Waorani Grief and the Witch-Killers Rage: Worldview, Emotion, and Anthropological Explanation

CLAYTON ROBARCHEK CAROLE ROBARCHEK

ABSTRACT This article analyzes a complex of grief, rage and homicide among the Ecuadorian Waorani, tracing the relationships among worldview, values and concepts of self, and envy, rage and homicide, especially witch-killing. We contrast the results with the position taken by Rosaldo in his widely cited paper Grief and the Headhunters Rage (1989). We hold that Waorani individuals experience of rage during bereavement is not, as argued by Rosaldo for the Ilongot, a thing sui generis, immune to further explanation. Rather, it is explained as a product of people dening their experience on the basis of cultural constructions of self and reality and acting in accord with those denitions. We also argue that this explanation, coupled with the similarities in the Waorani and Ilongot complexes, suggests the operation of similar sociocultural and psychological processes in the two societies and supports, contra the assertions of postmodernists and others, the continued value and validity of cross-cultural comparative research. [ethnology, Amazonia, Waorani, emotion, motivation]

INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Renato Rosaldo published Culture and Truth. Subtitled The Remaking of Social Analysis, the book took issue with the traditional
ETHOS, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 206230, ISSN 0091-2131, electronic ISSN 1548-1352. C 2005 by the American Anthropological Association. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/ rights.htm.

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methods and goals of anthropology as a social science. Rosaldos argument revolves around and regularly returns to the introductory chapter, entitled Grief and a Headhunters Rage, an account of how the author came to an intuitive understanding of an ethnographic conundrumthe equation of grief with rage by Ilongot headhuntersthrough the experience of his own wifes untimely death. The chapter is a very personal and moving account of profound grief and loss; its writing was, he says, therapeutic.1 But Rosaldos objectives in writing the book went beyond the personal and therapeutic to question what he saw as traditional modes of anthropological knowledge and explanation. The book, and particularly one or another version of that rst chapter, have been widely cited, both by those concerned with the anthropology of emotion and by those sympathetic with the postmodernist challenge to the methods and objectives of traditional social science (see, e.g., Clifford 1986; Denzin 1996; Hastrup 1995; Leavitt 1996; Lutz and White 1986; McNeal 1999; Reddy 1997, 1999; Stephan 1999). The force of Rosaldos argument ows directly from his account of a complex of grief, rage and headhunting among the Ilongot of Luzon, among whom he and his wife, Michelle Rosaldo, worked in the 1960s and 70s, and from his assertion that the Ilongots concatenation of the emotions grief and rage in the experience of bereavement is a thing sui generis that can only be experienced and apprehended, but not explained: If you ask an Ilongot man why he cuts off human heads, his answer is brief and one on which no anthropologist can readily elaborate: He says that rage, born of grief, impels him to kill his fellow human beings (1989:1). Although his informants repeatedly told him this, he reports that he . . . brushed aside their one-line accounts as too simple, thin, opaque, implausible, stereotypical, or otherwise unsatisfying (1989:3). And, echoing Geertz (1973:24), Either you understand it or you dont. And, in fact, for the longest time I simply did not (1989:12). In 1981, Michelle Rosaldo slipped over a precipice and fell to her death while doing eldwork in Luzon. The author says he experienced an overwhelming ood of emotions; grief, but also intense anger, were elicited by that devastating loss. Only then, he says, was he nally able to understand what his Ilongot friends had been telling him about the rage inherent in grief. That epiphany led him to two conclusions. The rst was that the Ilongots concatenation of grief and rage is an irreducible brute ethnographic fact that is the crucial motive for headhunting and that is impervious to further explanation:
In all cases, the rage born of devastating loss animates the older mens desire to raid. This anger at abandonment is irreducible in that nothing at a deeper level explains it.

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Although certain analysts argue against the dreaded last analysis, the linkage of grief, rage and headhunting has no other known explanation. [Rosaldo 1989:18]

Second, he concluded that such unexplainable phenomena could only be understood by the empathetic positioning of the observer through similar experience:
The ethnographer, as a positioned subject, grasps certain human phenomena better than others. He or she occupies a position or structural location and observes with a particular angle of vision. . . . In the case at hand, nothing in my own experience equipped me even to imagine the anger possible in bereavement until after Michelle Rosaldos death in 1981. Only then was I in a position to grasp the force of what Ilongots had repeatedly told me about grief, rage, and headhunting. [Rosaldo 1989:19]

A crucial implication of all this for Rosaldo and for many postmodern (if not postmodernist) anthropologists is that the interpretation of all ethnographic events is dependent on the cultural/political/theoretical and/or experiential position of the observer. Rosaldos intuitive understanding of Ilongot grief/rage was possible only after he was experientially repositioned by the death of his wife (cf. McGee and Warms 2000:525 526, fn. 13). That understanding, and by implication all ethnographic understanding, is contingent on such positioning; thus, there are potentially as many alternative understandings as there are positions, and all are equally valid:
Such terms as objectivity, neutrality, and impartiality refer to subject positions once endowed with great institutional authority, but they are arguably neither more nor less valid than those of more engaged, yet equally perceptive, knowledgeable social actors. [Rosaldo 1989:21]

Carried to its extreme, as some have done (e.g., Tyler 1986a), such a position of epistemological relativism maintains that there exist only multiple incommensurable realities that have no objectively denable commonalities. Cross-cultural comparisonethnologythereby becomes impossible. As Richard Shweder put it:
[Anthropology cannot be a] science designed to develop general explanatory theories and test specic hypotheses about objectively observable regularities in social and mental life, . . . [but must devote itself] . . . to the ethnographic study of multiple cultural realities and alternative ways of life. [Shweder 1996:1]

Objective knowledge, generalizations and cross-culturally valid explanations are thus delusions, and social science a chimera (e.g., Clifford 1986; Tyler 1986; cf. Kuznar 1997; Lett 1997). Although we certainly would not presume to question Rosaldos assertion that the tragedy of his wifes death gave him insight into Ilongot bereavement, we do question both his assertions that the cultural complex of grief, rage and homicide is a brute fact immune to further explanation and that such phenomena can only be grasped by the empathetic

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positioning of the observer through similar experience. In so doing, we also question the implications for anthropology and anthropological research that many have seen as deriving from those assertions.

