Uvalde CBP Report

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
Office of Professional Responsibility

IOD Headquarters
Case # UF2022586
THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCMENT MATERIAL. IT MAY NOT BE

LOANED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY AND, EXCEPT IN CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL
AGENCY ACTION, NO PORTION OF THE REPORT MAY BE COPIED OR DISTRIBUTED
WITHOUT THE KNOWELDGE AND CONSENT OF U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE
CASE CLOSING REPORT
CASE NUMBER: UF2022586 FIELD OFFICE: IOD Headquarters

CASE AGENT: SA
CASE TITLE: Uvalde Texas School Shooting w/ Fatalities
DATE OF INCIDENT: May 24, 2022
SECURITY CLEARANCE:
INCIDENT
On May 24, 2022, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR), Del Rio, Texas, received information concerning the CBP response to the
shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, which included a use of force by CBP
personnel. The shooting resulted in the deaths of 21 individuals and the injury of 17 others.
The purpose of this review is to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding this incident
(including use of force by CBP personnel); evaluate whether all CBP personnel complied with
relevant rules, regulations, and laws; and determine whether any actions can be taken to improve
CBP’s performance in similar situations in the future.
I affirm that my statements in this report are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.
Digitally signed by
Prepared by: Date: 2024.04.23 16:54:07 -04'00' Date:
Digitally signed by
Reviewed by: Date: 2024.04.24 00:04:05 -04'00' Date:
Digitally signed by DANIEL P ALTMAN
Approved by: DANIEL P ALTMAN Date: 2024.04.26 09:34:52 -04'00' Date:
WARNING: This document, along with any attachment(s), is loaned to you for official use only and remains the property of U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Office of Professional Responsibility Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD). You are prohibited from copying, releasing,
retransmitting, disseminating, disclosing, or otherwise sharing the document or its attachments within or outside CBP without prior, written approval
from IOD. The contents of this document and its attachment(s) may contain information, which is unclassified, law enforcement sensitive,
proprietary, privileged, or confidential, and may be legally protected or otherwise exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 and Privacy Act of 1974.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
CBP OPR’s Investigative Operations Directorate (IOD) conducts thorough, impartial, and timely
investigations into CBP use of force incidents involving death or serious bodily injury and other
critical incidents. This review sought to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding this
incident (including use of force by CBP personnel); evaluate whether all personnel complied
with relevant rules, regulations, and laws; and determine whether any actions could be taken to
improve CBP’s performance in similar situations in the future.
On May 24, 2022, at 11:33:02 AM (CDT), a lone assailant, , entered
Robb Elementary School through an unsecured exterior side door. Upon entering the school, the
assailant quickly moved down the hallway and pulled open one of the doors to adjoining
Classrooms 111 and 112, both fourth-grade classrooms full of students and their teachers. An
internal doorway connected Classroom 111 and Classroom 112. By entering through either
classroom door, the assailant had access to both classrooms. Upon entering the classroom, the
assailant began firing a semi-automatic rifle at the children and their teachers in both classrooms.
Approximately 77 minutes after the assailant entered the classroom, CBP personnel consisting of
Border Patrol Agents (BPAs) assigned to the Border Patrol Tactical Unit (BORTAC), along with
state and local law enforcement officials, entered the classroom and, after an exchange of
gunfire, shot and killed the assailant. By the time the incident at Robb Elementary was over, the
assailant had killed 19 children and 2 teachers. An additional 16 students, teachers, and law
enforcement officers were wounded.
A total of 188 CBP personnel, along with law enforcement officers from more than 20 other
federal, state, and local agencies, responded or provided support during or following the incident.
The incident created immense logistical and tactical challenges that severely tested the resources
and capabilities of responding officers and agencies.
OPR reached the following conclusions based on this review:
x Involved CBP personnel at all levels had an inconsistent understanding of their authority
to respond to non-federal incidents including active shooter situations. None of the
responders whom OPR interviewed could cite a specific authority for being at Robb
Elementary School on May 24, 2022.
x The failure of arriving law enforcement personnel to establish identifiable incident

management or command and control protocols led to a disorganized response to the
Robb Elementary School shooting. No law enforcement official ever clearly established
command at the school during the incident, leading to delays, inaction, and potentially
further loss of life.
x CBP personnel responding to the incident did not establish a command and control
framework for their own responding personnel, which resulted in responders taking on
tasks on an ad-hoc basis as requested by local law enforcement or at their own initiative.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
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x OPR determined existing CBP training on active shooter response procedures did not
adequately prepare responding personnel to deal with this situation. The current training
and curriculum did not include the proper application of National Incident Management
System (NIMS) or Incident Command System (ICS) protocols and did not prepare them
for a number of factors, including the need to address an active shooter behind a locked
door.
x None of the first responders from state, local, or federal law enforcement agencies in a
position to take action against the assailant had access to an accurate school layout or
knew how to obtain the correct keys to gain access to critical areas of the school.
Additionally, none of the first responders from law enforcement agencies had the
necessary tools to adequately breach the outwardly opening metal doors to Classrooms
111 and 112. Only one CBP law enforcement officer who arrived on scene had access to
a Halligan tool (used for forcibly opening a locked door).
x CBP personnel established a medical triage area in the hallway of the west building and
provided lifesaving care for multiple victims. However, the overall chaotic response
caused by the lack of command and control led to the breakdown of adherence to
established medical protocols for a mass-casualty incident. This led to some victims with
gunshot wounds being inadvertently placed on a school bus without receiving immediate
medical treatment.
x In the immediate aftermath of this incident, numerous investigative agencies, including

the Texas Rangers and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), began to independently
interview personnel and recover evidence, leading to fragmented crime scene processing
and evidence collection. Text messages and other records from cellular devices used by
CBP personnel during the incident were not obtained until OPR identified this deficiency
and collected most of these materials months following the incident. Coordination with
other investigative entities could prevent this oversight in the future.
x CBP lacked procedures for establishing a centralized point from which to disseminate all
information pertaining to the incident. A centralized point of dissemination would have
helped to ensure accurate and timely distribution of information while preserving the
integrity of ongoing investigations.
OPR made the following recommendations based on its review:
x CBP must ensure its officers, agents, and managers understand and properly work within
the confines of their authority. To the extent CBP intends for its personnel to continue to
respond to mass violence incidents in a non-federal setting, policy or law must be
generated to ensure they have proper authority to do so.
x All CBP personnel tasked with responding to incidents such as the one at Robb
Elementary School should be familiar with NIMS or ICS protocols. CBP should make
NIMS or ICS protocols a facet of CBP’s response protocols.
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x CBP’s active shooter training and doctrine should be revised to align with continuously
emerging best practices, including lessons learned from this incident. Once the training
is revised, all first responders within CBP should receive comprehensive training and the
tools necessary to deal with the management of and response to active shooter events.
x CBP should establish procedures for following medical best practices during critical
events and ensure that all CBP personnel are trained to properly assess people requiring
medical care, especially because CBP personnel might arrive on scene before emergency
medical technicians (EMTs) and paramedics.
x Responding to critical incidents can overwhelm both an organization’s and individuals’

ability to cope. The mental health needs of first responders must be addressed through
comprehensive and universally established protocols. CBP should continue to invest in
best practices for responding to critical incidents of all types, including mass violence
events, focusing on the healing involved.
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SUMMARY OF SCOPE AND METHODOLOGIES

CBP OPR self-initiated this review immediately after receiving notification of a use of force
incident involving CBP personnel at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, on May 24,
2022. In accordance with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy, OPR notified the
DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) about this incident on May 24, 2022.1 DHS OIG
ultimately declined interest in the matter.
This investigative report focuses on OPR’s review of the events of May 24, 2022, and aims to
provide transparency and accountability. The report contains additional specific information
about the actions taken by CBP personnel and describes the actions of CBP personnel and
applicable CBP policies and procedures.
In furtherance of this review, OPR assembled a team of investigative, operational, technical,
analytical, and legal experts. In total, 62 OPR investigators, analysts, and other personnel
contributed to this review and investigative report. Using the material obtained from various
sources, OPR analyzed and synthesized the information to develop an investigative plan. This
process formed the basis for formulating an interview strategy and culminated with the
development of a consolidated timeline of events from dozens of sources, including radio
communications, body worn cameras (BWC), static cameras, and interviews. From May 2022
until September 2023, the investigative team reviewed available video evidence, interviewed
CBP personnel, examined publicly available materials, researched commonly accepted practices
for critical incident planning, preparation, and training, and analyzed other findings from prior
active shooter events.2 OPR’s investigative process included obtaining records, videos, and
other evidence from the FBI, Texas Department of Public Safety (TXDPS) Ranger Division, and
other law enforcement agencies.3 In reaching the findings contained in this report, OPR
carefully considered the overall circumstances under which the incident took place.
OPR investigators who interviewed those who went inside Robb Elementary School completed
specialized interview training focused on trauma-informed cognitive interview techniques. In
March 2023, during the interview process, representatives from the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) observed select interviews of
CBP personnel.
As OPR conducted its investigation, other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
conducted their own investigations into this incident. The FBI coordinated with the United
1 Notification regarding certain incidents, including the discharge of firearms in deadly force situations, is required by
DHS Management Directive 0810.1 (June 10, 2004).
2 Texas House of Representatives Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting, Interim Report 2022;
ALERRT, Robb Elementary School Attack Response Assessment and Recommendations, June 2022; U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A Critical Incident Review of
the Orlando Public Safety Response to the Attack on the Pulse Nightclub, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services, Critical Incident Review: Active Shooter at Robb Elementary School, 2024.
3 CBP began a targeted deployment of BWC technology in August 2021 as part of its Incident-Driven Video Recording
Systems Program. Although 7,000 BWCs had been issued to CBP employees nationwide as of May 23, 2023, only one CBP
BWC was present and activated at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022.
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perspectives of non-CBP personnel who were on scene but declined to be interviewed by OPR as
part of this review.6
OVERVIEW OF AREA
Positioned in south Texas between San Antonio, Texas, and the United States/Mexico border, the
city of Uvalde has a population of over 15,000 people.7 Uvalde regularly sees USBP personnel
engage in federal border enforcement operations in and around the city. Because of its proximity
to US-83, a major throughfare in Uvalde, border enforcement-related operations by USBP,
TXDPS, and other agencies reportedly led to Uvalde school lockdowns in the past. From
January 1, 2020, to May 24, 2022, there were four documented instances of bailouts within a
one-mile radius of Robb Elementary School.8
Uvalde is in the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) Del Rio Sector (DRT) area of responsibility. Within
DRT, there are two specialty units that are assigned directly to DRT’s Special Operations
Division (SOD) – BORTAC and the Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue Unit
(BORSTAR). BORTAC provides an immediate response capability to emergent and high-risk
incidents requiring specialized skills and tactics, similar to a traditional SWAT team.
BORSTAR provides specialized law enforcement search and rescue response capabilities,
including emergency and tactical medicine. Both units are based in Del Rio, Texas,
approximately 70 miles from Uvalde, though CBP personnel may live or work throughout the
area.
CBP is a major part of the Uvalde community. In addition to the agents assigned to the USBP
Uvalde Station (UVA), many CBP families from across DRT call the city home. Children and
grandchildren of CBP personnel were attending school at Robb Elementary School on May 24,
2022, while children enrolled in other area schools were already done with school for the year.9
One CBP employee recalled how one of the victims he encountered at Robb Elementary School
was friends with and had been at his house playing just days prior to the incident.10
The incident at Robb Elementary School was more than just another law enforcement operation
for the CBP personnel who responded – many had a direct, personal connection to the
community.
6 OPR adheres to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Quality Standards for
Investigations to provide a framework for conducting high-quality investigations. The standards call for “the validity of
information and evidence obtained during an investigation” to be verified.
7 U.S. Census Bureau, 2020 Census (April 1, 2020)
8 “Bailouts” are instances where suspects pursued by law enforcement in a vehicle and evade apprehension by exiting the
vehicle and fleeing on foot. Data retrieved from CBP data systems and may not include enforcement actions carried out
by other agencies.
9 OPR interview of SBPA , February 14, 2023, timestamp 00:16:55; OPR interview of BPA
, March 2, 2023, timestamp 00:12:51; OPR interview of SBPA , March 16, 2022, timestamp
00:41:18.
10 OPR interview of BPA , dated March 6, 2023, timestamp 05:46:36
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On May 24, 2022, approximately CBP personnel were assigned to DRT, with
scheduled to work on that day as follows:
x USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) Staff:

x DRT Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU):
x DRT Special Operations Division (SOD):
o DRT BORTAC:
o DRT BORSTAR:
o DRT SOD Detailed In:
o DRT SOD Staff:
x USBP Abilene Station (ABT):
x USBP Brackettville Station (BRA):
x USBP Carrizo Springs Station (CAR):
x USBP Comstock Station (COM):
x USBP Del Rio Station (DRS):
x USBP Eagle Pass Station (EGT):
x USBP Eagle Pass South Station (EGS):
x USBP Rocksprings Station (RKS):
x USBP San Angelo Station (SAT):
x USBP Uvalde Station (UVA):
Map Source: USBP GIS

Figure 2. USBP Sectors and select USBP Stations
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Figure 3. Uvalde – Points of Interest
Figure 4. Area around Robb Elementary School
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Figure 5. Layout of West Building at Robb Elementary School
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TIMELINE OF EVENTS – MAY 24, 2022

OPR created the following timeline of events based on information, documents, and video
provided by the TXDPS, FBI, CBP, and employee interviews. All times are Central Daylight
Time.
This timeline is intended to be an overview of the chronology of events. Additional information

supporting this timeline is contained in the Incident Overview section.
TIME DESCRIPTION
The assailant crashed his truck into a culvert at the intersection of
11:28:25 AM
Grove and Geraldine Streets.
The assailant fired multiple shots outside Robb Elementary School

11:31:36 AM
toward windows on the west side of the school.
The assailant entered Robb Elementary School through the west

11:33:02 AM
entrance.
The assailant began firing at the doors of Classrooms 111 and 112,
11:33:24 AM
then entered the classrooms and continued firing.
Law enforcement officers from the UPD and UCISDPD entered

11:36:02 AM
Robb Elementary School through the west entrance.
UPD Acting Chief Pargas entered Robb Elementary School through

11:36:10 AM
the west entrance.
UCISDPD Chief Arredondo entered Robb Elementary School

through the south entrance and approached Classrooms 111 and 112
11:36:11 AM
from the opposite side of the building as the law enforcement
officers who entered through the west entrance.
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TIME DESCRIPTION
, the final victim initially removed from the classrooms,
12:52:52 PM was carried out of Classroom 112 and taken outside the west
entrance for treatment.
A possible second threat against other Uvalde-area schools was

2:00:00 PM (approx.) identified. Law enforcement officers were sent to area schools to
assist with the safe, orderly dismissal of students.
5:00:00 PM (approx.) Uvalde-area schools completely dismissed.
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INCIDENT OVERVIEW
This report is divided into six sections that correspond with six distinct segments of activity that
comprise the shooting at Robb Elementary School. The first section, Preliminary Events,
describes the events that preceded the shooting. This report focuses on the actions and events
after the shooting because CBP personnel were not involved in any related actions prior to
responding to the school. The second section, Phase I: 11:33 AM – 12:21 PM, focuses on the
actions and events between the time the assailant entered Robb Elementary School and the time
the assailant fired four gunshots from inside the classrooms. The third section, Phase II: 12:21
PM – 12:50 PM, details the events that occurred between the time the assailant fired the four
gunshots and the time the group of law enforcement officers engaged the assailant.
Because the assailant fired rounds through the classroom door and injured some of the first
responding law enforcement officers, responding personnel avoided the area immediately in
front of the classroom doors. Consequently, the actions of the personnel north of the classrooms
were not well coordinated or communicated with the responding personnel in the same hallway
south of the classrooms. To provide clarity, Phase I: 11:33 AM – 12:21 PM and Phase II: 12:21
PM – 12:50 PM are split between the two groups of law enforcement officers at the north and
south ends of the hallway. The sections describe each group’s actions separately.
The fourth section, Phase III: Rendering Aid, describes the actions taken to triage and treat the
victims following the breach of Classrooms 111 and 112. The fifth section, Phase IV: Post
Incident Response, details the potential of a second threat and the law enforcement response at
Uvalde-area schools and other points of interest including the Civic Center and hospital. Finally,
the sixth section, Air and Marine Operations Activities, details the actions related to the three
CBP helicopters involved in the incident.
Based on OPR’s review of the information available, the following is a summary of what
occurred:
PRELIMINARY EVENTS
The incident at Robb Elementary School began at 11:28:25 AM when the assailant approached
the intersection of Grove and Geraldine Streets at the northwest boundary of the school property
and crashed the truck he was driving into a culvert.11 Two employees from the Hillcrest
Memorial Funeral Home, located at the same intersection, saw the crash and approached the
vehicle to render aid; however, they were met with gunfire from the assailant (11:29:28 AM).
Both individuals were able to safely retreat. Video from the funeral home showed the assailant
emerge from the culvert and toss a dark-colored backpack over the chain link fence at the outer
edge of the schoolgrounds and then climb over the fence and walk toward the school (11:30:14
AM).12 As the assailant approached the west side of the western-most building, he began firing
11 Video footage captured by static camera located at Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home, May 24, 2022.
12 Id.
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at the exterior of the school. The assailant left the dark-colored backpack on the ground on the
west side of the school.
The campus of Robb Elementary School is located at the intersection of Old Carrizo Road and
Geraldine Street in Uvalde, Texas, and consists of several buildings connected by a series of
covered walkways. The fourth-grade classes were in the western-most building (adjacent to
Geraldine Street), along with the school’s library. The western-most building has three metal
doors leading to the outside: one located on the west side of the building, one located at the
opposite end of the hallway on the east side of the building, and one located on the south side of
the building. Each classroom has an outward opening metal door that opens into a hall.
According to school policy, the doors are supposed to always remain locked. A camera was
mounted to the ceiling at the T-intersection of the east/west and north/south hallways.
OPR obtained the video from the camera at the T-intersection from the FBI approximately one
week following the incident. Although the audio throughout much of the video is inaudible, the
video showed , the teacher from Classroom 132 (closest to the entrance where the
assailant entered), exit the school at the time of the crash and then immediately reenter the
school, closing the door behind her, while placing a phone call reporting the car crash and the
gunshots fired (11:29:40 AM). then moved back and forth in the main hallway
closest to the door where the assailant would enter, warning the teacher in Classroom 116 (which
is also adjacent to the entrance) and screaming, “He’s shooting!” (11:31:40 AM).13 According
to ’s interview with TXDPS investigators, she exited the building with her cell phone
to call 911 regarding the vehicle crash.14 As she moved toward the crash, she observed other
witnesses begin to retreat toward the funeral home yelling that the driver had a gun.15 She then
observed that the driver of the vehicle had a gun and was advancing toward the school. She saw
the driver fire shots in the direction of children who were on the playground at the south end of
the building. Multiple interviews by TXPDS investigators and footage from the static camera
substantiated ’s account.16
PHASE I: 11:33 AM – 12:21 PM
The assailant entered Robb Elementary School by pulling open the door at the west end of the
western-most building at 11:33:02 AM. Visible in the assailant’s hands as he entered the school
was an AR-style rifle. The assailant walked inside the building and turned right down the
north/south hallway, stopping at the doors of Classrooms 111 and 112, which are recessed in the
hallway next to each other. Twenty-two seconds after entering the building, while facing the
doors of Classrooms 111 and 112, the assailant began firing dozens of rounds. The assailant
13 Video footage captured by static camera located in Robb Elementary School, May 24, 2022.
14 TXDPS interview of , May 27, 2022.
15 Id.
16 TXDPS interview of , June 3, 2022; TXDPS interview of , June 11, 2022; Video footage
captured by static camera located in Robb Elementary School, May 24, 2022.
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side right now.” (12:09:05 PM). At 12:09:13 PM, Constable Zamora entered through the south
door with UPD Sergeant , and both cleared Classroom 108.38 UCSO Deputy ’s
and Constable Zamora’s BWCs captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo telling people near the
south door that the helicopter flying overhead needs to “go out” because it was too loud
(12:09:45 PM). Constable Zamora exited through the south door and relayed UCISDPD Chief
Arredondo’s direction to the officers waiting outside; however, there is no indication this
information was ever relayed to the pilots overhead.
UPD Sergeant focused on trying to enter the locked door to Classroom 109 to
evacuate the teacher and students and offered to break the small, reinforced window inset of the
metal door to access the interior door latch. UCISDPD Chief Arredondo told UPD Sergeant
not to because it was too small to be useful, and UCISDPD Chief Arredondo didn’t
want to draw attention toward the area (12:10:16 PM).39
At 12:10:38 PM, UCSO Deputy ’s BWC captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo making a
phone call and saying, “Johnny, Johnny, I’m getting a master key and we’re gonna check one
room that we can’t open. It’s dark. I need to verify the west wing is completely empty.”
Footage from the static camera at the T-intersection and TPWD Game Warden ’s BWC
showed Constable Johnny Field receiving a call at the same time at the north end of the hallway.
At the conclusion of the call, Constable Zamora’s BWC captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo
moving south down the hall at 12:12:10 PM, where he gave instructions and a situation report to
the nearby officers, stating, “Hey guys. Hey guys. Hold on. We're going to clear the building
first…and then we'll tackle him…but we're going to empty out these classrooms.” (12:12:23
PM).
Once UCISDPD Chief Arredondo finished speaking, Constable Zamora moved toward the south
door. Visible inside the south hallway near the door was BPA (UVA), along with
four other law enforcement officers. Outside the south door were approximately nine law
enforcement officers, including BPA-I , BPA (UVA), and BPA
(MRS, detailed to UVA). Constable Zamora’s BWC captured Constable Zamora telling
the group, “No entry until the Chief of Police gives you permission then.” (12:13:33 PM).
There is no indication that UCISDPD Chief Arredondo’s directions were relayed beyond the law
enforcement officers standing immediately outside the south door.
Constable Zamora then asked UPD Investigator about a master key, and UPD Investigator
told Constable Zamora there was a key on “the other side” and nodded toward the west
door (12:13:48 PM).40 Constable Zamora ran around to the west side of the building and asked
UPD Lieutenant if he knew where to find a master key. While on the west side of the
building, Constable Zamora learned of a dark-colored backpack found outside containing
38 BWC footage from Constable Zamora.

39 BWC footage from UPD Sergeant .
40 BWC footage from Constable Zamora.
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Figure 10. Approximate Location of Law Enforcement Officers at North End of Building at 12:50 PM
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Once positioned, SBPA gave the indication for the team to advance into the classroom
at approximately 12:50:00 PM. Video footage from BWCs and the static camera at the
T-intersection showed approximately 27 law enforcement officers lined up and prepared to enter
Classrooms 111 and 112, while approximately 19 law enforcement officers remained at the T-
intersection, for a total of approximately 46 law enforcement officers inside the north end of the
building when the team entered Classroom 111.
BPA entered the classroom and moved straight, stopping at the open doors that joined
Classroom 111 to Classroom 112. SBPA entered the room behind BPA and
immediately turned right to ensure there were no threats in the corner of the room not initially
visible from the doorway.66 While visually clearing the blind corner, SBPA saw a pile
of what appeared to be deceased people in the corner of the room.67
ZCSO Deputy entered the room next, followed by BPA , who also turned right
68
toward the blind corner before turning left to address “a loud bang.” As SBPA turned
toward BPA to proceed with clearing Classroom 112, he heard a sound and saw muzzle
flashes from the assailant’s rifle in the corner of the room.69 BPA stated his attention was
focused on the open doors leading to the next classroom, so he was caught off-guard when he
saw a closet door kicked open from the inside.70 Almost instantaneously, BPA took a
step back, slipped, and observed the assailant’s black hair and muzzle flashes from the assailant’s
rifle.71 BPA felt his shield receiving impacts from the assailant’s gunfire and returned
fire with four rounds from his pistol before it malfunctioned.72
66 OPR interview of SBPA , March 16, 2023, timestamp 05:46:25.

67 Id.
68 OPR interview of BPA , March 21, 2023, timestamp 02:14:00.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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groups. Law enforcement officers at the north end of the building were congregated outside
Classrooms 111 and 112 and near the T-intersection, while law enforcement officers at the south
end of the building, including UCISDPD Chief Arredondo, were lined up along the hallway.
The gap between the groups was to prevent a crossfire situation because of the position of
Classrooms 111 and 112. While UCISDPD Chief Arredondo was in the south hallway, three
other law enforcement leaders, UPD Acting Chief Pargas, UCSO Sheriff Nolasco, and (A)PAIC
, were on-site at Robb Elementary School but were not present inside the school, nor did
they give any direction to responding officers. Outside of these four individuals, no other law
enforcement leaders arrived until right before or immediately after law enforcement entered
Classrooms 111 and 112.
The BWCs of Constable Zamora, TXDPS Troopers and , UPD Sergeant
, and UCSO Deputy captured the four shots fired by the assailant at 12:21:05 PM
from the south end of the hallway. After repositioning along the south hallway following the
four shots from inside the classroom, the attention of the law enforcement officers in the
hallway, including UCISDPD Chief Arredondo, appeared to be focused on evacuating the
children in the classrooms around Classrooms 111 and 112. The assailant was believed to be in
Classroom 111 or 112, and all other classrooms besides Classroom 109 had been cleared prior to
the four shots.
Unknown to the officers in the south hallway, a teacher, , and a student, ,
had been shot in Classroom 109, as bullets from the assailant’s weapon penetrated through
multiple layers of drywall into adjoining classrooms. Outside, BPAs and
assisted with lifting students out the window of Classroom 109 while other law
enforcement officers guided the students to safety. Once the students were evacuated from
Classroom 109, BPA
lifted
-
window at 12:26:08 PM.
UPD Sergent
79
climbed through the window into the classroom at 12:25:43 PM and
through the window to safety.78 BPA climbed out of the classroom
’s BWC captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo talking during a phone

conversation with an unknown person, saying, “trying to…so we are trying to…people are going
to ask why we are taking so long…okay?…So that’s what we’re trying to preserve the rest of the
lives first” (12:26:29 PM). During UCISDPD Chief Arredondo’s phone conversation, UPD
Sergeant relayed a message from Constable Zamora to UCISDPD Chief Arredondo
that the final classroom, Classroom 109, was clear of students and teachers (12:26:37 PM).
UCISDPD Chief Arredondo then said, “We have a team ready to go? Have at it.” (12:26:57
PM). However, OPR’s review did not find evidence that this message was ever relayed to law
enforcement officers beyond those in UCISDPD Chief Arredondo’s immediate vicinity. While
talking on the phone, UCISDPD Chief Arredondo said, “so there is a window over there
obviously…so the door is going to probably be locked…probably is locked…that’s the nature
of…Let me try to find some more keys but man…I’m going to get more keys to test some of
78 OPR interview of BPA , March 6, 2023, timestamp between 01:06:57 and 01:29:45; cell phone video
footage from .
79 Cell phone video footage from .
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these doors…I’ll call you back.” (12:27:32 PM). After ending the call, UCISDPD Chief
Arredondo told Constable Zamora to find a man named “ ,” who possibly had a master
key.80 At 12:29:08 PM, UCISDPD Chief Arredondo repeated his description of “ ” to
Constable Zamora, who had been unable to locate him.
At 12:29:22 PM, UPD Officer ’s BWC captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo
explaining his understanding of the situation at that moment to an unknown TXDPS Sergeant
and TXDPS Criminal Investigations Division (CID) Special Agent (SA) :
UCISDPD Chief Arredondo: “We’ve cleared out…we’ve cleared out everything except
for that room…we do have some people down.” (12:29:24
PM)
TXDPS CID SA : “The one with the flag door?” (12:29:30 PM)
UCISDPD Chief Arredondo: “Uh…Just past the flag to the right…it’s probably going to
be the south…there’s two doors on the right…it’s going to
be the south door but…we were ready to breach but that
door’s locked.” (12:29:49 PM)
At the conclusion of that conversation, approximately 20 law enforcement officers were standing
in the south hallway, including SBPA (UVA) and BPA . Outside the south
door, UCSO Deputy said, “There’s a lot of people in there…you see those guys on the
other end? It’s just way too much…way too much gun firepower in there.” (12:31:15 PM).
As , the teacher in Classroom 109, was making her way away from the building and
seeking medical treatment with the assistance of law enforcement officers, TXDPS
communications captured a phone call between their dispatch and TXDPS Sergeant
(12:30:31 PM). During the phone call, TXDPS Sergeant was looking for
EMS to provide care for and said on the call, “I don’t see any EMS on scene.”
At 12:32:07 PM, UPD Sergeant ’s BWC captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo talking
on the phone and saying, “Yes sir…yes sir…We need a master key bro…None of these we got
are working bro. None of these we just got. Okay. Okay…Keys are coming with
…okay…I’m waiting for keys…Your BORTAC team…they’re ready to go right…so if
they’ve got flashbangs…I hope…I mean are they taking care of that? …’cause we need a
distraction for sure…if we get a key going to take a second to open that god damn door,
so…yeah…I say we breach those windows…you know what I mean? …offer that to
them…because going in through the door is going to be hard…[unintelligible]…would they
consider popping in through that window? …[unintelligible]…something to think about…” The
static camera at the T-intersection at that time showed that SBPA , the only
member of BORTAC on scene, was not talking on his phone. Additionally, SBPA
confirmed in his interview with OPR investigators that he never spoke to or received any
80 UCISD Maintenance and Operations Supervisor .
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was outside the south door, was heard on Constable Zamora’s BWC reiterating the belief the
door was locked and there was no way into the classroom (12:44:49 PM).
UCISDPD Chief Arredondo was still on the phone at 12:45:01 PM and UPD Officer ’s
BWC captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo saying law enforcement officers still needed keys.
UPD Lieutenant then told UCISDPD Chief Arredondo that the keys were on the other
side of the hall at the north end. At 12:45:45 PM, the person on the phone with UCISDPD Chief
Arredondo told him that the key was working. UCISDPD Chief Arredondo told the person on
the phone, “If y’all are ready to do it, you do it, but someone should distract him out the
window,” (12:45:51 PM). UCISDPD Chief Arredondo later told the group of law enforcement
officers closer to Classrooms 111 and 112 in the south hallway that a working key was found
(12:46:04 PM). The BWC of TXDPS Trooper , who was part of the group closer to
Classrooms 111 and 112 in the south hallway, captured the notification that a key was located.
At 12:47:17 PM, Constable Zamora’s BWC captured him telling the law enforcement officers
outside the south entrance that a team was about to make entry. Most of the conversations
captured by BWCs in the south hallway prior the team entering the classroom centered around
the need for officers to be out of the way of a possible crossfire situation. UPD Officer
briefly exited the south hallway to transmit over the radio, “Keep an eye on top of the
roof. He might have climbed on top of the ceiling.” (12:48:25 PM). UPD Officer ’s
BWC captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo saying, “Complete surround. I don’t know what’s
going on. The door is open.” (12:49:09 PM). At 12:50:00 PM, UCISDPD Chief Arredondo
said, “They’re going in.” Gunshots were heard at 12:50:02 PM.
PHASE III: RENDERING AID
When the team entered Classrooms 111 and 112 at 12:50:00 PM, approximately 79 law
enforcement officers were inside the building or immediately outside the south door.
Approximately 27 law enforcement officers were lined up on the north side of the hallway,
prepared to enter Classrooms 111 and 112, while approximately 19 law enforcement officers
remained at the T-intersection, for a total of approximately 46 law enforcement officers inside
the north side of the building. Of these 46 law enforcement officers, at least six were either
EMTs or paramedics. Outside the south doorway, various BWCs recorded 16 law enforcement
officers, including two EMTs. An additional 17 law enforcement officers were dispersed along
the south hallway between Classrooms 111 and 112 and the south door, bringing the total
number of law enforcement officers at the south end of the building to 33. Of the 33 law
enforcement officers at the south end, at least two were EMTs.
OPR determined that the medical response plan was not effectively communicated to everyone
inside the west building. Seconds prior to officers breaching Classroom 111, multiple law
enforcement officers entered the north hallway from the west door, some for the first time. None
of these officers were briefed on the medical response plan. OPR investigators did not identify
any evidence indicating that the law enforcement officers who lined up to enter the room were
made aware of the medical response plan. BPA-P and BPAs and
communicated the plan only to the officers at the T-intersection, away from the officers lined up
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Figure 12. Uvalde Area Schools Where Law Enforcement Responded
In an effort to keep families away from Robb Elementary School, which was still an active crime
scene, the Civic Center was utilized as a reunification site. At 12:23:09 PM, UPD Lieutenant
transmitted over his radio, “Advise the parents, all children are going to be bused to the
Civic Center and released there.” As students were evacuated from Robb Elementary School,
they were loaded onto buses and taken to the Civic Center, where they were to be picked up by
their parents or guardians. Because large crowds began to gather at the Civic Center, law
enforcement officers, including CBP personnel, provided security around the building and
allowed only students’ parents or guardians into the building.
May 24, 2022, was also the day of a primary run-off election and the Civic Center was one of the
polling locations. At some time during the day, voting ceased in response to the shooting, but
some members of the public, unaware of the shooting, attempted to enter the Civic Center to
vote. Law enforcement officers, including CBP personnel, denied these people entry into the
Civic Center.
As victims were transported to Uvalde Memorial Hospital, crowds began to gather there with
anxious family members arriving and searching for loved ones when they could not be found at
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STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

OPR reviewed the laws, policies, and agency training applicable to CBP personnel in effect on
May 24, 2022. Additionally, OPR evaluated the actions of CBP personnel in accordance with
applicable laws, policies, and agency training. OPR considered multiple facets of the response,
including the legal authority to take law enforcement action in such a situation, the agency’s
expectations for the conduct of its employees, and the training CBP provides its employees for
situations such as the one at Robb Elementary School.
AUTHORITY
Statutes & Policies
There is no authoritative statute that governs all scenarios involving federal law enforcement and
the enforcement of state law. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1589a and 8 U.S.C. § 1357, CBP
officers/agents have the authority to make arrests for federal crimes committed in the
officer/agent’s presence and for federal felonies if the officer/agent has reasonable grounds to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed such felony.98 These authorities are only
applicable for the enforcement of federal laws.
CBP, like all federal law enforcement agencies, does not possess statutory authority to enforce
state or local law. Any state law enforcement authority is contingent on whether the state has
conveyed peace officer status on the federal officers/agents or otherwise provided authority to
enforce state law via some other legal mechanism, including, but not limited to, deputation and
citizen arrest authority. Generally, when peace officer status is conveyed, peace officers can
make arrests for state felonies based on probable cause and for state misdemeanors committed in
the peace officer’s presence.
Texas has not conveyed peace officer status on CBP officers/agents. Narrow authority exists in
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for a CBP officer/agent to detain a person suspected of
public intoxication, driving while intoxicated, intoxication assault, or intoxication manslaughter
only while physically at a port of entry. Title 1, Chapter 2, Article 2.112(c) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure states:
Art. 2.122. SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS. (c) A Customs and Border Protection
Officer or Border Patrol Agent of the United States Customs and Border Protection
or an immigration enforcement agent or deportation officer of the Department of
Homeland Security is not a peace officer under the laws of this state but, on the
premises of a port facility designated by the commissioner of the United States
Customs and Border Protection as a port of entry for arrival in the United States by
land transportation from the United Mexican States into the State of Texas or at a
permanent established border patrol traffic check point, has the authority to detain
988 U.S.C. § 1357 may be utilized only if the officer is performing duties related to immigration enforcement at the time of
the arrest, and if there is no time for the officer/agent to obtain a warrant.
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a person pending transfer without unnecessary delay to a peace officer if the agent
or officer has probable cause to believe that the person has engaged in conduct that
is a violation of Section 49.02, 49.04, 49.07, or 49.08, Penal Code, regardless of
whether the violation may be disposed of in a criminal proceeding or a juvenile
justice proceeding.
Absent any peace officer status, Texas law allows any person, including members of the general
public, to arrest an offender if the offense is classified as a felony. Title 1, Chapter 14, Article
14.01(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states:
Art. 14.01. OFFENSE WITHIN VIEW. (a) A peace officer or any other person, may,
without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his presence or
within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an offense against the
public peace.
Additionally, Title 1, Chapter 2, Article 2.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states:
Art. 2.14. MAY SUMMON AID. Whenever a peace officer meets with resistance in
discharging any duty imposed upon him by law, he shall summon a sufficient number of
citizens of his county to overcome the resistance; and all persons summoned are bound to
obey.
Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.14, a Texas peace officer may request
assistance from the public in relation to discharging the Texas peace officer’s duties imposed by
law.
Federal law enforcement agencies may have authority to enforce state law through a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with state or local law enforcement, when permissible
under state law, or when a “law enforcement emergency” exists and federal assistance is
permitted and needed. “Actual need” is defined generally as “when state and local resources are
inadequate to protect lives or to enforce criminal law.”99 Both of these examples require advance
planning or authorization, which did not exist on May 24, 2022.
The USBP’s Law of Arrest, Search & Seizure Manual M-69 (M-69) is a 40-year-old document
issued by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). M-69 outlines the
administration and enforcement of laws relating to “the immigration and naturalization of
99Under the Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act (EFLEA), the Attorney General of the United States may
aid state and local units of government in case of a “law enforcement emergency.” A law enforcement emergency is
defined as “an uncommon situation which requires law enforcement, which is or threatens to become of serious or
epidemic proportions, and with respect to which State and local resources are inadequate to protect the lives and
property of citizens or to enforce the criminal law.” The Department of Justice has promulgated regulations under the
EFLEA governing the process to be followed by a state governor or chief state executive when requesting federal
assistance. The regulations require, among other things, the requesting state to identify the specific federal resources
required to respond to the emergency.
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aliens.”100 Despite referencing an agency that no longer exists, M-69 has never been formally
retracted. USBP still references M-69 as a manual articulating its authorities.
M-69 also addresses the fact that some states offer peace officer status to “INS officers stationed
in that state.”101 It goes on to address the intersection of federal and state law, specifically the
expectation that INS officers are to cooperate with local and state officers. Such cooperation
includes “enforcing local law where the matter is serious and the need to act is imperative.”102
When the local matter is a felony or violent misdemeanor cognizable under state law, M-69
directs “that the agent will take reasonable action as a law enforcement officer to prevent the
crime and/or arrest the violator.”103 Importantly, M-69 correctly articulates that such action in
the absence of specific peace officer authority is simply that of an “ordinary citizen.”104
Therefore, M-69 requires that federal law enforcement officials be thoroughly familiar with
applicable state laws in their jurisdiction.105 M-69 states that INS “will fully support an agent’s
reasonable actions,” and that agents will be regarded as having acted within the course and scope
of their employment.106
When federal law enforcement officers desire representation in a criminal and/or civil
proceedings related to actions purportedly taken within the scope of their employment, they must
first submit a written request for representation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to the
agency official designated to review such requests.107 Unless it is “clearly unwarranted,” the
designated agency official submits to the DOJ a statement of its findings regarding whether the
agency believes the employee was acting within the scope of employment and its
recommendation for or against providing representation. The DOJ then reviews the request and
determines whether the employee’s actions appear to be within their scope of employment and
whether it is in the interest of the United States to provide representation to the employee.
CBP lacks the authority to make assurances of federal support or determinations of scope of
employment. Scope of employment determinations are solely the responsibility of the DOJ.108
Legally, CBP officers/agents acting to enforce a state or local law do so as private citizens
without any guarantee of federal representation, regardless of the assertions made in M-69. A
supervisor’s order or directive to act does not absolve individual CBP officers/agents from
100 The Law of Search Manual: The Law of Arrest, Search & Seizure Manual M‐69, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
Office of the General Counsel, p. 4 (January 1983).

