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{!iHhre (}f H!:
SITTING AS AN IMPEACHMENT COURT FEB 16 1\11 :07
IN THE MATTER OF
THE IMPEACHMENT
OF RENATO C. CORONA
AS CHIEF JUSTICE OF
THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
REPRESENTATIVES
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
JOSEPH EMILIO A.
ABAYA, LORENZO R.
TANADA HI, REYNALDO
V. UMALI, ARLENE J.
BAG-AO (other
complainants comprising at
least one tlhird (1/3) of the
total Members of the House
of Repres(:ntatives as are
indicated in the Complaint),
Complainants.
Case No. 002-2011
}(---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------)(
MEMORANDUM
(On Transfer of Ownership)
Chief Jm:tice Renato C. Corona ("CJ Corona"), by counsel, respectfully
states:
1. In compliance with this Honorable Court's directive, CJ Corona
humbly submits this memorandum on the following issues:
(A) WHE'THER CJ CORONA BECAME 'THE OWNER OF
THE COLUMNS CONDOMINIUM UNIT (THE "COLUMNS
UNIT") lJPON 'THE EXECU'TION OF 'THE DEED OF SALE ON 1
OC'TOBER 2004, AND 'THE ISSUANCE OF THE CONDOMINIUM
CER'TIFICA'TE OF 'TI'fLE NO. 85716 ON 3 NOVEMBER 2004, OR
AT 'THE TIME HE AC'TUALLY ACCEPTED PHYSICAL
DELIVERY AND POSSESSION THEREOF; AND
(B) WHE'THER OR NOT CJ CORONA SHOULD STILL
BE CONSIDERED 'THE OWNER OF 'THE MARIKINA
PROPERTIES COVERED BY TeT NOS. N-97119 TO N-97125.'
2. This Memorandum aims to clarify discuss the delivery of property
as a necessary dement for dete.rmining the moment of the transfer of ownership.
There are 2 modes of delivery, namely: constructive and actual. In constructive
delivery, the property is deemed delivered to the buyer or transferee by symbolic
means, such as the execution and giving of a deed of transfer or sale, or the
giving of keys. In actual delivery, the property is abandoned by the seller or
transferor and actually or physically put in the control of the seller or transferee.
3. As a preliminary matter, the factual and legal issuesturnon two
seeming contradictory situations. Firstly, the Certificate of Title No. 85716
2
over
the Columns condominium unit of CJ Corona was issued on 3 November 2004.
The developer, Community Innovations, Inc., took the position that the unit was
"deemed accepted." CJ Corona maintains the position that he became the full
owner of the Columns Unit only in 2009, when he took actual possession. CJ
Corona refused to accept delivery in order to preserve his right to pursue legal
remedies against the developer for the repair of the defects and damage to the
Columns Unit. For this reason, CJ Corona could not mention the Columns Unit
in his SALN before 2010.
tExhs. "HH" to ''N]SL''
2 Exh. '1J]."
Memorandum on T ran.rfor if Ownership
Page 2 ifl1
4. In contrast, a second and converse problem arises with respect to
the Marikina ptoperty transferred by Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 July 1990,
executed by Mrs. Cristina R. Corona in favor of Demetrio C. Vicente (Mr.
Vicente). The parties agreed that registration of the sale and transfer of title
would be the responsibilty of Mr. Vicente, the buyer. After execution of a deed
of sale and t a l ~ t n g actual, physical possession of the Marikina property by Mr.
Vicente, he has not transferred the property to his name. As a result, all 7
relevant titles remain in the name of "Cristina R. Corona, married to Renato C.
Corona." All the while, however, Mr. Vicente has been occupying the property
and even paying the real property tax thereon. CJ Corona maintains that he is no
longer the owner of the property since delivery of ownership and possession to
Mr. Vicente are complete. CJ Corona, therefore, should not mention the
Marikina property in his SALN.
Discussion
THE TRANSFER OF
OWNERSHII:I OVER THE
COLUMNS UNIT SHOULD
BE RECKONED AT THE
TIME TH1E PHYSICAL
DELIVERY THEREOF WAS
ACCEPTED UY CJ CORONA.