GRIEF, RAGE, AND HOMICIDE AMONG THE WAORANI

The argument that follows derives from two eld research projects that we conducted among the Waorani of Amazonian Ecuador in 1987 and 199394. From the outset, that research has been explicitly comparative, undertaken to provide data for comparison with that derived from our earlier research among the Malaysian Semai, one of the worlds most peaceful societies. We chose the Waorani for this comparison because, until relatively recently, they had the highest homicide rate known anywhere in the world. Over at least the ve generations prior to the current one, more than 60 percent of Waorani deaths have been homicides (Robarchek and Robarchek 1989, 1992, 1998; Yost 1981). There are about 1,300 Waorani (Smith 1993) who, like both the Ilongot and the Semai, are upland tropical forest swidden gardeners and hunters. Their traditional territory lies between the Napo and Curaray Rivers in Amazonian Ecuador. The rst peaceful contacts with them began in the late 1950s, and some of the bands we visited were still at war with all outsiders into the 1960s and 70s. Their fearsome reputation and nine-foot hardwood spears allowed them to maintain control over some 8,000 square miles of densely forested ridges, valleys and swamps. Even today, one or more small bands still resist contact, hidden deep in the remote and disputed region along the Peruvian border, at war with all outsiders and all other Waorani.2 Prior to the cessation of large scale raiding engineered by Protestant and Catholic missionaries in the 1960s and 70s, the Waorani were at war with all surrounding groups whom they raided for iron tools, for excitement and, very occasionally, for women. They were raided in retaliation and for captivesmostly childrenwho were taken to work, and usually to die, on the haciendas that persisted into the 1970s in the Andean foothills (Robarchek and Robarchek 1998). Nearly 20 percent of Waorani deaths were the result of those violent clashes with outsiders (Yost 1981a). They also raided each other. Lethal vendettas rooted in previous killings and accusations of sorcery accounted for more than 40 percent of all deaths (Robarchek and Robarchek 1989, 1998; Yost 1981a). This complex of warfare and raiding was the focus of our eld research and, as soon as our language competency permitted, we set about documenting the vendettas, their raids and retaliatory raids. One of the things that impressed us when we rst read a reprint of Grief and a Headhunters Rage was the striking similarity in Ilongot

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and Waorani explanations for their raiding. When we asked, Why did he (or you, or they) go spearing? the answer was almost always the same: pnti bakandapa, which, roughly translated, means, raging he became.3 People seldom mentioned a precipitating incident, even though we probed for one; that seemed irrelevant to the accounts. From the Waorani perspective, just as Rosaldo reported for the Ilongot, rage was both reason enough and explanation enough for wholesale homicide.

EXPLAINING WAORANI RAGE AND VIOLENCE

The central theoretical premises guiding our research are that peoples behavior is explainable, and that peoples actions are motivated by what they want to achieve in their world as they perceive and understand it. Within their experienced realities, people make choices based on the information available to them about themselves, the world around them, and about possible goals and objectives in that world. We see individual and social behavior as governed by schemata, systems of information and control that constitute both maps of the world and plans for action in it (Laszlo 1969, 1972; cf. DAndrade 1995; Strauss 1992; Strauss and Quinn 1997).4 Most relevant here are the schemata operating on individual and social levels, the structures and processes sometimes designated by the terms personality and culture. These systems of information generate the assumptions, values, meanings, options, possibilities and constraints that individuals and societies use in dening, making sense of and acting in their worlds. From this perspective, raiding (or any other behavior) occurs when it is selected from a set of perceived alternatives as a viable means of achieving specic culturally constituted goals within a particular culturally constituted reality. Explaining Waorani homicide thus requires attending to peoples purposes and intentionsto what they want to achieveand to cultural and individual assumptions, beliefs and values, and the social order in which they are embedded. These constitute the behavioral environments within which people make their choices and chart their courses of action (cf. Hallowell 1967).5 Organizing and giving structure to the vast body of information that constitutes a societys culture is a set of underlying assumptions and premises about what is and what should bethe societys worldviewcore assumptions about the nature of human beings, the world around them, and the relations that should and do obtain among them (Kearney 1984; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961; Robarchek 1977a, 1980; Robarchek and Robarchek 1992, 1998).

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THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF WAORANI REALITY

Because all people are born into social worlds that are already culturally constituted, much of the information that comes to constitute individuals cognitive and affective schemata is incorporated from that preexisting body of cultural knowledge. Just as people enculturated in a particular linguistic context acquire the information and the behavioral habits that allow them to speak the language spoken around them, so also do they acquire other information about their world and habits of dealing with it. These fundamental existential and normative assumptions are distributively located in the personalities of the individual members of a society (Schwartz 1978; Spiro 1951), embodied (along with a great deal of additional cultural knowledge) in individuals beliefs, attitudes, values, habits, expectations, motives and goals. They constitute individuals assumptions about the nature of their reality and about how to deal with it. They tell people what they and others are like, what the world is like, how they should feel about it, what is good and to be sought after, what is bad and to be avoided, and so on, and are acquired by each new generation from the sociocultural milieu, largely during the processes of socialization and enculturation. Because those processes and the resulting cognitive/affective schemata remain open to new information, however, those assumptions can be modiedeven transformedby novel experience (see Robarchek and Robarchek 1996a, b: 1998 for a case in point). Thus they become widely (but not necessarily universally) shared components of the next generations knowledge systems. Waorani culture denes a world where people are not subject to stronger or more powerful beings and forces, a world that people can master and turn to their own ends. The vast forest poses little threat and evokes no fear; rather, it exists to be exploited for human purposes. This is an environment over all of which except the human component they have mastery, and within which every person is ultimately responsible to, and for, himself or herself. A peoples worldview assumptions are seldom readily available to them for conscious reection; rather, they are implicit in thought and action. Thus, worldview must be abstracted from observations of peoples actions: from their responses in various situations, from their voiced attitudes and values, from religious and ethnomedical beliefs and practices, from censorious gossip, and so on. As we immersed ourselves in our primary study community, we were able to identify six fundamental clusters of Waorani worldview presuppositions6 :