101 Id. at p. 6.
102 Id. at p. 36.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15, Representation of federal officials and employees by Department of Justice attorneys or by
private counsel furnished by the DOJ in civil, criminal, and congressional proceedings in which Federal employees are
sued, subpoenaed, or charged in their individual capacities.
108 Id.
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responsibility for their actions or guarantee that the DOJ will provide them with legal
representation in any criminal or civil proceedings stemming from the officer’s action.
Even in a situation where:
1) A supervisor orders and employee to act, and
2) Agency officials validate and affirm to the DOJ the supervisor gave the employee an
order to act,
The DOJ is not guaranteed to find the act was within the scope of employment and provide legal
representation.
Whether a CBP law enforcement officer self-deploys or is ordered to respond to an incident,
either on or off duty, each request for legal representation will be reviewed the same way, by an
independent third party at the DOJ. When deciding whether to take action to enforce a state or
local law, each CBP officer/agent must individually decide whether to act with the knowledge
that their actions may not be considered within the scope of their employment, thereby
potentially denying them legal representation by the DOJ.
In the weeks and months following the incident at Robb Elementary School, 45 CBP personnel
submitted a request for legal representation by the DOJ. At the time of this writing, the DOJ has
not granted any of the requests for a scope of employment determination regarding the actions of
CBP personnel on May 24, 2022.
Response
A bedrock principal of constitutional policing is ensuring that actions taken by law enforcement
officers are within their statutory authority and in accordance with the principles set forth in the
U.S. Constitution. Basic training provided to CBP law enforcement officers begins like training
at most police agencies, with a clear explanation of the agents’/officers’ statutory authority and
jurisdiction. Because of the criticality of swiftly responding to active shooter incidents, it is
important that all responding personnel have a clear understanding of their authority and of how
their agency would engage in an incident outside their jurisdiction. To the extent CBP intends to
continue to direct its personnel to respond to active shooter situations that lack a clear federal
nexus, CBP must ensure a framework exists that formally authorizes its personnel to engage in
such situations and seek assurances that they will be protected from civil and criminal liability
for acting within the scope of their employment. This will likely require either a legislative
solution or modification of DOJ’s procedures for scope of employment determinations.
Over 100 CBP law enforcement officials responded to the school in a variety of capacities, and
none of them were able to explain to OPR under what authority they were acting on May 24,
2022. CBP personnel’s articulation of their authority to respond to an active shooter incident off
federal property varied widely. Responses included the authority to take action against a felony
occurring in the agent’s presence, a moral imperative to preserve life, and a belief that they had
the authority to support state and local law enforcement efforts. Several OPR interviewees spoke
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Criminal Procedure, state and local law enforcement lack the legal authority “to summon” a
federal law enforcement officer, including CBP personnel.113
OPR considered the assertion that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 provided CBP
personnel the authority to respond to the incident at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022.
The Act makes it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone.114 The
penalty for violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act involves a fine of not more than $5,000,
imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both.115 The Act specifically defines a school as a public,
parochial, or private school providing elementary or secondary education.116 Although the
incident at Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022, fell within the scope of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, relying on the Act for statutory authority is insufficient moving
forward. The narrow scope of the Act applies to incidents involving firearms at schools. It does
not address the larger threat of mass violence using weapons other than firearms, such as knives
or improvised explosive devices, or occurring at locations other than schools, such as preschools
or shopping malls.
USE OF FORCE
Policy
The CBP Use of Force Policy (UOF Policy) dated January 2021 is the authoritative reference for
firearms procedures and use of force-related issues.117 It provides guidance and parameters
under which force may be used, as well as the levels of oversight when force is used, and the
ongoing training and demonstration of decision-making and skills surrounding the use of force.
By conforming to standard use of force policies, procedures, training, and equipment, authorized
CBP officers/agents can more effectively protect themselves and the public they serve.
The CBP UOF Policy states:
A respect for human life and the safety of the communities we serve, as well as
CBP’s officers and agents, is paramount and shall guide all employees in the
performance of their duties. In all instances, covered in the UOF Policy, of note,
Authorized Officers/Agents shall only use objectively reasonable and necessary
force to effectively bring an incident under control, while minimizing the risk of
injury for all involved parties. The use of excessive force by CBP law
enforcement personnel is strictly prohibited. This Policy establishes the minimum
CBP policy standards regarding the use of force. CBP offices may establish
additional policy guidance where they deem necessary, in accordance with the
113 U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.

114 18 U.S.C. § 922(q).
115 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(4).
116 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(26).
117 CBP Use of Force Policy, Law Enforcement Safety and Compliance Directorate, Operations Support, 4500-002A
(January 2021).
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minimum standards articulated in this Policy. … Violation of the UOF Policy

may constitute grounds for disciplinary action.118
Response
This critical incident review is not intended to definitively determine the appropriateness of the
force used by CBP personnel during the incident. Under CBP policy, uses of force by CBP
personnel resulting in serious bodily injury or death and those involving the discharge of a
firearm will be presented to a CBP National Use of Force Review Board to independently
determine if the use of force was consistent with CBP policy. That body will determine whether
this use of force was within policy. National Use of Force Review Board results are shared with
the public on CBP’s public webpage.
INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM
Training
OPR reviewed incident command policy and training documents, including:
 IS-100.C: Introduction to the Incident Command System, ICS 100.

 IS-200.C: Basic Incident Command System for Initial Response, ICS 200.
 IS-700.B: An Introduction to the National Incident Management System.
 IS-800.D: National Response Framework, An Introduction.119
 CBP Lead Field Coordinator Course Presentation.
Because of the absence of instruction regarding working with other local, state, or federal law
enforcement agencies during an incident or command and control during active shooter
situations in CBP’s Active Shooter Instructor Training Program (ASITP), OPR personnel
discussed CBP’s implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) with the CBP program manager
responsible for the program, Branch Chief (BC) , in August 2023. NIMS is the
framework by which coordination occurs during an incident involving multiple agencies. One
component of NIMS is the ICS, which is a standardized approach to the command, control, and
coordination of emergency responses that provides a common hierarchy within which responders
from multiple agencies can be effectively managed.
BC stated that CBP implements NIMS at the local level where the incident occurs.
Training for the implementation of NIMS and ICS consists of four classes offered virtually
through CBP’s distance learning platform, Acadis Training Management System. The classes
are:
Id.
118
IS-100.C., IS-200.C., IS-700.B., and IS-800.D. are Independent Study (IS) courses offered by the Federal Emergency
119
Management Agency (FEMA), Emergency Management Institute (EMI).
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ICS protocols stipulate the initial first responder on scene “need[s] to explicitly establish incident
or unified command and clearly state and record when command is transferred.”124 This makes
the first responder on scene the Incident Commander. As more people arrive on scene, a more-
qualified individual may assume command according to agency guidelines, maintain command
as it is and monitor command activity and effectiveness, or request a more-qualified Incident
Commander from the agency with a higher level of jurisdictional responsibility.125 Applying
ICS protocols to the incident at Robb Elementary School, every law enforcement officer had an
obligation to establish, maintain, and, if necessary, transfer command and control. None of the
senior law enforcement officials on scene, including USBP leadership, established command and
control. A review of CBP training records showed that 75.6% of the CBP personnel at Robb
Elementary School at the time the entry team breached the door of Classroom 111 had no
training in NIMS and ICS protocols.
Response
The lack of command and control on May 24, 2022, led to a disjointed and chaotic response by
all personnel at Robb Elementary School, including CBP personnel. Adding to the dysfunction,
the integration of CBP personnel and local personnel in a mass casualty incident such as the
incident at Robb Elementary School was never practiced prior to May 24, 2022. At no time
between when USBP BORTAC personnel began to arrive at Robb Elementary School at
12:13:12 PM and when they breached the room and killed the assailant did they receive any
guidance, direction, or instruction from any senior law enforcement leaders at the school or
elsewhere. This is clear from the testimony of the senior law enforcement official inside the
school, UCISDPD Chief Arredondo. He testified before the Texas House of Representatives
Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting on June 21, 2022, that he did not
consider himself to have assumed incident command.126
According to the Texas House of Representatives Investigative Committee on the Robb
Elementary Shooting, “[UCISDPD’s] active shooter policy called for [UCISDPD] Chief
Arredondo to be the incident commander in any active shooter response.”127 Following proper
NIMS and ICS protocols, an incident commander should not be present in an area near the active
threat but should instead establish a single command post and unified command among all
responding agencies from a remote location. UCISDPD Chief Arredondo said:
[W]hile you’re in there, you don’t title yourself … I know our policy states you’re the
incident commander. My approach and thought was responding as a police officer. And
so I didn’t title myself. But once I got in there and we took that fire, back then, I realized,
we need some things. We’ve got to get in that door. We need an extraction tool. We need
those keys. As far as … I’m talking about the command part … the people that went in,
124 IS-0200.c Student Manual.

125 Id.
126 Texas House of Representatives Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting, Interim Report, p. 63 (July
17, 2022).
127 Id. at p. 74.
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there was a big group of them outside that door. I have no idea who they were and how
they walked in or anything. I kind of – I wasn’t given that direction.128
Formal command and control was also never established for CBP personnel on site, including
those inside the west building, those outside on the campus of Robb Elementary School, and
those who arrived at the school immediately following the breach of Classrooms 111 and 112.
Additionally, the state and local law enforcement officials on site failed to establish incident
command. The lack of a unified command structure led to the impromptu tasking or autonomous
decision-making of CBP personnel until the situation transitioned to a more formal structure well
after the assailant was killed. For example, SBPA indicated there was never any
question that he had the autonomy to “act however [he] saw fit” to bring the incident to a
resolution.”129 He was the one who instructed BORTAC agents to respond to Robb Elementary
School and authorized the breach of Classroom 111.130 Beyond the level of command and
control exerted by SBPA as he attempted to enter Classrooms 111 and 112, CBP never
established an incident command structure for its responding personnel to support an established
unified command.
One of the benefits of establishing unified command is managing the flow of communication to
and from the area of the threat. OPR heard multiple people who were at the scene describe the
difficulties experienced with the radio system on May 24, 2022. In the absence of radio
communications, NIMS and ICS training encourages the use of runners – people whose sole
purpose is to go to and from the established command post delivering information. Based on the
lack of an established command post, there was nowhere for information to flow to or from,
leading to mass confusion regarding who was in charge of the situation.
CBP personnel at the school, including some who had received standard training in NIMS or ICS
protocols, did not establish command and control during the incident. Had CBP leadership
established an incident command post for its own personnel, it could have had an impact on the
overall command and control structure, even though CBP lacked the authority to assume control
of the incident from state and local law enforcement officers. Although various videos showed
some instances of leadership at intermittent moments, no specific plan of action ever came
together in a cohesive manner. OPR’s review identified that many of the responding CBP
officers/agents were unsure of who was in charge or who was providing direction at the school,
with some believing UPD was in charge, others believing TXDPS was in charge, and others
simply believing no one was in charge.
128 Id. at p. 63.

130 Id. at timestamp 07:03:20.
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three messages about the incident on social media without verifying the accuracy of the
statements.132 These messages were neither coordinated through the JIC nor accurate.133
ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS
Training
OPR reviewed CBP’s active shooter policy and other external training documents, including:
x Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Train-the-Trainer

Active Shooter Response Level 1 (v. 7.2).
x Active Shooter Instructor Training Program (ASITP) Instructor Guidebook.
ALERRT at Texas State University was created in 2002 to address the need for active shooter
response training for first responders. In 2013, the FBI named ALERRT at Texas State the
National Standard in Active Shooter Training.134 The two-day, 16-hour course is designed to
provide basic, tactically-sound, standardized active shooter response training across the country,
enabling law enforcement responders from different agencies to work together safely and
effectively on active shooter responses.135 Although OPR personnel did not audit ALERRT
training, four LESC instructors tasked with teaching ASITP have attended ALERRT training
since 2021.136
CBP initially developed the ASITP in 2009 and taught it exclusively at the USBP Academy.
Presently, ASITP is a one-week training program for CBP-certified firearms and less-lethal
instructors, taught by a cadre from LESC. ASITP focuses on room entry and clearing tactics
during an active shooter situation, utilizing interactive role players and inert training rounds. In
April 2023, OPR personnel audited CBP’s ASITP at Summit Point, West Virginia.
OPR personnel noted that ASITP students are told on the first day of training that they will not
receive instruction on breaching a locked door. Instead, students are told to find another way
into the room. Students did not receive any training on the use of ballistic shields during active
shooter situations. The ASITP curriculum did not address the legal authorities for CBP
personnel to respond to active shooter situations and did not discuss jurisdiction, leadership roles
or responsibilities, or how to work with other local, state, or federal law enforcement agencies at
the same scene or incident. There was no discussion or emphasis on command and control
during active shooter situations at the ASITP.
132 U.S. Border Patrol Chief Raul Ortiz tweeted on May 24, 2022, at 11:04:00 PM, “Risking their own lives, these Agents
and other officers put themselves between the shooter and children, to draw the shooter’s attention away from potential
victims and save lives. At least one Agent was wounded by the shooter during the exchange of gunfire.” U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Critical Incident Review: Active Shooter at Robb Elementary
School, 2024, pp. 213-214.
133 Id. While not within the scope of this report, the DOJ COPS report also found the accuracy of the overall public
communications coming from the JIC was questionable on May 24, 2022.
134 ALERRT at Texas State University, About ALERRT, https://alerrt.org/about, 2023.
135 ALERRT curriculum
136 OPR interview of ACPA , August 10, 2023, timestamp 00:22:26.
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were trained using the ASITP curriculum. The extent of the differences between the two could
have led to issues with interoperability.
First, the two programs have different definitions of an “active shooter” situation. ALERRT
teaches that an active shooter situation is one where “there is reliable evidence that an attacker is
actively killing people or that his or her actions are preventing medical attention from reaching
critically injured victims.”141 Conversely, ASITP teaches that an active shooter situation is “an
armed person who has used deadly, physical force on other people and continues to do so, while
having unrestricted access to additional victims.”142 These minor differences in verbiage can
have a significant impact on the actions law enforcement officers take during an active shooter
response. Additionally, ASITP incorporates the use of rifles in active shooter training scenarios,
whereas ALERRT does not because, according to ALERRT, not all law enforcement agencies
and officers have access to rifles. Instruction on medical response and incident command is
provided in ALERRT but only briefly mentioned in ASITP.
Neither training program includes instruction on actions to take when encountering a locked
door; however, this does not unburden officers/agents from finding other means of getting into a
locked room. The training does instruct students to do whatever is necessary to find alternate
means of entry. Without the benefit of adequate training, law enforcement officers were left
unequipped to handle the demands of the situation at Robb Elementary School. There is also a
potential missed opportunity in training programs to include scenarios with difficult
circumstances to teach officers/agents better decision-making skills.
Response
USBP is the largest and best equipped law enforcement unit in many rural border communities
and has multiple units with specialized capabilities, making it an attractive partner. USBP has
more law enforcement officers assigned to Uvalde than all other law enforcement agencies in the
Uvalde area combined. Compared to the more than BPAs assigned to UVA, UPD has 39
police officers, UCSO has 15 sheriffs’ deputies, and UCISDPD has only 6 police officers.143
Considering USBP’s size and specialized capabilities, area law enforcement agencies often look
to partner with USBP when necessary.
Dispersed throughout the USBP Del Rio Sector area of responsibility are members of BORTAC
and BORSTAR units. BORTAC members receive training in advanced tactics, high-risk warrant
service, and precision marksmanship, among other skills. BORSTAR members are trained in
tactical medicine, technical rescue, and operations management and planning. In addition to
these specialized units, dozens of other DRT BPAs completed EMT training. OPR learned that
BPAs in the USBP Del Rio Sector previously provided training to state and local law
141 ALERRT curriculum.

142 ASITP curriculum.
143 City of Uvalde, Public Safety, https://www.uvaldetx.gov/residents/public safety/index.php; Police1 by Lexipol, Uvalde
County Sheriff’s Department, https://www.police1.com/law-enforcement-directory/sheriffs-departments/uvalde-county-

sheriffs-department-uvalde-tx-ZDhEPsOIAVAkB9UF/; Uvalde Leader-News, UCISD adds two police officers for total of six,
https://www.uvaldeleadernews.com/articles/ucisd-adds-two-police-officers-for-total-of-six/.
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enforcement agencies on topics including active shooter training and tactical combat casualty
care.
Additionally, interviewed BPAs recalled their radios being “patched” during the Robb
Elementary School incident, meaning that two separate radio systems were combined to allow
interoperability to facilitate faster information sharing. The patch in place on May 24, 2022, was
not the first time the USBP and UPD radio systems had been merged.
Many of OPR’s interviews pointed to informal relationships previously established to provide
assistance to area law enforcement agencies when necessary. Although none of these
relationships were formalized through a memorandum of understanding, the BPAs interviewed
by OPR investigators expected that they would render assistance to state and local law
enforcement officers when circumstances necessitated it, based on past practice. The absence of
an executed memorandum of understanding likely contributed to the lack of clarity about CBP’s
role and under whose authority CBP was operating.
Because of the lack of a unified command at Robb Elementary School, CBP personnel were left
to make decisions and take actions on their own, drawing on their individual training,
experiences, and moral imperatives. CBP personnel, including the individuals who ultimately
brought the situation to a close, made autonomous decisions at almost every juncture of the
incident, from deploying to the scene to returning to their assigned USBP duty station.
CBP personnel responded to the incident based on a variety of prompts, including both self-
deployment and direction to respond from a supervisor. Some employees received phone calls,
others heard about the situation over the radio, and still others learned about the event from
social media. Some CBP personnel who responded were on duty while others came from off-
duty to assist.
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SBPA and other responding CBP personnel felt empowered to bring the incident to a
conclusion without the need to repeatedly seek permission for various courses of action.148
SBPA was only one of many officers/agents challenged by the lack of command and
control. Aside from concerns relating to authority or command and control, CBP personnel
faced specific and immediate issues needing to be addressed. The law enforcement officers who
responded to Robb Elementary School spent significant time trying to determine the best way
breach the door of Classroom 111. None of the law enforcement officers in the hallway were
aware of the adjoining door between Classrooms 111 and 112. OPR’s review did not find any
evidence to suggest anyone physically turned the handle of the door to Classroom 111 to see if it
was locked prior to the breach. Instead, a combination of factors, including overhearing
conversation coupled with the knowledge that other doors were actually locked led officers to
assume the door to Classroom 111 was locked.149
Alternative means of gaining access to Classroom 111 were explored and dismissed for a variety
of reasons. Within seconds of SBPA ’s arrival in the west building at 12:13:12 PM,
UPD Officer brought canisters of CS gas into the hallway at 12:13:58 PM. However,
as law enforcement officers were readying themselves for the use of gas, they learned that a child
was calling from inside the classroom and spoke of injured victims.150 The presence of
casualties led SBPA to eliminate the use of CS gas as a viable option.151 Other CBP
law enforcement officers who responded to the incident considered using an explosive breach;
however, the potential use of an explosive breach was not communicated to SBPA .152
If anyone had established an incident command post, the use of explosive breaching techniques
could have been communicated to the incident commander in a timely manner for consideration.
The incident commander could then have evaluated the logistical challenges of obtaining the
necessary materials, since they were not on site and needed to be transported from Del Rio.
Although transporting explosives by helicopter from Del Rio would have been faster, explosives
are not flown on CBP helicopters because CBP has not evaluated the effects of altitude and static
electricity on the materials.153 Given this standard practice, CBP law enforcement officers who
responded to the incident did not consider transporting the explosive supplies needed for a
dynamic breach via helicopter. Furthermore, all available helicopters were already tasked and
out of the Del Rio area by the time the need for explosive breaching materials was realized.
Explosive breaching materials were eventually driven up to Uvalde from Del Rio, but arrived at
12:47:00 PM, minutes before the entry team breached Classroom 111.154 The officers also
148 Id. at timestamp 07:02:40

149 Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Critical Incident Review:
Active Shooter at Robb Elementary School found, “Though the entry team puts the key in the door, turns the key, and
opens it, pulling the door toward them, the CIR Team concludes that the door is likely already unlocked, as the shooter
gained entry through the door and it is unlikely that he locked it thereafter” (p. 15).
152 OPR interview of SBPA , March 6, 2023, timestamp 03:22:07. OPR interview of BPA ,
March 9, 2023, timestamp 00:36:20.
153 OPR interview of AIA , August 2, 2023, timestamp 00:48:20.
154 OPR interview of BPA , March 9, 2023, timestamp 00:34:20
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equipping of their personnel. OPR, with the support of OFO’s EMS program, also trains and
equips medical providers. OFO, AMO, and OPR medical providers are required to be certified
by the National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians (NREMT) and licensed in DHS’s
eLicensing Portal, in accordance with best practices and industry standards.
OPR’s review identified that USBP medical providers, certified by the NREMT at both the EMT
and paramedic levels, who responded to Robb Elementary School on May 24, 2022, were not
licensed in DHS’s eLicensing Portal, nor were they licensed by the State of Texas. Some USBP
medics have provided EMT training to outside state and local agencies. From the NREMT
website:
Certification is the process by which a non-governmental organization grants
recognition to an individual who has met predetermined qualifications specified by
that organization. Licensure, on the other hand, is the state’s grant of legal
authority, pursuant to the state’s police powers, to practice a profession within a
designated scope of practice.159
On October 14, 2022, , former Director of Emergency Medical Services at the
DHS Office of Health Security, sent Assistant Chief , then-National USBP EMT
Program Manager, a memorandum outlining the proper medical provider credentialing
requirements for operational medical programs such as USBP’s.160 The DHS Office of Health
Security’s memorandum states:
The [DHS credentialing] system provides for a medical oversight process ensuring
the competencies and qualifications of those with medical care responsibilities. The
system establishes quality assurance requirements for the improvement of EMS
services through monitoring, review, and assessment of medical data. Evidenced-
based practice guidelines are developed and distributed as standard medical
protocols for use throughout DHS, providing continuity of care and interoperability
standards for all EMS programs. The credentialing system reduces the liability
exposure of DHS where the Federal Tort Claims Act does not apply by ensuring
that trained, qualified, and vetted EMS professionals who meet national standards
operate within an approved system of protocols and oversight.161
OPR discussed the conflicting definitions of licensure, certification, and credentialing with
representatives from the DHS Office of Health Security, CBP Office of Chief Medical Officer,
and USBP National EMT Program Manager. Absent the memorandum sent by the former
Director of Emergency Medical Services at the DHS Office of Health Security mentioned
previously, there is no definitive policy on the requirements for medical provider licensing
within the Department of Homeland Security. USBP does not interpret the DHS Office of
159 National Registry of Emergency Medical Technicians, The Nation’s EMS Certification, https://www.nremt.org/, version
2023.2, (2023).
160 Memorandum from DHS Office of Health Security, Director of Emergency Medical Services to USBP National EMT
Program Manager, dated October 14, 2022.

161 Id.
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Health Security memorandum to mean licensing is required. However, it is the intent of the
DHS Office of Health Security, based on industry standards and best practices, to have all DHS
medical providers, including those in USBP, registered in the DHS eLicensing Portal. This is to
ensure continuity of the standards for patient care throughout DHS and ensure adequate
oversight over DHS-component emergency medical systems.
Response
OPR evaluated the May 24, 2022, medical response by CBP personnel at Robb Elementary
School. The review did not focus on individual patient care provided to specific victims, but
instead focused on the actions of CBP personnel in the context of the incident.
Civilian medical crews were present at Robb Elementary School; however, they remained
outside. Standard practice dictated they remain outside the school while there still existed a
direct and immediate threat.162 Additionally, roads leading to Robb Elementary School were
clogged with police vehicles, leaving some ambulances unable to get to the school prior to
12:50:00 PM.163 With civilian medical crews unable to fully respond and establish medical
command and control of the situation, this task fell on law enforcement personnel inside the west
building. CBP personnel took the lead for this task by establishing a triage area near the
T-intersection.
Because of the separation between personnel at the north and south ends of the hallway,
individuals at the south end of the hallway were unaware of the medical response plan in place at
the north end. The chaotic nature of the situation, coupled with the lack of guidance, led to a
void in leadership that was filled on an ad-hoc basis. OPR’s review revealed that BPA-P
, an EMT, recognized the need for triage to be established and took the initiative
to lead that effort. He directed other law enforcement EMTs inside the west building to establish
a medical triage area at the north end of the hallway. Despite BPA-P ’s efforts in
establishing a triage area, there was no chance for the medical response plan to be implemented,
because the lack of communication between the groups at the north and south ends of the
hallway ultimately led to chaos and disorganization once additional personnel flooded into the
hallways following the breach of Classrooms 111 and 112.
BPA-P ’s plan involved following triage protocols for a mass casualty incident, i.e., once
an incident scene is safe, victims are triaged in place and assigned one of four color codes
pertaining to the severity of their injuries as follows:
162 Goldstein, Scott, LeeAnne M. Martin Lee, and Joseph Roarty. EMS Zones of Care. Treasure Island, FL: StatPearls
Publishing, 2023. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK436017. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community
-
Oriented Policing Services, Critical Incident Review: Active Shooter at Robb Elementary School, 2024; OPR interview of
BPA-P
163 OPR interview of SBPA
, March 8, 2023, timestamp 01:38:30.
, March 8, 2023, timestamp 00:50:53; OPR interview of BPA
March 10, 2023, timestamp 01:38:30; OPR interview of ASAC
to 911 made by TXDPS Sergeant at 12:34:00 PM.

,
, February 28, 2023, timestamp 00:22:50, Call
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x Green is given to victims who can safely walk to a different location.

x Yellow is given to victims who need medical treatment on site.
x Red is given to victims who need to be immediately transported to a higher level of care.
x Black is given to victims who are deceased or have no chance of survival.164
Once the scene is safe, the person on site with the highest level of medical training provides
direction to other medically trained personnel in accordance with ICS protocols, which are a part
of the National Emergency Medical Services Education Standards.165
In the specific instance of the Robb Elementary School shooting, protocols for a mass casualty
incident were not followed. Realizing that the medical response plan was not being followed by
the scores of law enforcement officers flooding into the classrooms, BPA-P worked his
way into Classroom 112 and personally triaged seven victims, taking charge of the medical
response inside the room. Other higher-level medically trained personnel inside the west
building were initially overwhelmed by the scene and focused on patient care instead of
coordinating the medical response.166
Ultimately, all occupants of Classrooms 111 and 112 were attended to in 2 minutes and 44
seconds. However, because mass casualty protocols were not followed, some victims were not
properly triaged and were instead unnecessarily taken out of the classrooms. Some of the
victims who were unnecessarily removed from the classroom were deceased and should have
been left in place. The lack of command and control over the medical response following the
breach also led to six victims being taken out of the building and to a school bus without being
properly triaged. Two of the six victims taken to the school bus had gunshot injuries that should
have been identified during triage. Although neither of those injured victims succumbed to their
injuries, they were not provided immediate care.
164 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Model Uniform Core Criteria for
Mass Casualty Incident Triage, December 2017.
165 U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, National Emergency Medical
Services Education Standards, December 2021.