5. Complainants attempt to show that the ownership of the Columns
Unit was transEerred to CJ Corona at the time that the Deed of Absolute Sale
3
over said prope:rty was executed on 1 October 2004, or at the latest, when the
Condominium Certificate of Ticle No. 85716
4
was issued on 3 November 2004.
3 Exh. ''PPP.''
4 Exh. "JJJ."
Memorandum on Transfer qf Ownership
Page 3 qfll
Hence, according to complainants, since ownership of the Columns Unit was
supposedly transferred in 2004 through symbolic delivery, it should have been
reported in CJ Corona's 2004 SALN,5 and not in his 2010 SALN.6
6. Complainants' sole reliance on the concept of symbolic deliveryis
mistaken. In Cebu Winland Development Corporation v. Ong Siao Hua/the Supreme
Court held thatsymbolic (or presumptive) delivery by the execution of a public
insttumentcan be negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession
of the land sold, vii}
The resolution of the issue at bar necessitates a scrutiny of the concept
of "delivety" in the context of the Law on Sales or as used in Article 1543 of
the Civil Code. Under the Civil Code, the vendor is bound to transfer the
ownership of and deliver the thing which is the object of the sale. The
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on the obligation of the vendor to
deliver the object of the sale provide:
ARTICLE 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the
ownership of and deliver, as well as warrant the thing which is the object of
the sale. (1461a)
ARTICLE 1496. The ownership of the thing sold is acquired by
the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways
specified in Articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an
agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.
(n)
ARTICLE 1497. The thing sold shall be understood as
delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.
(1462a)
ARTICLE 1498. When the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does
not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
XXX]{
7. Under the Civil Code, ownership does not pass by mere
stipulation but only by delivery. Manresa explains, "the delivery of the
thing * * signifies that title has passed from IDe seller to IDe
5 Exhs. "D" to "D-1."
6 Exhs. "M" to "M-l."
7G.R. No. 173215, 21 May 2009.
Memorandum on Tranifcr of Ownership
Page 4 of11
buyer." Accordling to Tolentino, the purpose of delivery is not only for
the enjoyment of the thing but also a mode of acquiring dominion and
determines the transmission of ownership, the birth of the real right. The
delivery under any of the forms provided by Articles 1497 to 1505 of the
Civil Code signifies that the transmission of ownership from vendor to
vendee has tal,en place. 8
8. Article 1497 above contemplates what is known as real or
actual delivery, when the thing sold is placed in the control and possession
of the vendee. Article 1498, on the one hand, refers to symbolic delivery
by the execution of a public instrument. It should be noted, however,
that Article 1498 does not say that the execution of the deed provides a
conclusive presumption of the delivery of possession. It confines itself to
providing that the execution thereof is equivalent to delivery, which
means that the presumption therein can be rebutted by means of clear and
convincing evidence. Thus, the presumptive delivery by the execution of
a public instrument can be negated by the failure of the vendee to take
actual possession of the land sold.
9
9. "Delivery" as used in the Law on Sales refers to the transfer
of two things: (1) possession and (2) ownership. This is the rationale
behind the doctrine that presumptive delivery via execution of a public
instrument is negated when the vendee actually fails to obtain material
possession of the land subject of the sale. In the same vein, if the buyer is
8[d.
'ld.
Memorandum on Transfer '!IOwnership
Page 5 '!I"
placed in actual possession of the property, but by agreement of the
parties, ownership of the same is retained by the seller until the price is
fully paid, the mere transfer of the possession of the property subject of
the sale is not the "delivery" contemplated in the Law on Sales or as used
in Article 1543 of the Civil Code.1O
10. A well-respected authority in Civil law has also stated that:
It :is further necessary that the act be coupled with the intention of
delivering the thing. For instance, where the keys to the place where the thing
is deposited are delivered to the vendee in order that he may examine it, but
not with the intention of making delivery, or where the titles of ownership of
incorporeal property are placed in the possession of the vendee for his study
or inspection, but not with the intent of making the tradition, it cannot be said
that there has been a constructive delivery. The act without the intention is
insufficient. For the same reason, any act, althongh not provided in these
articles, but accompanied by evident intention of the vendor to deliver or of
the vendee: to receive the thing, will be considered as constituting tradition. It
is the intention which is essential.!!
