrelease. 28 V. Wherearetheimmediateopportunitiesforsignalreforms:thosethatcanbeachievedquicklyand demonstratetoawideaudiencethedirectioninwhichlongertermreformsareheading? Sustainedreformofthejusticesectorrequiressignsofsuccessalongtheway.Evenlongtermplans mustrealizeshorttermgains.Fortunately,thereareseveralopportunitiesforsuchshorttermgainsin Haiti.Iconsiderthreehere:completionofthevettingofthepolice,establishmentofapublicdefender officeandconveningofthejudicialoversightbody,anduniversaltrainingofprisonsupervisorsandstaff intheappropriateuseofforce.Inallthreeofthesecases,successispossiblebecausetheinitiatives werewelladvancedbeforetheearthquakebutwerefacingsubstantialobstacles.Iftheneweracan beginwiththeremovalofthoseobstacles,visibleprogresscouldbeswift. TheinitiationofthevettingoftheHaitianNationalPolicein2006anditsaccelerationin2009heldgreat promiseforimprovementsinpoliceandstrengtheningofpublicconfidenceinthepoliceasthosewho hadcommittedcrimesorhumanrightsviolationswereremoved.Theprocessbeganatthetopofthe organizationsandwasbeginningtoworkitswaythroughtherankswhentheearthquakebroughtittoa temporaryhalt.Bytheendof2009,morethan3,500investigativefileshadbeencompletedbyateam drawnfromUNPOLandtheHNP,andhadbeenhandedovertotheInspectorGeneralforcompletionof thecertificationprocess,withanequalnumberunderactiveinvestigation.29 Allofthepaperrecords appeartohavebeendestroyedintheearthquake,butdigitalcopiesofmostoftheinformationwere maintainedbyMINUSTAH,makingitpossiblenowfortheworktoresumeifresourcesareavailableand thetaskisgivenpriority. TheexpertsurveyconductedfortheRuleofLawIndicatorsProjectrevealedseveralweaknessesinthe vettingprocessthatcouldbeaddressedimmediately.Ofthe36expertsinterviewedwhohadknowledge ofthevettingprocess,halfbelieveditwasproceedingeffectively.Theydescribedatwopartprocess, onepartvettingnewrecruitsandanothervettingservingofficers.Ineachcase,subjectsareinvestigated
28 29
UNRLIPnarrativesummaryforIndicator99. See:MINUSTAH,StrategicFramework,p.6.
ChristopherStone 13 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti jointlybytheHaitianNationalPoliceandtheUnitedNationsPolicewithnamesbeingpassedalongto nongovernmentalhumanrightsorganizationsfortheirassistanceaswell.Accordingtooneexpert,the vettingprocessisquiteeffectiveandasofOctober2009,9.7%ofservingofficerswerefired,and0.3%of applicationsfromprospectiveofficersrejectedbasedonpastcrimes,includinghumanrightsabuses. 30 Buttheexpertswhodoubtedtheeffectivenessofthevettingraisedconcernsthattheinformation providedbyhumanrightsorganizationswasignored,thatjudgesandmagistratesissuedcertificatesof moralprobity(CertificatdeBonneVieetMoeurs)forofficerswithoutanyinvestigation,andthatmany ofthosewithcriminalorabusivepastsarenotremovedfromthepolicebutmerelytransferredto remoteposts.Notoriouslyabusiveofficersareremoved,butmanyevadethevettingthroughcorruption orslackprocedures. 31 Theresultsoftheexpertsurveysuggestthataresumptionofthevettingprocessmightbeaccompanied byamorethoroughcommunicationseffortandanindependentauditingoftheprocessitself,making thevettingprocessmoretransparentandaccountable.Theauditshouldrevealweaknessesand strengths.Thecommunicationsstrategymighttargetcriminaljusticeexpertsinthefirstinstance,aiming topersuadeallthoseinvolvedintheadministrationofcriminaljusticethatthevettingis,asaresultof theaudits,increasinglyrigorousandeffective. UnderHaitianlaw,thegovernmentmustprovidelegalrepresentationtocriminaldefendantscharged withcrimesthatareheardintheCourdAssises,butthereisnopublicdefenderorgovernment