166 OPR interview of SBPA , March 8, 2023, timestamp 01:33:50; OPR interview of BPA ,
March 21, 2023, timestamp 00:49:04.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on a comprehensive review of the May 24, 2022, incident at Robb Elementary School, the
following are OPR’s findings and recommendations:
x VAGUE, MISUNDERSTOOD AUTHORITY. Effective multiagency coordination allows

all levels of government to work together more efficiently and effectively. In many
communities throughout the United States, CBP personnel constitute the largest group of law
enforcement personnel in the area. While there is recognition of the threat posed by active
shooter incidents in the communities in which they work and live, CBP first responders do
not have the statutory authority to intervene in incidents that lack a clear, federal nexus. CBP
officers, agents, and their managers at all levels have an inconsistent understanding of their
actual authority to respond to non-federal incidents including active shooter situations.
Recommendation: CBP must ensure its officers, agents, and managers understand and
properly work within the confines of their authority. To the extent that CBP intends to
continue to direct its personnel to respond to active shooter situations that lack a clear federal
nexus, CBP must ensure a framework exists that formally authorizes its personnel to do so
and guarantee that they will be protected from civil and criminal liability by ensuring these
actions are within the scope of their employment. Because of the strong societal interest in
preventing the loss of life, CBP officials should work with the U.S. Department of Justice
and/or Congress to provide more expansive authorities that allow federal officers/agents to
respond to acts of mass violence regardless of a nexus to a clear violation of federal law.
Such responses must be found within the scope of their duties for purposes of legal
representation.
x THE ABSENCE OF UNIFIED COMMAND. Over three hundred law enforcement

personnel responded to the scene of the Robb Elementary School shooting. The failure of
law enforcement personnel to establish identifiable incident management or command and
control protocols led to a confused overresponse to the Robb Elementary School shooting.
No law enforcement official ever clearly established they were in charge of the efforts inside
the school. None of the law enforcement personnel involved, including CBP law
enforcement personnel, executed NIMS protocols designed for the effective management of
critical events.
More importantly, there was a failure to establish an incident command post by anyone at the
scene, including CBP senior management officials. This failure left responding officers and
agents to act on their own and persisted throughout the duration of the event and into the
post-event medical care. A few first responders attempted to contain the assailant while
simultaneously addressing some scene management or command and control responsibilities
independently. This led to a disjointed and fractured response and caused undue delays, led
to wasted initiatives, clogged roads with emergency vehicles, prevented access by other
needed critical personnel, and created a chaotic medical triage response for victims in need of
advanced medical support.
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incident without a clear federal nexus. The CBP active shooter training did not align with the
standards other law enforcement agencies were trained on, including instruction on medical
response and the proper application of NIMS or ICS protocols. It was also unclear under
what authority CBP personnel are providing active shooter training to external partners
around the country, particularly since CBP’s training does not align with the standards by
which many other agencies train or operate.
Recommendation: CBP should align its training and doctrine on active shooter response
protocols with continuously emerging best practices, including lessons learned from this
incident, before providing additional training to CBP personnel or anyone else. Once
revised, all CBP first responders should receive comprehensive training on managing and
responding to active shooter events.
x SCARCE AVAILABILITY OF NECESSARY TOOLS. None of the CBP personnel at

Robb Elementary School had access to effective breaching equipment, such as a breaching
shotgun, a sledgehammer or ram, or breaching explosives. This issue was exacerbated by the
lack of unified command. Even if such equipment had been available, the lack of command
and control left dozens of officers trying to resolve the situation with only the tools they had
on hand and no coordination of assets.
Recommendation: CBP should assess which breaching tools are available to its personnel.
CBP personnel should be equipped with the necessary tools and training to breach commonly
encountered obstacles like locked doors. Those tools must be issued and positioned to make
them more widely available.
x AGENT APPEARANCE. BORSTAR personnel, who are medically trained at the EMT
and paramedic level, wore the same uniform as BORTAC personnel. This created confusion
about the number of tactically trained personnel on scene and may have contributed to the
lack of command and control during the medical response.
Recommendation: CBP should clearly distinguish medics from other personnel. CBP
should develop a way to easily distinguish BORTAC and BORSTAR uniforms. This will
allow law enforcement officers to know who to turn to for guidance and direction during a
situation similar to that encountered at Robb Elementary School.
x REINFORCE PROPER MEDICAL PROCEDURES AND TRAINING. The absence of

unified command led to a chaotic medical response following the breach of Classrooms 111
and 112. The lack of command and control led to six victims being taken out of the building
and to a school bus without being properly triaged. Best practices dictate that medical triage
should be conducted at the physical location of the event. Once triaged, victims should be
moved to dedicated areas for stabilization, or immediately taken to awaiting medical vehicles
for transport to hospitals. Failure to follow such established medical practices can lead to the
inability to provide prompt and necessary care to those with catastrophic injuries. The Robb
Elementary School incident also highlighted the importance of personnel receiving and
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maintaining medical response training to the maximum extent possible. Many of the CBP
personnel interviewed stated they did not receive proficiency training in CPR and the use of
IFAKs and AEDs.
Recommendation: CBP should establish procedures for following medical best practices
during critical events and ensure that all CBP personnel are trained to properly assess people
requiring medical care, especially since CBP personnel may arrive on scene before EMTs
and paramedics. To operate seamlessly in various locations, CBP should implement
standardized protocols throughout the nation by registering all CBP medical providers in
DHS’s eLicensing Portal to ensure adherence to the standards for patient care. Additionally,
CBP should provide all CBP medical personnel with opportunities to refresh and further their
medical response training.
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APPENDIX I: CBP PERSONNEL INTERVIEW SUMMARIES

The formal process to interview all CBP personnel who responded to the incident, as well as
other CBP personnel who supported CBP personnel on May 24, 2022, commenced in February
2023 and concluded in August 2023. OPR conducted a total of 193 interviews of CBP
employees, including Border Patrol Agents, Customs and Border Protection Officers, Air and
Marine Agents, and other CBP personnel, including those responsible for training CBP
personnel. In addition to the 188 CBP personnel who responded to or supported the response to
the incident at Robb Elementary School, OPR interviewed two CBP subject matter experts in the
fields of NIMS/ICS protocols and active shooter training and three CBP employees who did not
participate in the incident or its response but were mentioned as potentially being a part of the
incident response.
OPR’s interview strategy identified the individual level of involvement of CBP personnel and
grouped them into categories based on if and when they arrived at Robb Elementary School and
the actions they took on that day. OPR investigators who interviewed those who went inside
Robb Elementary School completed specialized interview training focused on trauma informed
cognitive interview techniques. All interviews of CBP personnel who responded to the incident
and the CBP personnel who supported them on that day included questions about incident
command, active shooter training, and the interviewee’s understanding of their authority and
responsibility to respond to an incident such as the one at Robb Elementary School. At the
conclusion of each interview day, OPR investigators and analysts met together to discuss salient
pieces of information collected from that day’s interviews and to identify knowledge gaps to help
shape future interviews.
Below are summaries of the interviews. OPR confirmed all times reflected in the interview
summaries through video footage and other verifiable means. Any times not validated are noted
as approximate.
BORTAC
BORTAC personnel played a prominent role in the CBP response to the incident. The following
is a summary of the interviews provided by BORTAC members, as well as those involved in the
deployment of BORTAC personnel:
BPA (DRT SOD), interviewed on March 13, 2023. (Exhibit 171)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was off duty and on his way to celebrate
in Concan, Texas. As he was about to depart his home in Uvalde, he received a group
text message from SBPA stating that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary
School and asking who was available to respond. BPA put on his multi-camouflage
uniform, body armor plates, gun belt, pistol, two pistol magazines, M4 rifle, and individual first
aid kit. He traveled to Robb Elementary School in an unmarked USBP vehicle without
activating the emergency equipment, believing the incident would be resolved by the time he
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arrived. He attempted to communicate via text messages using his personal phone without
success.
He arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:10:00 PM, parked on West Cargile
Street, and walked toward the southeast side of the school. He saw a group of students running
away from the school east toward Old Carrizo Road and guided them to safety. BPA
next saw a group of law enforcement officers running toward the school and decided to join
them. They stopped near the southeast side of the school and one of the law enforcement
officers told BPA the subject was barricaded in the west building, located in the room
that was the seventh window from the left side of the west building. BPA relayed
information to BORTAC team members via text message because radio communication was
lacking; however, his text messages did not appear to go through. BPA remained on
the southeast side of the school, attempting to relay information to BORTAC team members,
until he heard a volley of gunshots at approximately 12:50:00 PM. After hearing the gunshots,
he ran toward the south entrance of the school. He entered the building and froze when he saw a
pile of deceased children and heard one of the law enforcement officers say all the children were
deceased.
He met with other BORTAC BPAs by a tree in front of the school and was directed to go to the
Uvalde hospital to check on BPA . At the hospital, he was requested by hospital staff to
escort parents to help identify deceased children. After escorting several sets of parents, BPA
suggested the hospital find assistance from experienced personnel trained to assist
parents in that kind of situation. After BPA stopped escorting parents, he stayed with
BPA until BPA was discharged, then BPA went home.
BPA stated there was no incident command or sense of direction and the scene was the
most chaotic he had ever experienced. He stated the situation was announced multiple times as a
barricaded subject. BPA believed USBP’s role was to provide support if there was no
nexus to an immigration matter or the border. He stated there is an obligation to respond to an
active shooter situation as a law enforcement officer.
SBPA (DRT SOD), interviewed on March 16, 2023. (Exhibit 189)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was the acting BORTAC Commander, off-duty on approved
leave, when he received a phone call from BPA informing him about a shooting
or a shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA asked SBPA if he was
responding and said all UVA BPAs were instructed to respond. SBPA sent a text to the
BORTAC supervisors notifying them to respond and to the BORTAC text group ordering them
to respond. He then decided to come back on duty and respond, and informed (A)PAIC that
BORTAC was heading to the school.
SBPA drove in an unmarked GOV to the school and approached from the south. He
asked an unknown officer where the incident command post was located but the officer had no
information. SBPA parked in front of the west entrance of the school and entered the
building through the west entrance at 12:13:12 PM, then returned to his vehicle to get additional
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an impact to his head. He leaned against the hallway wall, then walked toward daylight shining
through the exterior door at the south end of the hallway and exited the building, where he met
BPA .
BPA took off his own hat to observe BPA ’s reaction to determine how badly
he was injured. The lack of BPA ’s reaction comforted him, and he told BPA
to go back into the school and assist. BPA noticed pain in his foot and leg and checked
the wounds. Medical personnel approached him to provide aid, but he rerouted them to the
school to support the medical needs inside the classrooms. BPA walked toward his
GOV through the same gate he had used earlier to enter the school and received a ride to the
hospital from an unknown BPA. He instructed the other BPA to take his GOV and gear to UVA,
saying he would retrieve it later.
BPA received x-rays of his head, leg, and foot, which identified shrapnel. Doctors
removed the shrapnel from his head but left it in his leg because removing it would cause more
damage. After BPA was discharged from the hospital, PAIC planned to drive
him to UVA, but BPA learned was nearby, so he joined her instead, and she
took him to UVA. From there, he drove his personal truck home.
BPA believed the situation at Robb Elementary School was a possible barricaded
shooter. He stated that radio traffic was unintelligible and conflicting. He was unsure of who
was in charge of the scene, but it was apparent that if BORTAC didn’t handle the situation, no
one else would. BPA observed a very relaxed posture by the other law enforcement
officers in the school hallway when he entered, as if they were waiting for instruction from
someone. He indicated the number of law enforcement personnel present was confusing for
what he believed was a contained subject. BPA stated there is a moral responsibility to
respond to incidents like the one at Robb Elementary School.
PAIC (USBP Tucson Sector, Nogales Station, Arizona), interviewed on
March 13, 2023. (Exhibit 166)
On May 24, 2022, PAIC was PAIC of BORTAC at DRT headquarters. While eating
lunch in his GOV, he received a phone call or notification via service radio that there was a
shooting in Uvalde. He notified (A)PAIC that he was going to respond to Uvalde to assist,
then traveled in the unmarked GOV with emergency equipment activated, following directly
behind a TXDPS trooper. PAIC called SBPA and told him he had authorization
to make all tactical decisions necessary and do whatever was needed. PAIC received a
phone call from (A)DCPA that BORTAC was heading to the scene and had authorization
to do whatever was needed.
PAIC arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:50:00 PM, parked his
GOV, donned his body armor, and moved toward the northwest gate of the school with the goal
of locating SBPA . After entering the school grounds, he approached the west entrance
and observed BPAs exiting the west entrance with wounded victims. He learned from an
unknown source that the threat was over. PAIC then attended a meeting with all BPAs
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who were not actively involved in something at that moment and was instructed to return to
UVA. While at UVA, he received notification of a potential second shooter, so he deployed the
BORTAC and BORSTAR teams to local schools to provide security. He drove his GOV to
Uvalde Junior High School and Uvalde High School to help with perimeter security and ensure
all BORSTAR and BORTAC BPAs were okay. He left the high school and returned to UVA,
then traveled to the Uvalde Regional Medical Center to visit BPA , who was wounded.
He stayed until BPA was discharged, then drove BPA to , who took
BPA home. PAIC drove back to DRT before going home.
PAIC stated he received a lot of conflicting and inaccurate information during the
incident. He observed a lot of chaos at Robb Elementary School but did not feel a sense of
urgency among the responders present. He was unsure if the situation had changed from an
active shooter to a barricaded subject, but based on the actions of the other law enforcement
officers he observed as he arrived on-scene just prior to the breach, it did not appear to be an
active shooter.
SBPA (USBP Tucson SOD, AZ), interviewed on March 6, 2023. (Exhibit 133)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was conducting line watch operations as a member of
BORTAC in the USBP Del Rio Sector. He was working at a remote location on ,
north of Eagle Pass, Texas, when he received notification from an AMO pilot on a tactical radio
channel saying there was a school shooting, and the pilot was leaving the area to assist. SBPA
wondered why the AMO pilot didn’t help transport other BPAs to the school, but
SBPA notified the other team members and said they needed to start getting ready to
leave in case they were deployed to the school. Shortly after the AMO pilot left the area, SBPA
received a phone call from SBPA telling him to get the BORTAC team to
the school.
BORTAC BPAs split into two teams and drove in two GOVs with emergency equipment
activated. SBPA maintained communication with SBPA via text messages
during the trip. He arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:50:00 PM, parked
approximately two blocks away and went to the funeral home after encountering BPA
preparing breaching charges. SBPA heard gunfire and ran to the west entrance of the
school with the goal of entering, finding SBPA and other team members, and providing
medical assistance. He entered Classroom 112 and was told everyone was deceased. He entered
Classroom 111 and spoke to SBPA , then told the BORTAC BPAs to clear the
classrooms in the west building.
SBPA exited through the south entrance to gather the rest of the BORTAC BPAs
outside. He provided a situation report to his PAIC, (A)DCPA, and CPA. They instructed him
to have BORTAC and BORSTAR members not actively involved in something rally in front of
the school, so he walked around the building and notified everyone he could find to report there.
After learning a medical helicopter was enroute and needed to land, he established a landing
zone, but a few minutes later he was told the helicopter was not coming. SBPA
reported to the rally point in front of the school, where everyone was requested to report to UVA
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at 2:00:00 PM. They received information about a secondary threat and SBPA
responded to Uvalde Middle School, where he assisted with evacuating children to the
gymnasium and ultimately to their parents. He returned to UVA before returning to ,
then went home.
SBPA understood the incident was an active shooter situation with a barricaded
subject and the subject probably had hostages. SBPA believed everyone on scene
was trying to be helpful, but there were too many law enforcement officers on scene. He
observed the responses seemed separated. He stated BORSTAR and paramedics maintained
command and control regarding patient triage and treatment and observed that BPAs
outnumbered state and local law enforcement officers throughout the scene. SBPA
stated he never located an incident command post anywhere. He believed that PAIC had
overall control outside the school until transferring control to (A)DCPA and CPA Owens,
then to TXDPS after the children were evacuated because TXDPS started processing the crime
scene.
SBPA stated that communication could have been a lot better, especially between the
north and south groups in the hallway. He believed Uvalde was not prepared for a mass casualty
event, stating there was no formal organization at the scene, and it was total chaos. SBPA
believed USBP’s authority to respond was based on a federal law banning guns on
school property and that an active threat to life requires a response from all law enforcement.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was working at a ranch in Eagle Pass, Texas, with other
BORTAC BPAs when SBPA told him to get his stuff because they had to go.
The BORTAC agents consolidated into GOVs and drove to Uvalde. They heard radio
transmissions indicating there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. They arrived at
the corner of Nicolas Street and Geraldine Street at approximately 12:50:00 PM and ran toward
the school. They entered the west entrance and walked down the hallway to Classroom 112,
where a Texas Ranger informed them that the classroom was now considered a crime scene, and
everyone had to leave.
SBPA directed BPA to go and find BPA . BPA and other
agents cleared Classrooms 103, 104, and 109, then were instructed via radio to exit the school
and meet at the tree by the north end of the school. There, they were ordered to report to UVA.
At UVA, they were informed of a threat by a potential second shooter, so BPA went to
Morales Junior High School to assist with security and crowd control.
BPA stated that when local law enforcement agencies see BORTAC agents, it is
assumed that BORTAC will handle the situation, although he did not feel that BORTAC was in
charge. He stated USBP has the authority to respond when a felony is being committed and as
first responders it is the right thing to do.
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He parked several blocks away and approached the funeral home. He called someone from his
group, who told him the incident was over and to report to the Uvalde Border Patrol Station.
When he got to UVA, he saw the BORTAC team exiting, so he caravanned with them to Uvalde
High School, where the principal asked him to help maintain perimeter security. He informed
parents that students would be released one by one and remained at the high school until 5:30:00
PM or 6:00:00 PM, then went to UVA for a short debrief.
SBPA stated that initially the information he received via text was that there was an active
shooter. However, while enroute to Uvalde, he heard the incident turned into a barricaded
subject. He thought the incident would be quickly resolved but felt it was necessary to respond
because USBP had been called to assist. He stated it did not seem there was any command and
control in place upon his arrival at Robb Elementary School, and the funeral home appeared to
be a consolidation point for student reunification with parents.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was with other BORTAC agents detaining a group of
undocumented migrants on Burr Ranch when the pilot of the AMO helicopter that was assisting
them stated over the radio that he had to leave because he got a call about a school shooting in
Uvalde. Five minutes later, the BORTAC agents received texts on their personal phones about
the shooting at an Uvalde school.
BPA took BPA to his vehicle and used a tow strap to get the vehicle out
of the mud. BPA stayed behind to transport the detained group while other
BORTAC agents departed. After the detained group was picked up, BPA headed
to Uvalde in a GOV. At the checkpoint on Highway 90, he instructed BPA to follow
him to the school with the BearCat armored vehicle.
BPA arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:20:00 PM. He
parked and was walking toward the school when he received a message to meet at the tree in
front of the school. There, he was directed to go to UVA, so he left the school and went to UVA.
While at UVA, everyone started talking about the girlfriend of the assailant who was allegedly
going to shoot up the high school and everyone in the muster room was directed to head to the
high school. BPA arrived at the high school and stood guard on the southwest
side for approximately 1.5 hours before all the students were evacuated. He went back to UVA
with the BORTAC and BORSTAR agents, then left after about 30 minutes. He returned to the
morning’s location to retrieve the remaining vehicles, then went home.
BPA did not know who was in command of the scene and was unsure what
agencies were at Robb Elementary School. He did not know who was in charge at the high
school and stated there is an understanding in the community that BORTAC will respond to
school shootings because they have the best training. BPA stated that if someone
is in danger, it is USBP’s responsibility to do something.
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On May 24, 2022, BPA
the BearCat and respond to Uvalde. BPA .

arrived at DRT and noticed BPAs running in the parking lot.
They told him there was an active shooter in Uvalde. (A)PAIC told BPA to get
transferred his issued gear to the BearCat
and drove to Robb Elementary School using lights and sirens. He arrived at approximately
1:20:00 PM, parked near Geraldine Street and Farm to Market 1435, then ran with another BPA
to the school. They were informed the door had been breached and there was not anything for
them to do. BPA joined other USBP personnel under a tree, where they learned of a
secondary threat and were directed to respond to the high school. He drove the BearCat to the
high school and parked at the student pickup point to provide security for students being
dismissed to their parents, then returned to Del Rio.
BPA stated he was unsure of who was in charge at Robb Elementary School. He
indicated USBP has a responsibility to respond, and their role was to provide support to local law
enforcement agencies.
from SBPA
- was off duty at home in Del Rio, Texas. He received a text
that there was a barricaded subject at a school in Uvalde. BPA
put on his BORTAC uniform, left his residence, and traveled in a GOV to Uvalde with the
emergency lights activated. He arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:30:00
PM, parked, and walked toward the school to join his teammates. He encountered PAIC ,
who advised him to go to UVA for a muster, so he returned to his GOV and drove to UVA.
While at UVA, he learned of another possible threat, so he and his teammates went to Morales
Junior High School and provided perimeter security for approximately one hour. BPA
then returned to UVA and met with other BORTAC and BORSTAR agents in an informal
muster. He left UVA and assisted other BORTAC agents to retrieve GOVs that were stuck in
the desert.
BPA stated he responded because it was his duty as a law enforcement officer, and he is
always on call. He believed the incident to be a barricaded subject and believed local police
departments were in command of the incident because when BORTAC responds it is always to
assist other agencies. He stated USBP’s role was to assist local and state police departments and
that USBP has authority to respond to any incident if requested.
BPA (DRT SOD), interviewed on February 28, 2023. (Exhibit 94)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was conducting line watch operations north of Eagle Pass,
Texas, when he received a text message on his personal cell phone from SBPA telling
BORTAC BPAs to immediately respond to Robb Elementary School for a shooting and that a
person was barricaded. BPA took a screenshot of the text and waited until another
BPA finished transporting migrants to the highway, then rode with that BPA to BPA ’s
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GOV. BPA drove his GOV toward Uvalde with emergency equipment activated. He
received a text to report to UVA and arrived there after 2:00:00 PM, where he was immediately
instructed to report to the Uvalde High School and provide security because there were other
possible shooters. BPA ’s was an employee at Uvalde High School, so he went
to location first to make sure she was okay, then started working with her and
helping at the school. He helped with traffic and to maintain some type of order as parents
arrived to retrieve their children. He returned to UVA for an out-briefing, traveled to the ranch
area to retrieve another GOV that was stuck in the mud, then went home at approximately
midnight. BPA observed that as other law enforcement agencies arrived, they were
under their own chain of command and were occupied with their own responsibilities.
Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (COM), interviewed on February 28,
2023. (Exhibit 97)
On May 24, 2022, DPAIC was acting PAIC ((A)PAIC) of the Special Operations
Detachment (SOD) for DRT overseeing operations and administration of BORSTAR and
BORTAC teams. Although PAIC (USBP Tucson Sector, Nogales Station,
Nogales, Arizona) was permanently assigned over the DRT Special Operations Detachment,
PAIC was temporarily detailed to TXDPS.
(A)PAIC received a phone call from an unknown person at the DRT Border Intelligence
Center (BIC) that there was a shooting incident at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde.
Approximately 15-20 minutes later, he received additional information that it was a male with a
rifle inside the school. Upon learning this additional information, (A)PAIC called SBPA
and SBPA on the phone and informed them about the preliminary information
and initiated the process of deploying SOD personnel to the scene. (A)PAIC remained in
Del Rio and did not respond to Uvalde. As information about personnel and resource
deployments came into the DRT SOD office, he kept track of them by listing the names of
responding SOD personnel on a whiteboard in the office. Additionally, he authorized BPA
to use the response truck to take EMTs to respond.
Due to the gravity of the situation, PAIC directed (A)PAIC to remain at DRT to
coordinate SOD efforts while PAIC responded to Uvalde. (A)PAIC relocated from
the SOD office to the radio room at the BIC to maintain clear lines of communication among all
DRT assets responding to the incident. (A)PAIC helped coordinate various facets of the
SOD response, including tactical considerations and medical response considerations. He also
prepared to conduct an after-action plan and ensured DRT staff were apprised of SOD plans.
(A)PAIC stated he backed off direct communication with the SOD commanders once PAIC
responded, but he continued to listen to radio communications and identify field
requirements, including a landing zone for air evacuations. As (A)PAIC received
information in the BIC, he attempted to disseminate it to the SOD BPAs in the field via PAIC
.
Beyond his initial contact with SBPAs and , (A)PAIC did not give any
directions or guidance to personnel in the field, nor did he receive any guidance from more
Page 95 of 201
He moved back to the south side of the building, then moved to assist other law enforcement
officers evacuating people from Classrooms 19–23. He then moved to the next building with
Classrooms 13–18 and assisted with evacuations. He went to the cafeteria and assisted with
evacuations from there, then moved back toward the south doorway of the west building when he
heard gunshots, which he assumed to be the breach of the classroom. He then entered the
hallway of the west wing through the south door and moved toward Classroom 111.
BPA-I entered the classroom, saw that the assailant was deceased, and observed that
no one in the classroom was directing anyone about which victims to prioritize or where to place
them for treatment. He assisted with getting children out of the classroom and carried three
children to the medical triage area, then someone yelled for all non-EMTs to get out of the
classroom. He went to the hallway, where he was requested to assist in moving deceased
children from the hallway to Classrooms 130 and 131. He exited the west doorway and took
over CPR on from another BPA who appeared tired. BPA-I checked in
with other BPAs, retrieved his EMT bag from the parking lot, and met with USBP personnel at a
tree on the north side of the building. He then returned to his vehicle and departed for UVA by
himself.
While enroute, he heard about another possible shooter at the high school, where his wife and
oldest child were, so he responded to the high school with another BPA and assisted with
evacuating children until 5:30:00 PM. He rendered aid to a dehydrated UPD officer until an
ambulance arrived, then returned to UVA, retrieved his vehicle, and went home.
BPA-I could not identify who was in command and control at any time. He stated
UCISDPD Chief Arredondo was the only person who could have been in charge, but there was
no active command and control initiated. BPA-I identified that USBP’s role was in a
backup capacity.
BPA (UVA), interviewed on March 6, 2023. (Exhibit 136)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was on day shift assigned to camera and sensor duties changing
batteries. While working at a ranch 10 miles west of Uvalde, he heard over the radio that all
agents should report to Robb Elementary School. Immediately, he drove toward the school and
arrived in less than 20 minutes, at approximately 11:50:00 AM. There, he used his vehicle to
block traffic down one of the streets near the school. He went to the west entrance of the school
and asked every law enforcement officer he encountered if they had any information, but no one
did. An unknown UPD officer told him the school police chief was in the classroom negotiating
with the assailant. BPA began assisting with the evacuation of children from Classrooms
102–106, then went to the south entrance and began evacuating children from Classrooms 108–
110. He broke classroom windows and climbed into Classroom 109 through the window to
assist the injured teacher, who was shot and could not move without assistance.
Prior to the breach, he staged near the south entrance. Immediately after the breach, he entered
the south entrance and went toward the classroom. He carried a girl from the floor just outside
the classroom to an EMT at the south entrance. He found a blanket and covered the girl, who
Page 97 of 201
was deceased, then entered Classroom 112 and was told to leave the classroom if he was not a
medic. He exited the school through the south entrance and gathered at the front of the school
for a muster, where he was directed back to UVA. Shortly after arriving at UVA, he left and
assisted with securing and evacuating several local schools.
BPA identified that SBPA took charge in the school hallway. BPA stated
the entire incident was chaotic and that USBP responded to the incident to assist the local police
departments. He identified that BPAs took control of the situation because no one else was
doing anything. BPA stated USBP did not have the authority to handle situations like the
Robb Elementary School shooting.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was scheduled for a use of force training day. During a
training break, he heard over a radio that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School
and local law enforcement officers were requesting assistance. He immediately went to the
UVA armory and got a rifle and hard plate body armor, then responded to the school with other
BPAs in a marked GOV. He communicated with USBP dispatch while enroute to confirm the
correct school.
When he arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 11:50:00 AM, he entered the west
entrance and inquired with local law enforcement officers about the situation, but they did not
seem to know what was going on or what to do. He inquired if there were students or teachers in
the surrounding classrooms but did not receive a definitive answer. Along with other BPAs, he
began evacuating classrooms near the west entrance, including Classrooms 131 and 132, where
there were two teachers but no students. The BPAs relieved a local law enforcement officer who
was aimed in at the classroom with the barricaded subject and discussed that if the assailant
began firing, they would go in.
BPA briefed SBPA when SBPA arrived. Shortly after SBPA
arrived, they heard four gunshots and advanced toward the classroom. In the hallway,
the law enforcement officers focused on finding the correct set of keys to open the doors to
Classrooms 111 and 112. Initially, the plan was to unlock the doors to Classrooms 111 and 112
and simultaneously enter both classrooms. However, after SBPA opened the door to
Classroom 111, the decision was made to only enter through Classroom 111. Following SBPA
and others entering Classroom 111, BPA heard a barrage of gunfire and
dropped to the floor in the hallway. Once the shooting was over, BPA got up and
entered the classroom to assist with the victims.
He took victims to the medical triage area and assisted an EMT with a victim. He took the
victim to an ambulance outside, then reentered the school and assisted with clearing the rest of
the building. He exited through the south door, then ran back to the triage area to gather medical
supplies and deliver them outside. He returned again to the triage area, but no additional
assistance was needed, and he was informed that the school was a crime scene, and no one was
allowed to enter.
Page 98 of 201
Owens and other BPAs for a briefing, then gave another BPA a ride back to UVA and returned
his rifle to the armory.
While enroute to Robb Elementary School, he believed he was responding to a school shooter
situation. Upon arriving at the school, he thought it was a barricaded subject based on
information from another law enforcement officer. He observed that radio traffic was chaotic
and at one point there was a “hot mic” that prevented anyone else from transmitting. He stated it
was difficult to understand what was being broadcast. When BPA arrived at Robb
Elementary School, it did not appear there was any command and control outside the school. He
was not aware if an incident command was established, and he believed UPD was in charge.
BPA did not see that anyone from USBP was in command and control, but
identified that when SBPA arrived, SBPA took control.
BPA identified that the situation in the school was chaotic with law enforcement
officers going in and out. BPA identified that his role at the incident was to provide
backup to UPD and stated it has been USBP’s past practice to assist other law enforcement
agencies when they request assistance.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was on day shift performing line watch with another
BORSTAR BPA northwest of Eagle Pass, Texas, when he received a group text from SBPA
stating there was an active shooter at an elementary school in Uvalde and a subsequent
message ordering everyone in the group text to respond to Uvalde. BPA deployed
toward Uvalde in his unmarked GOV. While enroute he overheard a prolonged hot mic moment.
He arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:25:00 PM, parked, put on his gear,
and ran toward the school. He dropped his radio while running and had to run back to get it, then
returned to the school and entered through the west entrance. After the breach, he took a
deceased child from another BPA and helped carry the body to the medical triage area. He
entered Classroom 111 and carried a child out to the medical triage area. He confirmed children
were deceased by checking for carotid pulses. He exited the school through the west entrance
after TXDPS ordered everyone out to preserve the crime scene. He reported to the tree north of
the building for a muster, where he was instructed to meet at UVA in 30 minutes. When he
arrived at UVA, he was informed about a second threat and decided to respond along with other
DRT SOD members to Morales Junior High School to provide security around the school. He
remained there until everyone was evacuated, then returned to UVA, where he changed out of
his uniform and went home.
BPA believed TXDPS was in charge based on the number of officers outside the school
perimeter. He did not feel USBP was in charge but observed SBPA lead the group of
law enforcement officers who entered Classroom 111. BPA stated that in an active
shooter event, his role was to stop the threat and support his team and other agencies.
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BPA (CAR), interviewed on March 21, 2023. (Exhibit 205)

On May 24, 2022, BPA was at CAR assigned to day shift on field duties near Texas
Highway 57 when, either via text or radio, he heard that there was an active shooter inside Robb
Elementary School. BPA decided, along with another BPA, to respond to the scene.
They drove straight to the school, arriving at approximately 12:25:00 PM, and parked several
blocks away. He put on his ballistic vest and helmet, took his M4 rifle and medical bag, and
walked to the school.
BPA encountered PAIC and asked if PAIC was okay; PAIC
said no because his child was inside the school. BPA entered the school through the
west entrance and spoke with BPA , then assisted with setting up a triage area. They
decided BPA would assist with breaching the classroom.
He approached the classroom after hearing gunshots and someone yell “shooter down.” BPA
identified a male teacher being dragged from the classroom as a potential patient. He
assisted another BPA with looking for signs of life in the pile of children in Classroom 112. He
checked four or five and determined none had signs of life. He determined all the children in
Classroom 112 were deceased. He took over performing lifesaving efforts on a boy from BPA
and took the boy to a nearby ambulance, but the boy did not show signs of life.
He attempted to reenter the school through the west entrance but was denied entry by a TXDPS
trooper. BPA met with other BPAs around a tree near the front of the school, where all
BPAs were instructed to report back to UVA. He walked alone to his vehicle. At UVA, he was
instructed to report to any local Uvalde school to assist with security upon being informed of the
possibility of another shooter. He arrived at Dalton Middle School and provided security on the
back side of the school. He remained in his vehicle for several hours before receiving
instructions to report back to UVA.
BPA (USBP International Falls Station, Minnesota), interviewed on March 10,
2023. (Exhibit 164)
at a local school. BPA -

UVA. During a training break, SBPA
worked at UVA providing less lethal instruction to BPAs from
notified BPA that there was a shooting
went to the armory, retrieved his rifle and keys to a marked
USBP vehicle, put on his duty belt, handgun, body armor, and retrieved his EMT bag. He saw
SBPA driving a USBP vehicle with emergency equipment activated and decided to follow
SBPA . He parked at the intersection of South Grove Street and Geraldine Street at
approximately 12:10:00 PM and ran toward Robb Elementary School with his rifle. Near the
school, BPA saw the assailant’s truck in a ditch, and spoke to BPA , who was
guarding the truck and weapons found near it. BPA returned to his truck to retrieve his
EMT bag from his vehicle and walked back toward the school. He left the EMT bag near a
Dodge Charger and approached a group of law enforcement officers north of the west entrance to
the school.
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BPA (BRA), interviewed on March 10, 2023. (Exhibit 159)