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1. The world exists for humans to exploit. It is not inherently threatening, dangerous or hostile to humans or to human intentions. It offers few dangers beyond the human threats of sorcery and spearing. 2. People are powerful and effective. They are fully capable of controlling a world that is tractable to human purposes, and thus are, and should be, in control of their own experiences. 3. People are independent and autonomous. A person should be self-reliant, and every persons survival and wellbeing is primarily his or her own responsibility. 4. People are equal, politically and economically. No one can compel another to do anything, except through the threat or application of force. There are no rank distinctions on the basis of gender, kinship, wealth, or anything else. Therefore, everyone, and especially kin, should be equal in terms of all desired good, material or immaterial. 5. There are fundamental differences between Waorani (people) and kowud (for eigners), and between girnani (kin) and warani (non-kin). Only among a restricted set of girnani are there denite obligations and responsibilities; all the rest are actual or potential enemies. 6. There are no accidents here. An important implication of this empowered and optimistic construction of a world under human control is that most serious misfortune also has its origins in human action. Serious misfortunes, especially illness, snakebites and other injuries and deaths, are products of purposive human action rooted in rage and expressed either directly at the point of a spear or, now more commonly, indirectly in the all-too-human malevolence, envy and rage of sorcerers and those who employ them (Robarchek and Robarchek 1998).

THE CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF A WAORANI SELF

A crucial component of the cultural construction of reality at the individual level is the cultural construction of self. Waorani cultural construction of personhood emphasizes, as we have seen, individualism, autonomy, self-reliance and egalitarianism. Both men and women are expected to be, and for the most part are, independent, self-reliant, and self-sufcient. Even within kindreds, support is conditional on ones own capacity to be self-reliant. The elderly, when they became a burden, were often allowed to starve or were even speared to death by their own kin (Robarchek and Robarchek 1996, 1998; Yost 1981a). A man partially paralyzed during the polio epidemic that struck shortly after contact starved to death when his wife refused to feed him. Another woman allowed her grandmother, who had adopted and raised her after her parents were speared, to starve to death when she could no longer get food for herself. When raiders struck, men often abandoned their wives, and women their children, as they ed into the forest. Cultural values such as self-reliance and autonomy are, of course, ideals, and it cannot simply be assumed, as is often done, that they are necessarily isomorphic with individuals perceptions and understandings

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of what they themselves are like.7 But, although they may not be isomorphic, neither are they unrelated. Cultural values, as ideals, largely constitute the standards against which people are judged, both by their neighbors and by themselves. People see themselves evaluated in the eyes of (and through the responses of) others, and they evaluate themselves in terms of how badly or well they approximate these ideals. Cultural ideals thus inform individuals ideals, helping to shape central components of their selves and self-images (cf. Hallowell 1967; Lewis 1995). In fact, individual Waorani, both men and women, are typically independent, autonomous, self-reliant, condent and pragmatic; they see themselves living in a world they feel fully competent to control and exploit.

THE CULTURAL CONSTITUTION OF WAORANI EMOTION

A cultural knowledge system not only has implications for how individuals think about the world, but it also shapes how they feel about it. The cultural emphases on egalitarianism and on the primacy, autonomy and effectiveness of the self have psychological implicationsboth cognitive and affectiveas well as implications for social action.8 Such cultural assumptions, incorporated as individual ideals, not only describe how things are, but they also dene how things should be. Their violation contradicts the natural, proper, moral order of things and calls into question the basic assumptions and values that give life meaning, stability and coherence. For Waorani the appropriate emotional response to such violations is homicidal rage pntiraging. -

Autonomy
Because the autonomy and effectiveness of the self are paramount assumptions and primary values, any interference with autonomy and effectiveness violates the image and expectation of a self that is in control of its own experience, and is felt as an assault on the self itself. It is tempting to use the word frustration to label what we are describing, but that term carries too much theoretical baggage. In the FrustrationAggression theory of violence, a frustration is taken to be any interference with a goal-directed activity, a situation that triggers the emotion of anger, which in turn generates an aggressive response (Berkowitz 1969). Such a view of frustration is not very useful here; rst, it includes any sort of interference with a goal, and second, it entails a conception of emotion, specically of anger, as part of a prepackaged response sequence that is triggered by, but otherwise independent of, the context in which it is elicited. Neither of those assumptions applies to the Waorani case.9

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One of the things that most impressed us while we were living with the Waorani was their typically good humor, even in the face of what would usually be considered frustration. Many frustrations, as we ordinarily think of thema man spends a week building the structure for a new house and a storm blows it down; a woman slips and falls, dumping the basket of plantains she has carried for a mile; a ood washes away half of a womans manioc gardenprovoked not anger, but laughter, both from bystanders and from the victims. For Waorani, it is not simply the interruption of a goal-directed activity that provokes rage. Rather, it is active human infringement of ones autonomy and the resulting experience of helplessness and powerlessness, in other words, the inability to be effective and in control of ones experiences. A sibling is shot and killed when a raid goes wrong; a sorcerer causes a child to die; a suitors marriage plans are blocked when an old woman objects to the proposed marriage of her grandchildrenthese kinds of situations are seen as deliberate assaults by another person on the autonomy of the self, and they are the kinds of incidents that precipitate homicidal rage. (Each of these did, in fact, result in one or more killings). Questioning one of our neighbors about a fairly recent killing, we got the following explanation:
In regard to Gam, her grandchildren wanted to marry and Gam refused. Angry, they speared her and she died. Her grandson said, Like that grandmother refuses, and I will kill her. Her grandchildren wanting to marry, they speared Gam.

Why did the grandmother refuse? we asked.

The grandmother, why might she have refused [meaning, who knows why]? She told them: Do not marry! For that reason they killed her and she died. Even though she was their own grandmother, they cut her head off and put it on a stake and threw her body into the river. Like that they did it.