11. As ruled by the Supreme Court in a number of cases, "(n)owhere in
the Civil Code, however, does it provide that execution of a deed of sale is a
conclusive presumption of delivery of possession. The Code merely said that the
execution shall be equivalent to delivery. The presumption can be rebutted by
clear and convincing: evidence. Presumptive delivery can be negated by the
failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold."12
12. In other words, even if there has been complete documentation
and registtation of the sale or transfer, delivery is not deemed complete, and it
negated if there: is proof that the buyer did not take actual possession of the
101d.
!! V TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 55 (1992).
12Ten FortY Realty and Development Corp. v. Marina Ct7It, G.R. No. 151212, 10 September 2003; Santos v.
Santos, et ah, G.R. No. 133895,2 October 2001.
Memorandum on Transfer rifOwnership
Page 6 rifll
property. It is only when both documentation and registration, coupled with
placing the buyer in actual, physical control of the property, is there completion
of delivery.
13. Delivery has been described as a composite act, a thing in which
both parties must join and the minds of both parties concur. It is an act by
which one partV parts with the title to and the possession of the property, and
the other acquires the right to and the possession of the same. In its natural
sense, delivery means something in addition to the delivery of property or title; it
means transfer of possession. In the Law on Sales, delivery may be either actual
or constructive, but both forms of delivery contemplate "the absolute giving up
of the control and custody of the property on the part of the vendor, and the
assumption of the same by the vendee. ,,13
14. In the case of Santos v. Santos, et al.,14 it was further explained that if,
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and material tenancy nor make use of it himself or through another in
his name, then delivery has not been effected, v i ~ :
On the second issue, is a sale through a public instrument tantamount
to delivery of the thing sold? Petitioner in her memorandum invokes Article
1477 of the Civil Code which provides that ownership of the thing sold is
transferred to the vendee upon its actual or constructive delivery. Article 1498,
in turn, provides that when the sale is made through a public instrument, its
execution .is equivalent to the delivery of the thing subject of the contract.
Petitioner avers that applying said provisions to the case, Salvador became the
owner of the subject property by virtue of the two deeds of sale executed in
his favor.
***
13EquatonalRcalty Development, Inc. v. M'fYjair Theater, Inc., G.R. No. 133879,21 November 2001.
14Santos v. Santos, et a,(, G.R. No. 133895,2 October 2001.
Memorandum on Transfer 0/ Ownership
Page 70/11
In Danguilan vs. lAC, 168 SCRA 22, 32 (1988), we held that for the
execution of a public instrument to effect tradition, the purchaser must be
placed in wntrol of the thing sold. When there is no impediment to prevent
the thing sold from converting to tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of
the vendo:t, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
purchaset: cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy nor make
use of it l ~ i m s e l f or through another in his name, then delivery has not
been effected.
As found by both the trial and appellate courts and amply supported
by the evidence on record, Salvador was never placed in control of the
property. The original sellers retained their control and possession. Therefore,
there was no real transfer of ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
15. The Supreme Court emphasized the need to show that the vendor
intended to absolutely deliver control and custody of the property, and that it
was likewise the: intention of the vendee to accept such delivery, thus:
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires
only upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in articles
1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferted from the vendor to the vendee." This right is
transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. Non nudis pactis
sed traditiOn'o dominia remm traniferantur. And there is said to be delivery if and
when the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of the vendee."
Thus, it has been held that while the execution of a public instrument of sale is
recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such
constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is deemed
negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.