On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to BPA field training and was interdicting a group
of migrants in the area along with a CBP helicopter when the pilot informed
them that he had received an urgent request for assistance and was departing the area. Another
BPA received information about a shooting happening in Uvalde involving a school, and the
BPAs decided to return to BRA to verify the situation. There, they were informed that there was
a shooting at Robb Elementary School and they needed to respond. BPA drove with
another BPA toward the school in a USBP-marked GOV with lights and sirens activated. They
arrived at the school at approximately 12:15:00 PM and were stopped at the entrance by
unknown law enforcement officers who informed them that only EMTs and paramedics were
needed inside. BPA stated he was previously a medic and was then allowed to enter
through the west entrance door.
He assisted with setting up the medical triage area by the bathrooms and water fountain. After
the breach, he attempted to stop an officer who was carrying a deceased child outside to prevent
onlookers from seeing the child, but the officer took the child outside, so BPA covered
the child with a blanket and asked another law enforcement officer for assistance moving the
child back inside the school. He applied a tourniquet to the arm of a male teacher who had a
gunshot wound to the arm and asked two law enforcement officers to take the teacher to an
ambulance. BPA moved deceased children into Classroom 132. He entered Classroom
111 and observed the scene, then went outside and assisted with chest compressions until EMS
took over. He assisted with chest compressions on another teacher on a stretcher being carried to
an ambulance before meeting with other BPAs by a tree. He then left to report to UVA for a
briefing, then returned home.
Upon arriving at the school, BPA assumed the assailant was deceased or in custody. He
did not know the scene was still active and did not know who was in command. He believed
CBP had authority to respond because there was a threat to human life.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was tracking a group of migrants with the assistance of a CBP
helicopter when the pilot relayed that he had to break off and respond to a possible active shooter
call. Around the same time, BPA ’s wife inquired with him if he knew
Robb Elementary School, was on lockdown; he responded that he had read about it on
-
social media but thought it was probably locked down related to a bailout. A few minutes later
called back and was upset because had been informed there was a shooting at the
school. BPA decided to respond to the school along with two other BPA trainees because
he is an EMT and because was there.
He drove to Robb Elementary School with two BPA trainees in a marked GOV with emergency
lights activated and activated the sirens when encountering traffic. When they arrived near Robb
Elementary School at approximately 12:15:00 PM, BPA observed the streets were backed
up and there were many parked vehicles blocking the streets and people pacing back and forth in
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message indicating the destination was Robb Elementary School, so he called SBPA for
more details and learned there was a shooting at the school.
BPA arrived near the school at approximately 12:30:00 PM and asked a TXDPS trooper
what was going on, but the Trooper did not know. BPA explained he was responding as
an EMT, parked in the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home parking lot, and ran toward the school.
He entered the west entrance and recognized BPA , who said they were still figuring out
the situation. BPA returned to his vehicle and collected medical supplies, then set up the
triage area in the hallway near the restrooms. He moved to the south entrance with another BPA
in case children were evacuated somewhere other than where the triage area was, then joined
other law enforcement officers in the hallway south of Classrooms 111 and 112.
After the breach, he entered the classroom through the same door as the entry team, picked up a
child, brought her to the south entrance, and began CPR. He terminated patient care upon
determining the extent of her injuries, then returned to the classroom to assist with other victims.
He ended up assisting with the treatment of another child in the triage area of the hallway before
determining that child was also deceased. He returned to the classroom and was informed that
all the victims in the classroom were already deceased. He exited the building through the west
door and assisted with one cycle of CPR on a patient after transporting the patient to an
ambulance. He reentered the building one final time to check for signs of life before joining
other BPAs near a tree outside the building. There, he informed CPA Owens that several of the
BPAs onsite would need Peer Support. He went to UVA, where he heard about a second threat
that was quickly dismissed. He then drove to BRA, changed clothes, threw away his bloody
clothes, and went home.
BPA stated it did not seem like anyone was in charge of the overall incident, beginning
with when he arrived at Robb Elementary School and the TXDPS trooper not knowing what was
going on. BPA believed BPA and BPA-P oversaw the medical response
inside the school.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to ranch liaison detail and was having lunch in
Brackettville, Texas, with another BPA when BPA ’s wife texted him that there was an
active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA drove with the other BPA to BRA and
advised SBPA about the possible active shooter and that they were going to respond. He
arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:40:00 PM, parked, and ran west toward
the school. Just as he entered the school through the west door, BPA heard gunshots.
Following the gunshots, he encountered a girl who did not appear injured, asked if she was hurt,
took her to a school bus, then ran back into the school. He helped another BPA move deceased
children from the hallway to Classrooms 131 and 132 until TXDPS told them to clear out of the
school due to it being a crime scene.
BPA handed medical supplies to law enforcement officers providing medical care to a
teacher, then was told to meet at UVA for a muster. He was at UVA for an hour, then drove
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back to BRA, where drove him home. BPA stated he never knew who was in
command of the incident and that USBP’s role in a situation such as the Robb Elementary
School shooting would be to assist in any way possible. He stated the first person on scene
would be the person or agency in charge.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to the day shift working on Paloma Ranch near
Eagle Pass, Texas, when he received a text message notifying him of a shooting in Uvalde.
SBPA directed BORSTAR agents to respond to Uvalde if they were not waiting for a
detainee transport, so BPA responded using the ATAK map location of Robb
Elementary School. He arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:40:00 PM and
parked two blocks away in the shade for his canine, who was a search and rescue canine, not a
patrol canine.
BPA entered the school through the west entrance and joined the group of law
enforcement officers on the left side of the hall preparing to enter a room. When gunfire started
during the breach, he dropped to the floor for a moment, then rejoined the other law enforcement
officers. After someone said, “all clear,” he and the other officers entered Classroom 111. BPA
carried children to the triage area until a law enforcement officer told him to stop
removing bodies because they had been declared dead and the room was now a crime scene.
BPA then exited the classroom and assisted with clearing two classrooms across from
Classrooms 111 and 112. He exited the school and met with other BPAs at the tree in front of
the school, then was instructed to report to UVA. At UVA, they learned of another threat against
other schools and redeployed to Dalton Elementary School, where he assisted with reuniting
students with their parents. BPA returned to UVA for another debrief, then went
home.
Prior to arriving at the school, he expected to encounter an active shooter situation but upon
arriving, he observed it was very quiet. He did not know who was in charge at the scene, but
believed SBPA was in command of the school hallway and BPA was in
command of the triage area. BPA believed USBP had the responsibility to respond
and assist.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to detention and care at BRA. While on his lunch
break, he learned about a shooting in Uvalde and was directed to respond because he was an
EMT. While departing, he informed another BPA EMT about the shooting and called a third
EMT while enroute. He arrived near Robb Elementary School and parked some distance away.
Some nearby parents suggested he drive to the other side of the school, so he tried to get closer
and finally parked and ran with his medical equipment toward the school. He arrived at the west
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making entry and then he heard the “shooter was down.” AEA parked down the street
because of the traffic, then ran toward the school and asked TXDPS troopers where he was
needed. They directed him to the entrance of the school. He arrived at approximately 12:55:00
PM and was at the front fence when someone handed him a child on a backboard. He helped
load the child into an ambulance, then saw BORSTAR EMTs and asked what they needed help
with. They told him to just find something to do, so he entered the school through the west
entrance, then exited through the south door to get out of the way. He assisted other personnel
with a child outside and told everyone there were ambulances by the front of the school. He
helped get another child on a gurney and moved to the ambulance.
A TXDPS officer prevented him from getting back into the school, but a UPD officer informed
him there were still children inside classrooms, so he followed the UPD officer to the portable
classrooms and helped evacuate the children to a collection point on the far east side of the
school. He was told help was needed with security at the Civic Center, so he went there. He
returned to Robb Elementary School with the UPD officer, then realized he was no longer
needed, so he went to the office to drop off his gear and went home between 5:30:00 PM and
6:00:00 PM.
AEA initially thought the incident was a bailout. A few minutes after his initial
notification, while still at home, received an additional notification, at which time he
believed it was a legitimate incident. While at the office, he learned it was a barricaded subject
at the school. He stated that it appeared TXDPS was in charge at the Civic Center.
SBPA (CBP LESC), interviewed on March 10, 2023. (Exhibit 160)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was observing low-light qualifications at DRT as part of an
LESC policy review when another BPA told him he heard about a possible bailout in Uvalde.
When they heard there were shots fired, they grabbed M4 rifles from the DRT armory and
traveled to Uvalde to assist. They attempted to obtain information enroute via handheld radio
and text messages and believed they heard gunshots over the radio as they parked.
SBPA parked at approximately 1:00:00 PM, ran toward Robb Elementary School,
and captured a video of the vehicle congestion using a cell phone. As an EMT, he went to the
busiest area he could find, which was the west building, and attempted to enter the school to
assist with medical treatment. Although he could see victims being treated by law enforcement
officers in the hallway, a TXDPS ranger denied him entry into the west building.
After being turned away by the TXDPS Ranger, he noticed a loaded, unattended CS gas weapon
near the entryway and decided to unload it. After unloading it, he noticed an EMT remove a
tourniquet on a woman being transported on a gurney and went over to assist the EMT with
applying a second tourniquet. Afterward, SBPA helped transfer a male child from
one gurney to another, then noticed BPAs were distraught and began providing comfort and
support to them.
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He gathered with all BPAs around a tree on the north side of the building, where they were
instructed to gather at UVA. At UVA, they learned of an alleged second threat, so he went to the
UVA armory to get a rifle, then went to Uvalde High School. He told the school security guard
to lock the school and only allow law enforcement officers to enter, then began clearing the
school. He exited the school and informed TXDPS that the high school was cleared and that the
junior high school still needed to be cleared.
After clearing Flores Elementary School, he returned to Uvalde High School to assist with the
reunification of children with their parents, then returned to UVA. Afterward, he returned his
rifle to the DRT armory, returned to the Del Rio firing range to pick up his personal gear, and
went to his hotel room for the night.
SBPA stated there was conflicting radio traffic at both Robb Elementary School and
at the Uvalde High School about the nature and details of the incident. SBPA did not
believe anyone was in charge at the scene at Robb Elementary School and there was a lack of
command and control throughout the entire situation. He stated USBP has a responsibility to
respond to the incident and stop children from dying. He further explained that USBP has
authority to use deadly force to prevent the loss of life and it is law enforcement’s responsibility
to stop the killing and stop the dying.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to administrative functions when he was advised
either verbally or via text of a possible active shooter at Robb Elementary School. He traveled to
the school in a GOV with lights and sirens activated, arriving at approximately 1:00:00 PM. He
received permission from a resident a couple hundred yards from the school to park in the
resident’s yard, then gathered his gas mask, M4 rifle, two 30-round magazines, three pistol
magazines, ballistic plates, and tactical medical bag, and approached the west entrance door.
There, he assisted with treatment of , then walked to the side yard where BORSTAR
agents were congregating.
Next, he responded to Uvalde High School upon receiving a message that the girlfriend of the
assailant made a threat there. He provided care to a student who was not injured but was
emotionally upset and stayed at the high school for a couple hours assisting the principal with the
release of the students.
BPA stated the scene at Robb Elementary School was very chaotic, with officers and agents
walking both toward and away from the school. He believed USBP’s role was to respond and
address the assailant. He stated that in active shooter situations, the priority is to stop the killing
and stop the dying. He did not know who was in command of the scene or if anyone from USBP
was in command and control of its personnel at the scene.
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SBPA (USBP Fort Brown Station, Brownsville, Texas), interviewed on March 15,
2023. (Exhibit 181)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was working at the DRT range providing active shooter training
when he heard someone say there was an active shooter situation in Uvalde. He asked his
training partner, SBPA , if he wanted to respond; SBPA said yes, so they
grabbed equipment and headed toward Uvalde. While enroute, SBPA explained to SBPA
what to expect when arriving at the scene and told SBPA to check in with incident
command for direction. SBPA arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately
1:00:00 PM, parked a few blocks away, and approached the school on foot. He observed no
incident command, so he approached the west entrance of the school. He took a few steps into
the school and assisted with moving at least one patient to an ambulance. He attempted to
reenter the school but was denied entry by a Texas Ranger, so he talked to and consoled other
BPAs outside the school.
SBPA gathered with other BPAs around a tree, where they were instructed to go to UVA.
He coordinated with other BPAs to find rides for everyone because some people were not in a
condition to drive. When law enforcement officers from Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) arrived, he told them there was nothing left to do at the school and directed them to the
hospital to assist with security.
At UVA, he learned about a possible threat at Uvalde High School and went there with SBPA
to assist. SBPA began clearing the school and assisting with the reunification
of parents and students at other schools, including Morales Junior High School, Flores
Elementary School, and Dalton Elementary School. He returned to UVA, ate dinner, then drove
back to Del Rio.
During the incident, SBPA heard talk about hostage negotiation over the radio and thought
too much time had passed since the original call about an active shooter. He observed there was
no incident command and he did not know who was in charge of the situation at Robb
Elementary School. SBPA observed that no one was yelling commands or seemed like
they were in charge. He stated USBP is not supposed to be the lead agency onsite but will
respond.
CBP PERSONNEL INSIDE ROBB ELEMENTARY SCHOOL OR ASSISTING WITH
CLASSROOM EVACUATIONS PRIOR TO BREACH
Dozens of CBP personnel arrived at Robb Elementary School prior to 12:50:00 PM and entered
the west building to address the threat posed by the assailant or assist with evacuating students
and teachers from nearby classrooms. The following is a summary of the interviews provided by
these employees:
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On May 24, 2022, BPA had just completed transporting migrants to Eagle Pass, Texas,
when he heard a radio transmission requesting all available agents respond to an active shooter
or shots fired at Robb Elementary School. He was already driving, so he activated the
emergency lights on his GOV and responded to the school. He parked and ran to the school with
two other BPAs, arriving between approximately 11:45:00 AM and 12:00:00 PM. They were
advised it was a hostage situation and a hostage negotiator was responding. He then entered the
school through the west entrance and assisted with evacuating a female teacher and escorted her
out of the school.
Outside the school, he assisted with breaking exterior windows to Classroom 105 or 106 to
evacuate everyone, then went to the south entrance of the school, where he was informed a
TXDPS helicopter was flying too low. He used his handheld radio to request the TXDPS air unit
to fly higher. He went outside the west building and broke the exterior windows on the east side
of the building to evacuate everyone from that classroom. As he reentered the school through
the south entrance, he heard gunshots as law enforcement officers breached the classroom. After
the breach, he entered Classroom 111, and after a short time, everyone but EMTs was told to
leave. He exited through the south entrance and met with other BPAs at a tree in front of the
school, where everyone was instructed to report to UVA. He remained at UVA for 30–45
minutes before being released for the day.
BPA stated he did not feel anyone had command and control of the incident. He stated
there was no rally point or command post, and there was an open mic that disrupted radio
communications.
SBPA (UVA), interviewed on March 15, 2023. (Exhibit 183)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was conducting use of force training at UVA when he
received a phone call that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. He went to
the armory and began handing out M4 rifles, magazines, and vehicle keys to the agents who were
in the training. He drove to the school with another BPA, dropped off the BPA, then parked near
the cafeteria on the east side of the school at approximately 11:50:00 AM. He jumped the fence
because the gate was locked and asked a UCISDPD officer what was going on, but the officer
said he didn’t know.
SBPA walked between the two southern-most classroom buildings and moved west at
the end of the Classroom 18 building, making sure the classroom doors were locked and the
students were safe. He did not know where the assailant was located. SBPA entered
the cafeteria and told the workers there to go to the kitchen until he returned. He observed a
teacher and students hiding behind the auditorium curtain and told them to stay there. He
returned to the cafeteria and evacuated the workers, children, and teachers east toward Old
Carrizo Road, then went outside to the northern two classroom buildings and attempted to clear
Classrooms 7–12 but they were already empty. He went to the building containing Classrooms
1–6 and stood at the southwest corner of Classroom 6 to provide security while TXDPS troopers
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cleared the classrooms. He then went south and entered the east door of the school and took up a
position at the T-intersection facing south.
After he heard the breaching gunfire, he assisted with carrying deceased children into
Classrooms 131 and 132. He escorted a boy outside the west door and directed him to medical
personnel on the sidewalk. SBPA assisted with carrying deceased children and then
exited the building upon an announcement from a Texas Ranger that the building was a crime
scene.
SBPA met with other USBP personnel at a large tree at the north end of the school. He
returned to his vehicle, where he swapped vehicles with (A)PAIC
’s vehicle was blocked by other vehicles. SBPA
again. Upon hearing of a possible second threat, SBPA

-
d
because (A)PAIC
(A)PAIC ’s
vehicle to the Civic Center, stayed there for about an hour, then swapped vehicles with (A)PAIC
stayed at the Civic
Center and instructed the people outside to move inside for safety. He then returned to UVA.
SBPA believed UCISDPD Chief Arredondo was the overall incident commander and
thought he was possibly negotiating with the assailant. SBPA believed USBP was
going to secure the perimeter around the school and assist local law enforcement officers.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned as a Vehicle Maintenance Officer at UVA and was
completing his duties in the GOV parking lot when he saw BPAs running toward vehicles. One
of the BPAs informed him there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. BPA
volunteered to accompany SBPA and returned to the office to get his vest, extra
magazines, and handheld radio before departing UVA with SBPA . They arrived at the
back side of the school near the playground at approximately 11:50:00 AM as the third unit to
arrive on scene. BPA told parents approaching from surrounding homes to stay back,
then learned the threat was on the other side of the school. The other BPAs went to that side
while BPA stayed on the south side of the school, followed the sidewalk to the southwest
corner of Classroom 23, and took cover.
BPA helped get the attention of a teacher in Classroom 23 by giving his USBP ballcap to
another BPA to wave in the window to identify themselves. When the teacher opened the door,
the BPAs directed the children to the playground and evacuated Classrooms 19–23. It took some
extra time to convince some children who had locked themselves in interior restrooms to come
out. BPA then held his position and listened to the patched radio communications until
he heard an announcement about the breach over the radio and gunfire.
Following the breach of Classrooms 111 and 112, BPA entered the building from the
south entrance to see how he could assist. He had difficulty walking because there was so much
blood in the hallway it caused him to slip and slide. By the time he made it to the classrooms,
many of the victims had already been brought out. Seeing BPAs emotionally distraught, he
began to focus on consoling them until he was ordered to meet at a tree near the front of the
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school. Following this meeting, he was told to muster at UVA. After the muster, he went to his
office with other BPAs and listened for updates, then departed UVA with other BPAs in his
carpool group.
Before the breach, BPA kept thinking about what was taking so long. He stated that
whichever agency is first on scene is in charge and his role was to provide backup. He explained
that USBP’s role would have been to take down the active shooter, but they did not because they
were not the first on scene. He believed the local law enforcement officers were first on scene
and were therefore in command and control. BPA observed a shift in command when
BORTAC arrived. He believed USBP’s authority to respond was related to the oath and a
responsibility to help whoever needs help.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to the evening shift but went early to work on
paperwork. He was working near the station dispatch room and overheard a radio transmission
in which someone stated shots were fired. He went into the dispatch room to gather information,
then went to the station armory, checked out a rifle, and drove to Robb Elementary School with
another BPA, arriving at approximately 11:50:00 AM. As they approached the school, they
witnessed numerous law enforcement agencies, including TXDPS, UPD, and UCSO. BPA
entered the school via the west entrance and noticed no one seemed to be in charge of
the situation. An unknown law enforcement officer told BPA that all the classrooms
were locked, and keys were needed. BPA checked the doors to Classrooms 131 and
132 and verified they were locked.
While waiting for keys to arrive, BPA assisted several BPAs with evacuating children
from Classrooms 102–106. At some point near the times the classrooms were being evacuated,
BPA recalled hearing four gunshots. Following the gunshots, he moved to the east
side of the building to evacuate Classrooms 108–110. After the classrooms were empty, he
waited near the south entrance of the building until he heard multiple gunshots. He entered the
school through the south entrance, proceeded to Classroom 111, saw the deceased assailant, and
was instructed to leave because it was a crime scene. He exited through the west entrance and
provided security in the field next to the school to establish a helicopter landing zone. He
attended a muster near the front of the school, where all BPAs were instructed to report back to
UVA. BPA stated the scene at the school when he arrived was quiet and no one
appeared to be in charge.
BPA (DRT), interviewed on March 8, 2023. (Exhibit 150)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was on duty near an area called 19-Mile Crossing when he
heard over the radio, “active shooter, Robb Elementary.” He drove to Robb Elementary School
and parked in front of the funeral home at approximately 11:50:00 AM, then went to the west
door of the west building, near Classroom 132. While there, he observed that the gate through
which he had entered was the only unlocked gate, so he decided to open the vehicle gate on the
north side of the school for first responders. He discovered it was locked and he was
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unsuccessful in breaking it open. Someone produced bolt cutters and he then opened the gate.
He went back toward the west hallway, gaining access through a pedestrian gate with the keys he
had been given (which did not work on the vehicle gate) and returned to the west building.
There, he assisted with the evacuation of students and faculty through the windows of
Classrooms 102–106. He took a student with blood on their clothes to an ambulance, then
returned to the west hallway and gathered medical supplies and brought them to the triage area.
He began staging ambulances along Geraldine Street and provided the keys he had to SBPA
, although they were not the correct master key.
After the breach, BPA gathered with other BPAs near a tree on the north side of the
school, where they were instructed to return to UVA. He returned to UVA and provided Peer
Support to other BPAs, then returned home.
Upon receiving the initial call, BPA assumed the incident was a failure to yield that
caused the school to go into lockdown. He assumed UCSO Chief Deputy was in
command of the scene based on him wearing a dress shirt and tie and walking around talking on
a cell phone and radio. BPA stated that the hallway was chaos, but BORSTAR and
BPA EMTs took charge of the triage area.
BPA (UVA), interviewed on February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 57)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was in training at the Uvalde Border Patrol Station. During a break
in training, he heard the UPD request assistance over the radio. BPA checked out a rifle
from the UVA armory and drove to Robb Elementary School with BPA (UVA).
They parked on the northeast side on Geraldine Street, approximately 50–60 yards from the
school and approached the school from the north at approximately 11:50:00 AM. As BPA
came around to the west side of the building, he observed law enforcement officers helping
children out of the classroom windows. BPA noticed there was no information being
provided to law enforcement officers regarding the assailant, so he provided cover for the
evacuation of the children. Afterward, BPA went to the southeast corner of the school and
remained there to cover the perimeter. At one point during the incident, BPA assisted an
injured teacher to an area where children were running.
OPR re-interviewed BPA on March 23, 2023, after learning that he had entered Robb
Elementary School. BPA entered the school through the south entrance after law
enforcement officers confronted and killed the assailant. He entered a dark classroom and
assisted another BPA with carrying a child victim to the medical triage area, then rendezvoused
with other agents at a tree and received instruction to report to UVA for a debrief. BPA
indicated he knew he was responding to a shooter at a school when he first learned of the
incident but was unaware there were children in the classroom with the assailant until after he
entered the classroom following the assailant’s final confrontation with law enforcement.
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BPA inquired about clearing the classrooms, but no one answered. After SBPA
arrived, the law enforcement officers in the hall discussed using gas. Then a report of a
911 call came through about a girl inside the classroom stating there were multiple injuries and
deceased children inside the classroom. At around the same time, they suddenly heard three or
four shots. As the law enforcement officers moved toward the classroom, someone from the rear
called out and stopped them. The law enforcement officers formed two lines and BPA
told SBPA he heard they needed keys to open the doors. An unknown law
enforcement officer brought keys that didn’t work, so BPA hung them on a doorknob.
When they finally opened the door, BPA lined up second in the line of law
enforcement officers that planned to enter Classroom 111. Upon hearing shots, he dropped to
the ground with his rifle. Following the breach, BPA entered Classroom 111 but was
overcome with emotion and exited the building. Afterward, he met with USBP personnel under
a tree and was told to go back to UVA.
Initially, BPA thought the incident was probably related to a bailout and would be
quickly resolved. While running toward the school, he realized it was not related to a bailout.
BPA informed him it was a barricaded subject situation. BPA believed
Constable Field had command and control inside the school. While in the school, BPA
did not know about the large presence of law enforcement officers outside the school.
He stated it was hard to get information from the local law enforcement officers but was
confident in SBPA ’s ability to take over when SBPA arrived. BPA
observed that some information could not get through the radio because of a “hot
mic.” He understood USBP fell into a support role because they were not the first agency to
arrive at Robb Elementary School.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was at UVA assigned to local patrol when radio traffic
indicated that other law enforcement agencies were driving through town with their emergency
lights and sirens activated. Radio traffic also indicated there was an active shooter at Robb
Elementary School. BPA began making his way toward the center of Uvalde. While
enroute, he received the address of the school via radio. He parked his GOV on the side of the
road near the cafeteria at approximately 12:00:00 PM and approached the school on foot using
other vehicles as cover. He asked a TXDPS trooper what was going on and the trooper stated
she had also just arrived and was waiting for additional information. A law enforcement officer
near Classroom 13 waved and beckoned BPA and provided information about shots
fired at the school.
BPA remained in the vicinity of Classroom 13 until two Sheriff’s deputies arrived,
then went with them to the southwest corner of Classroom 18. He opened the unlocked door to
Classroom 18 and instructed the students and teacher to remain in the classroom. He informed
the Sheriff’s deputies there were people inside the classroom and provided a quick brief to two
USBP SOD agents and other law enforcement officers as they arrived. BPA said the
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classrooms needed to be evacuated, and he provided cover near the west building until after the
breach.
After the breach, he was tasked with finding a blanket to cover a deceased child, then went inside
the building and walked to Classrooms 111 and 112 before someone shouted for everyone who
was not working on someone to get out of the building. He exited via the south entrance and
went to the adjacent open field and set up a perimeter large enough to land two to three
helicopters. He received instructions to meet at a tree in front of the school, where the BPAs
were instructed to meet at UVA for a debrief and accountability.
While enroute to UVA, he heard about the need for buses to evacuate people. He stopped and
spoke with a bus driver and escorted the bus driver to the funeral home adjacent to Robb
Elementary School, where police officers told him to leave the area as he no longer needed to be
there. He went to UVA, attended the debrief, returned his GOV keys, and was released for the
day. He heard a request for assistance at schools regarding as second threat, so he followed
USBP units in his POV and reported to the Uvalde Dual Language Academy, where he assisted
with the release of students to their parents. Then he drove home and continued listening to the
service radio in case additional assistance was needed.
BPA stated that he never heard anything about a plan of action, and no one appeared to
be in charge on the south side entrance of the west building. He observed a lot of people
standing around waiting for something and believed the overall agency in command was the
Uvalde Police Department, even after other agencies arrived. BPA observed BPAs on
their own actively looking for work and attempting to find ways to help. He believed USBP’s
role was to eliminate the threat of harm to others due to the active shooter and provide support.
He stated he had a responsibility to protect the public once an oath was sworn.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was at UVA on day shift and transport duties when he heard
over the UVA radio there was a possible active shooter at Robb Elementary School. He drove to
Robb Elementary School using emergency lights and sirens and parked near the Hillcrest
Memorial Funeral Home at approximately 12:10:00 PM. He put on his ballistic vest and walked
toward the school. As he neared the school, he told a male in a group of civilians that law
enforcement would take care of the situation and that the civilian should not enter the school.
BPA entered through the west entrance and told a UPD officer he was there to assist in
-
any manner and would go with them if they decided to enter the classroom. The UPD officer
told BPA a BORTAC team would arrive within 30 minutes. Hearing gunfire at
12:21:00 PM, BPA recalled seeing a group of law enforcement officers line up and
move down the hallway toward Classrooms 111 and 112, but they did not go in. He was not sure
why the line of officers stopped. Following the gunfire, BPA received a set of keys
from an unknown individual and used them to open Classrooms 131 and 132, then gave the keys
to another officer, who left with them via the west entrance. BPA stated he saw several
members of BORTAC arrive at the school and eventually enter Classroom 111.
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After the breach, BPA removed children from under desks and passed them to other
BPAs in the room. He assisted with providing medical aid at the T-intersection by getting
medical supplies for BPA . BPA gathered with other BPAs by a tree in
front of the school and was instructed to report to UVA. At UVA, he received a clean uniform
because his was covered in blood.
BPA stated the scene at the school was chaotic and no one was in charge. He was not
aware of any children being in any of the school classrooms and thought the assailant killed
himself upon hearing three shots fired from the classroom around 12:21:00 PM. He observed
that once BORTAC arrived, they appeared to be in charge of the scene.
SBPA (UVA), interviewed on March 7, 2023. (Exhibit 143)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA heard radio transmissions regarding a shooting at Robb Elementary
School from BPA-I . SBPA retrieved a rifle from the UVA armory and drove a
GOV to Robb Elementary School, arriving at approximately 12:15:00 PM. As he was running
toward the school, another law enforcement officer told him there was a guy pinned in a room
and they were negotiating with him. SBPA entered the school through the south door
between Classrooms 102 and 108 and helped evacuate students. He exited through the south
door and went to the grassy area on the east side of the classrooms to make sure no one was there
to prevent a crossfire situation during the breach.
Following the breach, he reentered the school after BPA exited. SBPA went toward
Classrooms 111 and 112 and helped move three deceased children into Classroom 132. He
exited through the east side door and helped other law enforcement officers clear the library, then
attended the muster near the tree at the school. He went to UVA and attended the muster there
and helped compile a list of all USBP personnel from UVA who were at Robb Elementary
School. He left UVA to go home around 8:00:00 PM.
Upon his initial notification about the incident, SBPA thought it was only a threat of a
shooting, not an actual shooter. Upon arriving at the school, he believed it was a barricaded
subject because there were no gunshots and no information about children in classrooms. He did
not know who was in charge or in command when he first arrived. After entering the south end
of the school, he believed UCISDPD Chief Arredondo was in command because UCISDPD
Chief Arredondo was giving directions to fellow law enforcement officers in the south end of the
hallway. SBPA stated USBP’s role would be as support if an incident did not have anything
to do with drugs or immigration, and he believed USBP would have an obligation to respond
because it was a shooting.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was off duty in Uvalde. While on his way home from working
out at an Uvalde area track, he saw a TXDPS vehicle with lights and sirens driving fast through
town. He followed the TXDPS vehicle, saw a vehicle in a ditch near Robb Elementary School,
assumed it was a traffic-related crash, and proceeded home. While enroute, , who is
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, received a call to come to work at the hospital immediately due to a