In a case such as this, the concept of frustration as it is typically understood ignores the crucial feature for the Waorani: the perception of one persons deliberate infringement of anothers autonomy. In so doing, it also ignores the crucial role of cultural and individual values and assumptions in giving such events their emotional and motivational power. The conception of emotion implicit in the Frustration-Aggression theory is similarly decient. It sees emotion generally, and anger specically, as things that exist independently of the culturally dened contexts in which they occur. As Rosaldo argues for the Ilongot, it just is. We found, in contrast, that the experience of a particular emotion, in this case of anger/rage, is a part of a persons evaluation and denition of a situation in terms of a set of cultural values and assumptions. The emotion, then, is a function not only of the objective situation (e.g.,

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of some intervening event), but of the interpretation of the event by a whole personincluding his or her own biological processes, culturally structured history, cognitive/affective schemata and learned response patternsin interaction with an environment that is, itself, culturally constituted. From this perspective, the subjective experience of emotion is, among other things, a part of the process of making experience comprehensible by assigning meaning to it. The relationship between the attribution of meaning and the experience of emotion can be seen clearly in situations in which, for most of us (i.e., non-Waorani), the most dominant and persistent emotion would be grief: ones child is bitten by a snake and dies; a sibling contracts polio and is dead in a few days; a mans wife is stung by a scorpion, goes into shock, and dies in hours. In all of these cases, the almost immediate reaction on the part of surviving kin was homicidal rage. In situations such as these, the relationship between culture and emotion enters into the processes of denition and evaluation in at least two ways. First, all of these situations were culturally dened as the consequences of the actions of other persons, as acts of sorcery. Thus each was dened and perceived by surviving kin as a human attack on their autonomy. Second, all of these situations violated the assumptions of the autonomous and effective self that has the capacity to control its experience; they generated the subjective experience of powerlessness. The emotion that is culturally appropriate to that experience is, for Waorani, rage, and it was in terms of rage that the survivors dened their feelings. The emotional response, in all of these cases, was rage, and the behavioral response was homicide.10 Individuals beliefderived from the cultural knowledge system in the existence and malevolence of sorcerers provides a framework for their understandings of, and responses to, such misfortunes. At the same time, the belief in sorcery itself is subjectively validated: the felt affective arousal, dened and experienced as rage, reinforces the cultural assumption that the situation is a result of the deliberate hostile action of another person. It is obviously true because it coincides with the emotional response of rage. It feels true; therefore, a human agenta sorcerermust be responsible (cf. Garro 1997). Curiously (to us), however, the rage and violence elicited in these kinds of situations are not necessarily directed at the perceived guilty party. As the Rosaldos described for the Ilongot, an innocent person may serve just as well as a target. Returning from a raid in which a sibling has been killed by kowud, a Waorani youth sees his elderly grandmother lying in her hammock, and drives a spear through her where she lies (Robarchek and Robarchek 1998).

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This displacement of rage is comprehensible if the rage elicited in these situations is not so much a response to a specic act as it is an unfocused emotional reaction to a violation of autonomy and of the capacity to control events, in other words, to the experience of powerlessness. Such unfocused rage may, it seems, be as easily directed at an innocent bystander. In the Waorani psychological map, the natural reaction to such rage, one that restores a sense of autonomy and control, is homicide. As with the Ilongot, the identity of the victim is largely irrelevant. Similarly, the difculty that we encountered in eliciting what we considered to be coherent reasons for particular spearing raids becomes comprehensible if the fundamental cause of the raiders rage is the challenge to the self posed by the perceived loss of autonomy and control; the precipitating event is, again, largely irrelevant.

Egalitarianism
The Waorani egalitarian assumption is, as we have seen, manifested socially in political and economic equality, but it also has implications at the individual level in relation to autonomy. People are unwilling to concede authority to anyone else, and no one, not even the smallest child, can be forced to do anything. Every person is ultimately a free agent, responsible to, and for, no one but himself or herself. This was exemplied for us by one of our informants account of his mothers abandonment of him when he was a child:
My mother now lives at Pavacachi [a Quichua village far downriver on the Curaray]. Oruga [a Quichua woman married to a Waorani] said she saw her there. She is married to an Oruna [Quichua]. She left after Moipa speared Kento. She was angry and fearful over that; she said, My brother is dead and I am going to the place of the kowud (foreigners). Having said that she left permanently. She feared that she too would be speared. From her sleeping-place, abandoning me when I was in my early childhood, she ed into the forest. She went empty-handed, taking nothing. She was pregnant when she ed. [Robarchek and Robarchek 1998:118]

Economically, egalitarianism is reected in the normative assumption that no one should have more of anything than anyone else. From the perspective of any individual, this implies that No one should have anything that I do not have. Prior to contact, there was, in fact, little variation in material wealth among individuals, because all resources were equally accessible to everyone; however, the end of large-scale raiding brought an inux of manufactured goods and the opportunity to work for the oil companies that are operating in the region, and economic differences have begun to appear. This violates the egalitarian principle, and when people see themselves as materially deprived in relation to others, especially to their own kin, the result is malignant envy.