institutionprovidingcriminallegalaid.Instead,mostaccusedpersonsarerepresentedbynovice lawyers,fulfillingtheirapprenticeshipswiththeBarAssociation.Thissystem,describedbyseveral expertsasinadequateorworse,isfinancedbyanarrayofinternationaldonors.Beforetheearthquake, theMinistryofJusticehadpledgedtoestablishandfundasystemofpublicdefenseby2015.32 Acceleratingthecreationofapublicdefendercouldaccompanyimplementationofmoreinstitutional oversightofthejudiciary.In2007,Haitiestablishedinlawajudicialoversightcouncil(ConseilSuperieur duPouvoirJudiciaire)butforwantofapresidentithadnotyetbeenconvenedatthetimeofthe earthquake.Aswithpolicevetting,establishinganinstitutionalsystemofpublicdefenseandconvening theConseilSuperieurduPouvoirJudiciairewouldbuildoncommitmentsalreadyinplace. Finally,intheprisons,ashorttermvictorycouldbeclaimedifallprisonofficersandtheirsupervisors weretrainedannuallyintheappropriateuseofforce.Priortotheearthquake,justunderaquarterof theofficershadreceivedtrainingintheappropriateuseofforceintheprevioustwelvemonths,yetthat suggeststhereisthecapacitytodeliverasubstantialamountoftrainingtothisgroup.Expandingthis existingtrainingtothepointwhereallofficersaretrainedannually,liketheotherpossibilitiesreviewed here,couldbeachievedwiththeresourcesnowavailable. 33 Trainingalone,ofcourse,doesnotproduce
30 31
ChristopherStone 14 ANewEraforJusticeSectorReforminHaiti improvement,butifthetrainingisdesignedinsupportofsupervision,andifsupervisorsaretrainedin tandemwiththoseintheranks,andiftheinspectoratefollowsupbyreportingonwhereandwhenthe trainingiswellimplemented,realprogresscouldbehighlyvisible. Which,ifany,ofthesepossibilitiesshouldthegovernmentpursuewithitsinternationalpartners?The answertothatquestionisbeyondthescopeofthisdiscussionpaper.Whatisclear,however,isthatthe reformofHaitisjusticesystemwillrequireablendoflongtermandshorttermstrategies,andshort termsuccesswillbenecessarytomaintainthemomentumforlongertermefforts.Intheimmediate term,thebestbetswillbethosethatbuildonpoliticalcommitmentsalreadyinplace. VI. Meaningfulimprovementstotheadministrationofjusticearehardwon.Theyrequirelegal craftsmanship,culturalperspicacity,andpoliticalacumen;buttheyalsodependondisciplined leadershipandmanagementandthese,inturn,requirethatwemeasurethequalityofthejusticewe deliver.Measuringthequalityofjusticeisneitherthebeginningnortheendofreform,butitisan essentialstepinanyseriousprocess.Itdoesnttelluswhattodo,butitdoestellussomethingabout howweredoing. ThemeasuresofjusticedescribedinthispapercannotsupplyavisionforjusticeinHaitinorsettle disputesaboutpriorityorresources,buttheycandisciplinediscussionofthesemeansandends,for theytelluswhatHaitiansthinkofthejusticetheyhavetoday,whatthepeopleworkinginthe institutionsofjusticearedoing,andwherethedeliveryofjusticestillfallsshortofitslegal commitments.Fortunately,theprocessofjusticereforminHaitihasalreadyseensomesuccess,so theseassessmentsbeforeandsincetheearthquakecanilluminateacontinuingsetofefforts. CanthisbethebeginningofaneweraforjusticesectorreforminHaiti?Yes;butnotbecauseofthe resourcesnowavailable.Noamountoffinancialassistancecanmakeenoughofadifferencewithouta willingnesstofacedifficultquestionsaboutwhatjusticemeansforthemajorityofHaitians,abouthow prioritiesforreformwillbeestablished,andabouthowprogresswillbemeasuredandassessed.Anew erawillnotbefreefromfailure,fromscandal,orevenfrominjustice,butitcanbemarkedbyanew rigorinthepursuitofsafetyandjustice,asoberseriousnessofpurposethathonorsthetragedyofthis yearaswellastheambitionsofthenation.