shooting.
At home, BPA gathered his duty belt, firearm, and ballistic vest, and self-deployed to the
scene of the accident, arriving at approximately 12:20:00 PM. He notified an SBPA at CAR that
he was on scene at the school, then proceeded to the north side of the school where a police
officer informed him that there was a barricaded shooter. BPA received a call from WC
, who informed him that BORTAC was on scene and not to get involved. BPA saw
a TXDPS trooper checking Classrooms 15 and 16 and assisted the trooper in evacuating the
children and directing them to the east parking lot.
After the breach, BPA moved to the south side of the west building and entered
Classroom 112, where he picked up a girl who he then determined was deceased and placed her
back on the ground. He saw a boy sit up and did not observe any injuries on him, so he directed
the boy toward the officers down the hallway. He helped another officer carry a deceased girl
out of the classroom, then was requested to assist in clearing the rest of the building (Classrooms
108–110).
He exited through the south door and met with other USBP personnel at a tree on the north side
of the building, where they were instructed to report to UVA for a briefing. At UVA, he was
deployed to the hospital to provide security, but upon arrival he observed several other BPAs
already there. After recognizing there were enough personnel at the hospital, he was directed to
deploy to the Civic Center. After his time at the Civic Center, another BPA drove him back to
UVA to retrieve his vehicle, then he returned home.
BPA was unable to identify whether anyone was in command and control while he was at
Robb Elementary School. He stated USBP had a responsibility to respond and assist as needed.
SOS (UVA), interviewed on March 1, 2023. (Exhibit 110)
On May 24, 2022, SOS was driving to the USBP Uvalde checkpoint when he heard radio
traffic about a vehicle crash, which he assumed was related to a bailout. He received a call from
CBP OPR ASAC asking if the watch commander was on the ground. SOS called
the watch commander and learned there was a shooting at Robb Elementary School. He then
drove to UVA, grabbed a bag with magazines and ammunition, and headed to Robb Elementary
School. He parked on South Grove Street to avoid blocking the road for emergency vehicles and
proceeded toward the school on foot at approximately 12:25:00 PM. He ran toward the school,
where he briefly encountered (A)PAIC , but then turned his attention toward someone
who was escorting a woman and yelling for a medic.
SOS called for an EMT from the area where EMS were parked. He guided children
running away from the building toward the northwest corner of the school grounds and made his
way to the south side of the school building, where he interacted briefly with Constable Zamora.
He entered the building through the south door after hearing gunshots and made his way toward
Classrooms 111 and 112. After the breach, he directed two girls to the triage area and attempted
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to enter Classroom 112 to help pull children out but heard someone say only medics were
allowed in. He returned to the south entrance and received rifles from other BPAs who were
bringing out an injured child. All USBP personnel were directed to regroup on the north side of
the school, then everyone not actively engaged at the school was directed to report to UVA.
At UVA, SOS worked on logistical matters such as obtaining clean uniforms for agents.
He received a call about another possible shooter at the Uvalde High School, so he reported to
the high school and assisted with traffic and perimeter security for approximately one hour. He
then returned to UVA and went home.
SOS believed Constable Zamora was in charge of the south entrance of the school because
Constable Zamora was communicating directly with UCISDPD Chief Arredondo. SOS
believed UCISDPD Chief Arredondo had overarching command of the incident because he heard
UCISDPD Chief Arredondo attempting to communicate with the assailant. SOS believed
the situation was a barricaded subject because that is what Constable Zamora told him and
because Chief Arredondo was attempting to communicate with the assailant. SOS did not
believe anyone from USBP was in charge or in command at Robb Elementary School and stated
that USBP’s role was to provide support to local law enforcement agencies. He was not aware of
any legal authority to respond to an active shooter situation, but stated an agent responds when
assistance is needed, and that law enforcement backs each other up.
On May 24, 2022, a neighbor, who was a Texas Parks and Wildlife (TPWD) Game Warden,
arrived at BPA ’s house to request BPA ’s wife to watch the Game Warden’s
children while the warden responded to a shooting at Robb Elementary School. The warden
requested BPA respond with him. BPA drove to the school in his
unmarked USBP K9 truck, following the Game Warden, with lights and sirens activated. He
parked some distance away and ran toward the school, arriving at approximately 12:30:00 PM.
He observed people already lined up across from the school and a BPA directing traffic. The
TPWD Game Warden led him toward the school where other law enforcement personnel were
staged.
BPA assisted with breaking windows from outside of the west building and pulling
children from classrooms. He entered the building via the west entrance and joined the law
enforcement officers staged in the north end of the hallway. There was a lot of discussion, a
period of time of waiting around, more discussion, and then someone arrived with keys, but they
were the wrong ones. The correct keys arrived, but UCISDPD Chief Arredondo and TXDPS
Ranger wanted the group to wait. BPA heard two separate occasions of
gunshots from inside the classroom.
The group of law enforcement officers formed two teams with BPA on the north side
of the classroom doors. The other team entered the classroom and there was a “massive”
exchange of gunfire, upwards of 60–80 rounds. The team was instructed to wait to enter, then
there was a call for everyone to come into the classroom. BPA assisted a male teacher
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from the classroom to the triage area. He yelled at law enforcement officers who were standing
in the hallway in a state of shock and instructed them to assist. BPA assisted with
carrying a female teacher outside because the triage area in the hallway was full. He assisted
with carrying out a deceased child, then returned to the classroom and was informed everyone
had to leave the classroom, so he left.
Next, he was requested to assist with clearing adjacent classrooms and the rest of the building.
When the remaining classrooms were clear, he exited the building and was requested to secure
the south entrance but was relieved from that after less than a minute. BPA assisted
with comforting a TPWD Game Warden and confirmed that they were both part of the group of
law enforcement officers who entered the classrooms. Then BPA was instructed to
report to the front of the school where there was a debrief and the BPAs were instructed to meet
at UVA. He met with two BPAs and the Game Warden to make sure they were okay before
departing. BPA went home to change clothes, then reported to UVA, then went home
again. He received a call from a Game Warden that there was a threat of another shooter and
offered to respond.
BPA was informed multiple times that the situation was that of a barricaded shooter.
He believed USCISDPD Chief Arredondo was in command and control with assistance from
TXDPS Ranger . BPA did not see anything like a traditional incident
command set up. He believed USBP had authority and a duty to respond to preserve life and
prevent immediate loss of life.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was working at the conducting maintenance on
cameras when a call came over the radio requesting all available agents to respond to Robb
Elementary School for shots fired. BPA departed the ranch and headed toward Uvalde in
his GOV. He parked on the west side of the school at approximately 12:30:00 PM, near a truck
that was in a concrete ditch, put on his body armor, and asked another BPA what was going on.
He approached the school, where UPD Officer told him they needed to keep people
back because ambulances were headed to the school.
BPA turned and directed the crowd to stay back and make a path for ambulances. He
observed BORTAC arrive on scene and a short time later, people began coming out of the school
carrying injured children. BPA ran over and asked how he could help. He entered the
school, but realized he was in the way and exited. He handed out bottles of water to BPAs and
other law enforcement officers. The BPAs then backed off from the scene and rallied around a
tree, where they received instruction to report to UVA for further debriefing. BPA returned
to UVA and observed agents with blood on their uniforms. A call came over the radio that there
was a threat made against Uvalde High School, but BPA had already turned in his GOV, so
he prepared to travel home in a commuter van with other BPAs. BPA did not know who
had command of the scene at Robb Elementary School.
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-
BPA when he received a text from
was on duty in a GOV working as a ranch liaison with another
asking if he had heard anything about a shooting at
Robb Elementary School. Initially he believed the incident was a failure to yield. The BPAs
returned to BRA to determine what had happened. There, SBPA
were needed at Robb Elementary School. BPA
said that EMTs
and the other BPA went to Robb
Elementary School. They parked near South Park Street and Geraldine Street and walked to the
funeral home across the street from the school, arriving at approximately 12:40:00 PM. There,
they were informed that law enforcement officers were about to enter the classroom.
BPA entered through the west side of the school and as he entered, he immediately heard
gunshots from the breach. He helped evacuate children and move deceased children to clear the
area for law enforcement officers to move around in the hallway. He walked down the hallway
to determine if was still in his classroom and was informed that everyone had to leave the
building because the area was a crime scene. He exited through the west entrance and began
conducting crowd and traffic control outside Robb Elementary School. He attended a muster of
all BPAs by the north end of the school, then took to Walgreens and took another student
home. BPA then drove to UVA before returning to BRA. He indicated he had a
responsibility to respond as part of his official duties.
BPA-I (DRT), interviewed on March 15, 2023. (Exhibit 194)
On May 24, 2022, BPA-I was assigned to the midnight shift at DRT. He woke up at
home to approximately 20 missed calls and texts from indicating there had been shots
-
fired at Robb Elementary School. He turned on his service radio and government cell phone and
sent a text from his personal cell phone to SBPA inquiring about the situation and
offering assistance. SBPA responded that BPA-I could report to the Civic
Center to assist. BPA-I decided to respond to Robb Elementary School. He put on his
government-issued body armor and responded in his personal vehicle. He heard a radio report of
a 911 call coming from inside a classroom. He arrived near the school at approximately
12:50:00 PM and proceeded on foot to the funeral home and attempted to assist where he could.
A few minutes later, he observed law enforcement officers flooding out of the west hallway of
the school with victims, so he proceeded there to provide assistance. He entered the west
hallway and went to help an agent in the triage area, but another medic arrived so he went to
assist other law enforcement officers in clearing the rest of the building. He was instructed to
exit the building after it had been declared a crime scene, so he exited and went to the large tree
on the north side of the school where all BPAs were instructed to meet. There, they were
instructed to report to UVA.
After arriving at UVA, BPA-I heard a report of a possible threat at another school in the
area, so he responded to Dalton Elementary School where was a student. He assisted in
providing security there until 6:00:00 PM, then retrieved and went home. BPA-I
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stated the radio traffic was chaos and he was unable to determine who, if anyone, was in
command of the incident. He stated it was his responsibility as a federal agent to respond.
CBP PERSONNEL ON PERIMETER OF ROBB ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PRIOR TO
BREACH
Other CBP personnel arrived at Robb Elementary School prior to 12:50:00 PM but remained
outside the west building. The following is a summary of the interviews provided by these
employees:
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to the Uvalde checkpoint and heard over the radio
that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. He and his partner immediately
grabbed their equipment and headed to their vehicles. BPA called SBPA
from his vehicle and informed him that he should probably have his tactical unit respond to the
school. BPA drove to the school and parked near the cafeteria building at approximately
11:50:00 AM. He asked a civilian in the area if they could find bolt cutters to get through the
locked gate at the entrance to the school. The civilian returned with bolt cutters and BPA
used them to gain access to the school through the gate.
He went to the southwest corridor of the building with Classrooms 19–23, where he received a
call informing him to relocate because the assailant was believed to be in a classroom with
windows facing his location. He relocated to Classroom 23 and held up a USBP hat at the
classroom window so the students and teachers would know he was law enforcement and open
the locked doors. He evacuated students from Classrooms 19–23 and directed them out through
the gate where he had entered. After law enforcement officers began exiting the south hallway
of the building where the assailant was located, he covered a deceased child with a blanket. A
BORSTAR agent asked him to take the BORSTAR agent’s M4 rifle so the BORSTAR agent
could assist with medical aid. BPA returned the rifle to other SOD members during the
muster near the tree prior to departing the school for UVA.
BPA stated the response was a mess with a lack of coordination. He did not know who,
if anyone, was in command and did not hear any radio traffic indicating who was in command.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was off duty at when he received text messages
from , who was at Robb Elementary School. BPA left the barber
shop with the barber, who provided BPA with a personally owned shotgun. They
parked in an alley off Geraldine Street at approximately 11:50:00 AM and ran toward the school.
He did not have any assigned work gear or a radio but found a USBP plate carrier with plates on
the ground, put the plates in the vest, and put on the vest. He walked toward the west entrance of
the school, where he encountered the owner of the vest, so he removed it. He received a text
message from that she was out of the school, so he began to search for . He
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encountered two UPD officers and cleared Classrooms 19–23 with them, finding in
Classroom 21. He began clearing Classrooms 13–18 and guided children and teachers toward
the sidewalk. He asked another BPA for a ride to his vehicle, then walked to the funeral home to
see if anyone needed assistance. He drove the barber to the Civic Center to look for the barber’s
son, then went back to Robb Elementary School.
BPA stated he did not know who was in command or control. He took direction from
UPD officers in helping to clear classrooms. He was not sure of USBP’s authority, but stated
BPAs always respond to these types of events.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to the USBP Uvalde Checkpoint and heard BPA-I
relay via the service radio that UPD was responding to an individual with a gun near
Robb Elementary School. BPA self-deployed to Robb Elementary School from the
checkpoint, along with other BPAs, arriving at approximately 11:50:00 AM. He took pictures of
a truck in a culvert with a rifle and duffle bag nearby, then stayed with the truck to secure that
scene.
He received information from a civilian on the appearance of the assailant and relayed the
information via radio. He requested a detective to his location, but no one responded, so he
obtained the civilian’s information and provided it to TXDPS Rangers. BPA remained
with the abandoned vehicle for the duration of the incident and fielded questions from civilians
until TXDPS relieved him. Once relieved, he received instruction to go to UVA.
While at UVA, he heard of a possible second threat at Uvalde High School. He informed other
BPAs of the second threat, then self-deployed to that area. He assisted with setting up a
perimeter at the middle school area and instructed parents to stay back until the school district
figured out how to release all the children. He cleared the entire area due to a report of a
suspicious subject near the soccer field, then returned to the middle school and focused on
evacuating children and reuniting them with their families.
BPA assumed USBP would be on scene in a support role to help UPD with perimeter
security. He assumed UPD would be in charge because it was within the city limits of Uvalde.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was eating lunch when he heard “shots fired” over his radio. He
left the café and went to his GOV, where he heard, “shots fired, all agents respond to Robb
Elementary School.” He responded, arrived, and parked at approximately 11:50:00 AM. By
that time, the school was already surrounded by law enforcement officers and there was no
guidance on the radio about where to go. Sheriff Nolasco asked him to help with crowd control.
BPA assisted with clearing the street and moving parents back toward the funeral home.
He began clearing Classrooms 19–23 with other BPAs, then remained at the corner of Classroom
23 to provide security. After hearing radio transmissions regarding the breach and that the
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assailant was down, he ran to the south entrance of the school to offer aid. He offered emotional
support to law enforcement officers coming out of the school, then went to the tree at the north
end of the school to meet with other BPAs, where he was ordered to return to UVA.
BPA was not aware of any CBP leadership guidance while on the scene. He stated that
radio transmissions were confusing, flooded with traffic, and there was a “hot mic” situation.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to use of force training at UVA and was on break
from training when he heard over the radio about an incident unfolding at Robb Elementary
School involving the words “active shooter.” BPA received a rifle and plates from SBPA
, who instructed him and other BPAs to go to the school to assist. BPA rode as a
passenger with other BPAs to Robb Elementary School, where they arrived at approximately
11:50:00 AM. They parked a block away from the school and he spoke to a Sheriff’s deputy to
gather information. BPA stayed near BPA because BPA didn’t have a radio.
He verbally reassured parents that law enforcement was going to take care of the situation and
joined a TXDPS trooper in directing children away from the west side of the school. He was
then directed to come closer to the school to provide cover for student evacuations.
After that evacuation was complete, he transitioned to the southeast corner of the building near
Classroom 109 and assisted with evacuating children and an adult through the window of
Classroom 109. BPA and another agent were instructed to watch the windows on the east
side of the building. They heard about a breach attempt over the radio, then heard the assailant
was down. He attempted to enter the school to assist with the medical response, but someone
didn’t allow him, saying there were enough people. He agreed, so he went to help elsewhere.
He assisted with guiding an ambulance, then moved to console an unknown BPA. He gathered
with other BPAs at a tree on the north side of the building, where they were instructed to go to
UVA for a debriefing. He walked back to his vehicle alone and waited for BPA , then they
drove to UVA. He returned the plates and rifles to the armory and heard talk of an accomplice or
second shooter that didn’t sound credible, then went home.
BPA did not feel that anyone was in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School or
that anyone was in control of communications. He did not know who was in charge of the
medical response, although he noticed a lot of BPAs providing medical assistance. He felt he
should help as a law enforcement officer.
Retired AIA (AMO Del Rio), interviewed on August 2, 2023. (Exhibit 226)
On May 24, 2022, AIA was working the day shift, flying a CBP helicopter alone in Eagle
Pass, Texas, near in support of BORTAC agents apprehending a group of suspected
migrants, when he received a call over the DRT radio regarding a possible shooting in Uvalde.
Dispatch directed him over the radio to immediately fly toward Uvalde. He communicated to the
BORTAC agents that he was departing, not aware of the details and scope of the situation when
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he departed. AIA flew on scene at Robb Elementary School for approximately 20 minutes
beginning at approximately 12:00:00 PM. He communicated the location of the assailant to the
TXDPS helicopter, then yielded the scene to TXDPS and took the AMO helicopter to the CBP
Air Branch at the Uvalde airport. He remained there for a few hours awaiting instruction before
returning to Del Rio.
AIA understood that state and local law enforcements on scene should have had command
and control over the incident at Robb Elementary School and that CBP’s role was to provide
them with assistance, backup, and resources. He stated that he responded because it was a
violent felony in progress.
WC (UVA), interviewed on March 1, 2023. (Exhibit 111)
On May 24, 2022, WC was the day shift administrative watch commander at UVA
when he heard BPAs come on the radio and ask the operations center at UVA if anything was
going on due to a heavy police response in town. Several minutes later, an unknown agent
broadcast on the radio that there was a shooter at Robb Elementary School and that local police
requested USBP assistance for security and crowd control. WC gathered his
equipment while deciding who was going to stay back at the station. He asked SBPA to
contact BORTAC and make sure they were aware and responding. He went to the armory to get
a long gun and found that all M4 rifles and magazines were already issued, so he got a 12-gauge
shotgun with 00 buckshot rounds. He gathered equipment and water and rode in WC ’s
GOV while attempting to make phone calls and notifications of the situation.
WCs and parked two blocks from the school and walked toward the funeral
home, arriving at the funeral home at approximately 12:00:00 PM. From there, they proceeded
toward the west door of the west wing of the school. WC ordered a couple of BPAs
in the area to go with UPD Officer to assist with crowd control at the funeral home,
then moved to the front of the school and attempted to break the lock on a gate to facilitate the
evacuation of children until someone showed up and unlocked the gate. He moved to a
breezeway to provide cover and direct children as they exited, but then was informed they were
no longer going to evacuate the children. He proceeded to the east doorway of the west building,
where he was waved back. He then moved toward the north side of the building where law
enforcement officers were arriving with tactical gear. He asked SBPA if BORTAC on
scene should be put on the Evolving Situation Report and SBPA said yes.
WC spent time telling people where others were located and answering a variety of
questions. He received a call from DPAIC . During the call, at approximately 12:50:00
PM, he heard shots fired from within the school, so he hung up and made his way to the west
door. He approached BPA , who was injured, to check on him, then walked BPA
to Geraldine Street, where he requested SBPA take BPA to the
hospital. WC gathered water and walked back to a tree with other USBP personnel,
where everyone was asked to return to UVA by 2:00:00 PM. He took over answering incoming
calls at UVA from (A)PAIC when (A)PAIC left.
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From UVA, WC responded to Flores Elementary School after hearing of a threat at

other schools. He understood the subject at Robb Elementary School was barricaded, isolated,
and contained inside the school. He never thought it to be an active shooter based on what he
observed and was told upon arrival. He believed the Uvalde County Sheriff’s Office was
overseeing the scene and observed that communication was very hard at the scene due to patched
radio frequencies and difficulty hearing who was talking. WC understood state and
local police were working the situation because UVA did not have any of the equipment he saw.
He believed USBP personnel knew that USBP did not have any statutory authority to respond
and that they were there in a backup capacity. WC stated that anything USBP was
doing was at the direction of the local police department because it was USBP’s responsibility to
respond and assist.
WC (UVA), interviewed on March 2, 2023. (Exhibit 118)
On May 24, 2022, WC was working the day shift at UVA, performing administrative
duties, when he heard a BPA ask over the radio if something was going on because TXDPS was
running lights and sirens through the Uvalde area. No one responded, and approximately 10
minutes later, the same BPA transmitted there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary. WC
spoke to WC , and they decided to respond to the school. WC went to the
UVA armory to get their assigned M4 rifles but discovered there were no M4 magazines
available. He checked out two shotguns instead. They traveled together in WC ’s assigned
GOV and parked several blocks away from the school due to heavy traffic in the immediate
vicinity. Based on the number of local law enforcement officers on scene at the time of his
arrival at approximately 12:00:00 PM, he assumed the situation was under control.
WC tasked SBPA to create an Evolving Situation Report and provide information
to USBP DRT. WC encountered (A)PAIC several times but they did not stay
together very long. WC assisted BPA , who was wounded, and passed BPA
off to BPA , instructing BPA to take BPA to the hospital. WC
met with all BPAs, then received information about a threat to other schools via social
media. He left the school with WC and went to Flores Elementary School to provide
security until approximately 7:00:00 PM, then returned to UVA and went home.
WC believed TXDPS and the Uvalde Police Department were in charge of the incident.
He was unaware of the location of the assailant or how many victims were in the school and was
under the impression that the assailant was barricaded in a classroom or a closet by himself
somewhere in the building that contained Classrooms 111 and 112. Based on the number of
local law enforcement officers on scene when he arrived, WC initially assumed the
situation was well in hand. He did not believe any member of USBP was in command of the
incident and did not see or become aware of the presence of a command post on scene. He
observed inaccurate information was transmitted over the radio throughout the incident, which
caused confusion, and was aware of law enforcement officers requesting perimeter security from
the BPAs on scene. WC stated BPAs have a responsibility to respond to shooter incidents
and it is common practice to assist local law enforcement officers.
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On May 24, 2022, BPA was scheduled to conduct use of force training when it was
broadcast over the UVA intercom that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School
and for BPAs to grab their gear and respond. He grabbed his ballistic vest and M4 rifle and
responded to the school in a GOV, arriving between approximately 12:00:00 PM and 12:10:00
PM. He parked a few blocks away because the path to the school was blocked by numerous law
enforcement vehicles. He proceeded to the school on foot, taking cover behind a telephone pole
north of Classroom 129. He moved to the east side of the school, cleared two restrooms, and
ended up near the cafeteria. He provided cover while other BPAs cleared and evacuated students
from Classrooms 13–18 and 31–34. He returned to the north side of the school after hearing
“shooter down” and instructed a TXDPS EMT to assist BPA , who was wounded.
BPA gathered with other BPAs near a tree on the north side of the school, then returned to
UVA, worked out for an hour to relieve stress, then went home. BPA could not identify
who, if anyone, was in command of the incident. A UCISDPD officer told BPA that the
UCISDPD police chief was inside the school with the assailant, which BPA understood to
mean in the same room at the assailant. BPA was under the impression that the incident
was an active shooter situation, and he heard the door to the classrooms was locked and a key
was needed. He believed he had responsibility as a BPA to respond and assist.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was at UVA attending training. During a training break, he
heard radio communications concerning an active shooter and a request that available law
enforcement officers respond. BPA retrieved a rifle from the UVA armory, along with
other BPAs, and rode to Robb Elementary School with another BPA in a marked USBP vehicle
with emergency lights and sirens activated, arriving between approximately 12:00:00 PM and
-
12:10:00 PM. They parked approximately one block away and walked toward the northeast side
of the building where the shooting occurred. BPA positioned himself near the
classrooms east of that building and relayed information to WC . He evacuated children
from the classrooms east of the building where the assailant was located and evacuated children
from Classrooms 7–12. Periodically, he met with law enforcement officers outside the west
building to obtain situational updates while continuing to evacuate children.
He moved to the cafeteria, where staff did not want to evacuate, then he was instructed to go to
the funeral home to assist with loading children onto buses. He did not know where it was and
could not drive anywhere because the roads were blocked with vehicles, so he returned to Robb
Elementary School, where he encountered BPA and drove him to the hospital. BPA
took BPA ’s vehicle, firearms, and equipment back to UVA, then turned in his
own vehicle keys and returned home.
BPA believed the assailant was contained within the school library based on information
from a UPD officer. BPA did not know who was in charge of the law enforcement
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(A)PAIC called UVA to request water and that the supervisor begin working on the
Evolving Situation Report. Sheriff Nolasco requested assistance guiding parents to the funeral
home where the children were being evacuated. (A)PAIC and another BPA directed
parents and made and received phone calls with other USBP personnel to update them on the
situation.
After the classroom was breached, all law enforcement personnel at the funeral home ran to the
school. (A)PAIC attempted to console other BPAs who were visibly shaken up and
Center, where he was reunited with

perimeter security. (A)PAIC
and
•
encouraged them to remove themselves from the scene. (A)PAIC went to the Civic
He remained at the Civic Center to provide
believed Sheriff Nolasco was in charge because he was the
highest-ranking law enforcement officer in the county. The Sheriff said the assailant was held up
in a room, so (A)PAIC believed the situation was a barricaded subject. (A)PAIC
stated USBP’s role was to support other law enforcement agencies for the benefit of
public safety and rendering aid. He believed he had a duty to respond to a felony in progress.
SBPA (USBP Erie Station, Pennsylvania), interviewed on February 28, 2023.
(Exhibit 109)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was assigned to UVA when he heard a radio transmission on
his service radio asking for all available agents to respond to Robb Elementary School. He went
to the UVA armory and retrieved his assigned M4 rifle and keys to his assigned GOV, donned a
ballistic vest, loaded the rifle, and drove to Robb Elementary School, arriving before 12:15:00
PM. He blocked off the intersection of Old Carrizo Road and Cargile Street with his GOV and
set up security. He instructed a person who was filming the school to move and instructed a
person in a car to move. He asked the school security guard what was going on and the guard
told him about a possible school shooter near the school’s cafeteria. While providing security, he
shared the information he knew about the potential shooter with two other law enforcement
officers. He called WC (UVA) at 12:20:00 PM to seek instructions and was
directed to remain at his current location because there were plenty of law enforcement officers at
the front of the school. When an unknown BORTAC agent arrived at his location, SBPA
-
provided him with the information he had before the BORTAC agent was called to the front of
the school. Prior to the breach at 12:50:00 PM, EMS personnel arrived at SBPA ’s
position near Old Carrizo Road. Because of the still-active nature of the situation, SBPA
escorted them onto the school grounds by the cafeteria building and staged with the EMS
personnel near Classroom 18. SBPA told the EMS personnel not to enter the field of fire
from the exterior windows of Classrooms 111 and 112.
Following the breach of Classrooms 111 and 112, he attempted to enter the hallway near the
south entrance to assist, but someone yelled for non-EMS people to get out. He then began
helping to gather BPAs together at a rally point on campus. After gathering at the rally point, all
BPAs were instructed to return to UVA. SBPA drove BPA there. At UVA,
BPAs received information that the assailant’s girlfriend threatened to attack another school and
several BPAs left the station to respond to area schools. At approximately 3:15:00 PM, SBPA
was asked to go to the local hospital to deliver the workers compensation paperwork
Page 136 of 201

-
BPA-T assisted with clearing Classrooms 1–6 at Robb Elementary School and placed a
chair in each doorway to indicate it had been cleared. BPA-T departed for UVA and drove
BPA , who was not in a condition to drive himself, to BRA. BPA-T believed USBP’s
response was due to their status as first responders and law enforcement officers. He believed if
there was an active shooter, it was USBP’s responsibility to respond, assist, and stop the threat if
needed. He believed Texas Rangers had command and control of the perimeter area.
BPA (CAR), interviewed on February 28, 2023. (Exhibit 102)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was working at the CAR checkpoint when he received text
messages from notifying him that there was an active shooter at Robb
Elementary School in Uvalde. BPA ’s was in Classroom 110 at Robb
Elementary School and was taking toward the playground when heard gunshots.
BPA ’s was a at Robb Elementary School and
attended Uvalde-area schools, including Robb Elementary School.
BPA told a coworker about the active shooter and said he had to go. BPA
-
called the on-duty supervisor and advised him of the active shooter in Uvalde and asked if he
could take his GOV to the situation. WC said BPA should take his POV and go
in an off-duty status. BPA parked near Highway 83 and Old Carrizo Road at
-
approximately 12:30:00 PM and walked toward the school. He saw law enforcement officers
establishing a perimeter, then heard call his name. BPA did not join the law
enforcement officers on the perimeter because told him was with staff from
Robb Elementary School down the street.
He returned to his POV and went to pick up
BPA
with school staff and dropped off BPA

active shooter at other schools, BPA
. At his vehicle, BPA
(CAR), an off-duty BPA, who asked BPA
- saw
for a ride back to his
vehicle. At the intersection of South Park Street and West Cargile Street, BPA found
. After hearing rumors of another
went to other schools to pick his other two
-
children. Unable to pick up because their schools, Dalton Elementary School
and Morales Junior High School, were on lockdown, BPA went to the Civic Center and
decided to secure the back door while waiting for to arrive.
After his wife arrived at the Civic Center, BPA , and returned to
Dalton Elementary School and Morales Junior High School to pick up .
After getting , BPA dropped off at the Civic Center to
assist with students. BPA then took home.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was off-duty in Brackettville, Texas, when he
received a text message from the Uvalde School District notifying of an active shooter at Robb
Elementary School. He also heard people in the grocery store discussing that there was an active
shooter, and received a text from teacher. BPA drove toward the
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school and arrived at approximately 12:30:00 PM. There, he recognized another BPA and asked
him for information. The other BPA asked for BPA ’s assistance with traffic control at
the intersection of Geraldine Street and Evans Street.
After the breach and reports that the assailant was killed, BPA walked toward the Civic
Center. Along the way, another BPA recognized him and drove him there, where he was
reunited with . He received a text from , who attended the
high school, and had take him to the high school where he reunited with .
BPA ’s took him and home. He could not identify who was in
command and control at any time during the event. BPA stated that when an active
shooter incident occurs, BPAs are expected to respond with their firearms and body armor.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was on light duty assigned to the Sensor Program at UVA
when an agent called and informed him there was a shooting somewhere. BPA
decided to self-deploy to Robb Elementary School to take water to the agents who had
responded. He arrived via GOV at approximately 12:30:00 PM and was requested to assist with
crowd control and move people to make room for buses and ambulances in front of the funeral
home. He did that for approximately 10 minutes, then provided emotional support as law
enforcement officers began exiting the building. After agents were informed there was a possible
second shooter, he deployed to the Uvalde Dual Language Academy and performed crowd
control.
BPA stated there was no sense of command present at Robb Elementary School. He
received commands from only the Sheriff’s department regarding crowd control. He believed
his authority to respond came from being a law enforcement officer and first responder.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was driving to UVA in a GOV and heard “shooter” and
“school” over his radio. He then began driving toward Uvalde High School because he did not
know which school was involved. He called UVA and was informed it was Robb Elementary
School, so he decided to respond there and offer assistance. Upon arriving at the school at
approximately 12:30:00 PM, BPA decided to assist with the evacuation of children
from the school. He observed that no one knew what was going on and there was a “hot mic”
situation on the radio. When EMTs arrived at his location, he guided them to the south entrance
of the school, then went to his GOV to retrieve a first aid kit to help with what he described as
“controlled chaos.” He then met PAIC , who ordered him back to UVA. At UVA, he
heard there was a second shooter at another school, so he deployed to Dalton Elementary School
and conducted crowd control and vehicle checks. He checked pedestrians with backpacks for
weapons.
BPA described the scene at Robb Elementary School as full of first responders and
felt that most of the information being transmitted over the radio was unnecessary. He did not
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perceive any incident command. BPA believed that when USBP responds to these
types of incidents they are in a supporting role.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to canine training in Del Rio, Texas. After training
ended, he got lunch and heard of an active shooter at Robb Elementary School via service radio.
He self-deployed to Robb Elementary School in an unmarked USBP K9 truck with emergency
equipment activated. He arrived on scene at approximately 12:30:00 PM and met an unknown
BPA who did not know what was going on. BPA then spoke with a TXDPS trooper who
said to stay near the road because they were waiting for a SWAT unit.
BPA asked other USBP personnel where he could help and decided to stay on the
perimeter with them. Approximately 20–30 minutes later, he heard gunshots from the breach,
then saw people being evacuated. He saw BPA approached him, and asked if he was all
right, then checked BPA ’s head and noticed a gash. He told BPA he would take
him to the hospital. As they went to BPA ’s vehicle, a different BPA said he would take
BPA to the hospital, so BPA returned to his previous location, then saw other
USBP personnel gathering under a tree and joined them. Everyone was instructed to return to
UVA for a debrief, so he went there and heard of a possible second threat. He deployed to the
Uvalde Classical Academy to provide security during the release of children to their parents. He
then deployed to Flores Elementary School and provided security before returning to UVA and
going home.
BPA explained that USBP often assists state and local law enforcement agencies as first
responders. He did not know who was in charge at Robb Elementary School. He stated the
radio was chaotic because all law enforcement agencies were on one channel.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was coming back from lunch when he saw USBP vehicles with
emergency equipment activated leaving the station. He was instructed to load a couple cases of
water into his vehicle and head to Robb Elementary School. He proceeded there in a marked
USBP vehicle with three other BPAs, arriving between 12:00:00 PM and 12:30:00 PM. He
attempted to drive to the funeral home, but the roads were blocked. He dropped off the water,
then began helping to evacuate children into buses. Never entering the west building, he joined
local law enforcement in trying to prevent the public from advancing toward Robb Elementary
School and escorted children from the funeral home to buses that were taking the children to the
Civic Center. He stayed with a BPA nicknamed “ ,” who was crying and distraught, then
resumed helping with crowd control and handing water to first responders. He created a path for
the children to the buses, shielding the children from view of the nearby onlookers. Upon
learning of a secondary threat, he went to pick up from Morales Junior High School.
He believed USBP’s role was to support local law enforcement.
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BPA-I (DRT SIU), interviewed on March 10, 2023. (Exhibit 163)

On May 24, 2022, BPA-I was on duty in plain clothes at the DRT SIU office when
another BPA-I informed him of an incident at Robb Elementary School. Shortly afterward,
BPA-I ’s supervisor called him looking for BPA-I (DRT SIU). Assuming
BPA-I was already at Robb Elementary School, BPA-I traveled to the school
and called BPA-I several times with no success.
BPA-I parked his GOV a few blocks away from the school, observed a significant law
enforcement presence on scene, and walked to the funeral home across the street from the
school, arriving at approximately 12:30:00 PM. There, he assisted with a loose perimeter to
keep parents and civilians away from the school. He asked a local law enforcement officer how
he could assist, but the law enforcement officer did not know what to do.
BPA-I met with other BPAs near the west hallway and was instructed to return to UVA,
where they received information indicating there was another threat. BPA-I responded to
the Uvalde High School and stood perimeter for approximately two hours, then returned to DRT
to finish his regularly scheduled shift. He went home at 10:00:00 PM. BPA-I stated the
situation was initially described as a bailout where the subject ran into the school and became a
barricaded subject. BPA-I was never able to identify anyone in command or an
established command post. He believed he had a responsibility as a BPA to respond.
BPA-P (DRT), interviewed on February 9, 2023. (Exhibit 55)
On May 24, 2022, BPA-P was the Less-Lethal Coordinating Officer at DRT, conducting
observations of DRT’s firearms and less-lethal training programs at BRA. He crossed paths with
an unknown BPA who advised him that there had been an incident in Uvalde. BPA-P
was not directed to respond, but was with other SBPAs who decided to respond, and they
proceeded to Uvalde as fast as they could when there was no traffic. Upon his arrival at Robb
Elementary School at approximately 12:30:00 PM, BPA-P had to park several hundred
yards away on Geraldine Street because the streets were clogged with emergency vehicles that
were parked and blocking the way to the school.
BPA-P attempted to find the drivers of the law enforcement vehicles that were blocking
Geraldine Street to clear a path for EMS vehicles. To limit the vehicle congestion near the
school, BPA-P set up traffic control on Geraldine Street and Evans Street, along with a
UPD officer and a UCISDPD police officer. After working at the traffic control point on
Geraldine Street and Evans Street, BPA-P traveled with SBPA (DRT) to
Uvalde Memorial Hospital to assist with crowd control for a short time, then went to UVA to
provide Peer Support services for approximately five hours. Based on his observations of the
scene around Robb Elementary School, BPA-P described the incident as chaotic and felt
that the law enforcement officers in the area lacked a sense of urgency. He noticed no gunfire,
calls for help, or anyone providing directions via megaphone. BPA-P stated he believed
all law enforcement officers, including USBP agents, have an obligation to respond to incidents
such as the one at Robb Elementary School with reasonable and necessary force to protect life.
Page 141 of 201

Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) (OPR Del Rio), interviewed on

February 28, 2023. (Exhibit 104)
On May 24, 2022, ASAC
call from SA
- was teleworking at home in Uvalde when he received a phone
advising that BPAs were enroute to an Uvalde school to respond to
reports of a man with a firearm. ASAC called Sheriff Nolasco, who advised there was a
barricaded subject at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde and that BORTAC was responding.
ASAC dressed in CBP tan pants and black polo shirt, gathered his handgun, rifle, and
ballistic armor, and went to Robb Elementary School. He arrived at Robb Elementary School
between 12:30:00 PM and 12:35:00 PM, approximately 15–20 minutes before the classroom
was breached and the assailant was shot. He parked at a distance and walked toward the school
because the streets were blocked with law enforcement vehicles. He instructed drivers to move
out of the way to allow room for an ambulance. He went to the school entrance on the west side,
where he spoke to FBI Special Agent , who did not know anything about what was going
on. ASAC was not able to enter the west building at the school because it was so full of
other people. An unknown TXDPS CID SA operating a TXDPS drone reported that the assailant
escaped, so ASAC and others began to form a perimeter around the school. Then
someone announced the assailant was down.
ASAC attempted to locate the incident command post, then received information
concerning another threat. He sent OPR Special Agents to other Uvalde area schools to assist
with security and evacuations while he continued working at the funeral home, providing updates
to OPR headquarters, coordinating activity, and disseminating information. He remained at the
funeral home until early morning the next day and continued working in Uvalde for the next
several weeks gathering information and assisting Texas Rangers and other law enforcement
agencies. While working at the funeral home following the incident, ASAC learned that
UPD attempted to establish an incident command post at the funeral home at the onset of the
incident, but other law enforcement agencies responded directly to the school instead, so UPD’s
efforts were abandoned. Although he was immediately outside the west door of the west
building at approximately 12:30:00 PM, ASAC did not know who was in charge and did
not observe any senior law enforcement leaders giving orders to other first responders. ASAC
stated USBP had authority to respond to assist other law enforcement agencies.
AIA (AMO Del Rio), interviewed on June 1, 2023. (Exhibit 218)
On May 24, 2022, AIA was on day shift patrol in the Carrizo Springs area assisting
USBP with tracking a group of suspected migrants when he heard a dispatch operator state over
the service radio that there was a shootout near a school in Uvalde and assistance from agents
was needed. AIA landed the helicopter so AIA could board and refueled at
CAR before responding to Uvalde. His supervisor informed him to go to Del Rio to pick up
AEA , but AIA advised his supervisor it would take too long to fly to Del Rio,
and he was responding straight to Robb Elementary School.
AIA orbited Robb Elementary School beginning at approximately 12:40:00 PM at
approximately 300 feet while communicating with a TXDPS air unit to coordinate each aircraft’s
Page 142 of 201

then arrived in the air at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:40:00 PM and started an
orbit pattern.
AEA stated USBP’s role was to respond as a support agency, and he believed state
and local law enforcement would maintain command of a school shooting incident. He did not
observe any medical triage or command center for medical aid.
SBPA (UVA), interviewed on February 16, 2023. (Exhibit 84)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was working brush crew at a ranch when he heard an unclear
radio transmission to be on the lookout for “a guy carrying a gun.” Later, there was a report that
someone went to a school with a gun. SBPA directed all brush crew team members
back to their vehicles and they fell in behind TXDPS with lights and sirens heading toward
Uvalde. They arrived near Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00 PM but were
unable to get close or out of their vehicles because there were so many other law enforcement
personnel and vehicles blocking the streets. SBPA then deployed his team to the Civic
Center, where they arrived as the first law enforcement presence. They blocked driveway
entrances with GOVs and established perimeter security. SBPA kept the road clear for
buses, helped escort students into the Civic Center, and directed parents to find school officials
to help reunite them with their children. His goal was to get students off the buses and safely
into the Civic Center. SBPA stated USBP’s general goal in Uvalde was to keep the
public safe and assist the Uvalde Police Department. When the situation escalated to an active
shooter, SBPA believed USBP’s role was to stop the killing.
CBP PERSONNEL WHO ARRIVED POST-BREACH OR WERE DIVERTED
ELSEWHERE
Many CBP personnel who responded to Robb Elementary School, some driving distances in
excess of 70 miles to respond, either arrived at the school after 12:50:00 PM or were diverted
enroute to other necessary locations, including other Uvalde-area schools, the Civic Center, or
the Uvalde Memorial Hospital. The following is a summary of the interviews provided by these
employees:
BPA (BRA), interviewed on February 7, 2023. (Exhibit 40)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was working with the BRA brush crew at a remote location near
Spofford, Texas, when the helicopter pilot they were working with announced he was leaving to
respond to a school shooting in Uvalde. Approximately 30–45 minutes later, SBPA
(BRA) notified BPA ’s group to respond to the Civic Center. They arrived at
the Civic Center at approximately 12:00:00 PM, and BPA directed children inside the
Civic Center so the school district could account for them. He provided security, directed
vehicles arriving at the Civic Center, announced that parents needed to sign out their children
inside, and attempted to obtain additional information about a potential second threat. BPA
believed it was his duty to respond and protect the lives of the public.
Page 144 of 201


On May 24, 2022, BPA serving as a Field Training Officer, was tracking a group of
individuals who illegally entered the United States, when he heard about the incident at Robb
Elementary School from the helicopter pilot who was providing air support for the tracking
operation. BPA ’s supervisor contacted him and directed him and his three trainees to
respond to the Civic Center. He drove to Uvalde with his emergency lights activated, activating
the sirens when he approached traffic. BPA arrived at the Civic Center at
approximately 12:00:00 PM. He parked at the Civic Center and assisted with safeguarding
children as they entered the building. He provided perimeter security at the Civic Center after
hearing that the girlfriend of the assailant was a potential threat. BPA stated there was
no USBP command and control at the Civic Center; rather, USBP was there as a support agency
to support the city and the state.
AIA (AMO Del Rio), interviewed on May 23, 2023. (Exhibit 217)
On May 24, 2022, a supervisor informed AIA
transport AEA
While enroute, AIA
-
officer and was possibly barricaded in a house. AIA
of a subject who may have shot a police
prepped an AMO helicopter to
(AMO Del Rio) to Uvalde and launched within two minutes.
heard via service radio that there was an active shooter at a school.
He flew to Uvalde, arrived at the Uvalde Fairgrounds at approximately 12:35:00 PM, and
remained on standby in case AIA ran out of fuel.
AIA stated that USBP’s role, pursuant to active shooter training, was to address the
assailant as quickly as possible. He believed local law enforcement would have command and
control in a multi-agency situation such as this.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was at BRA working on a detail near , Texas, around
12:00:00 PM when he received a message that went to the whole unit directing everyone to
report to Uvalde regarding a school shooting. BPA drove alone in a government-
owned vehicle (GOV) using lights and sirens. While enroute, he received information to report
directly to the Civic Center. He arrived there at approximately 12:45:00 PM and explained to
parents that their children had to first go inside before being released. He assisted with two to
three busloads of teachers and students by creating a lane that allowed a clear pathway for people
to walk from the bus to the Civic Center. He helped hand out water bottles to parents. After all
the children and parents departed, he repositioned and set up a perimeter to field questions from
the public regarding voting at the Civic Center. BPA stated USBP appeared to have
command and control of the area immediately outside the Civic Center because they were the
only agency with enough personnel there to assist.
Page 145 of 201


On May 24, 2022, BPA was a juvenile coordinator at UVA for the Mission Support
Unit when he heard radio or dispatch information about a shooting at Robb Elementary School.
BPA and his team stayed at UVA processing juveniles until all remaining agents were
ordered to bring water to the school for the law enforcement officers. Then he traveled to Robb
Elementary School, arriving at approximately 12:50:00 PM, and parked two blocks from the
school. He recorded part of the scene with his personal cell phone and provided the recording to
OPR.
BPA approached the west entrance of the school and entered the school wearing gloves
to assist, but exited after all non-emergency medical personnel were directed to leave. After a
muster at the school, he was ordered to return to UVA for a briefing but told his supervisor he
had to go home due to what he had witnessed. BPA stated that the scene looked like a
Hollywood movie with all the lights and chaos. He indicated local law enforcement had control
of the streets surrounding the school.
SBPA (BRA), interviewed on March 8, 2023. (Exhibit 148)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA heard a CBP air unit in the area advise over the radio of a
school shooting. SBPA called the duty SBPA to get more information, then notified WC
at BRA of the situation. SBPA contacted UVA to ask if they needed BPA
EMTs and informed the BPA who answered that BRA would send available EMTs. SBPA
dispatched four BPAs who responded, along with two trainees, then obtained his own
gear, including an M4 rifle, and departed for Robb Elementary School in a marked USBP GOV
with lights and sirens activated.
He arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:50:00 PM and looked for a
command post, but no one knew where it was; later he learned it was at the funeral home. As he
approached the funeral home, a local law enforcement officer asked him to assist with keeping
approximately 30–50 irate parents back from the funeral home. SBPA instructed the
BPA EMTs to assist the EMTs at the school and instructed a BPA trainee to stay and assist in the
funeral home area. SBPA saw BORTAC BPAs running toward the school and heard via
service radio that the assailant was down. SBPA sent a text to PAIC informing
him that the assailant was down, then made a path for children to be taken from the school to a
school bus while keeping the parents away.
After getting the children onto the bus, he went to a building on the east side of the school to
assist with evacuating children, then checked in with his personnel to make sure they were okay
and instructed them to meet at UVA for a briefing. SBPA learned of a possible second
threat, heard conflicting information, and figured out it was incorrect information. He then went
to UVA for the briefing and stayed there for about an hour. SBPA heard someone refer
to the assailant as a barricaded subject and stated that if a felony was committed, USBP could act
upon it. He stated USBP had a responsibility to respond in a support role.
Page 146 of 201

BPA (USBP Gulfport Station, Mississippi), interviewed on March 22, 2023.