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Envy necessarily indicates a violation of the egalitarian premise because, by denition, it entails the idea that someone has something desirable that I do not have. This violates both the existential assumption that equality is normal and the normative assumption that it is morally right. And, like the violation of autonomy, inequality is inherently rage inducing. In the Waorani psychological schema, envy and the rage it evokes in others nd their expression in attacks by sorcery.11

THE ETHNOPSYCHOLOGY OF RAGE

If we examine their own explanations for raiding and their attributions of homicidal rage to others, Waorani ethnopsychology supports the foregoing analysis. This can be most clearly seen in peoples explanations of why sorcerers bewitch others, that is, in peoples understanding of others rage as that understanding is revealed in accusations of sorcery. We hold that these explanations of others motives for sorcery make cognitive and emotional sense to Waorani because they represent peoples generalization and projection onto others of their understandings of their own feelings and motives: people know how they feel in similar situations. So, why do sorcerers bewitch people? Because they (or the people who employ them) are enraged, of course. Digging deeper into specic accounts of sorcery, we found two primary reasons given for the rage that is believed to motivate it. Most commonly it was, again, because of someones interference with the achievement of anothers objectives: a woman refuses anothers request for food from her garden, for example.12 The second kind of explanation for sorcery sees it rooted in envy. A spearing raid that occurred just prior to our last visit was precipitated by the sudden death of a Quichua woman who had married into a Waorani community. Her death, probably from anaphylactic shock following a scorpion sting, was immediately attributed to sorcery. The alleged motive was that her relatives in her home village were envious of the things, especially her four gold teeth, that her husband had purchased with money he earned working for one of the oil companies. One of our neighbors recounted to us the universally accepted account of the event:
Now, Itekas wife was an Oruna [Quichua] from the Curaray, and she took many of these gifts from The Company home to her mother. There, all her relatives saw her gold teeth and became very envious and angry that she should have gotten so many good things from The Company whereas they had nothing. Her mothers people went to the sorcererManwedo [Manuel] was his nameand gave him money and he sent a scorpion to sting her. Having been stung, Maria went into her house; it hurt all night and bled. Before she died, she said, For my gold teeth, my pots and my axes, I am going to die! By morning she was dead.

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The raid mounted soon after by her husband and his kin killed the suspected sorcerer, his wife and two of his three children. Only a teenaged daughter managed to scramble out a window and ee to safety. (See Robarchek and Robarchek 1998 for a more detailed discussion of this episode.) In another case, what sounds like a stroke was attributed to sorcery that was inspired by envy. Omaka, an old man whom we had interviewed and whose hunting songs we had recorded in his hamlet, a Christianized village on the Tzapino River had, we heard, disappeared while hunting. Maybe he was speared by the Tageiri (a still wild band), people said. Some time later, we met a young man from his hamlet in the frontier town of Puyo; we asked if there was any news of Omaka. He told us that the old man had gone hunting and been attacked by jaguars sent by a sorcerer. He was missing for ve days and when he found his way home he couldnt remember anything and he couldnt speak. His mouth and one arm were affected. For three days and nights his relatives gathered around him and prayed to God, and then he could speak, but not very well.
Who did it? we asked. People at Tonyempad did it; they bewitched him. Why did they do sorcery? They are raging. Why are they raging? Because at Tzapino we have lots of food, lots of meat. What they did is very bad.

Inequities in material goods are, however, not the only source of envy, as is illustrated by an accusation of witchcraft that occurred some years ago. We were talking with a neighbor one day about the deaths of her grandmother, Akawo, and Akawos sister, Gam, both of whom had been speared within the previous several years. This was her account:
Those two are witches, they said. After people become old, they always say that about old men and old women. Now they are saying the same thing about Dyiko because she is old. Now she behaves well, but in former times she was a witch. For example, she bewitched the child of her sister-in-law, Omengkidi, and she died. The child, a girl, was - very beautiful and Dyiko, seeing her, said, How can she be so beautiful? I will bewitch her and she is going to die! They lived in the same house at that time. One day Dyiko was swinging in her hammock back from the doorway and Omengkidis child came jumping into the house. Dyiko - bewitched her, perhaps it was as if she was bitten by a snake, and the child cried out in pain. As Omengkidi came in after her child, carrying her back basket, she heard her - child cry out, but there was nothing to be seen. As she set the basket down, the child cried out, then she died. She was about as old as my sisters child, Gmari (about 4 years old).

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How did she do it? we asked

With m [ayahuasca] she did it. She drank; while drinking, she said, She will not grow more beautiful, she is going to die! After drinking the m, she went to the house where the child would be. She drank; then Omengkidis child came in through the door and - Yeee! she cried out in pain. Omengkidi, coming in, said, Why does she cry out? She - cried out again and again, suffering, and nally died. Like that she did, Dyiko, in her youth.

Why did she do it?

After seeing this beautiful person, perhaps she thought, She is growing so beautiful, everyone will want to marry/sleep with her, and she became enraged. I dont have a child like that, she said. So saying, being enraged, Omengkidis child she bewitched, - and she died.

This attribution of rage and murderous intent to those who are presumed to be envious reects Waorani perceptions of the psychodynamics of anger. Implicit in these accusations of sorcery is the assumption that inequality, like powerlessness, is inherently rage producing. Envy is thus intrinsically hostile and, like powerlessness, the rage it generates nds its expression in sorcery.

RAGE/GRIEF EXPLAINED
In summary, our argument to this point is that the Waorani experience of rage in grief is, contra Rosaldo, amenable to explanation in terms of other social, cultural and psychological variables and processes, and that these variables and processes can be discovered and explored through the application of standard ethnographic methods by researchers who need assert no particular claims to exceptional empathetic understanding. In the Waorani case, social relations and the assumptions and values implicit in them comprise the context of enculturation for each new generation. Culturally structured experiences within that social milieu shape the cognitive and affective cores of developing individual personalities as those cultural assumptions and values become embodied in individual beliefs, attitudes, values, habits, expectations, motives and goals. At the most fundamental levelsthe construction and perceptions of self and of the world around oneselfthe processes are culturally informed. Given that individual personalities are premised on these values and assumptions, which impart meaning and coherence to experience, their violation or contradiction is experienced as a violation of the natural and moral order of things. For Waorani, the ability to project ones expectations onto and to realize ones goals in the world is the essence of the autonomous, effective self. Powerlessness, the experience of events that are beyond ones control,

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events such as the unwanted and unexpected death of a spouse, child or sibling (always seen to be caused by the actions of another), violates that core assumption about how the world is and how it should be. In a similar way, the experience of envy signals a violation of the egalitarian assumption. Both perceived powerlessness and perceived inequality are experienced as assaults on the self, situations where the appropriate emotional response is rage and where the culturally and psychologically appropriate behavioral response, one that restores the sense of power and effectiveness, is homicide. Both of these can be seen in the attribution of homicidal motives to others in accusations of sorcery. Sorcerers motives for murder by sorcery are seen to be expressions of their anger and envy, rooted in the same existential and normative assumptions. Rage and homicide are the assumed natural consequences of a refusal to grant a request or to accede to a marriage, of envy of someones beautiful child or of a womans gold teeth.