16. In the present proceedings, prosecution witness,Nerissa Josef,
testified and confirmed that there was no actual acceptance by CJ Corona of the
Columns Unit, and that it was only "deemed accepted" on 7 June 2008-a
unilateral act of the -developer Community Innovations, IncYMs. Josef also
admitted that there were issues concerning the Columns Unit as there was a
need for re-inspection,
16
thus negating any delivery or transfer of ownership since
15 Please see Exh. "PPP-4," which is also marked as Exh. "45."
16 Please see Exh. "48."
Memorandum on TmniferofOwnership
Page 8 of11
CJ Corona did not have the enjoyment and material tenancy nor make use of the
Columns Unit himself or through another in his name.
17. The record therefore shows that complainants have not proven
that CJ Corona was mistaken in declaring his ownership of the Columns Unit in
his 2010 SALN because as of this time, complainants have failed to show when
CJ Corona actually and intention:ally accepted delivery of said Unit.
THE MARIKINA
PROPERTIES
17
NEED NOT
BE REPORTED IN CJ
CORONA'S SALNS FROM
2002 TO 2010 SINCE THE
OWNERSHIl' THEREOF
WAS TRANSFERRED IN
1990.
18. As mentioned above, in Equatorial Realry Development, Inc. v. M'!Yjair
Theater, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires
only upon delivery of the thing to him "in any of the ways specified in articles
1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee." This right is
transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. Non
nudispactimdtraditionedominia1"l1rumtransferantur. And there is said to be delivery if
and when the thing sold "is placed in the control and possession of the
vendee." ...
19. During the proceedings held on 3 February 2012, it was shown that
a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 26 July 1990 was executed by Mrs. Cristina R
Corona in favolc of Demetrio C. Vicente ("Mr. Vicente") covering the Marikina
properties. Evidence will likewise be presented and offered to show that
17 Exhs. "!Iff' to ~ ' N 1 ' . J ,"
Memorandum on Transfer of Ownership
Page 9 of11
possession oveJt said properties was already transferred to Mr. Vicente, and that
he has been exercising his ownership rights on said properties, since 1990.
20. The non-registration of the Marikina properties in the name of Mr.
Vicente does not adversely affect the legal position of CJ Corona. Unlike the
circumstances surrounding the Columns Unit, the express provisions of the Civil
Code and applicable jurisprudence, as cited above, recognize the transfer of
ownership over the Marikina properties from Mrs. Corona to M1:. Vicente by
virtue of a contract and actual delivery by Mrs. Corona of possession of the
prQperties to Mr. Vicente, who accepted such delivery. Consequently, Mr.
Vicente has titLe to these properties because after execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale/a Mrs. Corona also delivered actual possession thereof to Mr
Vicente, who unqualifiedly accepted delivery and possession of the properties."
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Chief Justice Renato C. Corona respectfully prays that
this Honorable Impeachment Court consider the above memorandum in its
resolution of Article II of the "Verified" Complaint of Impeachment.
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona further prays for such other relief as may
be just and equitable in the premises.
Mahti for Pasay City, 15 February 2012.
18 Exh. "54" and "54_A.>1
Memorandum on Transfer of Ownership
Page 10 ofll
Respectfully submitted:
Counsel for ChlefJustice Renato C. Corona.
JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS (RET.)
PTR No .. 2643828,January 4, 2011, Makati
IBP No. 846915 issued January 6, 2011, Manila I
Roll no. 3814 MCLE-exempt
]OSEM. III
PTR No. 0038311; 1/09/12; Mahti City
IBP LRN 02570 August 20, 2001 (Lifetime)
Roll of Attorneys No. 37065
MCLE Exemption No. 1-000176
DENNIS P. MANALO
PTR No. 2666920; 5 J anUM? 2011, Makati City
IBP No. 839371.; 3 January 2011, Makati City
Roll No. 40950, 12 Api"il1996
MCLE Compliance No. III-0009471, 26 Aptil2010
Copies furnished:
House of RepJ:esentatives
Batasan Complex
Batasan Hills, Quezon City
Senators of t h f ~ Republic of the Philippines
GS1S Building
Macapagal Highway
Pasay City
Memoralldum on T rallifer of Ownership
Page 11 of11