(Exhibit 212)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was at DRT conducting firearms qualifications at the DRT range
when he learned of the Robb Elementary School incident from SBPA over the phone.
BPA responded to Uvalde with other BPAs. While enroute, he heard a radio
transmission that the assailant was killed. He arrived near Robb Elementary School at
approximately 12:50:00 PM, parked in a neighborhood, and walked toward the school. There,
he assisted with perimeter security for approximately one hour, then reported to UVA for a
debriefing.
At UVA, he learned of a second threat made on social media, so he responded to Uvalde High
School to assist with perimeter security, then responded to a middle school to assist with the
release of students to their parents.
BPA believed the incident was a barricaded subject based on hearing that a hostage
negotiator had been contacted. He believed TXDPS had control of the scene and did not know
of anyone from USBP who was in charge. BPA stated that USBP had an obligation to
respond as a law enforcement agency.
PAIC (BRA), interviewed on March 2, 2023. (Exhibit 119)
On May 24, 2022, PAIC was driving back to BRA after assisting a BPA with smugglers
and undocumented migrants when he heard radio communications on the Uvalde radio channel
that someone was shooting through windows. PAIC called BRA and inquired about the
shooting. (A)Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) was not aware, so PAIC
told him to inquire and send necessary resources to Uvalde. Upon receiving later text messages
- ---
concerning the active shooter in Uvalde and that all required resources were at the location,
PAIC advised (A)ACPA or SBPA that BRA BPAs did not need to
respond. Later, PAIC directed SBPA to respond to the incident command post
and relay information to BRA and assist.
PAIC returned to BRA and retrieved a rifle and other equipment, then self-deployed to
Uvalde, driving with emergency equipment activated. He spoke with BPAs at the Uvalde
Checkpoint and requested BRA to send BPAs to the Uvalde Checkpoint. While at the
checkpoint, he received a text message from SBPA stating that the assailant was shot.
He followed TXDPS troopers into Uvalde and arrived near Robb Elementary School
approximately between 12:50:00 PM and 1:00:00 PM. He parked three to four blocks away,
gathered his equipment, and went toward the school. He attempted to locate BRA BPAs and
determine how he could assist.
He approached the west entrance of Robb Elementary School, where he saw several
Brackettville BPAs who were distraught. PAIC asked SBPA if information that
students were still in some of the classrooms in the other buildings had been relayed to anyone,
but SBPA did not know. PAIC then followed a group of law enforcement
officers toward the older section of the school, which they discovered had not been cleared. He
Page 147 of 201

then entered a classroom with two uniformed officers and escorted a student who was sleeping
on the floor to his teacher. PAIC told SBPA to remain at the school and advise
any arriving BPAs that they should go to UVA or return to their station.
PAIC then returned to his vehicle. Upon hearing radio communications that shots were
fired at Uvalde High School, he went there approximately between 2:15:00 PM and 2:30:00
PM. He parked across the street from the high school and texted USBP management to let them
know he was there and would not be at the UVA meeting. He assisted with moving traffic in and
out of the high school so that students could be reunited with their families. He remained there
providing security until all students were released and the faculty departed.
-
He departed the high school approximately between 6:00:00 PM and 7:00:00 PM and went to
UVA and ate dinner there. He then went to the Civic Center looking for BPA , who had
-
been looking for his At the Civic Center, PAIC encountered SBPA
, whose family friend was a teacher killed at the school. PAIC spoke with and
consoled SBPA , then returned to BRA and went home.
PAIC believed the situation in Uvalde was an active shooter. He did not know who was
in command and did not know who had overarching command. He identified that USBP is
responsible to respond and protect the public along with other law enforcement agencies.
BPA (EGS), interviewed on February 8, 2023. (Exhibit 42)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assisting other BPAs along U.S. Highway 57 when he
received a phone call at approximately 12:20:00 PM from SBPA (EGS) stating
to respond to Uvalde because of an active shooter situation. BPA retrieved his gear from
the checkpoint and departed to Uvalde at approximately 12:35:00 PM. He drove to the funeral
home across the street from Robb Elementary School and arrived approximately between
12:50:00 PM and 1:45:00 PM. There, SBPA advised him that he was to go to the
Uvalde Border Patrol Station to muster. After arriving at UVA, he received a message about a
possible second shooter and returned to Robb Elementary School, where he was directed to go to
Flores Elementary School. He assisted at Flores Elementary School for approximately two hours
by directing traffic and directing parents to the doors where children were located until the
school was cleared. He then returned to the command post at Robb Elementary School, where it
was determined that he was no longer needed. He then drove back to EGS. BPA stated
that as an EMT and first responder, it is his responsibility to assist when needed, with the
approval of his supervisor.
SBPA (CAR), interviewed on March 8, 2023. (Exhibit 146)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was the administrative supervisor over the Field Training
Program. He received information over the service radio that USBP dispatch had requested a
-
CBP helicopter to respond to Uvalde for a shooting at a school. SBPA informed PAIC
and asked for approval to respond to Robb Elementary School. PAIC instructed
SBPA not to go to Uvalde.
Page 148 of 201

Approximately 50 minutes after learning of the incident, SBPA received a phone call
instructing EMTs to respond. He gathered his gear and drove with another BPA in his medical
vehicle. While enroute, SBPA suggested that SBPA should proceed to the west
side of the school. He arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 12:55:00 PM and
parked in front of a house on the corner of Geraldine Street and Nicolas Street, then ran toward
the west side of the school with his medical bag. He made contact with the personnel on site to
ascertain what was needed, but there was no communication taking place and even the EMS
personnel were unsure about the status of the situation. He met with other USBP personnel by a
tree near the front of the school, then departed Robb Elementary School and reported to UVA.
From UVA, he went to the Civic Center based on information related to a second threat, then
transitioned to assisting at nearby schools. First, he assisted at the Uvalde Dual Language
Academy, then Sacred Heart Catholic School, then Uvalde Classical Academy. He assisted with
the release of students to their parents for approximately one hour, then went back to the Civic
Center, then back to CAR.
SBPA observed that information over the radio was hard to decipher and was unclear
as to what the status of the situation was and if there was still an active shooter. He heard
discussion that the assailant was barricaded somewhere. He observed civilians and law
enforcement officers everywhere but could not find anyone who knew what was going on or
where anything was located. He stated USBP’s role was as a law enforcement entity helping in
the best interest of the community to stop the killing and save children and people. He believed
USBP had authority to respond because it was a significant incident and a felony.
SBPA did not know who was in command and control of USBP. He heard the funeral
home was supposed to be a command center, but when he passed it, it did not look like a
command center; it looked like a parking lot. He never saw anything that looked like a
command post and never saw anyone who looked or acted like they were in charge. He did not
know who was in charge of medical triage and coordination either pre- or post-breach or where
they were staged.
CBPO (Del Rio, Texas Port of Entry), interviewed on February 13, 2023.
(Exhibit 67)
On May 24, 2022, CBPO was on a plain clothes assignment to a DEA task force in Del
Rio, Texas, working on an operation in Eagle Pass, Texas, when a member of the task force
notified her of an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. Other DEA task force members
were responding, so CBPO drove to Uvalde in an unmarked GOV with lights activated.
While enroute, she heard over her service radio that the assailant was down. She arrived at Robb
Elementary School approximately between 12:50:00 PM and 12:55:00 PM and stood outside
the gate to assist with crowd control and keeping order. She went to the funeral home, where all
DEA personnel were directed to respond to the hospital to provide crowd control assistance for
two to three hours. After providing security and crowd control at the hospital, she returned to a
street near Robb Elementary School for a briefing with other DEA agents, then drove back to
Del Rio. CBPO had no direct knowledge of USBP’s role other than as first responders.
Page 149 of 201


On May 24, 2022, BPA was driving to lunch when multiple vehicles passed him with
their emergency lights activated. He received a text from his sister on his personal phone asking
if he had heard about a shooting in Uvalde and another text from her stating that the shooting had
occurred at a school. BPA returned to his office and asked if anyone had heard about a
school shooting. No one had, so he called ACPA at DRT to inquire about the shooting.
ACPA had not heard, but a few minutes later came to BPA ’s office and told him
to grab his stuff and go with him to Uvalde.
They drove to Uvalde with lights and sirens activated while following two TXDPS units.
Approximately 10 minutes before they arrived, BPA received a text stating “they” got the
assailant. BPA arrived at Robb Elementary School approximately between 12:55:00 PM
and 1:00:00 PM, parked about two blocks from the school, and approached the school on foot.
BPA comforted a BPA near the school building and brought him to the funeral home.
While at the funeral home, BPA heard TXDPS troopers say there was a threat of another
shooter at the middle school or high school, so he relocated to the Uvalde High School. He set
up on the east side of the high school in the parking lot in an observation role. He directed traffic
and parents where to go for approximately 30 minutes before being informed that a nearby
Catholic school needed security, so he relocated there and provided security until all students
were released to their parents. He returned to the high school and set up in an observation role in
the field behind the high school and stayed there for about 30 minutes until all students were
evacuated. He then received a text or email instructing all BPAs to return to UVA, so he went
there for about 30 minutes, then returned to DRT.
BPA observed that the scene did not appear chaotic but there was a lot of stuff going on.
He did not know who was in command at the scene or who was running the command center.
He did not know who was in charge at the high school. He observed everyone was taking
positions on their own and relaying their positions on the radio. At the Catholic school, he
identified six BPAs and understood that ACPA was in command; this was the only time
he understood who was in command.
ACPA (DRT), interviewed on February 28, 2023. (Exhibit 98)
On May 24, 2022, ACPA ’s supervisor, Executive Officer (XO)
GOV from DRT to Uvalde. While driving, ACPA

and instructed him to report to UVA while BPA
called
.
him there was a shooting at Robb Elementary School and that if he wanted to go, he could.
ACPA perceived the statement as an order, so he drove with BPA
(BPA
, told
in an unmarked
attempted to gather information

)
via the service radio. Because of communications issues, they only picked up partial
information. They received information that the assailant had been stopped and that there were
mass casualties. ACPA followed a TXDPS trooper from Del Rio to Uvalde.
Page 150 of 201

When he arrived at Robb Elementary School approximately between 12:55:00 PM and 1:00:00
PM, the shooting was already over. He parked approximately four blocks away and proceeded
to the school on foot. He walked past the assailant’s vehicle that had crashed in the ditch and
observed that the school was roped off with police tape. PAIC informed ACPA
that USBP was being instructed to stand by and that USBP agents might be needed at
another location.
ACPA observed that most of the radio traffic he heard while enroute to Uvalde was
BPAs relaying their positions and asking if assistance was needed. He received information that
the assailant’s girlfriend had threatened to shoot up another school, so he and BPA went
to a middle school to provide security for approximately one hour. He observed it was chaotic at
the middle school, but nothing of note happened. While at the middle school, unknown law
enforcement personnel asked them to assist with reuniting children with their parents at Robb
Elementary School. By the time he arrived, numerous BPAs and TXDPS troopers were already
assisting, so he just observed. Another unknown law enforcement officer mentioned that
assistance was needed at a local Catholic school, so he went there, but several other LEOs were
already there and only two students were left. He left the Catholic school after 20–30 minutes
and went to UVA, then departed UVA to drive back to DRT at 6:00:00 PM.
ACPA stated that by the time he arrived at Robb Elementary School, the shooting had
concluded, so he was there in a support role. He did not perceive that anybody was in charge
and attempted to find an incident commander with no luck. He observed that everyone on scene
looked like they were attempting to help in some way, but there were no directions being given.
He perceived the local police were in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School and
believed that BPAs were on scene only to assist local law enforcement officers. He felt it was
his duty as a public servant and as a BPA to help where he could but was not aware of any
specific authority that mandated BPAs to respond to these types of incidents. He felt he did not
play a big part in the response and wished he could have contributed more.
BPA (DRT), interviewed on February 14, 2023. (Exhibit 72)
with SBPA when SBPA
occurred in Uvalde. (A)SBPA .
was an acting supervisor ((A)SBPA) at EGS and was working
received a phone call regarding a shooting that had
rode with SBPA to Uvalde in an unmarked
GOV. They drove as close as they could to Robb Elementary School, arriving between 12:55:00
PM and 1:05:00 PM, but had to park and walk approximately two blocks because there were so
many law enforcement vehicles everywhere. They walked to the funeral home, where an
unknown law enforcement officer requested their help forming a perimeter to keep parents back.
(A)SBPA directed parents to pick up their children at the Civic Center, then spoke with
another BPA before driving to the formal muster at UVA. He then drove to another school
(Flores Elementary School or Morales Junior High School) after hearing a radio communication
advising of another possible shooting and provided perimeter security for approximately one
hour. BPA indicated he responded to provide support and that USBP was there to
provide assistance to other agencies.
Page 151 of 201


On May 24, 2022, BPA was at UVA assigned to brush duty, working in uniform on a
ranch south of Uvalde with several other BPAs, when SBPA received a phone call
regarding the shooting at Robb Elementary School and informed the BPAs, directing them to
respond to the school. They traveled in multiple vehicles with emergency lights and sirens
activated and arrived at the Civic Center at approximately 1:00:00 PM. There, they helped
unload children from buses and provided security. BPA cleared a pathway for buses to
approach the Civic Center and provided water to parents. He believed the purpose of his
response was to provide whatever assistance was necessary.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was working with the brush crew at when they
heard about the incident at Robb Elementary School via radio communication. The brush crew
decided they were going to respond and drove toward Uvalde in a USBP vehicle with lights and
sirens activated. While enroute, they received direction to respond to the Civic Center.
They parked in an alley at the back of the Civic Center at approximately 1:00:00 PM, entered
the Civic Center, and provided security near the rear door. After hearing about a potential
second threat, BPA relocated to the exterior of the Civic Center and conducted
perimeter security. After being notified to discontinue perimeter security, he drove to UVA,
turned in his vehicle and keys, and drove his personal vehicle to Dalton Elementary School
where worked. He remained there until was cleared to leave the school.
BPA was unable to identify the person in charge at the Civic Center and did not see
anyone giving orders to the law enforcement officers there. He stated USBP’s authority to
respond was to stop the threat and render aid as soon as possible by nature of their status as first
responders and law enforcement officers. He stated USBP would assist other law enforcement
agencies.
DCPA (DRT), interviewed on March 17, 2023. (Exhibit 190)
On May 24, 2022, DCPA was the Acting DCPA ((A)DCPA) for DRT when PAIC
and SOS informed him there was an active shooter at an elementary school in Uvalde.
(A)DCPA informed CPA Owens of the situation and that he was deploying to the scene.
He directed SOS to bring M4 rifles, then drove to Uvalde with three other agents. After
receiving reports of 911 calls indicating there could be at least nine victims, he activated the
emergency lights and sirens on the vehicle to get to the scene as fast as possible. (A)DCPA
instructed PAIC to order all EMTs within driving distance to deploy to the
vicinity of the school. He also instructed the DRT Training and Traumatic Incident Management
branch to have Peer Support and Chaplain resources on standby.
DCPA arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00 PM. Around the
school, vehicles were blocking the road, so he had to park at the funeral home across from the
Page 152 of 201

school. After a radio transmission announced the subject was down, he proceeded toward the
school with his medical bag. (A)DCPA entered the school through the west entrance and
asked how he could assist as a former EMT. (A)DCPA questioned people who were
standing around why they were not helping. He instructed the BPAs to gather under the tree in
front of the school and informed them if anyone was looking for a family member at the school,
they should go find them. After CPA Owens instructed all BPAs to meet at UVA, (A)DCPA
requested clean uniforms be gathered at UVA so the BPAs could change clothes. He
assisted with loading children from inside the funeral home onto a school bus, but the situation
became increasingly tense with rumors among upset parents.
(A)DCPA and the agents he arrived with departed the area and went to UVA. TXDPS
Rangers arrived at UVA, and DCPA helped them set up to interview BORTAC and
BORSTAR members who had been involved. He returned to DRT to handle reporting,
notifications, and other administrative matters.
Because of the distance from DRT to Uvalde, (A)DCPA expected the incident to be over
by the time he arrived and believed he would likely assume an incident command role. He
assumed the local police department and TXDPS would have control of the situation and would
provide instructions of where to respond, but never confirmed who was in charge. Although
radio communications were inconsistent and there was a “hot mic,” the information indicated
that they were responding to an active shooter scenario. Moments later, he began hearing that
the assailant was a barricaded subject. In types of incidents where USBP does not have
jurisdiction, DCPA identified that USBP responds in a support role. He stated USBP
should have been taking direction from another agency such as TXDPS or the local police
department, and the fact that USBP had to take charge of the situation was not normal. He
observed that “every law enforcement agency was onsite, and it was very chaotic.” He stated
that USBP had a duty to act and an obligation to respond when there was a commission of a
felony in their presence, especially if it involved loss of life.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to the brush crew working at the
with other BPAs when he was informed that there was a shooting at Robb Elementary School
and they were ordered to respond. The BPAs departed toward Robb Elementary School in four
different USBP-marked vehicles. While enroute, they heard radio communications stating that
the assailant was down. They heard a request for assistance at the Civic Center, so they
redirected there, arriving at approximately 1:00:00 PM. There, they were asked to clear a path
for the buses, set up a perimeter, and provide security for children and parents until relieved by
the swing shift around 5:00:00 PM. BPA returned to UVA and put his equipment
away. While there, he attempted to console BPA . BPA believed that SBPA
11111111
was in command and control at the Civic Center as the first SBPA to arrive.
Page 153 of 201

PAIC (COM), interviewed on March 3, 2023. (Exhibit 130)

On May 24, 2022, PAIC was the Assistant Chief Patrol Agent (ACPA) over the
Professional Standards Branch at USBP DRT. He was working in his office when he learned
from SOS of an incident at a school in Uvalde. ACPA met with (A)DCPA
and ACPA and agreed they should go to Uvalde. He rode in an unmarked GOV and
-
learned via service radio that a significant law enforcement response was occurring. He handled
communications for (A)DCPA while (A)DCPA drove with emergency equipment
activated. ACPA maintained communications with PAIC and learned that
BORSTAR and BORTAC had been sent to the scene.
Approximately 5–10 miles before entering Uvalde, they the heard an announcement that the
assailant was down. Upon arriving at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00 PM,
they parked on the north side of the funeral home. They gathered their medical bags and walked
toward the school after being unable to identify any incident command at the funeral home.
They entered the school and walked eastbound down the hallway looking for things to do but
learned they were not needed for medical assistance or clearing classrooms. They exited through
the west door and asked all BPAs not actively engaged in something to meet on the north side of
the building near the large tree.
ACPA worked with support staff at DRT to have extra uniforms gathered for BPAs who
had blood-stained uniforms. An unknown law enforcement officer asked for his assistance
providing security for children who were loading onto buses going to the Civic Center for about
10 minutes. Then he drove to UVA, where he fielded phone calls and emails regarding the
situation and helped BPAs exchange bloody uniforms for clean ones. After going home, he
received a call from PAIC regarding guidance for the process of asking the eight officer
safety questions to involved law enforcement officers following a deadly force incident, in
accordance with CBP policy.
ACPA may have given the order that the bloody uniforms could be thrown away a few
days later. He stated he could not identify if the situation was ever an active shooter versus a
barricaded subject. He did not observe anyone in command and control of the situation at Robb
Elementary School. He believed PAIC to be in command with the most information, but
upon entering the scene there was no one in command and no incident command post was
identified. ACPA stated that BPAs and other law enforcement officers have a mandate to
provide public safety and protect the innocent.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was the Sector Medical Coordinator at DRT coordinating EMT
certification classes. He had checked in on the class when another instructor advised him that
there was an active shooter in Uvalde. BPA went to the SOD team house to try to get
more information and was advised not to respond so as not to flood the scene. Later he received
a phone call from SBPA instructing him to head to Uvalde. BPA stopped at the
medical supply warehouse and loaded an unmarked GOV with medical supplies. He sent a text
Page 154 of 201