RAGE, HOMICIDE, AND THE ETHNOLOGICAL ENTERPRISE

It was the striking similarity in Waorani and Ilongot explanations for raiding that rst led us to think about writing this article. Contemplating that similarity raised a question that, although it is not directly relevant to the argument that we made above, bears on the larger issue of the appropriate methods and goals of anthropology. Is it possible, we wondered, that similar psychological and sociocultural processes might be at work in these two societies half a world apart? Because the crux of our argument thus far has been that the Waorani grief/rage/homicide complex can be explained in terms of their cultural constructions of selves and reality, we felt it would be helpful to know something about Ilongot world view, values and concepts of self. That, in turn, led us to the Rosaldos earlier monographs on the Ilongot: Ilongot Headhunting (R. Rosaldo 1980) and Knowledge and Passion (M. Rosaldo 1980) and to their other publications (e.g., M. Rosaldo 1982, 1983), where we found some striking correspondences between Ilongot and Waorani constructions of self and reality. Although autonomy, independence and self-reliance may not be culturally emphasized to the extremes that they are among the Waorani, they do seem to be important components of Ilongot self-constructions, particularly for men. Renato Rosaldo observed that: Coordination among autonomous individuals requires a particularly high degree of exibility and responsiveness. . . . Ilongots can try to persuade their fellow humans to do as they wish, but they cannot simply tell them what to do

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(Rosaldo 1989:117). And: In their everyday lives, Ilongots were relatively anarchistic: they often said that no person has the right to tell another what to do (Rosaldo 1989:65). Similarly, Michelle Rosaldo describes autonomy, equality independence, self sufciency, self-direction and self-control as adult male values (1980:75, 91, 175, 226; 1983:149150) central to a sense of self, observing that:
One might well claim that the individual mans most intense sense of self is won when, casting off a victims head, he establishes himself forever as an angry manautonomous because constrained by none, ready to pursue and later give direction to a wife because an equal in angry force to his fellows. [1980:226]

Renato Rosaldo also reported that the rage that motivates Ilongot headhunting derives not only from grief, but from other situations that could be construed as interference with ones autonomy or sense of self, including ones wife running off with another man (1989:18). Both monographs emphasize the value placed on egalitarianism and the importance of its correlates, envy and anger, whose psychological and sociocultural signicance may be as great as they are among the Waorani. Michelle Rosaldo titled one chapter Knowledge, Identity and Order in an Egalitarian World and in it, she stressed the causal relationship between the violation of egalitarianism and the arousal of envy and anger:
Liget (anger, passion) derives from insults, slights, and other intimations of inequality. Typically born of envy. . . liget grows through the hearts reections on the successes of an equal. . . as it notes that I have less. In a world in which equivalence is order and social precedence and domination constitute an inevitable source of strain, liget is the natural response to the vagaries of fortune, the ups and downs of social life and fate. . . . A woman is made envious and angry when her neighbors nish planting long before her, or if they reap a more impressive yield. . . . Similarly, a mans heart rises with liget when he notes that other men, in every way his equals, outdo him in their hunts. One persons boasts, news of anothers happy fortune, may stir the heart with angry musingas can severe misfortune, which leads people to wonder why they alone must suffer loss. The things that people strive for and desire are things they want because other people have them. [M. Rosaldo 1980:47; see also 1982:210]

Both authors also repeatedly stress the causal relationships (apparently well recognized by the Ilongot themselves) among envy, anger and headhunting: . . . Ilongots had said that they went headhunting because of their emotions, because grief, envy or humiliation had laid a weight that they would cast off with their hearts (M. Rosaldo 1980:34). And: . . . in fact, informants told me, if men were not envious of one anothers exploits, no Ilongot would have enough anger to want to kill (M. Rosaldo 1980:4647). Renato Rosaldo also emphasizes that, although adult mens motives for headhunting are rooted in rage derived from grief and loss, young men are motivated to kill by angry envy of the hornbill earrings worn by those

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who have already taken a head (1980:140, 157, 16168,177, 257, 254; 1989:1718). This rage, derived from envy and violations of autonomy and sense of self, though intense is, as is the case with the Waorani, also diffuse and unfocused: Born of insult, disappointment, envy and irritation, liget is the source of motions in the heart that may, unfocused and unsatised, produce no more than wild violence, social chaos. (M. Rosaldo 1980:47). And when this rage eventuates in homicide, the identity of the victim is, according to Renato Rosaldo, utterly irrelevant, merely a target of opportunity (1980, 1989). All this suggests at least the possibility that the similarities in Waorani and Ilongot grief/rage and homicide might be explainable, at least in part, in terms of similar fundamental existential and normative assumptions about themselves and the worlds they inhabit. That possibility raises yet another question: If the Ilongot grief/rage complex is, in fact, a product of people operating under a particular set of cultural assumptions that have been incorporated as components of their own individual knowledge systems, how could the complex suddenly make coherent emotional sense to Rosaldo after the tragic death of his wife? We have elsewhere discussed the similarities between fundamental Waorani and Western (especially American) conceptions of self and reality and the values that derive from them:
It is difcult for an American observer not to admire them [Waorani] because, in many ways, they are an extreme version of us. Their worldview and value system are strikingly similar to our own: humankind is seen as being dominant over nature and in charge of its own destiny; independence, autonomy, self-reliance and courage are all highly valued. Moreover, their culture, like ours, is suffused with violence. Although their mass killing has largely ceased, violence lurks just below the consciousness of even those young people who did not experience it directly. Waorani fascination with the spearings of the past mirrors the obsession of our mass media, itself a reection of our cultural and individual ambivalence about violence. [Robarchek and Robarchek 1996b:75; Cf. also Bellah 1985; Hsu 1972; Inkles 1979; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 1961; Nottingham 1971; Spence 1985]13

The argument that anger in western culture is related to the values of independence and self-determination has also been advanced by Kitayama and Markus (1994):
Anger is a central and natural emotion in Western cultures primarily because these cultures stress independence and the expression of ones internal attributes such as rights, goals or needs, and because anger is most closely associated with the blocking of these rights, goals, or needs. [1994:8]

Because it appears that we also share some similar constructions of self and reality with the Ilongot, these similarities in Ilongot and American world views may help to explain why the Ilongot concatenation of grief

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and rage made cognitive and emotional sense to Rosaldo, and why his account has seemed so natural and convincing to so many of his Western, especially American, colleagues.14 It is critically important to recognize that this conjunction of envy, grief and rage, although it may be common to Waorani, Ilongot and Americans, and probably to others whose individual and cultural knowledge systems are premised on similar existential and normative assumptions, is not, contra Rosaldo, universal. Nothing even remotely resembling that complex exists among the Malaysian Semai (among whom we have also conducted extensive ethnographic eldwork), whose view of themselves and their world is radically different. They see themselves as powerless in a hostile universe that is entirely beyond their control (Robarchek 1977a, 1980, 1986; Robarchek and Robarchek 1989, 1992). In that experiential context, grief is typically conjoined not with anger or rage, but with fear as the community draws itself together to resist the malevolent forces that menace from without. (Robarchek 1977a, 1979a).15 Finally, we must emphasize that this (or any) constellation of cognitive and affective orientations does not determine peoples behavior. Rather, it denes a behavioral context within which people make decisions based on the totality of the information available to them. Americans do not typically respond to grief with violence, and even Waorani, when new information permitted them to envision and formulate new goals, largely abandoned their generations-old pattern of revenge killing almost overnight. The rst peaceful contacts, mediated by a small group of American missionaries and by two Waorani women who had ed the vendettas and returned after years of living among the Quichua, opened a world of new possibilities to Waorani: access new goodsshotguns, axes, machetes and other tools, snakebite anti-venom and other medicinesaccess to potential spouses in previously hostile groups and, perhaps most important, an image of a world without the constant threat of attack. This new information and new perceptions of reality allowed the formulation of new individual and social goals, and people responded by choosing new courses of action based on what they wanted from this new reality. Once convinced that other groups would do the same, individual bands, one by one, abandoned raiding within a matter of months after contact. The homicide rate plunged by more than 90 percent, yet their basic worldview assumptions remained essentially unchanged (Robarchek and Robarchek 1996a, 1998). The old cultural and psychological schemata of envy, grief and rage persist but, in this new reality, they are only infrequently manifested in homicidal raiding. The speed with which the transformation from violence to relative peacefulness occurred can only be explained as a consequence of the Waoranis conscious striving to achieve what they themselves had

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long wanted: an end to the killing. When the opportunity presented itself, they seized and implemented it, a powerful demonstration of the capacity for human beings to take their destinies into their own hands.16

CONCLUSION
We began by questioning the assertions that the Ilongot complex of grief, rage and homicide is an irreducible fact impervious to further explanation, and that such phenomena can only be understoodbut not explainedthrough the empathetic positioning of the observer by similar experience. If these assertions are valid, then, many have argued, the implication is that generalizing, comparative social science is impossible. If, on the other hand, the grief/rage complex can be explained with reference to other phenomena such as existential and normative worldview assumptions, cultural beliefs such as sorcery, cultural values such as autonomy and egalitarianism, and individuals culturally conditioned cognitive and affective orientations, and if such analyses are dependent on data that can be derived from (at least theoretically) replicable operations that are not contingent on observers empathetic identity with the natives, then that implication seems, at the very least, to be open to serious question. And beyond that, if there is any validity to our admittedly supercial examination and analysis of the Ilongot grief/anger/homicide complex, then it is reasonable to suggest the hypothesis that similar psychological and sociocultural processes may underlie the violence in these two societies (and, as we have argued elsewhere [Robarchek and Robarchek 1996b, 1998] in American urban street gangs as well). The mere possibility that such cross-cultural regularities may exist and be discoverable suggests that, contrary to the claims of some of our colleagues, comparative research and cross-cultural generalization may be possible after all. That possibility is, in itself, more than sufcient to justify the continuation of the ethnological enterprise, despite the premature reports of its demise.

CLAYTON ROBARCHEK is Professor and Graduate Coordinator of Anthropology at Wichita State University. CAROLE ROBARCHEK is Research Development Specialist at Wichita State University.

NOTES
Acknowledgments. This article is based on a paper of the same title presented at the symposium Indigenous Amazonia at the Millennium: Politics and Religion, January 11

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14, 2001, New Orleans. Fieldwork among the Waorani in 1987 and subsequent data analysis were supported by research grants from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. Support for eldwork in 19921993 was provided by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation and the United States Institute of Peace. We gratefully acknowledge their support, without which our research would not have been possible. We want to thank our colleagues Robert Lawless and Donald Blakeslee and the Editor and reviewers for Ethos for their thoughtful reading of the manuscript and for their helpful suggestions. The names of all living Waorani individuals used in this article are pseudonyms. 1. An earlier version of the chapter was published as Grief and a Headhunters Rage: On the Cultural Force of Emotions, in Text, Play and Story: The Construction and Reconstruction of Self and Society (Bruner 1984). 2. We recently received a report that one such band recently speared to death two Quichua settlers on the lower Curaray River (Camille Tipton-Allaband, personal communication). Still more recently, we heard an Ecuadorian news report that one of the pacied bands raided and wiped out the Tageiri (Tages group), probably the last uncontacted band of Waorani. 3. We are not assuming that pnti and raging are necesarily subjectively identical states but, at the very least, there appears to be substantial overlap between them. Based on our experience, raging seems to us to be the best English gloss for the term. 4. The concept of schema rst entered anthropology in the 1970s with the rise of cybernetics, information theory and General Systems Theory. After a urry of interest, it largely disappeared from anthropology, reemerging again in the early 1990s (e.g., DAndrade 1992, 1995; Strauss 1992; Strauss and Quinn 1997). The concept as we are employing it here derives from that earlier incarnation, specically from Laszlo (1969, 1972), who proposed an hierarchy of schemata at different organizational levels from the genetic to the sociocultural, information and control structures that, in toto, operate to constitute the processes of adjustment and adaptation (see Robarchek 1977a). 5. We are, of course, not claiming that all motivational processes are necessarily fully conscious and rational. Intrapsychic processes (e.g., projection) are clearly motivationally important but operate below the level of consciousness. Similarly, learned behavioral propensities (e.g., dependency), cognitive constructs (e.g., worldview assumptions), and affective orientations (e.g., fearfulness) all inform decision-making processes but are themselves generally not accessible for conscious reection (cf. Robarchek 1979a, 1985, 1986, 1989). 6. For a discussion of the methods we used to elicit these assumptions, see Robarchek 1977a, Robarchek and Robarchek 1992. 7. Spiro (1993) emphasizes the necessity of grounding models of the self in observations of the behavior of real people rather than simply assuming an isomorphism between normative cultural ideals and individuals perceptions of themselves. See Robarchek and Robarchek 1998 for a discussion of the methodology we employed in deriving this model. 8. Our primary purpose in writing this article was to address one aspect of the postmodernist challenge to ethnology. Because emotion is central to our argument, however, several reviewers suggested that we should locate it within the constructionist/essentialist controversy over the nature of emotion. Toward that end, the position we take, could be characterized as a moderate constructionist stance (Reddy 1997:346) that: Drawing on the work of Cannon 1927, 1929, Selye (1956) and others [it sees emotion built on] . . . a generalized state of physiological and psychological arousal. This arousal state prepares the organism for a variety of possible responses. . . . This response system is probably phylogenetically very old. Indeed, it is unlikely that survival would be possible without some mechanism that, in the presence of a noxious stimulus, instigates a behavioral response directed toward avoiding or overcoming the stimulus. Some such mechanism clearly exists in the most primitive organisms and phylogenetically predates the evolution of higher nervous systems with their more complex psychological

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processes and cognitive functions. That some such mechanism is also ontogenetically prior to the development of complex cognitive processes in humans is suggested by the existence of so-called innate fears in human infants: the undifferentiated agitation induced by loud noises or loss of support (cf. Bridges 1932; Watson 1920). The basic reaction can thus apparently operate without the operation of higher cognitive processes, even in humans. . . . In humans, this complex state of arousal is ordinarily perceived as emotional arousal, perhaps, in the absence of adequate situational cues, as generalized anxiety. . . . The specic emotion an individual experiences is determined on the basis of a cognitive appraisal and interpretation of the situation in which he nds himself. This situation includes both the objective stimulus and the arousal state itself. The individual evaluates and interprets these in the light of his personal history of culturally patterned and idiosyncratic experience, including his knowledge of the situation and [his] culturally learned beliefs and values. . . . Culture, then, though not the only source, is a major source for the attribution of meaning to situations inducing arousal. This attribution of meaning is central to the process of evaluation and interpretation that determines which specic emotion is experienced. . . . Emotion, then, is a function not only of the objective situation, but rather of the whole person, including his past history and stable response patterns, in interaction with an environment that is itself culturally constituted. . . . The subjective emotion, once dened, does, as Berkowitz [1969] and others have argued, motivate behavioral responses. It does not, however, determine a specic response. The cultural milieu denes the appropriate behavioral response to a particular emotion. The individual learns, in the course of his enculturation, which behaviors are appropriate to particular situations and it is these behaviors that are motivated by the emotional state (cf. Bandura 1973). Thus in one cultural setting the appropriate response to fear may be ight, in another, attack. (Robarchek 1977b:774; for further discussion and applications of this biocultural model of emotion see Robarchek 1979a, 1980, 1985, 1986, 1992, 1998; cf. Hinton 1999; Spiro 1951; inter alios). 9. They did not apply in the case of the Malaysian Semai either. See Robarchek 1977b, 1979a. 10. Chagnon describes what appears to be a similar grief/rage/homicide complex for the Yanomamo: . . . they describe the feelings of the bereaved as hushuwo, a word that can be translated as anger verging on violence. . . . It is common to hear statements such as If my sick mother dies, I will kill some people. (1988:986). Schiefin (1983) also saw a relationship among grief, anger and retaliation among the Kaluli, but the psychocultural dynamic, premised on different cultural assumptions, differs from that of the Waorani. 11. Numerous researchers have described affects associated with egalitarianism, glossing them variously as shame, and anger (Schiefin 1983); shame, anger, envy, and grief (M. Rosaldo 1983); and anger (Myers 1988). Shoek (1966) argued for connections among an ideology of equality, envy and violence. 12. See Robarchek and Robarchek 1998:110112 for an example of just this sort of perceived motive for sorcery. 13. Hollan (1992), Spiro (1993), and Holland and Kipnis (1994) have raised serious questions about recent constructions of the concept of self and have particularly criticized the dichotomization of selves into an individualistic western self and a sociocentric Other, characteristic of the rest of the world (e.g., Geertz 1984; Shweder and Bourne 1984; Markus and Kitayama 1991). The argument that we are presenting here would seem to lend support to those criticisms. 14. This, of course, supports the postmodernist argument about the importance of positioning (in this case, cultural) in offering insight into ethnographic realities. We have no quarrel with that argument, only with the often-asserted corollary that no other kind of understanding or explanation is possible.

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15. Benedict described yet another possibility, headhunting as a response to the death of a close relative among the Kwakiutl, but there it was motivated not by anger, but by shame: Death, like all other untoward accidents of existence, confounded mans pride and could only be handled in terms of shame (1959[1934]:216). 16. For descriptions of these rst contacts from the missionary perspective, see Wallis 1960, 1973. For analyses of the processes of change in cultural and psychological schemata that resulted in the Waoranis abandonment of raiding, see Robarchek and Robarchek 1989, 1996a, b; 1998

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