from his personal phone to SBPAs and informing them that he was enroute
with medical supplies, then drove to Uvalde, departing at approximately 12:15:00 PM. He went
directly to the Uvalde Memorial Hospital to provide aid, arriving there at approximately 1:00:00
PM. BPA requested the assistance of other law enforcement officers who were standing
around at the hospital to unload medical supplies from the GOV into the emergency room and
informed the hospital staff to use them, if needed.
BPA then went to check on the status of an injured BPA but did not find him. He asked
hospital personnel where he could help. They said to set up outside the emergency room to
conduct initial triage, which he did. There, he overheard law enforcement officers talking about
a possible second shooter and decided he would be better utilized at a school, so he left the
hospital after confirming with hospital staff that he was not needed.
BPA went to Dalton Elementary School, entered the grounds, and met with BORSTAR
agents. He requested a reporter who was attempting to film the children to move farther away
from the school and outside the perimeter, which she did. BPA decided to meet with the
school principal and staff to coordinate the reuniting of students with parents and assisted with
the release of students until around 7:00:00 PM, then went home.
SBPA (CBP LESC), interviewed on February 15, 2023. (Exhibit 77)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was on detail conducting use of force training assessments at
USBP Del Rio Sector for the CBP LESC, observing use of force training at BRA. Around
lunchtime, he heard there was an active shooter in Uvalde and decided to respond. SBPA
and other SBPAs drove to Robb Elementary School, arriving at approximately 1:00:00
PM. They saw that stretchers were being carried into the building and determined that the
shooting had ended. SBPA directed traffic at the street beside the incident command
center, then provided security at the hospital. Later, he went to the Uvalde High School and
remained there until almost all the children went home, then went to UVA.
SBPA (CBP LESC), interviewed on February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 80)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was at USBP Del Rio Sector and USBP Brackettville Station
conducting observation and field review of the use of force training for the CBP LESC. While
outside after the observation was finished, an unknown BPA informed him that there was an
active shooter in Uvalde. SBPA decided to respond to Uvalde and left Brackettville in an
unmarked patrol vehicle with emergency lights and sirens activated. He drove directly to Robb
Elementary School, arriving at approximately 1:00:00 PM, and parked a couple blocks away
from the school. He attempted to clear out vehicles that were blocking EMS vehicles from
entering the school but was unsuccessful because the vehicles were locked. He dropped off a
BPA at UVA to serve as a Peer Support Member, then went to the Uvalde hospital and helped
direct traffic and advise family members where the entrance was. Then he drove to Flores
Elementary School to assist with traffic control and security while children were being released
to their parents. Next, he responded to Morales Junior High School to assist by standing guard to
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ensure the safety of the school. Finally, he returned to UVA to see if any further help was
needed, then went back to Del Rio.
ACPA (DRT), interviewed on March 3, 2023. (Exhibit 128)
On May 24, 2022, ACPA
Uvalde. ACPA
- learned from ACPA
-
obtained M4 rifles and rode with ACPA
of a possible active shooter in
and (A)DCPA
Robb Elementary School. During the drive, he worked with the others to identify and address
priorities. ACPA made the appropriate notifications, received and made phone calls,
and tried to get the phone number of the incident command post to contact Sheriff Nolasco but
to
received no answer. ACPA called and informed the Strategic Communications Branch
at DRT of the incident and contacted someone at the training branch and requested to have EMT,
Peer Support, and Chaplain personnel respond to Uvalde.
Shortly after arriving at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00 PM, they learned the
threat had been neutralized. They locked their rifles in the GOV lockbox and ran with their EMT
bags to assist at the school. They entered the school and saw there was nothing they could do
inside to assist, so they exited the building, separated, and began gathering USBP personnel to
meet with CPA Owens near a tree on the north side of the school.
There, they were directed to return to UVA. ACPA called SOS at DRT and
requested she collect and send clean uniforms to UVA. They were in the process of leaving
Robb Elementary School when a police officer asked them to assist with getting children onto a
bus from inside the funeral home. ACPA joined a line with other law enforcement
personnel to keep the children separated from the large number of nearby parents and ensure
they were safely on the bus. Due to the frustration demonstrated by some parents, they notified a
local law enforcement officer that they were leaving and went to UVA.
ACPA communicated with USBP headquarters in Washington, DC, and composed a list
of UVA personnel who responded to Robb Elementary School. He returned to DRT at
approximately 7:00:00 PM, then went home. Prior to arriving at Robb Elementary School,
ACPA confirmed there was an active shooter in Uvalde but stated that generally the
information he received was incomplete and unclear. He did not know if the assailant was still
shooting, had quit shooting, or was dead. He was told the incident command post was
established at a funeral home in Uvalde and that the agents on scene had the full support of the
Chief of the Border Patrol in Washington, DC, to do whatever needed to be done to get the
assailant.
ACPA stated that the scene at the school was chaos, with law enforcement vehicles
parked everywhere and streets blocked with law enforcement officers and civilians. He was not
aware if CBP had an active shooter policy. He stated that it appeared that the BORTAC agent
who took tactical control and put a team together was in charge at the school. ACPA
believed there was a moral obligation to respond because he took an oath to protect America, and
believed he also had a personal responsibility to respond to an incident like a school shooting.
He did not know what agency was in command and control of the overarching incident but stated
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it was not USBP. He stated that USBP’s role was to support other law enforcement agencies and
take joint action, if necessary, because a local or state agency would have had jurisdiction.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was working with the brush crew when he heard a radio
transmission that a shooting had occurred at Robb Elementary School. He rode with other BPAs
in a marked patrol vehicle with lights and sirens activated and fell in behind other USBP marked
patrol vehicles. BPA arrived at the Civic Center at approximately 1:00:00 PM and
provided crowd control and cleared a pathway for buses to drive. He was not sure what USBP’s
role was, but believed it was primarily as support and to help at the scene.
BPA-P (DRT), interviewed on February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 62)
On May 24, 2022, BPA-P was assigned to the Professional Standards Branch,
Management Inquiry Team at DRT, assisting with interviews at the USBP Soft Sided Facility in
Eagle Pass, Texas, with SBPAs (DRT) and (DRT) when an unknown
SBPA received a phone call advising them to respond to Uvalde because of a shooting incident.
BPA-P responded using lights and sirens and drove directly to Robb Elementary
School, arriving there a few minutes after 1:00:00 PM. Due to the large number of law
enforcement vehicles at the scene, they had to park approximately one-quarter to one-half of a
mile away from the school and walk.
While walking, they encountered an SBPA who told them the situation was over. BPA-P
remained outside the school’s fence for a short time, then walked to the funeral home,
where he received instructions from an unknown person to go to Dalton Elementary School. He
stopped at UVA to pick up body armor and a long arm, then drove to Dalton Elementary School
and helped reunite arriving parents with their children. He assisted with traffic control at the
entrance to the school, then returned the body armor and long arm to UVA before returning to
Del Rio. When asked about his general perception of who was in charge on May 24, 2022,
BPA-P indicated that the incident was complete chaos and it did not appear that anyone
was in charge. He stated USBP’s role in situations such as this was backup, but if USBP was
first on site, the role would be to provide for the safety of the general public.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was at UVA on light duty due to an ankle injury. He heard some
of the USBP mechanics talking about a possible shooter at Robb Elementary School and decided
to respond to Robb Elementary School as a BORSTAR agent. He drove a GOV to the school;
while enroute, he heard over the radio the “shooter was down.” BPA arrived at Robb
Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00 PM and parked at the funeral home, then walked
toward the school. He offered assistance to other BPAs, but they were busy and didn’t respond.
He then went to the front of the school and met with a group of BPAs for approximately 20
minutes before returning to UVA, where he was instructed to go to local schools and provide
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security assistance because of reports of a potential new threat. He provided security at Dalton
Elementary School, then returned to UVA.
On May 24, 2022, a supervisor called BPA on his personal cell phone and informed him
there was a possible shooting in Uvalde and instructed him to head to Uvalde. BPA arrived
at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00 PM and walked toward the school, where
he encountered other BPAs who informed him there were already enough people inside the
school to provide support. He went to the funeral home to figure out how he could help and was
instructed to relocate to the Civic Center, so he went there and met with other BPAs. He drove
some BPAs back to the funeral home, took general pictures of all the law enforcement activity
outside the school, then drove the BPAs back to the Civic Center. BPA provided support
by giving breaks to the BPAs stationed outside the Civic Center. He stated he did not know what
had occurred until he arrived at Robb Elementary School. Prior to arriving at Robb Elementary
School, he believed law enforcement officers were chasing a smuggler who bailed out of a
vehicle and ran into the school. BPA did not know who or which agency was running the
command center when he arrived at the funeral home.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to the Emergency Operations Center at
DRT, where a supervisor informed him there was an active shooter in Uvalde. BPA
asked if they were going to respond. The supervisor said yes and BPA
self-deployed. He drove in a GOV and arrived near Robb Elementary School at approximately
1:00:00 PM. He took his medical bag, weapon, and helmet, and proceeded toward the school.
He arrived at the west entrance after the breach and began helping fellow agents who were
affected by the events by providing water and emotional help. He met with his team, then went
to the side of the building where everyone was mustering and was ordered back to UVA.
Upon being informed of a message about the assailant’s girlfriend, he and other agents went to
schools around Uvalde. BPA went to Dalton Elementary School and was
stationed at the back door to make sure no one entered the school. He also assisted with
directing traffic for parents picking up their children. During his travel to Robb Elementary
School, BPA heard communications that described the event as a barricaded
subject. When he arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00 PM, he
observed people standing around as if nothing was going on. He felt that PAIC and SBPA
were in charge of USBP personnel because SBPA was providing direction and
guidance to his BORSTAR team. BPA believed USBP had authority to respond
to an active shooter situation because when lives are being threatened, the threat must be stopped
as soon as possible.
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On May 24, 2022, BPA was working brush crew at and
south of Uvalde when another BPA in the crew received a text from his spouse asking what was
going on at Robb Elementary School. BPA ’s supervisor instructed him to respond to the
school. He drove toward the school but was redirected to the Civic Center. While enroute, he
heard sporadic communication over the radio stating “they were going in,” and “the subject was
down.” He arrived at the Civic Center at approximately 1:00:00 PM and remained there to
provide security and assist with crowd control until all children were safely returned to their
parents. He then returned to UVA and went home.
BPA observed the atmosphere at the Civic Center was chaotic and people were panicking.
He perceived there was no command and control at the Civic Center and observed that law
enforcement officers were self-initiating work to control the scene. Regarding authority to
respond, BPA believed all law enforcement officers should respond to these types of
incidents.
BPA (EGT), interviewed on February 8, 2023. (Exhibit 45)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was on riverine patrol on the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass,
Texas, when BPA (EGT) told him about the Robb Elementary School incident. BPA
assisted the vessel commander in getting the boat out of the water so he could exit and
respond to Uvalde as an EMT. He took the M4 rifle from the boat and traveled with another
BPA in a USBP ambulance with the lights activated, using the sirens only when traffic
approached. He arrived at the Uvalde Memorial Funeral Home at approximately 1:00:00 PM
and parked as close to the school as possible.
He approached the school carrying his EMT gear but was advised that everyone needing medical
treatment had already been treated. He then proceeded to the funeral home and heard radio
traffic indicating the possibility of a second threat. He went to Dalton Elementary School, where
he provided security for five hours. He communicated with arriving parents to help them
understand the process for picking up children. BPA recalled receiving instructions
only from Watch Commander (WC) (DRS) and was not aware if anyone else
was in charge of the incident. BPA understood USBP’s role in the response was to
fan out and provide security around the school because he believed the school handled most of
what occurred.
BPA (COM), interviewed on March 1, 2023. (Exhibit 113)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was on duty at the USBP DRT firearms range when another BPA
received a phone call regarding an active shooter and possible bailout in Uvalde. He also heard
that a possible load vehicle had shot at the Uvalde Police Department and had something to do
with a school. BPA drove in a GOV with other BPAs to Robb Elementary School and
parked in a local resident’s driveway with the resident’s permission at approximately 1:00:00
PM. He helped provide security near a disabled truck in a drainage culvert and assisted with
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moving vehicles that were blocking the street. He went to the funeral home and was advised to
assist with security at the Uvalde Memorial Hospital. Before he could go there, he was
instructed to go to UVA for a muster.
From UVA, he traveled with other BPAs to various Uvalde schools to help with security based
on information regarding an additional shooter. He provided security for the rest of the day at
Uvalde High School, Morales Junior High School, and Flores Elementary School, then traveled
back to the DRT firearms range. BPA identified that the command center was in the
Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home. He identified examples of BPA authority to respond such as
a felony occurring or a smuggling vehicle incident and stated he was in a backup role during the
Robb Elementary School shooting because he arrived after the assailant was stopped.
SBPA (DRT), interviewed on February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 60)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was in Eagle Pass, Texas, to assist OPR conducting interviews
for a critical incident investigation. During the trip to Eagle Pass, he heard spotty
communications on the USBP radio about an incident taking place in Uvalde. During an
interview at Eagle Pass, he received a phone call informing everyone that they needed to respond
to Uvalde to assist with a critical incident involving CBP employees and a shooting. SBPA
drove to Uvalde with his lights and sirens activated when needing to overtake civilian
vehicles. He arrived in Uvalde after law enforcement had confronted and killed the assailant.
He arrived at the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home a few minutes after 1:00:00 PM and parked
approximately two blocks away from Robb Elementary School, then walked toward the school.
The incident was already over by that time, so he remained outside the school for about 10
minutes.
Afterward, he went to the command center at the funeral home and met with OPR SA
(OPR Del Rio) and Acting Resident Agent in Charge ((A)RAC) (OPR
Del Rio). While at the funeral home, (A)RAC directed him to secure Dalton Elementary
School after going to the Uvalde Border Patrol Station to check out hard-plate body armor and
M4 rifles. SBPA provided perimeter security at Dalton Elementary School and helped
direct traffic with other state and local law enforcement officers. He answered questions and
directed people where to go to retrieve their children. He stated that USBP’s role in this incident
was support and public safety.
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was the duty supervisor at CAR responsible for overseeing
daily operations, including scheduling and reviewing files. She heard a radio transmission over
the county radio related to a crash, then received a call from a BPA at CAR stating that
school was on lockdown because of an active shooter. Next, a BPA came into the
office and stated there was an active shooter in Uvalde County and inquired as to which school.
SBPA contacted UVA to obtain information. She stayed in the duty supervisor office
with WC and notified PAIC and DPAIC via text. She received a phone call
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from BPA , who informed her that he was responding to the school. She continued to field
phone calls from other BPAs. Other BPA EMTs and paramedics asked her if they could deploy;
she instructed them to stand by, then received authorization to deploy them. She broadcast over
the radio for all available EMTs to respond to Robb Elementary School, then grabbed her EMT
bag and departed for Uvalde.
She coordinated with the Crystal City Sheriff’s Office to clear the roads to allow EMTs to
quickly pass through town. She arrived at Robb Elementary School approximately between
1:00:00 PM and 1:10:00 PM and parked in front of a residence because the roads were blocked,
then ran toward the school. Another BPA stopped her and told her not to enter the school
because there was nothing else they could do. She gathered at a tree with other BPAs and began
providing Peer Support, then rode with BPA to UVA and continued Peer Support duties.
She was requested to go to the hospital to support BPA and went there with SBPA
but was unable to visit BPA because of a restriction on the number of visitors
allowed per patient. She provided her business card to BPA ’s family in case they
required Peer Support services, then remained at the hospital because it was on lockdown due to
the threat of a second shooter. During that time, she conversed with a boy who was a victim
from inside one of the classrooms and provided her business card to the boy’s mother. She left
the hospital and went to the Civic Center, where she assisted with security and crowd control.
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SBPA stated she could not tell who was in command and control at Robb Elementary
School. The only time she perceived anyone in command was when TXDPS Captain
gave the order to stand down over the radio, prior to the breach. SBPA stated that the
rest of the radio chatter was complete chaos. She believed USBP’s role in responding to the
school was to stop the threat and provide medical services, although she stated that the primary
responsibility to stop the threat was with the first law enforcement agency that arrived on scene.
She stated USBP employees are public servants with a responsibility to protect.
BPA (CAR), interviewed on March 10, 2023. (Exhbit 153)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was working at the permanent tactical checkpoint as an EMT
and EMT Coordinator when another BPA asked BPA to handle vehicle primary because
the other BPA’s wife and son were at a school involved in an active shooter incident. BPA
called CAR, and an SBPA advised him not to respond. Later, BPA received a
phone call from a radio operator instructing him to respond to Robb Elementary School as an
EMT. He drove alone with his emergency equipment activated and parked in the yard of a
house, then walked toward the school approximately between 1:00:00 PM and 1:15:00 PM. He
received instructions to not go inside the school, so he spoke briefly with other BPAs, then
traveled to UVA where he heard about a second threat and was instructed to provide security at
the hospital, which was then changed to the Civic Center. BPA responded to the Civic
Center, provided perimeter security, and advised some people that voting had been stopped
because of the need to secure the Civic Center. BPA did not know who was in charge of
the response to the active shooter. He believed USBP had a duty to act and respond as a law
enforcement organization responsible for protecting the public.
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five or six classrooms, then met with another group of BPAs who were directed to the Civic
Center. He provided perimeter security at the Civic Center for approximately three hours, then
returned home.
BPA did not know if there was an active shooter or if shots had been fired. He did not
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believe anyone from USBP oversaw the scene and understood he was directed to Robb
Elementary School in a medical capacity. BPA identified that PAIC was the
supervisor directing the agents at the rally point and that AEA appeared to be leading the
group clearing the classrooms. BPA did not know who was in command at the Civic
Center.
BPA (BRA), interviewed on March 8, 2023. (Exhbit 145)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was detailed to USBP DRT as an EMT Coordinator. He was
providing EMT training when a trainee (a trooper from TXDPS) notified him that there was an
active shooter in Uvalde. ACPA directed BPA to respond to Robb Elementary
School. BPA gathered his medical gear and responded with another BPA in an
unmarked USBP vehicle. They arrived at Robb Elementary School approximately between
1:00:00 PM and 1:30:00 PM and parked a block away from the school, then headed to the
funeral home. He signed in on a white board and asked where the medical triage area was
located, then walked outside toward the school looking for it. He asked the San Antonio Fire
Department Chief how he could be of assistance and was advised he would not be allowed in the
school because it had been declared a crime scene.
BPA then signed out of the command post at the funeral home and decided to meet
another BPA at the Uvalde Memorial Hospital to assist. While enroute, he heard “shots fired at
the high school” over the radio and decided to respond there. He helped search and clear the
inside of the high school, then proceeded to Flores Elementary School, an unknown charter
school, and Dalton Elementary School to provide perimeter security as each school was
evacuated. He drove back to DRT, arriving at approximately 6:00:00 PM.
BPA stated that the San Antonio Fire Department Chief appeared to be in command
and control of the local EMS on site. BPA understood he was responding to a mass
casualty event and stated that as an EMT he would provide first aid to anyone in need.
SA (OPR Los Angeles), interviewed on July 25, 2023. (Exhibit 225)
On May 24, 2022, SA was on duty and assigned to OPR Del Rio, where he was
driving with SA toward Eagle Pass, Texas. Two BPAs followed behind them in a
separate vehicle and one of the BPAs called SA and told him there was a shooting at a
school in Uvalde. (A)RAC told SA and SA to proceed to Eagle
Pass. Shortly after they arrived, they received a call to respond to Uvalde. They drove in their
GOV toward Uvalde with lights and sirens activated and arrived at Robb Elementary School
approximately a few minutes after 1:00:00 PM, where they saw 80–100 law enforcement
officers and were not sure whether the situation was still active. They learned of a possible
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secondary threat against other Uvalde schools and were directed to go to UVA to gather
information from TXDPS Rangers. They drove to UVA with lights and sirens activated, and SA
remained there the rest of the evening.
SA stated that the scene at the school was chaotic and he believed he was required
to respond because he is a federal agent. He also stated that any request from state or local law
enforcement would require a response.
SA (OPR Del Rio), interviewed on February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 63)
On May 24, 2022, SA was serving as a BPA on the Management Inquiry/Critical Incident
Team at USBP Del Rio Sector, Texas. While driving to a meeting with BPA-P and
SBPA at USBP Eagle Pass South Station, BPA heard over the radio that someone
had entered Robb Elementary School with a long arm and shots were fired. BPA called
SOS and reported the information from the radio and requested to divert to Uvalde. SOS
instructed BPA to continue to EGS. After BPA arrived at EGS, he conducted
the meeting, then received a phone call instructing him and the other agents to respond to
Uvalde. They drove to Uvalde in GOVs with emergency equipment activated, arrived at Robb
Elementary School a few minutes after 1:00:00 PM, and parked two blocks away from the
school. They entered the funeral home and signed in. There, a TXDPS supervisor told them that
there was an active threat to other local schools and instructed them to go to a local school. As
they prepared to do so, ACPA told SA that Chief Patrol Agent (CPA) Owens
wanted to address everyone at UVA. They went to UVA to get rifles and body armor, then went
to Dalton Elementary School, where they helped the principal release children by instructing
parents to drive up to the school and present identification to pick up their children. BPA
assisted with traffic control and brought Gatorade to the funeral home. He indicated that USBP
assists local police when circumstances require.
SA (OPR Del Rio), interviewed on July 19, 2023. (Exhibit 222)
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On May 24, 2022, SA was driving toward Eagle Pass, Texas, to respond to another
matter when he received a call from SBPA about radio communications he heard regarding
a possible shooting near a school in Uvalde. SA called (A)RAC , who initially
directed him to proceed with his planned assignment, but then directed him to respond to Uvalde
upon learning that BORTAC was responding. SA drove to Uvalde in his GOV with
lights and sirens activated. He arrived at Robb Elementary School approximately a few minutes
after 1:00:00 PM and was advised not to go inside the school.
He went to the funeral home, where he learned of a possible secondary threat against other
Uvalde schools and was directed to respond to Morales Junior High School. He sent a text
message to OPR SAs that he was responding to the junior high school, where he remained at the
perimeter and provided security. A local police officer requested him to accompany her to see
the parents and explain the process for student dismissal. After two hours, SA returned
to the incident command center near Robb Elementary School.
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He stated that CBP does not have authority to respond to incidents like the one at Robb
Elementary except at the request of state or local law enforcement, who have primary
jurisdiction.
Supervisory CBP Officer (SCBPO) (Del Rio Port of Entry), interviewed on
February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 59)
On May 24, 2022, SCBPO was at the federal courthouse in Del Rio, Texas, assigned as a
Task Force Officer (TFO) for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security
Investigations, Del Rio, Texas, when he received a group text message from investigators at
TXDPS regarding a possible active shooter incident at Robb Elementary School. TFO
decided not to respond because Del Rio is 70 miles away from Uvalde. He concluded his
activities at the courthouse, then received a call from his supervisor instructing him to respond to
the command center in Uvalde. TFO picked up another TFO and traveled to Uvalde in
an unmarked vehicle with lights and sirens activated. They arrived at the funeral home at
approximately 1:00:00 PM. He went to the Uvalde High School after an alleged report of a
threat there, and he assisted officers in trying to calm parents for approximately 30 minutes.
Hethen reported to the command center, where he was instructed to return to the high school and
assist school faculty with children who were going to be released to their parents. He provided
protection for school faculty and escorted children from the lunchroom to their parents’ cars
before responding to the fairgrounds for a debrief. TFO believed USBP’s role was to
assist where needed.
BPA-P (DRT), interviewed on March 1, 2023. (Exhibit 114)
On May 24, 2022, BPA-P was an SBPA at DRT and someone at the DRT range notified
him that there was an active shooter at Robb Elementary School. He and others gathered their
gear and drove GOVs with lights and sirens to Robb Elementary School, arriving in Uvalde
between approximately 1:05:00 PM and 1:10:00 PM. He anticipated the incident would be
resolved by the time they arrived and was not directed to respond but stated that is what they
train to do. Upon arriving, he walked down the street to see how he could help. He overheard
that assistance was needed at the hospital with perimeter security and traffic control, so he and a
BPA-P traveled there. Later, he was contacted to report to UVA to provide Peer Support
assistance. He reported to UVA, then received information about the threat of a possible second
shooter, so he traveled with a BPA-P to Uvalde High School, where they assisted in clearing the
school. He then traveled to Flores Middle School, Morales Junior High School, and Dalton
Elementary School to clear the schools and assist with reuniting students with their parents.
After clearing the schools, he drove back to UVA, then went back to the DRT firearms range.
BPA-P observed that incident command was nonexistent. He stated USBP’s role was to
assist, do the right thing, and try to save lives because that is what they are paid to do.
WC (EGS), interviewed on February 14, 2023. (Exhibit 73)
On May 24, 2022, WC received a text message from the Uvalde Consolidated
Independent School District indicating that Robb Elementary School was on lockdown because
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of police activity in the area. Later, contacted him by phone asking what was going on
at the school. He received a request from an unknown BPA for help and for EMTs and anyone
else able to respond. WC sent BPA to respond to Uvalde and followed BPA
with lights and sirens activated. They arrived at Robb Elementary School between 1:10:00
PM and 1:15:00 PM. WC sent BPA to the funeral home to check in at the
command center, while WC checked on injured BPA at the Uvalde
hospital. WC received information about a possible secondary threat and responded to
the Uvalde High School, where he cleared the high school and confirmed there was no shooter
and no shots fired. WC directed two agents to Flores Elementary School and two EMTs
to Dalton Elementary School. He coordinated with BPAs to cover gaps in security perimeters at
other Uvalde middle and high schools. He checked on at the Civic Center, returned
to the command center, then returned to the Uvalde High School and Morales Junior High
School to help reunify children with their parents. He requested assistance from BPAs over the
service radio for traffic control. WC observed that there was not a lot of command and
control. He described the situation as a chaotic mess and stated that it was difficult to get ahold
of anyone using service radios. He believed USBP was there to support and assist and respond
to the potential secondary threat.
WC (BRA), interviewed on February 9, 2023. (Exhibit 54)
On May 24, 2022, WC heard about the incident from a radio or phone call around
lunchtime. He traveled toward Uvalde in a USBP vehicle but got a flat tire along the way and
did not have a spare. Later, he learned the assailant had been confronted and shot, so he decided
to return to BRA. While at BRA, he learned of a secondary threat, so he continued toward
Uvalde with his emergency lights and sirens activated. He arrived at the Civic Center at
approximately 1:15:00 PM and provided perimeter security. He spoke with and provided
instruction to Brackettville BPAs. WC observed that the atmosphere at the Civic
Center was chaotic and disorganized. He never learned who had overarching command and
control and observed that law enforcement officers were given limited instructions. He believed
he had a duty to provide aid and react to the incident at Robb Elementary School because people
were dying.
On March 24, 2022, BPA was attending an EMT course at BRA when two BPA EMT
instructors told him there was a shooting and that they were leaving to go to Uvalde and assist.
Acting ACPA asked him to report to Robb Elementary School to assist as a certified
Chaplain. BPA drove toward there in his GOV with emergency equipment activated.
Enroute, he was directed to the Uvalde Border Patrol Station instead of the elementary school.
He arrived at UVA at approximately 1:15:00 PM and provided support wherever possible for the
rest of the day. He also assisted with distributing clean uniforms.
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On May 24, 2022, BPA was performing sign-cutting duties in the BRA area of
responsibility and heard on the service radio that all available agents in the field needed to
respond to Uvalde. He also received a message on his personal cell phone to respond to the
Civic Center to assist with releasing children to their parents. He hiked out of the brush, then
drove to Uvalde in his K9 vehicle with lights and sirens activated, arriving at the Civic Center at
approximately 1:20:00 PM. He coordinated with school staff at the Civic Center to create a
pathway for children arriving on buses to enter the building. He set up a security perimeter
around the Civic Center after a second threat was announced over the service radio. BPA
felt that the command and control structure was confusing and believed that his responsibility
was to provide backup and assistance.
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was assigned to the USBP SOD at DRT. He learned of the Robb
Elementary School incident via ATAK cell phone signal chat and text between BORSTAR
members. He put on his combat tactical shirt and body armor plates, gathered his agency radio
and rifle, and traveled alone to Uvalde. While enroute, SBPA heard mixed messages over
the radio about whether the assailant was alive or dead and where the assailant was. He also
received a text that said, “shooter is down.” Upon arriving at Robb Elementary School at
approximately 1:20:00 PM, he found his way via ATAK cell phone to BORSTAR members
gathered near a tree by the entrance of Robb Elementary School. He approached and consoled
BPA , then carried BPA ’s rifle and escorted him to his GOV, where he helped
secure the rifle.
SBPA instructed BORTAC members to report to UVA for a debrief, then drove to UVA.
After receiving a message about a second threat, he responded to a middle school (possibly
Dalton Middle School, but he does not remember), where he assisted with setting perimeter
security and established the perimeter. He stayed at the school for a few hours until all the
students were evacuated.
SBPA observed that law enforcement vehicles were unable to access the road into the
school and that it was eerily quiet, other than the sound of sirens. He stated that no one seemed
to know what was going on and no one appeared to be in command or control of the situation at
Robb Elementary School. SBPA believed USBP’s role was to respond in a support role
and stated that in an active shooter situation, whether USBP has peace officer authority does not
matter. He stated there is an implied obligation to respond and stop the assailant, with the
priorities being to engage the subject, stop the carnage, and treat the wounded.
On May 24, 2022, SA received a call from Acting Supervisory SA ((A)SSA)
telling him there was an active shooter situation in Uvalde and to be ready and on standby. SA
received a second call from (A)SSA to respond to Uvalde. SA
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drove his GOV at the speed limit because the vehicle was not equipped with emergency
equipment.
When he arrived at Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home at approximately 1:30:00 PM, SA
told him everything at the school was secure, but there was the possibility of a second
shooter at another school, so SA went to Uvalde Dual Language Academy to provide
security. He worked alongside other BPAs and other law enforcement officers to provide
security at that school, which was on lockdown. He left at approximately 4:00:00 PM and went
to UVA, then was sent to the Uvalde Memorial Hospital to serve as liaison between CBP and
hospital staff because a BPA had been shot and taken to the emergency room. After the BPA
was released, SA returned to UVA and remained in the muster room until he was
released around 12:00:00 AM.
SA believed the school principal and administrators and TXDPS troopers were
responsible for organizing the dismissal of students and interacting with parents. He stated that a
federal law enforcement officer has a responsibility and authority to respond to a threat of this
magnitude to provide security and protect the public.
WC (UVA), interviewed on February 16, 2023. (Exhibit 91)
On May 24, 2022, WC arrived at the office and heard on the USBP radio that a
shooting incident had occurred at Robb Elementary School. WC ordered his
immediate subordinates to remain at UVA to handle matters while he responded to the school.
He drove to Robb Elementary School in a marked USBP vehicle with emergency equipment
activated, arriving at approximately 1:30:00 PM, then attended a muster brief at UVA at 2:00:00
PM. After the brief, he went to the funeral home/incident command center to serve as the USBP
point of contact. He offered USBP resources to TXDPS, who requested USBP provide security
assistance at all schools and the Civic Center. WC ordered SBPAs and available
USBP personnel to report to different schools to provide security assistance for students being
released. He believed USBP had a responsibility to the community and to the United States to
respond and assist, especially if innocent people were being injured.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned watch duties at Dimmit Regional Hospital in
Carrizo Springs when he received a text from another BPA informing him of a shooting at an
Uvalde elementary school. BPA contacted the operations center at CAR to inquire
about responding to the school and was initially told to stand by, then 30 minutes later was told
someone was coming to relieve him so he could respond to the school.
He traveled to Uvalde in his GOV with lights and sirens activated, arriving at Robb Elementary
School at approximately 1:30:00 PM. He parked and was jogging toward the school with his
EMT bag when another BPA approached him and informed him to meet at UVA. He returned to
his vehicle and departed for UVA. While at UVA, the Uvalde Memorial Hospital requested
security assistance, so he and another BPA departed to go there in BPA ’s vehicle.
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Upon arrival, they identified there was ample security, so they responded to the Civic Center to
provide assistance. He assisted with reunifying several parents with their children, then dropped
the other BPA off at his vehicle at UVA and went home. BPA stated that the Civic
Center was a chaotic mess with parents, media, and law enforcement.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was working in a remote location near Spofford, Texas, when
she heard a request over the radio for any available units to report to Uvalde. An unknown
supervisor at BRA directed BPA and three other BPAs to report to the Civic Center.
They traveled there with lights and sirens activated, arriving at approximately 1:30:00 PM.
They were directed to stand on the sidewalk to facilitate crowd control. Later, BPA
relocated to provide security along the Civic Center’s perimeter, where she informed people they
needed to check in at the Civic Center to pick up students. BPA believed USBP’s efforts
were to assist school administrators and provide assistance to other agencies, including crowd
control and first aid.
BPA (DRS), interviewed on February 9, 2023. (Exhibit 50)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was serving as an instructor for an EMT class at DRT when a
fellow EMT instructor, BPA (BRA), told him to retrieve his medical kit because
they were leaving to go to Uvalde. They traveled in an unmarked GOV with lights activated, but
the lights stopped working before leaving Del Rio. At approximately 1:35:00 PM, BPAs
and arrived at the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home in Uvalde and attempted to follow
protocol by finding an on-scene incident commander. Finding none, they spoke with medical
personnel at the funeral home and were redirected to Uvalde Memorial Hospital.
While enroute to the hospital, they heard a radio communication regarding a suspected shooter at
Uvalde High School, so they decided to redirect to the high school. There, they assisted with
clearing classrooms, then went to nearby Morales Junior High School to provide additional
perimeter security for one hour before being relieved by someone from the UCSO. Next, they
went to Flores Elementary School to provide security and pass along information to parents.
When asked about USBP’s authority respond to incidents such as the one at Robb Elementary
School, BPA stated he believed, as federal law enforcement officers, it was USBP’s role
to respond to incidents and provide protection where needed.
SBPA (CAR), interviewed on February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 64)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA learned about the incident at Robb Elementary School because
a subordinate contacted him by phone and requested leave to go to the school because the
subordinate’s were there. SBPA approved the request and went to the
CAR checkpoint to cover for the subordinate until another BPA arrived. SBPA
monitored the response of other BPAs and EMTs on his Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK)
phone. He then heard that law enforcement officers had breached the classroom where the
assailant was. DRT requested SBPA to respond to UVA and provide Peer Support
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services. SBPA notified another Peer Support Member to also report to UVA to provide
Peer Support services, then drove alone to UVA in a marked USBP vehicle with emergency
equipment activated. He arrived at UVA at approximately 1:45:00 PM and provided Peer
Support services to affected BPAs. Upon hearing reports of a secondary threat, he shifted to
providing security and went to the Uvalde hospital for less than 10 minutes. Next, he went to the
Civic Center to provide security outside and direct and escort arriving parents to the entrance.
SBPA believed the priority was to send EMTs, then ensure the safety of the EMTs due
to possible threats. He responded to the incident as a matter of public safety.
On May 24, 2022, SA received a call from his supervisor telling him to grab his
equipment and respond to Uvalde because there was an incident involving a mass shooting and
USBP was involved. He drove to Uvalde in a GOV at the speed limit and obeying all traffic
laws because the vehicle was not equipped with emergency equipment. He parked near the
funeral home at approximately 1:45:00 PM and spoke with a TXDPS sergeant, trying to find the
incident command center.
SA saw another OPR SA and together they found the incident command center in a
trailer on the northeast side of the school. There, they learned about a possible secondary threat
at another school, so they left for Uvalde High School. They spent a few hours at the high
school providing security until all the children were released to their parents, then went to UVA
and awaited further instruction. He was directed to go to the Uvalde airport around 7:00:00 PM
and pick up CBP personnel. He took them back to UVA and was dismissed around 12:00:00
AM.
SA observed the area surrounding the school was chaos. He believed it was his duty to
act as a law enforcement officer to provide security and safety to the public.
SBPA (CAR), interviewed on February 14, 2023. (Exhibit 76)
On May 24, 2022, PAIC informed SBPA about the Robb Elementary School
shooting at a meeting they were both attending and instructed SBPA to respond to the
Uvalde Station. SBPA proceeded by himself in an unmarked USBP vehicle without
using emergency equipment, arriving in time to attend the 2:00:00 PM muster. He went to the
Uvalde hospital to check on a wounded BPA there but was unable to visit him. Next, SBPA
went to the Civic Center and provided security for 2.5–3 hours. He believed his role was
to provide support and security for whatever was needed.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was on riverine patrol on the Rio Grande near Eagle Pass, Texas,
with BPA (EGT) when BPA received a phone call directing them
to respond to the funeral home in Uvalde because they were both EMTs. BPA learned
about the shooting at Robb Elementary School while enroute by listening to the news on the
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radio. They traveled in a USBP vehicle with lights and sirens activated and parked several
blocks away from the funeral home. They arrived at the funeral home with their EMT
equipment at approximately 2:00:00 PM and were told that everyone needing medical treatment
had already been treated and to report to the Uvalde Border Patrol Station or Del Rio Sector.
As they were driving away from the funeral home, they heard a radio communication about a
possible threat to other Uvalde schools, so they followed another USBP vehicle that had its
emergency equipment activated and went to Dalton Elementary School, where they provided
security until the school’s lockdown was lifted. They then assisted school staff with releasing
students to parents and explained the lockdown and release procedures to parents. BPA
said he did not know who was in charge at the funeral home and did not observe any instructions
being provided to law enforcement officers. BPA explained that based on his training, in
a situation like this incident, the first responding law enforcement officer on scene is supposed to
take charge of the scene until a more senior law enforcement officer arrives. He stated that
USBP has previously assisted in emergency responses but understood these events to be
typically local matters with USBP providing a support role.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to a detail near Spofford, Texas, when he heard
a radio transmission from a helicopter advising that there was a school shooting in Uvalde and a
subsequent radio transmission ordering all BRA working agents to report to the Civic Center.
He left immediately for Uvalde with his team using a GOV with emergency lights and sirens
activated and arrived at the Civic Center at approximately 2:00:00 PM. There, he helped clear a
path so students could get inside and kept the area clear for vehicles arriving with students. He
spoke with parents who were asking questions and assisted with creating a perimeter around the
Civic Center because of a secondary threat that was being investigated. He also handed out a
few bottles of water. BPA observed numerous law enforcement officials from a
myriad of agencies at the Civic Center. He believed that USBP had authority to respond to
emergency situations and indicated that USBP has a lot of agents who live or work in the area.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was traveling back from a temporary duty assignment in
Carrizo Springs, Texas, when ACPA notified him of an active shooter at Robb
Elementary School in Uvalde and deployed him to Uvalde. He arrived at the scene at
approximately 2:30:00 PM and it was no longer active. He inquired where he could assist and
was advised that everyone who needed medical assistance had already been transported to the
hospital. He took photos of the suspect’s truck and remained at Robb Elementary School for
approximately one hour before hearing a radio transmission indicating a second threat at the
Uvalde High School, so he went there.
He was then advised to return to Robb Elementary School for a media briefing, so he proceeded
to the funeral home, where he received instructions to respond to the Civic Center to provide
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security during the media brief. He remained at the Civic Center for approximately two hours.
When the media brief ended, he was instructed to return to DRT.
BPA did not know who was in charge of the scene at Robb Elementary School. He stated
that it did not appear that anyone was in charge at the Civic Center. He did not know of a
specific authority that allowed USBP to respond, but believed USBP had a duty as public
servants and law enforcement officers to protect and serve the community.
WC (CAR), interviewed on February 28, 2023. (Exhibit 100)
On May 24, 2022, WC was scheduled to work the swing shift. He was at home reading
emails regarding the incident at Robb Elementary School on his government phone before his
shift started. Upon arriving at CAR shortly before his shift started, PAIC told WC
to send four agents from his shift to assist with traffic control at the Civic Center. WC
directed BPAs to respond to Uvalde and contact the incident commander. He went to Uvalde to
support the agents he sent, traveling by unmarked USBP vehicle without emergency equipment
activated. He arrived at the Hillcrest Memorial Funeral Home at approximately 3:00:00 PM,
then went to the Civic Center. He then went to UVA to see if they needed assistance and
remained there for 1.5 hours, then returned to the Civic Center. He stayed at the Civic Center for
a few hours until determining that support was no longer needed, then departed.
WC believed his role at the Civic Center was to provide security and crowd control as
needed. He did not know who was in charge at the Civic Center and didn’t see anyone giving
directions to the officers there. He stated that USBP’s authority or role was to support local law
enforcement agencies by providing security.
On May 24, 2022, ACPA was working at the DRT Strategic Communications
(STRATCOM) Branch when Deputy Chief Patrol Agent (DCPA) called and told him
there was a shooting incident in the Uvalde, Texas, area and that perhaps it was an active shooter
situation. DCPA instructed ACPA to deploy STRATCOM personnel to
Uvalde. ACPA traveled with the DRT Public Affairs Specialist in an unmarked GOV
without lights and sirens and ordered two STRATCOM BPAs to report to Robb Elementary
School. By the time they arrived in Uvalde, the threat was already neutralized and by the time
they arrived at Robb Elementary School (after 3:00:00 PM), there were no children or buses at
the school and the scene had been secured.
While at Robb Elementary School, ACPA attempted to collect information and ensure
that USBP personnel were not speaking to the media. He provided support to USBP personnel,
then entered the funeral home/incident command post to gather information. He heard a request
for assistance at the Civic Center, so he went there and provided security inside the Civic Center.
ACPA did not know who was in charge, but because it was a local incident, he assumed
local law enforcement was in charge. ACPA identified that as federal law enforcement
officers, BPAs had a responsibility to respond to an active shooter situation to save lives.
Page 172 of 201

WC (EGT), interviewed on February 14, 2023. (Exhibit 74)

On May 24, 2022, WC was the Watch Commander and acting Deputy Patrol Agent in
Charge at Eagle Pass South Station (EGS). He was with PAIC , who received a phone
call regarding the shooting at Robb Elementary School and told WC about the
incident. Initially WC decided to stay at EGS to avoid complicating the scene with
too many USBP personnel, but after it became prolonged and ongoing, he decided to respond to
the command post in Uvalde. WC traveled alone in an unmarked vehicle with the
lights and sirens activated and arrived at the command post at the funeral home near the school at
approximately 3:15:00 PM. He asked TXDPS where he could assist, then proceeded to Flores
Elementary School to assist the faculty with releasing children to their parents. He observed that
the incident command post was chaotic and it was difficult to determine who was in charge. He
stated that he was uncertain of USBP’s role but believed there was a responsibility to assist and
support other law enforcement agencies.
On May 24, 2022, BPA began his shift at 2:00:00 PM, attended the daily muster, then
departed CAR. He received a call from the duty supervisor to return to CAR because he would
be going to Uvalde. After he retrieved a rifle and magazines, BPA rode with another BPA
to Uvalde and arrived at the Civic Center at approximately 3:30:00 PM. There, they were
assigned to a parking lot on the Walgreens side of the Civic Center for the purpose of keeping
traffic in and out of the lot to a minimum. He directed parents looking for their children toward a
door where there were other uniformed officers. BPA characterized the response as “all
hands on deck.”
DPAIC (CAR), interviewed on February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 61)
On May 24, 2022, DPAIC received a text message from SBPA regarding an active
shooter threat at a school in Uvalde. DPAIC informed his supervisor of the active shooter
incident and the supervisor stated that there were enough BPAs already responding. Later, there
was a need for additional personnel for security at other buildings in Uvalde, so DPAIC
drove from Carrizo Springs to Uvalde in his personally owned vehicle (POV) following other
agents in patrol vehicles. He arrived in Uvalde approximately between 3:30:00 PM and 4:00:00
PM and drove to the Civic Center, where he assisted with establishing additional perimeter
security. He directed BPAs to relieve the initial perimeter security personnel, then report to the
command center. He talked with some parents he knew personally, then went to UVA at
5:00:00 PM, then left for home. DPAIC believed USBP’s role was to assist, stop any
threat, and provide security and assistance.
PAIC (CAR), interviewed on February 10, 2023. (Exhibit 58)
On May 24, 2022, PAIC was in a meeting with external stakeholders when someone in
the group received a phone call or text message advising of a possible active shooter in Uvalde.
PAIC cut the meeting short and sent an email to all CAR supervisors advising them to
Page 173 of 201

stand down and await further information. He attended a muster at CAR, then
proceeded with other agents to the Civic Center, arriving there approximately between 3:30:00
PM and 4:00:00 PM. There, he provided relief for BPAs who were already working at the Civic
Center. PAIC described the situation at the Civic Center as very disorganized when he
arrived. He stated that USBP’s role was only to support in any way possible because he believed
USBP had no jurisdiction or authority to respond to the incident.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was not yet on duty and was having lunch with when
she informed him that she had discovered through social media that a shooting had occurred at
Robb Elementary School. BPA reported for swing shift duty at CAR at
and was advised to respond to the incident command center and provide additional security
around the perimeter of Robb Elementary School. He traveled to Uvalde in a USBP patrol
vehicle. While enroute, he was directed to respond to the Civic Center instead and arrived there
at approximately 4:00:00 PM. At the Civic Center, he directed family members to the main
entrance and directed members of the media to a different area. He returned to CAR after being
relieved by officers from the Dilley Police Department. BPA indicated that USBP’s
role was to respond to the scene and assist where needed.
On May 24, 2022, BPA heard about the incident at Robb Elementary School from a
coworker while driving to work. He reported to CAR at and was told the situation
was handled, so he would remain at CAR. Later, he received instruction to pair up with other
BPAs and go to Uvalde to relieve BPAs working security at the Civic Center. He rode with
another BPA with emergency equipment activated, but they were later informed that it was not
necessary, so they deactivated it. BPA arrived at the Civic Center at approximately
4:00:00 PM and directed traffic there for two to three hours. He provided information to
civilians on where to go to vote, where to park, and where to get their children. He advised
people not to block the entrances/exits of the Civic Center. BPA stated that USBP’s role
was to support local law enforcement and protect the public from harm.
On May 24, 2022, BPA had begun work and attended the daily muster when he was
called to return to the station’s armory with other BPAs. They were assigned rifles and then
traveled to Uvalde. BPA was assigned to the Civic Center parking lot for
approximately two to three hours beginning at approximately 4:00:00 PM, after which he
returned to CAR. He stated that law enforcement officers have an obligation to respond to an
active shooter situation.
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ACPA (USBP Tucson Sector, Arizona), interviewed on February 10, 2023.

(Exhibit 70)
On May 24, 2022, ACPA was the SOS at USBP Eagle Pass South Station. SOS heard
about the incident at Robb Elementary School from another agent at the station. He took USBP
uniforms to UVA, driving in an unmarked GOV with lights and sirens activated. He arrived at
UVA approximately between 4:00:00 PM and 5:00:00 PM and dropped off the uniforms at the
UVA muster room. Then he went to Morales Junior High School and assisted school officials
with escorting children exiting the school to their parents and providing traffic control. After
that, he went to Uvalde High School, where he assisted a driver who did not look well. He
moved the driver’s vehicle to a parking spot and aided the driver until the driver’s mother
arrived. ACPA observed a large law enforcement presence from many different agencies.
He stated that USBP has authority and responsibility to provide service to the public and other
law enforcement officers by assisting with whatever emergency there is.
On May 24, 2022, BPA reported for duty after the incident at Robb Elementary School
was over. She did not respond to Robb Elementary School but was informed during the UVA
muster that USBP personnel had been involved in a school shooting incident. After the muster,
BPA made herself available to provide moral support. She received information that the
girlfriend of the Robb Elementary School assailant was going to “finish the job” and was
instructed by an SBPA to respond to Dalton Elementary School. She traveled to the school in
eight minutes and advised a uniformed law enforcement officer that she was there to assist. The
law enforcement officer directed her to park and provide perimeter security and assist with traffic
control. BPA stated that it was common for other law enforcement agencies to reach out
to USBP for assistance and that USBP usually responds in a secondary role.
ACPA (DRT), interviewed on March 1, 2023. (Exhibit 105)
On May 24, 2022, ACPA was overseeing the DRT Training and Traumatic Incident
Branch, which includes Peer Support, EAP, Chaplains, and canine support, and serving as the
acting Deputy Division Chief for DRT’s Mission Readiness Operations Division. While having
lunch with other USBP personnel, ACPA received either a call or a text message
regarding the shooting at Robb Elementary School. He left the restaurant and returned to DRT,
where he remained in Del Rio and did not respond to Uvalde. His role at DRT was to provide
resources to support responding BPAs by overseeing agent support services. He coordinated the
deployment of EMTs and a medical supply trailer; tasked Acting ACPA with activating
all Peer Support and Chaplain personnel to respond to UVA; coordinated with the watch
commander and a BPA to send a message through the emergency notification system to alert
personnel of the emergency and for people to reply with their status; requested additional
clinicians and agent services respond to Uvalde on a long-term basis; activated a surge team that
responded the day after the incident in two-week rotations; and requested funds for replacing
equipment and uniforms of BPAs who were hands-on at the scene. ACPA believed that
PAIC was responsible for supervising the field personnel responding to the incident and
that PAIC was managing the USBP personnel at UVA.
Page 175 of 201

CBP PERSONNEL WHO SUPPORTED THE RESPONSE

Some CBP employees did not respond to Robb Elementary School, but instead responded
elsewhere or remained where they were to provide support to the law enforcement response. The
following is a summary of the interviews provided by these employees:
BPA (DRT), interviewed on February 28, 2023. (Exhibit 93)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to DRT headquarters on a detail as the Peer
Support Coordinator. BPA was having lunch with other USBP personnel when he
learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School from a post on Facebook. Shortly after that,
everyone at the table began receiving notifications on their government cell phones. BPA
received calls from BPAs in Uvalde notifying him about the shooting and requesting
Peer Support help. He retrieved the Peer Support roster and began contacting personnel to report
to UVA. He departed Del Rio with another Peer Support Member who drove while BPA
continued to contact Peer Support personnel. He arrived at UVA at approximately 1:00:00 PM
and began coordinating and assigning tasks to Peer Support personnel. He sent a group of Peer
Support BPAs to provide security at the house of a BPA whose was one of the
deceased children from the shooting. From the time he arrived at the Uvalde Border Patrol
Station at approximately 1:00:00 PM, BPA understood that CPA Owens was in
command and control at UVA.
SBPA (EGT), interviewed on March 3, 2023. (Exhibit 129)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was on detail as adjutant to CPA Owens at DRT. CPA
Owens summoned SBPA to his office and told him that there was an active shooter at
an Uvalde elementary school. SBPA retrieved his ballistic vest and drove with CPA
Owens to Uvalde with lights and sirens activated when moving through intersections. They
arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00 PM, approximately 10 minutes
after the classroom was breached and the assailant was shot.
SBPA met with other BPAs at a tree on the north side of the school, then returned to
his GOV and drove to UVA. He left to pick up food and brought it to UVA, then drove back to
EGT. SBPA did not know who was in command, but he believed TXDPS was
responsible for investigating. He understood that if there is an incident of this type, USBP would
respond and stated that USBP is obligated to respond to active shooter events and regularly
assists other agencies.
Chief Border Patrol Agent (CPA) Jason Owens (DRT), interviewed on March 13, 2023.
(Exhibit 165)
On May 24, 2022, a DCPA came into CPA Owens’s office in Del Rio, Texas, and informed him
that there was a report of an active shooter in Uvalde. CPA Owens rode in an unmarked GOV
while SBPA drove with lights and sirens activated. While enroute, CPA Owens
contacted the TXDPS Regional Commander and apprised him of the situation. He talked to
DRT Division Chief (DC) to make sure all notifications were going to the chain of
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command and instructed him to activate the call tree and contact Office of Field Operations
(OFO) and AMO to get information on any of their personnel who had responded. CPA Owens
told DC to get as many people to Uvalde as needed to help and to activate Peer Support.
He relayed information to DCPA to tell BPAs to do what they needed to do and not to
wait.
SBPA and CPA Owens arrived at Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:00:00
PM and parked one to two blocks away, then walked toward the school. CPA Owens told
DCPA to make sure all BPAs were accounted for and taken care of. Upon realizing that
-
the school was a crime scene, he directed all USBP personnel to finish helping, then move to
UVA. He directed DCPA to get fresh uniforms and Peer Support ready at UVA, then
instructed DCPA to send BPAs wherever they could to help in response to additional
threats broadcasted on social media. CPA Owens contacted USBP Headquarters to plan with
other USBP sectors to keep operations running in Uvalde. CPA Owens coordinated moving
personnel from Laredo and other areas to cover the Uvalde area of responsibility. He spoke with
DHS Secretary Mayorkas and CBP Commissioner Magnus and advised them of the situation.
CPA Owens gave involved personnel two days of administrative leave to decompress and talk
with Peer Support.
CPA Owens stated that radio traffic was difficult to understand, with muffled sound and an open
mic at one point. He observed the scene at Robb Elementary School to be very chaotic with
vehicles parked everywhere. CPA Owens identified that BORTAC and BORSTAR each have a
commander and first-line supervisors for specific elements of each team. For May 24, 2022,
these were PAIC , acting DPAIC , and SBPA . CPA Owens stated that
when any incident like an active shooter takes place, USBP partners with local law enforcement
or a first responder agency in the jurisdiction. He stated the first responder agency takes
command and USBP is there in a support role. CPA Owens stated he responded because of the
severity of the incident; normally he would stay at DRT.
PAIC (USBP Laredo South Station, Texas), interviewed on February 13,
2023. (Exhibit 69)
On May 24, 2022, PAIC was PAIC at the USBP Del Rio Station (DRS), Texas, and was
having lunch when the first message came in reporting an active shooter in Uvalde. Later, he
was on his way to Eagle Pass, Texas, when a call came in requesting help in Uvalde. PAIC
changed direction and proceeded toward Uvalde to rendezvous with EMTs. He parked
near Robb Elementary School at approximately 1:30:00 PM and walked to within 50 yards of
the school, then heard a radio transmission instructing all USBP personnel to go to UVA for a
muster at 2:00:00 PM. PAIC observed that the atmosphere at UVA was chaotic and the
muster was emotional. He observed there was no real lead agency or command structure at the
school and believed that USBP was there in a support role.
Page 177 of 201

Deputy Patrol Agent in Charge (DPAIC) (DRT SOD), interviewed on March 1,

2023. (Exhibit 108)
On May 24, 2022, the acting PAIC informed DPAIC of an active shooter situation at a
school in Uvalde. DPAIC went to the conference room and began to write the
information being relayed on a display board. He contacted all SOD BPAs on duty and
instructed them to report to Robb Elementary School, then began a group text message with
BORTAC and BORSTAR members.
DPAIC then left DRT to go to the school to offer supervision and assistance but received
-
a call while enroute that BPA had been shot and to the hospital. DPAIC went to
the Uvalde Memorial Hospital to check on BPA , arriving there at approximately 1:45:00
PM. He relieved the other BPAs who were assisting BPA and filled out the medical
paperwork for BPA . After that, he went to UVA for a debrief and told all SOD BPAs
that they were free to take a few days of administrative leave. He encouraged them to participate
in the USBP-provided Peer Support services and informed them that participation in interviews
by TXDPS and the FBI was voluntary.
Because of DRT’s distance from Uvalde and the time it would take for them to arrive at the
scene, DPAIC thought the deployment of USBP assets to the shooting was more of a
gesture of support in response to a request from another law enforcement agency. He thought
the assailant would be taken care of quickly, but that BORSTAR medical assets could potentially
be of assistance. He stated that USBP only responds to requests from other law enforcement
agencies as a secondary or backup role to the requesting agency.
On May 24, 2022, SOS
-
at Robb Elementary School. ACPA
called and informed ACPA
- that Peer Support was needed

deployed to Uvalde in a Peer Support role. While
enroute, she received a call to report to UVA instead of the school. She arrived there after
2:00:00 PM and helped provide clean uniforms to everyone and collect the bloodstained
uniforms for evidence. She was then asked to go and pick up food for everyone. She comforted
an upset BPA and provided him with a clean uniform and emotional support. She departed UVA
at approximately 11:00:00 PM, returned to DRT to pick up her POV, and went home. ACPA
did not know who was in charge at Robb Elementary School but heard that USBP SOD
was in charge or had taken over.
Mission Support Specialist (MSS) (DRT), interviewed on March 3, 2023.
(Exhibit 126)
On May 24, 2022, Special Operations Supervisor (SOS) and Branch Chief
approached MSS and asked if she would be willing to assist as Peer Support with an
active shooter situation with mass casualties. MSS drove a GOV with emergency
equipment activated toward Robb Elementary School while a BPA passenger gathered
information via phone. She went to UVA instead of the school, arriving just in time for the
2:00:00 PM muster. She assisted where she could without interrupting existing conversation
Page 178 of 201

among BPAs. She helped sort piles of uniforms so that agents who responded to the school
could change clothes. She also helped organize tables for food and drinks and remained at UVA
until approximately 6:30:00 PM, then returned to DRT and went home.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to the EGT Planning Team and received a phone
call from a USBP supervisor asking him to retrieve uniforms from EGT and take them to the
Uvalde Border Patrol Station. As part of the Peer Support Program, BPA took the
uniforms to UVA for BPAs who had blood on their uniforms. He drove to UVA in a USBP
vehicle with emergency lights and sirens activated, arriving there at approximately 2:20:00 PM.
At UVA, he assisted with organizing the uniforms in the UVA muster room and prepared food
for those who responded. BPA indicated BPAs had a duty to assist in any response to
the extent needed to ensure the safety of the public and fellow BPAs and that USBP is
responsible for protecting lives.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was at the USBP Soft Sided Facility in Eagle Pass, Texas, when
he received a telephone call from SBPA informing him that a shooting had occurred at
Robb Elementary School and instructing him to respond to EGT to get a USBP vehicle and
respond to UVA. BPA traveled alone in the GOV with the emergency lights activated,
behind another BPA in a patrol vehicle. He arrived at UVA at approximately 2:40:00 PM and
helped by getting food and water. He made himself available as a Peer Support Member, then
returned to Eagle Pass after another Peer Support Coordinator arrived. BPA believed
USBP’s role was to respond and help at the incident location.
SOS (DRT SIU), interviewed on February 8, 2023. (Exhibit 48)
On May 24, 2022, SOS was assigned to the Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU) in Del Rio,
Texas, when he received a text message from PAIC (DRT) about a shooting at a
school in Uvalde. Upon receiving the text, SOS walked from the SIU to the Border
Intelligence Center (BIC), where he heard additional information over the radio. Initially SOS
remained at the BIC in Del Rio, assisting law enforcement efforts on the ground in
Uvalde by querying license plates via radio and answering phone calls to uncover useful
information about the assailant and any possible associates. A BPA at EGS requested SOS
respond to UVA as a Peer Support Member. SOS traveled there alone in an
unmarked USBP vehicle, not using the emergency lights or sirens, and arrived at approximately
3:00:00 PM. He coordinated with other members of the Peer Support Team at UVA for several
hours. SOS stated it was USBP’s responsibility to respond based on a general duty of
law enforcement officers to protect lives and make arrests for felonies committed in their
presence.
Page 179 of 201


On May 24, 2022, BPA was working as a K9 handler at CAR when a coworker told
him the news of the shooting. Shortly after that, he received a phone call from his Peer Support
Coordinator, who advised him to respond to Robb Elementary School. BPA drove to
Uvalde in his K9 patrol vehicle. While enroute, he received a phone call to respond to the
Uvalde Border Patrol Station, where he arrived at approximately 3:00:00 PM. There, he
identified arriving BPAs who looked distraught and offered to speak with them regarding their
experience. BPA stated that USBP’s role was to provide assistance as law
enforcement officers wherever needed.
BPA (DRS), interviewed on February 13, 2023. (Exhibit 68)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was on his way to work at DRS when he received a phone call
from Watch Commander asking if he was willing to travel to UVA as a Peer Support
Member. BPA retrieved his unmarked patrol vehicle from DRS and traveled alone to
UVA without lights or siren. He arrived at UVA at approximately 3:15:00 PM and proceeded to
the UVA muster room where he waited for BPAs to approach him for assistance, rather than
seeking them out. He believed USBP’s role was to respond and provide assistance.
CBP Officer (CBPO) (Del Rio Port of Entry, Del Rio, Texas), interviewed
on February 13, 2023. (Exhibit 65)
On May 24, 2022, CBPO was on detail to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives (ATF) as an Analytical Targeting Officer (ATO) when she received text
messages on her ATF-issued phone that there was an active shooter. She completed her
shift and went home, where she heard that blood donations were needed and
requested permission to respond. CBPO drove her POV to the Civic Center, arriving
there at approximately 4:00:00 PM, where she was advised that blood was not needed, so she
returned home. CBPO stated that there did not appear to be any agency in charge at the
Civic Center.
BPA (COM), interviewed on February 16, 2023. (Exhibit 92)
On May 24, 2022, BPA was scheduled to work at COM from
. He attended the COM muster, where he learned what had happened at Robb Elementary
School. A supervisor instructed him to get two boxes of USBP uniforms and take them to UVA.
He drove in a marked USBP vehicle without activating the emergency equipment and arrived at
UVA at approximately 4:00:00 PM. After delivering the uniforms, he headed back to COM and
passed the Civic Center, where he saw other BPAs. He stopped in the parking lot to determine if
anyone needed relief. No one did, so he continued to COM. BPA stated that USBP has a
responsibility to respond to active shooter situations because they are usually the first law
enforcement agency to arrive on scene. If another agency were already there, USBP would assist
in any way possible.
Page 180 of 201

PAIC (EGS), interviewed on February 14, 2023. (Exhibit 71)

On May 24, 2022, PAIC learned of the shooting from WC , who had
received a message about it from his spouse. PAIC activated WC and BPA
to provide EMT services and Peer Support. PAIC patrolled an area near
Kennedy Elementary School in Eagle Pass, Texas, and provided security at a middle school to
assist with parents picking up children. Later, he traveled to UVA to bring clean uniforms,
arriving there between 4:00:00 PM and 5:00:00 PM. PAIC stated that USBP is the
largest law enforcement entity in the area and will provide any support when needed.
SBPA (USBP Falfurrias Station, Falfurrias, Texas), interviewed on March
22, 2023. (Exhibit 211)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was serving as the administrative supervisor assigned to UVA
when he heard a transmission on the radio that there was an armed subject running toward Robb
Elementary School. SBPA requested a repeat of the radio transmission to confirm what
he heard, then requested the radio channel be cleared of all other traffic. He requested BPAs to
respond to Robb Elementary School, while he himself remained at UVA and did not respond to
Uvalde.
As the only person left at UVA, he fielded phone calls, maintained accountability of assets, and
coordinated various requests. He requested a radio patch via sector communications and handed
out rifles from the armory as BPAs were deploying. He maintained a list of personnel who were
in the field and coordinated availability of uniforms for BPAs who needed a change of clothes,
as well as water to the field and food for BPAs reporting to the station. SBPA stayed in
constant communication with the BIC at DRT and requested the BIC contact other stations to
request assistance. He assisted with obtaining information about BPA-I ’s involvement
with the initial stages of the incident and initiated the Evolving Situation Report.
SBPA did not know who was in command at Robb Elementary School. He stated that
USBP’s response and presence was in a support capacity to the local or state law enforcement
entities who had peace officer status.
PAIC (DRS), interviewed on February 16, 2023. (Exhibit 86)
On May 24, 2022, PAIC was acting Division Chief of Operations ((A)DCO) at Del Rio
Sector (DRT). (A)DCO was at lunch when he received several phone calls indicating
something was going on in Uvalde related to an active shooter. He did not respond to Uvalde.
Rather, he remained in Del Rio, where he established a makeshift emergency operations center
between the radio room and, which acted as a conduit for incoming information. He facilitated
information flow, notifications, and resource management from outside DRT and with
headquarters in Washington, DC. He relayed a request for vital resources to USBP Big Bend
Sector and USBP Laredo Sector, including manpower and resiliency teams. At approximately
12:47:00 PM, he received a message that the Hillcrest Funeral Home was the incident command
post and put out a directive for all EMTs to activate and respond to that location.
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SOS (DRT SOD), interviewed on March 22, 2023. (Exhibit 215)

On May 24, 2022, SOS was on duty at the Border Intelligence Center at DRT overseeing
the Collections Unit for Intelligence and Confidential Human Sources when he heard radio
chatter regarding an active shooter at a school in Uvalde. He then received a call from SBPA
advising that there was an active shooter at an elementary school in Uvalde. SOS
granted permission for SBPAs to respond to Robb Elementary School while he himself
remained in Del Rio and did not respond to Uvalde. He told them to wear their body armor for
easy identification. He tasked his team to contact their sources for information regarding the
assailant, but the sources did not provide any usable intelligence. SOS stated that his role
was to oversee SBPA and ensure the safety of BPA-I and USBP’s role was
to respond and assist other law enforcement agencies.
WC (CAR), interviewed on February 15, 2023. (Exhibit 78)
On May 24, 2022, WC heard about the incident over a radio channel that scans the local
police channels. He contacted DPAIC , who instructed WC to stand down and
not send any personnel. Later, WC received a call to deploy personnel, so he deployed
three SBPAs while he himself remained in Carrizo Springs and did not respond to Uvalde. He
believed the purpose of an active shooter response was to eliminate any threats posed by the
active shooter.
SOS (DRT), interviewed on February 15, 2023. (Exhibit 82)
On May 24, 2022, SOS was the supervisor over the Professional Standards Branch (PSB),
Management Inquiry Team at DRT. While on his way to Eagle Pass, Texas, from Del Rio, SOS
received a phone call asking what he knew about an active shooter at Robb Elementary
School. He was initially not instructed to go to Uvalde, but then decided to return to DRT when
others in his chain of command went. SOS got rifles for the other agents who went to
Uvalde while he himself remained in Del Rio and did not respond to Uvalde. At DRT, he ran the
PSB and performed hourly safety checks on his team. SOS indicated that USBP is always
called on to assist local law enforcement because USBP has more assets and better trained
personnel. He believed USBP had a duty to respond to an active shooter.
Executive Officer (XO) (DRT), interviewed on March 15, 2023. Exhibit 179)
On May 24, 2022, XO was about to have lunch when he received a call from the acting
PAIC for SOD at DRT informing him that there was an active shooter at or near a school in
Uvalde and that they were deploying to Uvalde. XO gave authority to the BORTAC
and BORSTAR unit personnel to respond and support local law enforcement. XO
returned to DRT, where he remained and did not respond to Uvalde. He began trying to
coordinate the USBP response and remained in contact with PAIC , DPAIC , and
(A)PAIC , serving as the conduit for information flow to USBP Headquarters in
Washington, DC. Either XO or PAIC authorized the deployment of USBP
personnel to other schools to provide support upon receiving information about a second threat.
Page 182 of 201

Initially, XO
-
barricaded subject. XO
understood the situation to be an active shooter, but it later changed to a
believed the command structure on scene was DPAIC
serving as incident commander until relieved by PAIC
state law enforcement. XO
in coordination with local and
stated that USBP’s role was to provide support to the local
law enforcement agencies and USBP’s authority to respond to an active shooter was to protect
the public and prevent further loss of life, especially if a felony was committed in the presence of
a federal law enforcement officer.
SBPA (USBP Artesia, New Mexico), interviewed on February 15, 2023.
(Exhibit 83)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was serving as a BPA and Firearms Instructor at the USBP Del
Rio Sector (DRT) firearms range, when a visiting firearms instructor notified him of a possible
active shooter at a school in Uvalde. While other firearms instructors equipped themselves with
rifles and body armor and departed the DRT range for Uvalde, BPA stayed behind to
manage the ongoing CBP firearms qualifications at the range. He did not respond to Uvalde.
WC (COM), interviewed on March 14, 2023. (Exhibit 173)
On May 24, 2022, WC was assigned as the Deputy Incident Commander to the DRT
Incident Command Post, where he was responsible for managing logistics and assets associated
with an ongoing migrant surge. He learned of the shooting at Robb Elementary School from a
BPA as he entered the DRT conference room. WC remained in Del Rio and did not
respond to Uvalde. He collected and coordinated SOD assets and personnel who would respond
to Robb Elementary School with the acting PAIC and DPAIC. He expressed concern regarding
USBP overcrowding at the scene, then relocated to the BIC to centralize information gathering.
He called all USBP stations within the DRT to collect information on personnel and assets that
were deployed to Robb Elementary School. WC did not know if the scene was live or if
it was a false call, but he treated it as a potential active shooter situation. He stated that USBP
always assists state and local law enforcement when requested but acts in only a secondary
capacity. He believed USBP did not have authority to take control of an active shooter situation
but had a duty as federal agents to respond and assist. He was not aware of the command
structure for USBP at the school.
SBPA (BRA), interviewed on February 16, 2023. (Exhibit 88)
On May 24, 2022, SBPA was the duty supervisor at BRA and heard about the
incident at Robb Elementary School while listening to radio communications between BPAs and
the USBP AMO helicopter pilot flying in the BRA area of responsibility. SBPA
called UVA and learned that the incident was a school shooting and inquired if UVA needed
anything. He dispatched BRA EMTs and brush crew BPAs to Uvalde, while he himself
remained in Brackettville and did not respond to Uvalde. He relayed information he received to
the personnel he dispatched. When Robb Elementary School was going to begin moving
children out of the school and to the Civic Center, he redirected some of the BPAs to the Civic
Center and directed other BPAs to assist with checkpoint duties at the USBP checkpoint near
Uvalde. He redirected BPAs and EMTs to wherever WC needed them and made calls
Page 183 of 201

and status checks to make sure they were alright. SBPA did not know who from
USBP may have been in command in Uvalde and stated that he served as the point of contact at
BRA for BPAs.
PAIC (DRT), interviewed on March 23, 2023. (Exhibit 214)
On May 24, 2022, PAIC had oversight of the Border Intelligence Center and Radio Room
920-Communication Center. He was having lunch with a group when someone in the group
received a call informing them of a possible shooting in Uvalde. After lunch, he returned to the
BIC radio room to validate the information, assist with any reporting, and allocate resources. He
ensured staff assigned a scribe, created an accurate timeline, conducted research to identify the
assailant, and identified the area of the incident to provide a map to personnel responding to the
scene. He ensured that radio communications were monitored and information was disseminated
to the field. Upon the BIC receiving information that the assailant’s girlfriend made a threat at
another location, he worked to identify the girlfriend and provide information to other law
enforcement agencies.
PAIC remained in Del Rio and did not respond to Uvalde. He did not respond to the
school because he knew there would be enough resources deployed. He stated that the BIC was
the USBP incident command for reporting and communication flow. During the incident, he was
informed that there was a radio broadcast or discussion regarding individuals at the scene asking
for keys and having difficulty getting through the doors.
PAIC stated that USBP protocol is to respond to critical incidents and that it is common for
local law enforcement agencies to request assistance from USBP because of the manpower and
skills USBP has in comparison to small agencies. PAIC stated that the role USBP would
assume was based on the situation. He believed DPAIC was initially in charge at the
scene but had been relieved upon leadership learning that he had a child at Robb Elementary
School. PAIC did not know what agency was in command of the overall law enforcement
response but did know that USBP’s role was to provide support and assist local law enforcement
agencies.
On May 24, 2022, BPA was assigned to the UVA radio room, where he learned that the
Uvalde Police Department was in pursuit of an unknown individual. Radio communications
indicated that the individual crashed his vehicle near Robb Elementary School. Then BPA
began receiving calls from DRT and BRA asking if agents were needed to assist with the
unfolding situation. BPA instructed BRA and DRT not to send agents at that time, then
learned from UPD radio transmissions that shots were being fired at the school. He observed
other BPAs checking out M4 rifles in preparation to respond and received a call from UPD
requesting USBP assistance at Robb Elementary School at approximately 11:45:00 AM.
BPA remained at UVA and did not respond to Robb Elementary School. He received
numerous calls from media outlets requesting information about the evolving incident and
Page 184 of 201

referred all media inquiries to the DRT Public Information Officer. He received calls from BRA
and DRT and instructed both to send all available assets to Robb Elementary School. BPA
believed that UPD was handling the situation. He perceived the radio traffic to be very
unorganized and chaotic and observed an open mic for 1–3 minutes. Based on the radio traffic,
it sounded like a barricaded subject at the school. He understood UPD to be in charge and he
stated that USBP’s role at the school was to provide assistance to the local police department.
SOS (CAR), interviewed on February 15, 2023. (Exhibit 81)
On May 24, 2022, SOS was attending a meeting with an oil field company and other
USBP personnel, two of whom received a text message and phone call about the incident in
Uvalde. PAIC (CAR) told SOS that no response was needed, so SOS
remained in Carrizo Springs and did not respond to Uvalde. SOS stated that
USBP’s role was backup because of the time it would take to respond and that their
responsibility was to protect the public.
DPAIC (DRT BIC), interviewed on March 15, 2023. (Exhibit 180)
On May 24, 2022, DPAIC
message from PAIC
- was in the prosecutions building when he received a text
regarding a possible active shooter at Robb Elementary School. He
received another text a few minutes later confirming the active shooter situation. DPAIC
remained in Del Rio and did not respond to Uvalde. He returned to the BIC and went
to the radio room. He knew he was responsible for ensuring that all recordings were captured,
that a timeline was initiated and maintained, and that all his staff at the BIC, UVA, and other
USBP stations were accounted for.
He alternated between the BIC and the radio room to ensure the timeline was maintained with
incoming information from the scene. He asked (A)PAIC if BORTAC was responding and
learned they were 30 minutes away. DPAIC assigned Law Enforcement Information
System Specialist (LEISS) as the scribe to record the timeline of events. He requested
to patch the USBP radio communication with the police department and other agencies they
could patch with, specifically the UCSO and TXDPS. He assigned SOS and WC
to conduct research on the assailant and obtain information from social media platforms. DPAIC
questioned who the onsite incident commander was, but no one was able to provide an
answer.
He asked the radio room to identify the source of the “hot mic” so the BIC could relay the
information to the source. He asked LEISS if she could override the “hot mic,” but
she was unable to. Later, the BIC identified the source and relayed the information to a
BORTAC member to make the person aware.
DPAIC continuously received information and shared information. The BIC identified
the assailant, created a “lookout” with information and a photograph of him, and disseminated
the information to the field and USBP personnel at the scene. He instructed his staff not to send
Page 185 of 201

anyone to Robb Elementary School because resources needed to be managed to address and
respond to incoming information.
DPAIC explained that the BIC became the Sector’s incident command center with
(A)DC as the incident commander because he was the highest ranking USBP official
present. DPAIC did not believe anyone was in command of USBP personnel at the
school but understood he was part of the command staff in charge of what was being coordinated
at the BIC and radio room. He identified that TXDPS requested BORTAC to respond and stated
that BORTAC and BORSTAR are always ready to support state and local law enforcement
agencies.
DPAIC stated that it was chaotic managing the information and misinformation
received, including conflicting threat and no-threat information from Sheriff’s dispatchers. He
encountered difficulty with school staff when attempting to corroborate the assailant’s
biographical and previous enrollment information. DPAIC identified that DRT has
MOUs with other federal law enforcement agencies, but not with any with state or local
agencies. He understood USBP’s authority and responsibility to respond was in a support role
unless told otherwise and stated that no one at the BIC was able to identify a specific person or
agency who was in charge at the scene.
WC (DRT), interviewed on February 13, 2023. (Exhibit 66)
On May 24, 2022, WC was serving in an acting capacity as the Acting Chief of the
Training and Traumatic Incident Management Branch. She received multiple phone calls from
people regarding the situation in Uvalde and a text message from another agent saying they were
enroute to UVA. WC notified EMT BPAs of the need for them to report to Uvalde,
while she stayed at DRT to field incoming calls and communicate activation messages as
required. She did not respond to Uvalde. WC gathered clean uniforms for people who
had responded. She activated the Mission Support Specialist and an SBPA for Peer Support
assistance. WC stated that USBP responded to assist other law enforcement agencies in
a support capacity and that nothing was reported about who had command or control of the
situation.
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS
OPR interviewed CBP subject matter experts in the fields of NIMS and ICS protocols and active
shooter training. The following is a summary of each of OPR’s interviews with these CBP
personnel:
ACPA (Director, National Firearms and Tactics Branch, LESC),
interviewed on August 10, 2023. (Exhibit 228)
On May 24, 2022, ACPA was the Director of the LESC Pre-Deployment Branch. He
was located in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and did not respond to Uvalde. ACPA explained
that the Active Shooter Instructor Training Program (ASITP) was developed in 2009 and added
Page 186 of 201

to the basic Firearms Instructor Training Program in 2019. It is a principle-based, scenario-based

program that emphasizes the use of cover, positioning, team movements, and clearing rooms, all
focused on tactics. The training was discontinued in 2020 because of a lack of requests, but was
restarted in 2021 based on USBP leadership’s request. The content was updated to include
clearing “L” and “T” intersections, shoot/no-shoot situations, and safe weapon handling skills.
The training does not teach hostage negotiation tactics or what to do in hostage situations and
provides no practical applications or scenarios regarding the differences between active shooter
and barricaded subject. ACPA stated that the training provides complex subject matter
regarding closed and locked doors, as well as threat prioritization focusing first on people, then
open doors, then closed doors. ACPA explained that the course teaches that a response
to an active shooter incident is broken into two parts: a contact team and a rescue team. The
contact team focuses on the primary mission of stopping the threat while the rescue team comes
behind the contact team, focusing on the medical triage. The training lacks any instructional
content for breaching locked doors, medical triage, or what responders should do once an active
shooter is neutralized.
ACPA stated that USBP’s legal authority to respond to active shooter situations is
convoluted. He explained that LESC and OCC have been working with Congress regarding
legislation to provide CBP specific authority, but that most of the existing authority to respond is
based on past practices of supporting local and state law enforcement agencies. Students are
instructed that the first person on scene must pick up incident command and take control until
someone with more rank or experience arrives and takes over. ASITP focuses on CBP being
first to arrive; it does not discuss what to do if other agencies arrive first or if CBP observes a
lack of response from other agencies.
Branch Chief (BC) (CBP Watch, Incident Management Branch), interviewed
on August 7, 2023. (Exhibit 227)
BC is located in Washington, DC, and did not respond to Uvalde. He explained that the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a doctrinal standard or baseline that allows
different agencies responding to incidents to operate in a common, consistent way. He explained
that ICS is a part of NIMS that allows the sharing of information and resources with all
responding agencies at all levels. He identified that CBP offers training on NIMS and ICS
protocols through Acadis, CBP’s distance learning platform, but more training is needed across
CBP in both areas. BC stated that the main principle of ICS is that incidents start and end
locally. The first person on scene is the incident commander until others who are more capable
arrive, then the role can be turned over as the situation dictates. He explained that chaos will
result in a situation where no one takes charge or follows ICS protocols.
PERSONNEL NOT INVOLVED
In the interest of thoroughness, OPR interviewed all CBP personnel identified during interviews
as potentially being a part of the CBP response to the events on May 24, 2022. The following is
a summary of OPR’s interviews with people whom OPR determined did not respond to Robb
Elementary School or other activities on May 24, 2022:
Page 187 of 201

EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Management Directive 0810
Texas House of Representatives Investigative Committee on the Robb
2
Elementary Shooting, Interim Report 2022
Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Robb
3 Elementary School Attack Response Assessment and Recommendations, June
2022
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,

4 Rescue, Response, and Resilience: A critical incident review of the Orlando
public safety response to the attack on the Pulse nightclub, 2017
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services,
5
Critical Incident Review: Active Shooter at Robb Elementary School, 2024
6 U.S. Census Bureau Data, Uvalde City, TX (2022)
7 CBP e3 database of G-166 events where bailouts were reported
8 CBP Standards of Conduct, Directive Number 51735-013B
9 CBP Use of Force Policy, Publication Number 4500-002A
10 The Law of Search Manual: The Law of Arrest, Search & Seizure Manual, M-69
11 ALERRT & FBI Active Shooter Response – Level 1, Version 7.2
12 Active Shooter Instructor Training Program, Instructor Guidebook
13 CBP Incident Management / Operations Support, CBP LFC Course
Excerpts from Program Syllabus for U.S. Border Patrol Integrated (USBPI)
14
Training Program
Model Uniform Core Criteria (MUCC) for Mass Casualty Incident Triage,
15
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
2021 National Emergency Medical Services Education Standards, National
16
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
17 Legal Differences Between Certification and Licensure, NREMT website
Memorandum from Office of Health Security Director of Emergency Medical
18 Services to U.S. Border Patrol National EMT Program Manager, October 14,
2022
19 TXDPS Voluntary Statement from TXDPS Ranger
20 TXDPS Voluntary Statement from ZCSO Deputy
Page 194 of 201

Department of Homeland Security
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington D.C., 20229
May 10, 2024
MEMORANDUM
Modification of Case Closing Report UF2022586
The purpose of this memorandum is to memorialize the addition of a disclaimer to the first page
of Case Closing Report UF2022586.
Following the final signature on Case Closing Report UF2022586, CBP’s Office of Chief
Counsel requested the following clarification be inserted on the first page of the report:
DISCLAIMER
This internal report outlines, for CBP leadership, the investigative findings, factual
observations and conclusions, and recommendations of CBP OPR. OPR's identification
and characterization of legal provisions in this report is offered to provide background
and context for findings, observations, conclusions, and recommendations in this report.
Nothing in this report constitutes, or should be interpreted as, official legal analysis,
legal interpretation, or the legal position of CBP or DHS.
The Office of Professional Responsibility concurs with the request from CBP’s Office of Chief
Counsel and is reissuing an updated report with the included language on the first page. No
other changes were made.
DANIEL P Digitally signed by DANIEL P

ALTMAN
ALTMAN Date: 2024.05.13 13:11:56 -04'00'
Daniel P. Altman
Executive Director
Investigative Operations Division
U.S. Customs and Border Protection

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

Office of Professional Responsibility

THIS REPORT CONTAINS SENSITIVE LAW ENFORCMENT MATERIAL. IT MAY NOT BE

CASE CLOSING REPORT

CASE NUMBER: UF2022586 FIELD OFFICE: IOD Headquarters

x The failure of arriving law enforcement personnel to establish identifiable incident

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

x In the immediate aftermath of this incident, numerous investigative agencies, including

x Responding to critical incidents can overwhelm both an organization’s and individuals’

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

SUMMARY OF SCOPE AND METHODOLOGIES

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

x USBP Del Rio Sector (DRT) Staff:

Map Source: USBP GIS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Map Source: USBP GIS

Figure 4. Area around Robb Elementary School

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Figure 5. Layout of West Building at Robb Elementary School

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

TIMELINE OF EVENTS – MAY 24, 2022

This timeline is intended to be an overview of the chronology of events. Additional information

The assailant fired multiple shots outside Robb Elementary School

The assailant entered Robb Elementary School through the west

Law enforcement officers from the UPD and UCISDPD entered

UPD Acting Chief Pargas entered Robb Elementary School through

UCISDPD Chief Arredondo entered Robb Elementary School

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

A possible second threat against other Uvalde-area schools was

5:00:00 PM (approx.) Uvalde-area schools completely dismissed.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

38 BWC footage from Constable Zamora.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

66 OPR interview of SBPA , March 16, 2023, timestamp 05:46:25.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

’s BWC captured UCISDPD Chief Arredondo talking during a phone

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

80 UCISD Maintenance and Operations Supervisor .

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Map Source: USBP GIS

Figure 12. Uvalde Area Schools Where Law Enforcement Responded

STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Office of the General Counsel, p. 4 (January 1983).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

113 U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

minimum standards articulated in this Policy. … Violation of the UOF Policy

 IS-100.C: Introduction to the Incident Command System, ICS 100.

Management Agency (FEMA), Emergency Management Institute (EMI).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

124 IS-0200.c Student Manual.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY // LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE