A New Map of Europe 1911 1914

5
HERBERT
tADAMS T
GIBBC^NS
LIBRARY
presented to the
LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO
by
FRIENDS OF THE LIBRARY
MR. & MRS. RICHARD KORNHAUSER

donor
3 1822 02463 9916
Date Due
THE
NEW MAP OF EUROPE
NEW MAP OF EURO
(1911-1914)
THE STORY OF THE RECENT EUROPEAN

DIPLOMATIC CRISES AND WARS AND OF
EUROPE'S PRESENT CATASTROPHE
BY
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D.

AUTHOR OF "THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1
NEW YORK
THE CENTURY CO.
1914
COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY
THE CENTURY CO.
Ptdlished, November, 1914

SO
MY CHILDREN
CHRISTINE ESTE of Adana,
LLOYD IRVING of Constantinople,
and
EMILY ELIZABETH of Paris.
Born in the midst of the wars and changes that this book describes,
may they lead lives of peace !
CONTENTS
PAGE
I. GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE . i
" "
II. THE WELTPOLITIK OF GERMANY . 21
III. THE "BAGDADBAHN" ... 58

IV. ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR .
.71.
V. THE PASSING OF PERSIA ... 84

VI. THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES .
96
VII. ITALIA IRREDENTA . . .
.119
VIII. THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES .
131
IX.
......
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
SLAVS
AND HER SOUTH
142
X. RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA . 161
XL THE YOUNG TURK REGIME IN THE

OTTOMAN EMPIRE . . . .180
XII. CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY . 220
XIII.
XIV.
KEY
THE WAR
......
THE WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND
BETWEEN THE
TUR-
BALKAN
241
STATES AND TURKEY . . .

263
XV. THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES .
319
viii CONTENTS
PAGE
XVI. THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN
ALLIES 330
XVII. THE TREATY OF BUKAREST . . 343
XVIII. THE ALBANIAN FIASCO . .
.351
XIX.
TO SERVIA .....
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM
368
XX. GERMANY FORCES WAR UPON RUSSIA
AND FRANCE 386
XXI. GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR .
399
MAPS
TO FACE PAGE
I. THE POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION OF POLAND .

104
II. EUROPE IN 1911 . . . . . 200
III. EUROPE IN AFRICA IN 1914 . . .

296
IV. BALKAN PENINSULA AFTER THE TREATY
OF BUKAREST . . .. .
344
V. BELGIUM AND THE FRANCO - GERMAN
FRONTIER . . . . . .
392
VI. EUROPE IN 1914 . ... . 408

FOREWORD
a July day in 1908, two American students,
ON who had chosen to spend the first days of their

honeymoon in digging the musty pamphleteers
of the Ligue out of the Bodleian Library, were walking
along the High Street in Oxford, when their attention

was arrested by the cry of a newsboy. An ha'penny
invested in a London newspaper gave them the news
that Niazi Bey had taken to the Macedonian highlands,
and that a revolution was threatening to overthrow
the absolutist regime of Abdul Hamid. The sixteenth
century was forgotten in the absorbing and compelling

interest of the twentieth.
Two weeks were entering the har-
later the students
bour of Smyrna on a French steamer which was bringing

back to constitutional Turkey the Young Turk exiles,
including Prince Sabaheddine Effendi of the Royal Otto-
man House. From that day to this, the path of the two
Americans, whose knowledge of history heretofore had
been gained only in libraries, has led them through
massacres in Asia Minor and Syria, and through mobili-
zations and wars in Constantinople, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Greece, and Albania, back westward to Austria, Italy,

x FOREWORD
and France, following the trail of blood and fire from its
origin in the Eastern question to the great European

conflagration.
On the forty-fourth anniversary of Sedan, when
German aeroplanes are flying over Paris, and the distant
thunder of cannon near Meaux can be heard, this book
has been begun in the Bibliothque Nationale by one of
the students, while the other has yielded to the more
pressing call of Red Cross work. It is hoped that there
is nothing that will offend in what is written here. At
this time of tension, of racial rivalry, of mutual recrimin-
ation, the writer does not expect that his

judgments will
pass without protest and criticism. But he claims for
them the lack of bias which, under the circumstances,
only an American of this generation at least dare
impute to himself.
The changes that are bringing about a new map
of Europe have come within the intimate personal
experience of the writer.
If foot-notes are rare, it is because sources are so
numerous and so accessible. Much is what the writer
saw himself, or heard from actors in the great tragedy,
when events were fresh in their memory. The books of
various colours, published by the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs of the various countries interested, have been
consulted for the negotiations of diplomats. From
day to day through these years, material has been
gathered from newspapers, especially the Paris Temps,
the London Times, the Vienna Freie Press, the Constanti-
nople Orient, and other journals of the Ottoman capital.
FOREWORD xi
The writer has used his own correspondence to the New

York Herald, the New York Independent, and the Phila-
delphia Telegraph. For accuracy of dates, indebtedness
is acknowledged to the admirable British Annual Register.
PARIS, September, 1914.

There are general causes, moral or physical, which act in
each State, elevate it, maintain it, or cast it down; every
accident is submitted to these causes, and if the fortune of
a battle, that is to say a particular cause, has ruined a State,
there was a general cause which brought it about that that
State had to perish by a single battle.
MONTESQUIEU.
THE
NEW MAP OF EUROPE
The New Map of Europe
CHAPTER I
GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE

war of 1870added to the German Confed-
eration Alsaceand a large portion of Lorraine,
THE both of which the Germans had always con-
sidered theirs historically and by the blood of
the inhabitants. In annexing Alsace and Lorraine,
the thought of Bismarck and von Moltke was not
only to bring back into the German Confederation
territories which had formerly been a part of it,
but also to secure the newly formed Germany against
the possibility of French invasion in the future.
For this it was necessary to have undisputed posses-
sion of the valley of the Rhine and the crests of the
Vosges.
From the academic and military point of view,
the German thesis was not indefensible. But those
who imposed upon a conquered people the Treaty
of Frankfort forgot to take into account the senti-
ments of the population of the annexed territory.
Germany annexed land. That was possible by the
THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE
right of the strongest. She tried for over forty years
to annex the population, but never succeeded. The
makers modern Germany were not alarmed at the
of
persistent refusal of the Alsatians to become loyal
German subjects. They knew that this would take
time. They looked forward to the dying out of the
party of protestwhen the next generation grew up,
a generation educated in German schools and formed
in the German mould by the discipline of military
service.
"
That there was still an Alsace-Lorraine question"
after forty years is a sad commentary either on the
justice of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by

Germany or on the ability of Germany to assimilate
that territory which she felt was historically, geo-
graphically, and racially a part of the Teutonic
Empire. In 1887, when "protesting deputies" were
returned to the Reichstag in overwhelming numbers,
despite the governmental weapons of intimidation,
disenfranchisement, and North German immigration,
Bismarck was face to face with the one great failure
of his career. He consoled himself with the firm
belief that all would be changed when the second
generation, which knew nothing of France and to

which the war was only a memory, peopled the
unhappy provinces.
But that second generation came. Those who
participated in the war of 1870, or who suffered by
it, were few and far between. The hotheads and
extreme francophiles left the country long ago, and
their place was taken by immigrants who were sup-
posed to be loyal sons of the Vaterland. Those of
the younger indigenous brood, whose parents had
brought them up as irreconcilables, ran away to
serve in the French foreign legion, or went into exile,
and became naturalized Frenchmen before their time
of military service arrived. And
yet the unrest
continued. Strasbourg, Metz, Mulhouse, and Col-
mar were centres of political agitation, which an
autocratic government and Berlin police methods
were powerless to suppress.
The year 1910 marked the beginning of a new
period of violent protest against Prussian rule.
Not since 1888 was there such a continuous agitation
and such a continuous persecution. The days when
the Prussian police forbade the use of the French
language on tombstones were revived, and the num-
ber of petty police persecutions recorded in the local
press was equalled only by the number of public
demonstrations on the part of the people, whose
hatred of everything Prussian once more came to a
fever-heat.
Let me a few incidents which I have taken
cite
haphazard from the journals of Strasbourg and Metz

during the first seven months of 1910. The Turn-
verein of Robertsau held a gymnastic exhibition in
which two French societies, those of Belfort and
Giromagny, were invited to participate. The police
refused to allow the French societies to march to the
hall in procession, as was their custom, or to display
their flags. Their two presidents were threatened
with arrest. A similar incident was reported from
Colmar. At Noisseville and Wissembourg the for-
tieth annual commemoration services held by the
3
French veterans were considered treasonable, and
they were informed that they would never again
be allowed to hold services in the cemetery. At
Mulhouse the French veterans were insulted by the
police and not allowed to display their flags even in
the room where they held their banquet. At the
college of Thann a young boy of twelve, who curi-
ously enough was the son of a notorious German

immigrant, whistled the Marseillaise and was
locked up in a cell for this offence. The conferring
of the cross of the Legion of Honour on Abbe Faller,
at Mars-la-Tour, created such an outburst of feel-
ing that the German ambassador at Paris was in-
structed to request the French Government to refrain
from decorating Alsatians. A volunteer of Mul-
house was reprimanded and refused advancement
in the army because he used his mother-tongue in
a private conversation. On July ist, twenty-one
border communes of Lorraine were added to those
in which German had been made the official language.
On July 25th, for the first time in the history of
the University of Strasbourg, a professor was hissed
out of his lecture room. He had said that the Prus-
sians could speak better French than the Alsatians.
The most serious demonstration which has oc-
curred in Metz since the annexation, took place on
Sunday evening, January 8, 1910, when the police
broke up forcibly a concert given by a local society.
The newspapers of Metz claimed that this was a
private gathering, to which individual invitations
had been sent, and was neither public not political.
The police invaded the hall, and requested the audi-
4
ence to disband. When the presiding officer refused,
he and the leader of the orchestra were arrested.
The audience, after a lively tussle, was expelled
from the hall. Immediately a demonstration was
planned to be held around the statue of General Ney.
A large crowd paraded the city, singing the Sambre-
et-Meuse and the Marseillaise. When the police
found themselves powerless to stop the procession
without bloodshed, they were compelled to call out
the troops to clear the streets with fixed bayonets.
These incidents demonstrated the fact that French
ideals, French culture, and the French language had
been kept alive, and were still the inspiration of the
unceasing and successful protest of nearly two
million people against the Prussian domination. The
effervescence was undoubtedly as strong in Alsace-
Lorraine "forty years after" as it had been on the
morrow of the annexation. But its francophile
character was not necessarily the expression of
desire for reunion with France. The inhabitants
of the "lost provinces" had always been, racially
and linguistically, as much German French.as
Now that the unexpected has happened, and reunion
with France seems probable, many Alsatians are
claiming that this has been the unfailing goal of
their agitation. But it is not true. It would be a
lamentable distortion of fact if any such record were
to get into a serious history of the period in which
we live.
The politicalideal of the Alsatians has been self-
government. Their agitation has not been for
separation from the German Confederation, but
5
for a place in the German Confederation. great A
number of the immigrants who were sent to "ger-
manize" Alsace and Lorraine came to side with the
indigenous element in their political demands. If
the question of France and things French entered
into the struggle, and became the heart of it, two
reasons for this can be pointed out: France stood
for the realization of the ideals of democracy to the
descendants of the Strasbourg heroes of 1793; and
the endeavour to stamp out the traces of the former
nationality of the inhabitants of the provinces was
carried on in a manner so typically and so foolishly
Prussian that it kept alive the fire instead of extin-
guishing it. Persecution never fails to defeat its
own ends. For human nature is keen to cherish
that which or dangerous to enjoy.
is difficult
To understand the Alsace-Lorraine question, from

the internalGerman point of view, it is necessary
to explain the political status of these provinces
after the conquest, and their relationship to the
Empire, in order to show that their continued unrest
and unhappiness were not due to a ceaseless and
stubborn protest against the Treaty of Frankfort.
When the German Empire was constituted, in
1872, comprehended twenty-five distinct sovereign
it
kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and free cities,

and, in a subordinate position, the territory ceded
by France, which was made a Reichsland, owned in
common by the twenty-five confederated sovereign-
ties. The King of Prussia was made Emperor of
the Confederation, and given extensive executive
powers. Two assemblies were created to legislate
6
for matters affecting the country as a whole. The
Bundesrath is an advisory executive body as well as
an upper legislative assembly. // is composed of
delegates of the sovereigns of the confederated states.
The lower imperial house, or Reichstag, is a popular
assembly, whose members are returned by general
elections throughout the Empire. In their internal
affairs the confederated states are autonomous,
and have their own local Parliaments. This scheme,
fraught with dangers and seemingly unsurmount-
able difficulties, has survived; and, thanks to the
predominance of Prussia and the genius of two great
emperors, the seemingly heterogeneous mass has
been moulded into a strong and powerful Empire.
In such an Empire, however, there never has been
any place for Alsace-Lorraine. The conquered ter-
ritory was not a national entity. It had no sov-
ereign, and could not enter into the confederacy on

an equal footing with the other twenty-five states.
The Germans did not dare, at the time, to give the
new member a sovereign, nor could they conjointly
undertake its Prussia, not willing to
assimilation.
risk the strengthening of a south German state by
the addition of a million and a half to its population,
took upon herself what was the logical task of Baden
or Wurtemberg or Bavaria.
So Alsace-Lorraine was an anomaly under the
scheme of the organization of the German Empire.
During forty years the Reichsland was without re-
presentation in the Bundesrath, and had thus had
no real voice in the management of imperial affairs.
By excluding the "reconquered brethren" from
7
representation in the Bundesrath, Germany failed to
win the loyalty of her new subjects. Where petty
states with a tithe of her population and wealth
have helped in shaping the destinies of the nation,
the Reichsland had to feel the humiliation of "taxa-
tion without representation." It was useless to
point out to the Alsatians that they had their vote
in the Reichstag. For the Bundesrath is the power
in Germany.
Nor did Alsace-Lorraine have real autonomy in
internal affairs. The executive power was vested
in a Statthalter, appointed by the Emperor, and
supported by a foreign bureaucracy and a foreign
police force. Before the Constitution of 1911, there
was a local Parliament, called the Landesausschuss,
which amounted to nothing, as the imperial Parlia-
ment had the privilege of initiating and enacting
for the Reichsland any law it saw fit. Then, too,
the delegates to the Landesausschuss were chosen
by such a complicated form of suffrage that they
represented the Statthalter rather than the people.
And the Statthalter represented the Emperor!
first decade after the annexation, Prussian
In the
brutality and an unseemly haste to impose military
service upon the conquered people led to an emigra-
tion of all who could afford to go, or who, even at the
expense of material interest, were too high-spirited
to allow their children to grow up as Germans.
This emigration was welcomed and made easy, just
as Austria-Hungary encouraged the emigration of
Moslems from Bosnia and Herzegovina. For it
enabled Bismarck to introduce a strong Prussian
8
and Westphalian element into the Reichsland by
settling immigrants on the vacant properties. But
most of these immigrants, instead of prussianizing
Alsace, have become Alsatians themselves. Some
of the most insistent opponents of the Government,
some of the most intractable among the agitators,
have been those early immigrants or their children.
This quite natural, when we consider that they
is
have cast their lot definitely with the country, and

are just as much interested in its welfare as the
indigenous element.
The revival of the agitation against Prussian
Government in 1910 was a movement for autonomy
on internal affairs, and for representation in the
Bundesrath. The Alsatians wanted to be on a foot-
ing of constitutional equality with the other German
States. One marvels at the Prussian mentality
which could not see either with the Poles or with
the Alsatians play and justice would
that fair
have solved the problems and put an end to the
agitation which has been, during these past few
years especially, a menace on the east and west to
the existence of the Empire.
Something had to be done in the Reichsland.
The anomalous position of almost two million Ger-
man subjects, fighting for their political rights, and
forming a compact mass upon the borders of France,
was a question which compelled the interest of
German statesmen, not only on account of its inter-
national aspect, but also because of the growing
German public sentiment for social and political
justice. The Reichstag was full of champions of the
9
claims of the Alsatians, champions who were not
personally interested either in Alsace- Lorraine or in
the influence of the agitation in the Reichsland upon
France, but who looked upon the Alsace-Lorraine
question as a wrong to twentieth-century civilization.
On March 14, 1910, Chancellor von Bethmann-
Hollweg announced to the Reichstag that the
Government was preparing a constitution for Alsace-
Lorraine which would give the autonomy so long and
so vigorously demanded. But he had in his mind,
not a real solution of the question, but some sort of
a compromise, which would satisfy the confederated
states, and mollify the agitators of the Reichsland,
but at the same time preserve the Prussian domination
in Alsace-Lorraine. In June, Herr Delbruck, Secre-
tary of State for the Interior, was sent to Strasbourg
to confer with the local authorities and representa-
tives of the people concerning the projected con-
stitution. It was during this visit that the Alsatians
were disillusioned. A
dinner, now famous or
notorious, whichever you like, was given by the
Statthalter, to which representative (!) members of
the Landesausschuss were invited. At this dinner
the real leaders of the country, such as Wetterle,
Preiss, Blumenthal, Weber, Bucher, and Theodor,
the very men who had made the demand for au-
tonomy so insistent that the Government could no
longer refuse to entertain were conspicuous by
it
their absence. Those bidden to confer with Herr

Delbruck in no way represented, but were on the
other hand hostile to, the wishes of the people.
We cannot go into the involved story of the fight
10
in the Reichstag over the new Constitution. The
Delbriick project was approved by the Bundesrath
on December 16, 1910, and debated in the following
spring session of the Reichstag. Despite the warnings
of the deputies from the Reichsland, and the brilliant
opposition of the Socialists, the Constitution given
to Alsace-Lorraine, on May 3ist, was a pure farce.
In no sense was what the people of the Reichsland
it
had wanted, although representation in the Bundes-

rath was seemingly given to them. The new Con-
stitution preserved the united sovereignty of the
confederated states, and its delegation to the Emperor,
who still had the power to appoint and recall at will
the Statthalter, and to initiate legislation in local
matters. A Landtag took the place of the Lan-
desausschuss. The Upper Chamber of the Landtag
consists of members, representing the
thirty-six
religious confessions, University and other
the
bodies, the supreme court of Colmar, and the muni-
cipalities and chambers of commerce of Strasbourg,
Mulhouse, Metz, and Colmar, to the number of
eighteen and the other eighteen chosen by the Emperor.
;
The Lower Chamber has sixty members, elected by

direct universal suffrage, with secret ballot. Elect-
ors over thirty-five possess two votes, and over
forty-five three votes.

By forcing this Constitution upon Alsace-Lorraine,
the interests of Prussia and of the House of Hohen-
zollern were considered to the detriment of the
interests of theGerman Empire. A glorious oppor-
tunity for reconciliation and assimilation was lost.
The Emperor would not listen to the admission of
ii
Alsace-Lorraine to the Bundesraih in the only logical
way, by the creation of a new dynasty or a republican
form of government, so that the Alsatian votes
would represent a sovereign state. Prussia in her
dealings with Alsace-Lorraine, has always been
afraid, on the one hand, of the addition of Bundes-
rath votes to the seventeen of Bavaria,
Saxony,
Baden, and Wurtemberg, and on the other hand, of
the repercussion upon her internal suffrage and other
problems with the Socialists.
Since 1911, the eyes of many Alsatians have been
directed once more towards France as the only if
forlorn hope of justice and peace. What words
could be found strong enough to condemn the suicidal
folly of the German statesmen who allowed the dis-
appointment over the Constitution to be followed by
a series of incidents which have been like rubbing
salt into a raw wound?
The first Landtag, in conformity to the Consti-
tution of 1911, was elected in October. It brought
into life a new political party, called "The National
Union," led by Blumenthal, Wetterle, and Preiss,
who united for the purpose of demanding what the
Constitution had not given them the autonomy of
Alsace and Lorraine. This party was badly beaten
in this first election. But its defeat was not really
a defeat for the principles of autonomy, as the Ger-
man press stated at the time. The membership of
thenew Landtag was composed, in majority, of men
who had been supporters of the demand for au-
tonomy, but who had not joined the new party for
reasons of local politics. Heir Delbruck had given
12
universal suffrage (a privilege the Prussian electorate
had never been able to gain in spite ctf its reiterated
demands) to the Reichsland in the hope that the
Socialists would prevent the Nationalists from con-
trolling the Alsatian Landtag. Many Socialists, how-

ever, during the elections at Colmar and elsewhere,
"
did not hesitate to cry in French, Vive la France!
A bas la Prusse /"
The Prussian expectations were bitterly deceived.
The Landtag promptly showed that it was merely
the Landesausschuss under another name. The
nationalist struggle was revived; the same old ques-
tions came up again. The Government's appropria-
tion "for purposes of state" was reduced one- third,
and it was provided that the Landtag receive com-
munication of the purposes for which the money

was spent. The Statthalter's expenses were cut in
half, and a bill, which had always been approved in
previous years, providing for the payment of the
expense of the Emperor's hunting trips in the Reichs-
land, failed to pass.
In the spring of 1912, the Prussians showed their
disapproval of the actions of the new Landtag by
withdrawing the orders for locomotives for the
Prussian railways from the old Alsatian factory
of Grafenstaden near Strasbourg. This was done
absolutely without any provocation, and aroused
a violent denunciation, not only among the purely
German employes of the factory and in the news-
papers, but also in the Landtag, which adopted an
order of the day condemning most severely the
attitude of the Imperial Government towards Alsace-
13
Lorraine, of which this boycott measure was a petty
and mean illustration.
The indignation was at its height when Emperor
Wilhelm arrived in Strasbourg on May I3th. Instead
of acting in a tactful manner and promising to set
right this wrong done to the industrial life of Stras-
bourg, the Emperor addressed the following words
to the Mayor :
"Listen. Up to here you have only known the

good side of me: you might be able to learn the
other side of me. Things cannot continue as they
are: if this situation lasts, we will suppress your
Constitution and annex you to Prussia."
This typically Prussian speech, which in a few

lines reveals the hopelessly unsuccessful tactics of
the German Government towards the peoples whom
it has tried to assimilate the world over, only served
to increase the indignation of the inhabitants of
the Reichsland; in fact, the repercussion throughout
all Germany was very serious.
The arbitrary threat of the Emperor was badly
received in the other federated states, whose news-
papers pointed out that he had exceeded his author-
ity. gave the Socialists an opportunity to attack
It
Emperor Wilhelm on the floor of the Reichstag.

Four days after this threat was made, an orator of
the Socialist party declared
"We words as the confession,

salute the imperial
full of weight and coming from a competent source,
that annexation to Prussia is the heaviest punish-
ment that once can threaten to impose upon a
people for its resistance against Germany. It is a
punishment like hard labour in the penitentiary
with loss of civil rights."
This speech caused the Chancellor to leave the

room with all the Ministry. On May 22d, the
attack upon Emperor Wilhelm for his words at
Strasbourg was renewed by another deputy, who
declared that if such a thing had happened in Eng-
land, "the English would shut up such a King at
Balmoral or find for him some peaceful castle, such
as that of Stemberg or the Villa Allatini at Salonika."
The answer of the Landtag to Emperor Wilhelm's
threat was the passing of two unanimous votes:
one demanding that hereafter the Constitution could
not be modified except by the law of the country and
not by the law of the Empire, and the other demanding
for Alsace-Lorraine a national flag.
One could easily fill many pages with illustrations
of senseless persecutions, most of them of the pettiest
character, but some more serious in nature, which
Alsace and Lorraine have had to endure since the
granting of the Constitution. Newspapers, illus-
trated journals, clubs and organizations of all kinds
have been annoyed constantly by police interference.
Their editors, artists, and managers have been brought
frequently into court. Zislin and Hansi, celebrated
caricaturists, have found themselves provoked to
bolder and bolder defiances by successive condemna-
tions, and have endured imprisonment as well as
fines. Hansi was sentenced to a year's imprison-
ment by the High Court of Leipsic only a month
15
before the present war broke out, and chose exile
rather than a Prussian fortress.
The greatest effort during the past few years has
been made in the schools to influence the minds of
the growing generation against the "souvenir de
France," and to impress upon the Alsatians what
good fortune had come to them to be born German
citizens.
Among the boys, the influence of this teaching

has been such that over twenty-two thousand fled
from home during the period of 1900-1913 to enlist
in the Foreign Legion of the French Army. The
campaign of the German newspapers in Alsace-
Lorraine, and, in fact, throughout Germany, was
redoubled in 1911. Parents were warned of the
horrible treatment accorded to the poor boys who
were misguided enough to throw away their citizen-
ship, and go to be killed in Africa under the French
flag. The result of this campaign was that the For-
eign Legion received a larger number of Alsatians
in 1912 than had enlisted during a single year since
1871!
Among the girls, the German educational system
flattered itself that could completely change the
it
sentiments of a child, especially in the boarding-

schools. Last year the Empress of Germany visited
a school near Metz, which
girls' is one of the best
German schools in the Reichsland. As she was leav-
ing, she told the children that she wanted to give
them something. What did they want? The answer
was not sweets or cake, but that they might be
taught a little French !
16
Since 1910, the German war budget has carried
successively larger items for the strengthening of
forts and the building of barracks in Metz, Colmar,
Mulhouse, Strasbourg, Neuf-Brisach, Bischwiller,

Wissembourg, Mohrange, Sarrebourg, Sarregue-
mines, Saarbruck,Thionville, Molsheim,and Saverne.
The former French provinces have been flooded
with garrisons, and have been treated just as they
were treated forty years ago. The insufferable
spirit of militarism, and the arrogance of the Prussian
officers in Alsatian towns, have served to turn against
the Empire many thousands whom another policy
might have won. For it must be remembered that
by no means all the inhabitants of the Reichsland
have been by birth and by home training French
sympathizers. Instead of crushing out the "souvenir
de France" the Prussian civil and military officials
have caused it to be born in many a soul which was
by nature German.
The most notorious instance of military arrogance
occurred in the autumn of 1913 in Saverne. Lieu-
tenant von Forstner, who was passing in review
cases of discipline, had before him a soldier who had
stabbed an Alsatian, and had been sentenced to two
months' imprisonment. "Two months on account
of an Alsatian blackguard!" he cried. "I would
have given you ten marks for your trouble." The
story spread,and the town, tired of the attitude of
began in turn to show its contempt for
its garrison,
the Kaiser's soldiers. Windows in von Forstner's

house were broken. Every time officers or soldiers
appeared on the streets they were hooted. Saverne

2 17
was put under martial law. Threats were made to
fire upon the citizens. One day Lieutenant von
Forstner struck a lame shoemaker across the fore-
head with his sword. The affair had gone so far
that public sentiment in Germany demanded some
action. Instead of adequately punishing von Forst-
ner and other officers, who had so maddened the
civilpopulation against them, the German military
authorities gave the guilty officers nominal sentences,
and withdrew the garrison.
All these events had a tremendous repercussion
in France. It is impossible to exaggerate the ill-
feeling aroused on both sides of the Rhine, in Ger-

many, in Alsace-Lorraine, and in France by the per-
secutions in the Reichsland. Only one who knows
intimately the French can appreciate their feeling
or share it over the Zislin and Hansi trials, the
Saverne affair, the
suppression of the Souvenir
Fran$ais, the Lorraine Sportive and other organiza-
tions, and the campaign against the Foreign Legion.
It has given the French soldiers in the present war
something to fight for which is as sacred to them as
the defence of French soil. The power of this senti-
ment is indicated by the invasion of Alsace, the
battle of Altkirk, and the occupation of Mulhouse at
the beginning of August. The French could not be
held back from this wild dash. Strategy was power-
less in the face of the sentiment of a national army.
The Alsatian leaders themselves have seen the
peace of Europe of the German attitude
peril to the
towards their country. They did not want France
drawn into a war for their liberation. They were
18
alarmed over the possibility of this, and desired it
to be understood that their agitation had nothing
international in it. The attitude of all the anti-
Prussian parties may be summed up in the words of
Herr Wolff, leader of the Government Liberal party,
who declared that "all the inhabitants of the Reichs-
land had as their political ambition was only the
elevation of Alsace-Lorraine to the rank of an inde-
pendent and federated state, like the other twenty-
fivecomponent parts of the German Empire." Their
sincerity and their desire to preserve peace is proved
by the motion presented by the leaders of four of the
political groups in the Reichsland, which was voted
on May 6, 1912, without discussion, by the Landtag:
"The Chamber invites the Statthalter to instruct

the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine in the Bun-
desrath to use all the force they possess against the
idea of a war betweeen Germany and France, and
to influence the Bundesraih to examine the ways
which might possibly lead to a rapprochement be-
tween France and Germany, which rapprochement
will furnish the means of putting an end to the race
of armaments."
The mismanagement of the Reichsland has done

more than prevent the harmonious union of the
former French provinces with Germany. It has
had an effect, the influence of which cannot be exag-
gerated, upon nourishing the hopes of revenge of
France, and the resentment against the amputation
of 1870. On neither side of the Vosges has the
wound healed. The same folly which has kept alive
a Polish question in eastern Prussia for one hundred
19
and twenty-five years, has not failed to make impos-
sible the prussianizing of Alsace and Lorraine. The
Prussian has never understood how to win the con-
fidence of others. There has been no Rome in his
political vision. As for conceptions of toleration,

of kindness, and of love, they are non-existent in
Prussian officialdom. Nietzsche revealed the char-
acter of the Prussian in his development of the idea
of the tibermensch. The ideal of perfect manhood
is the imposition of one will on another will by force.
Mercy and pity, according to Nietzsche, were signs

of weakness, the symbols of the slave.
Under the circumstances, then, we are compelled
after forty-five years to revise our estimate of Bis-
marck's sagacity. His genius was limited by the
narrow horizon own age. He did not see that
of his
the future Germany needed other things that France
could give far more than she needed Alsace and
Lorraine. In posterity, Bismarck would have had
a greater place had he, in the last minutes of the
transactions at Versailles, given back Alsace and
Lorraine to France, waived the war indemnity, and
asked in return Algeria or other French colonies.
But would it have been different with the French
colonies? It is impossible to write this chapter,
and have faith in the success of a German weltpolitik.
20
CHAPTER II
THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY

the transrhenane provinces of the old
WHEN German Empire were added to France in

the eighteenth century, the assimilation
of these territorieswas a far different proposition from
their refusion into the mould of a new German Empire
in 1871. In the first place, the old German Empire
was a mediaeval institution which, in the evolution
of modern Europe, was decaying. Alsace and Lor-
raine were not taken away from a political organism
of which they were a vital part. The ties severed
were purely dynastic. In the second place, the
consciousness of national life was awakened in
Alsace and Lorraine during the time that they were
under French rule, and because they shared in the
great movement of the birth of democracy following
the French Revolution.
France, then, by the Treaty of Frankfort, believed
that she had been robbed of a portion of her national
territory. The people of the annexed provinces, as
was clearly shown by the statement of their repre-
sentatives at Bordeaux, did not desire to enter the
German Confederation.
21
Germany failed to do the only thing that could
possibly have made her new territories an integral

part of the new Empire, i. e. to place Alsace-Lorraine
upon a footing of equality with the other states of
the Confederation, and make their entry that of an
autonomous sovereign state. Consequently, neither
in France nor in the Reichsland was the Treaty of
Frankfort accepted as a permanent change in the
map of Europe. Germany has always been com-
pelled, in her international politics, to count upon the
possibility of France making an attempt to win back
the lost provinces. She has sought to form alliances
to strengthen her own position in Europe, and to
keep France weak. France, the continued object
of German hostility, has found herself compelled to
ally herself with Russia, with whom she has never
had anything in common, and to compound her
colonial rivalries in Africa with her hereditary enemy,
Great Britain. This is the first case of the unrest in
Europe that has culminated in a general European
war.
The second cause is the Weltpolitik of Germany
which has brought the German Empire into conflict
with Great Britain and France outside of Europe,
and with Russia in Europe.
On the map of Europe, Russia, Great Britain, and
France are, in 1914, practically what they were in
1815. The changes, logical and in accordance with
the spirit of centralization of the nineteenth century,
have transformed middle and south-eastern Europe.
The changes in south-eastern Europe have been
effected at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, and
22
have been a gradual development throughout the
century, from the outbreak of the Greek revolution
in 1822 to the Treaty of London in 1913. In middle
Europe, during the twelve years between 1859 an d
1871, the three Powers whose national unity, racially
as well as politically, was already achieved at the
time of the Congress of Vienna, were brought face to
face with three new Powers, united Germany, united
Italy, and the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary.
The nineteenth century has been called the age of
European colonization. Europe began to follow its

commerce with other continents by the imposition of its
civilization and its political system upon weaker races.
Checked by the rising republic of the United States
from encroaching upon the liberties of the peoples
of North and South America, there have been no
acquisitions of territory by European nations in the

western continents since the Congress of Vienna.
European expansion directed itself towards Africa,
Asia, and the islands of the oceans. There was no
Oriental nation strong enough to promulgate a
Monroe Doctrine.
In extra-European activities, Great Britain, France,
and Russia were the pioneers. That they succeeded
during the nineteenth century in placing under their
flag the choicest portions of Africa and the backward
nations of Asia, was due neither to the superior enter-
prise and energy, nor to the greater foresight, of the
Anglo-Saxon, French, and Russian nations. They
had achieved their national unity, and they were
geographically in a position to take advantage of the
great opportunities which were opening to the world
23
for colonization since the development of the steam-
ship and the telegraph.
But the other three Powers of Europe came late
upon the scene. It has only been within the last
quarter of a century that Germany and Italy have
been in the position to look for overseas possessions.
It has only been within the last quarter of a century
that Austria, finding her union with Hungary a
durable one, has been able to think of looking beyond
her limits to play a part, as other nations had long
been doing, in the history of the outside world.
By every force of circumstances, the three new
States threatened by their neighbours, who had
looked with jealous, though powerless, eyes upon
their consolidation were brought together into a
defensive alliance. The Triple Alliance, as it is
called, has drifted into a spirit of common general

aims and ambitions, if not of particular interests,
against their three more fortunate rivals, who had
been annexing the best portions of the Asiatic and
African continents while they were struggling with
internal problems.
Oceans of ink have been wasted upon polemics
against the peace-disturbing character of the Triple
Alliance. Especially has Germany and her growing
Weltpolitik been subject to criticism, continuous and
untiring, on the part of the British and French press.
But the question after all is a very simple one: the
three newer Powers of Europe have not been willing
to be content with an application in practical world
politics of the principle that "to him that hath shall
"
be given. Germany and Italy, transformed under
24
modern economic conditions into industrial states,
have been looking for outside markets, and they have
wanted to enjoy those markets in regions of the globe
either actually under their flag or subjected to their
political influence. In other words, they have
wanted their share in the division of Africa and Asia
into spheres under the control of European nations.
Is a logical and legitimate ambition to play a part
in the world's politics in proportion to one's popula-
tion, one's wealth, one's industrial and maritime

activity, necessarilya menace to the world's peace?
It has always been, and I suppose always will be,
in the nature of those who have, to look with alarm
upon the efforts of those who havenot, to possess

something. Thus capital, irrespective of epoch or
nationality or of religion, has raised the cry of alarm
when it has seen the tendency for betterment, for
education, for the development of ideals and a sense
on the part of labour. In just the same way,
of justice
Russia with her great path across the northern half
of Asia and her new and steadily growing empire in
the Caucasus and central Asia; France with the
greater part of northern and central Africa, and an
important corner of Asia under her flag; and Great
Britain with her vast territories in every portion of
the globe, raised the cry of "Wolf, Wolf!" when the
Powers of the Triple Alliance began to look with
envious eye upon the rich colonies of their neighbours,
and to pick up by clever diplomacy and brutal force,
if you wish a few crumbs of what was still left for
themselves.
The result of these alarming ambitions of the
25
Triple Alliance has been the coming together of
Russia, France, and England, hereditary enemies in
former days but now friends and allies, in the main-
tenance of the colonial "trust."
The great cry of the Triple Entente is the mainten-
ance of the European equilibrium. For this they have
reason. Europe could know no lasting peace under
Teutonic aggression. But is there not also to the
account of the Triple Entente some blame for the
unrest in Europe and for the great catastrophe which
has come upon the world? For while their policy has
been the maintenance of the European equilibrium,
it has been coupled with the maintenance of an ex-
tra-European balance of power wholly in their favour.

The sense of justice, of historical proportion, and
the logic of economic evolution make one sym-
pathize, in abstract principle, not only with the
Weltpolitik of Germany, but also with Austria-
Hungary's desire for an outlet to the sea, and with
Italy's longing to have in the Mediterranean the
position which history and geography indicated
ought to be, and might again be, hers.
But sympathy in abstract principle is quite another
thing from sympathy in fact. In order to appreciate
the Weltpolitik of Germany, and be able to form an
intelligent opinion in regard to it for it is the most
vital and burning problem in the world to-day we must
consider it from the point of view of its full signi-
ficance in practice in the history of the world.

Bismarck posed as the disinterested "honest
courtier" of Europe in the Congress of Berlin. The
declaration he had made, that the whole question
26
"was not worth the finger bone of a
of the Orient
Pomeranian grenadier," was corroborated by his
actions during the sessions of the Congress. We
have
striking illustrations of this in the memoirs of Kara-
theodory pasha, who recorded from day to day,
during the memorable sessions of the Congress, his
astonishment at the indifference which Bismarck
displayed to the nationalities of the Balkans, and to
the complications which might arise in Europe from
their rivalries.
Bismarck did not see how vital was to be the Bal-
kan question with the future of the nation he had
built. Nor did he see the intimate relationship
between the economic progress of united Germany
and the question of colonies. One searches in vain
the speeches and writings of the Iron Chancellor
for any reference to the importance of the two pro-
blems, in seeking the solution of which the fabric of
his building is threatened with destruction.
Perhaps it is easy for us, in looking backwards, to
point out the lack of foresight which was shown by
Bismarck in regard to the future of Germany.
Forty-five years later, we are able to pass in review
the unforeseen developments of international politics
and the amazing economic evolution of contemporary
Europe. Perhaps unreasonable to expect that
it is
much attention and thought should have been given

by the maker of modern Germany to the possible
sphere that Germany might be called upon to play
in the world outside of Europe.
For we must remember that the new Germany,
after the Franco-Prussian War, was wholly in an
27
experimental stage, and that the duty at hand was
the immediate consolidation of the various states
into a political and economic fabric. There was
enough to demand all the attention and
all the genius
of Bismarck and co-workers in solving these

his
problems. Cordial relationship with Austria had

The dynasties of the south
to be reestablished.
German kingdoms and of the lesser potentates,
whose names still remained legion in spite of the
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss 1803, had to be

of
carefully handled. There were four definite internal
problems which confronted Bismarck: the relation-
ship of the empire to the Catholic Church; the
reconciliation of the different peoples into a har-
monious whole; the establishment of representative
government without giving the strong socialistic
elements the upper hand; and the development of
the economic wealth of Germany.
There was little time to think of Germany's place
in the world's politics. In foreign affairs, it was
considered that the exigencies of the moment could
be met by adopting a policy of conciliation towards
both Russia and Austria, and the winning of the
friendship of Italy. The Kulturkampf, the creation
of the Bundesrath under Prussian hegemony, and the
formation of the Triple Alliance and the events
connected with them, are important in an analysis
of Germany's international politics. Unfortunately
we cannot bring them into the scope of this book.
We can mention only the various factors that have
been directly responsible for giving birth to what is
called the Weltpolitik.
28
These factors are the belief of the German people
in the superiority of their race and its world-civilizing
mission; their connotation of the word "German";

the consciousness of their military strength being dis-
proportionate to their political influence; the rapid
increase of the population and the development of the
industrial and commercial prosperity of the empire;
and the realization of the necessity of a strong navy,
with naval bases and coaling-stations in all parts of
the world, for the adequate protection of commerce.
The belief of the German people in the superiority of
their race and world-civilizing mission is a sober
its
fact. It pervades every class of society from the

Kaiser down to the workingman. It is heralded from
the pulpit, taught in the schools, and is a scientific
statement in the work of many of Germany's leading
scholars. The
anthropologist Woltmann said that
"the German the superior type of the species
is
homo sapiens, from the physical 'as well as the intel-

lectual point of view." Wirth declared that "the
world owes its civilization to Germany alone" and
that "the time is near when the earth must inevitably
be conquered by the Germans." The scientific
book a serious one in which these statements occur
was so popular that it sold five editions in three years !
Paulsen remarked that "humanity is aware of, and

admires, the German omnipresence." Hartmann
taught that the European family is divided into two
races, male and female, of which the first, of course,
was exclusively German, while the second included
Latins, Celts, and Slavs. "Marriage is inevitable."
Goethe expressed in Faust the opinion that the work
29
of the Germans was to make the habitable world
"
worth living in, while Our language
Schiller boasted,
shall reign over the whole world," and that "the
German day lasts until the end of time." Schiller
also prophesied that "two empires shall perish in
east and west, I tell you, and it is only the Lutheran
faith which remain." Fichte, one hundred
shall
years ago, exhorted the Germans to be "German

"
patriots, and we shall not cease to be cosmopolitan.
Heine believed that "not only Alsace and Lorraine,
but all France shall be ours."
To show the German state of mind towards those
whom they have not hesitated to provoke to arms,
the remarkable teaching of Hummel's book, which
is used in the German primary schools, is a convincing
illustration. Frenchmen are monkeys, and the best

and strongest elements in the French race asserted
to be German by blood. The Russians are slaves,
as their name implies. Treitschke's opinion of the
British is "among them love of money has killed
that
all sentiment of honour and all distinction of just and
unjust. Their setting sun is our aurora." One of

the leading newspapers of Germany recently said:
"The army of the first line of which Germany will
dispose from the first day of the mobilization will be
sufficient to crush France, even if we must detach a
part of it against England. If England enters the

war, it will be the end of the British Empire, for
England is a colossus with feet of clay."
The Kaiser has been the spokesman of the nation
in heralding publicly the belief in the superiority
of the German people, and its world mission. It was
30
at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the
Empire that the scope of the Weltpolitik was an-
nounced by Wilhelm II. He said:
"The German Empire has become a world empire

(ein Weltreich). Everywhere, in the most distant
lands, are established thousands and thousands of our
compatriots. German science, German activity, the
defenders of the German ideal pass the ocean. By
thousands of millions we count the wealth that
Germany transports across the seas. It is your duty,
gentlemen, to aid me to establish strong bonds be-
tween our Empire of Europe and this greater German
Empire (dieses grossere Deutsche Reich} . . .
May our German Fatherland become one day so

powerful that, as one formerly used to say, Civis
romanus sum, one may in the future need only to say,
Ich bin ein deutscher Burger."
At Aix-la-Chapelle, on June 20, 1902, he revealed

"
his ambition in one sentence, It is to the empire of the
world that the German genius aspires" Just before
leaving for the visit to Tangier in 1905 the visit
which was really the beginning of one of the great
issues of the present war he said at Bremen: "If
later one must speak in history of a universal domina-
tion by the Hohenzollern, of a universal German
empire, this domination must not be established by
military conquest .... God has called us to civilize
the world:we are the missionaries of human progress"
This idea was developed further at Munster, on
September I, 1907, when the Kaiser proclaimed:
"The German people will be the block of granite on
which our Lord be able to elevate and achieve
will
the civilization of the world!"
This attitude of mind is as common among the
disciples of those wonderful leaders who founded the
international movement for the solidarity of interests
of labour, as among the aristocratic and intellect-
it is
ual elements of the nation. The German Socialist

has proclaimed the brotherhood of man, and the
common antagonism of the wage-earners of the world
against their capitalistic oppressors. But, for all
his preachng, the German Socialist is first of all a
German. He has come to believe that the mission of
Socialism will be best fulfilled through the triumph
of Germanism. This belief is sincere. It is a far
cry from Karl Marx to the militant or rather mili-
tarist German bearing arms gladly upon
Socialist,
the battlefields of Europe to-day, because he is
inspired by the thought that the triumph of the army
in which he fights will aid the cause of Socialism. T
There is a striking analogy between the German
Socialist of the present generation and the Jacobins of
1793. The heralders of Liberte, Egalite et Fraternite

fought for the spread of the principles of the Revolu-
tion through God's chosen instruments, the armies
of France, and were carried away by their enthusiasm
until theybecame the facile agents for saddling
Europe with the tyranny of Napoleon. Love for
1
While the Landtage of the German states are mostly controlled
by Conservative elements, owing to restricted suffrage, the Reichstag

is one of the most intelligently democratic legislative bodies in the
world. Its social legislation is surpassed by that of no other country.
During thirty years the Socialist vote in Germany has increased one
thousand per cent. It now represents one-third of the total elec-
torate. But the Socialists are to a man behind the war.
32
humanity was turned into blood-lust, and fighting for
freedom into seeking for booty and glory. Are the
profound thinkers of the German universities, and
the visionaries of the workingmen's forums following
to-day the same path? Does the propagation of an
ideal lead inevitably to a blind fanaticism, where the
dreamer becomes in his own imagination a chosen
instrument of God to shed blood?
There is undoubtedly an intellectual and idealistic
German militarism and to German arrogance.
basis to
" "
Their connotation of the word German has led
the Germans to look upon territories outside of their
political confines as historically and racially, hence
rightfully, virtually, and eventually theirs
1
geo-
. A
graphy now in its two hundred and forty-fifth edition
in the public schools (Daniel's Leitfaden der Geo-
"
graphie) states that Germany is the heart of Europe.
Around it extend Austria, Switzerland, Belgium,
Luxemburg, and Holland, which were all formerly
part of the same state, and are peopled entirely or in
the majority by Germans."
When German children have been for the past
generation deliberately taught as a matter of fact
not as an academic or debatable question that
Deutschland ought to be more than it is, we can
understand how
the neutrality of their smaller
neighbours seems to the Germans a negligible
consideration. No wonder the soldiers who ran up
against an implacable enemy at Liege, Namur, and
Charleroi thought there must be a mistake some-
where, and were more angered against the opposition
of those whom they regarded as their brothers of
3 33
blood than they later showed themselves against the
French. No wonder that the sentiment of the whole
German nation is for the retention of Belgium,
their path to the sea. It was formerly German. Its
inhabitants are German. Let it become German
once more !
But to the Germans there are other and equally

important elements belonging to their nation outside
of the states upon the confines of the empire. These
are the German emigrants and German colonists in
all portions of the world. In recent years there has
come to the front more than ever the theory that
German nationality cannot be lost by foreign residence
or by transference of allegiance to another State: once
a German, always a German.
Convincing proof of this is found in the new citizen-
ship law, sanctioned with practical unanimity by the
Reichstag and Bundesrath, which went into effect on
January I, According to Article XIII of this
1914.
law, "a former German who has not taken up his
residence in Germany may on application be natur-
"
alized. This applies also to one who is descended
from former German, or who has been adopted as the
a
child of such! According to Article XIV, any former
German who holds a position in the German Empire
in any part of the world, in the service of a German
religious society or of a German school, is looked upon

as a German citizen "by assumption." Any for-
eigner holding such a position may be naturalized
without having a legal residence in Germany. The
most interesting provision of all is in Article XXV,
section 2 of which says: "Citizenship is not lost by
34
one who before acquiring foreign citizenship has
secured on application the written consent of the
competent authorities of his home state to retain his
"
citizenship.
Germany allows anyone of German blood to be-
come a German citizen, even if he has never seen
Germany and has no intention of taking up his
residence there; and Germans, who have emigrated
to other countries, secure the amazing opportunity
to acquire foreign citizenship without losing their
German citizenship.
The result of this law,since the war broke out, has
been to place a natural and justifiable suspicion upon
all Germans living in the countries of the enemies of
Germany. It is impossible to overestimate the

peril from the secret ill-will and espionage of Germans
residing in the countries that are at war with Ger-
many. There are undoubtedly many thousands of
cases where Germans have been honest and sincere
change of allegiance, but how are the nations
in their
where they have become naturalized to be sure of
this? A legal means has been given to these natural-
ized Germansto retain, without the knowledge of the
nation where their oath of allegiance has been received
in good faith, citizenship in Germany.
German emigration and colonization societies, and
many seemingly purely religious organizations for
"the propagation of the faith in foreign lands," have
been untiring in their efforts to preserve in the minds
of Germans who have left the Fatherland the prin-
ciple, "once a German always a German." The
Catholic as well as the Lutheran Church has lent
35
to this effort. Wherever there are Germans,
itself
one finds the German church, the German school,

the Zeitung, the Bierhalle, and the Turnverein. The
Deutschtum is sacred to the Germans. One cannot
but have the deepest respect for the pride of Germans
in their ancestry, in their language, in their church,
and in the preservation of traditional customs.
There isno better blood in the world than German
blood, and one who has it in his veins may well be
proud of it for it is an inheritance which is distinctly
:
to a man's intellectual and physical advantage. But,

in recent years, the effort has been made to confuse
Deutschtum with Deutschland. Here lies a great
danger. We may admire and reverence all that
has come to us from Germany. But the world can-
not look on impassively at a propaganda which is
leading to Deutschland uber alles!
When we take the megalomania of the Germans,
their ambition to fulfil their world mission, their
belief in their peculiar fitness to fulfil that mission,
and their idea of the German character of the neigh-
bouring states, and contrast the dream with the
reality, we see how they must feel, especially as they
are conscious of the fact that they dispose of a military
strength disproportionate to their position inmondial
politics. Great Britain, with one- third less popula-
tion, "the colossus with the feet of clay," owns a
good fourth of the whole world; France, the nation
of "monkeys," which was easily crushed in 1870,
holds sway over untold millions of acres and natives
in Africa and Asia; while Russia, the nation of
"
"slaves, has a half of Europe and Asia.
36
The most civilized people in the world, with a
world mission to fulfil, is dispossessed by its rivals
of inferior races and of inferior military strength!

The thinking German isby the very nature of things
a militarist.
But even if the logic of the Weltpolitik, under the
force of circumstances, did not push the German of
every class and category to the belief that Germany
must solve her great problems of the present day by
force of arms, especially since her military strength
is so much greater than that of her rivals, the nature
of the German would make him lean towards force

as the decisive argument in the question of extending
his influence. For from the beginning of history the
German has been a war man. He has asserted him-
self by force. He has proved amenable to the
less
refining and softening influences of Christianity and

civilization than any other European race. He has
worshipped force, and relied wholly upon force to
dominate those with whom he has come into contact.
The leopard cannot change his spots. So it is as
natural for the German of the twentieth century to
use the sword as an argument as it was for the
German of the tenth century, or, indeed, of the first
century. We
cannot too strongly insist upon this
fatal tendency of the German to subordinate natural,
moral, legal, and technical rights to the supremacy of
brute force. There is no conception of what is
called "moral suasion" in the German mind. Al-
though some of the greatest thinkers of the world
have been and are to-day Germans, yet the German
nation has never come to the realization that the pen
37
may be mightier than the sword. Give the German
a pen, and he will hold the world in admiration of his
intellect. Give him a piano or a violin, and he will
hold the world in adoration of his soul. But give him
a sword, and he will hold the world in abhorrence of
his force. For there never was an ubermensch who
was not a devil. Else he would be God.
But the Weltpolitik has had other and more
tangible and substantial causes than the three we
have been considering. It is not wholly the result of
the German idea that Germany can impose her will
upon the world and has the right to do so. The
power of Germany comes from the fact that her
people have been workers as well as dreamers.
The rapid increase of the population and development
of the industrial and commercial prosperity of the
empire have given the Germans a wholly justifiable
economic foundation for their Weltpolitik.
United Germany, after the successful war of 1870,
began the greatest era of industrial growth and pro-
sperity that has ever been known in the history
of the world. Not even the United States, with all
its annual immigration and opening up of new fields
and territories, has been able to show an industrial

growth comparable to that of Germany during the
past forty years. In this old central Europe cities
have grown almost over night. Railways have been
laid down, one after the other, until the whole empire
is a network of steel. Mines and factories have
sprung into being as miraculously as if it had been
by the rubbing of Aladdin's lamp. The population
has increased more than half in forty years.
38
It was as her population and her productive power
increased far more quickly and far beyond that of her
neighbours, that Germany began to look out into the
extra-European world for markets. She had reached
the point when her productivity, in manufacturing
lines, had exceeded her power of consumption.
Where find markets for the goods? German mer-
chants, and not Prussian militarists, began to spread
abroad in Germany the idea that there was a world
equilibrium, as important to the future of the nations
of Europe as was the European equilibrium. Ger-
many, looking out over the world, saw that the pros-
perity of Great Britainwas due to her trade, and that
the security and volume of this trade were due to her
colonies.
Who does not remember the remarkable stamp
issued by the Dominion of Canada to celebrate the
Jubilee of Queen Victoria? On the mercatorial
projection of the world, the British possessions were
given in red. One could not find any corner of the
globe where there were not ports to which British
ships in transit could go, and friendly markets for
British commerce. The Germans began to compare
their industries with those of Great Britain. Their
population was larger than that of the great colonial
power, and was increasing more rapidly. Their
industries were growing apace. For their excess
population, emigration to a foreign country meant
annual loss of energetic and capable compatriots.
Commerce had to meet unfair competition in
every part of the world. Outside of the Baltic
and North Seas, there was no place that a Ger-
39
man ship could touch over which the German flag
waved.
It was not militarism or chauvinism or megalo-
mania, but the natural desire of a people who found
themselves becoming prosperous to put secure and
solid foundations under that prosperity, that made
the Germans seek for colonies and launch forth upon
the Weltpolitik.
The first instance of the awakening on the part of
the German people to a sense that there was some-
thing which interested them outside of Europe, was
the annexation by Great Britain in 1874 of the Fiji
Islands, with which German traders had just begun,
at great risk and painstaking efforts, to build up a
business. This was the time when the Government
was engaged in its struggles with the Church and
socialism, and when the working of the Reichstag
and the Bundesrath was still in an experimental
stage. Nothing could be done. But there began to
be a feeling among Germans that in the future Ger-
many ought to be consulted concerning the further
extension of the sovereignty of as European nation
over any part of the world then unoccupied or still
independent. But Germany was not in a position
either to translate this sentiment into a vigorous
foreign policy, or to begin to seize her share of the
world by taking the portions which Great Britain
and Russia and France had still left vacant.
German trade, still in its infancy, received cruel
setbacks by the British occupation of Cyprus in
1878 and of Egypt in 1883, the French occupation
of Tunis in 1 88 1, and the Russian and British dealings
40
with central Asia and Afghanistan. The sentiment
of the educated and moneyed classes in Germany
began to impose upon the Government the necessity

of entering the colonial field. The action in Egypt
and in Tunis brought about the beginning of German
colonization. Bismarck had just finished success-
fully his critical struggle with the socialists. The
decks were cleared for action. In 1882, a Bremen
trader, Heir Ludritz, by treaties with the native
chiefs, gained the Bay of Angra-Pequefia on the west
coast of Africa. For two years no attention was
paid to this treaty, which was a purely private com-
mercial affair. In 1884, shortly after the occupation
of Egypt, a dispute arose between the British author-
ities at Cape Town and Herr Ludritz. Bismarck saw
that he must act, or the old story of extension of
British sovereignty would be repeated. He tele-
graphed to the German Consul at Cape Town that
the Imperial Government had annexed the coast and
hinterland from the Orange River to Cape Frio.
Other annexations in Africa and the Pacific fol-
lowed in the years 1884-1886. In Africa, the
German flag was hoisted over the east coast of the
continent, north of Cape Delgado and the river
Rovuma, and in Kamerun and Togo on the Gulf of
Guinea. In the Pacific, Kaiser Wilhelm's Land was
formed of a portion of New Guinea, with some adja-
cent islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago, the
Solomon Islands, and the Marshall Islands were
gathered in. Since those early years of feverish
activity, there have been no new acquisitions in
Africa, other than the portion of French Congo ceded

in 1912 as "compensation" for the French protecto-
rate of Morocco. In the Pacific, in 1899, after the
American conquest of the Philippines, the Caroline,
Pelew, and Marianne groups and two of the Samoan
Islands were added.
In China, Germany believed that she had the right
to expect to gain a position equal to that of Great
Britain at Hongkong and Shanghai, of France at
Tonkin, and Russia in Manchuria. She believed
that it was
just as necessary for her to have a forti-
fied port to serve as a naval base for her fleet as it
was for the other Powers, and that by a possession of
territory which could be called her own she would
be best able to get her share of the commerce of the
Far East. From
1895 to 1897, Germany examined
carefully the
all possible places which would serve
best for the establishment of a naval and commercial
base. At the beginning of 1897, after naval and
commercial missions had made their reports, a
technical mission was sent out whose membership
included the famous Franzius, the creator of Kiel.
This mission reported in favour of Kiau-Chau on the
peninsula of Shantung in north China.
When negotiations were opened with the Chinese,
the answer of the Chinese Government was to send
soldiers to guard the bay!The Kaiser, in a visit to
summer of 1897, secured
the Czar at Peterhof in the
Russian "benevolent neutrality." The murder of
two missionaries on
in the interior of the province,
November same year, gave Germany her
1st of the
chance. Three German war vessels landed troops
on the peninsula, and seized Kiau-Chau and Tsing-
42
Tau. After five months of tortuous negotiations, a
treaty was concluded between Germany and China
on March 6, 1899. Kiau-Chau with adjacent
territory was leased to Germany for ninety-nine
years. To German capital and German commerce
were given the right of preference for every industrial
enterprise on the peninsula, the concession for the
immediate construction of a railway, and the exclu-
sive right to mining along the line of the railway.
Thus the greater part of the province of Shantung
passed under the economic influence of Germany.
The entry of Japan into the war of 1914 is due to
her desire to remedy a great injustice which has been
done to Japanese commerce in the province of
Shantung by the German occupation, to her fear of
thisnaval base opposite her coast (just as she feared
Port Arthur), and probably to the intention of oc-
cupying the Marianne Islands, the Marshall Islands,
and the Eastern and Western Carolines, in order
that the Japanese navy may have important bases
in a possible future conflict with the United States.
When Germany leased Kiau-Chau, she declared
solemnly that the port of Tsing-Tau would be an
open port, ein frei Hafen fur alien Nationen. But
Japanese trade competition soon caused her to go
back on her word. She conceived a clever scheme
in 1906, by which the Chinese customs duties were
allowed to be collected within the Protectorate in
return for an annual sum of twenty per cent, upon the
entire customs receipts of the Tsing-Tau district.
In this way, she is more than recompensed for the
generosity displayed in allowing German goods to
43
be subject to the Chinese customs. She reimburses
herself at the expense of the Japanese Berlin could
!
not have been astonished at the ultimatum of August

1 5th from Tokio.
There has always been much opposition in Ger-
many to the colonization policy of the Government.
The dissatisfaction over the poor success of the
attempts at African colonization led Chancellor

Caprivi to state that the worst blow an enemy could
give him was to force upon him more territories in
Africa! The Germans never got on well with the
negroes. Their colonists, for the most part too poor
to finance properly agricultural schemes, lived by
trading. Like all whites, they cheated the natives
and bullied them into giving up their lands. In
South-West Africa, a formidable uprising of the
Herreros resulted in the massacre of all the Germans
except the missionaries and the colonists who had
established themselves there before the German
occupation. The suppression of this rebellion took
more than a year,and cost Germany an appalling
sum in money and many lives. But it cost the
natives more. Two thirds of the nation of the Her-
reros were massacred while only six or seven thou-
:
sand were in arms, the German official report stated

that forty thousand were killed. The Germans
confiscated all the lands of the natives.
In 1906, after twenty-one years of German rule,
there were in South-West Africa sixteen thousand
prisoners of war out
of a total native population of
thirty-one thousand. All the natives lived in con-
centration camps, and were forced to work for the
44
Government. In commenting upon the Herrero
campaign, Pastor Frenssen, one of the most brilliant
writers of modern Germany, put in the mouth of the
hero of his colonial novel the following words: "God
has given us the victory because we were the most
noble race, and the most filled with initiative. That
is not saying much, when we compare ourselves with
this race of negroes; but we must act in such a way

as tobecome better and more active than all the other
people of the world. It is to the most noble, to the
most firm that the world belongs. Such is the justice
of God."
German opposition has been bitter also against the
occupation of Kiau-Chau. For traders have claimed
that the political presence of Germany on the Shan-
tung peninsula and the dealings of the German dip-
lomats with the Pekin court had so prejudiced the
Chinese against everything German that it was
harder to do business with them than before the
leasehold was granted. They actually advocated
the withdrawal of the protectorate for the good of
German commerce!
But German pride was at stake in Africa after
the Herrero rebellion. And in China, Kiau-Chau
was too valuable a naval base to give up. In 1907,
a ministry of colonies was added to the Imperial
Cabinet. Since then the colonial realm has been
considered an integral part of the Empire.
At every point of this colonial development,
Germany found herself confronted with open opposi-
tion and secret intrigue. The principal strategic
value of south-west Africa was taken away by the
45
British possession of Walfisch Bay, and of east
Africaby the protectorate consented to by the Sultan
of Zanzibar to the British Crown. Togoland and
Kamerun are hemmed in by French and British
possession of the hinterland. The Pacific islands are
mostly "left-overs," or of minor importance. In
spite of the unpromising character of these colonies,
the commerce of Germany with them increased from
1908 to 1912 five hundred per cent., and the com-
merce with China through Kiau-Chau from 1902
to 1912 nearly a thousand per cent.
And yet, in comparison to her energies and her
willingness let us leave till later the question of
ability and fitness Germany has had little oppor-
tunity to exercise a colonial administration on a large
scale. She must seek to extend her political influence
over new territories. Where and how? That has
been the question. Most promising of all appeared
the succession to the Portuguese colonies, for the
sharing of which Great Britain declared her willing-
ness to meet Germany halfway. An accord was
made in 1898, against the eventuality of Portugal
selling her colonies. But since the Republic was

proclaimed in Portugal, there has been little hope
that her new Government would consider itself
strong enough to part with the heritage of several
centuries.
For the increase of her colonial empire, Germany
has felt little hope. So she has tried to secure com-
mercial privileges in various parts of the world,
through which political control might eventually
come. We have already spoken of her effort in
46
THE "WELTPOLITIK" OP GERMANY
China. Separate chapters treat of her efforts in
the three Moslem countries, Morocco, Persia, and
Turkey, and show how in each case she has found
herself checkmated by the intrigues and accords of
the three rich colonial Powers.
Long before the political union of the German
States in Europe was accomplished, there were
German aspirations in regard to the New World,
when Pan-Germanists dreamed of forming states in
North and South America.
These enthusiasts did not see that the Civil War
had so brought together the various elements of the
United States, the most prominent and most loyal
of which was the German element, that any hope
of a separatist movement in the United States
was chimerical. As late as 1885, however, the third
edition of Roscher's Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und
Auswanderung stated that "it would be a great step
forward, if the German immigrants to North America
would be willing to concentrate themselves in one of

the states, and transform it into a German state."
For different reasons Wisconsin would appear to be
most particularly indicated.
As early as 1849, the Germans commenced to
organize emigration to Brazil through a private
society of Hamburg (Hamburger Kolonisationverein] ,
which bought from the Prince de Joinville, brother-

in-law of Dom Pedro, vast territories in the state of
Santa Catharina. There the German colonization
in Brazil began. It soon extended to the neighbour-
ing states of Parana and Rio Grande do Sul. There

are now about three hundred and fifty thousand
47
Germans, forming two per cent, of the population.
In no district are they more than fifteen per cent.
However, in Rio Grande, there is a territory of two
hundred kilometres in which the German language
is almost wholly spoken; and a chain of German
colonies binds Sao Leopoldo to Santa Cruz.

Among the Pan-Germanists, the three states 01
southern Brazil have been regarded as a zone par-
ticularly reserved for German expansion. The
colonial congress of 1902 at Berlin expressed a formal
desire that hereafter German emigration be directed
towards the south of Brazil. An amendment to
include Argentina was rejected. The decree of
Prussia, forbidding emigration to Brazil, was revoked
in 1896 in so far as it was a question of the three states
of Parana, Santa Catharina, and Rio Grande do Sul.
It has not been very many years since diplomatic
incidents arose between Brazil and Germany over
fancied German violation of Brazilian territoryby
the arrest of sailors on shore. But Germany has not
entertained serious hope of getting a foothold in
South America. Brazil has increased greatly in
strength, and there is to-day in South America a
tacit alliance between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile
to support the American Monroe Doctrine. Ger-
many found, when she was trying to buy a West India
island from Denmark, that she had to reckon not
only with Washington, but also with Buenos Ayres,
Rio, and Santiago.
Finding herself so thoroughly hemmed in on all
sides, in the New World and in the Old World, by
alliances and accords directed against her overseas
48
political expansion, modern Germany has repeated
the history of the Jews. Deprived of some senses,
one develops extraordinarily others. Deprived of
civil and the Jews de-
social rights for centuries,
veloped the business sense until to-day their wealth

and influence in the business world are far beyond the
proportionate numbers of their race. Deprived of
the opportunity to administer and develop vast
overseas territories, the Germans have turned to
intensive military development at home and exten-
sive commercial development abroad, until to-day
they are the foremost military Power in Europe, and
are threatening British commercial supremacy in
every part of the globe.
The German counterpart of the British and French
and Russian elements that are directing the destinies
of vast colonies and protectorates is investing its
energy in business. During the past generation, the
German campaign for the markets of the world has
been carried on by the brightest and best minds in
Germany. There have been three phases to this
campaign: manufacturing the goods, selling the
goods, and carrying the goods. German manufac-
tures have increased so greatly in volume and scope
since the accession of the present Emperor that there
is hardly a line of merchandise which is not offered
in the markets of the world by German firms.
Articles "made in Germany" may not be as well
made as those of other countries. But their price
ismore attractive, and they have driven other goods
from many fields. One sees this right in Europe in
the markets of Germany's competitors and enemies.
4 49
Since the present war began, French and British
patriots are hard put to it sometimes when they find
that article after article which they have been accus-
tomed to buy is German. In my home in Paris, the
elevator is German, electrical fixtures are German,
the range in my kitchen is German, the best lamps for
lighting are German. I have discovered these things
in the past month through endeavouring to have
them repaired. Interest led me to investigate other
articles in daily use. My cutlery is German, my
silverware is German, the chairs in my dining-room
are German, the mirror in my bathroom is German,
some of my food products are German, and prac-
tically all the patented drugs and some of the toilet
preparations are German. Curiously enough, while
my beer is French, my milk is German !
All these things have been purchased in the Paris

markets, without the slightest leaning towards, or
preference for, articles coming from the Fatherland.
I was not aware of the fact that I was buying German
things. They sold themselves, the old combination

of appearance, convenience, and price, which will sell
anything. That I am unconsciously using German

manufactured articles is largely due to the genius of
the salesman. It is a great mistake to believe that
salesmanship primarily the art of selling the goods
is
of the house you represent. That has been the

British idea. It is today exploded. Is it because the
same type as the Britisher who is devoting his brains
and energy to solving the problems of inferior people
in different parts of the world is among the Germans
devoting his energies to German commerce in those

50
same places, that the Germans have found the fine
art of salesmanship to be quite a different thing?
It is studying the desires of the people to whom you
intend to sell, finding out what they want to buy,
and persuading your house at home to make and
export those articles. From the Parisian and the
Londoner, and the New Yorker down to the naked
savage, the Germans know what is wanted, and they
supply it. If the British university man is enjoying
a position of authority and of fascinating perplexity
in some colony, and feels that he has a share in shap-
ing the destinies of the world, the German university

man not without his revenge. Deprived of one
is
sense, has he not developed another and a more

practical one?
The young German, brought up in an overpopu-
lated country, unable to enter a civil service which
will keep him under his own flag and remember how
intensely patriotic he is, this young German, just as
patriotic as the young Frenchman or the young
Britisher, must leave home. He is not of the class
from which come the voluntary emigrants. His ties
are all Germany: his love and his move all
in
for Germany. So he becomes a German resident
abroad, in close connection with the Fatherland,
and always working for the interests of the Father-
land. He goes to England or to France, where he
studies carefully and methodically, as if he were to
write a thesis onit (and he often does), the business
methods of and the business opportunities among the

people where he is dwelling. He is giving his life to
put Deutschland uber alles in business right in the
heart of the rival nation, and he is succeeding. Dur-
ing October, 1914, when they tried to arrest in the
larger cities of England the German and Austrian
subjects they had to stop there was not room in the
jails for all of them! And in many places business
was paralyzed.
In carrying the products of steadily increasing vol-
ume to steadily growing markets, Germany has been
sensible enough to make those markets pay for the,
cost of transport. Up to the very selling price, all
the money The process is simple
goes to Germany. :
from German by German

factories, ships, through
German salesmen, to German firms, in every part of
the world beginning with London and Paris.
Germany's merchant marine has kept pace with
the development of her industry. Essen may be the
expression of one side of modern Germany, which is
said to have caused the European war. But one is
more logical in believing that Hamburg and Bremen
and the Kiel Canal have done more to bring on this
war than the products of Krupp. During the last
twenty-five years the tonnage of Germany's merchant
marine has increased two hundred and fifty per cent.,
a quarter of which has been in the last five years, from
1908-1913. There are six times as many steamships
flying the German flag as when Wilhelm II mounted
the throne. In merchant ships, Germany stands
today second only to Great Britain. The larger
portion of her merchant marine is directed by great
corporations. The struggle against Great Britain
and France for the freight carrying of outside nations
has been most bitter and most successful. Before
52
the present war, there was no part of the world in which
the German flag was not carried by ships less than ten
years old.
With the exception of Kiau-Chau, the colonies of
Germany have never been of much practical value,
except as possible coaling and wireless stations for the
German fleet. But here also the opposition of her
rivals has minimized their value. Walfisch Bay and
Zanzibar have, as we have already said, lessened the
strategical value of the two large colonies on either
side of the African continent. In the division of the
Portuguese colonies agreed to by Great Britain, it
was "the mistress of the seas" who was to have the
strategic places not part of them, but all of them,

the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira, and the Azores.
As Germany's commerce and shipping have so
rapidly developed, the seeking for opportunities to
extend her political sovereignty outside of Europe
has not been so much an outlook for industrial
enterprise as the imperative necessity of finding
naval bases and coaling stations in different parts of
the world for the adequate protection of commerce.
The development of the German navy has been the
logical complement of the development of the Ger-

man merchant marine. Germany's astonishing naval
program has kept pace with the astonishing growth
of the great Hamburg and Bremen lines. Germany
has had exactly the same argument for the increase
of her navy as has had Great Britain. Justification
for the money expended on the British navy is that
Great Britain needs the navy to protect her com-
merce, upon which the life of the nation is dependent,
53
THE NEW MAP OP EUROPE
and guarantee her food-supplies. The industrial
evolution of Germany has brought about for her
practically the same economic conditions as in Great
Britain. In addition to the dependence of her
prosperity upon the power of her navy to protect her
commerce, Germany has felt that she must keep the
sea open for the sake of guaranteeing uninterrupted
food-supplies for her industrial population. It must
not be forgotten that Germany is flanked on east and
west by hereditary enemies, and has come to look
to the sea as the direction from which her food
supplies would come in case of war.
This the Weltpolitik, the creation of a
last factor of
strong navy, must not be looked upon either as a

provocation to Great Britain or as a menace to the
equilibrium of the world. If it has brought Germany
inevitably into conflict with Great Britain, it is
because the navy is the safeguard of commerce. The

Weltpolitik essentially a -Handelspolitik.
is The
present tremendous conflict between Great Britain
and Germany is the result of commercial rivalry. It
is more a question of the pocket-book than of the
sacredness of treaties, if we are looking for the cause
rather than the occasion of the war. It has come in
spite of honest efforts to bring Great Britain and

Germany together.
Lord Haldane, in February, 1912, made a trip to
Berlin to bring about a general understanding be-
tween the two nations. But while there was much
discussion of the question of the Bagdad Railway,
Persian and Chinese affairs, Walfisch Bay, and the
division of Africa, nothing came of it. On March
54
1 Mr. Churchill said to the House of Commons:
8th,
"
If Germany adds two ships in the next six years, we
shall have to add four; if Germany adds three, we
shall have to add six. Whatever reduction is made in
the German naval program will probably be followed
here by a corresponding naval reduction. The
Germans will not get ahead of us, no matter what
increase they make; they will not lose, no matter
what decrease they make." This was as far as
Great Britain could go.
In the spring of 1912, the British fleet was con-
centrated in the North Sea, and an accord was made
with France for common defensive action in the
North Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. At the same
time, during M. Poincare's trip to Petrograd, an
accord was signed between France and Russia for
common naval action in time of war.
The Pan-Germanic movement in recent years has
not been a tool of the Government, but rather a party,
including other parties, banded together more than
once to oppose the German Government in an hon-
ourable attempt to preserve peace with the neigh-
bours in the west.
It is a tremendous mistake and a mistake which
has been continuously made in the French, British,
and American press since the beginning of the war
to consider the Weltpolitik as an expression of the
sentiments of the German Emperor and his officials.
Since was forced upon Bismarck against his will,
it
Pan-Germanism has been a power against which the

Emperor William II has had to strive frequently
throughout his reign. For it has never hesitated to
55
force him into paths and into positions which were
perilous to the theory of monarchical authority.
The Kaiser has resented the pressure of public opin-
ion in directing the affairs of the Empire. Pan-Ger-
manism has been a striking example of democracy,
endeavouring to have a say in governmental policies.
The Naval and Army Leagues, the German Colonial
Society, and the Pan-Germanic Society are private
groups, irresponsible from the standpoint of the
Government. They have declared the govern-
mental programs for an increase in armaments in-
sufficient, and have bitterly denounced and attacked
them from the point of view exactly opposite to that
of the Socialists. The Pan-Germanic Society refused
to recognize the treaty concluded between Germany
and France after the Agadir incident. Said Herr
Klaas at the Hanover Conference on April 15,
1912: "We persist in considering Morocco as the
country which will become in the future, let us hope
"
the near future, the colony for German emigration.
The same intractable spirit was shown in Dr. Pohl's
address at the Erfurt Congress in September, 1912.
We hear much about the Kaiser and the military
party precipitating war. A review of the German
newspapers during the past few years will convince
any fair-minded reader that German public opinion,
standing constantly behind the Pan-Germanists, has
frequently made the German Foreign Office act with
a much higher hand in international questions than
it would have acted if left to itself, and that German
public opinion, from highest classes to lowest, is for

this war to the bitter finish. // is the war oj the
56
people, intelligently and deliberately willed by them.
The statement that a revolution in Germany, led
by the democracy to dethrone the Kaiser or to get
him out of the clutches of the military party, would
put an end to the war, is foolish and pernicious.
For it leads us to false hopes. It would be much
nearer the truth to say that if the Kaiser had not
consented to this war, he would have endangered his
throne.
The principle of the Weltpolitik,
imposed upon
European diplomacy by the German nation in the
assembling of the Conference of Algeciras, was that
no State should be allowed to disturb the existing
political and territorial status quo of any country
still free, any part of the world, without the consent
in
of the other Powers. This Weltpolitik would have
the natural effect, according to Karl Lamprecht, in
his Zur Jiingsten Deutschen Vergangenheit, of endan-
gering a universal and pitiless competition among

the seven Great Powers in which the weakest would
eventually be eliminated.
57
CHAPTER III
THE "BAGDADBAHN"
the development of her Weltpolitik, the most
formidable, the most feasible, and the most
IN
successful conception of modern Germany has
been the economic penetration of Asiatic Turkey.
She may have failed in Africa and in China. But
there can be no doubt about the successful beginning,
and the rich promise for the future, of German en-
terprises in the Ottoman Empire.
The countries of sunshine have always exercised
a peculiar fascination over the German. His litera-
ture is filled with the Mediterranean and with Islam.
From his northern climate he has looked southward
and eastward back towards the cradle of his race,
and in imagination has lived over again the Cru-
sades. As long as Italy was under Teutonic political
influence, the path to the Mediterranean was easy.
United Italy and United Germany were born at
the same time. But while the birth of Italy threat-
ened to close eventually the trade route to the
Mediterranean to Germany, the necessity of a trade
route to the south became more vital than ever to the
new German Confederation from the sequences of
the union.
58
"
THE BAGDADBAHN"
When her political consolidation was completed
and her industrial era commenced, Germany began
to look around the world for a place to expand.
There were still three independent Mohammedan
nations Morocco, Persia, and Turkey. In Morocco
she found another cause for conflict with France than
Alsace-Lorraine. In Persia and Turkey, she faced
the bitter rivalry of Russia and Great Britain.
The rapid decline of the Ottoman Empire, and the
fact that its sovereign was Khalif of the Moslem
world, led German statesmen to believe that Con-
stantinople was the best place in the world to centre
the efforts of their diplomacy in the development of
the Weltpolitik. Through allying herself with the
Khalif, Germany would find herself able to strike
eventually at the British occupation of India and

Egypt, and the French occupation of Algeria and
Tunis, not only by joining the interests ofPan-Islamism
and Pan-Germanism, but also by winning a place in
Morocco opposite Gibraltar, a place in Asia Minor
opposite Egypt, and a place in Mesopotamia opposite
India.
The certainty of economic success helped to make
the political effort worth while, even if it came to
nothing. For Asia Minor and Mesopotamia are
countries that have been among the most fertile and
prosperous in the whole world. They could be so
again. The present backward condition of Asia
Minor and Mesopotamia is due to the fact that these
countries have had no chance to live since they came
under Ottoman control, much less to develop their
resources proportionately to other nations. The
59
natives have been exploited by the Turkish officials
and by foreign holders of concessions. Frequently
concessions have been sought to stop, not to further,
development. If there have been climatic changes
to account for lack of fertility in Asia Minor, this
is largely due to deforestation. Ibn Batutah, the
famous Moorish traveller of the first half of the four-
teenth century, and Shehabeddin of Damascus, his
contemporary, have left glowing accounts of the
fertility of regions of Asia Minor, now

and prosperity
hopelessly arid, as they existed on the eve of the
foundation of the Ottoman Empire. Not only have
all the trees been cut down, but the roots have been
torn up for fuel One frequently sees in the markets
!
of Anatolian towns the roots of trees for sale. The

treatment of trees is typical of everything else. The
country has had no chance. In Mesopotamia, the
new irrigation schemes are not innovations of the
twentieth century, but the revival of methods of
culture in vogue thousands of years before Christ.
The Romans and Byzantines improved their in-
The Osmanlis ruined it.
heritance.
In addition to sunshine and romance, political
advantages, and prospects of making money, another
influence has attracted the Germans to the Ottoman
Empire. There is a certain affinity between German
and Osmanli. The Germans have sympathy with
the spirit of Islam, as they conceive it to be interpreted
in the Turk. They admire the yassak of the Turk,
which is the counterpart of their verboten. The von
Moltke who later led Prussia to her great victories
had at the beginning of his career an intimate know-
Go
THE "BAGDADBAHN"
ledge of the Turkish army. He admired intensely
the blind and passive obedience of the Turk to au-
thority, his imperturbability under misfortune and
his fortitude in facing hardship and danger. "Theirs
not to reason why: theirs but to do and die" is a
spirit which German and Turk understand, and show,
far better than Briton, with all due respect to Tenny-
son. A Briton may obey, but he questions all the
same, and after the crisis is over he demands a
reckoning. Authority, to the Anglo-Saxon, rests in
the body politic, of which each individual is an
integral and ineffaceable part.
The Turkish military and official cast is like that
of theGermans in three things: authority rests in
superiors unaccountable to those whom they com-
mand; the origin of authority is force upholding
tradition and the sparing of human life and human
;
suffering is a consideration that must not be enter-

tained when it is a question of advancing a political
or military end. I have seen both at work, and have
seen the work of both; so I have the right to make
this statement. For all that, I have German and
Turkish friends, and deep affection for them, and
deep admiration for many traits of character of both
nations. The that the people of Germany
trouble is
and the people of Turkey allow their official and

military castes to do what their own instincts would
not permit them to do. The passivity of the Turk is
natural: it is his religion, his background, and his
climate. The passivity of the German is inexcusable-
He will not exorcise the devil out of his own race. It
must be done for him.
61
In 1888, a group of German financiers, backed by
the Deutsche Bank, which was to have so powerful a
future in Turkey, asked for the concession of a rail-
way line from Ismidt to Angora. The construction
of this linewas followed by concessions for extension
from Angora to Csesarea and for a branch from the
Ismidt- Angora line going south-west from Eski Sheir
to Konia. The extension to Caesarea was never
made. That was not the direction in which the
Germans wanted to go. The Eski Sheir-Konia spur
became the main line. The Berlin-Bagdad-Bassorah
"all rail route" was born. The Germans began to
dream of connecting the Baltic with the Persian Gulf.
The Balkan Peninsula was to revert to Austria-
Hungary, and Asia Minor and Mesopotamia to Ger-
many. The south Slavs and the populations of the
Ottoman Empire would be dispossessed (the philoso-
pher Haeckel actually prophesied this in a speech
in 1905 before the Geographical Society of Jena).
Russia would be cut off from the Mediterranean.
This was the Pan-Germanist conception of the
Bagdadbahn.
From the moment the railway concession was
first
granted to Germans in Asia Minor, which coincided

with the year of his accession, Wilhelm II has been
heart and soul with the development of German
interests in theOttoman Empire. His first move in
foreign politics was to visit Sultan Abdul Hamid
in 1889, when he was throwing off the yoke of Bis-
marck. This visit was the beginning of an intimate
connection between Wilhelmstrasse and the Sublime
Porte which has never been interrupted excepting
62
THE "BAGDADBAHN"
for a very brief period at the beginning of the First
Balkan War. The friendship between the Sultan
and the Kaiser was not in the least disturbed by the
Armenian massacres. The hecatombs of Asia Minor
passed without a protest. In fact, five days after the
great massacre of August, 1896, in Constantinople,
where Turkish soldiers shot down their fellow-citizens
under the eyes of the Sultan and of the foreign
ambassadors, Wilhelm II sent to Abdul Hamid for
his birthday a family photograph of himself with the
Empress and his children.

In 1898, the Kaiser made his second voyage to
Constantinople. This voyage was followed by the
concession extending the railway from Konia to the
Persian Gulf. was the beginning of the Bagdad-
It
bahn in the and narrower sense. After this
official
visit of the Kaiser to Abdul Hamid, the pilgrimage

was continued to the Holy Land. At Baalbek, there
isa stone of typically German taste, set in the wall of
the great temple, to commemorate the visit of the
man who dreamed he would one day be master of the
modern world. If this inscription seems a sacrilege,
what name have we for the large gap in the walls of
Jerusalem made for his triumphal entry to the Holy
City? The great Protestant German Church, whose
corner-stone was laid by his father in 1869, was
solemnly inaugurated by the Kaiser. As solemnly,
he handed over to Catholic Germans the title to land
for a hospital and religious establishment on the road
to Bethlehem. Still solemnly, at a banquet in his
honour Damascus, he turned to the Turkish Vali,

in
and declared: "Say to the three bundled million
63
Moslems of the world that I am their friend." To
prove his sincerity he went out to put a wreath upon
the tomb of Saladin.
Wilhelm II at Damascus is reminiscent of Na-
poleon at Cairo. Egypt and Syria and Mesopotamia
have always cast a spell over men who have dreamed
of world empires; and Islam, as a unifying force for
conquest, has appealed to the imagination of others
before the present German Kaiser. I have used the
word "imagination" intentionally. There never has
been any solidarity in the religion of Mohammed;
there is none now; there never will be. The idea of
community aims and community of interests is
of
totally lacking in the Mohammedan mind. Solidar-

ity is built upon the foundation of sacrifice of self
for others. It is a virtue not taught in the Koran,
nor ever developed by any Mohammedan civiliza-
tions. The failure of all political organisms of
Mohammedan origin to endure and to become strong
has been due to the fact that Mohammedans have
never felt the necessity of giving themselves for the
common weal. The virility of a nation is in the
virile service of those who love it. If there is no
willingness to serve, no incentive to love, how can a
nation live and be strong?
The revelation of Germany's ambition by the
granting of the concession from Konia to the Persian
Gulf, and the application of the German financiers
for a firman constituting the Bagdad Railway Com-
pany, led to international intrigues and negotiations
for a share in the construction of the line through
Mesopotamia. It would be wearisome and profitless

64
THE "BAGDADBAHN"
to follow the various phases of the Bagdad question.
Germany did not oppose international participation
in the concession. The expense of crossing the Tau-
rus and the dubious financial returns from the desert
sections influenced the Germans to welcome the
financial support of others in an undertaking that
they would have found great difficulty in financing
entirely by their own capital. The Bagdadbahn con-
cession was granted in 1899: the firman constituting
the company followed in 1903.
Russia did not realize the danger of German
influence at Constantinople, and of the eventualities
of the German "pacific penetrations" in Asia Minor.
She adjusted the Macedonian question with Emperor
Franz Josef in order to have a free hand in Man-
churia, and she made no opposition to the German
ambitions. She needed the friendly neutrality of
Germany in her approaching struggle with Japan.
Once the struggle was begun, Russia found herself
actually dependent upon the goodwill of Germany.
It was not the time for Petrograd to fish in the
troubled waters of the Golden Horn.
The situation was different with Great Britain.
The menace of the German approach to the Persian
Gulf was brought to the British Foreign Office just
long enough before the Boer crisis became acute for a
decision to be made. Germany had sent engineers
along the proposed route of her railway. She had
neglected to send diplomatic agents!
The proposed in fact the only feasible terminus
on the Persian Gulf was at Koweit. Like the Sultan
of Muscat, the Sheik of Koweit was practically inde-
5 65
pendent of Turkey. While showing deference to the
Sultan as Khalif Sheik
,
Mobarek resisted every effort
of the Vali of Bassorah to exercise even the sem-
blance of authority over his small domain. In 1899,
Colonel Meade, the British resident of the Persian
Gulf, signed with Mobarek a secret convention which
assured to him "special protection, "ifhe would make
no cession of territory without the knowledge and con-
sent of the British Government. The following year,
a German mission, headed by the Kaiser's Consul
General at Constantinople, arrived in Koweit to
arrange the concession for the terminus of the Bag-
dadbahn. They were too late. The door to the
Persian Gulf was shut in the face of Germany.
Wilhelm II set into motion the Sultan. The
Sublime Porte suddenly remembered that Koweit
was Ottoman territory, and began to display great
interest in forcing the Sheik to recognize the fact.
A Turkish vessel appeared at Koweit in 1901. But
British warships and British bluejackets upheld the
independence of Koweit! Since the Constitution of
1908, all the efforts of the Young Turks at Koweit
have been fruitless. Germany remains blocked.
British opposition to the German schemes was not
limited to the prevention of an outlet of the Bagdad-
bahn at Koweit. Since 1798, when the East India
Company established a resident at Bagdad to spy
upon and endeavour to frustrate the influence of the
French, just beginning to penetrate towards India
through the ambition of Napoleon to inherit the
empire of Alexander, British interests have not failed
to be well looked after in Lower Mesopotamia.
66
THE "
BAGDADBAHN "
After the Lynch Brothers in 1860, obtained the right
of navigating on the Euphrates, the development
of their steamship lines gradually gave Great Britain
the bulk of the commerce of the whole region, in the
Persian as well as the Ottoman hinterland of the
Gulf. In 1895, German commerce in the port of
Bushir was non-existent, while British commerce
surpassed twelve million francs yearly. In 1905, the
Hamburg-American Line established a service to
Bassorah. merchants began to raise the
British
cry that if the Bagdadbahn appeared the Germans
would soon have not only the markets of Mesopo-
tamia but also that of Kermanshah! The Lynch
Company declared that the Bagdadbahn would ruin
their river service, and their representations were
listened to at London, despite the absurdity of their
contention. The Lynches were negotiating with
Berlin also. This mixture of politics and commerce
in Mesopotamia is a sordid story, which does not
improve in the telling.

The revolution of 1908 did not injure the German
influence at Constantinople as much as has been
popularly supposed. The Germans succeeded dur-
ing the first troubled year in keeping in with both
sides through the genius of Baron Marschall von
Bieberstein, in spite of the Bosnia-Herzegovina affair.
Germany was fortunately out of the Cretan and
Macedonian muddles, which her rivals were hope-
in
lessly entangled. Mahmud Shevket pasha was al-

ways under German influence, and the Germans had
Enver bey, "hero of liberty," in training at Berlin.
German influence at Constantinople succeeded also
67
in withstanding the strain of the Tripolitan War,
although it grew increasingly embarrassing as the
months passed to be Turkey's best friend and at the
same time the ally of Italy! During the first dis-
astrous period of the war of the Balkan Allies against
Turkey, it seemed for the time that the enemies of
Germany controlled the Sublime Porte. But the
revolver of Enver bey in the coup d'etat of January,
1913, brought once more the control of Turkish
hands friendly to Germany.
affairs into They have
remained there ever since.
Germany strengthened her railway scheme, and
her hold on the territories through which it was to
pass, by the accord with Russia at Potsdam in 1910.
The attack of British diplomacy on the
last clever
Bagdadbahn was successfully met. In tracing the

extension of the railway beyond Adana, it was sug-
gested to the Department of Public Works that the
cost of construction would be greatly reduced and
the usefulness of the line increased, if it passed by
the Mediterranean littoral around the head of the
Gulf of Alexandretta. Then the control of the rail-
way would have been at the mercy of the British
fleet. When the "revised" plans went from the
Ministry of Public Works to the Ministry of War, it
was not hard for the German agents to persuade the
General Staff to restore the original route inland
across the Amanus, following the old plan agreed
upon in the time of Abdul Hamid. More than that,
the Germans secured concessions for a branch line
from Aleppo to the Mediterranean at Alexandretta,
and for the construction of a port at Alexandretta.
68
THE "
BAGDADBAHN "
The Bagdadbahn was have a Mediterranean
to
terminus at a fortified port, and Germany was to have
her naval base in the north-east corner of the Medi-
terranean, eight hours from Cyprus and thirty-six
hours from the Suez Canal! This was the revenge
for Koweit.
A month before the Servian ultimatum, Germany
had contracted to grant a loan to Bulgaria, one of the
conditions of which was that Germany be allowed
to build a railway to the Êgean across the Rhodope
Mountains to Porto Laghos, and to construct a port
there, six hours from the mouth of the Dardanelles.
There was a panic in Petrograd.
The events in since the opening of the
Turkey
war are too recent history and as yet too little under-
stood to dwell upon. But the reception accorded to
the Goeben and Breslau at the Dardanelles, their
present* anomalous position in "closed waters" in
defiance of all treaties, the abolition of the foreign
post-offices, the unilateral decision to abrogate the
capitulations all show in which direc-
these straws
tion the wind is
blowing on the Bosphorus. A suc-
cessful termination of the German campaign in
France, which at this writing seems most improbable
the fact that the Germans are at Com-
(in spite of
piegne and their aeroplanes pay us daily visits),
would certainly draw Turkey into the war and to
her ruin.
On the other hand, the German reliance upon
embarrassing the French and British in their Moslem
colonies through posing as the defenders of Islam
and Islam's Khalif has not been well-founded. On
'October, 1914. 69
the battlefield of France, thousands of followers of
Mohammed from Africa and Asia are fighting loyally
under the flags of the Allies. The Kaiser, for all his
dreams and hopes, has not succeeded in getting a
single Mohammedan to draw his sword for the com-
bined causes of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Islamism.
Have the three hundred million Moslems forgotten
the declaration of Damascus?
In seeking for the causes of the present conflict, it
isimpossible to neglect Germany in the Ottoman
Empire. As one looks up at Pera from the Bos-
phorus, the most imposing building on the hill is the
German Embassy. It dominates Constantinople.
There has been woven the web that has resulted in
putting Germany in the place of Great Britain to
prevent the Russian advance to the Dardanelles,
in putting Germany in the place of Russia to threaten
the British occupation of India and the trade route
to India, and in putting Germany in the place of
Great Britain as the stubborn opponent of the com-
pletion of the African Empire of France. The most
conspicuous thread of the web is the Bagdadbahn.
In the intrigues of Constantinople, we see develop
the political evolution of the past generation, and the
series of events that made inevitable the European
war of 1914.
70
CHAPTER IV
ALGECIRAS AND AGADIR
1904, an accord was made between Great Bri-

tain and France in regard to colonial policy in
IN northern Africa. Great Britain recognized the
"
special" interests of France in Morocco in exchange
for French recognition of Great Britain's "special"
Egypt. There was a promise to defend

interests in
each other in the protection of these interests, but
no actual agreement to carry this defence beyond
the exercise of diplomatic pressure. The accord
was a secret one. Its exact terms were not known
until the incident of Agadir made necessary its
publication inNovember, 1911.

But that there was an accord was known to all the
world. Germany, who had long been looking with
alarm upon the extension of French influence in
Morocco, found in 1905 a favourable moment for
protest. Russia had suffered humiliation and defeat
in her war with Japan. Neither in a military nor a
financial way was she at that moment a factor to
be reckoned with in support of France. Great
Britain had not recovered from the disasters to her
military organization of the South African campaign.
Her domestic politics were in a chaotic state. The
Conservative Ministry was losing ground daily in
bye elections; the Irish question was coming to the
front again.
German intervention in Morocco was sudden and
theatrical. On March 31, 1905, a date of far-reach-
ing importance in history, Emperor William entered
the harbour of Tangier upon his yacht, the Hohen-
zollern. When he disembarked, he gave the cue to
German policy by saluting the representative of the
Sultan, with peculiar emphasis, as the representative
of an independent sovereign. Then, turning to the
German residents in Morocco who had gathered to
meet him, he said: "I am happy to greet in you the
devoted pioneers of German industry and commerce,
who are aiding in the task of keeping always in a
high position, in a free land, the interests of the
mother country."
The repercussion of this visit to Tangier in France
and in Great Britain was electrical. It seemed to be,
and was, a direct challenge on the part of Germany
for a share in shaping the destinies of Morocco. It
was an answer to the Anglo-French accord, in which
Germany had been ignored. Great Britain was in no
position to go beyond mere words in the standing
behind France. France knew this. So did Ger-
many. After several months of fruitless negotia-
tions between Berlin and Paris, on June 6th,Ut was
made plain to France that there must be a conference
on the Moroccan question.
M. Delcasse, at that time directing with consum-
mate skill and courage the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
urged upon the Cabinet the necessity for accepting
72
Germany's challenge. But the Cabinet, after hear-

ing the sorrowful confessions of the Ministers of
War and Navy, and learning that France was not
ready to fight, refused to accept the advice of the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. M. Delcasse resigned.
A blow had been struck at French prestige.
For six months the crisis continued in an acute
stage. The chauvinistic or shall we say, patriotic?
elements were determined to withstand what they
called the Kaiser's interference in the domestic affairs
of France. But France seemed isolated at that mo-
ment, and prudence was the part of wisdom. M.
Rouvier declared to the Chamber of Deputies on
December i6th "France cannot be without a Moroc-
:
can policy, for the form and direction which the evolu-
tion of Morocco will take in the future will influence
in a decisive manner the destinies of our North Afri-
can possessions." France agreed to a conference, but
won from Germany the concession that France's
special interests in Morocco would be
and rights
admitted as the basis of the work of the conference.
On January 1906, a conference of European
17,
States, to which the United States of America was
admitted, met to decide the international status of
Morocco. For some time the attitude of the Ger-
man delegates was uncompromising. They main-
tained the Kaiser's thesis as set forth at Algiers the :
complete independence of Morocco, and sovereignty

of her Sultan. But they finally yielded, and ac-
knowledged the right of France and Spain to organize
in Morocco an international police.
The Convention was signed on April 7th. It
73
provided under the sovereign authority
for: (i) police
of the Sultan, recruited from Moorish Moslems, and
distributed in the eight open ports; (2) Spanish and
French officers, placed at his disposal by their govern-
ments, to assist the Sultan ; (3) limitation of the total
effective of this police force from two thousand to
two thousand five hundred, of French and Spanish
commissioned sixteen
officers, to twenty, and non-
commissioned thirty to forty, appointed for five
years; (4) an Inspector General, a high officer of
the Swiss army, chosen subject to the approval of
the Sultan, with residence at Tangier; (5) a State
Bank of Morocco, in which each of the signatory
Powers had the right to subscribe capital; (6) the
right of foreigners to acquire property, and to build
upon it, in any part of Morocco; (7) France's ex-
clusive right to enforce regulations in the frontier
region of Algeria and a similar right to Spain in the
frontier region of Spain; (8) the preservation of the
public services of the Empire from alienation for
private interests.
Chancellor von Bulow's speech in the Reichstag
on April 5, 1906, was a justification of Germany's
attitude. It showed that the policy of Wilhelm-
strassehad been far from bellicose, and that Ger-
many's demands were altogether reasonable. The
time had come, declared the Chancellor, when
German interests in the remaining independent
portions of Africa and Asia must be considered by
Europe. In going to Tangier and in forcing the
conference of Algeciras, Germany had laid down the
principle that there must be equal opportunities for
74
Germans independent countries, and had demon-
in
was prepared to enforce this principle.
strated that she
When one considers the remarkable growth in
population, and the industrial and maritime evolu-
tion of Germany, this attitude cannot be wondered
at, much less condemned. Germany, deprived by
her late entrance among nations of fruitful colonies,
was finding it necessary to adopt and uphold the
policy of trying to prevent the pre-emption, for the
benefit of her rivals, of those portions of the world
which were still free.
Neither France nor Spain had any feeling of

loyalty toward the Convention of Algeciras. How-
ever much may have been written to prove this
few years following Algeciras
loyalty, the facts of the
are convincing. After 1908, Spain provoked and
led on by the tremendous expenditures entailed
upon her by the Riff campaigns began to consider
the region of Morocco in which she was installed as
exclusively Spanish territory. French writers have
expended much energy and ingenuity in proving
the disinterestedness of French efforts to enforce
loyally the decisions of Algeciras. But they have
explained, they have protested, too much. There
has never been a moment that France has not dreamt
of the completion of the vast colonial empire in
North Africa by the inclusion of Morocco. It has
been the goal for which allher military and civil
administrations in Algeria and the Sahara have been
working. To bring about the downfall of the
Sultan's authority, not only press campaigns were
undertaken, but anarchy on the Algerian frontier
75
was allowed to go on unchecked, until military
measures seemed justifiable.
In a similar way, the German colonists of Morocco
did their best to bring about another intervention
by Germany. Their methods were so despicable
and outrageous that they had frequently to be dis-
avowed officially. In 1910, the German Foreign
Office found the claims of Mannesmann Brothers
to certain mining privileges invalid, because they
did not fulfil the requirements of the Act of Alge-
ciras. But the Mannesmann mining group, as
well as other German
enterprises in Morocco, were
secretly encouraged to make all the trouble they
could for the French, while defending the authority
of the Sultan. The Casablanca incident only one
is
of numerous affronts which the French were asked

to swallow.
Great Britain had her part, though not through
official agents, in the intrigues. There is much
food for thought in the motives that may, not with-
out reason, be imputed to the publication in the
Times of a series of accounts on Moroccan anarchy,
and on Muley Hafid's cruelties.
In the spring of 1911, it was realized everywhere
in Europe that the Sultan's authority was even less
than it had been in 1905. The Berber tribes were
in arms on all sides. In March, accounts began to
appear of danger at Fez, not only to European resi-
dents, but also to the Sultan. The reports of the
French Consul, and the telegrams of correspondents
of two Paris newspapers, were most alarming. On
April 2d, it was announced that the Berber tribes
76
had actually attacked the city and were besieging
it. Everything was prepared for the final act of the
drama.
A relief column of native troops under Major
Bremond arrived in Fez on April 26th. The very
next day, an urgent message for relief having been
received from Colonel Mangin in Fez, Colonel Bru-
lard started for the capital with another column.
Without waiting for further word, a French army
which had been carefully prepared for the purpose,
entered Morocco under General Moinier. On May
2 1st, Fez was occupied by the French. They found
that all was well there with the Europeans and with
the natives. But, fortunately for the French plans,
Muley Hafid's brother had set himself up at Mequi-
nez as pretender to the throne. The Sultan could
now retain his sovereignty only by putting himself
under the protection of the French army. Morocco
had lost her independence!
Germany made no objection to the French expedi-
tionary corps in April. She certainly did not expect
the quick succession of events in May which brought
her face to face with the fait accompli of a strong
French army in Fez. As soon as it was realized at
Berlin that the fiction of Moroccan independence
had been so skilfully terminated, France was asked
"what compensation she would give to Germany
in return for a free hand in Morocco." The pour-
parlers dragged on through several weeks in June.
France refused to acknowledge any ground for com-
pensation to Germany. She maintained that the
recent action in Morocco had been at the request
77
of the Sultan, and that it was a matter entirely
between him and France.
Germany saw that a bold stroke was necessary.
On July 1st, the gunboat Panther went to Agadir,
a port on the Atlantic coast of Morocco. To Great
Britain and to France, the dispatch of the Panther
was represented as due to the necessity of protecting
German interests, seeing that there was anarchy in
that part of Morocco. But the German news-
papers, even those which were supposed to have
official relations with Wilhelmstrasse, spoke as if
a demand for the cession of Mogador or some

other portion of Morocco was contemplated. The
Chancellor explained to the Reichstag that the
sending of the Panther was "to show the world
that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed
to one side."
But in the negotiations through the German
Ambassador in Paris, it was clear that Germany
was playing a game of political blackmail. The Ger-
man Foreign Office shifted its claims from Morocco
to concessions in Central Africa. On July I5th,
Germany asked for the whole of the French Congo
from the sea to the River Sanga, and a renunciation
in her favour of France's contingent claims to the
succession of the Belgian Congo. The reason given
to this demand was, that if Morocco were to pass
under a French protectorate, it was only just that
compensation should be given to Germany else-
where. France, for the moment, hesitated. She
definitely refused to entertain the idea of compensa-
tion as soon as she had received the assurance of the
78
aid of Great Britain in supporting her against the
German claims. ?
On July the German Ambassador had noti-

IST),
fied Sir Edward Grey of the dispatch of the Panther

to Agadir "in response to the demand for protection
from German firms there," and explained that
Germany considered the question of Morocco re-
opened by the French occupation of Fez, and thought
that it would be possible to make an agreement with
Spain and France for the partition of Morocco.
On July 4th, Sir Edward Grey, after a consultation
with the Cabinet, answered that Great Britain could
recognize no change in Morocco without consulting
France, to whom she was bound by treaty. The
Ambassador then explained that his Government
would not consider the reopening of the question in
a European conference, that it was a matter directly
between Germany and France, and that his overture
to Sir Edward Grey had been merely in the nature
of a friendly explanation.
Germany believed that the constitutional crisis

in Great Britain was so serious that the hands of
the Liberal Cabinet would be tied, and that they
would not be so foolhardy as to back up France at
the moment when they themselves were being so
bitterly assailed by the most influential elements of
the British electorate on the question of limiting
the veto power of the House of Lords. It was in
this belief that Germany on July I5th asked for
territorial cessions from France in Central Africa.
Wilhelmstrasse thought the moment well chosen,
and that there was every hope of success.
79
But the German mentality has never seemed to
appreciate the frequent lesson of history, that the
British people are able to distinguish clearly between
matters of internal and external policy. Bitterly
assailed as a traitor to his country because he ad-
vocates certain changes of laws, a British Cabinet
Minister can still be conscious of the fact that his
bitterest opponents will rally around him when he
takes a stand on a matter of foreign policy. This
knowledge of admirable national solidarity enabled
Mr. Lloyd George on July 2ist, the very day on
which the King gave his consent to the creation of
new peers to bring the House of Lords to reason, at
a Mansion House banquet, to warn Germany against
the danger of pressing her demands upon France.
The effect, both in London and Paris, was to unify
and strengthen resistance. It seemed as if the Pan-
ther's visit to Agadir had put Germany in the unen-
viable position of having made a threat which she
could not enforce.
But the ways of diplomacy are tortuous. Through-
out August and September, Germany blustered and
threatened. In September, several events hap-
pened which seemed to embarrass Russia and tie
her hands, as in the first Moroccan imbroglio of
1905. For Premier Stolypin was assassinated at
Kiev on September I4th; the United States de-
nounced its commercial treaty with Russia on ac-
count of the question of Jewish passports; and the
Shuster affair in Persia occupied the serious atten-
tion of Russian diplomacy. Had it not been for
the splendidly loyal and scrupulous attitude of the
80
British Foreign Office towards Russia in the Persian
question, Germany might have been tempted to
force the issue with France.
German demands grew more moderate, but were
not abandoned. For members of the House of
Commons, of the extreme Radical wing in the Liberal
party, began to put the British Government in an
uncomfortable position. Militarism, entangling al-
liances with a continental Power, the necessity for
agreement with Germany, these were the subjects

which found their way from the floor of the House
of Commons to the public press. A
portion of the
Liberal party which had to be reckoned with be-
lieved that Germany ought not to have been left
out of the Anglo-French agreement. So serious
was the dissatisfaction, that the Government deemed
it make an explanation to the House.
necessary to
Sir Edward Grey explained and defended the action
of the Cabinet in supporting the resistance of France
to Germany's claims. The whole history of the
negotiation was revealed. The Anglo-French agree-
ment of 1904 was published for the first time, and
it was seen that this agreement did not commit
Great Britain to backing France by force of arms.

Uncertainty of British support had the influence
of bringing France to consent to treat with Germany
on the Moroccan question. Two agreements were
signed. By the first, Germany recognized the
French protectorate Morocco, subject to the
in
adhesion of the signers of the Convention of Alge-
ciras, and waived her right to take part in the nego-
tiations concerning Moroccan spheres of influence
6 81
between Spain and France. On her side, France
agreed to maintain the open door in Morocco, and
to refrain from any measures which would hinder
the legitimate extension of German commercial and
mining interests. By the second agreement, France
ceded to Germany certain territories in the southern
and eastern Cameroons, in return for German
cessions.
There was a stormy Parliamentary and newspaper
discussion, both in France and Germany, over these
two treaties. No one was satisfied. The treaties
were finally ratified, but under protest.
In France, the Ministry was subject to severe
criticism. There was also some feeling of bitter-
ness perhaps a reaction from the satisfaction over
Mr. Lloyd George's Mansion House speech in the
uncertainty of Great Britain's support, as revealed
by the November discussions in the House of Com-
mons. This uncertainty remained, as far as French
public opinion went, until Great Britain actually
declared war upon Germany in August, 1914.
In Germany, the Reichstag debates revealed the
belief that the Agadir expedition had, on final ana-
lysis, resulted in a fiasco. An astonishing amount
of enmity against Great Britain was displayed. It
was when Herr Heydebrand made a bitter speech
against Great Britain, and denounced the pacific
attitude of the German Government, in the Reichs-
tag session of November loth, that the Crown Prince
made public his position in German foreign policy
by applauding loudly.
The aftermath of Agadir, as far as it affected
82
Morocco, resulted in the establishment of the French
Protectorate, on March 30, 1912. The Sultan
signed away independence by the Treaty of Fez.
his
Foreign legations at Fez ceased to exist, although

diplomatic officials were retained at Tangier. France
voted the maintenance of forty thousand troops in
Morocco "for the purposes of pacification." The
last complications disappeared when, on November
27th, a Franco-Spanish Treaty was signed at Ma-

drid, in which the Spanish zones in Morocco were
defined, and both states promised not to erect forti-
fications or strategic works on the Moroccan coast.
But the aftermath of Agadir in France and Ger-
many has been an increase in naval and military
armaments, and the creation of a spirit of tension
which needed only the three years of war in the
Ottoman Empire to bring about the inevitable clash
between Teuton and Gaul. Taken in connection
with the recent events in Alsace and Lorraine, and
the voting of the law increasing military service in
France to three years, the logical sequence of events
is clear.
CHAPTER V
THE PASSING OF PERSIA
weakness of the Ottoman Empire and of
THEcommercial
Morocco served to bring the colonial and
aspiration of Germany into con-
flict with other nations of Europe. The recent
fortunes of Persia, the third and only other
independent Mohammedan state,have also helped
to make possible the general European war.
The first decade of the twentieth century brought
about in Persia, as in Turkey, the rise of a constitu-
tional party, which was able to force a despotic
sovereign to grant a constitution. The Young
Persians had in many respects a history similar to
that of the Young Turks. They were for the most
part members of influential families, who had been
educated in Europe, or had been sent into exile.
They had imbibed deeply the spirit of the French
Revolution from their reading, and had at the same
time developed a narrow and intense nationalism.
But to support their revolutionary propaganda,
they had allied themselves during the period of dark-
ness with the Armenians and other non-Moslems.
As Salonika, a city by no means Turkish, was the
foyer of the young Turk movement, so Tabriz,
84
capital of the Azerbaidjan, a city by no means
Persian, was the centre of the opposition to Persian
despotism.
Young Turks, Young Persians, Young Egyptians,
Young Indians, and Young Chinese have shown to
Europe and America the peril and the pity of our
western and Christian education, when it is given to
eastern and non-Christian students. They are born
into the intellectual life with our ideas and are
inspired by our ideals, but have none of the back-
ground, none of the inheritance of our national
atmosphere and our family training to enable them
to live up to the standards we have put before them.
Their disillusionment is bitter. They resent our
attitude of superiority. They hate us, even though
they feign to admire us. Their jealousy of our
institutions leads them to console themselves by
and forcing themselves to
singling out see only the
weak and vulnerable points in our civilization.
Educated in our universities, they return to their
countries to conspire against us. The illiterate and
simple Oriental, who has never travelled, fre- is
quently the model of fidelity and loyalty and af-

fection to his Occidental master or friend. But no
educated non-Christian Oriental, who has travelled
and studied and lived on terms of equality with
Europeans or Americans in Europe or America, can
ever be a sincere friend. The common result of
social contact and intellectual companionship is that
he becomes a foe, and conceals the fact. Famil-
iarity has bred more than contempt.
The Young Persians would have no European
85
aid. They waited, and suffered. Finally, after a
particularly bad year from the standpoint of finan-
cial exactions, the Moslem clergy of the North were
drawn into the Young Persia movement. A revolu-
tion, in which the Mohammedan
mullahs took part,
compelled the dying Shah, Muzaffereddin, to issue
a decree ordering the convocation of a medjliss (com-
mittee of notables) on August 5, 1906. This impro-
vised Parliament, composed only of delegates of the
provinces nearest the capital, drafted a constitution
which was promulgated on New Year's Day, 1907.
The following week, Muzaffereddin died and was
succeeded by his son, Mohammed AH Mirza, a
reactionary of the worst type.
Mohammed Ali had no intention of putting the
Constitution into force. A serious revolution broke
out in Tabriz a few weeks after his accession. He
was compelled to acknowledge the Constitution
granted by his father. In order to nullify its effect,
however, the new Shah called to the Grand Vizierate
the exiled Ali Asgar Khan, whom he believed to be
strong enough to overrule the wishes of the Parlia-
ment. The Constitutionalists formed a society of
fedavis to prevent the return to absolutism. At their
instigation, Ali Asgar Khan was assassinated. The
country fell into an anarchic state.
Constitutional Persia, as much because of the
inexperience of the Constitutionalists as of the ill-
Shah, was worse off than under the despot-
will of the
ism of Muzaffereddin. There was no money in the
treasury. The peasants would not pay their taxes.
One can hardly blame them, for not a cent of the
86
money ever went improvements or local
for local
government. Throughout Persia, even in the cities,

life was unsafe. The Persians, no more than the
Turks, could call forth from the ranks of their enthu-
siasts a progressive and fearless statesman of the
type of Stambuloff or Venizelos. In their Parlia-

ment they all talked at once. None was willing to
listen to his neighbour. It may have been because
there was no Mirabeau. But could a Mirabeau
have overcome the fatal defects of the Mohammedan
training and character that made the Young Persians
incapable of realizing the constitutionalism of their
dreams? Every man was suspicious and jealous of
his neighbour. Every man wanted to lead, and none
to be led. Every man wanted power without respon-
sibility, prestige without work, success without
sacrifice.
It was at this moment
that one of the most signi-
ficant events of contemporary times was helped to
fruition by the state of affairs in Persia. Great
Britain and Russia, rivals even enemies in west-
ern and central Asia, signed a convention. Their
conflicting ambitions were amicably compromised.
Along with the questions of Afghanistan and Thibet,
this accord settled the rivalry that had done much
to keep Persia a hotbed of diplomatic intrigue like
Macedonia ever since the Crimean War.
In regard to Persia, the two Powers solemnly
swore to respect its integrity and its independence,
and then went on to sign its death warrant, by agree-
ing upon tHe question of "the spheres of influence."
In spite of all sophisms, this convention marked the
87
passing of Persia as an independent state. Persia is
worse off than Morocco and Egypt. For one master

is better than two!
Here enters Germany. For many years German
merchants had looked upon Persia as they looked
upon Morocco and Turkey. Here were the legiti-
mate fields for commercial expansion. Probably
there were also dreams of political advantages to
be gained later. In their dealings with the three
Moslem countries that were still "unprotected"
when they inaugurated their Weltpolitik, the Germans
had been attentive students of British policy in the
days of her first entry into India and to Egypt.
There were many Germans who honestly believed
that their activities in these independent Moslem
countries would only give them "their place under
the sun," and a legitimate field for the overflow of
their population and national energy, but that it
would also be a distinct advantage to the peace of
the world. Great Britain and Russia and France
had already divided up between them the larger
part of Asia and Africa. In the process, Great
Britain had recently come almost to blows with both
her rivals. If Germany stepped in between them,
would this not prevent a future conflict? But the
rivals "divided up." Germany was left out in the
cold. It is not a very far cry from Teheran and
Koweit and Fez to Liege and Brussels and Antwerp.
Belgium is paying the bill.
The Anglo- Russian convention of August 31,

1907, was the first of three doors slammed in Ger-
many's face. The Anglo-French convention of May
88
8, 1904, had been an attempt to do this. But by
Emperor William's visit to Tangiers in 1905, Ger-
many got in her foot before the door was closed!

In Persia there was no way that she could in-
tervene directly to demand that Great Britain and
Russia bring their accord before an international
congress.
Germany began to work in Persia through two
agencies. She incited Turkey to cross the frontier
of the Azerbaidjan, and to make the perfectly reason-
able request that the third limitrophe state should
be taken into the pourparlers which were deciding
the future of Persia. Then she sent her agents
among the Nationalists, and showed them how ter-
rible a blow this convention was to their new consti-
tutionalism. Just at the moment when they had
entered upon a constitutional life, Great Britain
and Russia had conspired against their independence,
went the German thesis.
If only there had been a sincerity for the Consti-
tution in the heart of the Shah, and an ability to
establish a really constitutional regime in the leaders
of Young Persia, the Anglo-Russian accord might
have proved of no value. But unfortunately for
Persia and for Germany the Shah, worked upon
skilfully by Russian emissaries and by members of
his entourage, who were paid by Russian gold, at-
tempted a coup d'etat against the Parliament in

December, 1907. He failed to carry it through.
With a smile on his lips and rage in his heart, he once
more went through the farce of swearing to be a good
constitutional ruler. But in June, 1908, he succeeded
89
in dispersing the Parliament by bombarding the
palace in which it sat.
would be wearisome to go into the story of the

It
revolts and anarchy in all parts of Persia in 1908
and 1909. After a year of fighting and Oriental
promises, of solemn oaths and the breaking of them,
the constitutionalists finally drove Mohammed Ali
from Teheran in July, 1909. The Shah saved his
life by taking refuge in the Russian legation. A
few days later, he took the road to exile. He has
since reappeared in Persia twice to stir up trouble
in the north. On both
occasions, it was when the
Russians were finding it hard to justify their con-
tinued occupation of the northern provinces.
Mohammed Ali was succeeded by his son Ali
Mirza, a boy of eleven years, who was still too young
to be anything more than a mere plaything in the
hands of successive regents.
The gave Great Britain and
civil strife in Persia
Russia the excuse for entering the country. In
accord with Great Britain, Russia sent an expedition
to occupy Tabriz on April 29, 1909. Later, Russian
troops occupied Ardebil, Recht, Kazvin, and other
cities in the Russian sphere of influence. Owing to
the anarchy in the south during 1910, Great Britain
prepared to send troops "to protect the safety of the
roads for merchants." This was not actually done,
for conditions of travel slightly ameliorated. But
Persia has rested since under the menace of a British
occupation.
Every effort made to bring order out of chaos in
Persia has failed. Serious attempts at financial
90
THE PASSING OP PERSIA
reform were undertaken by an American mission,
under the direction of a former American official
in the Philippine Islands. This mission failed, and
only increased the humiliation of the Persian Govern-
ment. The American Treasurer- General had more
zeal than common sense. He failed to recognize
the fact that the Anglo-Russian accord of 1907 was
more than a mere bit of writing. The sphere of
influence had become
far from imaginary. One
day summer
in the of 1911, I was walking along the
Galata Quay in Constantinople. I heard my name
called from the deck of a vessel just about to leave
for Batum. Perched on top of two boxes containing
typewriters, was a young American from Boston,
who was going out to help reform the finances of
Persia. I had talked to him the day before concern-
ing the extreme delicacy and difficulty of the task

of the mission whose secretary he was. But his
refusal to admit the political limitations of Oriental
peoples made it impossible for him to see that con-

stitutional Persia was any different, or should be
treated any differently, from constitutional Massa-
chusetts. From the sequel of the story, it would
seem that the chief of the mission had the same
attitude of mind as his secretary. The American
Treasurer- General was dismissed because he refused
to accept the reality of the Anglo-Russian accord.
When Germany saw that the Russian troops had
entered northern Persia with the consent of Great
Britain,and had come to stay, there was nothing
do but to treat with Russia.
for her to
In November, 1910, when the Czar was visiting
the Kaiser, Russian and German ministers exchanged
views concerning the ground upon which Germany
would agree to the fait accompli of Russia's exclusive
political interests in Northern Persia, and the Russian
military occupation. Satisfactory bases were found
for an agreement between Russia and Germany
concerning their respective interests in Persia and
Asiatic Turkey. The Accord of Potsdam, as it is
called, was made in the form of a note presented by
the Russian Government to Germany, and accepted
by her. Russia declared that she would in no way
oppose the realization of the project of the Bagdad
railway up to the Persian Gulf, and that she would
construct to the border of Persia a railway to join a
spur of the Bagdad railway from Sadije to Khanikin.
In return for this, Germany was to promise not to
construct railway lines outside of the Bagdad railway
zone, to declare that she had no political interest
in Persia, and to recognize that "Russia has special
interests inNorthern Persia from the political,
strategic, and economic points of view." The Ger-
man Government was to abandon any intention of
securing a concession for a trans-Persian railway.
On the other hand, Russia promised to maintain in
Northern Persia the "open door," so that German
commercial interests should not be injured.
The accord between Russia and Germany was
badly received everywhere. France feared that
Germany was trying to weaken the Franco-Russian
alliance. Great Britain did not look with favour
upon a recognition by Russia of German interests
in Asiatic Turkey. The Sublime Porte felt that
92
Russia and Germany had shown a disregard for the
elementary principles of courtesy in discussing and
deciding questions that were of tremendous import-
ance to the future of Turkey without inviting the
Sublime Porte to take part in the negotiations.
Turkey in the Potsdam accord was ignored as com-
pletely as Morocco had been in the Algeciras Con-
vention and Persia in the Russo-British accord.
The Potsdam stipulations brought prominently
before Europe the possible significance of Germany's
free hand in Anatolian and Mesopotamian railway
constructions. It also aroused interest in the pos-
sibility of an all-rail route from Calais to Calcutta,

in which all the Great Powers except Italy would
participate.
The trans-Persian and all other railway schemes
in Persia came Between 1872 and 1890
to nothing.
twelve district railway projects had received con-
cessions from the Persian Government. One of
these, the Reuter group, actually started the con-
struction of a line from the Caspian Sea to the Persian
Gulf. A French project for a railway from Trebizond
to Tabriz had gained powerful financial support.
All these schemes were frustrated by Russian diplo-
macy. In 1890, Russia secured from the Persian
Government the exclusive right for twenty-one years
to construct railways in Northern Persia. Needless
to say,no lines were built. Russia had all she could
do with her trans-Siberian and trans-Caucasian
schemes. But she deliberately acted the dog in
the manger. preventing private groups from
By
building railways in Persia which she would not
93
build herself, Russia has retarded the economic pro-
gress, and is largely responsible for the financial, mili-
tary, and administrative weakness, of contemporary
Persia. By the accords of 1907 with Great Britain
and 1911 with Germany, Russia secured their con-
nivance in still longer continuing this shameful
stagnation. To this day no railroad has been built
in the Shah's dominions.
Just a month before the outbreak ot the European

war, the boy Shah of Persia was solemnly crowned
at Teheran. It was an imposing and pathetic cere-
mony. The Russians and British saw to it that

full honour should be given to the sovereign of
Persia. The pathos of the event was in the fact
that the Russian and British legations at Teheran
paid the expenses of the coronation. The Shah
received his crown from the hands of his despoilers.
A similar farce was enacted a little while before in
Morocco. Turkey alone of Moslem nations remains.
The last effort of Persia to shake off the Russian
octopus was made on October 8, 1914, when Russia
was requested once more to withdraw her troops from
the Azerbaidjan. The Russian Minister at Teheran,
without going through the form of referring the
request to Petrograd, answered that the interests
of Russia and other foreign countries could be safe-
guarded only by the continued occupation. To this
response his British colleague gave hearty assent.
The importance of the passing of Persia is two-
fold. It shows howone more direction Germany
in
found herself shut out from a possible field of expan-
sion. Through the weakness of Persia, Great Britain
94
*
and Russia, after fifty years of bitter struggle, were

able to come to a satisfactory compromise. It was
in Persia that their animosity was buried, and that
co-operation of British democracy and Russian

autocracy in a war against Germany was first en-
visaged.The failure of the Persian constitutional
Government was a tremendous blow to Germany.
It strengthened the bases of the Triple Entente.
For the events of 1908 and 1909 put the accord to
severe test, and proved that it was built upon a
solid foundation. The agony of one people is often
the joy of another. Has Persia suffered vicariously
that France may be saved?
95
CHAPTER VI
THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES*

Russia, Austria, and Prussia parti-
WHEN tioned Poland at the end of the eighteenth

century, there were at the most six million
Poles in the vast territory stretching from the Baltic
nearly to the Black Sea. Of these a large number,
especially in Eastern Prussia and in Silesia, had
already lost their sense of nationality. Poland was
a country of feudal nobles, whose inability to group
under a dynasty for the formation of a modern
state, made the disappearance of the kingdom an
inexorable necessity in the economic evolution of
Europe, and of ignorant peasants, who were indiffer-
ent concerning the political status of the land in
which they lived.
To-day there are twenty million Poles. Although
they owe allegiance to three different sovereigns,
they are more united than ever in their history.
For their national feeling has developed in just the
same way that the national feeling of Germans and
Russians has developed, by education primarily,
and by that remarkable tendency of industrialism,
*
This chapter has not been written without giving consideration
to the Russian point of view. There is an excellent book on Russia
since the Japanese War (from 1906 to 1912) by Peter Polejaieff.
96
THE PARTITIONERS AND THEIR POLES
which has grouped people cities, and brought
in
them into closer association.This influence of city
life upon the destinies of Poland comes to us with
peculiar force when we realize that since the last
map Europe was made Warsaw has grown from

of
forty thousand to eight hundred thousand, Lodz

from one thousand to four hundred thousand, Posen
from a few hundreds to one hundred and fifty
thousand, Lemberg and Cracow from less than ten
thousand to two hundred thousand and one hundred
and fifty thousand respectively. These great cities
(except Lodz, which Russia foolishly allowed to be-
come an outpost of Pan-Germanism in the heart of a
Slavic population, are the foyers of Polish nationalism.
The second and third dismemberments of Poland
(1793 and 1795) were soon annulled by the Napo-
leonic upheaval. The larger portion of Poland
was revived in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The
Congress of Vienna, just one hundred years ago,
made what the representatives of the partitioning
Powers hoped would be a definite redistribution of
the unwelcome ghost stirred up by Napoleon. Poz-
nania was returned to Prussia, and in the western
end of Galicia a Republic of Cracow was created.
The greater portion of Poland reverted to Russia,
not as conquered territory, but as a separate state, of
which the Czar assumed the kingship and swore to
preserve the liberties. The unhappiness, the unrest,
the agitation, among the Poles of the Muscovite
Empire, just as among the Finns, came from the
breaking of the promises by Russia to Europe when
these subjects of alien races were allotted to her.
7 97
The story of modern Poland is not different from
that of any other nationalistic movement. A sense
of nationality and a desire for racial political unity
are not the phenomena which have been the under-
lying causes of the evolution of Europe since the
Congress of Vienna. In Italy, in Germany, in
Poland, in Alsace-Lorraine, in Finland, among the
various races of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and
the Balkan Peninsula, as well as in Turkey and
Persia, the underlying cause of political agitation,
of rebellions and of revolutions has been the desire
to secure freedom from absolutism. Nationalism
issimply the tangible outward manifestation of the
growth of democracy. There are few national move-
ments where separatism could not have been avoided
by granting local self-government. Mixed popula-
tions can live together under the same government
without friction, if the lesser races are granted social,
economic, and political equality. But nations that
have achieved their own unity and independence
through devotion to a nationalistic movement have
shown no mercy or wisdom with smaller and less fortu-
nate races under their domination The very methods
.
that European statesmen have fondly believed were

necessary for assimilation have proved fatal to it.
The Polish question, as we understand it to-day,
has little connection with the Polish revolutions of
1830 and of 1863. These movements against the
Russian Government were conducted by the same
elements of protest against autocracy that were at
work in the larger cities and universities throughout
Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century.
98
Nationalism was the reason given rather than the
cause that prompted. The revolutions were un-
successful because they were not supported by the
nation. The mass of the people were indifferent to
the cause, just as in other countries similar revolu-
tions against despotism failed for lack of real support.
The apathy of the masses has always been the bul-
wark and reactionary poli-
of defence for autocracy
cies. Popular rights do not come to people until
the masses demand them. Education alone brings
self-government. This is the history of the evolution
of modern Europe.
The Poles as a nation began to worry their parti-
tioners in the decade following the last unsuccess-
ful revolution against Russia. To understand the
contemporary phases of the Polish question, it is
necessary for us to follow first its three-fold develop-
ment, as a question of internal policy in Russia,
Germany, and Austria. Only then is its significance
as an international question clear.
THE POLES SINCE 1864 IN RUSSIA
The
troubles of Russia in her relationship to the
Poles have come largely from the fact that the distinc-
tionbetween Poland proper, inhabited by Poles, and
the provinces which the Jagellons conquered but
never assimilated, was not grasped by the statesmen
who had to deal with the aftermath of the revolu-
tion. What was possible in one was thought to be
possible in the other. What was vital in one was
believed to be vital in the other. In the kingdom
99
of Poland, as it was bestowed upon the Russian
Czar by the Congress of Vienna, there were massed
ten million Poles who could be neither exterminated
nor exiled. Nor was there a sound motive for at-
tempting to destroy their national life. The king-
dom of Poland was not an essential portion of the
Russian Empire, and was not vitally bound to
the fortunes of the Empire. So unessential has the
kingdom of Poland been to Russia, and so fraught
with the possibilities of weakness to its owner, that
patriotic and far-sighted Russian publicists have
advocated its complete autonomy, its independence
or its cession to Germany. Because it was limi-
trophe to the territories occupied by the Poles of the
other partitioners, there was constantly danger of
weakening the defences of the empire and of inter-
national complications. Through failing to treat
these Poles in such a way that they would be a loyal
bulwark against her enemies, Russia has done irre-
parable harm to herself as well as to them.

The Polish question in Lithuania, Podolia, and
the Ukraine was a totally different matter. These
provinces had been added to Russia in her logical
development towards the west and the south-west.
Their possession was absolutely essential to the ex-
istence of the Empire. Their population was not
Polish,but Lithuanian, Ruthenian, and Russian.
From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the acquisition
of these territoriesmade possible the entrance of
Russia into the concert of European nations. They
had been conquered by Poland during the period of
her greatness, and had naturally been lost by her
100
when she became weak. In these portions of Greater
Poland, the Poles were limited to the landowning
class, and to the more prosperous artisans in the
cities and villages. They were the residue of an
earlier conquering race that had never assimilated
the country. They had abused their power, and
were heartily disliked. These provinces were vital
to Russia, and she was able to carry out the policy
of uprooting the Poles. Their villages were burned,
their fortunes and their lands confiscated, the landed
proprietors deported to Siberia, and others so cruelly

persecuted that, when their churches and schools
were closed and they found themselves forbidden to
speak their language outside of their own homes,
they emigrated. In Lithuania, the Lithuanian lan-
guage was also proscribed. The Russians had no
intention of blotting out a Polish question in order
to make place for a Lithuanian one.
Where the Poles were few in number, these meas-
ures, which were exactly the same as the Poles had
employed themselves in the same territories several
centuries before, were successful. The peasants
were glad to see their traditional persecutors get a
taste of their own medicine. It was not difficult
to make provinces Russian. They have
these
gradually been assimilated into the Empire. In all
fairness, one can hardly condemn the Russian point
of view, as regards the Poles in Lithuania, Podolia,
and the Ukraine. Only youthful Polish irredentists
still dream of the restoration of the Empire of the
Jagellons.
In the kingdom of Poland, the situation was
101
entirely different. This huge territory had been
given to Russiaby the Congress of Vienna upon the
solemn assurance that it was to be governed as a
separate kingdom by the Romanoffs. There was
no thought in the Congress of Vienna of the disap-
pearance of the Poles as a separate nationality from

the map of Europe. But the autonomy of Poland
was suppressed after the rebellion of 1830.
After the rebellion of 1863, Russia tried to as-
similate the kingdom of Poland as well as the
Polish marches. The repression was so severe
that Polish nationalism was considered dead.
The peasants had been indifferent to the move-
ment. Not only had they failed to support it, but
they had frequently shown themselves actually hos-
tile to it.
It was because the nobles and priests were be-

lieved to be leaders of nationalistic and separatist
movements, not only in Poland but in other allo-
geneous portions of the composite Empire, that

Czar Alexander II emancipated the serfs. The
policy of every autocratic government, when it
meets the symptoms of unrest in a subject race,
first
isto strike at their church and their aristocracy.

The most efficient way to weaken the power of the
nobles is Alexander
to strengthen the peasants.
himself may have
been actuated by motives of pure
humanity, but his ministers would never have allowed
the ukase to be promulgated, had they not seen in it
the means of conquering the approaching revolution
in Poland. For the moment it was an excellent
move, and accomplished its purpose. The Polish
102
peasants were led to believe that the Czar was their
father and friend and champion against the exactions
of the church and landowner. Was not their emanci-
pation proof of this?
But in the long run the emancipation of the serfs
proved fatal to Russian domination in Poland. For
the advisers of Alexander had not realized that free-
men would demand and attend schools, and that
schools, no matter how careful the surveillance and
restrictionsmight be, created democrats. Demo-
crats would seize upon nationalism to express their
aspiration for self-government. The emancipation
of the serfs, launched as a measure to destroy Poland,
has ended in making it. Emancipation created
Polish patriots. It was a natural and inevitable
result. The artificial aid of a governmental perse-
cution helped and hastened this result. The Irish-
man expressed a great truth when he said that there
are things that are not what they are.
A flock of hungry Russian functionaries descended
upon Poland in 1864. They took possession of all
departments of administration. The Polish lan-
guage was used in courts only through an interpreter,
and was forbidden as the medium of instruction
in schools. No Polish signs were tolerated in the
railways or post-offices. In the parts of the kingdom
where there were bodies of the Lithuanians, their
nationalism was encouraged, and they were shown
many favours, in contradiction to the policy adopted
towards the Lithuanians of Lithuania. Catholics
who followed the Western Rite were forced to join
the national church. There was a clear intention
103
to assimilate as much as possible the populations of
the border districts of Poland.
After thirty years of repression, Russia had made
no progress in Poland.
In 1897, Prince Imeretinsky
wrote to the Czar that the policy of the Government
had failed. Polish national spirit, instead of dis-
appearing, had spread remarkably among the peas-
ant classes. The secret publication and importation
of unauthorized journals and pamphlets had multi-
plied. The number of cases brought before the
courts for infraction of the "law of association,"
which forbade unlicensed public gatherings and
clubs, had so increased that they could not be heard.
Heavy fines and imprisonment seem to have had no
deterring effect.
Could Russia hope to struggle against the tenden-
modern life? Free press and free speech are
cies of
the complement of education. When men learn to
read, they learn to think, and can be reached by
propaganda. When men increase in prosperity,
they begin to want a voice in the expenditure of the
money they have to pay for taxes. When men come
together in the industrial life of large cities, they
form associations. No government, no system of
spies or terrorism, no laws can prevent propaganda
in cities. From 1864 to 1914, the kingdom of Poland
has become more Polish than ever before in her
history. Instead of a few students and dreamers,
fascinated by the past glories of their race, instead of
a group of landowners and priests, thinking of their
private interests and of the Church, there is awak-
ened a spirit of protest against Russian des-
104
potism in the soul of a race become intelligently
nationalistic.
The issue between Russia and her Poles has be-
come clearer, and for that reason decidedly worse,
since the disastrous war with Japan. The Poles
have demanded autonomy in the fullest sense of the
word. The Russians have responded by showing
that their intention to destroy Poland, just as
it is
they intend to destroy Finland. There is an analogy

between the so-called constitutional regimes in Rus-
sia and Turkey. In each Empire, the granting of a
constitution was hailed with joy by the various races.
These races, who had been centres of agitation, dis-
loyalty, and weakness, were ready to co-operate with
their in building up a large, broad,
governments
comprehensive, national life upon the principles of
liberty, equality,and fraternity. But in both Em-

pires, the dominant race let it soon be understood
that the Constitution was to be used for a destructive
policy of assimilation. In the Ottoman Empire,
the Constitution was a weapon for destroying the
national aspirations of subject races. In Russia
it has been the same.
After the Russo-Japanese War, Czar Nicholas
and his ministers had their great opportunity to
profit by the lessons of Manchuria. But the grant-
ing of a constitution was a pure farce. Blind to
the fact that the enlightened Poles were interested
primarily in political reforms, and in securing equity
and justice for the kingdom of Poland, instead of for
the advancement of a narrow and theoretical nation-
alistic ideal, the Russians repulsed the proffered
105
loyalty of the Poles to a free and constitutional
Russian Empire. In the second Duma, Dmowski and
other Polish deputies unanimously voted the sup-
plies for strengthening the Russian army. They
stated that the Poles were willing to cast their lot
loyally and indissolubly with constitutional Russia.
Were they not brethren, and imbued with the same
Pan-Slavic idea? Was it not logical to look to Russia
as the defender of all the Slavs from Teutonic
oppression?
But Poland, like Finland, was to continue to be
the victim of Russian bureaucracy and of an intoler-
ant nationalism which the Russians were beginning
to feel as keenly and as arrogantly as the Prussians.
Is the Kaiser, embodying the evils of militarism,
more obnoxious and more dangerous to civilization
than the Czar, standing for the horrors of bureau-
cratic despotism and absolutism? Have not the
Armenian massacres, ordered from Constantinople,
and the Jewish pogroms, ordered from Petrograd,
associated Christian Czar with Mohammedan Sultan
at the beginning of the twentieth century?
The first deliberate violation of the integrity of
the kingdom of Poland was sanctioned by the Russian
Duma in the same session in which it approved
violation of Russian obligations to Finland. law A
separating Kholm from the kingdom of Poland was
voted on July 6, 1912. The test of the law declared
that Kholm was still to be regarded as a portion of
the kingdom of Poland, but to be directly attached

to the Ministry of the Interior without passing by
the intermediary of the Governor- General of Warsaw;
1 06
and to preserve the Polish adaptation of the Code
Napoleon for its legal administration, but to have
its court of appeal at Kief.
The from the kingdom of Poland
elections of 1913
to the Duma gave a decided setback to the party of
Dmowski, who had so long and so ably pled for a
policy of Pan-Slavism through accommodation with
Russia. The law concerning Kholm had been the
response of the Duma to Dmowski's olive branch.
The moderates were discredited. But the failure
of the radical nationalists to conciliate the Jewish
element caused their candidates to lose both at
Warsaw and Lodz.
The birth of an anti-Semitic movement has been
disastrous to Polish solidarity during recent years.
The Polish nationalists suspected the Jews of work-
ing either for German or Russian interests. They
were expecially bitter against the Litvak, or Lithua-
nian and south Russian Jews, who had been forced
by Russia to establish themselves in the cities of
Poland. Poland is one of the most important pales
in the Empire. The Jewish population is one-fifth
of the total, and enjoys both wealth and education
in the cities. Their educated youth had been cour-
ageous and forceful supporters of Polish nationalism.
Before the Russian intrigues of the last decade and
the introduction of these non-Polish Jews, there had
never been a strong anti-Semitic feeling in Poland.
The Polish protests against the encroachment of
the Russians upon their national liberties have been
greatly weakened by their antagonism to the Jews.
The anti-Semitic movement, which has carried away
107
both the moderate party of Dmowski and the radical
nationalists, as was expected, has played into the
hand of Russia.
The Muscovite statesmen, while endeavouring to
use the Balkan Wars for the amalgamation of south
Slavic races under the wing of Russia against Austria
have treated the Poles as if they were not Slavs.
During 1913 and the first part of 1914, the policy
of attempting to russianize the Poles has proved
disastrous to their feeling of loyalty to the Empire.
The government announced definitely that the
kingdom of Poland would be "compensated" for the
loss of Kholm by a law granting self-government to
Polish cities. This promise has not been kept.
The municipal self-government project presented to
the Duma was as farcical in practical results as
all democratic and liberal legislation which that
impotent body has been asked to pass upon.
THE POLES SINCE 1867 IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
The disappearance of Austria from Germany after

the battle of Sadowa led to the organization of a
new state, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. We must
divorce in our mind the Austria before 1867 from
the Austria-Hungary of the Dual Monarchy. The
political situation changed entirely when Austrians
and Hungarians agreed to live together and share
the Slavic territories of the Hapsburg Crown. Austria
no longer had need of her Galicians to keep the
Hungarians in check. But there was equally
important work for them to do.
1 08
The Austrians have always treated the Poles very
well. Galicia, which had been Austria's share in
the partition of Poland, was given local self-govern-
ment, with its own Diet, and proper representation
in the Austrian Reichsrath. Poles were admitted in
generous numbers to the functions of the Empire.
The Polish nationalists of Russia and Prussia feel
very bitter about the indifference of the Galicians
to the nation at large or rather in captivity. They
claim that the lack of national feeling among the
Austrian Poles is due to the fact that they have
been bribed by the Austrians to desert not only

their brethren of Russia and of Prussia, but also
their fellow-Slavs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
I have heard and feelingly pre-
this criticism ably
sented, but do not think it just. Since national
I
aspirations are awakened and sustained by the effort

to secure political equality and justice, the enjoy-
ment of these takes away need or desire to plot
against the Government. The Poles of Austria are
like the French of Canada. Their nationalism is
literary and religious in character. There is no,
reason for its
being anti-governmental.
Of however, there has been a national
late years,
Polish agitation in Galicia. It is directed not against
the Government, but against the Ruthenians, who,
to the number of three millions nearly forty per
cent, of the total population inhabit the eastern
section of Galicia.This local racial conflict, which
has strengthened rather than weakened the attach-
ment of the Poles to the Vienna Government, arose
after the introduction of universal suffrage, when
109
eastern Galicia began to send in large numbers
Ruthenian deputies to the Galician Diet and to the
Austrian Parliament.
On April 12, 1908, Count Potocki was assassinated
by a Ruthenian student, whose death sentence was
commuted to twenty years' imprisonment. With
the complicity of wardens, the assassin escaped from
three years. There has never been peace
jail after
between the Poles and the Ruthenian s since that
time. After serious disorders at the University of
Iêmberg, where the Ruthenian students were treated
disgracefully, Polish and Ruthenian leaders tried
to find common ground for reconciliation in Decem-
ber, 1911. The Ruthenians demanded electoral
reform with greater representation, and the creation
of a Ruthenian university. The imperial govern-
ment communicated to the representatives of the
two nationalities the project of a decree of public
instruction in Galicia in January, 1913. The project
was a marvel of ingenuity. A
Ruthenian university
was to be established after four years, but if by
October I, 1916, the law voting credits for it was
not yet passed, a special school for Ruthenians
would be attached to the University of Lemberg,
until their own university was a reality. The teach-
ing of the Ruthenian language would cease in the
University of Lemberg when this "special school"
was inaugurated. The Ruthenians were suspicious
of a trick in the project. They could not understand
its vagueness. It looked as if they would be giving
up their present rights in the University of Lemberg,
limited as they were, for an uncertainty. Why was
no
no definite date for opening specified, or indication
given of the new university's location? Would it
be maintained by Galicia with a budget appropria-

tion in proportion to the taxes paid by Ruthenians?
The Ruthenian question in Galicia has been cited
here to show how there are wheels within wheels
in the complex questions of nationalities. European
racial questions seem to follow the law of the animal
world. The littlest animals are eaten by little
animals, who in turn serve as food for larger animals.

Nations which have suffered most cruelly from race
persecution are generally themselves relentless and
fanatical when the power to persecute is in their
hands.
The Ruthenian question shows also how Poles
and Austrians work together, and are content with
the mutual advantages of their union. I have never
met an Austrian Pole, who lived in Galicia and had
a settled profession or business there, who was not
a loyal even ardent supporter of the Hapsburg
Monarchy. Austrian Poles are dismayed as they
face the terrible dilemma of union with Russia or
Germany.
THE POLES SINCE 1870 IN GERMANY
Germany, like Russia, has had a twofold Polish

question: The acquisition of Polish territory on
either side of the Vistula to the Baltic Sea was as
essential to the creation of a strong Prussian kingdom
as was the acquisition of Pomerania. The portion
of Poland which, before the partition, cut off eastern
in
from western Prussia was fully as much German as
Polish, in fact more so. It became German by
logical and natural conquest in the course of Prussia's
evolution.
The situation was different in
.fab
Poznania. This
territory of the later partition reverted to Prussia
at the Congress of Vienna. In 1815, its population
was only twenty per cent. German. For fifty years
the process of Germanization went on naturally
in no way forced. When the German Empire was
formed, nearly half of Poznania was German. Many
of the leading Poles had lost their sense of Polish
nationality. They had become German in language

and in culture. How many families there are in
Prussia whose Polish origin is betrayed only by their
names!
But the Germanized Poles, for the most part,
retained their religion. The
notorious Kulturkampf
of Bismarck aroused again the sense of nationality
which had been lost, not only among the prosperous
Poles of Poznania, but even of Silesia. Only the
bureaucratic classes were unaffected by this renais-
sance of nationalism awakened by revolt against
religious persecution.
Just after the formation of the Empire, when
Prussia needed her strength and force to preserve
all
her hegemony in the new confederation and to lead

modern Germany in the path of progress and civili-
zation, on either side of her kingdom she had to cope
with nationalist movements of Danes and of Poles.
But she did not fear to undertake also the assimila-
tion of Alsace and Lorraine!
112
Since the Kulturkampf, the Polish renaissance in
Prussia has thrived in spite of persecution. As in
Russia, the Polish language was banished, Polish
teachers were transferred to schools in other parts
of the Empire, and about forty thousand Poles of
Russian and Austrian nationality were expelled from
the country. The persecution has been carried on
in the schools, in the army, and in the church.
School children have been forbidden to pray in the
Polish language. Two unconstitutional laws have
been passed by the Prussian Diet. The first of these
forbade the Poles to speak Polish in public gatherings.
The second, sanctioned by the Landtag on March
8, 1908, authorized the Government to expropriate
land owned by Poles for the purpose of selling it to
Germans.
The Prussian scheme for getting rid of the Poles
was to drive them from and instal German
their lands
colonists. Private enterprise was first tried. A
"colonization society" was formed, with a large
capital, and given every encouragement by Prussian
officialdom. But economic laws are not controlled
by politics. The colonists were boycotted. Enor-
mous sums of money were lost in wasted crops. The
farms of the colonists had to be resold by the sheriff,
and were bought in by Poles. To discourage the
buying back of the German farms, a law was passed
forbidding Poles to build upon land acquired by them
after the date of the colonization society's failure.
The Poles got around this law most cleverly. If one
goes into Poznania to-day, he will see farmhouses,
barns, dairies, stables even chicken-coops on
8 113
wheels. The people live in glorified wagons. They
do not build. Will there be a law now against
owning wagons?
When the failure of private enterprise was demon-
strated, the Prussian Government announced its
intention of applying the law of expropriation "for
the use of the commission of colonization." This
was in October, 1912. At the beginning of 1913, the
Polish deputies to the Reichstag brought before their
colleagues of all Germany the question of the expro-
priation of Polish lands in Prussia. They asked the
representatives of a supposedly advanced and consti-
tutional nation what they thought of this injustice.
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg tried to keep the
question from being debated. He argued with
perfect reason that it was a purely internal Prussian
matter, which the Imperial Parliament was incom-
petent to discuss. But the Catholic centre and the
Socialist left combined to vote an order of the day
allowing the discussion of the Polish lands question.
In the history of the German confederation, it was
the first time that an imperial chancellor had received
a direct defiance. This vote is mentioned here to show
how Prussian dealings with the Poles, just as with
Alsace-Lorraine, have tended to weaken the purely
Prussian substructure of the German confedera-
tion, and to arouse a dangerous protest against
Prussian hegemony. Contempt for the elementary
principles of justice has been the key-note of Chan-
cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's career. His mental-
ity is typical of that of German bureaucracy no,
more than that, of German statesmanship. It is
114
possible to have sympathy with German national
aspirations, but not with the methods by which
those aspirations are being interpreted to the world.
To show how little regard he had for parliamentary
opinion in the German confederation, the Chancel-
lor forced through the Prussian Landtag, on April
22, 1913, only three months from the

after his rebuke
Reichstag, an infamous law, voting one hundred

and twenty-five million marks for German coloniza-
tion in Prussian Poland. Shortly before the Euro-
pean war broke out, another unconstitutional law was
passed, which makes possible the arbitrary division
of large landed properties owned by Poles.
THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT OF THE POLISH QUESTION
During the war with Japan, the Czar and the

Kaiser understood each other perfectly on the
Polish question. The neutrality of Germany was
essential to Russia at that time. The Russians owe
much to Germany for her benevolent attitude of those
trying days. The Poles have since paid the bill.
As in Prussia, the Poles of Russia have seen their
libertiesmenaced more than ever before during the
past decade, and have had to struggle hopelessly
against a policy of ruthless extermination. If on the
one hand the Prussian persecution is more to be
condemned because Germany asks the world to
believe that she is an enlightened, constitutional
nation,and "the torch-bearer of civilization," while

Russia is admittedly reactionary and still half-
barbarous, on the other hand there is less excuse for
the Russian persecution of the Poles. For in Russia
it is not Teuton against Slav, but Slav against Slav.
Germany and Russia have had the common inter-

est of fellow-criminals in their relation to the Polish
nation.Russia has not hesitated to co-operate with
Germany through diplomatic and police channels in
riveting more securely the fetters of the Poles. Her
championship of the south Slavs against Teutonic
aggression has been supposedly on the grounds of
"burning love for our brothers in slavery, inwhose
veins runs the same blood as ours." The sham and
hypocrisy of this attitude is revealed when we con-
sider the fact that Russia has never protested to
Germany against the treatment of the Poles of

Poznania, nor shown any inclination to treat with
' '
equity her own Poles. Here are brothers in slavery

' '
nearer home. There is ground for suspicion that

her interest in the south Slavs has been purely be-
cause they are on the way to Constantinople and
the Mediterranean. One who reads the recent
history of Russia stultifies himself if he allows him-
self to believe that Russia has entered into the present
war to defend Servia from Austrian aggression
through any love for or humanitarian interest in the
Servians. If Russia gets the opportunity, will her
treatment of Servian national aspirations be any
different from that of Austria-Hungary? When we
try to answer this question, let us think of Bulgaria
after 1878 (the last "war of liberation") and of
Poland in 1914.
On August 1 6, 1914, when I read the proclamation
of Czar Nicholas to the partitioned Poles, promising
116
to restore administrative autonomy to the kingdom
of Poland, and posing as the liberator of Poles now
under the yoke of Austria and of Prussia, it was hard
to be enthusiastic. For the Jews of Odessa and Kief,
and the Finns of Helsingfors, rise up to add their
cry of warning to the bitter comments of Polish
friends. Only two years ago I saw in those cities
subjects of the Czar suffering cruelly from fanaticism
and broken promises, and deprived of that which is
now being held out as bait to the Poles, and as a sop
to Russia's Allies.
Austria-Hungary has been able to use the Russian
treatment of Poland as a means of strengthening
her own hold on the border regions of the Empire.
It was at the instigation of Ballplatz that the Gali-
cian deputies, on December 16, 1911, made a motion
in the Reichsrath, inviting the Minister of Foreign
Affairs "to undertake steps among the Powers who
signed the conventions at Vienna in 1815 to assure

the maintenance of the frontiers of the kingdom of
Poland, of which Russia, in violation of her inter-
national obligations, was threatening the integrity.
For the separation of Kholm from Poland is an attack
upon Polish historic and national consciousness."
It was tit for tat with the two Eastern Powers.
Russia burned with indignation for the feelings of
Servia when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Austria-Hungary burned with in-
dignation for the feelings of her own loyal Polish
subjects, when Russia separated Kholm from Poland.
Both had violated international treaties. Russia
had no genuine interest in the Servians, and Austria
117
none in the Poles. They merely seized upon weapons
with which to attack each other.
It is a mystery how French and British public
opinion, always so traditionally favourable to down-

trodden races, and especially to the Poles, can hail
the Russian entry into Lemberg as a "victory for
civilization." To the Austrian Poles, the coming of
the Cossacks is as the coming of the Uhlans to the
Belgians. They look upon the Russian invasion of
Galicia as a calamity to their national life. Fight-
ing with the Austrians are thirty thousand young
Poles who call themselves Sokols (falcons). Their
organization is something like the German Turnverein,
but more purely military. The Poles of Austria-
Hungary are a unit against Russia.
One can make no such positive statement about
the attitude of the Poles of the other two partition-
ers. They have little hope of any amelioration of
their lotfrom a change of masters through the present
war. As I write, the thunder of German cannon is
heard at Warsaw, and the unhappy kingdom of
Poland is the centre of conflict between Russia and
Germany. The Poles are fighting on both sides,
and Polish non-combatants are suffering from the
"
brutality of both liberating armies. The situation
' '
is exactly expressed by a Polish proverb which is the
fruit of centuries of bitter experience: Gdzie dwoch
panaw sie, bije, Mop w

skurg, dostaje "When two
masters fight, the peasant receives the blows."
118
CHAPTER VII
ITALIA IRREDENTA
grew inevitably out of the deci-

sions of the Congress of Vienna, whose members
IRREDENTISM
were subjected to two influences in making a
new map of Europe. The first consideration, so
common and so necessary in all diplomatic arrange-
ments, was that of expediency. The second con-
sideration was to prevent the rise of liberalism and
democracy. The decisions on the ground of the
first consideration were made under the pressure
and the play and the skill of give and take by the
representatives of the nations who fondly believed
that they were making a lasting peace for Europe.
The on the ground of the second considera-
decisions
tion were guided by the idea that the checking of
national aspirations was the best means of preventing
the growth of democracy.
The decisions of Vienna, like the later modifica-
tions of Paris and Berlin, could not prevent the
development of the national movements which have
changed the map as it was rearranged after the
collapse of the Napoleonic regime.
During the past hundred years, ten new states
have appeared on the map of Europe: Greece,
119
Belgium, Servia, Italy, the German Confederation,
Rumania, Montenegro, Norway, Bulgaria, and
possibly Albania. With the exception of Albania
(and is this the reason why we have to qualify its
viability by the word possibly?}, all of these states
have appeared upon the map against the will of, and
in defiance of, the concert of the European Powers.
They have all, again with the exception of Albania,
been born through a rise of national consciousness
preceded and inspired by a literary and educational
revival. The goal has been democracy. None of
them, in achieving independence, has succeeded
in including within its frontiers all the territory
occupied by people of the same race and the same
language. Irredentism is the movement to secure the
union with a nation of contiguous territories inhabited
by the same race and speaking
the same language. It is
the call of the redeemed to the unredeemed, and of
the unredeemed to the redeemed.
If we were to regard the present unrest in Europe
and the antagonism of nations from the standpoint
of nationalism, we could attribute the breaking out
of contemporary wars to five causes the desire of
:
nations to get back what they have lost, illustrated

by France in relationship to Alsace- Lorraine; the
desire of nations to expand according to their legiti-
mate racial aspirations, illustrated by the Balkan
States in relationship to Turkey and Austria-Hun-
gary, and Italy in relationship to Austria-Hungary;
the desire of nations to expand commercially and
politically because of possession of surplus popula-
tion and energy, illustrated by Germany in her
I2O
ITALIA IRREDENTA
Weltpolitik; the desire of nations to prevent the

commercial and political expansion of their rivals,
illustrated by Great Britain and Russia; and the
desire of nations to stamp out the rise of national
movements which threaten their territorial integrity,
illustrated by Austria-Hungary and Turkey.
The irredentism of the Balkan States led, first, to
their war with Turkey; second, to their war with
each other; and third, to Servia becoming the direct
cause of the European war. The aspirations of
none have been satisfied. Rumanian irredentism has
stood between Rumania and the Triple Alliance.
The irredentism of Italy has not yet led to anything,
but it is so full of significance as a possible factor in
bearing upon and changing the whole destinies of
Europe during the winter of 1914-1915, that it can-
not be overlooked in a study of contemporary national
movements and wars.
The entrance of Italy into an alliance with the
Teutonic Powers of Central Europe was believed by
her statesmen to be an act of self-preservation.
The opposition of the French clerical party to the
completion of the unification of Italy during the last
decade of the Third Empire destroyed whatever
gratitude the Italian people may have felt for the
decisive aid rendered to the cause of Italian unity at
Solferino. On the part of the moving spirits of Young
Italy, indeed, this gratitude was not very great.
For the first great step in the unification of Italy
had been accompanied by a dismemberment of the
territories from which the royal house of Piedmont
took its name. Young Italy felt that the French
121
had been paid for their help against Austria, and
paid dearly. The cession of his birthplace, at the
moment when the nation for which he had suffered
so terriblyand struggled so successfully came into
being, hurt Garibaldi more than the French bullets
lodged in his body eight years later at Mentana.
When the French look to-day with joy upon Italian
irredentism as the hopeless barrier between Italy
and Austria-Hungary, they should not forget that,
even though fifty years have passed, Italian irre-
dentism includes also Savoy and Nice.
After the Franco-German War, there were two
tendencies in the policy of the Third Republic to
prevent an understanding between France and
Italy. The first of these was the recurrence in
France of the old bitter clericalism of the Empire.
Italy feared that French soldiers might again come
to Rome. The second was the antagonism of France
to the budding colonial aspirations of Italy. When
France occupied Tunis, Italy felt that she had been
robbed of the realization of a dream, which was hers
by right of history, geography, and necessity.
So Italy joined the Triple Alliance. It is argued
with reason in France that the alliance of Teuton and
Latin was unnatural. Since Italy had become wholly
Guelph to realize its unity, why this sudden return to
Ghibellinism? The alliance of Italy with Germany
and Austria-Hungary, however, was not more para-
doxical than the alliance of increasingly democratic
and socialistic and anti-clerical France with mediae-
val Russia. The reasons dictating the alliance were
practically the same.
122
ITALIA IRREDENTA
But there was this difference. Italy entered into

an alliance with a former enemy and oppressor, who
was still holding certain unredeemed territories of
the united Italy as it had existed in the minds of the
enthusiasts of the middle of the nineteenth century.
Too many books have been written about the
distribution of populations in the Austro-Hungarian
Empire to make necessary going into the details here
of the Italian populations of the Austrian Tyrol and
of the Austrian provinces at the north of the Adriatic
Sea. The Tyrolese Italians are undoubtedly Italian
in sympathies and characteristics. But is their
union with Italy demanded by either internal
European political and economic
Italian or external
considerations more than would be the union with
Italy of the Italian cantons of the Swiss confederation ?
Italian irredentism in regard to the Adriatic lit-
more serious and complicated problem.
toral is a far
One struck everywhere in the Adriatic, even as
is
far south as Corfu, by the Italian character of the

cities. Cattaro, Ragusa, Spalato, Zara, Fiume,
Pola, and Trieste, all have an indefinable Italian
atmosphere. It has never left them since the

Middle Ages. It is in the buildings, however, rather
than in the people. One hesitates to attribute even
to the people of Fiume and Trieste Italian char-
narrower sense of the word. On
acteristics in the
the Dalmatian coast, the Slavic element has won all
the cities. In Fiume and Trieste, it is strong enough
to rob these two cities of their distinctive Italian
character. One's misgivings concerning the claims
of Italian irredentists grow when he leaves the cities.
123
There are undoubtedly several hundred thousands
of Italians in this region. Italian is the language of
commerce, and on the Austrian- Lloyd and Hungaro-
Croatian steamship lines, Italian is the language of
the crews. But the people who speak Italian are
not Italians, in every other case you meet, nor do
they resemble Italians. Why is this?
Nationality, in the twentieth century, has a mental
and civic, rather than a physical and hereditary
basis. We
are the product of our education and of the
politicalatmosphere in which we live. This is why
assimilation is so strikingly easy in America, where
we place the immigrant in touch with the public
school, the newspaper, and the ballot. Just as the
Italians and Germans and French of Switzerland are
Swiss, despite their differences of language, so the
Italians of the Adriatic littoral are the product of
the dispensation under which they have lived. Un-
like the Alsatians, they have never known politi-
cal freedom and cultural advantages in common
with their kin across a frontier forcibly raised to cut
them off; unlike the Poles, they have not been com-
pelled to revive the nationalism of an historic past
as a means of getting rid of oppression; unlike the
Slavs of the Balkans, their national spirit has not
been called into being by the tyranny of a race alien
in civilization and ideals, because alien in religion.
I have among my clippings from French news-
papers during the past five years a legion of

quotations from Vienna and Rome correspondents,
concerning the friction between Austria-Hungary and
Italy, and between the Italian-speaking population
124
ITALIA IRREDENTA
of Austria and the Viennese Government, over the

question of distinct Italian nationality of Austro-
Hungarian subjects. There have been frontier inci-
dents; there have been demonstrations of Austrian
societies visiting Italian cities and Italian soc-
ieties visiting Trieste; there has been much discus-
sion over the creation of an Italian Faculty of Law
at the University of Vienna, and the establishment
of an Italian University at Trieste or Vienna; and
there have been occasional causes of friction between
the Austrian Governor of Istria and the Italian
residents of the province. But the general impres-
sion gained from a study of the incidents in question,
and the effort to trace out their aftermath, leads to
the conclusion that these irredentist incidents have
been magnified in importance. A clever campaign
of the French press has endeavoured to detach
Italian public opinion from the Triple Alliance by
publishing in detail, on every possible occasion, any

incident that might show Austrian hostility to the
Italian "nation."
In 1844, Cesare Balbo, in his Speranze d" Italia, a
book that is as important to students of contempo-
rary politics as to those of the Risorgimento, set forth

clearly that the hope of Italy to the exclusion of
Austria from Lombardy and Venetia was most
reasonably based upon the extension of the Austrian
Empire eastward through the approaching fall of the
Ottoman Empire. Balbo was a man of great vision.
He looked beyond the accidental factors in the mak-
ing of a nation to the great and durable considera-
tions of national existence. He grasped the fact
125
that the insistence of the Teutonic race upon hold-
ing in subjection purely Italian territories, and its
hostility to the unification of the Italian people, was
based upon economic considerations. Lombardy
and Venetia had been for a thousand years the path-
way of German commerce to the Mediterranean.
If Austria, Balbo argued, should fall heir to a portion
of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire,
she would have her outlet to the Mediterranean more
advantageously than through the possession of
Lombardy and Venetia. Once these Ottoman terri-

torieswere secured, Austria would be ready to cede
Lombardy and Venetia to a future united Italy.
After the unity of Italy had been achieved, and
Austria had been driven out of Lombardy and
Venetia, she did receive compensation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and, just as Balbo predicted, there
was born the Austrian ambition to the succession of
Macedonia. That this ambition has not been realized,
and that Russia was determined to prevent the attempt
to reviveit, explains the Austro-Hungarian willingness
to fightRussia in the summer of 1914.

Austria and Hungary, from the very beginning
of their existence as a Dual Monarchy, have been
caught in the vise between Italian irredentism and

Servian irredentism. They have not been able to
secure their outlet through Macedonia to the vÊgean
Sea. They have been constantly threatened by their
neighbours on the south-east and south-west with
exclusion altogether from the Adriatic, their only
outlet to the Mediterranean.
From the economic point of view, one cannot
126
ITALIA IRREDENTA
but have sympathy with the determination of the
Austrians and Hungarians to prevent the disaster
which would certainly come to them, if the aspira-
tions of Italian and Servian irredentism were
realized. The severity of Hungary against Croatia
and the oppression of the Servians in Bosnia-Herze-
govina and Dalmatia by Austria have been dictated
by the same reasons which led England and Scotland
to attempt to destroy the national spirit of Ireland
for so many centuries after they had robbed her of
her independence. They could not afford to have
their communications by sea threatened by the
presence and growth of an independent nation,
especially since this nation was believed to be
susceptible to the influence of hereditary enemies.
It has been fortunate for Austria-Hungary that
the claims of the irredentists at the head of the
Adriatic have overlapped and come into conflict in
almost the same way that the claims of Greece and
Bulgaria have come into conflict in Macedonia.
From time immemorial, the Italian and Greek
peoples, owing to their position on peninsulas, have
been seafaring. Consequently, it is they who have
developed the commercial life of ports in the eastern
Mediterranean. Everywhere along the littoral of the
JE.gea.ri and the Adriatic, Greeks and Italians have
founded and inhabited, up to the present day, the
chief ports. But, by the same token, those engaged
in commercial and maritime occupations have never
been excellent farmers, shepherds, or woodsmen.
So, while the Italians and Greeks have held the
predominance in the cities of the littoral, the hinter-
127
land has been occupied by other races. Just as the
hinterland of Macedonia is very largely Bulgarian,
the hinterland of the upper end of the Adriatic is very
largely Slavic. Just as the realization of the dreams
of Hellenic irredentists would give Greece a narrow
strip of coast line along European Turkey to Con-
stantinople, with one or two of the larger inland
commercial cities, while the Slavs would be cut off
entirely from the sea, the realization of the dreams of
Italian irredentists would give to Italy the ports and
coast line of the northern end of the Adriatic, with no
hinterland, and the Slavs, Hungarians, and Germans
an enormous hinterland with no ports.
Italian irredentism, in so far as the Tyrol goes, is
not unreasonable. But its realization in Istria and
the Adriatic littoral is impracticable. Our modern
idea of a state of people living together in a political
is
union that to their economic advantage.

is Only
the thoughtless enthusiasts could advocate a change
in the map of Europe by which fifty million people
would be cut offfrom the sea to satisfy the national
aspirations of a few hundred thousand Italians.
The Italian Society Dante Alighieri has gotten into
the hands of the irredentists, and, before the Tripoli-
tan conquest, was successful in influencing members
of Parliament to embarrass the Government by
interpellations concerning the troubles of Italians
who are Austrian subjects. This society has advo-
cated for Italy the adoption of a law so modifying
the legislation on naturalization that Italians who
emigrate can preserve their nationality even if they
acquire that of the countries to which they have gone.
128
ITALIA IRREDENTA
It was a curious anticipation of the famous Article

XXV, German Citizenship Law of 1914. In
of the
1911, a Lombard deputy tried to raise the old cry
of alarm concerning German penetration into Italy,
and emphasized the necessity of the return to the
"
policy of the Ghibelline motto, Fuori i Tedeschi"
"Expel the Germans."
Italian statesmen, however, have never given seri-
ous attention to the claims of the irredentists. The
late Marquis di San Giuliano deplored their senseless
and harmful manifestations. In trying for the
impossible, and keeping up an agitation that tended
to make friction between Italy and Austria-Hungary,
he pointed out that they harmed what were the real
and attainable Italian interests.
The antagonism between Italy and Austria-
Hungary has had deeper and more logical and justi-
fiable foundation than irredentism. The two nations
have been apprehensive each about allowing the
other to gain control of the Adriatic. Up to 1903,
Spezzia was the naval base for the whole of Italy.
Since that time, Tarento has become one of the first
military ports, important fortifications have been

placed at Brindisi, Bari, and Ancona,and an elaborate
scheme has been drawn up for the defence of Venice.
The Venetians have been demanding that Venice
become a naval base.
Italian naval and maritime activity having in-
creased in the Adriatic, there has naturally been more
intense opposition and rivalry between the two
Adriatic Powers over Albania. The spread of
Austro-Hungarian influence has been bitterly fought
9 129
by the Italian propaganda. This problem was
becoming a serious one for the statesmen of the two
nations while Albania was still under Turkish rule.
Since, at the joint wish of Italy and Austria-Hungary,
Albania has been brought into the family of European
nations, the question of the equilibrium of the
Adriatic has only become more unsettled. For free
Albania turned out to be a fiasco.
If the relations between Austria-Hungary, fighting
for life, and her passive ally of the Triple Alliance
have become more strained since the European war
began, let it be hoped for the future stability of
Europe that it has not been because Italian irredent-

ism has gained the upper hand at Rome. For if
Italy were to intervene in the war for the purpose of
taking away from Austria-Hungary the Adriatic
littoral inhabited by Italians, she would be menacing
her own future, and that of Switzerland as well. To
entertain the hope of taking and keeping Trieste
would be folly.
130
CHAPTER VIII
THE DANUBE AND THE DARDANELLES
River Danube and the Straits leading from
THE the Black Sea to the Êgean Sea have been

the waterways of Europe whose fortunes have
had the greatest influence upon the evolution of
international relations during the last half century.
The control of these two waterways, as long as the
Ottoman Empire remained strong, was not a ques-
tion of compelling interest to Europe. It was only
when the decline of the Ottoman power began to
foreshadow the eventual disappearance of the empire
from Europe that nations began to think of the vital
importance of the control of these waterways to the
economic life of Europe.
There is an extensive and interesting literature on
the history of the evolution of international law in its
relationship to the various questions raised by the
necessarily international control of the Danube and
the Dardanelles. In a book like this, an adequate
statement of the history and work of the Danube
Commission, and of the various diplomatic negotia-
tions affecting the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles,
their freedom of passage, their fortifications, their
lighthouses, and their life-saving stations, cannot be
attempted. It is my intention, therefore, to treat

these great waterways only in the broader aspect of
the important part that the questions raised by them
have played in leading up to the gigantic struggle
which foreshadows a new political reconstruction of
the world.
The Danube is navigable from Germany all the
way to the Black Sea. On its banks are the capitals
of Austria, Hungary, and Servia. It traverses the
entire Austro-Hungarian Empire, forms a natural
boundary between Austria and Servia, Rumania
and Bulgaria, and then turns north across Rumania
to separate for a short distance Rumania and Russia
before finally reaching the Black Sea.
The volume of traffic on the Danube has increased
steadily since the Crimean War. It has become the
great path of export for Austrian and Hungarian
merchandise to the Balkan States, Russia, Turkey,
and Persia, for Servian, Bulgarian, and Ruman-
and
ian products to Russia and Turkey. The passenger
service on the Danube has kept pace with the com-
petition of the railways. Eastward, it is frequently
quicker, cheaper, and more convenient than the rail-
way service. You can leave Vienna or Buda-Pesth
in the evening, and reach Buda-Pesth or Belgrade in
the morning. From Belgrade to the Hungarian and
Rumanian Danube furnishes the
frontier towns, the
shortest route. From Bulgaria to Russia, the Danube
route, via Somovit and Galatz to Odessa, is in many
ways preferable to the through train service. It is by
spending days on the Danube that I have come to
132
realize how vital the river is to freight and passenger
communications between Austria-Hungary, the Bal-
kan states, and Russia. Travel gives life and mean-
ing to statistics. The Danube
interprets itself.
The Congresses of Paris and Berlin considered
carefully the entrance of the Danube question into
international life through the enfranchisement of the
Balkan States. International laws, administered by
an international commission, govern the Danube.
It is a neutral waterway. Problems, similar to those
of the Scheldt, have arisen, however, in the present
war between Austria-Hungary and Servia. If Ru-
mania and Bulgaria should join in the European war,
no matter on which side they should fight, the whole
Danube question would become further complicated.
When war actually breaks out, the rulings of inter-
national law concerning neutrality are invariably
violated. States act according to their own interests.
In its larger European aspect, the Danube, as an
international waterway, is dependent upon the Dar-
danelles. Were Rumania to close the navigation of the
Danube, or were she to preserve its neutrality, she
would only be preventing or assisting the commerce
of the riverain states with the Black Sea. Unob-
structed passage to the outside world for Danube
commerce depends upon the control of the outlet
from the Black Sea to the Êgean Sea. The Hun-
garian and Servian peasant looks beyond his own
great river to the narrow passage from the Sea of
Marmora. The question of the Danube is sub-
ordinated to the question of the Dardanelles.
That the passage from the Black Sea to the outside
133
world remain open and secure from sudden stoppage
or constant menace is of vital importance to the
riverainDanube states, Austria-Hungary and Servia,
to the states bordering the Black Sea, Russia, Ru-
mania, and Turkey, and to Persia, whose nearest
communications with Europe are by way of the Black
Sea. Austria-Hungary, however, has another outlet
through the Adriatic, Servia is pressing towards the
Adriatic and the JEgean, Bulgaria has recently
secured an JEgean littoral, Persia is dependent upon
Russia, and Turkey holds the straits. There remain
Russia and Rumania, to whom the question of the
Dardanelles is a matter of life and death.
The international position of Rumania is most
unfortunate. She must make common cause with
Germanic Europe or with Turkey to prevent her
only waterway to the outside world from falling into
the hands of Russia, or she must ally herself with
Russia, and, by adding Bukovina and Transylvania,
increase her numbers to the point where she can hope
to resist the tide of Slavs around her. In discussing
the neutrality of Rumania, the French and British
press have given too much emphasis to the loyalty of
King Carol for the Hohenzollern family, of which
he was a member, as the cause of the failure of Ru-
mania to join the enemies of the Germanic Powers,
and to the hope that the death of the sovereign who
made Rumania may result in a favourable
change
in the policy of the Bukarest Cabinet. The new
sovereign, King Ferdinand, is also a Hohenzollern.
The hesitation of Rumania has not been, and is not,
primarily because of the family ties of her rulers.
134
The Rumanians in Hungary may call for union with
their enfranchised brethren, just as the Italians in
Austria may call for union with the Italians who
were liberated in 1859 and 1866. But is irredentism
the only factor in influencing the policy of Italy and
Rumania? For Rumania, at least, the hope of acquir-
ing Transylvania and Bukovina in the international
settlement following the war is offset by the appre-
hension of seeing Russia at the Dardanelles.
The Dardanelles has been the scene of struggles for
commercial supremacy since the days of the Pelo-
ponnesian wars. It was in the Dardanelles that
the great battle was fought which brought about the
downfall of Athenian hegemony. It was over the
question of fortifying the island of Tenedos that
Venice and Genoa in the latter half of the fourteenth
century fought the war during which the Genoese
occupation of Chioggia nearly caused the destruction
of Venice. Then came the Ottoman occupation to
put a stop to international jealousies until modern
times.
The political development of Russia from Moscow
has been a consistent forward march towards ocean
waterways. There have been six possible outlets for
Russia, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, the White Sea,
the Yellow Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Adriatic.
At different periods of her history, Russia has ex-
pended her efforts continuously in these various
directions. To reach the Baltic, Peter the Great
built Petrograd. One has to stand on the Kremlin
on a beautiful summer day and look out over the
sacred city of the Russians to grasp the fulness of
135
the sacrifice and the marvellous daring of the man
who abandoned Moscow to build another capital on
piles driven into dreary salt marshes. It was for the
sea and contact with the outside world! To reach
the Pacific Ocean, Russia patiently conquered the
former empire of the Mongols, steppe by steppe, and
when she thought the moment of realization had
arrived, did not hesitate to throw a band of steel
across the continent of Asia. To reach the Persian
Gulf, she crossed the Caucasus and launched her
ships upon the Caspian Sea. To reach the Black
Sea, she broke the militarypower of the houses of
Jagello and Osman, building laboriously upon the
ruins of Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Is it to
reach the Adriatic that her forces are now before
Przemysl?
In spite of her struggles through three centuries,
Russia is still landlocked. The ice is an insur-
mountable barrier to freedom of exit from the White
Sea, her only undisputed outlet. Japan has arisen to
shatter the dreams of the future of Port Dalny, and
make useless the sacrifices to gain the Pacific. The
control of Germany to the exit from the Baltic Sea
has been strengthened in recent years by the con-
struction and fortification of the Kiel Canal. The
Persian Gulf has been given up by the accord of 1907
with Great Britain. There has remained what has
always been the strongest hope, and the one for the
realization of which Russia has made consistent
and stupendous efforts.
Radetsky, in his memoirs, has summed up the

attitude of Russia towards the Ottoman Empire in
136
words that give the key to the whole Eastern Ques-
tion during the past century :
"Owing to her geographical position, Russia is

the national and eternal enemy of Turkey. . . .
Russia must therefore do all she can to take posses-

sion of Constantinople, for its possession alone will
grant to her the necessary security and territorial
"
completeness.
Three times during the nineteenth century Russia

endeavoured to destroy the Ottoman Empire in
Europe so that she might gain control of the exit to
the Êgean Sea. In 1828, her armies reached
Adrianople, and half a century later the suburbs of
Constantinople. In both instances, especially the

second, it was the opposition of Great Britain that
forced Russia to make peace without having attained
her end. In 1854, France and Italy joined Great
Britain in the invasion of the Crimea to preserve
"the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." In 1856,
at the Congress of Paris, Russia saw the western
Powers uphold the principle that the Czar had no
right to sovereignty even on the Black Sea, a half of
which his ancestors had wrested from the Turks. It
was no use for Russia to plead that she had "special
interests" in her own territorial waters. The Black
Sea was neutralized. The expression "selon nos
convenances et was understood by Great
inter ets"
Britain to refer only to British interests! It was by
right of might that Russia was held in check. In
1870, Bismarck purchased the neutrality of Russia
in his war against France by agreeing to Russia's
137
denunciation of the Paris treaty clauses which held
her impotent in the Black Sea. But again, in 1878,
Great Britain interfered to bottle up Russia. Since
then the Russian navy has been a prisoner in the
Black Sea. Will it continue to be so after the war of
1914?
Just when Ottoman power was receding, the rapid
development of steam power began to make southern
Russia the bread basket of Europe. Steam machinery
increased the yield of these vast and rich lands, steam
railways enabled the farmers to send their harvests to
Black Sea ports, and steamships made possible the
distribution of the harvests throughout Europe. I
used to live on the Bosphorus, and from my study
window I could see every day the never-ceasing pro-
cession of grain ships of all nations going to and com-
ing from the Black Sea. In May, 1912, when the
Dardanelles was closed for a month during the
Italian war, two hundred steamships lay at anchor in
the harbour of Constantinople.
Another influence whose importance cannot be
overestimated has constantly turned the eyes of
Russians towards Constantinople. Slavs are ideal-
ists. For an ideal one makes sacrifices that material
considerations do not call forth. To the Russians,
Constantinople is Tsarigrad, the city of the Emperor.
It is from Constantinople that the Russians received
their religion. Their civilization is imbued with the
spirit of Byzantium. Just as one sees in the Polish

language the influence of Latin in the construction of
the sentence, one sees in the kindred Russian tongue
the influence of Greek. I have frequently been struck
'
138
20
PARTITIONS OF POLAND
Scale of Miles
24 Lonsritud
East 28 from Greenwich
with the close and vital relationship between Con-
stantinople and Russia during the period of the
development of the Russian nation. Now that
Russia seems to be entering upon a period of national
awakening, the sentiment is bound to be irresistible
among the Russians that they are the rightful inheritors
of the Eastern Empire, eclipsed for so many centuries
by the shadow of Islam and now about to be born again.
On a July evening in 1908, when the constitutional
revolution in Turkey was beginning to occupy the
attention of Europe, I sat with my
wife in the winter
garden of the Grand Hotel in Paris. Wewere listen-
ing to a charming and intelligent Russian gentleman
explain to us the aims of the political parties in the
Duma of 1907. A came to tell us that our
waiter
baggage was ready. "Where are you going?" asked
the Russian. "To Constantinople," we answered.
An expression of wistful sadness or joy you can
never tell which it is meant to be with a Russian
came across his face. "Constantinople!" he mur-
mured, more to himself than to us "This revolution
:
will fail. You will see. For we must come into our
own."
The political aspect of the question of the Darda-
nelleshas changed greatly since Great Britain and
France fought one war with Russia, and Great
Britain stood ready to fight a second, in order to
prevent this passage from falling into Russian hands.
Almost immediately after the crisis of San Stefano
and the resulting revision of the Russo-Turkish
treaty at Berlin, the interests of Great Britain were
diverted from the north-east to the south-east Medi-
139
terranean. She decided that her permanent route
to India was through the Suez Canal, and made it
secure by getting possession of the majority of the
shares of the Canal and by seizing Egypt. The
Bulgarians began to show themselves lacking in the
expected docility towards their liberator. British
diplomats realized that they had been fearing what
did not happen. They began to lose interest in the
Dardanelles. This loss of interest in the question
world interests
of the straits as a vital factor in their
has grown so complete in recent years that Russia
has no reason to anticipate another visit of the
British fleet to Besica Bay if I refrain from pro-
phesying. It is safe to say, however, that London
has forgotten Mohammed Ali, the Crimea, and
the Princes' Islands, while the traditions of Unkiar
Skelessi are still dominating the foreign policy of
Petrograd.
For, while the future of the Dardanelles has come
to mean less to Great Britain, it means more than
ever before to Russia. Russia has been turned back
from the Pacific. The loss of Manchuria in the war
with Japan caused her once again to cast her eyes
upon the outlet to the Mediterranean. To the in-
crease in her wheat trade has been added also the
development of the petroleum trade from the Cau-
casus wells. Since the agreement for the partition of
Persia with Great Britain in 1907, and the mutual
"hands off" accord with Germany at Potsdam in
1910, the expectations of a brilliant Russian future
for northern Persia and the Armenian and Kurdish
corner of Asiatic Turkey have been great.
140
Since the Congress of Berlin, Germany has come
into the place of Great Britain as the enemy who
would keep Russia from finding the Êgean Sea.
The growth of German interests at Constantinople
and Asia Minor has become the India in anticipa-
tion ofGermany. When Russia, after her ill-fated
venture in the Far East, turned her efforts once more
towards the Balkan peninsula, it began to dawn upon
her that the Drang nach Oesten might prove a menace
to her control of the Dardanelles, fully as great as
was formerly the British fetish of the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire to keep open the route to India.
Diplomacy endeavoured to ward off the inevitable
struggle. But the Balkan wars created a new situa-
tion that broke rudely the accords of Skierniewice and
Potsdam. Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and
Germany in Asia Minor became the nightmare of
Russia.
141
CHAPTER IX
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND HER SOUTH
SLAVS
has often been predicted in recent years that

the union between Austria and Hungary would
IT be broken by internal troubles. Hungary has
been credited with desiring to cut loose from Austria.
The frequent and serious quarrels between the mem-
bers of the Dual Monarchy have caused many a
wiseacre to shake his head and say, "The union
will not outlive Franz Josef!" But the Austro-
Hungarian Empire has been founded upon sound
political and economic principles, which far trans-
cend a single life or a dynasty. Austrians and
Hungarians may be unwilling yoke-fellows. But
they know that if they do not pull together, they
cannot pull at all. They have too many Slavs
around them.
The principle upon which Austrians and Hungari-
ans have founded a Dual Monarchy is the old Latin
proverb, divide impera. In the Empire, Austrians
et
and Hungarians are in the minority. In each king-

dom, by dividing the Slavs cleverly between them,
they hold the upper hand. The German race is,
142
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND SOUTH SLAVS
therefore, the dominant race in Austria, and
the Hungarian race is the dominant race in
Hungary.
If one looks at the map, and studies the division
of the Empire, he will readily see that it is much
more durably constructed than he would have reason
to believe from statistics of the population. The
Slavic question in the Dual Monarchy is not how
many Slavs of kindred races are to be found in
Austria-Hungary, how they are placed in re-
but
lationship to each other and to neighbouring states.
It is a question of geography rather than of cen-
sus. The student needs a map instead of columns
of figures.
In only one place is the Austro-Hungarian Mon-
archy very weak, and that is in the south. The sole
port for the thirty millions of Austria is Trieste.
To reach Trieste one passes through a belt of Slavic
territory, and Trieste itself is more Italian than
German. The sole port of Hungary is Fiume. To
reach Fiume one passes through a belt of Slavic
territory, and there are hardly any Hungarians in
Fiume itself. The Slavs which cut off Fiume from
Hungary and the Slavs of the Dalmatian coast and
of all Bosnia and Herzegovina belong to the same
family. They speak practically the same language
as the Servians and Montenegrins.
The Hungarians, then, have exactly the same
interest as the Austrians in every move that has
been made since the proclamation of the constitution
of Turkey to prevent the foundation of a strong
independent Servian State on the confines of the
143
Austro-Hungarian Empire, and to prevent the
Slavs from reaching the Adriatic Sea.
Austria has not been necessarily influenced in her
attitude towards the Balkan problem by Germany.
Although her Drang nach Oesten is frequently inter-
preted as a part of the Pan-Germanic movement, the
Germans of Austria have needed no German senti-
ment and no German prompting to arrive at their
point of view in regard to the Balkan nationalities.
It must be clearly kept in mind that the Convention
of Reichstadt in 1876, which was the beginning of
Austria's consistent policy towards the Balkan
peninsula, was signed before the alliance with Ger-
many; that it was the conception of a Hungarian
statesman, and that the occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina had nothing whatever to do with Pan-
Germanism. It was a measure of self-protection to
prevent these remote provinces of Turkey from form-
ing a political union with Servia, should the Russian
arms, intervening on behalf of the south Slavs
against Turkey, prove successful. The extension of
sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 was
to prevent the constitutional regime from trying to
weaken the hold of Austria-Hungary upon these
provinces. Austria-Hungary certainly would have
preferred the more comfortable status of an occu-
pation to the legal adoption of a Reichsland. But
she could take no chances with the Young Turks. Her
military occupation of the Sandjak of Novi Bazar was
inspired as much by
the necessity of preventing the
union of Montenegro and Servia as by the desire to
provide for a future railway extension to Salonika.
144
Hungary has had to grapple with two Balkan
problems, the rise of Rumania and the rise of Servia.
She has had within her kingdom several million
Rumanian and several million South Slavic
subjects
subjects. Most of her Rumanians, however, have
been separated from Rumania from the natural
barrier of the Carpathian mountains, and have not
found their union with Hungary to their disadvant-
age. For the Rumanians of Hungary enjoy through
Buda-Pesth and Fiume a better outlet to the markets
of the world, and a cheaper haul, than they would
find through Rumania. They have benefited greatly
by their economic union with Hungary. It is not
the same with the Croatians. They are situated
between Buda-Pesth and the Adriatic. They have
a natural river outlet to the Danube. They are
not separated by physical barriers from their broth-
ers of race and language in Servia, Bosnia, and Dal-
matia. Were they to separate from Hungary, they
would not find their economic position in any way
jeopardized.
Many South Slavs have advocated a trialism
to replace the present dualism. They have
claimed that the most critical problems of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire could be solved in this
way. Added to Hungary and Austria, there could
be a Servian kingdom, perhaps enlarged by the
inclusion of independent Servia and Montenegro,
whose crown could be worn by the Hapsburg
ruler.
But this solution has never found favour, simple
and attractive though it sounds on first sight, with
H5
eitherHungarians or Austrians. For it would mean
the cuttingoff of both kingdoms from the sea. The
Hungarians would be altogether land-locked, and
surrounded on all sides by alien races. Austria
would be forced into hopeless economic dependence
upon Germany. The Germans of Austria and the
Hungarians of Hungary have felt that their national
existence depended upon keeping in political sub-
jection the South Slavs, and upon repressing merci-
lessly any evidences of Italian irredentism upon the
littoral of the Adriatic. Italian irredentism is treated
in another place. Therepression of national aspir-
ations among the South Slavs, which interests us
here, has been the corner-stone of Austro-Hungarian
policy in the Balkans. For Hungary it has also
been an internal question in her relationship with
Croatia.
The Serbo-Croatian movement in southern Hun-
gary has been repressed by Hungary with the same
bitterness and lack of success that have attended the
attempts to stifle national aspirations elsewhere in
Europe. No weapon has been left unused in fight-
ing nationalism in Croatia. Official corruption,
bribery, manipulation of judges, imprisonment with-
out trial, military despotism, gerrymandering, electo-
ral intimidation, has been for years and is
this
still, the daily record in Croatia. If there were a
Slavic Silvio Pellico, the world would know that the

ministers of the aged Franz Josef are not very differ-
ent from the ministers of the young Franz Josef, who
crushed the Milanese and tracked Garibaldi like a
beast. Radetzkys and Gorzkowskis are still wearing
146
Austrian livery.To Austria and Hungary, Salonika
and Macedonia may have been the dream. But
Trieste, Fiume, and Dalmatia have always been
the realities. If Hungary took her heel off the
neck of the Croatians, Buda-Pesth might become
another Belgrade and Hungary another Servia,
land-locked with no other outlet than the Danube.
This does not excuse, but it explains. In this
world the battle is to the strong. The survival of
the fittest is a historical as well as a biological
fact.
In spite of their juxtaposition, the Serbo-Croats
have never been able to unite. There have been
more reasons for this than their political separa-
tion. They are divided in religion. The Servians
are Orthodox, and the Croatians and Dalmatians
Catholic. In Bosnia and Macedonia, the race
adhered to both confessions, though in majority
Orthodox, and has also a strong Mohammedan
element. The Orthodox Servians of Servia use the
Cyrillic alphabet, and the Catholic Croatians and
Dalmatians of Austria-Hungary the Latin alphabet.
Until the recent Balkan Wars, the Croatians and
Dalmatians considered themselves a much superior
branch of the race to the Servians. They have cer-
tainly enjoyed a superior education and demonstrated
a superior civilization. The probable reason for this
is that they did not have the misfortune to be for
centuries under the Ottoman yoke. The Croatians

have never been willing to play the understudy to
the Servians. Agram has considered itself the centre
of the Serbo-Croat movement rather than Belgrade.
147
It is a far more beautiful and modern city than
Belgrade. Few cities of all Europe of its size can
equal Agram for architecture, for municipal works,
and for keen, stimulating intellectual life. Its uni-
versity is the foyer of Serbo-Croat nationalism and

of risorgimento literature. It was here that the
one Roman bishop of the world, who dared to speak
openly in the Vatican Council of 1870 against the
doctrine of papal infallibility and remain within the
Church, gave to his people the prophetic message
that nationality transcended creeds. Here also an-
other Catholic priest taught the oneness of Ser-
vians and Croatians in language and history, and
proved by scholarly research which is universally
admired, that Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia
formed a triune kingdom, whose juridic union
with theAustro-Hungarian Empire was wholly
personal connection with the Hapsburg Crown,
and had never been subjection to the Magyar.
The Hungarians, during the past few years of bit-
terest persecution at Agram, have not been able to
drive away the ghosts of Strossmayer and Racki.
In Croatia, the pen has proved mightier than the
sword.
Until recently, Austria-Hungary has not felt
uneasy about the relationship between the Cro-
atians and the Servians of the independent king-
dom. But there has never been a minute since
the annexation of 1908 that the statesmen of the
Ballplatz have not been nervous about the Servian
propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To keep
Catholic Croatians and Orthodox Servians in an-
148
tagonism with each other and with the Moslems,
to prevent the education and economic emancipa-
tion of the Orthodox peasants, and to introduce
German colonists and German industrial enter-
prises everywhere, has been the Austro-Hungarian
program.
Vienna has used the Catholic Church and the
propaganda of Catholic missions for dividing the
Orthodox Servians in Bosnia from their Croatian
brothers of the Catholic rite. Missionaries give
every encouragement to Servians to desert the
Orthodox Church. In the greater part of Bosnia,
the Government has made it absolutely impossible
for a child to receive an education elsewhere than in
the Catholic schools. There are only two hundred
and sixty-eight schools supported by the Govern-
ment, of which one-tenth are placed in such a way
that they serve exclusively other populations. The
Bosnian budget provides four times as much money
for the maintenance of the gendarmerie as for public
schools.
Moslem law provides conquered land be-
that all
longs to the Khalif He farms it out in annual, life,

.
or hereditary grants. In the Ottoman conquest of

the Balkan Peninsula, the territories acquired were
granted to successful soldiers on a basis which pro-
vided for a feudal army. The feudal proprietors, or
beys, left the land to the peasants who occupied it,
in consideration of an annual rental of a third of the
yield of the land. The peasants had in addition to

pay their tenth to the tax collectors of the Sultan.
In territories that were on the borders of the Ottoman
149
Empire, Bosnia and Albania, the lands were
like
by their former proprietors, who

largely retained
became Moslems. So the landed aristocracy re-
mained indigenous.
The lot of the peasants in Bosnia, who were
largely Orthodox Servians was not intolerable under

Turkish rule, except when Moslem fanaticism was
aroused by Christian separatist propaganda. Austria-
Hungary claimed, however, that her occupation of
the province was a measure dictated by humanity
to ameliorate the lot of the enslaved Christians.
But the Austrian administration has accomplished
just the opposite. The new government from the
beginning supported its authority upon the Moslem
landowners, upon whose goodwill they were de-
pendent to prevent the awakening of national
feeling among the peasants. Vienna was more
complacent in overlooking abuses of the beys
than had been Constantinople. For the Turks
held their beys in check when exactions grew too
bad. The Sublime Porte was afraid of giving an
excuse for Christian intervention. But the Aus-
trians encouraged the exactions of the beys in order
to keep in abject subjection the Servian peasant
population.
From the first moment of the Austro-Hungarian
occupation, the peasants found that they would no
longer enjoy undisturbed possession of their lands.
The exodus of Mohammedan Bosnians, who, as we
have seen elsewhere, were urged to follow the Otto-
man flag, gave the Germans the opportunity of
settling colonists on the vacated lands. This process
150
of colonization was afterwards pursued to the detri-
ment of the indigenous Christian population. Ernest
Haeckel, the great philosopher, once said in a lecture
at Jena that "the work of the German people to
assure and develop civilization gives it the right to
occupy the Balkans, Asia Minor, Syria, and Mesopo-

tamia, and to exclude from these countries the races
actually occupying them which are powerless and
incapable." This statement, publicly made before
a body of distinguished German thinkers, reveals the
real ulterior ideal of the Drang nach Oesten. Pro-
fessor Wirth, dealing specifically with present possi-
bilities, stated that the policy of Austria-Hungary
in Bosnia must be to keep the peasantry in slavery
and, as much as possible, to encourage them by
oppression to emigrate. The reason given for
this was: "To render powerful the Bosnian peas-
ant is render powerful the Servian people, which
to
would be the suicide of Germany" Can we not see

from this how public sentiment in Germany has
stood behind the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to
Servia?
From 1890 to 1914, the theory of Haeckel and the
advice of Wirth have been followed by the Austrian
functionaries in Bosnia. No stone has been left
unturned to drive the peasants from their lands.
Right of inheritance has been suppressed, a tax col-
lector has been introduced between the bey and
his peasants, the taxes have been raised in many
cases arbitrarily to the point where the peas-
ants have been compelled to abandon their land.
To German immigrants have been given com-
munal lands which were necessary to the peasants
for pasturageand the forests where their swine fed
on acorns.
The population of Bosnia hardly surpasses thirty-
five inhabitants to the kilometre. The total popu-
lation about two millions, of whom eight hundred
is
thousand are Orthodox, six hundred thousand Mos-

lem, and five hundred thousand Catholic. But
practically all of this population except one hundred
thousand who are Jews, Protestants, and other
German immigrants Servian or Servian-speaking.
is
There are thirty-five Germans, as opposed to one

million hundred thousand Slavs. And yet
eight
German the language of the administration, and
is
the only language of the railways and posts and tele-

graphs, which in Bosnia have not ceased to be under
the control of the military government. Many
functionaries after thirty years of service in Bosnia
do not know the language of the country. Two
German newspapers supported at the ex-
are
pense of the public budget to attack indigenous
elements. In German schools, pupils are taught
the history of Germany, but in Slavic schools the
history of the south Slavs is excluded from the
curriculum. There are fourteen schools for ten
thousand Germans, and one school for every six
thousand Slavs.
In the administration of Bosnia, only thirty-one
out of three hundred and twenty-two functionaries
are Servians, only twelve out of one hundred and
twenty-five professors of lyceums, only thirty-one
out of two hundred and thirty-seven judges and
152
magistrates. And yet the Orthodox Servians form
forty-four per cent, of the population. The young
Bosnians who have graduated from the Austro-
Hungarian universities find themselves excluded from
public life. Turning to commercial life, they find
eighty per cent, of the large industries controlled by
German capital and managed exclusively by Ger-
mans. Turning to agriculture, they find economic
misery and hopeless ignorance among the peasants
of their race, and every effort made by the Govern-
ment to prevent the bettering of their lot. Turning
to journalism and public speaking to work for their
race, they find an unreasoning censorship and a law
against assemblies. As one of them expressed it
to me, "We must either cease to be Slavs or become
' '
revolutionaries.
Did Austria-Hungary need to look to Servian
propaganda, to influences from the outside, to find
the cause of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand?
Political assassinations were not new in the south
Slavic provinces of the monarchy. A young Bosnian
student attempted to assassinate tne Governor of
Bosnia at Sarajevo on June 6, 1910, at the time of
the inauguration of the Bosnian Sabor (Diet). Two
years later the royal commissioner in Croatia was
the object of an attempt at assassination by a
Bosnian at Agram. In September of the same
year, a Croatian student shot at the Ban of Cro-
atia. The same Ban, Skerletz, was attacked
again at Agram by another young Croatian on
August 1 8, 1913. These assassinations preceded
those of the Archduke and his wife. They
153
were allcommitted by students of Austro-Hun-
garian nationality. Only the last one had ever
been in Servia.
In theory, Bosnia has had since February 20, 1910,
a constitution with a deliberative assembly. But
the Sabor can discuss no projects of law that have
not been proposed by the two masters. Once voted,
a law has to pass the double veto of Vienna and Buda-
Pesth. As if this were not enough, the Viennese
bureaucracy has so arranged the qualification of the
electorate and the electoral laws that the suffrage
does not represent the country. Then, too, the
constitution decides arbitrarily that the membership
of the Sabor must be divided according to religions,
one Jew, sixteen Catholics, twenty-four Moslems,
and thirty-one Orthodox. The Government has
reserved for the right of naming twenty mem-
itself
bers! The constitution provides for individual

liberty, the inviolability of one's
home, liberty of the
press and speech, and secrecy of letters and tele-
grams. This enlightened measure of the Emperor

was heralded to the world. But of course there
was the joker, Article 20. Vienna held the highest
card! In case of menace to the public safety, all
public and private rights may be suspended by a
word from Vienna. Public safety always being
menaced in Bosnia, the constitution is perpetually
suspended. The Government even goes as far as
to prosecute deputies for their speeches in Parlia-
ment. Newspapers are continually censored. Their
telegraphic news from Vienna and Buda-Pesth is
suppressed without reason. Particularly severe

154
fines sometimes jail sentences are passed upon
offending journalists.
Is necessarily because of instigation and pro-
it
paganda from Belgrade that of the three Ser-

vian political parties in Bosnia two (the Narod
and the
Otachbina) are
closely allied to the
Pan-Servian Society Narodna Obrana, and that
these two parties openly support the separatist
movement?
In Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Croatia in 1914 the
bureaucracy of Vienna has been engaged in the
same process of repression and police persecution
as in Italy during the half century from 1815
to the liberation of Italy. The local constitu-
tions have been suspended everywhere. Why
have the Austrians, in spite of the lessons of the
beginning of the present reign, dared to tempt
providence in exactly the same way after the Golden

Jubilee?
The victories of the Allies in the Balkans were a
terrible blow to Austria-Hungary. Not only was
her dream of reaching the ^gean Sea through the
sandjak of Novi Bazar and Macedonia shattered
by the Greek occupation of Salonika, but the aggran-
dizement of Servia, caused by a successful war,
threatened to have a serious effect upon the
fortunes of the Empire. The appearance of the
Servians on the Adriatic would mean really the
extension of Russian influence through Bulgaria
and Servia to the Austrian and Italian private
lake, and would cut off Austria for ever from
her economic outlet to the Êgean. But there
155
was more than this to cause alarm both in
Austria and in Hungary. Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, and Dalmatia would they remain loyal
to the Empire, if once they came under the spell
of the idea of Greater Servia?Leaving Russia
entirely out of the calculation, an independent,
self-reliant, and enlarged Servia, extending towards
the Adriatic and Êgean Seas, if not actually reach-
ing it, would it not be, as Professor Wirth declared,
"the suicide of Germany"? The. statesmen of the
Hohenzollern and Hapsburg Empires determined
that it should not occur.
From the very moment that the Servian armies
drove the Turks before them, Austria-Hungary
began to act the bully against Servia. The Aus-
trian consuls at Prisrend and Mitrovitza were
made the first cause of Austrian interference.
It was pretended that Herr Prochaska had been
massacred and mutilated at Prisrend, and that
the life of Herr Tahy had been threatened so
that he was forced to flee for safety from Mi-
trovitza. A formal inquest showed that the first
of these consuls was safe, and that the trouble
had been merely a discussion between Servian
officers and Herr Prochaska over some fleeing
Albanians who had taken refuge in the consulate.
In the other case, there seemed to be no ground
at all for complaint. But on January 15, 1913,
the Servians acceded to the demand of Austria
that the reparation be granted for the Prisrend
incident. A company of Servian soldiers saluted
the Austro-Hungarian flag as Consul Prochaska
156
solemnly raised it. This incident seems too petty
to mention, but in that part of the world and at
that moment we thought it very serious. For it
showed how anxious Austria-Hungary was to pick
a quarrel with Servia in the midst of the Balkan
War.
Two other incidents of an even more serious
character immediately followed. Servia refused
the Austrian demandthat Durazzo be evacuated,
supporting herself upon the hope that Russia would
intervene. During December and January, deluded
by unofficial representatives of Russian public sen-
timent and by demonstrations against Austria-
Hungary in Moscow and Petrograd, Servia held out.
It was only when she saw that Russian support was
not forthcoming that she withdrew from Durazzo.
The international situation during January, 1913,
was and the cause
similar to that during July, 1914,
of the crisiswas practically the same. In both
cases Servia backed down, but the second time
Austria-Hungary and Germany determined to
provoke the war which they believed would be
the end of Servia and the destruction of Rus-
sia'spower to influence the political evolution of
Balkan Peninsula.
After Durazzo, it was Scutari. Servia for the
third time bowed before the will of Austria.
The next move against Servia was the annexa-
tion on May 12, 1913, of the little island of Ada-
Kaleh on the Danube, which had curiously enough
remained Turkish property after the Treaty of
Berlin. It had actually been forgotten at that time.
157
This island, situated in front of Orsova, would have
given Servia a splendid strategic position at the
mouth of the river. Austria-Hungary anticipated
the Treaty of London.
It was to reduce Servia that secret encouragement
was given to Bulgaria to provoke the second Balkan
war. There is no doubt now as to the role of the
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Sofia in allowing
this crisis to be precipitated.
Had Germany been willing to stand behind her
at Bukarest, Austria-Hungary would have prevented
the signing of the treaty between the Balkan States
by presenting an ultimatum to Servia. But Ger-
many did not seem to be ready. The reason com-
monly given that Emperor William did not want to
embarrass King Carol of Rumania, a prince of his
own house, and his brother-in-law, the King of
Greece, does not seem credible. In view of the
events that have happened since, the signing of the
Treaty of Bukarest is a mystery not yet cleared up.
The second Balkan war acted as a boomerang to
Austria-Hungary. It increased tremendously the
prestige of Servia abroad, and the confidence of the
Servians in themselves. The weakness of the
Turkish armies in the first Balkan war had been
so great that Servia herself has hardly considered
it a fair test of her military strength. To have
measured arms successfully with Bulgaria was
worth as much to Servia as the territory that she
gained.
We have seen how strained were the relationships
of Austria-Hungary as separate kingdoms and to-
158
gether as an empire in their relationship with their
south Slavic subjects. The Croatians, the Dalma-
tians, and a major portion of the inhabitants of
Bosnia-Herzegovina were Servian in language and
sympathies. They had never thought of political
union with Servia, the petty kingdom which had
allowed its rulers to be assassinated, and which
seemed to be insignificant in comparison with the
powerful and brilliant country of which they would
not have been unwilling, if allowed real self-govern-
ment, to remain a part. But a large and glorified
Servia, with an increased territory and a well-earned
and brilliant military reputation would this prove
an attraction to win away the dissatisfied subjects
of the Dual Monarchy?
Austria-Hungary by the annexation of Bosnia-

Herzegovina had taken to herself more Servians in a
compact mass than she could well assimilate. They
were not scattered and separated geographically
like her other Slavic subjects. It was a danger from
the beginning. After the Balkan wars, it became
an imminent peril.
The death sentence of Servia was decided by the
statesmen of Austria-Hungary and Germany the
moment their newspapers brought to them the
story of the battle of Kumonova.
I shall never forget my presentiment when I heard
on June 29, 1914, down in a little Breton village,
that a Bosnian student had celebrated the anniver-
sary of the battle of Kossova by assassinating the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The incident for
which Austria was waiting had happened. There
159
came back to me the words of Hakki Pasha,
"If Italy declares war on Turkey, the cannon
will not cease to speak until all Europe is in con-
flagration."
160
CHAPTER X
RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA
the latter half of the nineteenth century, the
IN peace of Europe was twice disturbed, and ter-

riblewars occurred, over the question of the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Since it is still
the same question which has had most to do directly
at least with bringing on the general European
war of 1914, it is important to consider what has
been, since the Treaty of Berlin, the very heart of
the Eastern question in relation to Europe, the
rivalry of races in Macedonia.
When the European Powers, following the lead
of Great Britain intervened after the Russo-Turkish
War of 1877-78 to annul the Treaty of San Stefano,
they frustrated the emancipation from Moslem rule
of the Christian populations in Macedonia. A Bal-
kan territorial and political status quo was decided
upon by a Congress of the Powers at Berlin in 1878.
In receiving back Macedonia, Turkey solemnly
promised to give equal rights to her Christian sub-
jects. In taking upon themselves the terrible re-
sponsibility of restoring Christians to Turkish rule,
the Powers assumed at the same time the obligation
to watch Turkey and compel her to keep her promises.
161
The delegates of the Powers brought to the Con-
gress of Berlin a determination to solve the problems
of South-eastern Europe, according to what they
believed to be the personal selfish interests of the
nations they represented. From the beginning of
the Congress to the end, there was never a single
thought of serving the interests of the people whose
destiniesthey were presuming to decide. They
compromised with each other "to preserve the peace
of Europe." This formula has always been inter-
preted in diplomacy as the getting of all you can
for your country without having to fight for it !
Practically every provision of the

Treaty of Berlin
has been disregarded by the contracting parties
and by the Balkan States. The
policy of Turkey in
this respect has not been different from that of the
Christian Powers. Great Britain and France, as
their colonial empires increased, ignored the obli-
gations of the treaty which they had signed, because

they feared the effect upon their commercial and
colonial interests overseas, were they to press the
Khalif . The only effective pressure would have been
force of arms. When
popular sympathy was stirred
to the depths by the cruelty of Abdul Hamid's op-
pression and massacres, successive Britain and French
Cabinets washed their hands of any responsibility to-
wards the Christians in Turkey. Pan-Islamism was
their nightmare. They had an overwhelming fear
of arousing Mohammedan sentiment against them
in their colonies. Germany refused to hold Abdul
Hamid to his promises, because she wanted to curry
favour with him to get a foothold in Asiatic Turkey.
162
Russia and Austria, the Powers most vitally inter-
ested in theOttoman Empire, because they were its
neighbours, were agreed upon preserving the Sultan's
domination in the Balkan Peninsula, no matter how
great the oppression of Christians became. Neither
Power wanted to see the other increase in influence
among the Balkan nationalities.
The centres of intrigue were Bulgaria, Albania,
Thrace, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia,
the portions of the Peninsula which had been refused
emancipation by the Congress of Berlin. Bulgaria
worked out her own emancipation. She refused
the tutelage of Russia, annexed Eastern Rumelia in
defiance of the Powers in 1885, and proclaimed her
independence in 1908. The fortunes of Albania
have been followed in another chapter. Thrace was
too near Constantinople, the forbidden city, too
unimportant economically, and too largely Moslem
in population to be covetedby the Balkan States.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, administered by Austria-
Hungary since 1878, were annexed in defiance of
treaty obligations in 1908. The principal victim
of the mischief done by the Congress of Berlin was
Macedonia.
The future of Macedonia has been the great
source of between Austria-Hungary and
conflict
Russia, and between the Balkan States. At Athens,

Sofia, Belgrade, Bukarest, and Cettinje, the diplo-
mats of Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey, from
the morrow of the Berlin Congress to the eve of the
recent Balkan Wars, played a game against each
other, endeavouring always to use the Balkan States
163
as pawnsin their sordid strife. Turkey was backed
by France and England, whenever it suited opportune
diplomacy to do so. Austria-Hungary was backed

by Germany, who at the same time did not hesitate
to play a hand with the Turks. Russia has always
stood more or less alone in the Balkan question,
even after the conclusion of the alliance with France.
Except at Cettinje, Italian activity in this diplomatic
game has never been particularly marked.
What has been the object of the game? This is
difficult to state categorically. Aims have changed
with changing conditions. For example, during the
five years immediately following the Congress of
Berlin, British diplomacy was directed strenuously
towards keeping down emancipated Bulgaria, and
towards preventing the encroachment of Servia in
the direction of the Adriatic and the Êgean. But
when she saw that Bulgaria had refused to be the
tool of Russia, and when her problem of the trade
route of India had been solved by the buying up of
the majority of shares in the Suez Canal and the
occupation of Egypt, Great Britain championed
Bulgaria and sustained her in the annexation of
Eastern Rumelia. British policy remained anti-
Servian for thirty years. There was more in the
withdrawal of the British Legation from Belgrade
than disapproval of a dastardly regicide. But the
moment commerce began to fear German
British
competition, and an accord had been made with
Russia to remove causes of conflict, the British press
began to change its tone towards Servia. What a
miracle has been wrought in the decade since "an
164
immoral race of blackguards, with no sense of national
honour" has become "that brave and noble little
race, spirited defenders of the liberties of Europe!"
I quote these two sentiments from the same news-
papers. If Premier Asquith is sincere in his belief

that this present war is to defend the principle of
the sanctity of treaties, will he insist, when peace is
concluded, that Servia make good her oath to Bul-
garia, and Russia her international treaty obliga-
tions in regard to the kingdom of Poland? Great
Britain is the least of the offenders when it comes
to diplomatic cant and hypocrisy. For the British
electorate has a keen sense of justice, and an intel-
ligent determination that British influence shall be
exerted for the betterment of humanity. Cabinets
must reckon with this electorate when they decide
questions of foreign policy.
But we do not want to lose ourselves in a maze of
diplomatic intrigue, which it is fruitlessto follow,
even if we could. We must limit ourselves to an
exposition of the ambitions of Austria-Hungary and

of the Balkan States to the possession of this coveted
province.
Since the creation of modern Italy, the great Ger-
man trade route to the Mediterranean has been
changed. The influence in Teutonic commercial
evolution of the passing of Lombardy and Venetia
from the political tutelage of a thousand years has
been of tremendous importance, for the connection
between Germany and Italy had always been vital.
It was the first Napoleon who broke this connection.
It was the third Napoleon who nullified the effort
165
of the Congress ofVienna to re-establish it. United
Italy gave a new direction to Teutonic expansion.
United Germany gave to it a new impulsion. The
Drang nach Oesten was born.
By the Convention of Reichstadt in 1876, Austria-
Hungary secured from Russia the promise of the
Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
return for her neutrality in the "approaching war
of liberation" of Russia against Turkey. In order
to liberate some Slavs, Russia changed the subjection
of others. The Convention of Reichstadt is really
the starting-point of the quarrel which has grown
so bitterly during the last generation between Austria
and Russia over the Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula.
Russia paid dearly for a "free hand" with Turkey
in 1877. She is
paying still.
In her attitude towards the Balkans, Austria has
had three distinct aims: the prevention of a Slavic
outlet to the Adriatic, the realization of a German
outlet to the Êgean, and the effectual hindrance of
the growth in the Balkans of a strong independent
south Slavic state, which might prove a fatal attrac-
tion to her own provinces of Croatia and Dalmatia.
It was
this triple consideration that led her to the
occupation and annexation of Bosnia and Herzego-

vina, and to the policy of hostility to Servia, which
isdeveloped in another chapter.
Desiring to possess
for herself the wonderful port of Salonika on the
Êgean Sea, to reach which her railroads would have

to cross Macedonia, the policy of Austria-Hungary
towards Macedonia has been consistently to en-
deavour to uphold the semblance of Turkish author-
166
ity, and at the same time to make that authority

difficult to uphold though the exciting of racial
rivalry among Greece, Servia, Bulgaria, Rumania,
and Albania in this turbulent country. Turkey and
Austria met on the common ground of "keeping the
pot boiling," although with a different aim. By
keeping the pot boiling, Turkey thought that her
sovereignty was safe, while Austria hoped that
when Turkey and the Balkan States had worn them-
selves out, each opposing the other, she could step in
and capture the prize.
Turkey and Austria-Hungary, then, conspired to-
gether to create as many points of conflict as possible

among the Macedonians of different races. The
most devilish ingenuity was constantly exercised in
stirring up and keeping alive the hatred of each

race over the other. While frequently aroused to
the point of making perfunctory protests, the other
nations of Europe, with the exception of Russia,
let Austria and Turkey do as they pleased, just as
Turkey was allowed a free hand in massacring the

Armenians. The laissez faire policy of the Powers
was a denial of their treaty obligations.
It was only when the Balkan States awoke to the
realization of the fact that they were regarded as
mere pawns upon the chequer board of world politics,
to be sacrificed without compunction by the Euro-
pean Powers whenever it was to their interest, that
they buried differences for a moment, and worked
out theirown salvation. If the Balkan Wars have
brought the present terrible disaster upon Europe,
it is no more than the contemptible diplom-
167
acy of self interest and mutual jealousy could
expect.
Why was the Austro-Turkish policy possible, and
why did it succeed for a whole generation?
The Ottoman Empire was founded in the Balkan
peninsula by rulers whose military genius was coupled
with their ability to use one Christian population
against the other. The Osmanlis never fought a
battle in which the Balkan Christians did not give
valuable assistance in forging the chains of their
slavery. The Osmanlis conquered the Balkan peo-
ples by means of the Balkan peoples. They kept
possession of the country just as long as they could
pit one chief against another, and then, when national
one race against another.
feeling arose,
Gradually, in the portion of the Balkans where
one race was predominant, nationalities began to
form states, which secured independence as soon
as they demonstrated the possibility of harmony.
Greece was the first, and was followed by Servia.
Moldavia and Wallachia united into the principality
of Rumania. Last of all came Bulgaria. After
having gained autonomy, independence was only
a matter of form. But in the central portion of the
Balkan Peninsula, from the Black Sea to the Êgean,
through Thrace, Macedonia, and Albania, the sover-
eignty of Turkey, restored by the Treaty of Berlin,
was able to endure. For the people were mixed up,
race living with race, and in no place could the
Christians of any one race claim that the country
was wholly theirs.
As emancipated Greeks, Servians and Bulgarians
1 68
formed independent states, they looked towards
Macedonia as the legitimate territory for expansion.
But here their claims, both historically and racially,
overlapped. Greece regarded Macedonia as entirely
Hellenic. Had it not always been Greek before the
Osmanlis came, from the days of Philip of Macedon
to the Paleologi of the Byzantine Empire? The
Servians, on the other hand, invoked the memory
of the Servian Empire of Stephen Dushan, who in
the fourteenth century, on the eve of the Ottoman
conquest, was crowned "King of Romania" at
Serres. was from the Servians and not from the
It
Greeks, that the Osmanlis conquered Macedonia in

the three battles of the Maritza, Tchernomen, and
Kossova. The Bulgarians invoked the memory of
domination of Macedonia and Thrace.
their mediaeval
It was by the Bulgarians that northern Thrace was
defended against the Ottoman invasion a Bulgarian
;
prince was the last independent ruler of central

Macedonia; and long before the ephemeral Servian
Empire of Stephen Dushan, the Bulgarian Czars
were recognized from Tirnova to Okrida. This
latter city, in fact, was the seat of the autonomous
Bulgarian patriarchate in the Middle Ages.

These historical claims, to us of western Europe,
would have only a sentimental value. They had
been forgotten by the subject populations of Euro-
pean Turkey for many centuries. The first revival
of political ambitionswas that of Hellenism. Modern
Greece, divorcing itself from the impossible and
pagan dream of a restoration of classic Greece, with
Athens as its capital, which had been woven for it
169
by western European admirers during the first half
century of its liberation, began to take stock of its

Byzantine and Christian heritage during the latter
part of the reign of Abdul Aziz. The new Hellenism,
as the prestige of the Ottoman Empire decreased,
took the definite form of a determination to succeed
the Ottoman Empire, as it had preceded it, with
Constantinople as capital.
The Greeks believed themselves to be the unifying
Christian race of the Balkan Peninsula. They had
a tremendous advantage over the Slavs, because the
ecclesiastical organization, to which all the Christians
of the Balkan Peninsula owed allegiance, was in their
hands. When Mohammed the Conqueror entered
Constantinople, he gave to the Patriarch of the East-
ern Church the headship of the Balkan Christians.
The spirit of Moslem institutions provides for no
other form of government than a theocracy. Reli-
gion has always been to the Osmanli the test of
nationality. The Christians formed one millet, or
nation. This millet was Greek. During all the
centuries ofOttoman subjection, the Balkan Christ-
ians owed allegiance to the Greek Patriarchate.
Whatever their native tongue, the language of the
Church and of the schools was Greek.
Unfortunately for Hellenism, the new Greek
aspirations came into immediate conflict with the
renaissance of the Bulgarian nation. Russia had
long been encouraging, for the purposes of Pan-
Slavism, the awakening of a sense of nationality in
the south Slavs. Her agents had been long and
patiently working among the Bulgarians. But they
170
overshot their mark. When Bulgarian priests and
the few educated menof the peasant nation turned
their attention to their past and their language, it
was not the idea of their kinship with the great Slavic
Power of eastern Europe that was aroused, but the
consciousness of their own particular race. Bulgaria
had been great when Russia was practically un-
known. Bulgaria could be great once more, when,
by the disappearance of Ottoman rule, the Bulgarian
Empire of the Middle Ages would be born again in
the Balkans.
One can
readily appreciate that the first necessity
of Bulgarian renaissance was liberation from the Greek
Church. Russia strenuously opposed this separatist
agitation. What she wanted was a Slavic movement
within the bosom of the Greek Orthodox Church,
which, if bitterly persecuted by the Patriarchate,
would throw the south Slavs upon the Russian Synod
for protection, or, if tolerated, would give Russia a
powerful voice in the councils of the Orthodox Church

in the Ottoman Empire. But the Bulgarians had
progressed too far on the road of religious separation
from the Greeks to be arrested by their Russian
godfather. It was a prophecy of the future inde-
pendent spirit of the Bulgarian people, which Beacons-
field and Salisbury unfortunately failed to note,
that the Bulgarians determined to go the length
of uniting with Rome in order to get free from
Phanar. Another Uniate sect would have been born
had Russia not yielded. With bad grace, her Ambas-
sador obtained from Sultan Abdul Aziz the firman
of March n, 1870, creating the Bulgarian Exarchate.
171
The cleverness of the Bulgarians outwitted the
manoeuvre made to have the seat of the Exarchate
at Sofia. The Greeks realized that a formidable
competitor had entered into the struggle for Mace-
donia. From that moment there has been hatred
between Greek and Bulgarian. In spite of the treaty
of Bukarest, the end of the struggle is not yet. The
policy and ambition of the modern state are dictated
by strong economic reasons, of which sentimental
aspirations are only the outward expression. If
wars and the treaties that follow them were guided
by honest confession of the real issues at stake, how
much easier the solution of problems, and how much
greater the chances of finding durable bases for

treaties!The whole effort of Bulgaria in Macedonia
may be explained by the simple statement that the
Bulgarian race has been seeking its natural, logical,
and inevitable outlet to the JEgean Sea.
During the middle of the nineteenth century,
Servian national aspirations were directed toward
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
Servians thought only in terms of the west. It was
the foundation of the Austro-Hungarian dual mon-
archy in 1867, followed by the Austrian occupation
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the sandjak of Novi
Bazar, that led Servia to enter into the struggle for
Macedonia.
As soon as Russia saw that she could not control
Bulgaria, she began to favour a Servian propaganda
in the valley of the Vardar. Russian intrigues at
Constantinople led to the suppression of the Bul-
garian bishoprics of Okrida, Uskub, Kiiprulu (Veles)
172
and Nevrokop. Bulgaria secured the restoration of
these bishoprics through the efforts of Austria-Hun-
gary and Great Britain. The story of Macedonia
is full ofinstances like this of intrigue and counter
intrigue by European Powers at the Sublime Porte.
Combinations of interests changed sometimes over
night. Is it any wonder that the Turks grew to
despise the European alliances, and to laugh at

every "joint note" of the Powers in relation to
Macedonia?
Austria-Hungary opposed the Russian aid given
to Servia by introducing a new racial propaganda.
Ever since the Roman occupation there had been a
small, but widely diffused, element in the population
of Macedonia, which retained the Roman language,
just as the Wallachians and Moldavians north of the
Danube had done. Diplomatic suggestion at Buka-
rest succeeded in interesting Rumania in these
Kutzo- Wallachians, as they came to be called.
Rumania did not have a common boundary with
European Turkey. But her statesmen were quick
to see the advantage of having "a finger in the pie"
when the Ottoman Empire disappeared from Europe.
So Rumania became protector of the Kutzo- Walla-
chian. The Sublime Porte gladly agreed to recog-
nize this protectorate. The development of a
strong Rumanian element in Macedonia would help
greatly to preserve Turkish sovereignty. For Ruma-
nia could have no territorial aspirations there, and
would look with disfavour upon Rumania being
swallowed up by Greece, Servia, or Bulgaria. An-
other propaganda, well financed, and encouraged
173
by the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Governments
was added to the rivalry of races in Macedonia.
We cannot do more than suggest these intrigues.
After 1885, the Macedonian question became gradu-
"
ally the peculiar care of the two "most interested
Powers. There was little to attract again interna-
tional attention until the question of Turkey's
existence as a state was brought forward ina most
startling way by the repercussion throughout the
Empire of the Armenian massacres of 1893-96.
By refusing to intervene at that time, the Powers, who
fondly thought that they were acting in the interest of
the integrity of the Empire, were really contributing
to its further decline.
Elsewhere we have spoken of the Cretan insur-
rection of 1896 and the train of events that followed
it, ending in the formation of the Balkan alliance to
drive Turkey out of Europe. Here we take up the

other thread which leads us to the Balkan Wars.
Bulgaria, remembering the happy result of her own
sufferings from the massacres of twenty years before,
was keen enough to see in the Asiatic holocausts of
the "Red Sultan" a sign of weakness instead of a
show of strength. The statesmen of the European
Powers had not acted to stop the massacres of the
Armenians. But their indecision and impolitic ir-
resolution was not an expression of the sentiments
of the civilized races whom
they represented. The
time was ripe for an insurrection in Macedonia.
Public opinion in Europe would sustain it. The
movement was launched from Sofia.
From that moment, Turkish sovereignty was
174
doomed. Turkey did not realize this, however.
Instead of adopting the policy of treating with
Bulgaria, and giving her an economic outlet to the
Êgean Sea, the Sublime Porte was delighted with
the anticipation of a new era of racial rivalry in
Macedonia. For it knew that Bulgaria's efforts
to secure Macedonian autonomy would be opposed
by Servia and Greece. In fact, the Greeks were so
alarmed by the Bulgarian activity that immediately
after their unhappy war with Turkey they gave
active support to the Turks in putting down the
Bulgarian rebels. The services of the Greek Patri-
archate were particularly valuable to Turkey at this
time.
Nor did Austria-Hungary and Russia appreciate
the significance of the Bulgarian movement. In
1897, they signed an accord, solemnly agreeing that
the status quo be preserved in the Balkan peninsula.
Russia was anxious for this convention with Austria.
For the moment her energies were devoted to
all
developing the policy in the Far East that was to

end so abruptly eight years later on the battlefield
of Mukden. Austria-Hungary was delighted to
have the solution of the Macedonian problem de-
layed. She felt that every year of anarchy in European
Turkey would bring her nearer to Salonika. The
Drang nach Oesten was to be made possible through
the strife of Servian, Bulgarian, and Greek.
The moment was favourable for the Bulgarian
propaganda. Russia was too much involved in
Manchuria to help the Servians. The Greeks had
lost prestige with the Macedonians by their easy
175
and humiliating defeat hands of Turkey.
at the
Gathering force with successive years, and supported
by the admirably laid foundation of the Bulgarian
ecclesiastic and scholastic organizations throughout
Macedonia, the Bulgarian bands gradually brought
the vilayets of Monastir, Uskub, and Salonika into
a state of civil war. In 1901 and 1902, conditions
in Macedonia were beyond description. But the
Powers waited for some new initiative on the part
of Austria-Hungary and Russia.
Emperor Franz Josef and Czar Nicholas met at

Murszteg in the autumn of 1903. Russia, more and
more involved in Manchuria, and on the eve of her
conflict with Japan, found no difficulty in falling in
with the suggestion of the Austrian Foreign Secre-
tary that the two Powers present to the signers of
the Treaty of Berlin a program of "reforms" for
Macedonia. Europe received with delight this new
manifestation of harmony between Austria-Hungary
and Russia.
In 1904 the "Program of Murszteg" was imposed
upon Turkey by a comic-opera show of force on the
part of the Powers. An international gendarmerie
was their solution of the Macedonian problem.
Different spheres were mapped out, and allotted to
officers of the different Powers. Germany refused
to participate in this farce, just as she had refused
to participate in "protecting" Crete.
The international "pacification" failed in Mace-
donia for the same reasons that it had failed in
Crete, and was to fail a third time ten years later in
Albania. // was a compromise between the Powers,
176
dictated by considerations which had nothing whatever
to do with the problem of which itwas supposed to be
the solution. This is the story of European diplomacy
in the Near East.
From the very moment that Turkey found herself
compelled to accept the policing of Macedonia by
European officers, she set to work to make their task
impossible. Hussein Hilmi pasha was sent to

Salonika as Governor. An accord was quickly
established between him and the Austro-Hungarian
agents in Macedonia. Where the Bulgarians were
weak, the Turks and the Austrian emissaries en-
couraged the Bulgarian propaganda. Where the
Greeks were weak, Hellenic bands were allowed
immunity. Where the Servians were weak, the
Servian propaganda made great strides with the con-
nivance of the Government. The European gen-
darmerie was powerless to struggle against Turkish,
Austro-Hungarian, and Balkan intrigues. The cor-
respondence of the European officers and consuls,
and of journalists who visited Macedonia during
this period, makes interesting reading. Their point
of view is almost invariably that of their surround-
ings. It depended upon just what part of Mace-
donia one happened to be in, or the company in which
one travelled, whether a certain nationality were
"noble heroes suffering for an ideal" or "blood-
thirsty ruffians." are so many writers who
Why
pretend to be impartial observers like chameleons?
Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria were alike guilty of

subsidizing bands of armed men, who imagined that
they were fulfilling a patriotic duty in brutally
177
forcing their particular nationality upon ignorant
peasants, most of whom did not know or care to
what nation they belonged. There was little to
choose between the methods and the actions of the
different bands. Everywhere pillage, incendiarism,
and assassination were the order of the day. When
Christian propagandists let them alone, the poor
villagers had to endure the same treatment from
Moslem Albanians and from the Turkish soldiery.
In order to give the "reforms" of the Program of
Murszteg a chance, Athens, Sofia, and Belgrade
ostensibly withdrew their active support of the
bands. But the efforts of the Powers had still not
only the secret bad faith of Austria-Hungary and
Turkey to contend with, but also the determination
of the Macedonians themselves not to be "reformed"
d I'europeenne, that is to say, d la turque. The
powerful Bulgarian "interior organization" in
Macedonia kept up the struggle in the hope that the
continuation of anarchy would bring the Powers to
was no other
see that there solution possible of the
Macedonian question than the autonomy of Mace-
donia under a Christian governor. Greeks and
Servians opposed the project of autonomy, however,
because they knew that it would result eventually
in the reversion of Macedonia to Bulgaria. The
history of Eastern Rumelia would be repeated. In
considering the Macedonian problem, it must never
be forgotten that the great bulk of the population of
Macedonia is Bulgarian, in spite of all the learned
dissertations and imposing statistics of Greek and
Servian writers. But the difficulty is that this
178
Bulgarian population is agricultural. In the cities

near the sea and all along the seacoast from Salonika
to Dedeagatch the Greek element is predominant.
No Macedonia can be made,
geographical division of
viable from the economic point of view, which
satisfies racial claims by following the principle of
preponderant nationality.
After her disasters in the Far East, Russia began
to turn her attention once more to the Near East.
A reopening of the Macedonian question between
Austria-Hungary and Russia was imminent when
the Young Turk revolution of July, 1908, upset all
calculations, and brought a new factor into the prob-
lem of the future of European Turkey. Austria-
Hungary boldly challenged more than that, defied
Russia by annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this
action she was backed by Germany. Russia and
France were not ready for war. Great Britain and
Italy, each involved in an internal social revolution
of tremendous importance, could not afford to risk
the programs of their respective cabinets by em-
barking upon uncertain foreign adventures.
The Balkan States were left to solve the Mace-
donian problem by themselves. Their solution was
the Treaty of Bukarest. The success of Servia in
planting herself in the valley of the Vardar, and in
occupying Monastir, is the result of the struggle of
races in Macedonia. It is the direct, immediate
cause of the European War of 1914.
179
CHAPTER XI
THE YOUNG TURK REGIME IN THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE
event during the first decade of the twentieth
NO century was heralded throughout Europe with

so great and so sincere interest and sympathy
as the bloodless revolution of July 24, 1908, by which
the regime of Abdul Hamid was overthrown and the
constitution of 1876 resuscitated.
Although the world was unprepared for this event,
it was not due to any sudden cause. For twenty
years the leaven of liberalism had been working in
the minds of the educated classes in the Ottoman
Empire. Moslems, as well as Christians, had been
in attendance in large numbers at the American,
French, Italian, and German schools in Turkey, and
had gone abroad to complete their education. Just
as in Italy and in Germany, Young Turkey had come
into existence through contact with those free institu-
tions in the outside world which other races enjoyed,
had been emancipated from superstition and from the
stultifying influences of religious formalism, and had
grown, in the army, to numbers sufficient to dictate
the policy of the Government.
From the beginning of his reign, Abdul Hamid had
1 80
THE YOUNG TURK REGIME
done all in his power to prevent the growth of the
liberal spirit. The result of thirty years, in so far
officials of the Government were concerned,
as civil
had been the stamping out of every man who com-
bined ability with patriotism and devotion to an
ideal. The best elements had taken the road to
death, to imprisonment, or to exile, so that from the
palace down to the humblest village, the Turkish
civil service was composed of a set of men absolutely
lacking in independence and in honour, and devoted

to the master who ruled from Yildiz. But in the
army, this same policy, though attempted, had not
wholly succeeded. A portion at least of the officers
received an education; many of them, indeed, had
been sent abroad to Germany and to France in order
to keep abreast with the development of military
science, so essential to the very existence of Turkey.
In the army, then, hundreds of officers of high
character and high ideals were able to avoid the fate
which had come to other educated Moslems in
Turkey. They learned to love their country, and
with that love came a sense of shame for the results
of the despotism under which they existed. To have
lived in Paris or in Berlin was enough to make them
dissatisfied; to have visited Cairo or Alexandria,
Sofia or Bukarest or Athens, and to have contrasted
the conditions of life in these cities, recently their
own, with Constantinople, Salonika, and Smyrna, was
sufficient.
It is impossible in the limits of this book to tell
how this bloodless revolution was planned by exiles
abroad and officers at home. It was successful, as
181
well as bloodless, because the army refused to obey
the orders of the Sultan. To save his life and his
throne, Abdul Hamid was compelled to resuscitate
the constitution which he had granted, and then
suppressed, at the beginning of his reign.
We who lived through those dream days of the
beginning of the new regime will never forget the
sense of joy of an emancipated people. The spy
system was abolished, newspapers were allowed to
tell the truth and express their own
opinions, pass-
ports and teskeres
(permissions to travel from one
point to another within the Empire) were declared
unnecessary, bakshish was refused at the custom
house and police station. Moslem ulema and Chris-
tian clergy embraced each other in public, rode
through the streets in triumph in the same carriages,
and harangued the multitudes from the same plat-
form in mosque and church. A new era of Liberty,
Fraternity, and Equality, they said, had dawned for
all the races in Turkey. The Sultan was the father,
Turkey the fatherland, barriers and disabilities of
creed and race had ceased to exist. It seemed in-
credible, but these scenes were really happening

from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf.
Optimism, hope for the future, was so strong that
one had not the heart to express very loudly his
belief that no real revolution was ever bloodless, that
no real change in political and social life of the people
could come in a single day or as a result of an official
document. No one could think of anything else but
the constitution, which had broken the chains for
Moslem and Christian alike, the constitution which
182
was going to restore Turkey to its lawful place
among the nations of Europe, the constitution which
was to heal the sick man and solve the question of the
Orient. In Smyrna, in Constantinople, in Beirut,
and in Asia Minor, I heard the same story over and
over again. But there was always the misgiving, the
apprehension for the future, from which the foreigner
in Turkey is never free. It seemed too good to be
true ;
it was too good to be true. It was against the
logic of history. The most wonderful constitution
that the world has ever known
that of England.
is
It does not exist on paper; there is no need for a

document. It is good, and it has endured, because
it has been written in blood, in suffering, and in the
agony of generations, on the pages of eight centuries

of history. Could Turkey hope to be free in a day?
The first test of the constitution came, of course,
with the election and composition of the Parliament.
The election was held quietly, in some parts of the
Empire secretly even, and when the Parliament as-
sembled at Constantinople, one began to see already
the handwriting on the wall. For its composition
was in no way in accordance with the distribu-
tion of population in the Empire. The Turk and
by the Turk I mean the composite Moslem race
which has grown up through centuries of inter-
marriage and forcible conversion had always been
the ruling race. With the establishment of a con-
stitutional regime, the Young Turks did not mean to
abdicate in favour of Moslem Arabs or Christian
Greeks and Armenians. They had "arranged" the
elections in such a way that they would have in the
183
Parliament a substantial majority over any possible
combination of other racial elements.
One cannot but have sympathy with the natural
feeling of racial pride which is inborn in the Turks.
A race of masters, who could expect that they
would be willing to surrender the privileges of cen-
turies? But they forgot that a constitutional regime
and the principles of Liberty, Equality, and Frater-
nity must necessarily imply the yielding of their
unique position in the Empire. The Turk, as a race,
iscomposed two elements, a ruling class of land-
of
owners and military and civil officials, arrogant
though courteous, corrupt though honest in private
parasitical though self-respecting, and a peasant
life,
,
class, hopelessly ignorant, lacking in energy, initia-

tive,ambition, aspirations, and ideals. The great
bulk of the Turkish element in the Empire looked
with the indifference of ignorance and the hostility
of jealous regard for their unique position in the
community upon the granting of a constitution. I
doubt if Turkish population of
five per cent, of the
the Empire has ever known what a constitutional
regime means, or cared whether it exists or not.
There remains the five per cent. Of these the
great bulk belong either to the corrupt official class,
whose subjection to the tyranny of Yildiz Kiosk had
totally unfitted them for service under the new
regime on which they were entering, and the land-
owners, whose wealth was dependent upon the
unequal privileges that the law allowed to them as
Moslems, and whose interests were totally at vari-
ance with the spirit of the constitution. There are
184
left small groups of younger army officers and of
professional men, who had been educated in foreign
schools or by foreign teachers in Turkey and abroad.
They were, for the most part, either without the
knowledge of any other metier than the army, or,
if civilian, by training and experience for
unfitted
governmental executive and administrative work.
Consequently from the very beginning, the genuine
Young Turks who were honest in their idealism had
to make a compact with the higher army officers and
with corrupt civil officials of Abdul Hamid. When
the real Young Turks controlled the Cabinet, their
disasters were those of theorists and visionaries.
When they yielded the control of affairs to men more
experienced than they, it was simply the renewal of
the tyranny of Abdul Hamid. It was because these
two elements were united in the firm resolution to
keep the control in the hands of Moslem Turks, that
the constitutional regime in Turkey has gone from
Scylla to Charybdis without ever entering port.
From the very beginning, thoughtful men pointed
out that there was only one way of salvation and of
liberal evolution for the Ottoman Empire. That was
an honest and sincere co-operation with the Christian
elements of the Empire, and with the Arabic and
Albanian Moslem elements. Fanaticism and racial
pride prevented the Young Turks from adopting the
sole possible way of establishing the constitutional
regime. From the very beginning, then, they failed,
and it is their failure which has plunged Europe into
the series of wars that has ended in the devastation of
unhappy Belgium, so far remote from the cause and
185
so innocent of any part in the events which brought
upon her such terrible misfortunes. One could write
a whole book upon the events of the first five years of
constitutional government in Turkey and could show,
beyond a shadow of a doubt, how from the very
beginning there was no honest and loyal effort made
to apply even the most rudimentary principles of
constitutional government. Despotism means the
subjection of a country to the will of its rulers.
Constitutionalism means the subjection of the rulers
to the will of the country. The Young Turks, em-
bodied in the "Committee of Union and Progress,"
merely continued the despotism of Abdul Hamid.
They were far worse than Abdul Hamid, however,
for they were irresponsible and unskilled. One
handling the helm, knowing how to steer, might have
kept the ship of state afloat, all the more easily,
perhaps, because the waters were so troubled. Many
hands, none knowing where or how to go, steered the
Ottoman Empire to inevitable shipwreck.
Although the vicissitudes of various Cabinets and
Parliaments can have place in our work only so far
as they have a direct bearing on foreign relations,
there are six matters of internal policy which must be
mentioned in order to explain how rapidly and surely
the Ottoman Empire went to its destruction; the
treatment of Armenians before and after the Adana
massacres; the attempt to suppress the liberties of
the Orthodox Church; the Cretan question, ending
in the Greek boycott; the Macedonian policy; the
Albanian uprisings; and the lack of co-operation and
sympathy with the Arabs.
1 86
THE ARMENIANS AND THE ADANA MASSACRES
Among the various races of the Ottoman Empire,

none was more overcome with joy at the proclama-
tion of the constitutional regime than the Armenian.
Scattered everywhere throughout the Empire, and
in no region an element of preponderance, the Ar-
menians had always made themselves felt in the
commercial and intellectual life of Turkey far out of
proportion to their numerical strength. They ap-
preciated and understood, best of all the Christian
populations, the significance of constitutional govern-
ment. Honestly applied, it meant more to them
than to any other element of the Empire.
In the first place, the burden of Turkish and Mos-
lem oppression had fallen most heavily on them.
It was not only the massacres of 1894 to 1896,
horrible as they were, which had put the Armenians
in continual fear for their lives ;
it was the centuries-
old petty persecution, from which they believed they
were now to be freed. Turkish officialdom had
grown rich in extorting the last farthing from the
Armenians. Only those who had seen this persecu-
tion and extortion can realize how large a part it
played in the daily life of the Armenians, and how
continuous and rich a source of revenue it was to the
official Turk. For every little service the official ex-
pected his fat always charging up to the limit
fee,
his victim to pay. You could not carry on
was able
your business, you could not build a house, you could
not enlarge or alter or repair your shop, you could
not get a tax on your harvest estimated, you could
187
not travel even from one village to another for the
purpose of business or pleasure or study, without
paying the officials. Very frequently between the
local Turkish official and the Armenian stood a
middle man who must also be paid for the purpose of
carrying the fee or bribe to the official in charge.
How people could have lived under such a regime
and have prospered, is beyond the comprehension of
the Occidental. Nothing speaks so eloquently for the
business acumen of the Armenian race, as well as for
devotion to the religion of its fathers.
Naturally, the Armenians expected that the
constitution would bring to them a complete relief
from economic repression, as well as from the terrors
of massacre.They were led to believe this by the
Young Turks who had so long plotted the overthrow
of Abdul Hamid's despotism. During the campaign
from 1890-1908, the Young Turks needed the money
and the brains of Armenians in the larger centres of
population where they had their foyers, and in the
cities abroad where they lived in exile. It cannot be
doubted that there were among the Young Turks
during the period when they had to keep alive their
ideals in the fire of hope, an honest intention to give
the Armenians a share in the regeneration of the
Ottoman Empire. But, as soon as they realized their
ambitions, racial and religious fanaticism came to
them with such force that they forgot the brilliant
promises as well as the affectionate intercourse of the
days of suffering and struggle.
In the second place, Armenians, unlike the Greeks,
the Macedonians, and the Arabs, had, as a race, no
188
separatist tendencies. They were not looking to-
wards another state to come and redeem them.
They feared Russia. They were too scattered to
hope to form, by the break-up of the Ottoman Empire,
a state of their own. They loved the land in which
they lived with allthe passion of their nature. In
many regions, Turkish was their native tongue.
They were industrious tillers of the soil, as well as
merchants. The Sultan could have had no more
loyal subjects than these, had he so desired.
Although the composition of the new Parliament

chosen in October, 1908, and of the first constitu-
tional Cabinet, was a prophecy of how they were to
be left out in the cold, the Armenians were through-
out that winter, when the constitution was new, firm
and loyal, as well as intelligent, supporters of re-
generated Turkey. The wish was father to the
thought. For them there was no longer the barrier
of race and creed. All were Osmanlis, and willing to
lose their identity in the politically amalgamated
race. The reign of Abdul Hamid was a nightmare,
quickly forgotten. The future was full of hope. If

only the Young Turks had what a tremen-
realized
dous influence the Armenians could have played in
the creation of New Turkey, if only they had been will-
ing to use these allies, we might have been able to write
a different history of the past few years in Europe.
But the awakening was to be cruel. It came in a
region of the Empire that never before experienced
the horrors of a general massacre, where Christians
felt not only at ease, but on friendly terms with their
Moslem neighbours.
189
On April 14, 1909, on a morning when the sun had
risenupon the peaceful and happy city of Adana, out
of a clear sky came the tragedy which was the be-
ginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire. Without

provocation, the Moslem population began to attack
and kill the Christians. The Governor of the pro-
vince and his military officials not only did nothing
whatever to stop the bloodshed, but they actu-
ally handed out arms and munitions to the blood-
frenziedmob of peasants, who were pouring into the
city. For three days, killing, looting, and burning of
houses were aided by the authorities. The massacres
spread west through the great Cilician plain to
Tarsus, and east over the Amanus Range into north-
ern Syria, as far as Antioch, where the followers
of Jesus were first called Christians. The world,
horrified by the stories which soon made their way
to the newspapers, realized that the "bloodless re-
volution" had not regenerated Turkey. The blood
had come at last, and without the regeneration!
The Great Powers sent their warships to Mersina,
the port Tarsus and Adana. Even from the
of
distant United States came two cruisers, under
pressure, over six thousand miles.
In the meantime, events of great importance, but
not of equal significance in the future of Turkey,
were taking place at Constantinople. On the eve of
the first Adana
massacre, Abdul Hamid, having
corrupted the soldiers of the Constantinople garrison,
set in motion a demonstration against the constitu-
tion. The soldiers shot down their officers in cold
blood, marched to Yildiz Kiosk, and demanded of the
190
Sultan the abolition of the constitution, which they
declared was at variance with the Sheriat, the sacred
law of Islam. Abdul Hamid gladly consented. Popu-
larsympathy in Constantinople and throughout the
Empire was with the Sultan, as far as the object of
the revolution went. But the way in which it was
brought about made it impossible for the Sultan to
remain within the pale of civilization. Of all nations,
none relied on its army more than Turkey. Were
the assassination of the officers to go unpunished, the
disintegration of the Empire necessarily followed. So
the military hierarchy, "Old" Turks as well as
"Young," rose against the Sultan. The army
corps in Salonika under the command of Mah-
mud Shevket pasha, marched against the capital
and with very little resistance mastered the mu-
tiny of the Constantinople garrison. Abdul Hamid
was deposed, and sent into exile at the Villa Ala-
tini at Salonika. His brother, Reshid Mohammed,
came to the throne, under the title of Moham-
med V.
As soon as the Young Turks found themselves
again in control of the situation, even before the
proclamation of the new Sultan, they sent from
Beirut to Adana a division of infantry to "re-estab-
lish order." These regiments disembarked at Mer-
sina on the day Mohammed V ascended the throne,
April 25th. Immediately upon their arrival in Adana
they began a second massacre which was more
horrible than the first. Thousands were shot and
burned, and more than half the city was in ruins.
This second massacre occurred in spite of the fact
191
that a dozen foreign warships were by this time
anchored in the harbour of Mersina.
It is impossible to estimate the losses of life and
property in the vilayets of Cilicia and northern Syria
during the last two weeks of April, 1908. Not less
than thirty thousand Armenians were massacred.
The losses of property in Adana alone were serious
enough to cause the foremost fire insurance company
in France to fight in the courts for two years the
payments of its claims. But it is not in the realm of

our work to follow out the local aftermath of this
terrible story. We are interested here only in its
bearing on the fortunes of the Empire and of Europe.
From the very beginning, the Young Turks, now
re-established in Constantinople with a Sultan of
their own creation, and having nothing more to fear
from the genius and bad will of Abdul Hamid, pro-
tested before Europe that the massacres were due
to the old regime and that they had been arranged
by Abdul Hamid, whose deposition cleared them of
responsibility. But the revelations of the New York
Herald, the Tribuna of Rome, and the Berliner Tage-
blatt, translated and reprinted in the British, French,
and Russian press, were so moving that it was
necessary for the Young Turks to send special com-
missions to the capitals of Europe to counteract
the impression of these articles.
Europe was willing to accept the explanation of
the Constantinople Cabinet, and to continue its
faith, though shaken, in the intentions of the Young
Turks to grant to the Christians of Turkey the
regime of equality and security of life and property
192
which the constitution guaranteed. Even the Ar-
menians, terrible as this blow had been, were also
willing to forgive and forget. But the condition of
forgiveness, and the proof of sincerity of the declara-
tions of the Young Turks, both to the outside world
and to the Armenians, would be the punishment of
those who had been guilty of this most horrible blot
upon the civilization of the twentieth century. This
was to be the test.
The Court-Martial, sent to Adana from Constan-
tinople after the new Sultan was established upon
the throne and the Young Turks were certain of their
position, had every guarantee to enable it to do its
work thoroughly and justly. It was not influenced
or threatened. There was, however, no honest in-
tention to give decisions impartially and in accord-
ance with the facts that the investigation would
bring forth. The methods and findings of the Court-
Martial were a travesty of justice. Its members
refused absolutely to go to the bottom of the massa-
cre, and to punish those who had been guilty. I
happen to be the only foreign witness whose deposi-

tion they took. They refused to allow me to testify
against the Vali and his fellow-conspirators. The
line of conduct had been decided before their arrival.
The idea was to condemn to death a few Moslems
of the dregs of the population, who would probably
have found their way to the gallows sooner or later
any way. With them were to be hanged a number
of Armenians, whose only crime was that they had
defended the lives and honour of their women and
children. The Vali of Adana, who had planned the
13 193
massacre and had carried it and two or three
out,
Moslem leaders of the city who had co-operated with
him and with the military authorities in the effort
to exterminate the Armenians, were not even sent to
prison. No testimony against them was allowed to
be brought before the Court-Martial. They went
into exile "until the affair blew over."
When a future generation has the prospective to
inake researches into the downfall of the Young Turk
constitutional regime in Turkey, they will probably
find the beginning of the end in the failure to punish
the perpetrators of the Adana massacres. For this
was a formal notification to the Christians of Turkey
that the constitutional regime brought to them no
guarantees of security, or justice, but, on the other
hand, made their position in the Empire even more
precarious than it had been under the despotism of
Abdul Hamid. After Adana, the Armenian popula-
tion became definitely alienated from the constitu-
tional movement, and was convinced that its only
hope lay in the absolute disappearance of Turkish
rule.
THE ATTEMPT TO SUPPRESS THE LIBERTIES OF

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH
When Mohammed the Conqueror entered Con-
stantinople in 1453, he showed a wise determination
to continue the policy of his predecessors by pre-
serving the independence of the Orthodox Church.
For he knew well that the success of the Osmanlis had
been due to religious toleration, and that no durable
empire could be built in Asia Minor and the Balkan
194
Peninsula by a Moslem government, unless the
liberties of the Christian inhabitants were assured
through the recognition of the Greek patriarchate.
The first thing that Mohammed did was to seek out
the Greek patriarch, and confirm him in his position
as the political, as well as the religious, head of
Christian Ottoman subjects.
Islam is a theocracy. The spirit of its
government
isinspired by the sacred law, the Sheriat, based upon
the Koran and the writings of the earliest fathers of
Islam. Down to the smallest details, the organiza-
tion of the state, of the courts of justice, and of the
social life of Mohammedan peoples, is influenced by
ecclesiastical law,and by the power of the Church.
As this law does not provide for the inclusion of non-
Moslem elements either in the political or social life
of the nation, has always been evident that people
it
of another religion, within the limits of a Moslem

state, can exist only they have an ecclesiastical
if
organization of their own, with well-defined liberties,

privileges,and safeguards.
This principle was recognized by the Osmanlis for
over five hundred years; even the most despotic of
sultans never dreamed of abandoning it. There
might be persecutions, there might be massacres,
there might be even assassination of patriarchs, but,
until the Young Turk regime, no Ottoman ministry
ever dreamed of destroying the organism which had
made possible the life of Moslem and Christian under
the same rule.
The thesis of the Young Turks was, from a theo-
retical standpoint, perfectly sound and just.. They
195
said that ecclesiastical autonomy was necessary under
a despotism, but that it had ceased to have a raison
d'etre under a constitutional government. The con-
stitution guaranteed equal rights, irrespective of
religion, to all the races of the Empire. Therefore

the Greek Church must resign its prerogatives of a
political nature, for they were wholly incompatible
with the idea of constitutional government.
Many foreigners, carried away by the reasonable-
ness of argument, severely condemned the
this
Orthodox Church for continuing to resist the en-
croachments of the new Government upon its secular
privileges secular in both senses of the word. They
attributed the attitude of the Greek ecclesiastics
to hostility to the constitution, to the reactionary
tendency of e.very ecclesiastic organization, and to
selfish desire to hold firmly the privileges which
enabled them to keep in their clutches the Greek
population of Turkey, and continue to enjoy the
prestige and wealth accruing to them from these
privileges. Such criticism only revealed ignorance
of history and a lack of appreciation of the real
issue at stake.
No ecclesiastical organization can,under a con-
stitutional government, continue indefinitely to be a
state within a state, and to enjoy peculiar privileges
and immunities. But the application of the consti-
tution must come first. It must enter into the life
of the people. It must become the vital expression
of their national existence, evolved through genera-
tions of testing and experimenting. The constitu-
tion is finally accepted and supported by a nation
196
when, and because, it has been found good and has
come to reflect the needs and wishes of the people.
Then, without any great trouble, the ecclesiastical
organization will find itself gradually deprived of
every special privilege. For the privileges will have

become an anachronism.
But, just as in the establishment of the constitu-
tion, in their attitude toward the Greek Church the
Young Turks acted as if the work of generations in
other countries could be for them, in spite of their
peculiarly delicate problems and the differences in
creed involved, the act of a single moment. This
mentality of the half-educated, immature visionary
has been shown in every one of the numerous sense-
less and disastrous decisions which have brought the
Ottoman Empire so speedily to its ruin. /
The Greek Church resisted bitterly every move of

the Young Turks to bring about the immediate
millennium. The patriarch was a man of wide ex-
perience, of sound common sense, and of undaunted
courage. Backed by the Lay Assembly, which has
always been an admirable democratic institution of
the Orthodox Church, he refused to give up realities
for chimeras. With all its privileges and all its
power, had
it been hard enough for the Orthodox
Church to protect the Greek subjects of Turkey.
The patriarch did not intend to surrender the safe-
guards by which he was enabled to make tolerable
the life of his flock for illusory and untested guar-
antees. Let the constitution become really the
expression of the will of the people of Turkey, let it
demonstrate the uselessness of any safeguards for
197
protecting the Christians from Moslem oppression,
let the era of liberty and equality and fraternity
actually be realized in the Ottoman Empire, and

then the Church would resign its privileges. For
they would be antiquated, and fall naturally into
desuetude. But in constitutions, as in other things,
the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
What the Young Turks attempted
to do was to
destroy the privileges of the Orthodox Church, on the
ground that these privileges were a barrier to the
assimilation of the races in the Empire. Americans,
above all nations,have deep sympathies for, and well
justified reasons for having faith in, the policy of
assimilation. Have not the various races of Europe,
different in religion and in political and social cus-
toms, passed wonderfully through the crucible of
assimilation on American soil? But by assimilation
the Young Turks meant, not the amalgamation of
races, each co-operating and sharing in the building
up of the fatherland, as in America, but the complete
subjection and ultimate disappearance of all other
elements in the Empire than their own. They in-
tended, from the very first days of the constitutional

regime, to make Turkey a nation of Turks. Theirs
was the strong, virile race, into which the other races
would be fused. Turkey was weak, they declared,
because it was the home of a conglomeration of
peoples. If Turkey was to become like the nations
of Europe, these different nationalities must be de-
stroyed. To destroy them, the Government had first

to aim at the foyer of national life, the ecclesiastical
hierarchies.
198
I have talked with many a zealous Young Turk.
What I have written here is not only the logical
interpretation of the facts; it is also the faithful

expression of the ideas of the most earnest and in-
telligent Turkish partisans of the new regime. They
pointed out, with perfect logic, that this process had
gone on in every European country, and that it was
the only way which a strong nation could be built.
in
So far they were right. But, aside from the fact
that in Europe this political and social evolution had
taken centuries, there was also the working of the
law of the survival of the fittest. In European na-
tions it had been the element, always composite,
which deserved to live, that formed the nucleus of a
nationality. The whole root of the question in
Turkey was, were the Young Turks justified in
believing that the Turk was this element?
There is not space to discuss the reasons for the
supremacy of the Osmanli in the Ottoman Empire.
Up to the eighteenth century, the Osmanli was un-
doubtedly the "fittest" element. For the past two
hundred years, the continued domination of Turk
and the continued subjection of Christian popula-
tions, in Turkey, has been due to causes outside of
the Empire. The Turk has remained the ruling race.
But is he still the fittest? One may examine the
different elements of the Ottoman Empire, and
measure them by the tests of civilization. From the
intellectual standpoint, from the business standpoint,
from the administrative standpoint, the Turk is
hardly able to sustain his claim to continue to be, in
a twentieth-century empire, the element which can
199
hope to assimilate Greek, Armenian, Albanian, Slav,
and Arab. He is less fit than any of the others,
especially than the Greek and Armenian in intellec-
tual and business faculties, and than the Albanian in
administrative faculties. There remains, then, as his
sole claim to dominate the other races, his physical
superiority. By history and by legend, he is the

fighting man and rules by right of conquest and
force.
It was always the sane and only safe policy of
the Turks to keep Christians out of the army. They
saw to it that the metier of arms remained wholly to
the Moslems. In spite of the increasing wealth and
education of the Christian elements of the Empire,
the ascendancy was preserved to the Turk through
the army. But at what a sacrifice! By reason of
military service, the Turkish peasant has been kept
in economic and intellectual serfdom, while his
Christian neighbour progressed. The Turkish popu-
lation has actually decreased, and the ravages of
garrison life, due to dyspepsia and syphilis, have

diminished fearfully the physical vigour of the race.
By the same token, the upper classes, knowing only
the life of army officers, have been removed from the
necessity of competing in the world for position and
success. Can manhood be formed in any other mould
than that of competition, where the goal is achieve-
ment, and is reached only by continued effort of will
and brain? The upper class Turk is a parasite, and,
like all parasites, helpless when that upon which he
feeds is taken from him.
The attack of the Young Turk party upon the
200
Longitude D West Longitude F 1
East- 2U I
30 H 10 J
EUROPE
In 1911
G Greenwich Jo
Greek Church failed. The patriarch refused to sur-
render his privileges. The Greek clergy and the
Lay Council held out under persecution and threats.
In October, 1910, when the Lay Council met in
Constantinople, its members were arrested, and
thrown into jail. In Macedonia and Thrace, in the
Êgean Islands, along the coast of Asia Minor, the
bishops and clergy suffered untold persecutions.
Some were even assassinated. I shall never forget a
memorable interview I had with Joachim III, during
that crisis. His Holiness untied with trembling
fingers the dossier of persecutions, which contained
letters and sworn statements from a dozen dioceses.
"They treat us like dogs!" he cried. "Never under

Abdul Hamid or any Sultan have my people suffered
as they are suffering now. But we are too strong for
them. We refuse to be exterminated. I see all
Europe stained with blood because of these crimes."
How prophetic these words as I record them now!
The Turk could not hope to assimilate the Greek
by peaceful methods, because he was his intellectual
inferior. When he planned to use force, the Balkan
Alliance was formed. The battle of Lule Burgas
took away from the Turk his last claim to fitness as
dominant race. He could no longer fight better than
Christians. The first Balkan War gave the coup de
grace to the final and has it not been all along the
only? argument for Turkish racial supremacy.
THE CRETAN QUESTION AND THE GREEK BOYCOTT

The island of Crete had long been to Turkey, in
relation to Greece, what Cuba had been to Spain, in
201
relation to the United States. In both cases, and
about the same time, wars of liberation broke out.
But Greece was not as fortunate in her efforts for the
emancipation of an enslaved and continually rebel-
lious population as was the United States. Powerless
and humiliated, after the war of 1897, Greece could
no longer hope to have a voice, by reason of her own
force, in the direction of Cretan affairs. Crete be-
came the foundling of European diplomacy.
Together with the declaration of Bulgarian in-
dependence, and the annexation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina by Austria-Hungary, the Young Turks had to
face a decree of the Cretan assembly to the effect
that Crete was indissolubly united to the kingdom of
Greece. The Young Turks could do nothing against
Bulgaria. For the ceremony of Tirnovo had been
no more than the de jure sanction of a de facto con-
dition. The only cause for conflict, the question
of the railroads in eastern Rumelia, was solved
by Russian diplomacy. Against Austria-Hungary a
boycott was declared. a few success-
It resulted in
ful attempts to prevent the landing of mails and
freights from Austrian steamers, and in the tear-

ing up of several million fezes which were of Aus-
trian manufacture. These, by the way, were soon
replaced by new fezes from the same factories. The
Sublime Porte settled the Bosnia-Herzegovina ques-
tion by accepting a money payment from Austria-
Hungary.
All the rancour resulting from these losses and
humiliation, all the vials of wrath, were poured upon
the head of Greece. The Cretan question became
202
the foremost problem in European diplomacy. The
Cretans stubbornly refused to listen to the Powers,
and decided to maintain their decision to belong to
Greece. But Greece was threatened with war by
Turkey, if she did not refuse to accept the annexation
decree voted by the Cretans themselves. In order to
prevent Turkey from attacking Greece, the Powers
decided to use force against the Cretans. Turkey,
not satisfied with the efforts of the Powers to preserve
the Ottoman sovereignty and Ottoman pride in
Crete, demanded still more of Greece. She asked that
the Greek Parliament should not only declare its
disinterestedness in Crete, but should take upon it-
self the obligation to maintain that disinterestedness
in the future.
To go into all the tortuous phases of the Cretan
question up to the time of the Balkan War would
make this chapter out of proportion; and yet Crete,
like Alsace-Lorraine, has had a most vital in-
fluence upon the present European war. The
one point be emphasized here is, that to
to
bring pressure to bear upon Greece in defining her
attitude toward Crete, the Young Turks decided
to revive the commercial boycott which they had
used against Austria. I have seen from close range
the notorious Greek boycott of 1910 to 1912. It was
far more disastrous to the Turks than to the Greeks
of Turkey. It threatened so completely, however, the
economic prosperity of Greece, which is a commercial
rather than an agricultural country, that it forced
Greece into the Balkan Alliance much against her
will, for the sake of self-preservation.
203
If this boycott had been carried on against the
Greeks of Greece alone, it would not have affected
vitally the prosperity of the Greeks in the Ottoman
Empire. Their imports come from every country,
and for their exports the freight steamers of all the
European nations competed. But it was directed
also against the Greeks who were Ottoman subjects.
In Salonika, Constantinople, Trebizond, Smyrna,
and other ports, commerce was entirely in the hands
of Greeks. They owned almost every steamer
bearing the Ottoman flag. They owned the cargoes.
They bought and sold the merchandise. The Young
Turks, working through the hamals or longshoremen
and the boatmen who manned the lighters, all
Turks and Kurds, succeeded in tying up absolutely
the commerce of Ottoman Greeks. The Greek
merchants and shippers were ruined. It was urged
cleverly that this was the chance for Moslems to get
the trade of the great ports of Turkey into their own
hands. The Government encouraged them by buy-
ing and maintaining steamship lines. But the Turks
had no knowledge of commerce, no money to buy
goods, and no inclination to do the work and accept
the responsibilities necessary for successful commer-
cial undertakings. The result was that imports were
stopped, prices went up, and the Moslems were hurt
as much as, if not more than, the Christians. After
several voyages, the new government passenger
vessels were practically hors de combat. There was
no longer second, and third class.
first, Peasants
squatted on the decks and in the saloons. Filth
reigned supreme, and hopeless confusion. No
204
European could endure a voyage on one of these
steamers, and no merchant cared to entrust his
shipments to them.
The boycott died because it was a hopeless under-
taking. For many months, the Government lost

heavily through the falling off in the custom house
receipts. The labouring class (almost wholly Mos-
lems) of the seaports suffered terribly, as our labour-
ing class suffers during a prolonged strike. The
boycott was removed, Greeks were allowed to re-
sume their business, so essential for the prosperity
of the community, and, as is always the case in
Turkey, everything worked again in the same old

way.
But, just as the failure to punish the perpetrators
of the Adana massacre alienated definitely and
irrevocably thesympathy and loyal support of the
Armenian element from the constitutional regime,
so the boycott, iniquitous and futile, lost to the
Young Turks the allegiance of the Greeks of the
Empire. Already alarmed by the attack upon
the liberties of the patriarchate, the Greeks began
to look to Greece for help and, in the islands of the
;
^gean and Macedonia, the hope was strong that

in
a successful war might put an end to what they were
suffering.
The Greeks of from the univer-
Turkey are not free
sal characteristic of human nature. You can perse-
cute and browbeat a man, you can bully him and do
him physical injury, you can refuse him a share in
the government and put him in an inferior social
position, and he will continue to endure it. But,
205
rob him of the chance of making a livelihood, and he
will commence to conspire against the government.
A man's vital point is his pocket-book. That vital
point the Young Turks threatened by their boycott.
THE YOUNG TURKS AND THE MACEDONIAN PROBLEM
It was at Salonika that the Young Turk move-

ment first gained its footing in the Ottoman Empire,
and until the loss of European Turkey, after the
disastrous war with the Balkan States, Salonika
continued to be the centre of the "Committee of
Union and Progress." Its congresses were always
held there. From Salonika the third army corps
went forth to suppress, in April, 1909, the counter-
revolution in Constantinople. To the Young Turks,
Salonika seemed the safest place in all the Ottoman
dominions for the imprisonment of Abdul Hamid.
Many of the leading members of the party were
natives of Macedonia. In fact, it was because the
Young Turks saw clearly that European Turkey
would soon be lost to the Empire, unless there was
a regeneration, that they precipitated in 1908 the
revolution which had so long been brewing.
It is natural, then, that the Macedonian problem
should be the first and uppermost of all the many
problems that had to be solved in the regenera-
tion of Turkey. The "Committee of Union and Pro-
gress" saw that immediate action must be taken to
strengthen Ottoman authority, so severely shaken
since the war with Russia, in the European vilayets.
We have already shown in a previous chapter how
206
the struggle of races in European Turkey had made
Macedonia the bloody centre of Balkan rivalry, and
had reduced the vilayets of Uskub and Salonika to
anarchy.
Up to the coming of the constitutional regime,
there had been a very strong element in Macedonia,
principally Bulgarian, which saw oh, how prophetic-
ally! that the liberation of Macedonia from Turkish
rule would endanger, rather than aid, the propa-
ganda for eventual Bulgarian hegemony in the

Balkan Peninsula. These Bulgarians, wise in their
day and generation beyond their emancipated
brethren, advocated the intervention of Bulgarian
arms, not to secure independence, but autonomy.
They felt that by the creation, for a period of years,
of an autonomous province of Macedonia under the
suzerainty of the Sultan, the felicitous history of
Eastern Rumelia would repeat itself.
The Young Turks decided to solve the Macedon-
ian problem by strengthening the Moslem element
in every corner of the vilayets of Salonika and Uskub.
The means of doing this were at hand. After the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkish
agents began to work among the Moslem popula-
tion in these countries to induce them to emigrate
"
and come under the dominion of the "Padishah, as
the Sultan is called by his faithful subjects. They
were brought in and settled, with the help of the
Government, in those districts of Macedonia where
the Moslem element was weak. This was a repeti-
tion of the policy of Abdul Hamid after the Congress
of Berlin, when, in Eastern Rumelia and Thrace,
207
to oppose the Bulgarians Circassians from the lost
Caucasus were settled, and to oppose the Servians
Albanian emigration into old Servia and the Sand-
jak of Novi Bazar was encouraged.
In addition to this, the Young Turks decided to
secure the loyalty of their Christian subjects in
European Turkey by abolishing the karadj (head tax)
which exempted Christians from military service.
Bulgarians, Greeks, and Servians were summoned to
serve in the Ottoman army.
The first of these measures should never have been
adopted. The bitter experience of former years
should have taught the Young Turks the lesson
that emigration of this nature not only tended to
arouse religious fanaticism, but also introduced an
element, ignorant and unruly, and wholly worthless
from the economic point of view. It has often been
recorded that Moslems, prompted to the sacrifice of
abandoning everything for their love of remaining
Turkish subjects, have made these "treks" after the
unsuccessful wars of Turkey of their own initiative.
Nothing is farther from the truth. There has never
been an exodus of this sort which has not been due
to the instigation of political agents. From the very
fact that large industrious and influential Moslem
elements have remained and prospered under Rus-
sian, Bulgarian, and Austrian rule, it can be inferred
that those who yielded to the solicitation of Turkish
agents were the undesirable Moslem element, who,
never having acquired anything where they were,
had nothing to lose by making a change. If one
excepts a certain portion of the Circassians, the
208
statement may well be made that these emigrants
muhadjirs they are called in Turkish are an element
forming the lowest dregs of the population, as worth-
less and shiftless as the great majority of the Jews
whom the Zionist movement has attracted to Pales-
tine. More than this, the muhadjirs have been
fanatical and lawless, and it is they whose massacres
of Christians have invariably ended in irretrievable
disaster for Turkey.
In Macedonia, the muhadjirs, in conjunction with
the Albanian Moslem immigrants, were responsible
for the succession of massacres in 1912, such as those
of Ishtip and Kotchana, which helped to bring about
the Balkan alliance. The same thing is happening
to-day in the coasttowns of Asia Minor and Thrace,
where the brutality and blood lust of the muhadjirs
since 1913 will eventually cause another attack of
Greece upon Turkey.
The second policy that of enrolling Christians in
the army was recorded, back in the days of the first
attempt at the emancipation of Christians, the Tan-
zimat of 1839, as a measure which would ameliorate
their lot and bring about equality. The idea was
splendid, but its application was impracticable. Otto-
man Christians are so wholly incompatible, from their
social and educational background, with Ottoman
Moslems, that they cannot be placed in the army,

in mixed regiments, without incurring humiliation,
degradation, and persecution of the most cruel sort.

The only way in which Christians could be called
to serve in the Ottoman army would have been the
formation, at first, of separate regiments, where the
14 209
soldiers would enjoy immunity from persecution.
When this reform was made, there should have been
also a provision from the very first, that the ranks of
officers be recruited from the Christian elements in
the Empire, in proportion to their numerical strength.
But with both Christians and Jews, obligatory army
was used from the beginning it is still used
service
today as a means of extorting money from those

who could pay, and terrorizing and reducing to
slavery those who could not raise the forty pounds
required for exemption. Even if there were no reli-
gious fanaticism, even if it were not necessary for
Christians of intelligence to serve in an army wholly
officered by Moslems, the terrible and criminal condi-
which they were called upon to suffer
tions of service
would have justified the Christians in adopting every
possible measure to avoid military service.
Throughout the Empire, intelligent Christians
who could not purchase their freedom from this
obligation preferred exile to military service. From
1909 to 1914, Turkey has lost hundreds of thousands
young blood.
of its best
The Macedonia of the coming of the
result in
muhadjirs and the taking of Christians for the

army, was that the Macedonians abandoned their
advocacy of autonomy, under the suzerainty of the
Sultan, and looked to the Balkan States for freedom
from Turkish rule.
THE ALBANIAN UPRISINGS

Albania was never fully conquered by the Osmanlis.
Like the Montenegrins, the Albanians were always
210
able to resist the extension of Turkish authority in
their mountains. Not only did the nature of the
country favour them, but their proximity to the
Adriatic, and their ability to call at will for Italian
and Austrian help, made it advisable for the Supreme
Porte to compromise with them. Many Albanians,
including principally, as in Bosnia, the landowning
families,were converted to Mohammedanism, and
attached themselves to the fortunes of Turkey.
Without ever giving up their local independence,
these renegade Albanians became the most loyal and
efficient supporters of Ottoman authority outside of
Albania.
Turkey has gained much from the Albanians. Her
higher classes, endowed with extreme intelligence and
physical activity, have been the most valuable civil
and military officials that the Government has ever
enjoyed. Because they were Moslems, they were

able to take high positions in the army and govern-
ment service. It is one of the most remarkable facts
of Ottoman history that the great majority of the
really great statesmen and soldiers of the Empire,
if not of Christian ancestry, have been, and still are,
Albanians. In strengthening the Turkish domination

in the European provinces, after the period of decline
set in, the Albanians have been indispensable. Their
emigration from their mountains into Epirus, Old
Servia, the valley of the Vardar, and the coast towns
of Macedonia checked for a long time the conspira-
cies and rebellions of the Christian elements.
The Sultans of Turkey and their counsellors have
always recognized the value of the Albanians. In
211
return for their great services to the Empire, they
were allowed to retain their local privileges. This
meant independence, in reality, rather than auton-
omy. They gave what taxes they pleased, or none.
Military service was rendered upon their own terms.
Christian Albanians, as well as Moslem, have pre-
ferred Ottoman sovereignty to any other. They have
never thought of independence, because this would
have brought them responsibilities and dangers
from which, under the fetish of "the integrity of the
Ottoman Empire," they were free. So they resisted
every effort of Italian, Austrian, Slav, and Greek to
weaken their allegiance to the Sultan. Turkey also
allowed them to remain under the mediaeval condi-
tions in which they lived back in the fourteenth
century. They wanted neither railways, roads, nor
ports. Among all the subjects of the Sultan, the
Albanians were best satisfied with the absolute lack
of progress under Moslem rule. These are the
reasons why the majority of Albanians want to
return once more to the fold of Turkey.
The Young Turks were no more felicitous in their
treatment of the Albanians than of the Greeks and
Armenians. Without any consideration of the pe-
culiar problems involved, they decided immediately,
tackling every problem at once, that Albania must

be civilized and that Ottoman sovereignty must work
there in exactly the same way as in any other part of
the Empire. Albanians must render military service,
and submit to being sent wherever the authorities at
Constantinople decided. Local independence must
cease. Taxes must be paid regularly. When the
212
Albanians resisted, as they did immediately, an
army was sent to pacify the country.
One cannot but sympathize with the principle laid
down by the Minister of the Interior at Constan-
tinople, that the central authority must be recognized
and that the only way to stamp out the Albanian
anarchy was to disarm the population. But the
Young Turks knew no other way of doing this than
by force. They did not realize that anarchy and
lawlessness disappear only with education and
economic progress. Instead of starting to "civilize"
the Albanians by establishing schools and opening
up the country with railways, they sent rapid-firing
guns. In the summer of 1909, the rebellion was
stamped out with ruthless cruelty by the burning of
villages, the destruction of crops, and the seizing of
cattle. Such measures were a very poor argument
for the Albanian to induce him to comply with the
disarmament decree. Under ordinary circumstances
an Albanian would rather lose his leg than his gun.
Under these circumstances, he preferred risking his
life to giving up what he considered his only means
of defence.
Every year the Albanian rebellion broke out afresh.

Every year the Young Turks exhausted the strength
and spent the resources of their armies in European
Turkey against the invulnerable mountains of
Albania. After every "pacification," Albania' in
arms was just as certain each May as the coming
again of summer.
In 1912, when affairs were in a critical state as
regards the Christian neighbours, the Cabinet in
213
Constantinople was once more engaged in the hope-
less task of subduing Albanian opposition. The
Albanians, however, seemed to gain strength rather
than lose it. In September, 1912, I was in Uskub
just four weeks before the Balkan War broke out.
The Albanian chieftains were there, having made a
truce for Ramazan (the sacred month of the Moslem
fasting). They said to me that the next year, if the
Turks did not stop persecuting them, they would
take their army to Constantinople. Others were
to get ahead and they were to win their
of them,
independence without having to fight the Turks

again. The poor showing of the Turkish arms against
the Greeks and Servians is very largely due to the
exhaustion which had come to them through con-
tinuous and unsuccessful attempts to get the better
of the Albanian uprisings. The Balkan States knew
how severely the western Macedonian army had
suffered in July and August, 1912. It was one of the
considerations which decided them to strike at that
moment.
THE TREATMENT OF THE ARABIC ELEMENT
In Asiatic Turkey there are supposed to be about

eight million Arabic-speaking inhabitants. These
figures may be an exaggeration, for no census has
ever been taken. But the vilayets are occupied
almost exclusively by Arabs and races speaking
Arabic. They form a half of the Empire's dominions
in Asia, starting with the Taurus and Amanus ranges,
south through Syria to Arabia and east and south-
east through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf.
214
These large stretches of territory were never
thoroughly conquered by the Turks. They did not
settle there in the way they had done in the Balkan
Peninsula, outside of Albania and Montenegro, and

in Asia Minor. The race from whom they had taken
their religion and from whom they soon absorbed
whatever culture and art they can be said to possess,
was never assimilated by the Turks. Their simple
warrior and herdsman language was enriched by
Arabic substantives, as Anglo-Saxon was enriched
by the Latin gotten through the Normans and
through the Church. But there was no racial fusion.
Only in appearance did Turkish officialdom and
the authority of the Sultan ever get a real hold over
the Arabs. By habit they came to respect the Sultan
as Khalif. The allegiance which they gave him as
ruler was altogether without value a pure matter of
form. An aggressive pasha found it easy to detach
Egypt from Turkish rule. It was conglomerate
populations and a lack of natural boundaries for
forming states that prevented the other Arabic

portions of the Ottoman Empire from following
Egypt. In Arabia proper, and in the larger portion
of Mesopotamia, up to the present day, the Arabs
have been as independent of the Sublime Porte as
have been the Albanians.
In the reign of Abdul Hamid, when the idea of the
Pan-Islamic movement was conceived, the import-
ance of joining the sacred cities of Medina and Mecca
more closely with the Turkish Empire was recognized.
French interests were building a railway across the
Lebanon Mountains to Aleppo and Damascus. The
215
Germans had launched their project for the Bag-
dadbahn. Abdul Hamid decided to create a railway
directly under government control, from Damascus
to Medina and Mecca. For the first time since they
were joined to the Ottoman Empire, the Arabic
provinces saw themselves in prospective connec-
tion with the capital. It had been for a long time
easier and quicker to go from Constantinople to the
United States or to China than to Bagdad or to
Mecca. The railways would have one of two results :
either the Arabs would be brought more closely

into connection with the Empire, or they would be
definitely alienated from it.
The Arabic question stood thus when the constitu-
tion was re-established in 1908. There are many
Arabs among the Young Turks, but these, like the
Slavs in the military and official service of Austria-
Hungary, have been definitely alienated from their
own nationality. Here was the opportunity to bring
into sympathy with the constitutional movement the
millions of Arabic-speaking subjects of the Sultan,
who formed the most numerous Moslem element in
the Empire. But the Young Turks were no more
tactful in the treatment of the Arabs, who were
mostly of their own religion, than of the Greeks and

Armenians. In the first Parliament, they were
almost as unfair to Moslem Arabs as to Christians.
In the apportionment of places in the Cabinet, the
Arabs were ignored. It is true that some Cabinet
members, some high officials both in the military and
civiladministration, and some members of the inner

council of the Committee of Union and Progress
216
were of Arabic origin.But they must be counted
practically as Turks, for they had lived so long away
from their own country and their people that they
had lost Arabic sympathies. Some who were
all
called Arabs were in reality members of the old

Turkish families, who in Mesopotamia, as in Syria
and Egypt, had received large tracts of land at the
time of the conquest, and had always been Turks by
interests and by atmosphere. The younger national-
istic Arabic element, educated, and living by pro-
fessional or business interests in cities of the Arabic
portion of the Empire, were from the very beginning

ignored.
Two things soon became evident. In the first
place, the Young Turks tried to impose their language

in local administration as the sole official language
of the Empire. In many places in Syria and Mesopo-
tamia, civil officials, even in the courts of justice,*
were appointed without a knowledge of the language
of the people among whom they had to serve. In
the Balkans and in Asia Minor, where there were so
many races and so many tongues, the Turks were
acting reasonably and sensibly in imposing their own
language as a medium for the transaction of gov-
ernment business, but in vilayets which were wholly
Arabic speaking, the foisting of the Turkish language
upon the people could be likened to a bastard child
endeavouring to rule the branch of his family from
which he had received his best and purest blood.
Before a year had passed, the educated, intellectual
Arabs were wholly out of sympathy with the new re-
gime. Many of them began to dream of the revival of
217
the Arabian khalifate, and looked to the nationalistic
movement in Egypt as the seed from which their
Pan- Arabic tree would some day grow. Others,
older and less sentimental, did not hesitate to express
a desire to see British or French sovereignty extended
over Syria and Mesopotamia.
In the second place, among the quasi-independent
tribes of the Syrian hinterland, and of the Arabian
peninsula, the attempt of the Turks to destroy their

privileges ended in the same way as it had done in
Albania. From 1908 up to the outbreak of the Bal-
kan War, millions of treasure and thousands of the
best soldiers of the Empire were lost in fruitless
efforts to realize the aspirations of the Young Turks.
We cannot even enumerate these rebellions. They
were as perennial as the Albanian uprisings, and as
disastrous to the Turkish army. In Arabia, rebellious
Arabs treated with the Italians. In Syria, beyond
the Jordan, they made a practice of tearing up the
tracks and burning the stations of the Hedjaz rail-
way. In Mesopotamia, they refused to respond to
the obligation of military service.
This incomplete summary of the Young Turk

regime in the Ottoman Empire has been given to
throw light upon the collapse of the constitutional
regime and of the military reputation of Turkey. I
have refrained from going into a discussion of party
politics, of intrigues, and of the bickerings of Parlia-
ment. Enough has been told to show that the
constitutional regime was marked for failure from
the beginning for three reasons There was no honest
:
218
attempt to bring together the various races of the
Empire in a common effort for regeneration. The
Young Turks, having no statesmen among their
leaders, depended upon untrained men and upon
those Abdul Hamid had trained in sycophancy and
despotism. In spite of the heroic and able efforts
of the German military mission and the British naval
mission, no progress was made in reforming the only
force by which the Young Turks could have held in
respect and obedience the Sultan's own subjects, as
well as those foreign nations who were looking for the
opportunity to dismember the Empire.
If the hopes of the true friends of Turkey had been
realized, if only the constitution had been applied,

if only there had been the will to regenerate Turkey,
all the wars of the past few years, including the one
which is now shaking Europe to its foundations,
would have been avoided.
219
CHAPTER XII
CRETE AND EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY

November 19, 1910, the Cretan General
ON Assembly made a stirring appeal "to the four
Great Powers who are protectors of the island,
to the two great Powers of Central Europe, to the
great Republic of the New World, to the liberal and
enlightened press of two Continents, and in general
to all Christians, in favour of the rights of the Cretan
people which it represents, rights acquired and
made legal by so many sacrifices and sufferings."
The Cretans definitely included the United States
and the American press in this manifesto. They
wanted the American people to become acquainted
with what was known to the chancelleries of Europe
as "the Cretan question." For one fifth of the
Cretans have members of their families in America.
There are few hamlets in the island into which the
spirit and influence of "the great Republic of the
New World" has not penetrated.
A review of the relationship between Crete and
the European Powers is as necessary in trying to
throw light upon the events which led up to the war
of 1914 as is the exposition of the later phases of the
Albanian question. It helps us to grasp the attitude
220
of the Powers towards Turkey in the years immedi-
ately after the proclamation of the constitution, the
tremendous power of Hellenism under the wise and
skilful guidance of a statesman such as M. Venizelos
has proved himself to be, the importance of the
Cretan question in precipitating the Balkan Wars,
and the impotence of European diplomacy to pre-
serve the status quo, and decide ex cathedra the de-
Crete and Macedonia, whose
stinies of countries like
emancipated kinsfolk had acquired the spirit of the

soldiers who sang:
"As Christ died to make men holy, let us die to

make men free. "
A century ago, Crete was cut off from the outside
world. It had been for two hundred and fifty years
under the Turks, who took a peculiar pride in the
island from the fact that it was their last great
conquest. Its Christian inhabitants, although form-
ing the majority of the population, lived, or rather
existed, under the same hopeless conditions as pre-
vailed throughout Turkey. In the sea-coast towns
the Christians prospered better than the Moslems,
owing to their aptitude for commerce; but the bulk
of the Christian population was in abject slavery to
the Turkish beys,who were the great landowners.
The Greek war of liberation was shared in by the
Cretans, who lent valuable aid to their brethren of
the mainland. They endured all the sufferings of
the war, but reaped none of its rewards. It is quite
possible that they might have thrown off the Turkish
yoke at that favourable moment had it not been for
221
the astute policy of the Turks, who, seeing the
danger of losing Crete, handed it over to Mehemet
AH in 1830 as a reward for Egyptian aid in the Greek
war and compensation for the ships destroyed at
Navarino. With the downfall of Mehemet Ali's
schemes of conquest in 1840, the island reverted to
Turkey. At this time the Powers could easily have
united Crete with Greece, but deliberately sacrificed
the Cretans to their commercial rivalries.
Turkey never succeeded in gaining her former
ascendancy in Crete. Insurrection after insurrec-
tion was drowned in blood. During two generations
the Turks sent into the unhappy island successive
armies, whose orgies of cruelty and lust are better
left undescribed. But the tortures of hell could not
extinguish the flames of liberty. Every few years the
Cretans would rise again and repay blood with blood
until they were overwhelmed by Anatolian soldiers,
of whom Turkey possesses an unlimited supply.
At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 the Greeks pled,
withmuch force, for the privilege of annexing Crete.
As we read them to-day, the arguments of M. Dely-
annis are a prophecy. The Powers put Crete back
under Ottoman control, subject to a reformed con-
stitution called the Pact of Helepa, which provided a
fairly good administration, if a capable and sincere

governor were chosen. Everything went well until
Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1889 practically annulled
the solemn agreement he had made by appointing
a Moslem Governor-General, and reducing the repre-
sentation in the General Assembly in such a way
that the Moslem minority in the island came into
222
power again. It would be fruitless to go into the
complex history of the next seven years during which
the lawlessness of former times was revived.
Christian refugees fled to Greece and carried the
tale of their sufferings. A massacre in Canea in
February, 1897, engineered by Turkish officers fresh
from similar work in Armenia, had such a reper-
cussion in Greece that King George would have lost
his throne had he remained deaf to the popular
demand that aid be sent to the Cretans. Greek
soldiers crossed to the stricken island. This meant
war with Turkey. In a few weeks Greece was over-
whelmed in Thessaly, and the Powers were compelled
to intervene. Much ridicule has been cast upon
Greece for her impotence in the war of 1897. Her
defeat was a foregone conclusion, and she was
severely blamed for having jeopardized the peace
of Europe just as the Balkan States are being
blamed to-day.
But there are times when a nation simply has to
fight. So it was with Greece in 1897. I n exactly
similar circumstances, but with conditions less serious
and an issue not so long outstanding or so vital to
national well-being, the United States a year later
declared war on Spain. There was great similarity
between the Cretan situation in 1897 and that of
1912 in Crete and Macedonia. Refugees, crossing
the borders and telling unspeakable tales to their
brothers of blood and religion, were continually
before the eyes of the Bulgarians and Servians and
Montenegrins and Greeks since the proclamation of
the constitution in 1908. Each nationality suffered
223
by massacres in Macedonia which were followed by
no serious punishment.
Even though defeated in 1897, Greece forced the
hand of the Powers and of Turkey. Crete was given
autonomy, and placed under the protection of Italy,
Great Britain, France, and Russia, who occupied the
principal ports of the island. For a year and a half
they searched for a "neutral" governor for the Cre-
tans. The Turkish troops, however, remained at
Candia, leaving the rest of the island to the revolu-
tionaries.It was not until the British were attacked
in the harbour of Candia, and their Vice-Consul
murdered, that the Powers moved. But, as at
Alexandria in 1882, it was a bluff admiral and not the
diplomats who settled the status of the island. The
Turkish troops were compelled to withdraw, and
the Powers were told that they would either have to
appease the Cretans by some encouragement of their
aspirations or conquer the island by force. A way
out of the dilemma was found in the appointment of
Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner of
the protecting Powers in Crete.
Here is where the Powers, if they had at that time
any intention of "preserving the rights of Turkey"
in Crete, made the first of their blunders. To call the
son of the King of Greece to the chief magistracy of
an island which had so long aspired to political union
with Greece was, in the eyes of the people, a direct
encouragement to their aspirations. How could they
think otherwise? The Turkish Cretans, too, re-
garded this step as the end of Ottoman sovereignty,
number that soon the
for they emigrated in so great a
224
Moslem population was reduced to ten per cent.
Prince George's appointment, made in December,
1898, was for three years, but really lasted eight.
In 1906 he withdrew because he had become hope-
lessly involved in party politics, and had "backed
the wrong horses."
Now comes the second blunder, unless the Powers
were preparing Crete for union with Greece. They
sent a letter to the King of Greece, asking him to
appoint a successor to his son! Let me quote from
the exact wording of this letter:
"The protecting Powers, in order to manifest

their desire to take into account as far as possible
the aspirations of the Cretan people, and to recog-
nize in a practical manner the interest which His
Hellenic Majesty must always take in the pros-
perity of Crete, are in accord to propose to His
Majesty that hereafter, whenever the post of High
Commissioner of Crete shall become vacant, His
Majesty, after confidential consultations with the
representatives of the Powers at Athens, will desig-
nate a candidate capable of exercising the mandate
of the Powers in this island. ..."
Turkey naturally protested against the change in

the status quo which such a step implied, and pointed
out that it was a virtual destruction even of the
suzerainty of the Sultan. The Powers, however, did
not object to the publication of their note to the King
of Greece in the newspapers of Crete. M. Zaimis, a
former prime minister of Greece, was appointed High
Commissioner. The island had its own flag and
postage stamps, and laws identical with those of
is 225
Greece. Cretan officers in Greek uniform com-
manded the militia and constabulary of the island.
Turkey treated Crete as a foreign country. For this
statement there is no more conclusive proof than the
records of the custom-houses at Smyrna and Salonika
which show that Cretan products were subjected to
the same duties as were applied to all foreign imports.
It would seem, then, that Crete was in practically
the same position as Eastern Roumelia in 1885, or, in
fact, asBulgaria herself. Nothing was more natural
than that the establishment of a constitutional regime
in Turkey should lead to a proclamation of union
with Greece. The motives which led to this action
were identical with those which Austria-Hungary put
forth as an explanation of her annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The Cretans quite justly feared
that the Young Turks would repudiate the obliga-
tions assumed by Abdul Hamid, and endeavour to
bring Crete back into the Turkish fold. At the

moment Turkey was so engrossed in the question of
the Austrian annexation and the Bulgarian declara-
tion of independence and seizure of the railways in
Eastern Roumelia that she contented herself with a
formal protest against the action of the Cretan
Assembly.
What did the Powers do? Turkey, at the moment,
could have done nothing had they recognized the
union with Greece. But they did not want to go that
far. On the other hand, they did not want to offend
Greece and the Cretans. They made no threats, and
took no action, although their troops were in the
island. Inaction and indecision were made worse by
226
the following note, which was sent by the four
Consuls at Candia to the self-appointed provisional
government :
"The undersigned, agents of France, Great

Britain, Italy, and Russia, by order of their re-
spective governments, have the honour of bringing
to the knowledge of the Cretan government (sic)
that the protecting Powers consider the union of
Crete to Greece as depending upon the assent of
the Powers who have contracted obligations with
Turkey. Nevertheless they would not refuse to
envisage with kindly and sympathetic interest the
discussion of this question with Turkey, if order is
maintained in the island and if the safety of the
Moslem population is secured."
That diplomatic sanction would sooner or later be

given to the action of the Cretans, if they showed
their ability to preserve order in the island and treat
the Moslems well, is an altogether justifiable inter-
pretation of this note of the Powers. Otherwise
would they not have protested against the illegality
of the provisional government, and have forbidden
the Cretan authorities to promulgate their decrees
in the name of King George? Although the High
Commissioner had disappeared, and the Cretans were
running the island just as if the annexation were an
assured fact, the Powers, far from protesting, an-
nounced their intention of withdrawing their troops
of occupation !
What were their intentions concerning Crete, and

what was their understanding of the status quo at the
moment of withdrawal? This question they did not
227
answer then, nor did they answer it afterwards.
They simply withdrew from the island without
stating what legal power was to succeed them. This
was in the summer of 1909. M. Venizelos, then
Prime Minister of Crete, asked the Powers to state
definitely their intentions.He said that he did not
wish to run counter to the orders of the Powers, but
that he would have to raise the flag of Greece over
the island when their troops left, unless they for-
mally forbade him to do so. With admirable clear-
ness and irrefutable logic he pointed out to the
Powers that the only other alternative would be
anarchy. But the Powers, pressed by their am-
bassadors at Constantinople, were afraid to assent to
annexation. They were equally averse to taking the
opposite course. So they contented themselves with
giving M. Venizelos "friendly counsels" not to hoist
the Greek flag. The result was the ludicrous spec-
tacle of the cutting down of the Greek flag by marines
landed from eight warships. It was like a scene
from a comic opera, and M. Venizelos must have
formed then the opinion which every succeeding
action of the Powers strengthened and to which he
gave expression after the Balkan War was declared,
"
that the Powers were "venerable old women.
Crete now began to be menaced by the insensate
chauvinism of the Young Turks, who thought they
could avenge the loss of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Bulgarian declaration of independence by destroy-
ing the autonomy of Crete and re-establishing the
authority of the Sultan in this island which had been
repudiating the Ottoman government for eighty
228
years. In the spring of 1910, the Tanine, at that
time organ of the Committee of Union and
official
Progress, laid down five points as the minimum which

the Porte would accept in the definite and permanent
solution of the status of Crete :
"i. Formal recognition of the rights of the Sul-

tan.
"2. The right of the Sultan to name the Gover-
nor-General of the island among three Cretan can-
didates elected by the General Assembly.
"3. The right of the sheik-ul-islam to name the
religious chiefs of the Cretan Moslems.
"4. Establishment in the Bay of Suda of a coal-
ing-station for the Ottoman fleet, and the main-
tenance there of a permanent stationnaire like the
stationnaires of the embassies at Constantinople.
"5. Restriction of the rights of the Cretan
government in the matter of conclusion of treaties
of commerce and agreements with foreign powers."
"
What the "rights of the Sultan might be were not
specified then, nor have they been since but articles
:
four and five were enough to throw the whole of Crete

into a state of wildest excitement. The Turks, after
having lost the island, were trying to win it back.
Left to themselves (as they had every reason to
believe) the Cretans convoked the National Assem-
bly for April 26, 1910. The Assembly was opened
name
in the of George I., King of the Hellenes.
The Moslem deputies immediately presented a
protest in which they rejected the sovereignty of
Greece over Crete. The deputies were then asked
to take the oath of allegiance in the name of King
George. A second petition was presented by the
229
Moslem deputies, declaring that, as the Sultan of
Turkey held "sovereign rights" in the island, they,
in the name of their Moslem constituents, protested
against such an action. They refused to take the
oath. Should they be excluded from the Assembly,
or be allowed to sit without taking the oath?
Instead of insisting on the admission of the Moslem
deputies, the Powers again gave "friendly counsels."
Once more M. Venizelos pleaded that they speak out
their mind in the matter of the legal status of the
island. The diplomats "temporized" again, and the
warships reappeared to assure to the Moslem depu-

"
ties "their lawful rights.When M. Venizelos could
get no statement from the Powers as to the grounds
upon which these "lawful rights" rested, he saw that
all hope of help from the Powers was over, and that
he was only wasting his time. Like Cavour, when he

turned with disgust from his efforts to interest the
Powers and had the inspiration, Italia faro da se,
the Cretan leader abandoned the antechamber of t-he
chancelleries. While the Powers still sought a modus
vivendi for Crete, M. Venizelos made one. From that
moment the Balkan War was a certainty.
The Young Turk Cabinet, arrogant and drunk
with the success of their boycott against Austria-
Hungary, and at the same time knowing that they
must turn public attention away from the loss of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, began to press the Powers
for the restoration in Crete of the status quo as it had
existed before the diplomatic blunders I have out-
lined above, and, in addition, for the coaling station
and for control over Crete's foreign relations. At
230
the same time, they demanded of the Athens Cabinet
that Greece renounce formally, not only for the
present but also for the future, any intention of annex-
ing Crete. The Young Turks represented that public
opinion in Turkey was so wrought up over the Cretan
question that war with Greece would certainly follow.
To illustrate to the Powers and to Greece the force
of this public opinion, a widespread boycott against
everything Greek in Turkey was started. This
economic warfare is described in another chapter.
In some parts of Turkey the boycott has never ceased.
There is no doubt that this boycott was one of
the very most important factors in bringing on the
Balkan War. For it taught the Greeks, who were
continually being bullied and threatened with an
invasion in Thessaly, the imperative necessity of
reconciliation with Bulgaria by a compromise of rival
claims in Macedonia.
Thinking that he could serve his country better in
Greece than in Crete, M. Venizelos posed his candi-
dacy to the Greek Chamber in the summer of 1910.
Seemingly he was abandoning Crete to its fate,
and he had to bear many unjust reproaches from
his fellow-countrymen. His wonderful personality
and extraordinary political genius soon brought him
to the front in Greece. The Cretan revolutionary
became Prime Minister of Greece. Steadfast in his
purpose he began to negotiate with the other Balkan
States and with Russia. He was able to accomplish
the impossible. The war with Turkey is largely his
personal success. No statesman since Bismarck has
had so brilliant a triumph.
231
In 1910, M. Venizelos took the step which was the
turning point in his career and in the history of Greece.
Firmly persuaded that Crete could be annexed to
Greece only by Greece proving herself stronger than
Turkey, and not by diplomatic manoeuvres, he de-
cided "to desert Cretan politics, and enter the larger
sphere open to him at Athens. It was easy to secure
a seat in the Greek Parliament, but that was the
only easy part about it. When one considered the
fickle character of the Greek people in their politics,
the selfish narrowness and bitter prejudices of their
leaders, the inefficiency of the army and navy, whose
officers had been ruined bypolitical activity, the
emptiness of the treasury, the unpopularity of the
royal family, and the general disorder throughout
the country, it seems incredible that M. Venizelos
should have been willing to assume the responsibility

of government, let alone succeed in his self-imposed
task. Had you asked the leading statesmen of
Europe five years ago what country presented the
most formidable and at the same time most hopeless
task for a Premier, there would have been unanimity
in selecting Greece.
But for Eleutherios Venizelos there was no diffi-
culty which could not be overcome. It is the nature

of the man to refuse to see failure ahead. "If one
loves to work, and works for love," he has declared,
"failure does not exist."
Called to be Prime Minister in August, 1910, M.
Venizelos began to reform everything in sight. His
first step was to endow Greece with a new constitu-
tion, whose most important changes were a Council of

232
State, chosen for life and irremovable, to act as a
Senate (Greece has single-chamber government),
legalizing the state of siege, sanctioning the employ-
ment of foreigners in the service of the Government,
fixing twenty-four hours as the maximum delay for
bringing one who had been arrested before a magis-
trate, forbidding the publication of uncensored news
relative to military and naval operations in time of
war, establishing free, obligatory primary instruction,
excluding from Parliament directors in corporations,
and facilitating the expropriation of property for
public purposes. I have given enough to show the
practical character of the new constitution.

Although strongly urged to do so, both by the
King and by the political leaders, M. Venizelos re-
fused to turn his Constituent Assembly into an ordi-
nary Parliament, and proceed to the legislation made
possible by the new constitution. Seeing clearly
that durable and effective ministerial power could be
derived only from the people and supported only by
their intelligent goodwill, he balked the intrigues of
the politicians, and overcame the dynastic fears of
the King. The Constituent Assembly was dissolved.
M. Venizelos went before the people, travelling
everywhere and explaining his program for the re-
formation of the country. The result was a tri-
umph such as no man has ever received in modern
Greece. In November, 1910, followers of M. Venize-
los were returned in so overwhelming a majority
that he could afford to ignore the Athenian politicians
who saw in him a menace to their personal rule, their
sloth, and their ''graft."
233
Since that day M. Venizelos has been the idol of
Greece. Never has trust in public man been more
amply justified. Every administration of the State
was completely transformed within eighteen months.
Even to outline what M. Venizelos has accomplished
reads like a fairy tale. Only those who knew the
Greece before his arrival and are able to contrast it
with the Greece of today can appreciate the im-
mensity of his labours and the radical character of the
changes he has made. I cannot dwell on the talent
shown by this Cretan in matters of financial reform.
But his military and naval reforms, and his foreign
policy, have been so important in making possible
the Balkan alliance and its successes that they
cannot be passed over.
M. Venizelos, when he first came to Athens, saw
what was the matter with the Greek military and
naval establishments. Like Peter the Great and
the Japanese, he realized that the Greeks must
learn from Europe by submitting to European
teachers. To persuade his fellow-countrymen, who
have a very exalted opinion of their own ability
(the Greeks are always sure they were born to com-
mand, without first having learned to obey!), that
they must not only call in foreign advisers, but must
submit to their authority, has been the most Hercu-
lean of the tasks this great man set before him.
Article three of the new constitution had authorized
the appointment of foreigners as officers of the
Government and given them temporarily Hellenic
citizenship. From England was asked a naval
mission, from France a military mission, and from
234
Italy officers to reorganize the gendarmerie. In
Greece the foreign officers were able to accomplish
more months than the foreign "advisers"
in eighteen
of Turkey had accomplished in many long years.
This is no assertion of personal opinion. The facts
of the Balkan War speak for themselves. Why is
this? In Turkey, the foreign teachers have never
been given any real authority, and have seen every
effort they put forth nullified by the insouciance,
self-sufficiency, and cursed apathy of the Turk. The

Greeks, on the contrary, "became as little children,"
and lo! a miracle was wrought!
When foreigners who visited Greece within recent
years read about the successes of the Crown Prince
at Salonika and Janina, the assassination of King
George, the mourning of the Greek people, and the
hearty acclamation of King Constantine, the national
hero, they could think back to less than four years
ago when the Crown Prince was practically banished
from Greece, after having been dismissed from his
command army by a popular uprising, and
in the
when the portrait of the King was removed from
every coffee-house in Athens. What is the cause of
the complete revulsion in public feeling towards the
dynasty? It is due to the common sense of M.
Venizelos. He saw that the present dynasty was
necessary for Greece, and that the Crown Prince
must come back and take command of the army.
In defiance of public opinion, he insisted on this
point. This attitude was a bitter disappointment to
many who imagined that M. Venizelos would be
anti-dynastic in his policy. As a result of his
235
success in reconciling the Greeks with their sovereign
and his family, thesympathies of Russia and Ger-
many and Great Britain were not alienated from the
Greek people, as was rapidly becoming the case.
Emperor William especially, whose sister is wife of
the new Greek King, was so delighted with the success
of M.
Venizelos in rehabilitating his brother-in-law
that he asked the Greek Premier to visit him at
Corfu.
This visit of the former Cretan revolutionary to
the German Emperor in April, 1912, was hardly
commented upon by the European press. But epoch-
making words must have been spoken in the villa
Achilleion, for immediately after that visit the semi-

official German press began to prepare the public for
the events which were to take place in the Balkans.
The eloquence and remorseless logic which had
carried the day among Cretan insurgents and Greek
electors was not lost on the "war-lord of Europe."
Emperor William carried back to Berlin the convic-
tion that no diplomacy could outwit the Greek
Premier's determination that Turkey should dis-
appear from Crete and Macedonia.
I do not think I am exaggerating in saying that
when the Young Turks, by their insensate chauvin-
ism, caused M. Venizelos to despair of saving Crete
through Crete itself, they signed their own death-
warrant. If they had refrained from their boycott
and let Crete alone, would M. Venizelos have gone to
Greece? I think not. It is one of those strange
coincidences of history that on the very day when
Mahmud Shevket pasha, in the Ottoman Parliament,
236
declared that if Greece did not make a public state-
ment to the effect that she had no intention at any
time to extend her sovereignty over Crete, a million
Turkish bayonets would gleam upon the plains of
Thessaly, Eleutherios Venizelos was quietly leaving
Crete for Athens.
To
bring together Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and
Montenegro into an alliance which would drive the
Turk out of Europe was mind of M. Venizelos
in the
as far back as the summer of 1909, when he saw the
international fleet at Canea land marines to cut down
the Greek flag which he had raised. It became an
obsession with him. It was possible, because he
believed it was possible. But no one else regarded
it as more than an idle dream. The rare friends to
whom M. Venizelos vaguely hinted that such an
alliance was the only way of solving the Balkan
question called it the "acme of absurdity." I quote
the words of an eminent diplomat to whom this
solution was mentioned. At the opening of the
ItalianWar, when I suggested to the Turkish Grand
Vizier that such an alliance was possible, he looked
at me pityingly, and said, "The questions you ask
display your ignorance of conditions in this part of
the world. My
time is too valuable to discuss such
an impossible hypothesis. Go to Hussein Hilnii
pasha, and ask him if he thinks the Greeks and Bul-
garians could ever unite." Hussein Hilmi pasha
referred me to every single book that has ever been
written about the Macedonian question. "I do not
care which you read," said the ex- Governor- General
of Macedonia, "they all tell the same story."
237
But M. Venizelos was not asking himself, "Can I
do it?" but, "How shall I do it?" Once more he saw
clearly. The pan-Hellenic national ideal must be
given up. Greece must content herself with Epiros,
the Êgean Islands, Crete, and a slice of Macedonia
west of the Vardar possibly including Salonika, if
the army proved as victory-winning as those of
Bulgaria and Servia. Everything else must be left
to Bulgaria and Servia. When first proposed to the

leaders of Greece, this proposition seemed so pre-
posterous that M. Venizelos was accused of being a
traitor to Hellenism. He is still denounced by the
fanatics, after all that he has accomplished. But
patiently he built up his argument, using all his
magnetism and his eloquence to convince his col-

leagues. He showed how Greece was being constantly
humiliated and menaced by the chauvinism of the
Young Turks, how the boycott was ruining Greek
shipping, how Crete itself would gradually get to
like independence better than union with Greece,
and how inevitable it was that the Slavs should in
the course of time come to possess Thrace and Mace-
donia. "Instead of sacrificing everything to Bul-
"
garia, he maintained, "this is our only chance to get
any part of European Turkey. We must give up our
ideal, because it is impracticable. With Bulgaria, we
can crush Turkey. Without Bulgaria, Turkey will
crush us. And if Bulgaria helps, we must pay the
price." It may be years not until archives are
open to historians and memoirs of present actors are
published before everything is clear concerning the
formation of an alliance which was as great a surprise
238
to Europe as it was to Turkey. But the famous
telegram which M. Gueshoff, Prime Minister of
Bulgaria, addressed to his colleagues at Athens after
the first successes of the war were won, is sufficient
testimony to the essential part played by M. Veni-
zelos in forming the coalition.
After M. Venizelos left Crete, a last blunder made
the protecting Powers the laughing-stock of Europe.
The Cretans elected deputies to the Greek Chamber,
and the warshipsof the Powers played hide-and-seek
with small Cretan craft in a fruitless endeavour to
prevent the chosen deputies from proceeding to
Athens. This move was altogether unnecessary, for
they had not yet learned the matchless worth of their
opponent. M. Venizelos, knowing that Greece and
her new allies were not yet ready for war with Turkey,
"tipped off" both the Cretans and the leaders in the
Greek Parliament that they would have to wait one
or two years longer. But, to satisfy the hoi polloi
on the one hand and the diplomats on the other, a
little comedy was enacted before the Parliament
House in Athens which threw wool over everybody's
eyes.
As soon as he saw that war was inevitable and that
his allies were ready, M. Venizelos admitted the
Cretan deputies. Europe was face to face with a
fait accompli. The Cretan and Macedonian ques-
tions were settled by war. The hand of Turkey and
the diplomats was forced.
Now we see the importance of the Cretan question.
The Balkan War could have been avoided by a
courageous and straightforward policy of efficient
239
protection of Christians who lived under the Ottoman
flag. It is because the Powers did not fulfil the obli-
gations of the Treaty of Berlin, and sacrificed Cretans

and Bulgarians and Servians and Greeks to the
furthering of their commercial interests at Con-
stantinople, that all Europe is now stained with
blood. By flattering the Turk and condoning his
crimes, the Powers succeeded in destroying the "in-
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire," which they pro-
fessed to uphold. In trying to be the friends of the
Turk they proved his worst enemies.
The Cretan question is a commentary upon the
utter futility of insincere and procrastinating
diplomacy.
240
CHAPTER XIII
THE WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY

the days when Mazzini, looking beyond
the almost ^realizable dream of Italian unity,
SINCE
said in his Paris exile, "North Africa will be-
long to Italy," a new Punic conquest has been the

steadfast hope of the Italians. France had already
started her conquest of Algeria when Mazzini spoke,
and was mistress of the richest portion of the
southern Mediterranean littoral before the Italian
unification was completed. Late though they were
in the race, the Italians began to try to realize their
dream by sending thousands of colonists to Egypt and
to Tunis. But the events of the years 1881-1883 in
these two countries, consummated by the Conven-
tion of London in 1885, gave Egypt to England
and Tunis to France. Italy was too weak at the
time to protest, and Germany had not yet begun to
develop her weltpolitik.
For some years Italian colonial aspirations were
directed towards Somaliland and Abyssinia. The
battle of Adowa in 1896 was a death-blow to the
hopes of founding an Italian empire of Erythrea.
Ten years ago Giolitti received a portfolio in the
Zanardelli ministry, and ever since then there has
16 241
been a new Cato at Rome, crying "Tripoli must be
taken." By the Franco-Italian protocol of 1901,
it was agreed that if France should ever extend her
protectorate over Morocco, Italy should have the

Tripolitaine and Barca, with the Fezzan as a hinter-
land. This "right" of Italy was recognized at the
international conference of Algeciras in 1906, and
has since been accepted in principle by the European
cabinets.
During the past decade Italy quietly prepared to
seize Tripoli, peacefully, if possible, and if not, by
force. Had Italy been ready, Turkey would have
lost Tripoli in the autumn of 1908, when Bulgaria
declared herindependence and Austria annexed
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Internal politics made a
bold stroke impossible at that favourable moment.
To accomplish her purpose, Italy worked along
two lines. She tried to make her economic position
so strong in Tripoli that the country would virtually
belong to her and be exploited by her without any
necessity for a change in its political status, until
Arabs and Berbers, choosing between prosperity
under Italy and poverty under Turkey, would of
their own accord expel the Turks. Foreseeing a pos-
sibility of failure in this plan, she at the same time
prepared for a forcible occupation of the country.
Immediately after the Anglo-Boer War, the Italian
Ministries ofWar and Marine began to make a study
of the question of transporting troops and landing
them under the cover of a fleet. Tourists who were
in Italy during the summer of 1904 will remember the
famous dress rehearsal of the Tenth Army Corps.
242
WAR BETWEEN ITALY AND TURKEY
Some six thousand men, completely provided with
horses, ammunition, artillery, and provisions, were
embarked in eleven hours. The convoy put to sea,
escorted by a squadron of battleships and torpedo-
boats, in two columns of five transports each. De-
spite a heavy swell, these troops and all their stores
were landed in the Bay of Naples in sixteen hours.
I wonder if many who were watching and applauding
on that memorable day understood why Italy was
practising so assiduously landing from transports,
and under the protection of the fleet. For what war
was she preparing in time of peace? In 1907, the
Minister of Marine announced in the Italia Militare
that Italy could send seventy thousand troops upon
a distant expedition oversea and one hundred and
fourteen thousand for a short journey not exceeding
two nights at sea!
The peaceable conquest of Tripoli was cleverly
conceived, and has been faithfully tried. Branches
of the Banco di Roma were established at Tripoli
and Benghazi, and, for the first time since the days
of Imperial Rome, a serious attempt was made to
develop the agricultural and commercial resources
of the country. The natives were encouraged in
every enterprise, and managed in such a way that
they became in the vicinity of the seaports and
trading-posts, at least dependent for their liveli-
hood upon the Banco Roma. Italian steamship
di
lines, heavily subsidized, maintained regular and
frequent services between Tunis and Tripoli and

Benghazi and Derna and Alexandria. The more
enterprising natives travelled for a few piastres to
243
Alexandria, and the object-lesson of contrast was
left without words to work its effect upon them.
The admirable Italian parcel post system one of
the most successful in Europe extended its opera-
tions into the hinterland and captured the ostrich
feather trade. The began to talk of making
Italians
secure the routes to Ghadames and Ghat and Mur-
zuk, and of establishing for the interior postal and
banking facilities that these regions could never
hope to have under Turkish administration. Rail-
ways were contemplated as soon as they could be
financed entirelyby Italian capital.
The Italian schemes were working beautifully
when the birth of New Turkey in the revolution of
July, 1908, changed the whole situation. The indo-
lent and corrupt the vilayet of Tripoli and
officials of
sandjak of
Benghazi, whose attention had been
turned from Italian activities by Italian gold pieces,
were replaced by members of the Union and Progress
party. These new officials, owing to their utter in-
experience and their sense of self-esteem, may have
been no better than the old ones; probably they
proved as executive power is not in-
inefficient, for
herent in the Turkish character. But they were men
who had passed through the fire of persecution and
suffering for love of their fatherland, and the renais-
sance of Turkey was the supreme thing in their lives.
Their patriotism and enthusiasm knew no bounds.
Their ambitions for Turkey may have been far in
advance of their ability to serve her. But criticism
is silent before patriotism which has proved its
willingness to sacrifice life for country.
244
One can imagine the feelings of the Young Turks
when they saw what Italy was doing. It is easy
enough to say that they should have immediately
reformed the administration of the country and given
to the Tripolitans an efficient government. Reform
does not come in a twelvemonth, and the Young
Turks had to act quickly to prevent the loss of
Tripoli. They took the only means they had. They
began to thwart and obstruct every Italian enterprise,
to extend the military frontiers of Tripoli into the
Soudan, to bring all the Moslem tribes of Africa into
touch with the Constantinople khalifate.
Italy saw her hopes being destroyed as other
colonial hopes had been destroyed one after the other.
Representations at Constantinople were without

effect. The more her ambassador tried, the more he
realized the hopelessness of his case. Surely it was
a fruitless diplomatic task to persuade Young Turkey
that her officials in Tripoli and Benghazi should be
forbidden to hinder the onward march of Italian
"peaceable conquest." The Italian economic fabric
in Tripoli, so carefully and so patiently built, seemed
to be for nothing. Austria-Hungary had begun the
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by the annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. No Power
had successfully protested, much less the helpless
Turks. So Italy began to prepare her coup.
The crisis could not be precipitated. Italian public
opinion, wary of colonial enterprises since the terrible
Abyssinian disaster, and opposed to the imposition
of fresh taxes, had to be carefully prepared to sustain
the Ministry in a hostile action against Turkey.
245
In January, 1911, the Italian press began to pub-
lish articles on Tripoli, dilating upon its economic
value and importance to Italy,
its vital if she were
to hold her place the great Powers of Europe.
among
Every little Turkish persecution and there were
many of them was made the subject of a first-page
bit of telegraphic news. The Italian people were
worked up to believe that not only in Tripoli, but
elsewhere, the Young Turks were showing their con-
tempt for Italian officialsand for the Italian flag.
An Italian sailing vessel was seized at Hodeidah in
the Red Sea the incident
;
was magnified. An Ameri-
can archaeological expedition was granted a concession
in Tripoli; a similar concession had been refused to
Italian applicants. The newspapers pretended that
the Americans were really prospecting for sulphur
mines, whose development would mean disaster to
the great mines in Sicily! French troops reached
the Oasis of Ghadames the hinterland of Tripoli was
;
threatened by the extension of French sovereignty

into the Sahara. At this moment the reopening of
the Morocco question by the Agadir incident gave
Italy the incentive and the encouragement to show
her hand.
In September, the press campaign against the
Turkish treatment of Italians in Tripoli became daily
and violent. Signer Giolitti succeeded in getting all
parties, except the extreme Socialists, to promise their
support.
It was not until the last moment that the Sublime
Porte realized the danger. On September 26th, the
Derna, a transport, arrived at Tripoli, with much-
246
needed munitions of war. There had been a shame-
ful up the garrisons in the Afri-
neglect to keep
can provinces, and when it was too late as is so
often the case at Constantinople there dawned
the realization that the provinces were practically
without defence.
û
On September 27th, the first of the series of ulti-
matums which have brought all Europe into war was
delivered to the Sublime Porte. Italy gave Turkey
forty-eight hours to consent to the occupation of
Tripoli, with the proviso of the Sultan's sovereignty
under the Italian protectorate, and the payment of an
annual subsidy into the Ottoman Treasury. In Italy,
two classes were mobilized, General Caneva em-
barked his troops upon transports that had already
been prepared, and the Italian fleet proceeded to
Tripoli.
The Turks did not believe that there would be war.
On the afternoon of September 29th, the Grand
Vizier, as far-seeing in his understanding of interna-
tional affairs ashe was blind in grasping what was
best for Turkey's interests, told me that he was sure
Italy would hesitate before entering upon a war that
would be the prelude to the greatest catastrophe that
the world has ever known. "Italy will not draw the
sword," he declared, "because she knows that if she
does attack us, all Europe will be eventually drawn
into the bloodiest struggle of history, a struggle
that has always been certain to follow the destruction
of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Hakki
pasha was right, except in one important particular.
Perhaps Italy did know what an attack upon Turkey
247
would eventually lead to. But two hours after my
conversation with the Grand Vizier, he received a
declaration of war.
Simultaneously with the news of the declaration
of war, Constantinople learned that the first shots
had already been fired.Without waiting for any
formalities, the Italian fleet had attacked and sunk
Turkish torpedo-boats off Preveza at the mouth of
the Adriatic. The Turkish fleet had just left Beirut
to return to Constantinople, and for three days it was
feared that the Italians would follow up their offen-
siveby destroying the naval power of Turkey. They
did not do so, although it would have been an easy
victory. For it was the hope of the Giolitti Cabinet
that there would be no real war.
The attack at Preveza had a double purpose of
preventing the torpedo-boats from interfering with
the Italian commerce, and of striking terror into the
hearts of the Turks. The Italians did not want to
widen the breach and draw upon themselves the
hatred and enmity of Turkey by sinking her navy.
Such an action would make difficult the negotiations
which they hoped to pursue. It was not war
still
against the people of Turkey that they had declared ;
that was a mere form. What they wanted was a

pretext for seizing Tripoli. So naval and military
operations were directed not against Turkey, but
against the coveted African provinces. Considera-
tions of international diplomacy, also, dictated this
policy.
The Italian warships opened fire upon Tripoli on
September 3Oth. On October 2d and 3d, the forts
248
were dismantled and the garrison driven out of the
city by the bombardment. On October 5th, Tripoli
surrendered. The expeditionary corps disembarked
on the nth. The next transports from Italy went
farther east.Derna capitulated on the 8th, but a
heavy sea prevented the troops from landing until
the 1 8th. General Ameglio took Benghazi at the
point of the bayonet on October igth. Horns was
occupied on the 2ist.
The Turks and Arabs attempted to retake Tripoli
on October 23d. While the Italian soldiers were in
the trenches they were fired upon from behind by
Arabs who were supposed to be non-combatants.
Discovery of the assailants was practically im-
possible, because many clothed themselves like
women and hid their faces by veils. The Italians
had to repress this move from the rear with ruthless
severity. They did what any other army would
have done under the circumstances, for their safety
depended upon putting down the enemy that had
arisen in their rear. Failure to act quickly and
severely would have encouraged a revolution in the
city and its suburbs. Horror was excited throughout
the world by the highly coloured stories of this re-
pression. Details of Italian cruelty were emphasized.
No effort was made to explain impartially the provo-
cation which had led to this killing. There was an
unconscious motive in these stories to embarrass
Italy in her attempt to build a colonial empire, just
exactly as there had been in the time of the Abys-
sinian War in 1896. The American Consul at Tripoli
has assured me that the correspondents who were
249
guests at the time of the Italian army did not give
the facts as they were.
The French and English newspaper campaign
against Italy was as violent as it had been against
Austria in 1908, at the time of the first violation of
Ottoman Attempts were made
territorial integrity.
to denounce the high-handed act of piracy of which
Italy had been guilty, and to poison the public mind
against the Italian army. It is significant to note
this attitude of the press of the two countries, which
are now so persuasively extending the olive branch
to Italy. Great Britain and France were alarmed
over the menace to the "equilibrium" of the Medi-
terranean. This is why they did not hesitate to
denounce unsparingly the successful effort of Italy to
follow in their own footsteps The tension between
!
France and Italy was illustrated by the vehement

newspaper protests against the Italian use of the
right of search for contraband on French ships. Italy
was taken to task for acting in exactly the same way
that France has since acted in arresting Dutch ships
in August and September, 1914.
The attempt of October 23d failed, in spite of the
conspiracy behind the lines. A second attempt on

the 26th was equally unsuccessful. On November
6th, the garrison of Tripoli started to take the offen-
sive. But progress beyond the suburbs of the city
was found to be impossible.
A decree annexing the African provinces of Turkey
was approved by the Italian Parliament on Novem-
ber 5th. .The Italian "adventure," as those who
looked upon Italy's aggression with unfriendly eyes
250
persisted in calling was now shown to be irrevoca-
it,
ble. Turkey's opportunity to compromise had passed.

In Tripoli, as well as in the other cities, it took the
whole winter to make the foothold on the coast secure.
From November 27th to March 3d, Enver bey made
three attempts to retake Derna. From November
28th to March I2th, six assaults of Turks and Arabs
were made upon Benghazi. The Italian positions
at Horns were not secure until February 27th. Italy
was practically on the defensive everywhere.
Hakki pasha found himself compelled to resign
when the war was declared. In fact, he considered
himself fortunate not to be assassinated by army
officers, whodeclared that he had been negligent to
the point of treason in laying Turkey open to the
possibility of being attacked where and when she was
weakest. Said pasha became Grand Vizier he had
held the post six times under Abdul Hamid. Five
members of the former Cabinet, including Mahmud
Shevket pasha, remained in office.
The first appearance of Said pasha's Cabinet be-
fore Parliament is a scene that I shall never forget.
No pains had been spared to make it a brilliant spec-
tacle. The Sultan was
present during the reading
of his speech from the throne. Everyone expected
an important pronouncement. The speech of Said
pasha was typically Turkish. Instead of announcing
how Turkey was to resist Italy, he gave it to be
understood in vague language that diplomacy was
going to save the day once more, and that Turkey
was secure because the preservation of her territorial
integrity was necessary for Europe.
251
The action of Italy, however, had upset the calcu-
lations of the Young Turks in the game they were
trying to play in European diplomacy. It was their
dream more than that Turkey
that, their belief
held the balance of power between the two great
groups of European Powers. They thought that the
destinies of Europe were I heard
in their hands.
Mahmud Shevket pasha say once that "the million
bayonets of Turkey would decide the fortunes of
Europe." Turkey was essentially mixed up in the
European imbroglio. But it was the absence of
those million bayonets, of which Mahmud Shevket
pasha boasted, that changed the fortunes of Europe.
The military weakness of the Ottoman Empire has
brought us to the present catastrophe.
The embarrassment of the Young Turks was that
Italy belonged to the Triple Alliance, and that Ger-
many, while professing deep and loyal friendship,
stood by and saw Turkey attacked by her ally, Italy,
just as she had stood by in 1908, when the other
partner of the Triple Alliance had annexed Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Those who had based their hopes
of Turkey's future upon the pan-Germanic move-
ment had a bitter awakening. In what sense could
Wilhelm II be called "the defender of Islam"?
I attended sessions of Parliament frequently during
the five weeks between the outbreak of the war and
the passing of the decree by which the African pos-
sessions of Turkey were annexed to the kingdom of
Italy. Before this step had been taken by Italy,
there was a possibility of saving the situation. But
the Turks, instead of presenting a united front to the
252
world, and finding ways and means of making a
successful resistance against Italy, wasted not only
the precious month of October, when there was still
a way out, but also the whole winter that followed.
In November, the opposition in the House and
Senate formed a new party which they called the
"
"Entente Liberale. The principal discussions in
Parliament were about whether the Hakki pasha
Cabinet should be tried for high treason, and whether
the Chamber of Deputies could be prorogued by the
Sultan without the consent of the Senate. The
opposition grew so rapidly that the Committee of
Union and Progress induced the Sultan to dissolve
Parliament on January 18, 1913.
The new elections were held at the end of March.
Throughout the Empire they were a pure farce. The
functionaries of the Government saw to it that only
members of the Committee of Union and Progress
were returned. While the Young Turks were play-
ing their game of parties, anarchy was rife in differ-
"
ent parts of the Empire. The Interior Organization"
had been revived in Macedonia. The Albanians,
who had been left entirely out of the fold in the new
elections, were determined to get redress. In Arabia, \
the neutrality of Iman Yahia in the war with Italy

was purchased only by the granting of complete
autonomy. It was the surrender of the last vestige
of Turkish authority in an important part of Arabia.
Said Idris, the other powerful chief in the Yemen,
refused to accept autonomy, and continued to harass
the Turkish army.
The Committee of Union and Progress was not
253
allowed to enjoy long its fraudulent victory. In the
army an organization which called itself "The Mili-
tary League for the Defence of the Country" was
formed, and received so many adhesions that Mah-
mud Shevket pasha was compelled to leave the Minis-
try of War on July loth, and Said pasha the Grand
Vizirate eight days later. Ghazi Mukhtar pasha
accepted the task of forming a new Cabinet. The
Unionist Parliament refused to listen to his program.
So he secured from the Sultan a second prorogation
of Parliament on August 5th. The weapon the
Unionists had used was turned against them.
While Turkey showed herself absolutely incapable
of making any military move to recover the invaded
provinces or to punish the invader, Italy had none
the less a difficult problem to face. A few Turkish
officers had succeeded in organizing among the Arabs
of Tripoli and Benghazi a troublesome resistance.
General Caneva went to Rome at the beginning of
February, and told the Cabinet very plainly that it
would take months to get a start in Africa, and years
to complete the pacification of the new colonies,
unless the Turks consented to withdraw the sup-
port of their military leadership and to cease their
religious agitation.
The question was, how could Turkey be forced to
recognize the annexation decree of November 5th?
The Italian fleet could not be kept indefinitely, at
tremendous expense and monthly depreciation of the
value of the ships, under steam. The Turkish fleet
did not come out to give battle, so the Italians were
immobilized at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Ital-
254
ian commerce in the Black Sea and eastern Medi-
terranean was at a standstill. Upon Italian imports
into Turkey had been placed a duty of one hundred
per cent. Where, outside of Tripoli, was the pressure
to be exercised?
Premier San Giuliano had promised before the war
started that he would not disturb political conditions
in the Balkan peninsula. The alliance with Austria-
Hungary made impossible operations in the Adriatic.

But it was clear that something must be done. Pub-
lic opinion in Italy had been getting very restless.
It did not seem to the Italians that the considerations
of international diplomacy should stand in the way
of finishing the war. Were they to burden them-
selves with heavy taxes in order to spare the feelings
of the Great Powers? Had Russia hesitated in the
Caucasus? Had Great Britain hesitated in Egypt?
Had Austria hesitated in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
As a sopto public opinion, and also as a feeler to
see how the move would be taken by the other
Powers, the Cabinet decided upon direct action
against Turkey. The
appeared before Beirut
fleet
on February 24th, and sank two Turkish warships

in the harbour. It was not exactly a bombardment
of the city, but many shells did fall on the
buildings and on the streets near the quay. Neither
Turkey nor Europe paid much attention to this
demonstration. In April, Italy had come to the
point where she that she must cast all scruples
felt
to the winds. A direct attack upon Turkey was

decided. Italy, atwriting the only neutral
this
among the Great Powers of Europe, took the action

255
which brought Balkan ambitions to a ferment, and
caused the kindling of the European conflagration.
Her declaration of war on Turkey and the annexa-
tion of Tripoli inevitably led to this. On April i8th
Admiral Viala bombarded the forts of Kum
Kale at
the Dardanelles, and on the same day the port of
Vathy in Samos. Four days later Italian marines
disembarked on the island of Stampali. On May
4th, Rhodes was invaded, a battle occurred in the
streets of the town, and the Turks withdrew to
the interior of the island. They were pursued, and
surrendered on the i/th. Ten other islands at the
mouth of the JEgean Sea were occupied.
A demonstration at Patmos for union with Greece
was vigorously repressed. Italy protested her good
faith in regard to the islands. But the dismember-
ment of the Ottoman Empire, arrested at San Stef-
ano in 1878, had begun again.
Turkey responded to the bombardment of Kum
Kale by closing the Dardanelles, and to the occupa-
tion of Rhodes by attempting to expel from Turkey
all Italian residents. The expulsion decree, however,
was carried out with great humanity and considera-
tion by the Turks. During the Italian War and
also the Balkan War, Turkish treatment of sub-
jects of hostile statesliving in Ottoman territory
was highly praiseworthy. The Christian nations of
Europe would today do well to follow their example !
The closing of the straits lasted for a month. It

disturbed all Europe. Never before has the question
of the straits been shown to be so vital to the world.
From April i8th to May i8th. over two hundred
256
merchant vessels of all nations were immobilized in
Constantinople. It was a sight to be witness of once
For these ships were not lost in a maze
in a lifetime.
and piers. They lay in the stream of
of basins, docks,
the Bosphorus and at the entrance to the Sea of
Marmora. You could count them all from the
Galata Tower. The loss to shipping was tremendous.
Southern Russia is the bread basket of Europe. No
European resident could remain unaffected by a
closing of the only means of egress for these billions
of bushels of wheat. Angry protests were in vain.
Turkey reopened the straits only when assurance had
been given to her that the attack of the Italian fleet
would not be repeated.
Little had been gained by Italy as far as hastening
peace was concerned. She had done all that she

could. Turkey still remained passive and unresisting,
because she knew well that any vital action, such
as the bombardment of Salonika or Smyrna, or the
invasion of European Turkey by way of Albania or
Macedonia, would bring on a general European war.
Italy could not take this responsibility before history.
So for months longer it remained a war without
battles. Many Italian warships had not fired a
single shot.
During May, June, and July, the Italians pushed
on painfully to the interior of Tripoli. There was
no other way. In August, the Turkish resistance on
the side of Tunis was finished. In September, a
desperate attack of Enver bey against Derna was
repulsed. The Italian forces were in a much better
position than before. But the attacks of the Arabs
17 257
were of such a character that they could not be
suppressed by overwhelming numbers of trained
men that the Italians could muster. It was a guerilla
warfare with the oases of the desert as the back-
ground. The Italians felt that the Arabs, if left to
themselves, would soon tire of the conflict. For they
were, after all, traders, and were dependent upon the
outlets for their caravan trade which was now com-
pletely in the hands of Italians. It was the mere
handful of Turkish troops and Turkish officers who
kept the Arabs stirred up to fight.
As early as June, Italian and Turkish representa-
tives met informally at Ouchy on Lac Leman to
discuss bases for a solution of the conflict which had
degenerated into an odd impasse. Italy was anxious
to conclude peace for several reasons. Her com-
merce was suffering. Her warships needed the dry-
dock badly. While Turkey could no longer prevent
the conquest of Tripoli and Benghazi, the absence
of Turkish direction in keeping the tribesmen of the
interior stirred up, and the cessation of the propa-
ganda against the Italian occupation on the ground

of religion, would help greatly in the pacification of
the provinces. Since the Albanian revolution had
assumed alarming proportions, Turkey also became
anxious for peace. She was uncertain of Italy's
attitude in case of an outbreak in the Balkans. Un-
officially, Italy had let it be known that there was a
limit to patience, and that the development of a
hostile attitude by the Balkan States against Turkey
would find her, in spite of Europe, in alliance with
them against her. In reality, however, the Italian
258
ministers at the Balkan courts had all along done
their best to keep Greece and Bulgaria from being
carried away by the temptation to take advantage of
the situation. This had been especially true in April
and May, during the period of Italian activity in the
Turkey knew perfectly well, before the pourparlers

at Ouchy, what were the Italian terms. In March,
when the five other Powers had offered to mediate,
Italy had laid down the following points tacit recog-
:
nition of the Italian conquest and withdrawal of the

Turkish army from Africa recognition by the Powers,
;
ifnot by Turkey, of the decree of annexation. Italy

promised, if this were done, to recognize the Sultan
as Khalif in the African provinces (this meant purely
religious sovereignty) to respect the religious liberty
;
and customs of the Moslem populations; to accord

an amnesty to the Arabs to guarantee to the Otto-
;
man Public Debt the obligations for which the cus-

toms-duties of Tripoli had been mortgaged; to buy
the properties owned by the Ottoman Government;
to guarantee, in accord with the other Powers, the
(future!) "integrity of the Ottoman Empire." Tur-
key had refused these terms, in spite of the pressure
of the Powers at the Sublime Porte. Then followed
the loss of Rhodes and the other islands.
The first pourparlers at Ouchy had been inter-
rupted by the fall of Said pasha. They were resumed
on August 1 2th by duly accredited delegates. After
six weeks an accord was prepared, and sent to Con-
stantinople. The ministry, although facing a war

with the Balkan States, tried to prolong the negotia-
259
tions. Italy then addressed an ultimatum on Octo-
ber I2th. The Sublime Porte was doing its best to
prevent war with the Balkan States. Italy was
determined now to go to any length to wring peace
from her stubborn opponent. For the Balkan storm
was breaking, and she wanted to get her ambassador
back to Constantinople to take part in the councils of
the Great Powers. The continuance of a state of war
with Turkey was never more clearly against her
interests. When the ultimatum arrived, Turkey
yielded. The preliminaries of Ouchy were signed on
October I5th.
There were two distinct parts to the Treaty of
Lausanne, as it is generally called. In order to save
the pride of Turkey, nothing was said in the text of
the treaty about a cession of territory. Turkey was
not asked to recognize the Italian conquest. The
unofficial portion of the treaty consisted of a firman,
granting complete autonomy to the African vilayet,

and appointing a personal religious representative
of the Khalif , with functions purely nominal and the
;
promise of amnesty and good administration to the

Êgean Islands.
The text of the treaty provided for the cessation of
hostilities the withdrawal of the Turkish army from
;
Tripoli and Benghazi and the withdrawal of the

Italian army from the islands of the Êgean; the
resumption of commercial and diplomatic relations;
and the assumption by Italy of Tripoli's share of the
Ottoman Public Debt.
Italy had no intention of fulfilling the spirit of
the second clause of this treaty, which was that the
260
islands occupied by her be restored to Turkey.
The text of the treaty provided that the recall of the
Italian troops be subordinated to the recall of the
Turkish troops from Tripoli. It was easy enough to
quibble at a later time about the meaning of "Turk-
ish." As long
as there was opposition to the Italian
pacification, the opponents could be called Turkish.
Italy said that the holding of the Dodecanese was a
guarantee of Turkish good faith in preventing the
continuance secretly of armed opposition to her
subjugation of the new African colonies. As long as
an Arab held the field against the Italian army, it
could still be claimed that Turkey had not fulfilled
her side of the promise in Article 2. At the moment,
Turkey was quite willing to see the Italians stay in
the southern islands of the JEgean. For otherwise
they would have inevitably fallen into the hands of
the Greeks when the Balkan War broke out.
Since the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the
Italians have remained in the Dodecanese. Not only
that, but they have used their position in Rhodes to
begin a propaganda of Italian economic influence in
south-western Asia Minor. Before the present Euro-
pean war, Italy might have found herself compelled
to relinquish her hold on these islands. But now her
advantageous neutrality has put into her hands the
cards by which she can secure the acquiescence of
Europe to the annexation of Rhodes.
The outbreak of indignation in Turkey against
Italy at the beginning of the war was even more
vehement than that against Austria-Hungary when
she had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908.
261
Hussein Djahid bey, in the Tanine, wrote an edi-
torial, in which he said: "Never shall we have any
dealings with the Italians in the future. Never shall

a ship bearing their flag find trade at an Ottoman
port. And we shall teach our children, and tell them
to teach their children, the reasons for the undying
hatred between Osmanli and Italian as long as history
lasts." Having read the same sort of a thing in
1908, I in seeing just how long the
was interested
hatred would Just a year from the day war
last.
was declared, and this editorial appeared, the Italian
ambassador returned on a warship to Constantinople,
the Italian post offices opened, and all my Italian
friends began to reappear. This is told here to illus-
trate the fact that cannot be too stronglyemphasized :
no public opinion in Turkey.

there is
The chief importance of the year of "the war that
was no war" is not in the loss of Tripoli. It is in the
fact that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire,
secure since 1878, had been attacked by violence.
The example given by was to be followed by the
Italy
Balkan States. What Europe had feared had come.
This war was the prelude to Europe in arms.
CHAPTER XIV
THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN STATES
AND TURKEY
the year 1911 there had been a per-
ceptible drawing together of the Balkan
DURING
States common ground
in the effort to find a
for an offensive alliance against Turkey. The path
of union was very difficult for the diplomats of the
Balkan States to follow. It was clear to them in
principle that they would never be able to oppose
the policy of the Young Turks separately. They
were not even sure whether their united armies
could triumph over the large forces which the Ot-
toman Empire was able to put in the field, and which
were reputed to be well trained and disciplined.
This reputation was sustained by the unanimous
opinion of the military attaches of the Great Powers
at Constantinople And then, there were the mutual
antipathies to be healed, and the problem of the
terrible rivalry in Macedonia, of which we have
spoken before, to be solved. Most formidable of

all, was the uncertainty as to the benefit to the
different Balkan nations of a successful war against
Turkey.
It is impossible to explain here all the diplomatic
263
steps leadingup to the Balkan alliance against
Turkey. They have been set forth, with much
divergency of opinion, by a number of writers
who were in intimate touch with the diplomatic
circles ofthe Balkan capitals during the years imme-
diately preceding the formation of the alliance. We
muet confine ourselves to a statement of the general
causes which induced the Balkan States, against
the better judgment of many of their wisest leaders,
to form the alliance, and to declare war upon Turkey.
Both Bulgaria and Greece had sentimental reasons ;
the terrible persecution of the Christians of their

own race in Macedonia seemed cause enough for
war. But while Bulgaria had long held the thesis
of Macedonian autonomy, which was sustained by
the Bulgarian Macedonians themselves, Greece was
afraid that the creation of such a regime would in
the end prove an irrevocable blow to Hellenistic
aspirations. It was well known to the Greeks that
the population of Macedonia was not only largely
Bulgarian, but aggressively so, and that its sense
of nationality had been intelligently and skilfully
awakened and fostered by the educational propa-
ganda. Above all things Hellenism feared the
Bulgarian schools. Under an autonomous regime
their influence could not be combated.
The
possibility of the Balkan alliance was really
in thehands of Greece. For it was recognized that
no matter how large and powerful an army Bulgaria
and Servia could raise, the co-operation of the Greek
navy, which would prevent the use of the .Êgean
ports of the Macedonian littoral for disembarking
264
BALKAN ALLIANCE AGAINST TURKEY
troops from Asia, was absolutely essential to success.
In spite of their fears for the future of Macedonia,
the Greeks were converted to the idea of an alliance
with the Slavic Balkan States to destroy the power
of Turkey by the continual bullying of the Young
Turks over Crete, and by the economic disasters
from the boycott. It is not too much to say that
the attitude of the Young Turks towards the Cretan
questions, and their institution of the boycott, were
two factors directly responsible for the downfall of
the Empire.
The hundred Bulgarian students to
visit of three
Athens in Easter week, 1911, should have been a
warning to Turkey of the danger which attended
her policy of goading the Greeks to desperation. I
was present on the Acropolis at the memorable re-
ception given by the students of Athens to their
guests from the University of Sofia, and remember
well the peculiar political significance of the speeches
of welcome addressed to them there. Later in the
same year, Greece followed the example of the other
Balkan States in sending her Crown Prince to Sofia
to join in the festivities attendant upon the coming
of age of Crown Prince Boris.
Bulgaria was drawn into the Balkan alliance, and

reluctantly compelled to abandon the policy of
Macedonian autonomy, by the attitude of the Young
Turks toward Macedonians. The settlement of
immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the
conscription for the Turkish army, led to reprisals
on the part of Bulgarian bands. These were fol-
lowed by massacres at Ishtib and elsewhere. In the
265
firstweek of August, 1912, the massacre of Kotchana
was for Bulgaria the last straw on the camel's back.
I was in Sofia at the end of August when the national
congress, called together wholly without the Govern-

ment's co-operation, declared that war was a neces-
sity. Seated one evening in the public garden at a
cafe if I remember rightly it was the 1st of Septem-
ber I heard from the lips of one of the influential
delegates at this congress that public opinion in
Bulgaria was so wholly determined to force war, that
the King and the Cabinet would have to yield.
In Servia and Montenegro, it had long been re-
cognized that any opportunity to unite with Bul-
garia and Greece to bring pressure to bear upon
Turkey could not but be beneficial to these two
kingdoms. There was the sandjak of Novi Bazar
to be divided between Montenegro and Servia.
There was the possibility of an outlet to the Adriatic.
So far as Macedonia was concerned, if we believe
that she was honest and sincere in the treaty of
partition with Bulgaria, Servia was quite content
with the idea of a possible annexation of Old Servia,
and the opportunity to drive back the Moslem
Albanians, who had been established on her frontiers
under the Young Turk regime, and were ruthlessly
destroying Slavs wherever they got the opportunity.
One does not have any hesitation in declaring that
the political leaders in power in the Balkan States
at first hoped to avoid a war with Turkey. That
they did not succeed in doing so was due to the pres-
sure of public sentiment upon them. This public
sentiment forced them to action. Every Balkan
266
Cabinet would have fallen had the ministries re-
mained advocates of peace. Over against the fear of
the Turkish army, which (let me say it emphatically)
was very strong among the military authorities in
each of the Balkan States, was the feeling that the
time was very favourable to act, and that chances
of success in a common war against Turkey were
greater in the autumn of 1912 than they would be
later; for the Young Turks were spending tre-
mendous sums of money on army reorganization.
At that moment, they were coming to the end of a
demoralizing war with Italy, and the Macedonian
army had suffered greatly during the summer by
the Albanian uprising.
Early in September, Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and
Montenegro decided that peace could be preserved
only by the actual application, under sufficient
guarantees, of sweeping reforms in Macedonia.
They appealed to the Powers to sustain them in
demanding for Macedonia a provincial assembly, a
militia recruited within the limits of the province,
and a Christian Governor. The Great Powers, as
usual, tried to carry water on both shoulders. Blind
to the fact that inaction and vague promises would
no longer keep in check the neighbours of Turkey,
they urged the Balkan States to refrain from "being
insistent," and pointed out to Turkey the "ad-
visability" of making concessions. The Turks did
not believe in the reality of the union of the Balkan
States. They could not conceive upon what grounds
their neighbours had succeeded in forming an alli-
ance. Neither the Balkan States nor Turkey had
267
any respect for the threats or promises or offers of
assistance of the Powers.
In order to convince the Balkan States that they
had better think twice before making a direct ulti-
matum, the Turks organized autumn manoeuvres
north of Adrianople, in which fifty thousand of the
ilitearmy corps were to take part. The answer of
the Balkan States was an order for general mobili-
zation issued simultaneously in the four capitals.
This was on September 3Oth.? -The next day Turkey
began to mobilize. All the Greek ships in the Bos-
phorus and the Dardanelles were seized. Munitions
of war, disembarked at Salonika for Servia, were
confiscated. It was not until then that it began to
dawn upon Turkey and her sponsors, the Great
Powers, that the Balkan States meant business.
The questions of reforms in Macedonia had been so
long the prerogative of the Powers that they did not
realize that themoment had come when the little
Balkan States, whom they called "troublesome,"
were no longer going to be put off with promises.
The absolute failure of concerted European diplo-
macy to accomplish anything in the Ottoman Empire
was demonstrated from the results in Macedonia, and
also in Crete.
So the Balkan States were not in the proper frame
of mind to receive the joint note on the status quo,
which will remain famous in the annals of European
diplomacy as a demonstration of the futility of con-

certed diplomatic action, when is no genuine
there
unity behind it. On the morning of October 8th,
the ministers of Russia and Austria, acting in the
268
"
name of the six Great Powers," handed in at Sofia,
Athens, Belgrade, and Cettinje, the following note:
"The Russian and Austro-Hungarian Govern-

ments declare to the Balkan States :
"i. That the Powers condemn energetically

every measure capable of leading to a rupture of
peace;
"2. That, supporting themselves on Article 23
of the Treaty of Berlin, they will take in hand,
in the interest of the populations, the realization
of the reforms in the administration of European
Turkey, on the understanding that these reforms
will not diminish the sovereignty of His Imperial
Majesty the Sultan and the territorial integrity
of the Ottoman Empire; this declaration reserves,
also, the liberty of the Powers for the collective
and ulterior study of the reforms;
"3. That if, in spite of this note, war does
break out between the Balkan States and the
Ottoman Empire, they will not admit, at the end
of the conflict, any modification in the territorial
status quo in European Turkey.
"The Powers will make collectively to the Sub-
lime Porte the steps which the preceding declaration
makes necessary."
The shades of San Stefano, Berlin, Cyprus,

and Egypt, Armenian massacres, Mitylene and
Miinsterberg, Bagdad railway, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Tripoli, and Rhodes, haunted this declaration, and
made it impotent, honest effort though it was to
preserve the peace of Europe. It was thirty-six
years too late.
For, one hour after it was delivered, the chargb
269
d'affaires of theMontenegrin legation at Constanti-
nople, evidently as a result of an anticipation of a
joint note from the Powers, left at the Sublime Porte
the following memorable declaration of war:
"In conformity with the authorization of King

Nicholas, I have the honour of informing you that
I shall leave Constantinople to-day. The Govern-
ment of Montenegro breaks off all relations with
the Ottoman Empire, leaving to the fortunes of
arms of the Montenegrins the recognition of their
rights and of the rights scorned through centuries
of their brothers of the Ottoman Empire.
"I leave Constantinople.
"The royal government will give to the Ottoman
representative at Cettinje his passports. ' '
' '
October 8 1912.
,
PLAMENATZ.
There could no longer be any doubt of the trend

of things. Inevitable result, this declaration of war,
of the action of Italy one year before, just as the
action of Italy harked back to Russian action in
the Caucasus, British action in Egypt, Austrian
action in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and French action
in Morocco. Inevitable precursor, this declaration
of war, of theEuropean catastrophe of 1914. Who,
then, is presumptuous enough to maintain that the
cause is simple, and the blame all at one door?
"
Europe is reaping in blood-lust what all the Great
Powers" have sown in land-lust.
The chancelleries made
strenuous efforts to nullify
what their inspired organs called the
"blunder,"
or the "hasty and inconsiderate action," of King
Nicholas. There was feverish activity in Constan-
270
tinople,and a continual exchange of conferences be-
tween the embassies and the Sublime Porte. The
ambassadors gravely handed in a common note, in
which they offered to avert war by taking in hand
themselves the long-delayed reforms. Had they
forgotten the institution of the gendarmerie in 1903,
and Hussein Hilmi pasha at Salonika?
On this same day, the Montenegrin ex-minister
at Constantinople, whose declaration of war had
been so theatrical, was reported as having said at
Bukarest on his way home, "Montenegro wants
territorial aggrandizements, and will not give back
whatever conquests she makes. We do not fear to
cross the will of the Great Powers, for they do not
worry us." These words express exactly the senti-
ments of the other allies, both as regards their
possible conquests and their attitude towards the
dictum of the Powers.
Events moved rapidly during the next ten days.
On October I3th, the Balkan States responded to
the Russo- Austrian note, thanking the Powers for
their generous offices, but declaring that they had
come to the end of their patience in the matter of
Turkish promises for Macedonian reform, and were
going to request of the Ottoman Government that
itaccord "without delay the reforms that have been
demanded, and that it promise to apply them in
six months, with the help of the Great Powers, and
of the Balkan States whose interests are involved"

This response was not only a refusal of mediation.
It was an assertion, as the last words show, that the
time had come when the Balkan States felt strong
271
enough to claim a part in the management of their
own affairs.
Acting in accordance with, this notification to the

Powers, on October I4th, Servia, Greece, and Bul-
garia demanded of Turkey the autonomy of the
European provinces, under Christian governors; the
occupation of the provinces by the allied armies while
the reforms were being applied; the payment of an
indemnity for the expenses of mobilization; the
immediate demobilization of Turkey; and the pro-
mise that the reforms would be effected within six
months. The demand was in the character of an
ultimatum, and forty-eight hours were given for a
response.
It was now evident that unless the Powers could
compel the Balkan States to withdraw this sweeping
claim, war would be inevitable. For no independent
state could accept such a demand, and retain its self-
respect. The representatives of Turkey at Belgrade
and Athens were quite right in refusing to receive
the note and transmit it to Constantinople.
The Sublime porte did not answer directly the
ultimatum of the allies. An effort was made to anti-
cipate the Balkan claims, and get the Powers to
intervene, by reviving the law of reform for the
vilayets, which provided for the organization of
communes and schools, the building of roads, and
the limitation of military service to the vilayet or
recruitment. But the fact that this law had been
on the statute books since 1880, and had remained
throughout the Empire a dead letter, gave little
hope that it would be seriously applied now.
272
On October I5th, fighting began on the Serbo-
Turkish frontier. The war had already brought
about Turkish reverses at the hands of the Monte-
negrins. Greece threw an additional defiance in the
face of Turkey by admitting the Cretan deputies to
the Greek legislative chamber.
To gain time, for she was unprepared, and her
mobilization progressing very slowly, Turkey made
desperate efforts to delay the declaration of war by
offering to treat at Sofia, on the basis of a cessation
of Moslem immigration into Macedonia, and the
suspension of enrolment of Christians in Moslem
regiments. These points, as we have already shown,
were the two principal reasons why the Bulgarians
of Macedonia had changed their policy from auto-
nomy to independence. But Bulgaria, feeling that
cause for hesitation over a war of liberation had
been removed by her secret partition treaty with
Servia, remained obdurate.
Thenthe Turkish diplomats turned their atten-
tion to Athens, and tried to detach the Greeks from
the alliance by agreeing to recognize the annexation
of Crete to Greece, and promising an autonomous
government for some of the JEgean Islands. This
failed. But, to the very last, the Turks believed
that Greece might stay out of the war. For this
reason her representative at Athens was instructed
to do all in his power to remain at his post, even if
war were declared by the Sublime Porte on Bulgaria
and Servia.
Peace was hurriedly concluded with Italy at
Ouchy on October I5th. On the i6th, when the
is
273
forty-eight hours of the ultimatum had expired, and
there was no answer from Turkey, every one expected
a declaration of war from the allies/ None came.
On the 1 8th, to preserve her dignity, Turkey saw
that she must be the one to act. It was no longer
possible to wait until the allies were "good and
ready"! She declared war on Bulgaria and Servia.
Greece waited till afternoon to receive a similar
declaration. None came. So Greece declared war
on Turkey.
THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE WAR
While the diplomats were still agitating and bluster-

ing, while Turkey was procrastinating and trying
to put off the evil day, and while the larger Balkan
States were quietly completing their mobilization,
Montenegro entered into action. On October 9th,
the day following her declaration of war, the Mon-
tenegrins entered the sandjak of Novi Bazar, and
surrounded the frontier fortress of Berana. This
was captured after six days of fighting. On the
same day, Biepolje fell. Nearly one thousand
prisoners, fourteen cannon, and a large number of
rifles and stores were captured by the Montenegrins.
In the meantime, two other Montenegrin columns

had marched southward, reached San Giovanni di
Medua, at the mouth of the Boy ana, and cut Scutari
off from the sea. Scutari was invested, but the
Montenegrins, who had been able to put into the
field scarcely more than thirty thousand men, found
themselves mobilized for the entire winter. The
274
great fortress of Tarabosh, a high mountain, towering
over the town of Scutari and the lower end of the
lake, was too strong for their forces and for their
artillery. Inside the city of Scutari, it was the Al-
banians fighting for their national life, and not the
Turks, who organized and maintained the splendid
and protracted resistance.
The mobilization in the other Balkan States was
not completed until the i8th, when the declaration
of war was made on both sides.
Most important of the foes of Turkey were the
Bulgarians, whose military organization had for
some years been attracting the admiration of all
who had been privileged to see their manoeuvres and
to visit their casernes. Bulgaria had been carefully
and secretly preparing her mobilization long before
the crisis became acute. I had the privilege of
travelling in Bulgaria during the last two weeks of
July, and of spending the month of August along
the frontier between Thrace and Bulgaria. Every-
where one could see the accumulation of the soldiers
of the standing army already on war footing, and
of military stores, at anumber of different places.
During August and September, every detail of the
mobilization had been carefully arranged. When
war was declared, Bulgaria had four armies with
a total effective of over three hundred thousand.
Three of them were quickly massed on the frontier,
fully equipped. No army has ever entered the field
under better auspices.
On the day of the declaration of war, the Czar
Ferdinand issued a proclamation to his troops which
275
clearly defined the issue. It was to be a war of
liberation, a crusade,undertaken to free the brothers
of blood and faith from the yoke of Moslem oppres-
sion. In summing up, the Czar said: "In this
struggle of the Cross against the Crescent, of liberty
against tyranny, we shall have the sympathy of all
those who love justice and progress." At the time,
bitter criticism was directed against the Czar for
having used words which brought out so sharply
the religious issue. The proclamation of a crusade
could bring forth on the other side the response of a
djehad (holy war). This, above all things, was what
the European Powers wished to avoid for they feared
;
not only that it would make the war more bitter

and more cruel between the opponents in the field,
but that it would awaken a wave of fanaticism
among the Moslems living under European control
in Asia and in Africa. How many lessons will it
need to teach Europe that the political menace of

Pan-Islamism is a phantom, a myth !
According to the plan adopted by the allied States,

the offensive movement in Thrace, in which the bulk
of the Turkish army would be met, was to be under-
taken solely by Bulgaria. Only a Bulgarian army
of secondary importance was to enter eastern Mace-
donia, to protect the flank of the main Bulgarian

army from a sudden eastward march of the Turkish
Macedonian army. Its objective point, though not
actually agreed upon, was to be Serres.
The r61e of Servia and Greece, who in the general
mobilization were expected to put about one hundred
and fifty thousand troops each into the field, was
276
to keep in check the Turkish army in Macedonia,
and to prevent Albanian reinforcements from reach-
ing the Turkish army in Thrace. In addition to
this, Servia and Montenegro were expected to prevent
the possible surprise of Austrian interference, while
the fleet of Greece would perform the absolutely
necessary service of preventing the passage of
Turkish forces from Asia Minor to a Macedonian
port.
The allies expected a bitter struggle and, in
Macedonia and Thrace at least, the successful op-
position of a Turkish offensive, rather than the
destruction of the Turkish armies.
The mobilization in Turkey was described by
many newspaper men who had come to Constanti-
nople for the war in the most glowing terms. The
efforts of Mahmud Shevket pasha to prepare the
Turkish army for war were declared to be bearing
splendid fruits in the first days of the mobilization.
Wholly inaccurate accounts were written of the
wonderful enthusiasm of the Turkish people for the
war. Naturally, what even the residents of Con-
stantinople saw at the beginning was the best foot
front. We knew that tremendous sums had been
expended for four years in bringing the army up to
a footing of efficiency. We had seen with our own
eyes the brilliant manoeuvres on the anniversary of
the Sultan's accession in May, and on the anniver-
sary of the Constitution in July. The work accom-
plished by the German mission had cast its spell over
us. We saw what we were expecting to see during
the first days of the mobilization. The "snap
277
judgments" of special correspondents have little
value, other than freshness and naivete, except to

readers even less informed than they are. But the
East is a sphinx even to those who live there. After
you have figured out, from what you call your
"experience," what ought to happen, the chances
are even that just the opposite comes true. In
spite of the misgivings which had been awakened by
a trip into the interior of Asia Minor, as far as Konia,
during the third week of September, I believed that
the Turkish army was going to give a good account
of itself against the Bulgarians, whose spirit and
whose organization I had had opportunity to see
and admire during that very summer.
Every one was mistaken. There were large bodies
of splendidly trained and well-equipped troops in
Thrace. Spick and span regiments did come over
from garrison towns in Asia. We saw them fill
the trains at Stambul and at San Stefano. But we
over-estimated their number. The truth of the
matter is that the trained and well-equipped forces
of the Thracian army, officered by capable men, did
not amount to more than eighty thousand. In
retrospect, after going over carefully the position
of the forces which met the Bulgarians, I feel that
these figures can be pretty accurately established.
But even these eighty thousand soldiers of the nizam
(active army) could have done wonders in the Thra-
cian campaign, if they had been allowed to go ahead
to meet the Bulgarians, and to form the first line
of battle. But this was not done.

There are three time-honoured principles that
278
cannot afford to be neglected at the beginning of a
campaign. The army used for initial offensive action
against the enemy should be composed wholly of
soldiers in active service. The army should be
concentrated to meet the attack, or to attack one
opposing army first, leaving the others until later.
Armies must be kept mobile, and not allow themselves
to be trapped in fortresses. The fortresses in the
portions of territory which may have to be abandoned
temporarily to the invasion of the enemy may easily
be overstocked with defenders, but never with
provisions and munitions of war. In spite of the
instructions of von der Goltz pasha, the Turks
showed no regard for the first two, at least, of these
elementary principles. The mobile army in Mace-

donia, outside of the fortresses, was not recalled to
Thrace, and redifs (reservists) were mixed with
nizams (actives) in the first line of battle. The
neglect of these principles was the direct cause of
the Turkish disasters.
After the nizams, most of whom were already in
Thrace, came the redifs from Asia Minor. They
arrived at Constantinople and at San Stefano in
huge numbers, and without equipment. saw many
I
of them with their feet bound There
in rags. were
no tents over them or other shelter; there was no
proper field equipment for them, and, even while
they were patiently waiting for days to be forwarded
to the front, they lacked (within sight of the mina-
rets of Stambul!) bread to eat, shoes for their feet,
and blankets to cover them at night. More than
that, among them were many thousands who did
279
not know how to use the rifles that were given to
them, and who had not even a rudimentary military
education. In defensive warfare, as they proved
at Adrianople and at Tchatalja, they could fight
like lions. But an offensive movement in the
for
field the great majority of the redifs were worse
than useless.
The Turks were absolutely sure of victory. The
press of the capital, on the day that war was de-
clared, stated that the army of Thrace was composed
of four hundred thousand soldiers, and that it was
the intention to march direct to Sofia. Turkish
officers of acquaintance told me that they were
my
all taking their dress uniforms in their baggage for
this triumphal entry into Sofia, and that the invasion

of Bulgaria would commence immediately.
On the 9th of October, the Bulgarian army ap-
1
peared in force at Mustafa Pasha, the first railway

station after passing the Turkish frontier on the
line from Sofia to Constantinople, and about eighteen
miles north-west of Adrianople. It was the an-
nounced intention of the Bulgarians to attack imme-
diately the fortress of Adrianople, whose cannon
commanded the sole railway line from Bulgaria into
Thrace. Two of the Bulgarian armies were directed
upon Adrianople, and the third army under General
Dimitrieff received similar orders. In Bulgaria,
as well as in Turkey, every one expected to see an
attack upon Adrianople. Had not General Savoff
declared openly that he would sacrifice fifty thou-
sand men, if necessary, as the Japanese had done at
Port Arthur, in order to capture Adrianople?
280
A strict censorship was established in Bulgaria.
No who by chance saw just
one, native or foreigner,
what the armies were doing, could have any hope
of sending out the information. Postal and tele-
graphic communications were in the hands of the
military authorities. No one, who happened to be in
the region in which the troops were moving forward,
was allowed to leave by train, automobile, bicj^cle,
or even on foot. Never in history has the world
been so completely in the dark as to the operations
of the army. But the attacks of the outposts of
Adrianople, and the commencement of the bombard-
ment of the forts, seemed to indicate the common
objective of the three Bulgarian armies. Adrianople
had the reputation of being one of the strongest
fortresses in the world. This reputation was well
justified.
Some miles to the west of Adrianople, guarding
the mountains of the south-eastern frontier of Bul-
garia, was Kirk Kilisse, which was also supposed
to be an impregnable position. Here the Ottoman
military authorities had placed stores to form the
base of supplies for the offensive military operation
against Bulgaria. Shortly before the war, a branch
railway from the sole line between Constantinople
and Adrianople, going north from Lule Burgas, was
completed. It furnished direct means of communi-
cation between the capital and Kirk Kilisse.
The General Staff at Constantinople wisely decided
to leave in Adrianople only a sufficient garrison to
defend the forts and the city. It was their inten-
tion to send the bulk of their Thracian army north-
281
west from Kirk Kilisse, using that fortress as a base,
in order to cut off the Bulgarians from their supplies,
and throw them back against the
forts of Adrianople.
In thisway they intended to put the Bulgarians
between two fires and crush them. Then they
would commence the invasion of Bulgaria. The
plan was excellent. If Turkey had actually had
in the field a half million men well trained and well
equipped, well officered and with a spirit of enthusi-
asm, and most important of all properly fed,
it is probable that the Bulgarians could have been
held in check. But this army did not exist. The

millions spent for equipment had disappeared who
knows where? There were not enough horses, even
with the requisitions in Constantinople, for the
and for the cavalry reserves. That meant
artillery,
that there were no horses at all for the commissary
department. The only means of communication with
the front was a single railway track. Roads had
never been made in Thrace since the conquest. The
artilleryand the waggons had to be drawn through
deep mud.
Beyond the needs of the nizam (active) regiments,
there were hardly any officers. The wretched masses
of redifs (reservists) were without proper leadership.
Not only was this all important factor for keeping
up the morale of the soldiers lacking, but, from the
moment they left Constantinople even before that
there was insufficient food. Nor did the soldiers
know why they were fighting. There was no enthu-
siasm for a cause. The great mass of the civil popu-
lation, if not, like the Christians, hostile to the army,
282
was wholly indifferent. I do not believe there were
ten thousand people in the city of Constantinople,
who really cared what happened in Thrace. Since
I have been in the midst of a mobilization in France,
and have seen how the French soldiers are equipped
for war and fed, and how they have been made to
feel that every man, woman, and child in the nation
was ready to make any sacrifice no matter how
great for "the little soldiers of France," I feel more
deeply the tragedy of the Turkish redifs. My wonder
isthat they were able to fight as bravely as they did.
The world has no use for the government for the
"system" which caused them to suffer as they did,
and to give their lives in a wholly useless sacrifice.
Thestory of the Thracian campaign I heard from
the lips of many of those who had taken part in it,
when the events were still fresh in their memory.
go into all the details, to discuss the
It is fruitless to
strategy of the generals in command, and to give a

technical description of the battles, and of the retreat.
Turkish and Bulgarian officers, as well as a host of
foreign correspondents, have published books on
this campaign. Most of them hide the real causes
of the defeat under a mass of unimportant detail,
and seem to be written either to emphasize the
writer's claim as a "first-hand" witness, to take to
task certain generals, or to prove the superiority of
French artillery, and the faultiness of German mili-
tary instruction. When all these issues are cast to
one side, the campaign can be briefly described.
Wehave already anticipated the debdcle of the
military power of Turkey by giving the causes.
283
This is not illogical. For these causes existed, and
led to the inevitable result, before the first gun was
fired.
On October igth, the Bulgarians
began the invest-
ment of Adrianople from the north and west. There
was no serious opposition. The Turkish garrison
naturally fell back to the protection of the forts,
for the Turks had not planned to oppose, beyond
Adrianople, the Bulgarian approach. The Ottoman

advance-guard, composed of the corps of Constanti-
nople and Rodosto, under the command of Abdullah
and Mahmud Mukhtar pashas, was ordered to take
the offensive north of Kirk Kilisse. They were to
be followed by another army. This movement was
intended to cut off the Bulgarians from their base
of supplies, and throw them back on Adrianople.
The remainder of the Turkish forces in Thrace were
to wait the result of this movement. If the Bul-
garians moved down the valley of the Maritza,

leaving Adrianople, they would meet these imposing
forces which covered Constantinople, and would
have behind them the garrison of Adrianople, and
the army of Abdullah and Mahmud Mukhtar
threatening their communications. If they besieged
Adrianople, the second army would take the offensive
and the Bulgarians would be encircled.
The outposts of the Turkish army came into
contact with the Bulgarians on October 2Oth. Be-
lieving that they had to do with the left of the army
investing Adrianople, Mahmud and .Abdullah decided
to begin immediately their encircling movement.
On the 2 1st and 22d, the two columns of the Turkish
284
army were in fact engaged with the advance-guards
and second Bulgarian armies. But, in
of the first
the meantime, General Dimitrieff and the third
army (which they believed was on the extreme
Bulgarian right, pressing down the Maritza to invest
the southern forts of Adrianople) had quietly crossed
the frontier almost directly north of Kirk Kilisse,
and fell like a cyclone upon the Turks. The Turkish
positions were excellent, and had to be taken at the
point of the bayonet. From morning till night on
October 23d, the Bulgarian third army captured
position after position, without the help of their
artillery, which was stuck in the mud some miles in
the rear. In the evening, during a terrible storm,
two fresh Bulgarian columns made an assault upon
the Turkish positions. It was not until then that
the Turks realized that they were fighting another
army than that charged with the investment of
Adrianople. A wild panic broke out among the
redifs, who were mostly without officers.They
started to retreat, and were soon followed by the
remainder of the army. At Uskubdere, they met
during the night reinforcements coming to their aid.
Two regiments fired on each other, mutually mistak-
ing the other for Bulgarians. The reinforcements
joined in the disorderly retreat, which did not end
until morning, when, exhausted and still crazed by
fear,what remained of the Turkish army had reached
Eski Baba and Bunar Hissar.
The army was saved from annihilation by the
darkness and the storm. For not only were the
Bulgarians ignorant of the abandonment of Kirk
285
where they knew the enemy
Kilisse, but, along the line
were retreating, their cavalry could not advance in
the darkness and mud, nor could their artillery shell
the retreating columns. On the morning of the
24th, when General Dimitrieff was preparing to
make the assault upon Kirk Kilisse, he learned that
the Turkish army had fled, and that the fortress
was undefended.
By the capture of Kirk Kilisse the Bulgarians
gained enormous stores. They had a railway line
open to them towards Constantinople. The only
menace to a successful investment of Adrianople
was removed. The victory, so easily purchased,
was far beyond their dreams. But it would not
have been possible had it not been for the willingness
of the Bulgarian soldiers to charge without tiring
or faltering at the point of the bayonet. The victory
was earned, in spite of the Turkish panic. For the
Bulgarian steel had much to do with that panic.
As soon as he realized the extent of the victory
of Kirk Kilisse, General Savoff ordered a general
advance of the three Bulgarian armies. Only enough
troops were left around Adrianople to prevent a sortie
of the garrison. Notwithstanding the unfavourable
condition of the roads, the Bulgarian armies moved
with great rapidity. cavalry in two days made
The
reconnaissances on the east as far as Midia, and on
the south as far as Rodosto. The main and sole
armies of the Turks were thus ascertained to be along
the Ergene, and beyond in the direction of the capital.
On the left, the third army of General Dimitrieff,
not delaying at Kirk Kilisse, was in contact with the
286
Turks at Eski Baba on the 28th. On the afternoon
of the same day the Bulgarians drove the Turks
out of the village of Lule Burgas, on the railway
to Constantinople, east of the point where the
Dedeagatch-Salonika line branches off.
For three days, October 29-31, the Turkish armies
made a stand along the Ergene from Bunar Hissar
to Lule Burgas. Since Gettysburg, Sadowa, and
Sedan, no battle except that of Mukden has ap-
proached the battle of Lule Burgas in importance,
not only because of the numbers engaged, but also
of the issue at stake. Three hundred and fifty,
thousand soldiers were in action, the forces being
about evenly divided. For two days, in spite of the
demonstration of Kirk Kilisse, the Turks fought
with splendid courage and tenacity. Time and
again the desperate charges of the Bulgarian in-
fantry were hurled back with heavy loss. Not until
the third day did the fighting seem to lean decisively
to the advantage of the Bulgarians. Their artillery
began to show marked superiority. From many
points shells began to fall with deadly effect into the
Turkish entrenchments. The Turks were unable
to silence the murderous fire of the Bulgarian bat-
teries. The soldiers, because they were starving, did
not have it in them to attempt to take the most
troublesome Bulgarian positions by assault.
The retreat began on the afternoon of the 3ist.
On November 1st, owing to lack of officers and of
central direction, it became a disorderly flight, a
sauve qui pent. Camp equipment was abandoned.
The soldiers threw away their knapsacks and rifles,
287
so that they could run more quickly. The artillery-
men cut the traces of their gun-wagons and am-
munition-wagons, and made off on horseback.
Everything was abandoned to the enemy. Nazim
pasha, generalissimo, and the general staff, who had
been in headquarters at Tchorlu, without proper tele-
graphic or telephonic communication with the battle
front, were drawn into the flight. The Turkish
army did not stop until it had placed itself behind
the Tchatalja line of forts, which protected the city
of Constantinople.
The battle of Lule Burgas marked more than the
destruction of the Turkish military power and the
loss of European Turkey to the Empire. It revealed
the inefficiency of Turkish organization and adminis-
tration to cope with modern conditions, even when
in possession of modern instruction and modern
tools. With the Turks, not a question of an
it is
ignorance or a backwardness which can be remedied.

Total lack of organizing and administrative ability
is a fault of their nature. Courage alone does not
win battles in the twentieth century.
The Bulgarians were without sufficient cavalry
and mounted machine-guns to follow up their victory.
The defeat of the Turks, too, had not been gained
without the expenditure of every ounce of energy
in the army that had in those three days won undying
fame. The problem of pursuit was difficult. There
was only a single railway track. Food and muni-
tions for the large army had to be brought up. The
artillery advanced painfully through roads hub-
deep in mud. It took two weeks for the Bulgarian
288
army to move from
the Ergene to Tchatalja, and
prepare for the assault of the last line of Turkish
defence.
An immediate offensive after Lule Burgas would
have found Constantinople at the mercy of the
victorious army. The two weeks of respite changed
the aspect of things. For in this time the forts
across the peninsula from the Sea of Marmora to
the Black Sea were hastily repaired. They were
mounted with guns from the Bosphoras defences,
the Servian Creusots detained at Salonika at the
beginning of the war, and whatever artillery could
be brought from Asia Minor. The army had been
reformed, the worthless, untrained elements ruth-
lesslyweeded out, and a hundred thousand of the best
among whom the only redifs were those
soldiers,
who had come fresh from Asia Minor, and had not
been contaminated by the demoralization of Kirk
Kilisse and Lule Burgas, were placed behind the
forts. The Turkish cruisers whose guns were able
to be fired were recalled from the Dardanelles, and
anchored off the end of the line on either side.
On November I5th, the Bulgarians began to put
their artillery in position all along the Tchatalja
line from Buyuk-Tchekmedje on the Sea ot Marmora
to Derkos Lake, near the Black Sea. At the same
time, they entrenched the artillery positions by
earthworks and ditches, working with incredible
rapidity. For they had to take every precaution
against a sudden sortie of the enemy. In forty-
eight hours they were ready.
The attack on the Tchatalja lines commenced
19 289
at six o'clock on Sunday morning, November iyth,
by machine-gun and rifle fire as well as by artillery.
The forts and the Turkish cruisers responded. In
the city and in the villages along the Bosphorus we
could hear the firing distinctly. On the lyth and
1 8th, the Bulgarians delivered assaults in several
places. Near Derkos they even got through the
lines for a short while. These were merely for the
purpose of testing the Turkish positions, however.
Several of the assaults were repulsed. The Bulga-
rians suffered heavily on the i8th, when the first
and only prisoners of the war were made. On the
the artillery fire grew less and less, and there
1 9th,
were no further attacks. Towards evening it was

evident that the Bulgarians had abandoned their
advanced lines, and did not intend to continue the
attack. No general assault had been delivered.
It seems certain that General Savoff had in mind
the capture of Constantinople on November iyth-
Turkish overtures for peace, opened on the I5th,
had been repulsed. Every preparation was made
for the attempt to pierce Tchatalja. 'Why was
the plan abandoned before it was actually proven
impossible? Did General Savoff fear the risk of a
reverse? Was he short of ammunition? Had the
Turkish defence of the lyth and i8th been more
determined than he had expected? Was it fear of a
cholera epidemic among his soldiers? Or was the
abandonment of the attempt to capture Constan-
tinople, for that what a triumph at Tchatalja
is
would have meant, dictated by political reasons?

Perhaps there was a shortage of ammunition.
290
But it is impossible to believe that General Savoff
ceased the attack because he feared a failure, or

because he paused before the heavy sacrifice of life
it would involve. The Bulgarians were too fresh
from their sudden and overwhelming victories to
be halted by the unimportant fighting of the 17th
and 1 8th. They were not yet aware of the terrible
danger from cholera.
At the time it was the common belief in Constan-
tinople I heard it expressed in a number of intel-
ligent circles that the Great Powers in particular
Russia had informed Bulgaria that she should halt
where she was. A second San Stef ano This seems
!
improbable. Even in the moment of delirium over

Lule Burgas, the Bulgarians had no thought of
occupying permanently Constantinople. They knew
that this would be a task beyond their ability as a
nation to undertake. If there was a thought of
entering Constantinople, it was to satisfy military
pride, and to be able to dictate more expeditiously
and satisfactorily terms of peace.
The real reason for the halt of Tchatalja, and
the willingness to conclude an armistice, must be
found in the alarm awakened in Bulgaria by the
Servian and Greek successes. Greece had settled
herself in Salonika, and the King and royal family
had come there to live. Is it merely a coincidence
that on November i8th the Servians captured
Monastir, foyer of Bulgarianism in western Mace-
donia, and on the following day, a telegram from Sofia
caused the cessation of the Bulgarian attack upon
Tchatalja?
291
At Adrianople, a combined Bulgarian and Servian
army, under the command of General Ivanoff, which
had been hampered during the first month of opera-
tions by the floods of the Maritza, and by daring
sorties of the garrison, after receiving experienced
reinforcements on November 22d, began a deter-
mined bombardment and narrow investment of the
forts. Ten days later, a general attack was ordered,
probably to hurry the Turks in the armistice nego-
tiations. The investing army had made very little
progress on December 2d and 3d, when the signing
of the armistice caused a cessation of hostilities.
But while the Bulgarians were vigorously pressing
the attack upon Adrianople, they were inactive at
Tchatalja.
At the beginning of the Thracian campaign, a
portion of the Turkish fleet started to attack the
Bulgarian coast. The Bulgarians had only one
small cruiser and six torpedo-boats of doubtful value.
But their two ports, termini of railway lines, were
well protected by forts. On October iQth, two
Turkish battleships and four torpedo-boats appeared
before Varna, and fired without effect upon the forts.
Then they bombarded the small open port of Ka-
varna, near the Rumanian frontier. On the 2ist,
they succeeded in throwing a few shells into Varna,
but did not risk approaching near enough to do
serious damage. This was the extent of the offensive
naval action against Bulgaria. A short time later,
the Hamidieh, which was stationed on the Thracian
coast of the Black Sea to protect the landing of
redifs from Samsun, was surprised in the night by
292
Bulgarian torpedo-boats. Two torpedoes tore holes
in her bow. She was able to return to Constanti-
nople under her own steam, but had to spend ten
weeks in dry-dock. The only service rendered by
the Turkish fleet against the Bulgarians was the
safeguarding of the transport of troops from Black
Sea ports of Asiatic Turkey, and the co-operation
at the ends of the Tchatalja lines during the Bul-
garian assaults of November I7th and i8th.
The Servian campaign was a good second to the
astounding successes of the Bulgarians in Thrace.
The third army entered the sandjak of Novi Bazar,
so long coveted by Servia, and expelled the Turks
in five days.A portion of this army next occupied
Prisrend and Diakova, descended the valley of the
Drin through the heart of northern Albania to
Alessio, where it joined on November iQth the Mon-
tenegrins, who were already at San Giovanni di
Medua. On the 28th, they occupied Durazzo. The
Servians had reached the Adriatic!
While the third army was in the sandjak of Novi
Bazar, the second Servian army crossed into Old
Servia, passed through the plain of Kossova, where
the Turks had destroyed the independence of Servia
in 1389, and occupied Pristina on October 23d. This
gave them control of the branch railway from Uskub
to the confines of the sandjak.
The flower of the Servian fighting strength was
reserved for the first army under the command of
Crown Prince Alexander. This force, considerably
larger than the two other armies combined, mustered
over seventy thousand. Its objective point was
293
Uskub, covering which was the strong Turkish army
of Zekki pasha. Battle was joined outside of Kuma-
nova on October 22 d. After three days of fighting
during which the Turkish cavalry was annihilated
by the Servian artillery and the Servian infantry
took the Turkish artillery positions at the point of
the bayonet, the army of Zekki Pasha evacuated
Kumanova. No attempt was made to defend
Uskub, which the Servians entered on October 26th.
The Turkish army retreated to Kuprulu on the
Vardar, towards Salonika. When the Servians
continued their march, Zekki pasha retreated to
Prilip, where he occupied positions that could not
well be shelled by artillery. After two days of
continuous fighting, the Servians' bayonets dislodged
the Turks. They withdrew to Monastir with the
Servians hot upon their heels.
Together with Kumanova, in which the bulk of
Prince Alexander's forces did not find it necessary to
engage, the capture of Monastir is the most brilliant
feat of an army whose intrepidity, agility, and intel-
ligence deserves highest praise. Into Monastir had
been thrown the army of Tahsin pasha, pushed
northward by the Greeks, as well as that of Zekki
pasha, harried southward by the Servians. The
Servians did not hesitate to approach the defences
of the cityon one side up to their arm-pits in water,
while on the other side they scaled the heights domi-
nating Monastir heights which ought to have been
defended for weeks without great difficulty. The
Turks were compelled to withdraw, for they were at
the mercy of the Servian artillery. They tried to
294
retreat to Okrida, but the Servian left wing anti-
cipated this movement. Only ten thousand escaped
into Epirus. Nearly forty thousand Turks surren-
dered to the Servians on November i8th. Monastir
and Okrida were captured. The Turkish armies of
Macedonia had ceased to exist.
The Greeks were eager to wipe out the shame of
the war of 1897. Fifteen years had wrought a great
difference in the morale of the Greek army. A new
body of officers, who spent their time in learning
their profession instead of in discussing politics at
cafe terrasses, had been created. The French mili-

tary mission, under General Eydoux, had been
working for several years in the complete reorgani-
zation of the Greek army. I had the privilege at
Athens of enjoying the hospitality of Greek officers
in their casernes at several successive Easter festi-
vals. Each year one could notice the progress.
They were always ready to show you how the trans-
formation of their artillery, and its equipment for
mountain service as well as for field work, would
make all the difference in the world in the " approach-
ing" war with the Turks. The results were beyond
expectations. What the Greeks had been working
for was mobility. This they demonstrated they
had learned. They had also an esprit de corps
which, in fighting, made up for that they lacked
of Slavic dogged perseverance. Neither in actual
combat, nor in strategy, with the exception of Janina,
were the Greeks put to the test, or called upon to
bear the burden, of the Bulgarians and Servians.
But, especially when we take into consideration the
295
invaluable service of their fleet, there is no reason to
belittle their part in the downfall of Turkey. If the
effort had been necessary, they probably would have
been equal to it.
The Greeks sent a small army into Epirus. The
bulk of their forces, following a sound military prin-
ciple, were led into Thessaly by the Crown Prince
Constantine. They crossed the frontier without
resistance, fought a sharp combat at Elassona on the
1 9th, in which they stood admirably under fire, and
broke down the last Turkish resistance at Servia.

The army of Tahsin pasha was thrown back upon
Monastir. The battles of the next ten days were
hardly more than skirmishes, for the Turkish stand
was never formidable. At Yanitza, the only real
battle of the Greek campaign was fought. The
Turks fled. The way to Salonika was open.
The battle of Yanitza (Yenidje-Vardar) was
fought on November 3d. On October 30th, a Greek
torpedo-boat had succeeded, in spite of the strong
harbour fortifications, equipped with electric search-
lights, and the mined channel, in
coming right up
to the jetty at Salonika during the night, and launch-
ing three torpedoes at an old Turkish cruiser which
lay at anchor there. The cruiser sank. On his
way out to open sea, the commander of the torpedo-
boat did not hesitate to fire upon the forts !
This daring feat, and the approach of the Greek

army, threw the city into a turmoil of excitement.
The people had been fed for two weeks on false
news, and telegrams had been printed from day to
day, relating wonderful victories over the Servians,
296
I
Bulgarians, and Greeks. But the coming of the
refugees, fresh thousands from nearer places every
day, and the presence in the streets of the city of
deserters in uniform, gave the lie to the "official"
news. When the German stationnaire arrived from
Constantinople, and embarked the prisoner of the
Villa Allatini, ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, the most
pessimistic suspicions were confirmed.

Although he had thirty thousand soldiers, and
plenty of munitions, Tahsin pasha, commandant of
Salonika, did not even attempt to defend the city.
He began immediately to negotiate with the advanc-
ing Greek army. When the Crown Prince refused
to accept any other than unconditional surren-
der, and moved upon the city, Tahsin pasha yielded.
Not a shot was fired. On November Qth, without
any opposition, the Greek army marched into
Salonika.
In other places the Turks at least fought, even if
they did not fight well. At Salonika their surrender
demonstrated to what humiliation and degradation
the arrogance of the Young Turks had brought a
nation whose past was filled with glorious deeds of
arms.
The Bulgarian expeditionary corps for Macedonia,
under General Theodoroff, had crossed the frontier
on October i8th. Joined to it were the notorious
bands of comitadjis under the command of Sandansky,
who afterwards related to me the story of this march.
General Theodoroff s mission was to engage the
portion of the Turkish Fifth Army Corps, which was
stationed in the valleys of the Mesta and Struma,
297
east of the Vardar, thus preventing it from assem-
bling and making a flank movement against the main
Servian or Bulgarian armies. The Bulgarians were
greeted everywhere as liberators, and, although they
were not in great numbers, the Turks did not try
to oppose them. Soldiers and Moslem Macedonians
together fled before them towards Salonika.
When General Theodoroff realized the demoraliz-
ation of the Turks, and heard how the Greeks were
approaching Salonika without any more serious
opposition than that which confronted him, he hur-
ried his column towards Salonika. The Bulgarian
Princes Boris and Cyril joined him. They were not
in time to take part in the negotiations for the sur-
render of the city. The cowardice of Tahsin pasha
had brought matters to a climax on November Qth.
But they were able to enter Salonika on the loth,
at the same time that Crown Prince Constantine
was making his triumphal entry. Sandansky and
his comitadjis hurried to the principal ancient church
of the city, for over four hundred years the Saint
Sophia of Salonika, and placed the Bulgarian flag

in the minarets before the Greeks knew they had
been outwitted. On the I2th, King George of
Greece arrived to make his residence in the city
that was to be his tomb.
After the capture of Monastir, the Servians pressed
on to Okrida, on November 23d, and from there into
Albania to Elbassan, which they reached five days
later. It was their intention to join at Durazzo
the other column of the third Servian army, of whose
march down the Drin we have already spoken. But
298
the threatening attitude of Austria-Hungary neces-
sitated the recall of the bulk of the Servian forces to
Nish. This is the reason they were not able, at that
stage of the war, to give the Montenegrins effective
assistance against Scutari.
The left wing of the Thessalian Greek army, after
the capture of Monastir by the Servians, pursued
towards Albania, the Turks who had escaped from
Monastir. With great skill, they managed to pre-
vent the Turks from turning north-west into the
interior of Albania. After the brilliant and daring
storming of the heights of Tchangan, what remained
of the Turkish army was compelled to retreat into
Epirus towards Janina.

On October 2Oth, the Greek fleet under Admiral
Koundouriotis appeared at the Dardanelles to offer
battle to the Turks. Under the cover of the pro-
tection of their fleet, the Greeks occupied Lemnos,
Thasos, Imbros, Samothrace, Nikaria, and the
smaller islands. The inhabitants of Samos had
expelled the Turkish garrisons on their own initia-
tive at the outbreak of the war. Mitylene was
captured without great difficulty on November 2 1st.
The Greeks landed at Chios on the 24th. Here the
Turkish garrison of two thousand retired to the
mountainous centre of the island, and succeeded in
prolonging their resistance until January. When he
saw that no help was coming from Asia Minor, whose
shores had been in sight during all the weeks of
combat and suffering, the heroic Turkish commander
surrendered with one thousand eight hundred starv-
ing men on January 3d. It was only because Italy,
299
by a clause of the Treaty of Ouchy, still held the
Dodecanese, that all of the Êgean Islands were
not "gathered into the fold" by Greece.
There had been less than six weeks of fighting.
The Balkan allies had swept from the field all the
Turkish forces in Europe. The Turkish armies
were bottled up in Constantinople, Adrianople,
Janina, and Scutari, with absolutely no hope of
making successful sorties. Except at Constantinople,
they were besieged, and could expect neither rein-
forcements nor food supplies. The Greek fleet was
master of the Êgean Sea, and held the Turkish
navy blocked in the Dardanelles. No new armies
could come from Asiatic Turkey. This was the
situationwhen the armistice was signed. The
Ottoman Empire in Europe had ceased to exist.
The military prestige of Turkey had received a
mortal blow.
THE ARMISTICE AND THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF

LONDON
The hopelessness of the outcome of the war with

Italy, the dissatisfaction over the foolish and arbi-
trary rule of its secret committees had weakened the
hold of the "Committee of Union and Progress" over

the army. Despite its success in the spring elections
of 1912, its position was precarious. In July, Mah-
mud Shevket pasha, who was suspected of planning
a military pronunciamento, resigned the Ministry of
War. The Grand Vizier, Said pasha, soon followed
him into retirement. The Sultan declared that a
300
ministry not under the control of a political party
was a necessity.
Ghazi Mukhtar pasha, after much difficulty,
succeeded in forming a which a distin-
ministry, in
guished Armenian, Noradounghian effendi, was given
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. The Unionist
majority in the lower house of Parliament proved
intractable. Its obstructionist tactics won for the
Chamber of Deputies the name of the "comic opera-
"
house of Fundukli. (Fundukli was the Bosphorus
quarter in which the House of Parliament was
located.) With the help of the Senate, and the moral
support of the army, the Sultan dissolved Parliament
on August 5th. Only the menace of the Albanian
revolution prevented the Committee from attempting
to set up a rival Parliament at Salonika. This was
the unenviable internal situation of Turkey at the
opening of the Balkan War.
The disasters of the Thracian campaign led to
the resignation of the Ghazi Mukhtar pasha Cabinet.
The aged statesman of the old regime, Kiamil pasha,
was called for the eighth time to the Grand Vizirate.
He retained Nazim pasha, generalissimo of the
Turkish army, and Noradounghian effendi, in the
Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. The most
influential of the Young Turks, who had opposed
bitterly the peace with Italy and were equally deter-

mined that no negotiations should be undertaken
with the Balkan States, were exiled. Kiamil pasha
saw clearly that peace was absolutely necessary. His
long experience allowed him to have no illusions as
to the possibility of continuing the struggle. Before
301
the Bulgarian attack upon Tchatalja, he began
pourparlers with General Savoff After the repulse
.
of November lyth and he was just as firm in his

i8th,
decision that the negotiations must be continued.
He won over to his point of view the members of the
Cabinet, and notably Nazim pasha.
The conditions of the armistice, signed on Decem-
ber 3d, were an acknowledgment of the complete
debacle of the Turkish army. Bulgaria forced the
stipulation that her army in front of Tchatalja
should be revictualled by the railway which passed
under the guns of Adrianople, while that fortress
remained without food! Greece, by an agreement
with her allies, refused to sign the armistice, but was
allowed to be represented in the peace conference.
The allies felt that the state of war on sea must
continue, in order that Turkey should be prevented
during the armistice from bringing to the front her
army corps from Syria and Mesopotamia and Arabia ;
while Greece, in particular, was determined to run

no risk in connection with the Êgean Islands. The
peace delegates were to meet in London.
Orientals, Christian as well as Moslem, are famous
for bargaining. Nothing can be accomplished with-
out an exchange of proposals and counter-proposals
ad infinitum. In the Conference of London, the
demands of the allies were the cession of all European
Turkey, except Albania, whose boundaries were not
defined, of Crete, and of the islands in the Êgean
Sea. A war indemnity was also demanded. Turkey
was to be allowed to retain Constantinople, and a
strip of territory from Midia on the Black Sea to
302
Rodosto on the Sea of Marmora, and the peninsula
of the Thracian Chersonese, which formed the
European shore of the Dardanelles. The boundaries
and
of Albania, its future status, were to be decided
by the Powers.
I had a long conversation with the Grand Vizier,
Kiamil pasha, on the day the peace delegates left
for London. He was frank and unhesitating in the
statement of his belief that Turkey could not con-
tinue the war. He denounced unsparingly the
visionaries who were clamouring for a continuance of
the struggle. "It is because of them that we are in
"
our present humiliating position," he said. They
cry out now that we must not accept peace, but they
know well that we cannot hope to win back any por-
tion of what we have lost."
There were a number of reasons why the position
of Kiamil pasha was sound. First of all, the army
organization was in hopeless confusion. Although the
Bulgarians were checked at Tchatalja, the condi-
tions on the Constantinople side of the forts was
terrible. The general headquarters at Hademkeuy
were buried in filth and mud. Although the army
was but twenty-five miles from the city, there were
days on end when not even bread arrived. Cholera
was making great ravages. Soldiers, crazed from
hunger, were shot dead for disobeying the order
which forbade their eating raw vegetables. There
were neither fuel, shelter, nor blankets. Winter was
at hand. At San Stefano, one of the most beautiful
suburbs of Stambul, in a concentration camp the
soldiers died by the thousands of starvation fever.
303
It was one of the most heart-rending tragedies of
history.
All the while, in the cafes of Pera, Galata, and
Stambul, Turkish officers sat the day long, sipping
and deciding that Adrianople must not
their coffee,
be given up. Even while the fighting was going on,
when the fate of the city hung in the balance, I saw
these degenerate officers by the hundreds, feasting at
Pera, while their soldiers were dying like dogs at
Tchatalja and San Stefano. This is an awful state-
ment to make, but it is the record of fact. Notices
in the newspapers, declaring that officers found in
Constantinople without permission would be im-
mediately taken before the Court-Martial, had
absolutely no effect.
The navy failed to give any account of itself to
the Greeks, who were
waiting outside of the Darda-
nelles. Finally, on December i6th, after the people
of the vicinity had openly cursed and taunted them,
the fleet sailed out to fight. An action at long range
did little damage to either side. The Turkish vessels
refused to go beyond the protection of their forts.
They returned in the evening to anchor. The mas-
T
tery of the sea remained to the Greeks.
1
In this connection, it would be forgetting to pay tribute to a
remarkable exploit to omit mention of the raid of the Hamidieh
during the late winter. One Ottoman officer at least chafed under
the disgrace of the inaction of the Ottoman navy. With daring and
skill, Captain Reouf bey slipped out into the Êgean Sea on the
American-built cruiser, the Hamidieh. He evaded the Greek block-
aders, bombarded some outposts on one of the islands, and sank the
auxiliary cruiser, the Makedonia, in a Greek port. The Hamidieh
next appeared in the Adriatic, where she sank several transports, and
bombarded Greek positions on the coast of Albania. The cruiser
304
army and the navy were powerless, how about
If the
the people of the capital? From the very beginning
of the war, the inhabitants of Constantinople, Mos-
lem as well as Christian, displayed the most complete
indifference concerning the fortunes of the battles.
Even when the Bulgarians were attacking Tchatalja,
the city took little interest. Buying and selling went
on as usual. There were few volunteers for national
defence, but the cafes were crowded and the theatres
and dance-halls of Pera were going at full swing. The
refugees came and camped in our streets and in the
cemeteries outside of the walls. Those who did not
die passed on to Asia. The wounded arrived, and
crowded our hospitals and barracks. The cholera
came. The soldiers starved to death at San Stefano.
The spirit of Byzantium was over the city still. The
year 1913 began as 1453 had begun.
The Government tried to raise money by a national
loan. It could get none from Europe, unless it agreed
to surrender Adrianople and make peace practically
on the terms of the allies. An appeal must be made
to the Osmanlis. For how could the war be resumed
without money? There are many wealthy pashas
at Constantinople. Their palaces line both shores of
the Bosphorus. They spend money at Monte Carlo
was next heard of at Port Said. She passed through the Suez Canal
into the Red Sea for a couple of weeks, and then returned boldly
into the Mediterranean, although Greek torpedo-boats were lying
in wait. Captain Reouf bey ran again the gauntlet of the Greek
fleet, and got back to the Dardanelles without mishap. This venture,
undertaken without permission from the Turkish admiral, had no
effect upon the war. For it came too late. But it showed what a
little enterprise and courage might have done to prevent the Turkish
debdcle, if undertaken at the beginning of the war.
305
like water. They live at Nice, as they live at Con-
stantinople, like princes or like American million-
aires! One of the sanest and wisest of Turkish
patriots, a man whom
have known and admired,
I
was appointed to head a committee to wait upon
these pashas, many of them married to princesses of
the imperial family, and solicit their contributions.
The scheme was that the subscribers should advance
five years of taxes on their properties for the pur-
poses of national defence. The committee hired a

small launch, and spent a day visiting the homes of
the pashas. On their return, after paying the rental
of the launch, they had about forty pounds sterling!
Was it not two million pounds that was raised for the
Prince of Wales Fund recently in London? Was
not the French loan "for national defence," issued
just before the present war, subscribed in a few hours
forty-three times over the large amount of thirty-two
million pounds asked for?
In the face of these facts, the Young Turks were
vociferous in their demand that the war be continued.
Adrianople must not be surrendered Kiamil pasha
!
decided to call a "Divan," or National Assembly, of

the most important men in Turkey. They were
summoned by the Sultan to meet at the palace of
Dolma-Baghtche on January 22, 1913. I went to see
what would happen there. One would expect that
the whole of Constantinople would be hanging on
the words of this council, whose decision the Cabinet
had agreed to accept. A half-dozen policemen at the
palace gate, a vendor of lemonade, two street-
sweepers, an Italian cinematograph photographer,
306
and a dozen foreign newspaper men that was the
extent of the crowd.
The Divan, after hearing the exposes of the Minis-
ters of War, Finance, and Foreign Affairs, decided
that there was nothing to discuss. The decision was
inevitable. Peace must be signed. That night
Kiamil pasha telegraphed to London to the Turkish
commissioners, directing them to consent to the
readition of Adrianople| and the other* fortresses
which were holding out, and to make peace at
still
the price of ceding all the Ottoman territories in

Europe beyond a line running from Enos on the
Êgean Sea, at the mouth of the Maritza River, to
Midia on the Black Sea.
On the following day, January 23d, a coup d'etat
was successfully carried out.
Enver bey, the former "hero of liberty," who had
taken a daring and praiseworthy part in the revolu-
tion of 1908, had been ruined afterwards by being
appointed military attache of the Ottoman Embassy
at Berlin. There was much that was admirable and
winning in Enver bey, much that was what the
French call "elevation of soul." He was a sincere
patriot. But the years at Berlin, and the deadening
influence of militarism and party politics mixed
together, had changed him from a patriot to a politi-
cian. He went to Tripoli during the Italian War,
and organized a resistance in Benghazi, which he
announced would be "as long as he lived." But it
was a decision a la Turgue. The Balkan War found
him again at Constantinople not at the front lead-
ing a company against the enemy but at Con-
307
stantinople, plotting with the other Young Turks
how they could once more get the reins of govern-
ment in their hands. The Divan
decision of the
was the opportunity. Enver bey band
led a small
of followers into the Sublime Porte, and shot Nazim
pasha and his aide-de-camp dead. The other mem-
bers of the Cabinet were imprisoned, and the tele-
phone to the palace cut. Enver bey was driven at
full speed in an automobile to the palace. He
secured from the Sultan a firman calling on Mahmud
Shevket pasha to form a new Cabinet. The Young
Turks were again in power.
The bodies of Nazim pasha and the aide-de-camp
were buried quickly and secretly. For one of Enver's
companions, a man of absolutely no importance, who
had been killed by defenders of Nazim, a great mili-
tary funeral was held.
Mahmud Shevket pasha, who had been living in
retirement at Scutari since the war began, accepted
the position of Grand Vizier. I heard him, on the
steps of the Sublime Porte, justify the murder of
Nazim pasha, on the ground that there had been the
intention to give up Adrianople. The new Cabinet
was going to redeem the country, and save it from a
shameful peace.
Whenthe news of the coup d'etat reached London,
it was recognized that further negotiations were
useless. The peace conference had failed.
THE SECOND PERIOD OF THE WAR

It is very doubtful if Mahmud Shevket, Enver,
and their accomplices had any hope whatever of
308
retrieving the fortunes of Turkish arms. They had
prepared the coup d'etat to get back again into office.
This could not be done without the tacit consent

of the army. At the moment of the Divan the
army was stirred up over the surrender of Adrianople.
It was the moment to act. At any other time the
army would not have acquiesced in the murder of its
generalissimo. The Sultan's part in the plot was not
clear. His assent was, however, immediately given.
Living in seclusion, and knowing practically nothing
of what was going on, he signed the firmans, accept-
ing the resignation of the Kiamil pasha Cabinet and
charging Mahmud Shevket with the formation of a
new Cabinet, eitherby force or by playing upon his
fears of what might be his own fate, should the agree-
ment to surrender Adrianople lead to a revolution.
On January 29th, the allies denounced the armis-
tice, and hostilitiesreopened. The Bulgarians at
Tchatalja had strongly entrenched themselves, and
were content to rest on the defensive. They did not
desire to capture Constantinople. But the Turks
wanted to relieve Adrianople. The offensive move-
ment must come from them. The Young Turks had
killed Nazim pasha, they said, because they believed
Adrianople could be saved. The word was now to

Mahmud Shevket and Enver. Let them justify
their action.
Enthusiasticspeeches were made at Constan-
tinople. We were told that the army at Tchatalja
had moved forward, and was going to drive the Bul-
garians out of Thrace. The Turks did advance some
kilometres, but, like their fleet at the Dardanelles,
309
not beyond the protection of the forts! They did
not dare to make a general assault upon the Bulgarian
positions. The renewal of the war, as far as Tcha-
talja was concerned, was a perfect farce. Every one
in Constantinople knew that the army was not even
trying to relieve Adrianople by a forward march

from Constantinople.
Enver bey, who realized that he must make
some move to justify the coup d'etat of January 23d,
gathered two army corps on the small boats which
serve the Bosphorus villages and the Isles of Princes.
It was his intention to land on the European shore of
the Dardanelles, and take the Bulgarians in the rear.
A few of his troops the first that were sent dis-
embarked at Gallipoli, and, co-operating with the
Dardanelles garrison, attempted an offensive move-
ment against the Bulgarian positions at Bulair,
which were bottling the peninsula. The attack
failed ignominiously. For the Bulgarians, after
dispersing the first bayonet charge by their machine-
guns, were not content to wait for another attack-
They scrambled over their trenches, and attacked
the Turks at the point of the bayonet. The army
broke, and fled. Some six thousand Turks were left
on the field. The Bulgarian losses were trifling. On
the same day, February 8th, and the following day,
the rest of Enver bey's forces tried to land at several
places on the European shore of the Sea of Marmora.
For some reason that has never been explained, the
Turkish fleet did not co-operate with Enver bey's
attempted landings. Naturally the Turks were
mowed down. At Sharkeuy it was simply slaughter.
310
Three divisions were butchered. Those few who
succeeded in getting foot on shore were driven into
the sea and bayoneted. The two corps were prac-
tically annihilated.
After this exploit, Enver bey returned to Con-
stantinople, and received the congratulations of the
Grand Vizier whom he had created, by a murder, to
redeem Turkey and recover Adrianople.

The inability to advance at Tchatalja and at
Bulair, and the failure to land troops on the coasts
of Thrace, entirely immobilized the Turkish armies
during the second period of the war. They were
content to sit and watch the fall of the three fortresses
of Janina, Adrianople, and Scutari. At the moment
of the coup d'etat, I telegraphed that the whole miser-
able affair was nothing more than a party move of
" "
the "outs to oust the "ins. The events confirmed
this judgment. Mahmud Shevket pasha had no
other policy than that of Kiamil pasha and Nazim
pasha. He, and the Young Turk party, did abso-
lutely nothing to relieve the situation. As soon as
they thought they were safe from those who swore to
avenge Nazim's death, they began again negotiations
for peace, and on exactly the same terms.
In the meantime, the Greeks, who had not signed
the armistice, decided that they must take Janina by
assault. The worst of the winter was not yet over,
but plans were made to increase the small Greek
forces which had been practically inactive since the
siege began. Janina had never been completely
invested. When the Crown Prince arrived, he
planned to capture the most troublesome forts, and
from them to make untenable the formidable hills
which commanded the city. The Greeks followed
the plan with great skill and courage. Position after
position was taken until the city was at the mercy
of their artillery. During the night of March 5th,
Essad pasha sent to Prince Constantine emissaries
to surrender the city, garrison, and munitions of war
without conditions.
The Crown Prince returned to Salonika in triumph.
A few days later, the assassination of King George
made him King. From this time on, the diplomatic
position of Premier Venizelos, in his endeavour to

keep within bounds the military party which had the
ear of the new King, became most difficult. Even his
great genius could not prevent the rupture with
Bulgaria.
After the fall of Janina, the Bulgarian general staff
realized that it was essential for them to force the
capitulation of Adrianople, or to take the city by
assault. As they had to keep a large portion of their
army before Tchatalja and Bulair, it was decided
that forty-five thousand Servians, with their siege
cannon, should co-operate in the attack upon Adria-
nople. It was afterwards given by the Servians as an
excuse for breaking their treaty with Bulgaria, that
they had helped in the fall of Adrianople. But it
must be remembered that the Bulgarian army, by
its maintenance of the positions at Tchatalja and
Bulair, was rendering service not to herself alone but
to the common cause of the allies. Greece and Servia
will never be able to get away from the fact that
Bulgaria bore the brunt of the burden in the first
312
Balkan War, and that her services in the common
cause were far greater than those of either of her
allies. One cannot too strongly emphasize the point,
also, that the capture and possession of Adrianople
did not mean to Bulgaria either from the practical
or from the sentimental standpoint what Salonika
meant to the Greeks and Uskub to the Servians.
The Servian contingent before Adrianople was not
helping Bulgaria to do what was to be wholly to the
benefit of Bulgaria. The Servians were co-operating
in an enterprise that was to contribute to the success
of their common cause.
Adrianople had been closely invested ever since the
battle of Kirk Kilisse. No army came to the relief
of the garrison after the fatal retreat of October 24th.
The Bulgarians had not made a serious effort to
capture the city during the first period of the war.
The armistice served their ends well, because each
day lessened the provisions of the besieged. Inside
the city Shukri pasha had done all he could to keep
up the courage of the inhabitants. He himself was
ignorant of the real situation at Constantinople.
Perhaps it was in good faith that he assured the
garrison continually that the hour of deliverance was
at hand. By wireless, the authorities at Constan-
tinople, after the coup d'etat especially, kept assuring
him that the army was advancing, and that it was a
question only of days. So, in spite of starvation and
of the continual rain of shells upon the city, he
managed to maintain the morale of his garrison. The
allies finally decided upon a systematic assault of
the forts on all sides of the city at once. In this way,
313
the Turks were not able to use their heavy artillery
to best advantage. Advancing with scissors, the
Bulgarians and Servians cut their way through the
tangle of barbed wire. On the 24th and 25th, the
forts fell one after the other. Czar Ferdinand entered
the city with his troops on March 26th.
It was at the moment of this heroic capture, in
which there was glory enough for all, that the clouds
of trouble between Bulgaria and Servia began to
appear on the horizon. Shukri pasha, following the
old policy of the Turks, which had been so successful
for centuries in the Balkan Peninsula, tried to surren-
der to the Servian general, who was too loyal to
discipline to fall into this trap. But the Servian
newspapers began to say that it was really the Servian
army who had captured the city, and that Shukri
pasha recognized this fact when he sent to find the
Servian commander. There was an unedifying duel
of newspapersbetween Belgrade and Sofia, which
showed that the material for conflagration was
ready.
In the second period of the war, the Servians gave
substantial aid, especially in artillery, to the Mon-
tenegrins,who had been besieging Scutari ever since
October I5th. I went over the mountain of Tarabosh
on horse with an Albanian who had been one of its
defenders. He related graphically the story of the
repeated assaults of the Montenegrins and Servians.
Each time they were driven back before they reached
those batteries that dominated Scutari and made
impossible the entry to the city without their capture.
The loss of life" was tremendous. The bravery of the
assailants could do nothing against the miles and
miles of barbed wire. No means of stopping assault
has ever proved more efficacious. The besiegers were
unable to capture Tarabosh. So they could not enter
the city.
At the beginning of the war, Scutari was under
the command of Hassan Riza pasha. In February,
he was assassinated by his subordinate, Essad pasha,
an Albanian of the Toptani family, who had been a
favourite of Abdul Hamid, and had had a rather
questionable career in the gendarmerie during the
days of despotism. After the assassination of the
Turkish commandant, it was for Albania and not for
Turkey that Essad pasha continued the resistance.
In March, Austria began to threaten the Montene-
grins, and assure them that they could not keep the
city. The story of how she secured the agreement of
the Great Powers in coercing Montenegro is told in
another chapter. Montenegro was defiant, and paid
no attention to an international blockade. But on
April 1 3th, the Servians, fearing international com-
plications, withdrew from the siege. It was astonish-
ing news to the world that after this, on April 22d,
Essad pasha surrendered Scutari to the King of
Montenegro, with the stipulation that he could
withdraw with his garrison, his light artillery, and
whatever munitions he might be able to take with
him.
The Ottoman flag had ceased to wave in any part
ofEurope except Constantinople and the Dardanelles.
The war was over, whether the Young Turks would
have it so or not. Facts are facts.
315
THE TREATY OF LONDON
Nazim pasha was assassinated on January 23d.

The armistice was denounced on the 29th. On
February loth, ^Mahmud Shevket pasha began to
sound the Great Powers for their intervention in
securing peace. It was necessary, however, now that
the war had been resumed, that the impossibility of
relieving Adrianople be demonstrated, so that it
might not continue to be a stumbling-block in re-
opening the negotiations. The Great Powers were
willing to act as mediators, but could not make any
acceptable overture until after the fall of Janina and
Adrianople.
On March 23d, they proposed the following as
basis for the renewal of the negotiations at London:
"l. A frontier line from Enos to Midia, which

would follow the course of the Maritza, and the
cession to the Allies of all the territories west of
that line, with the exception of Albania, whose
status and frontiers would be decided upon by the
Powers.
"2. Decision by the Powers of the question of
the -rEgean Islands.
"3. Abandonment of Crete by Turkey.
"4. Arrangement of all financial questions at
Paris, by an international commission, in which
the representatives of Turkey and the allies would
be allowed to sit. Participation of the allies in the
Ottoman Debt, and in the financial obligations of
the territories newly acquired. No indemnity of
war, in principle.
"5. End of hostilities immediately after the
acceptance of this basis of negotiations."
Turkey agreed to these stipulations. The Balkan
States, however, did not want to commit themselves
to the Enos-Midia line "as definitely agreed upon,"
but only as a base of pourparlers. They insisted
that the Êgean Islands must be ceded directly to
them. They wanted to know what the Powers had
in mind in regard to the frontiers of Albania. In the
last place, they refused to relinquish the possibility
of an indemnity of war.
Notes were exchanged back and forth among the
chancelleries until April 2Oth, when the Balkan States
finally agreed to accept the mediation of the Powers.
They had practically carried all their points, how-
ever, except that of the communication of the
Albanian frontier. Hostilities ceased. There really
was not much more to fight about, at least as far
as Turkey was concerned.
was a whole month before the second conference
It
at London opened. The only gleam of hope that
the Turks were justified in entertaining, when they
decided to renew the war, had been the possible
outbreak of a war between the Allies. If only the
quarrel over Macedonia had come, for which they
looked from week to week, they might have been
able to put pressure on Bulgaria for the return of
Adrianople, and on Greece for the return of the
Êgean Islands. But the rupture between the Allies
did not take place until after they had settled with
Turkey. Why fight over the bear's skin until it was
actually in their hands?
The negotiations were reopened in London on
May 2Oth. On May 3oth, the peace preliminaries
were signed. The Sultan of Turkey ceded to the
Kings of the allied states his dominions in Europe
beyond the Enos-Midia line. Albania, its status and
frontiers, were intrusted by the Sultan to the sover-
eigns of the Great Powers. He ceded Crete to the
allied sovereigns, but left the decision as to the
islands in the Êgean Sea, and the status of Mount
Athos, to the Great Powers.
The war between the allies enabled Turkey to
violate this treaty. They won back from Bulgaria,
without opposition, most of Thrace, including Adri-
anople and Kirk Kilisse. Later, treaties were made
separately with each of the Balkan States. But, as
it seems to be a principle of history that no territories
that have once passed from the shadow of the Cres-

cent return, it is probable that the Treaty of London
will, in the end, represent the minimum of what
Turkey's former subjects have wrested from her.

CHAPTER XV
THE RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES
those who knew the centuries-old hatred and
TO race rivalry between Greece and Servia and

Bulgaria in the Balkan Peninsula, an alliance
for the purpose of liberating Macedonia seemed im-
possible. The Ottoman Government had a sense of
security which seemed to be justifiable. They had
known how to keep alive and intensify racial hatred
in European Turkey, and believed that they were
immune from concerted attack because the Balkan
States would never be able to agree as to the division
a successful war.
of spoils after
The history of the ten years of rivalry between
bands, which had nullified the efforts of the Powers
to "reform" Macedonia by installing a gendarmerie
under European control, had taught the diplomats
that they had working against the pacification of
Macedonia not only the Ottoman authorities, but
also the native Christian population and the neigh-
bouring emancipated countries. They were ready

to believe the astute Hussein Hilmy pasha, Vali of
Macedonia, when he said: "I am ruling over an
insane asylum. Were the Turkish flag withdrawn,
they would fly at each other's throats, and instead
of reform, you would have anarchy."
If the Balkan States had realized how completely
and how easily they were going to overthrow the
military power of Turkey, they probably would not
have attempted it. This seems paradoxical, but
it is true all the same.
The Allies did not anticipate more than the hold-
ing of the Ottoman forces in check and the occupa-
tion of the frontiers and of the upper valleys of the
Vardar and Struma. Greece felt that she would
be rewarded by a slight rectification of boundary in
Thessaly and Epirus, if only the war would settle
the status of Crete and result in an autonomous
regime for the ^gean Islands. At the most, the
Balkan States hoped to force upon Turkey the au-
tonomy Macedonia under a Christian governor.
of
So jealous was each of the possibility of another's
gaming control of Macedonia that this solution
would have satisfied them more than the complete
disappearance of Turkish rule. Both hopes and
fears as to Macedonia were envisaged rather in
connection with each other than in connection
with the Turks.
Between Servia and Bulgaria there was a definite
treaty, signed on March 13, 1912, which defined
future spheres of influence in upper Macedonia.
But Greece had no agreement either with Bulgaria
or Servia.
The events of October, 1912, astonished the whole
world. No such sudden and complete collapse of
the Ottoman power in Europe was dreamed of. I
320
RUPTURE BETWEEN THE ALLIES
have already spoken of how fearful the European
Chancelleries were of an Ottoman victory. Had
they not been so morally certain of Turkey's triumph
they would never have sent to the belligerents their
famous and in the light of subsequent events ridi-
culous joint note concerning the status quo.
But if the Great Powers were unprepared for the
succession of Balkan triumphs, the allies were much
more astonished at what they were able to accom-
plish. Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas gave Thrace to
Bulgaria. Kumanovo opened up the valley of the
Vardar to the Servians, while the Greeks marched
straight to Salonika without serious opposition.
The victories of the Servians and Greeks, so easily
won, were to the Bulgarians a calamity which over-
shadowed their own striking military successes.
They had spilled much blood and wasted their
strength in the conquest of Thrace which they did
not want, while their allies but rivals for all that
were in possession of Macedonia, the Bulgaria irre-
denta. To be encircling Adrianople and besieging
Constantinople, cities in which they had only second-
ary interest, while the Servians attacked Monastir
and the Greeks were settling themselves comfort-
ably in Salonika, was the irony of fate for those who
felt that others were reaping the fruits for which they
had made so great and so admirable a sacrifice.
When we come to judge dispassionately the folly
of Bulgaria in provoking a war with her comrades in
arms, and the seemingly amazing greed for land
which it revealed, we must remember that the Bul-
garians felt that they had accomplished everything
21 321
to receive nothing. Salonika and not Adrianople
was the city of their dreams. Macedonia and not
Thrace was the country which they had taken arms
to liberate. The Êgean Sea and not the extension
of their Black Sea littoral formed the substantial
and logical economic background to the appeal of
race which led them to insist so strongly in gathering
under their sovereignty all the elements of the Bul-
garian people. European writers have not been able
to understand how little importance the Bulgarians
attached to their territorial acquisitions in Thrace,
and of how little interest it was for them to acquire
new possessions in which there were so few Bulgarians.
Then, which had pushed
too, the powerful elements
Bulgaria into the war with Turkey, and had contri-
buted so greatly to her successes, were of Mace-
donian origin. In Sofia, the Macedonians are
numerically, as well as financially and politically,
very strong. I had a revelation of this, such as the
compilation of statistics cannot give, on the day
after the massacre of Kotchana. The newspapers
called upon the Macedonians in Sofia to put out
all
flags tied with crpe. In the main streets of the

city, it seemed as if every second house was that of
a Macedonian. To these people, ardent and power-
ful patriots, Macedonia was home. It had been the
dream of their lives to unite the regions from which
they had come once emancipated from the Turks
to the mother country. From childhood, they
had been taught to look towards the Rhodope Mount-
ains as the hills from which should come their help.
Is it any wonder then, that, after the striking victo-
322
ries of their arms, there should be a feeling of insan-
ity for it was that when they saw the dreams of
a lifetime about to vanish?
But the mischief of the matter, as a Scotchman
would say, was that Greeks and Servians felt the
same way about the same places. Populations had
been mixed for centuries. At some time or other
in past history each of the three peoples had had
successful dynasties to spread their sovereignty over
exactly the same Each then could
territories.
evoke the same memories, each the same
historical
past of suffering, each the same present of hopes,

and the same prayers of the emancipated towards
Sofiaand Athens and Belgrade.
After the occupation of Salonika by the Greeks,
the Bulgarian ambitions to break the power of
Turkey were not the same as they had been before.
Had Salonika been occupied two weeks earlier, there
might not have been a Lule Burgas. An armistice
was hurriedly concluded. During the trying period
of negotiations in London, and during the whole of
the second part of the war, the jealousies of the allies
had been awakened one against the other. Between
Greeks and Bulgarians, it had been keen since the
very first moment that the Greek army entered Mace-
donia. The crisis between Servia and Bulgaria did
not become acute until Servia saw her way blocked to j
the Adriatic by the absurd attempt to create a free

Albania. Then she
naturally began to insist that
the treaty of partition which she had signed with
Bulgaria could not be carried out by her. In vain
she appealed to the sense of justice of the Bulgarians.
323
The treaty had been signed on the understanding
that Albania would fall under the sphere of Servian
aggrandizement. Nor, on the other hand, had it
been contested that Thrace would belong to Bul-
garia. If the treaty were carried out, Bulgaria
would get everything and Servia nothing. Servia
also reminded the Bulgarians of the loyal aid that
had been given them in the reduction of Adrianople.
But Bulgaria held to her pound of flesh.
Under the circumstances of the division of ter-
ritory, Bulgaria's claim to cross the Vardar and

go as far as Monastir and Okrida, would not
only have given her possession of a fortress from
which she could dominate both Servia and Greece,
but would have put another state between Servia
and Salonika. Bulgaria was, in fact, demanding
everything as far as Servia was concerned. Servia
cannot be blamed then for coming to an understand-
ing with Greece, even if it were for support in the
violation of a treaty. For where does history give
us the example of a nation holding to a treaty when
itwas against her interest to do so?
After their return from London, the Premiers
Venizelos and Pasitch made an offensive and defen-
sive alliance for ten years against the Bulgarian
aspirations. In this alliance, concluded at Athens
shortly after King George's death, the frontiers
were definitely settled. In the negotiations, Greece
showed the same desire to have everything for
herself which Bulgaria was displaying. Finally she
agreed to allow Servia to keep Monastir. Without
this concession, Servia would have fared as badly
324
at the hands of Greece as at the hands of Bulgaria.
It is only because Greece feared that Servia might
be driven to combine with Bulgaria against her,
that the frontier in this agreement was drawn south
of Monastir. The Greek army officers opposed
strongly this concession, but Venizelos was wise
enough to see that the maintenance of Greek claims
to Monastir might result in the loss of Salonika.
The Serbo- Greek alliance was not made public until
the middle of June. Bulgaria had also been making
overtures to Greece, and at the end of May had
expressed her willingness to waive her claim to
Salonika in return for Greek support against Servia.
Venizelos, already bound to Servia, was honourable
enough to refuse this proposition.
But the military reputation of Bulgaria was still
so strong in Bulgarian diplomacy that Servia and
Greece were anxious to arrive, if possible, at an
arrangement without war. Venizelos proposed a
meeting at Salonika. Bulgaria declined. Then
Venizelos and Pasitch together proposed the arbi-
tration of the Czar. Bulgaria at the first seemed to
receive this proposition favourably, but stipulated
that it would be only for the disputed, matter in her
treaty with Servia. At this moment, the Russian
Czar sent a moving appeal to the Balkan States to
avoid the horrors of a fratricidal war. Bulgaria
then agreed to send, together with her Allies, dele-
gates to a conference at Petrograd.
All the while, Premier Gueshoff of Bulgaria had
been struggling for peace against the pressure and
the intrigues of the Macedonian party at Sofia.
325
They looked upon the idea of a Petrograd conference
as the betrayal of Macedonians and Bulgarians by
the mother country. Unable to maintain his posi-
tion, Gueshoff resigned. His withdrawal ruined
Bulgaria, for he was replaced by M. Daneff, who
was heart and soul with the Macedonian party. A
period of waiting followed. But from this moment
war seemed inevitable to those who knew the feeling
on both sides. Daneff and his friends did not hesi-
tate. They would not listen to reason. They
believed that they had the power to force Greece
and Servia to a peace very nearly on their own
terms. Public opinion was behind them, for
news was continually coming to Sofia of Greek and
Servian oppression of Bulgarians in the region be-
tween Monastir and Salonika. These stories of
unspeakable cruelty, which were afterwards estab-
lished to be true by the Carnegie Commission, had
much to do with making possible the second war.
It was not difficult for the Macedonian party at
Sofia to precipitate hostilities. The Bulgarian
general staff, in spite of the caution that should have
imposed itself upon them by the consideration of the
exhausting campaign in the winter, felt certain of

their ability to defeat the Servians and Greeks com-
bined. Then, too, the army on the frontiers, in
which there was a large element perhaps twenty
per cent. of Macedonians, had already engaged in
serious conflicts with the Greeks.
In fact, frontier skirmishes had begun in April.
The affair of Nigrita was really a battle. After
these outbreaks, Bulgarian and Greek officers had
326
been compelled to establish a neutral zone in order
to prevent the new war from beginning of itself.
At the end of May, there had been fighting in the
Panghaeon district, east of the river Strymon. The
Bulgarian staff had wanted to prevent the Greeks
from being in a position to cut the railway from
Serres to Drama. In the beginning of June, Bul-
garian coast patrols had fired on the Aver off By .
the end of June, the Bulgarian outposts were not

far from Salonika.
The Bulgarian plan was to seize suddenly
first
Salonika, which would thus cut off the Greek army

from its base of supplies and its advantageous com-
munication by sea with Greece. There were nearly
one thousand five hundred Bulgarian soldiers in
Salonika under the command of General HassapsiefT.
How many comitadjis had been introduced into the
city no one knows. I was there during the last
week of June, and saw many Bulgarian peasants,
big strapping fellows, who seemed to have no occu-
pation. When I visited the Bulgarian company,
which was quartered in the historic mosque of St.
Sophia, two days before their destruction, they
seemed to me to be absolutely sure of their position.
At this moment, the atmosphere among the few
Bulgarians in Salonika was that of complete
confidence.
Among the Greeks, a spirit of excitement and of
apprehension made them realize the gravity and the
dangers of the events which were so soon to follow.
Perfect confidence, while highly recommended by the
theorists, does not seem to win wars. Nervous-
327
ness, on the other hand, makes an army alert, and
ready to exert all the greater effort, from the fact
that it feels it needs that effort. In all the wars with
which this book deals this has been true, Italian
confidence in 1911, Turkish confidence in 1912,
Bulgarian confidence in 1913, and German confidence

in 1914.
On the 29th of June, when I left Salonika to go
to Albania, it was the opinion of the Greek officers
in Salonika that the war which they viewed with

apprehension would be averted by the conference
at Petrograd. When I got on my steamship, the
first man I met was Sandansky, who had become
famous a decade before by the capture of Miss Stone,

an American missionary. He had embarked on
this Austrian Lloyd steamer at Kavalla, with the
expectation of slipping ashore at Salonika, if possible,
to prepare the way for the triumphal entry of the
Bulgarian army. But he was only able to look
sorrowfully out on the city, for the police were
waiting to arrest him. What bitter thoughts he
must have had when he saw the Bulgarian flag,
which he had planted there with his own hands,
waving from the minaret of St. Sophia, and he un-
able to organize its defence! A week later I saw
Sandansky at a cafe in Valona. The war had then
started, and he was probably trying to persuade the
Albanians to enter the struggle and to take the
Servians in the rear.
Up toJune 29th, Servians and Bulgarians were
fraternizing at their outposts, and joking about how
soon they would be getting back to their everyday
328
occupations, for which months of war and excite-
ment had begun to unfit them. In several places
Servians and Bulgarians ate together. I know of
one outpost where the patrols were photographed
together on a bridge. Little did they realize the
horrible plot that was beingcoolly planned at Sofia,
and which would cause a new period of bloodshed
and destruction in Macedonia, frustrate all the
efforts of the European Chancelleries, and bring in
its wake the world-wide war.
329
CHAPTER XVI
THE WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES
Sunday night, June 29th, without any de-
ON claration of war or even warning, General

Savoff ordered a general attack all along
the Greek and Servian lines. There was no direct
provocation on the part of Bulgaria's allies.
The responsibility for precipitating the war which
brought about the humiliation of Bulgaria can be
directly fixed. Two
general orders, dated from the
military headquarters at Sofia on June 29th, have
been published. They set forth an amazing and
devilish scheme, which stands out as a most cold
and bloody calculation, even among all the horrors
of Balkan history. General Savoff stated positively
that this energetic action was not the commence-
ment of a war. It was merely for the purpose of
occupying as much territory as possible in the con-
tested regions before the intervention of the Powers.
It had a two-fold object: to cut the communications
between the Greek and Servians at Veles (Kuprulu)
on the Vardar, and to throw an army suddenly into
Salonika. The began in the night-time.
fighting
The Bulgarians naturally were able to advance into
a number of important positions.
330
WAR BETWEEN THE BALKAN ALLIES
When the news became known at Salonika on the

morning of the 3Oth, General Hassapsieff, on the
ground that he was a diplomatic agent, was allowed
to leave. Before his departure he gave an order to
his forces to resist, if they were attacked, as he would
return with the Bulgarian army in twenty-four
hours.
Early in the afternoon the Greeks sent an ulti-
matum ordering the Bulgarians in Salonika to sur-
render by six o'clock. Their refusal led to all-night
street fighting. Barricaded in St. Sophia and several
other buildings, they were able to defend themselves
until the Greeks turned artillery upon their places of
refuge. Not many were killed on either side. Salo-

nika was calm again the next day. One thousand
three hundred Bulgarian soldiers and a number of
prominent Bulgarian residents of Salonika, under con-
ditions of exceptional cruelty and barbarism, were
sent to Crete. The Greek forces in Salonika, among
whom were some twenty thousand from America,
were hurried to the outposts for the defence of the
city.
There was no diplomatic action following the
treachery of the Bulgarians towards their allies.
The Greek Foreign Minister stated that Greece
considered the Bulgarian attack an act of war, and
that the Greek army had been ordered to advance
immediately to retake the positions which the Bul-
garians had captured. Nor did Servia show any
disposition to treat with Bulgaria. No official
communications reached Sofia from a Great Power.

There had been a miscalculation. Bulgaria was
compelled, as a consequence of her ill-considered
act, to face a new war. There was no withdrawal
possible.
From a purely military point of view, it seems
hard to believe that the Bulgarians really thought
that their night attack would bring about war. Their
army had borne the brunt of the campaign against
the Turks, and had suffered terribly during the
winter spent in the trenches before Tchatalja.
They were not in a good strategic position, for the
army was spread out over a long line, and the char-
acter of the country made concentration difficult.
Adequate railway communication with the bases of
supplies was lacking. The Greeks and Servians,
on the other hand, held not only the railway from
Salonika to Nish through the valley of the Vardar,
but even were it successfully cut, had communication
by railway with their bases at Salonika, Monastir,
Mitrovitza, Uskub, and Nish.
General Ivanoff, in command of the second Bul-
garian army, was charged with confronting the whole

of the Greek forces, in a line passing from the ^gean
Sea to Demir-Hissar on the Vardar, between Serres
and Salonika. When we realize that General
Ivanoff had less than fifty thousand men, a portion
of whom were recruits from the region of Serres,
and that he had to guard against an attack on his
right flank from the Servians, we cannot help won-
dering what the Bulgarian general staff had counted
upon in provoking their allies to battle. Did they
expect that the Greeks and Servians would be intimi-
dated by the night attack of June 29th, and would
332
agree to continue the project of a conference at

Petrograd? Or did they think that the Greek army
was of so little value that they could brush it aside,
and enter Salonika, just as the Greeks had been able to
enter in November? Whatever hypothesis we adopt,
it shows contempt for their opponents and belief
in their own
star. The proof of the fact that the
Bulgarians never dreamed of anything but the suc-
cess of their "bluff," or, if there was resistance, of an
easy victory, found
is in the few troops at the dis-
posal of General Ivanoff, and in the choice of Doiran,

so near the front of battle, as the base of supplies.
At Doiran everything that the second army needed
in provisions and munitions of war was stored.
From the financial standpoint alone, Bulgaria could
not afford to risk the loss of these supplies.
On July 2d, the Greek army, under the command of
Crown Prince Constantine, took the offensive against
the Bulgarians, who had occupied on the previous
day the crest of Beshikdag, from the mouth of the
Struma to the plateau of Lahana, across the road
from Salonika to Serres, and the heights north of
Lake Ardzan, commanding the left bank of the
Vardar. The positions were strong. If the Greek
army had been of the calibre that the Bulgarians
evidently expected, or if General Ivanoff had had
sufficient to hold the positions against the
forces
Greek attack, there would undoubtedly have been
pourparlers, and a probable cessation of hostilities
just as the Bulgarians counted upon.
But the Greeks soon proved that they were as
brave and as determined as their opponents. Their
333
artillery fire was excellent. There was no wavering
before the deadly resistance of the entrenched Bul-
garians. After five days of struggle, in which both
sides showed equal courage, the forces of General
Ivanoff yielded to superior numbers. The Bulga-
rians were compelled to retreat, on July 6th, in
two columns, towards Demir-Hissar and Strumitza.
The retreat was effected in good order, and the
Greeks, though in possession of mobile artillery,
could not surround either column. Victory had
been purchased at a terrible price. The Greek
losses in five days were greater than during the whole
war with Turkey. They admitted ten thousand
hors du combat. The Greeks had received their first
serious baptism of fire, and had demonstrated that
they could fight. The Turks had never given them

the opportunity to wipe out the disgrace of 1897.
It is a tribute to the quickness of decision of the
Crown Prince Constantine and his general staff,
and to the spirit of his soldiers, that this severe trial
of five days of continuous fighting and fearful loss
of life was not followed by a respite. The Greek
headquarters were moved to Doiran on the 7th.
It was decided to maintain the offensive as long as
the army had strength to march and men to fill the
gaps made by the fall of thousands every day. The
Bulgarians, although they contested desperately
every step, were kept on the move. On the right,
the Greeks pushed through to Serres, joining there,
on July nth, the advance-guard of the detachments
which the Greek fleet had landed at Kavalla on the
9th.
334
The advance of the Greek armies was along the

Vardar, the Struma, and the Mesta. On the Vardar,
the Bulgarian abandonment of Demir-Hissar, on the
loth, enabled the Greeks to repair the railway, and
establish communication with the Servian army.
The right wing, advancing by the Mesta, occupied
Drama. On July iQth, the Bulgarian resistance was
concentrated at Nevrokop. When it broke here,
the Greek right wing was able to send its outposts
to the foothills of the Rhodope Mountains, on the
Bulgarian frontier.
The Greeks began to speak of the invasion of
Bulgaria, and of making peace at Sofia. But the
bulk of their forces met an invincible resistance at
Simitli. Fromthe 23d to the 26th, they attacked
the Bulgarian positions, and believed that the ad-
vantage was theirs. But on the 27th the Bulgarians
began a counter-attack against both wings of the
Greek army at once. On the 29th, the Greeks began
to plan their retreat. On the 3Oth, they realized
that the retreat was no longer possible. The Bul-
garians were on both their flanks. It was then that
the armistice saved them.
While the Greek army was gaining its victories
in the hinterland of Macedonia, the ports of the
Êgean coast, Kavalla, Makri, Porto-Lagos, and
Dedeagatch were occupied without resistance by the
Greek fleet. Detachments withdrawn from Epirus
were brought to these ports. Some went to Serres
and Drama. Others garrisoned the ports, and occu-
pied Xanthi and other nearby inland towns.
The Bulgarians may have had some reason to
335
discount the value of the Greek army. For it had
not yet been- tried. But the Servians had shown
from the very first day of the war with Turkey that
they possessed high military qualities. The courage
of their troops was coupled with agility. They had
had more experience than the Bulgarians and Greeks
in quick marches, and in breaking up their forces
into numerous columns. There is probably no army
in Europe to-day which can equal the Servians in
mobility. It is incredible that the Bulgarians could

have hoped to surprise the Servians, and find a weak
place anywhere along their lines. On the defensive,
in localities which they had come to know intimately
by nine months in the field, it would have taken a
larger force than the Bulgarians could muster to

get the better of soldiers such as the Servians had
proved themselves to be.
Whether it was by scorn for the Greeks, or by
appreciation of the Servian concentration, the Bul-
garians had planned to confront the Servians with
four of their five armies. We have already seen
that General Ivanoff had the second army alone to
oppose to the Greeks, and that even a few battalions
of his troops were needed on the Servian flank.
The engagements between the Bulgarians and
the Servians had two distinct fields of action, one
in Macedonia, and the other on the Bulgaro-Servian
frontier.
In Macedonia, the Bulgarians experienced the
same surprise in regard to the Servians as in regard
to the Greeks. Their sudden attack of June 3Oth
did not strike terror to the hearts of their opponents.
336
Instead of gaining for them a favourable diplomatic

position, they found that the Servians did not even
suggest a parley. On July ist,'the Servians started
a counter-attack, and kept a steady offensive against
their former allies for eight days. Gradually the
Bulgarians, along the Bregalnitza, gave ground,
retreating from position to position, always with
their face towards the enemy. The battle, after the
first day, was for the Bulgarians a defensive action
all along the line.
On July 4th, General Dimitrieff assumed the

functions of generalissimo of the Bulgarian forces.
He tried his best to check the Servian offensive.
But the aggressive spirit had gone out of the Bul-
garian army. Lule Burgas could not be repeated.
It was incapable of more than a stubborn resistance
to the Servian advance. By July 8th, the Servians
were masters of the approaches to Istip, and had
cleared the Bulgarians out of the territory which
led down into the valley of the Vardar. Then they
stopped. From this time on to the signing of the
armistice, the Macedonian Servian army was content
with the victories of the first week.
Along the Servian-Bulgarian frontier, the Bul-
garian army had some initial success. But General
Kutincheff did not dispose of enough men to make
possible a successful aggressive movement towards
Nish. From the very first, when the Macedonian
army failed to advance, the Bulgarians' plans of
an invasionof Servia fell to the ground. They had
based everything upon an advance in Macedonia
to the Vardar. So the forward movement wavered.
22 337
The Servians, now sure of Rumanian co-operation,
advanced in turn towards Widin. General Kutin-
cheff was compelled to fall back on Sofia by the
Rumanian invasion. Widin was invested by the
Servians on July 23d.
Rumania had watched with alarm the rise of the
military power of Bulgaria. She could not inter-
vene in the first Balkan war on the side of the Turks.
The civilized world would not have countenanced
such a move, nor would it have had the support of
Rumanian public opinion. Whatever the menace
of Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula,
Rumania had to wait until peace had been signed
between the allies and the Turks. But, as we have
already seen, during the first negotiations at London,
her Minister to Great Britain had been instructed
to treat with Bulgaria for a cession of territory from
the Danube at Silistria to the Black Sea, in order
that Rumania might have the strategic frontier
which the Congress of Berlin ought to have given
her, when the Dobrudja was awarded to her, without
her consent, in exchange for Bessarabia. As Ruma-
nia had helped to free Bulgaria in 1877-78, and had
never received any reward for her great sacrifices,
while the Bulgarians had done little to win their
own independence, the demand of a rectification
of frontier was historically reasonable. Since Ru-
mania had so admirably developed the Dobrudja,
and had constructed the port of Constanza, it was
justified from the economic standpoint. For the
possession of Silivria, and a change of frontier on
the Dobrudja, was the only means by which Ru-
338
mania could hope to defend her southern frontier

from attack.
At first, the Bulgarians opposed any
bitterly
compensation to Rumania.
They discounted the
importance of her neutrality, for they knew that
she could not act against them as long as they were
at war with Turkey. They denounced the demands
of Rumania, perfectly reasonable as they were, as
"blackmail." They were too blinded with the
dazzling glory of their unexpected victories against
the Turks to realize how essential the friendship
of Rumania at least, the neutrality of Rumania
was to their schemes for taking all Macedonia to
themselves. When, in April, they signed with
very ill grace the cession of Silivria, as a compromise,
and refused to yield the small strip of territory from
Silivria to Kavarna on the Black Sea, the Bulgarians
made a fatal political mistake. It was madness
enough to go into the second Balkan war in the
belief that they could frighten, or, if that failed, over-
whelm the Servians and Greeks. What shall we
call the failure to take into their political calcula-
tions the possibility of a Rumanian intervention?
Even there were not the question of the fron-
if
tier inthe Dobrudja, would not Rumanian inter-

vention still be justified by the consideration of
preserving the balance of power in the Balkans?
By intervening, Rumania would be acting, in her
small corner of the world, just as the larger nations
of Europe had acted time and again since the six-
teenth century.
The Rumanian mobilization commenced on July
339
3d. On July loth,Rumania declared war, and
crossed the Danube.The Bulgarians decided that
they would not oppose the Rumanian invasion.
How could they? Already their armies were on the
defensive, and hard pressed, by Greeks and Servians.
There is a limit to what a few hundred thousand men
could do. It is possible, though not probable, that
the Bulgarian armies might have gained the upper
hand in the end against their former allies in Mace-
donia. But with Rumania bringing into the field
a fresh army, larger than that of any other Balkan
States, Bulgaria's case was hopeless. The Ruma-
nians advanced without opposition, and began to
march upon Sofia. They occupied, on July I5th,
the seaport of Varna, from which the Bulgarian
fleet had withdrawn to Sebastopol.
It would have been easy for the Rumanians to
have occupied Sofia, and waited there for the Servian
and Greek armies to arrive. The humiliation of
Bulgaria could have been made complete. Why,
then, the armistice of July 3Oth? Why the assem-
bling hastily of a peace conference at Bukarest?
Political and financial, as well as military, considera-
tions dictated the wisdom of granting to Bulgaria
an armistice.
Greece and Servia were exhausted financially,
and their armies could gain little more than glory
by continuing the war. The Greek army, in fact,
was in a critical position, and ran the risk of being
surrounded and crushed by the Bulgarians. The
Servians had not shown much hurry to come to the
aid of the Greeks. The truth of the matter is that,
340
after the battle of the Bregalnitza, which ended on
July loth, the Servians began to get very nervous
about the successes of their Greek allies. They
knew Greek character, and feared that too
well the
easy victories over the Bulgarians might necessitate
a third war with Greece over Monastir. So, on
July nth, with the ostensible reason that such a
measure was necessary to protect their rear against
the Albanians, the Servian general staff withdrew
from the front a number of the best regiments, and
placed them in a position where they could act, if
the Greeks tried to seize Monastir. On the other
hand, Rumania gave both Greece and Servia to
understand that she had entered the war, not from
any altruistic desire to help them, but for her own
interests. To see Bulgaria too greatly humiliated
and weakened was decidedly no more to the interest
ofRumania than to see her triumphant.
As for Montenegro, she had entered the second
Balkan war to give loyal support to Servia, from
whom she expected in return a generous spirit in
dividing the sandjak of Novi Bazar. Her co-opera-
tion, however, as I am able to state from having
been in Cettinje when the decision was taken to send
ten thousand men against Bulgaria, was not made
the subject of any bargain. So, when Servia thought
best sign the armistice, Montenegro was in
to
thorough accord.
After a month of fighting, in which the losses had
been far greater than during the war with Turkey,
and the treatment of non-combatants by all the
armies horrible beyond description, the scene of
battle shifted from the blood-stained mountains
and valleys ofMacedonia to the council chamber at
Bukarest. Rumania was to preside over a Balkan
Congress of Berlin!
342
CHAPTER XVII
THE TREATY OF BUKAREST
the delegates from the various im-
WHEN portant capitals reached Bukarest on

July 3Oth, the armies were still fighting.
Everyone, however, seemed anxious to come to an
understanding as soon as possible. The first session
of the delegates was held on the afternoon of July
3Oth. Premier Pasitch for Servia and Premier
Venizelos for Greece were present. But Premier
Daneff, who had so wanted the war, did not have the
manhood to face its consequences. The Bulgarians
were represented in Bukarest by no outstanding
leader, either political or military. Premier Majo-
resco of Rumania presided over the conference.
The first necessity was the decision for an armistice.
A suspension of arms was agreed upon to begin
upon July ist at noon. On August 4th the armistice
was extended for three days to August 8th.
In the conference of Bukarest, Bulgaria, naturally,
stood by herself. It was necessary, if there was to
be peace, that her delegates should come to an under-
standing as to the sacrifices she was willing to make
with each of her neighbours separately. Conse-
343
quently the important decisions were made in com-
mittee meetings. The general assembly of delegates
had little else to do than to ratify the concessions
wrung from Bulgaria in turn by each of the opponents.
Rarely have peace delegates been put in a more
painful position than the men whom Bulgaria sent
to Bukarest. It will always be an open question as
to whether the military situation of Bulgaria on the
3 ist of July, as regards Servia and Greece, was re-
trievable. But the presence of a Rumanian army in
Bulgaria made absolutely impossible the continu-
ance of the war. Consequently there was nothing
for Bulgaria to do but to yield to the demands of
Greece and Servia. The only check upon the Ser-
vian and Greek delegates was the determination of
Rumania not to see Bulgaria too greatly weakened.
She had entered into line to gain her bit of territory
in the south of the Dobrudja. But she had also
in mind the prevention of Bulgarian hegemony in
the Balkan Peninsula, and she did not propose to
see this hegemony go elsewhere. This explains the
favourable terms which Bulgaria received.
The Bulgarian and Rumanian delegates quickly
agreed upon a frontier to present to the meeting of
August 4th. By this, the first of the protocols,
Bulgaria ceded to Rumania all her territory north
of a line from the Danube, above Turtukaia, to the
end of the Black Sea, south of Ekrene. In addition,
she bound herself to dismantle the present fortresses
and promised not to construct forts at Rustchuk,
Schumla, and the country between and for twenty
kilometres around Baltchik.
344
-î/y'
w
lAiT^"' V^S^ ^" t. ^S
I ^J- %/ c. V-â ^ o
On August 6th, the protocol with Servia was pre-
sented. The Servian frontier was to start at a line
drawn from the summit of Patarika on the old
frontier, and to follow the watershed between the
Vardar and the Struma to the Greek-Bulgarian
frontier,with the exception of the upper valley of
the Strumnitza which remained Servian territory.
The following day the protocol with Greece was
presented. The Greek-Bulgarian frontier was to
run from the crest of Belashitcha to the mouth of
the River Mesta on the Êgean Sea. Bulgaria for-
mally agreed to waive all pretensions to Crete. The
protocol with the Greeks was the only one over which
the Bulgarians made a resolute stand. When they
signed this protocol, they stated that the accord
was only because they had taken notice of the notes
which Austria-Hungary and Russia presented to
the conference, to the effect that in their ratification
they would reserve for future discussion the inclusion
of Kavalla in Greek territory.
The Bulgarians insisted on a clause guarantee-
ing autonomy for churches and schools in the con-
dominium of liberated territories. Servia opposed
this demand mildly, and Greece strongly. They were
right. The question of national propaganda through

churches and schools had done more to arouse and
keep alive racial hatred in Macedonia than any
other cause. If there were to be a lasting peace,
nothing could be more unwise than the continuance

of the propaganda which had plunged Macedonia
into such terrible confusion.
Rumania, however, secured in the Treaty of
345
Bukarest from each of the States what they had been
unwilling to grant each other. Rumania imposed
upon Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia, the obligation
of granting autonomy to the Kutzo-Wallachian
churches, and assent to the creation of bishoprics
subsidized by the Rumanian Government.
A rather amusing incident occurred on August
5th by the proposition of the United States Govern-
ment through its Minister at Bukarest, that a pro-
vision be embodied in the treaty according full
religious liberties in transferred territories. The

ignorance of American diplomacy, so frequently to
be deplored, never made a greater blunder than
this. It showed how completely the American
State Department and its advisors on Near Eastern
affairs had misunderstood the Macedonian question.

Quite rightly, the consideration even of this request
was rejected as superfluous. Mr. Venizelos ad-
ministered a well-deserved rebuke when he said that
religious liberty, in the right sense of the word, was
understood through the extension of each country's
constitution over the territories acquired.
Much has been written concerning the intrigues
of European Powers at Bukarest during the ten
days of the conference which made a new map for
the Balkan Peninsula. It will be many years, if
ever, before these intrigues are brought to light.
Therefore we cannot discuss the question of the
pressure which was brought to bear upon Rumania,
upon Bulgaria, and upon Servia and Greece to de-
termine the partition of territories. Germany
looked with alarm upon the possibility of a durable
346
settlement. Austria was determined that Bulgaria
and Servia should not become reconciled.
Austria-Hungary and Russia, though for different
reasons, were right in their attitude toward the
matter of Greece's claim upon Kavalla. Greece
would have done well had she been content to leave
to Bulgaria a larger littoral on the ^gean Sea, and
the port which is absolutely essential for the proper
economic development of the hinterland attributed
to her. By taking her pound of flesh, the Greeks
only exposed themselves to future dangers. The
laws of economics are inexorable. Bulgaria cannot
allow herself to think sincerely about peace until her
portion of Macedonia, by the inclusion of Kavalla,
is logically complete. would have been better
It
politics for Greece to have shown herself magnani-

mous on this point. As George Sand has so aptly
said: "It is not philanthropy, but our own interest,
which leads us sometimes to do good to men in order
that they may be prevented in the future from doing
harm to us."
When we come to look back upon the second
Balkan war, and have traced out the sad conse-
quences and the continued unrest which followed the
Treaty of Bukarest, it is possible that Servia's re-
sponsibility may be considered as great, if not greater,
than that of Bulgaria in bringing about the strife
between the allies. In our sympathy with the in-
herent justice of Servia's claim for adequate terri-
torial compensation for what she had suffered for,
and what she had contributed to, the Turkish de-
bdde in Europe, we are apt to overlook three indis-
347
putable facts: that Servia repudiated a solemn
treaty with Bulgaria, on the basis of which Bulgaria
had agreed to the alliance against Turkey; that the
territories granted to Servia, south of the line which
she had sworn not to pass in her territorial claims,
and a portion of those in the "contested zone" of
her treaty with Bulgaria, were beyond any shadow
of doubt inhabited by Bulgarians; and that since
these territories were ceded to her she has not, as
was tacitly understood at Bukarest, extended to
them the guarantees and privileges of the Servian
constitution.
The Treaty of Bukarest, so far as the disputed
territories allotted to Servia are concerned, has
created a situation analogous to that of Alsace and
Lorraine after the Treaty of Frankfort. And Servia
started in to cope with it by following Prussian
methods. What Servians of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and Dalmatia have suffered from Austrian rule,
free Servia is inflicting upon the Bulgarians who
became her subjects after the second Balkan war.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the
population of Macedonia, as a whole, of whatever

race or creed, would welcome to-day a return to
the Ottoman rule of Abdul Hamid. The Turkish
"constitutional regime" than Abdul
was worse
Hamid, the war of "liberation" worse than the
Young Turks, and the present disposition of terri-
tories satisfies none. Poor Macedonia!
After the disastrous and humiliating losses at
Bukarest, Bulgaria still had her former vanquished
foe to reckon with. The Turks were again at Adria-
348
nople and Kirk Kilisse. Thrace was once more in
her power. The Treaty of Bukarest, while attri-
buting Thrace to Bulgaria on the basis of the Treaty
of London, actually said nothing whatever about it.
Nor were there any promises of aid in helping Bul-
garia to get back again what she had lost, without
a struggle, by her folly and treachery.
A new war by Bulgaria alone in her weakened
military condition and with her empty treasury, to
drive once more the Turks back south of the Enos-
Midia line, was impossible. Bulgaria appealed to
the chancelleries of Europe to help her in taking
possession of the Thracian territory ceded to her at
London. The Powers made one of their futile over-
tures to Turkey, requesting that she accept the
treaty which she had signed a few months before.
But no one could blame the Turks for having
taken advantage of Bulgarian folly. Who could
expect them to meekly withdraw behind the Enos-
Midia line? Bulgaria could get no support in
applying the argument of force.
In the end, the victors of Lule Burgas had to go
to Constantinople and make overtures directly to
the Sublime Porte. They fared very badly. The
Enos-Midia line was drawn, but it took a curve
northward from the Black Sea and westward across
the Maritza in such a way that the Turks obtained
not only Adrianople, but also Kirk Kilisse and
Demotica. The Bulgarians were not even masters
of the one railway leading to Dedeagatch, their sole
port on the Êgean Sea.

The year 1913 for Bulgaria will remain the most
349
bitter one of her history. She had to learn the
lesson that the life of the nations, as well as of indi-
viduals, is one of give as well as take, and that com-
promise is the basis of sound statesmanship. Who

wants all, most often gets nothing.
350
CHAPTER XVIII
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO

world has not known just what to do with
the mountainous country which comes out in
THE a bend on the upper western side of the Bal-
kan Peninsula directly opposite the heel of Italy. It
caused trouble to the Romans from the very moment
that they became an extra-Italian power. Inherited
from them by the Byzantines, fought for with the
varying fortunes by the Prankish princes, the Vene-
tians, and the Turks, Albania has remained a country
which cannot be said to have ever been wholly
subjected. Nor can it be said to have ever had a
national entity. Its present mediaeval condition
isdue to the fact that, owing to its high mountains
and its being on the road to nowhere, it has not,
since the Roman days at least, undergone the influ-
ences of a contemporary civilization.
Venice recognized the importance of Albania
during the days of her commercial prosperity. For
the Albanian coast, with its two splendid harbours,
of Valona and Durazzo, effectively guards the
entrance of the Adriatic into the Mediterranean Sea.
But Albania did not demand attention a hundred
years ago when the last map of Europe was being
made by the Congress of Vienna. The reason for
this issimple. Italy was not a political whole.
The head of the Adriatic was entirely in the hands
of Austria. There was no thought at that time of
our modern navies, and of the importance of keeping
open the Straits of Otranto. It was the Dalmatian
coast, north of Albania, which Austria considered
essential to hercommercial supremacy. Then, too,
Greece had not yet received her freedom, and the
Servians had not risen in rebellion against the Otto-
man Empire. There were no Slavic, Hellenic, and
Italian questions to disturb Austria in her peaceful
possession of the Adriatic Sea.

It was not until the union of Italy had been ac-
complished, and the south Slavic nationalities had

formed themselves into political units, that Albania
became a "question" in the chancelleries of
Europe.
Austria-Hungary determined that Italy should
not get a foothold in Albania. Italy had the same
determination in regard to Austria-Hungary. Since
the last Russo-Turkish War, Austria-Hungary and
Italy have had the united determination to keep the
Slavs from reaching the Adriatic. For the past
generation, feeling certain that the end of the Otto-
man Empire was at hand, Austria and Italy through
and their consular
their missionaries, their schools,
and commercial agents, have struggled hard against
each other to secure the ascendancy in Albania.
Their intrigues have not ceased up to this day.
When Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, and the Young Turk oppression of the Albani-
ans aroused the first expression of what might possibly
352
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
be called national feeling since the time of Skander
bey's resistance to the Ottoman conquest, the rival
Powers, instead of following in the line of Russia
and Great Britain in Persia, and establishing spheres
of interest, agreed to support the Albanian national
movement as the best possible check upon Servian
and Greek national aspirations. This was the
status of Albania in her relationship to the Adriatic
Powers, when the war of the Balkan States against
Turkey broke out. The accord between Austria
and Italy had stood the strain of Italy's war with
Turkey. Largely owing to their fear of Russia and
Germany, it stood the strain of
to the pressure of
the Balkan War. But both Italy and Austria let it
be known to the other Powers that if the Turkish
Empire in Europe disappeared, there must be an
independent Albania.
This dictum was accepted in principle by the other
four Powers, who saw in it the only possible chance
of preventing the outbreak of a conflict between
Austria and Russia which would be bound to involve
all Europe in war. No nation wanted to fight over
the question of Albania. Russia could not hope to
have support from Great Britain and France to
impose upon the Triple Alliance her desire for a
Slavic outlet to the Adriatic. For neither France
nor Great Britain was anxious for the Russian to
get to the Mediterranean. The accord between the
Powers was shown in the warning given to Greece
and Servia that the solution of the Albanian question
must be reserved for the Powers when a treaty of
peace was signed with Turkey. The accord weathered
23 353
the severe test put upon it by the bold defiance of
the Montenegrin occupation of Scutari.
We have spoken elsewhere of the policy of the
Young Turks towards Albania. This most useful
and loyal corner of the Sultan's dominions was
turned into a country of perennial revolutions,
which started soon after the inauguration of the
constitutional regime. In the winter of 1911-1912,
when the group of Albanian deputies in the Ottoman
Parliament saw their demands for reforms rejected
by the Cabinet, and even the right of discussion of
their complaints refused on the floor of Parliament,
the Albanians north and south, Catholic and Moslems,
united in a resistance to the Turkish authorities
that extended to Uskub and Monastir. After the
spring elections of 1912, the resistance became a for-
midable revolt. For the Young Turks had rashly
manoeuvred the balloting with more than Tammany
skill. The Albanians were left without representa-
tives in Parliament! Former deputies, such as
Ismail Kemal bey, Hassan bey, and chiefs such as
Isa Boletinatz, Idris Sefer, and AH Riza joined in a
determination to demand autonomy by force of
arms.
When, in July, the Cabinet decided to move an
army against the Albanians, there were wholesale
desertions from the garrison of Monastir, and of
Albanian officers from all parts of European Turkey.
Mahmoud Shevket pasha was compelled to resign the
Ministry of War, and was followed by Said pasha
and the whole Cabinet. The Albanians demanded
as a sine qiia non the dissolution of Parliament. The
354
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
Mukhtar Cabinet agreed to the dissolution, and
accepted almost all the demands of the rebels in a
conference at Pristina.
For the tables had now been turned. Instead of
a Turkish invasion of Albania for "pacification," as
in previous summers, it was a question now of an
Albanian invasion of Turkey. In spite of the con-
ciliatory spirit of the new Cabinet, the agitation
persisted. It was rumoured that the Malissores and
the Mirdites were planning a campaign against
Scutari and Durazzo. I was in Uskub in the early
part of September
1
. 'Isa Boletinatz and his band

were practically in possession of the city. A truce
for Ramazan, the Moslem fast month, had been
arranged between Turks and Albanians. But the

Albanians said they would not lay down their arms
until a new and honestly constitutional election was
held.
Immediately after Ramazan came the Balkan War.
Albania found herself separated from Turkey,
and in a position to have more than autonomy
without having to deal further with the Turks.
During the Balkan War, the attitude of the Alba-
nians was a tremendous disappointment to the Turks.
One marvels that loyalty to the Empire could have
been expected, even from the Moslem element, in
Albania. And yet the Turks did expect that a
Pan-Islamic feeling would draw the Albanian beys
to fight for the Sultan, just as they had expected a
similar phenomenon on the part of the rebellious
Arabs of the Arabic peninsula during the war with
Italy.
355
From the very beginning the Albanians adopted
an attitude of opportunism. They did not lift a
hand directly to help the Turks. Had they so
desired, they might have made impossible the invest-
ment of Janina by the Greeks. But nowhere, save
in Scutari, did the Albanians make a stubborn
stand against the military operations of the Balkan
allies. Almost from the beginning, they had under-
stood that the Powers would not allow the partition
of Albania. They knew that the retention of Janina
was hopeless after the successes of the allies during
October. But they received encouragement from
both Austria-Hungary and Italy to fight for Scutari.
The heroic defence of Scutari, which lasted longer
than that of any of the other fortified towns in the
Balkan Peninsula, cannot be regarded as a feat of
the Turkish army. During the siege, the general
commanding Scutari had been assassinated by order
of Essad pasha, who was his second in command.
Essad then assumed charge of the defence as purely
Albanian in character. He refused to accept the
armistice, and continued the struggle throughout
the debates in London. Scutari is at the south
end of a lake which is shared between Albania and
Montenegro. Commanding the city is a steep
barren hill calledTarabosh. With their heavy
artillery on this hill, the Albanians were able to
prevent indefinitely the capture of their city.
Servians and Montenegrins found themselves con-
fronted with the task of taking Tarabosh by assault,
if they hoped to occupy Scutari. This was a feat
beyond the strength of a Balkan army. On the
356
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
steep slopes of this hill were placed miles of barbed
wire. The assailants were mowed down each time
they tried to reach the batteries at the top. As
Tarabosh commanded the four corners of the horizon,
itscannon could prevent an assault or bombardment
of the city from the plain. The allies were unable
to silence the batteries on the crest of this hill.
During the winter, the principal question before
the concert of European Powers was that of Scutari.
Austria-Hungary was so determined that Scutari
should not fall into the hands of the Montenegrins
and Servians that she mobilized several army corps
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the Russian frontier
of Galicia, at Christmas time, 1912. The New Year
brought with it ominous forebodings for the peace
of Europe. Diplomacy worked busily to bring
about an accord between the Powers, and pressure
upon the besiegers of Scutari. In the middle of
March, it was unanimously agreed that Scutari
should remain to Albania, and that Servia should
receive Prizrend, Ipek, Dibra, and Diakova as com-
pensation for not reaching the Adriatic, and the
assurance of an economic outlet for a railroad at
some Albanian port. The European concert then
decided to demand at Belgrade and Cettinje the
lifting of the siege of Scutari.
Servia, yielding to the warning of Russia that
nothing further could be done for her, consented to
withdraw her troops from before Scutari, and to
abandon the points in Albanian territory which had
been allotted by the Powers to the independent
Albanian State which they intended to create.
357
Servia had another reason for doing this. Seeing
the hopelessness of territorial aggrandizement in
Albania, she decided to denounce her treaty of
partition, concluded before the war, with Bulgaria,
To realize this act of faithlessness and treachery,
she had need of the sympathetic support of the
Powers in the quarrel which was bound to ensue.
We see here how the blocking of Servia's outlet to
the Adriatic led inevitably to a war between the
Balkan Allies.
But with Montenegro the situation was entirely
different. She had sacrificed one-fifth of her army
in the attacks upon Tarabosh, and Scutari seemed
to her the only thing that she was to get out of the
war with Turkey. Perched up in her mountains,
there was little harm that the Powers could do to
her. Just as King Nicholas had precipitated the
Balkan War against the advice of the Powers the
previous October, he decided on April ist to refuse
to obey the command of the Powers to lift the siege
of Scutari. From what I have gathered myself
from conversations in the Montenegrin capital two
months later, I feel that the King of Montenegro
can hardly be condemned for what the newspapers
of Europe called his "audacious folly" in refusing
to give a favourable response to the joint note pre-
sented to him by the European Ministers at Cettinje.
The Montenegrins are illiterate mountaineers, who
know nothing whatever about considerations of
international diplomacy. If their King had listened
to words written on a piece of paper, and had or-

dered the Montenegrin troops to withdraw from
358
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
before Scutari, he would probably have lost his
throne.
So the Powers were compelled to make a show of
force. Little Montenegro, with its one port, and
its total population not equal to a single arrondis-
sement of the city of Paris, received the signal honour

of an international blockade. On April 7th, an
international fleet, under the command of the British
Admiral Burney, blockaded the coast from Antivari
to Durazzo. While all Europe was showing its dis-
pleasure in the Adriatic, the Montenegrins kept on,
although deserted by the Servians, sitting in a circle
around Scutari, only twenty-five miles inland from
the blockading fleet. An April 23d, after the Balkan
War was all finished, Europe was electrified by the
news that the Albanians had surrendered Scutari
to Montenegro. The worst was to be feared, for
Austria announced her determination to send her
troops across the border from Bosnia into Monte-
negro. Such an action would certainly have brought
on a great European war. For neither at Rome nor
at Petrograd could Austrian intervention have been
tolerated.
No Power in Europe was at that moment ready
for war. Largely through pressure brought to bear
at Cettinje by his son-in-law, the King of Italy,
King Nicholas decided on May 5th to deliver Scu-
tari to the Powers. The Montenegrins -withdrew,
and ten days later Scutari was occupied by detach-
ments of marines from the international squadron.
The blockade was lifted. The peace of Europe was
saved.
359
The Treaty of London, signed on May 30, 1913,
put Albania into the hands of the Powers. The

northern and eastern frontiers had been arranged
by the promise made to Servia in return for her with-
drawal from the siege of Scutari. But the southern
frontier was still an open question. Here Italy was
as much interested as was Austria in the north.
With Corfu in the possession of Greece, Italy would
not agree that the coast of the mainland opposite
should also be Hellenic. The Greeks, on the contrary,
declared that the littoral and hinterland, up beyond
Santi Quaranta, was part of ancient Epirus, and
inhabited principally by Greeks. It should therefore
revert logically to greater Greece. Athens lifted
again the old cry, "Where there are Hellenes, there
is Hellas." The Greeks were occupying Santi
Quaranta. They claimed as far north as Argyro-
kastron. But they consented to withdraw from the
Adriatic, north of and opposite Corfu, if interior
points equally far to the north were left to them.
An international commission was formed to make
a southern boundary for Albania. Its task has
never been satisfactorily completed. The question
is still open.
What was to be done with this new state, foster
child of all Europe, with indefinite boundaries, with
guardians each jealous of the other, and neighbours
waiting only for a favourable moment to throw them-
selves upon her and extinguish her life?
I visited Albania in July, 1913, during the second
Balkan War. At Valona, in the south, I found a
provisional government, self-constituted during the
360
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
previous winter, whose authority was problematical
outside of Valona itself. At the head of the govern-
ment was Ismail Kemal, whom I had known as the
champion of Albanian autonomy in the Ottoman
Parliament at Constantinople. He talked passion-
ately of Albania, the new State in Europe, with its
united population and its national aspirations. He
was eager to have the claims of Albania to a generous
southern frontier presented at London. He assured
me that I could write with perfect confidence in
glowing terms concerning the future of Albania,
that a spirit of harmony reigned throughout the
country, and that the Albanians of all creeds, freed
from Turkish oppression, were looking eagerly to
their new as an independent nation. When I
life
expressed misgivings as to the role of Essad pasha,

the provisional president asserted that the former
commander of Scutari was wholly in accord with
him, and cited as proof the fact that he had that
very day received from Essad pasha his acceptance
of the portfolio of Minister of the Interior.
But that indefinable feeling of misgiving, which
one always has over the enthusiasm of Orientals,
caused me to withhold judgment as to the liability
of Albania until I had seen how things were going in
other portions of the new kingdom.
At Durazzo, the northern port of Albania, the
friends of Essad pasha were in control of the govern-
ment. Things were still being done a la turque, and
there was a feeling of great uncertainty concerning

the future. Few had any faith whatever in the pro-
visional government at Valona, and it was declared
that the influence of Essad pasha would decide the
attitude of the Albanians in Durazzo, Tirana, and
Elbassan. Essad was chief of the Toptanis, the
most family in the neighbourhood of
influential
Durazzo. He had "made his career" in the gendar-
merie, and had risen rapidly through the approval
and admiration of Abdul Hamid. This is an indica-
tion of his character. He was credited with the
ambition of ruling Albania. To withdraw his forces
and his munitions of war intact, so that he could
press these claims, is the only explanation of his
"deal" with King Nicholas of Montenegro to sur-
render Scutari. Essad had sacrificed the pride and
honour of Albania to his personal ambition.
From Durazzo, I went to San Giovanni di Medua,
which was occupied by the Montenegrins, just as I
had found Santi Quaranta in the south occupied by
the Greeks. Going inland from this port (one must
use his imagination in calling San Giovanni di Medua
a port) by way of Alessio, I reached Scutari, from
whose citadel flew the flags of the Powers. In every
quarter of this typically and hopelessly Turkish
town, one ran across sailors from various nations.
Each Power had its quarter, and had named the
streets with some curious results. The Via Garibaldi
ran into the Platz Radetzky. On the Catholic
cathedral was a sign informing you that you were
in the Rue Ernest Renan.
This accidental naming of streets was a prophecy
of the hopelessness of trying to reconcile the con-
flicting aims and ideals of the Powers whose bands
were playing side by side in the public garden. In
362
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
the dining-room of the hotel, when I saw Austrians,
Italians, Germans, British, and French officers eating
together at the long tables, instead of rejoicing at
this seeming spirit of European harmony, I had the
presentiment of the inevitable result of the struggle

between Slav and Teuton, to prevent which these
men were there. Just a year later, I stood in front
of the Gare du Montparnasse in Paris reading the
order for General Mobilization. There came back
to me as in a dream the public garden at Scutari,
and the mingled strains of national anthems, with
officers standing rigidly in salute beside their half-
filled glasses.
In the palatial home of a British nobleman who

had loved the Albanians and had lived long in Scu-
tari, Admiral Burney established his headquarters.
I talked with him there one afternoon concerning
the present and the future of Albania, and the rela-
tionship of the problem which he had before him with
the peace of Europe. Never have I found a man
more intelligently apprehensive of the possible out-
come of the drama in which he was playing a part,
and at the same time more determinedly hopeful
to use all his ability and power to save the peace of
Europe by welding together the Albanians into a
nation worthy of the independence that has been
given to them by the European concert. Such men
as Admiral Burney are more than the glory of a
nation they are the making of a nation. The great-
:
ness of Britain is due to the men who serve her.

High ideals, self-sacrifice, ability, and energy are
the corner-stones of the British overseas Empire.
363
There was little, however, that Admiral Burney,
or anyone in fact, could do for Albania. No nation
can exist in modern times, when national life is in
the will of the people rather than in the unifying
qualities of a ruler, if there are no common ideals
and the determination to attain them. Albania
is without a national spirit and a national past. It
is, therefore, no unit, capable of being welded into
a state. The creation by the Ambassadors of the

Powers in London may have been thought by them
to be a necessity. But it was really a makeshift.
If the Albanians had done their part, and had shown
the possibility of union, the makeshift might have
developed into a new European state. As things
have turned out, it has stayed what it was in the
beginning, a fiasco.
Among the many candidates put forward for the

new throne, Prince William of Wied was finally
decided upon. He was a Protestant, and could
occupy a position of neutrality among his Moslem,
Orthodox, and Catholic subjects. He was a German,
and could not be suspected of Slavic sympathies.
He was a relative of the King of Rumania, and could
expect powerful support in the councils of the Balkan
Powers.
It would be wearisome to go into the story
of Prince William's short and unhappy reign. At
Durazzo, which was chosen for the capital, he quickly
showed himself incapable of the role which a genius
among rulers might have failed to play successfully.
Lost in a maze of bewildering intrigues, foreign and
domestic, the ruler of Albania saw his prestige, and
364
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
then his dignity, disappear. He never had any real
authority. He had been forced upon the Albanians.
They did not want him. The Powers who had placed
him upon the throne did not support him. In the
spring, the usual April heading, "Albania in Arms,"
appeared once more in the newspapers of the world.
Up to the outbreak of the European war, when
Albania was "lost in the shuffle," almost daily tele-
grams detailed the march of the insurgents upon
Durazzo, the useless and fatal heroism of the Dutch
officersof the gendarmerie, the incursions of the
Epirote bands in the south, and the embarrassing

position of the international forces still occupying
Scutari. What the Albanians really wanted, none
could guess, much less they themselves!
The European war, in August, 1914, enabled the
Powers to withdraw gracefully from the Albanian
fiasco. Their contingents hurriedly abandoned
Scutari, and sailed for home. The French did not
have time to do this, so they went to Montenegro.
Since the catastrophe, to prevent which they had
created Albania, had fallen upon Europe, what
further need was there for the Powers to bother
about the fortunes of Prince William and his subjects?
Italy alone was left with hands free, and her interests
were not at stake, so long as Greece kept out of the
fray. For Prince William of Wied, Italy felt no
obligation whatever.
Without support and without money, there was
nothing left to Prince William but to get out. He
did not have the good sense to make his withdrawal
from Albania a dignified proceeding. The palace
365
was leftunder seals. The Prince issued a proclama-
tion which would lead the Albanians to believe that
it was his intention to return. It may be that he
thought the triumph of the German and Austrian
armies in the European war would mean his re-
establishment to Durazzo. But after he was once
again safely home at Neu-Wied, he did what he
ought to have done many months before. A high-
sounding manifesto announced his abdication, and
wished the Albanians Godspeed in the future. After
this formality had been accomplished, the former
Mpret of Albania rejoined his regiment in the German

army, and went out to fight against the French.
With Prince William of Wied and the international
corps of occupation gone, the Albanians were left
to themselves. At Durazzo, a body of notables,
calling themselves the Senate, adopted resolutions
restoring the Ottoman flag and the suzerainty of the
Sultan, invited Prince Burhaneddin effendi, a son
of Abdul Hamid, to become their ruler, and solemnly
decreed that hereafter the Turkish language should
be restored to its former position as the official
language of the country.
But Essad pasha thought otherwise. The psycho-
logical moment, for which he had been waiting ever
since his surrender of Scutari to the Montenegrins,
had come. In the first week of October, he hurried
to Durazzo with his followers, had himself elected
head of a new provisional government by the Albanian
Senate, and announced openly that his policy would
be to look to Italy instead of to Austria for support.
After rendering homage to the Sultan as Khalif,
366
THE ALBANIAN FIASCO
asking the people to celebrate the happy spirit of
harmony which now reigned throughout Albania,
and prophesying a new era of peace and prosperity
for Europe's latest-born independent state, the
former gendarme of Abdul Hamid entered the palace,
broke the seals of the international commission, and
went to sleep in the bed of Prince William of Wied.
One wonders whether the new ruler of Albania
will have more restful slumbers than his predecessor.
In spite of all protests, Greece is still secretly en-
couraging the Epirotes in their endeavour to push
northward the frontier of the Hellenic kingdom.
Italy has two army corps at Brindisi waiting for a
favourable moment to occupy Valona. The Mon-
tenegrins and Servians are planning once more to
reach the Adriatic through the valleys of the Boy ana
and Drin, after they have driven the Austro-Hun-
garian armies from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only
an Austrian triumph could now save Albania from
her outside enemies. But could anything save her
from her inside enemies? When I read of Essad
Pasha in Durazzo, self-chosen Moses of his people,
there comes back to me a conversation with the
leading Moslem chieftain of Scutari, whose guest
I had the privilege of being, in his home in the sum-
mer of 1913. When I mentioned Essad pasha, he
rose to his feet before the fire, waved his arms, and
cried out: "When I see Essad, I shall shoot him like
a dog!"
367
CHAPTER XIX
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ULTIMATUM
TO SERVIA
discussing the relations of the Austrians and

Hungarians with their south Slavic subjects,
IN and the rivalries of races in Macedonia, the
general causes behind the hostile attitude of Austria-
Hungary to the development of Servia have been
explained. Specific treatment of the Servian atti-
tude towards the annexation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina was reserved for this chapter, because the
events of the summer of 1914 are the direct sequence
of the events of the winter of 1908-1909.
On October 3, Marquis Pallavicini, Austro-
1908,
Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople, notified
verbally the Sublime Porte that Austria-Hungary
had annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, whose administration was entrusted to
her by the Treaty of Berlin just thirty years before.
Austria-Hungary was willing to renounce the right
given her by the Treaty of Berlin to the military
occupation of the sandjak of Novi Bazar (a strip of

Turkish territory between Servia and Montenegro),
if Turkey would renounce her sovereignty of the
annexed provinces.
368
AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA
This violation of the Treaty of Berlin by Austria-
Hungary aroused a strong protest not only in Servia
and in Turkey, but also among the other Powers
who had signed at Berlin the conditions of the main-
tenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
The was especially strong in London and
protest
Petrograd. But Austria-Hungary had the backing
of Germany, whose Ambassador at Petrograd,
Count de Pourtales, did not hesitate several times
during the winter to exercise pressure that went almost
point of being a threat upon the Russian Foreign
to the
Office to refrain from encouraging the intractable

attitude of Servia towards the annexation.
With Germany's support, Austria-Hungary did
not have much difficulty in silencing the protests of
all the Great Powers. She had a free hand, thanks
to Germany, in forcing Turkey and Servia to accept
the fait accompli of the annexation.
Turkish protests took the form of the boycott of
which we have spoken
F elsewhere. On November
X ,
^
22d, Austria-Hungary threatened to put the whole

status of European Turkey into question by con-
voking the European congress to revise the Treaty
of Berlin. This is exactly what Austria-Hungary
herself did not want. But neither did Turkey.
Both governments had a common interest in prevent-
ing outside intervention in the Balkan Peninsula.
The boycott, as evidencing anti- Austrian feeling,
was rather a sop to public opinion of Young Turkey,
and a blind to the Powers to hide the perfect accord
that existed between Germany and Turkey at the
moment, than the expression of hostility to Austria-
24 369
Hungary. After several months of pourparlers an
agreement was made between Constantinople and
Vienna on February 26, 1909. Turkey agreed to
recognize the annexation in return for financial
compensation. The negotiations at Constantinople
concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina are a monument
to the diplomatic finesse and skill of the late Baron
Marschallvon Bieberstein and of Marquis Pallavicini.
To lose something that you know you can no
longer keep is far different from losing the hope of
possession. It is always more cruel to be deprived

of an anticipation than of a reality. Turkey gave
up Bosnia and Herzegovina with her usual fatalistic
indifference. Her sovereignty had been only a
fiction after all. But Servia saw in the action of
Austria- Hungary a fatal blow to her national aspira-
tions. The inhabitants of the two Turkish provinces
on her west were Servian Bosnia-Herzegovina formed
:
the centre of the Servian race. Montenegro on

the south was Servian. Dalmatia on the west was
Servian. Croatia on the north was Servian. Every-
thing was Servian to the Adriatic Sea. And yet
Servia was land-locked. The Servians determined
they would not accept this annexation. They ap-
pealed to the signatory Powers of Berlin, and suc-
ceeded in arousing a sentiment in Europe favourable
to a European conference. They threatened to
make Austrian and Hungarian sovereignty intoler-
able, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also
in Croatia and Dalmatia.
Austria-Hungary was more than irritated; she

was alarmed. She appealed to her ally, and pictured
370
the danger to the Drang nach Oesten. The powerful
intervention of the German ambassadors in the
various European capitals succeeded in isolating
Belgrade. Russian support of Servia would have
meant a European war. Rather than risk this,
France begged Russia to yield. Russia, not yet
recovered from the Manchurian disaster, ordered
Servia to yield. Austria-Hungary was allowed to
force Servia into submission.
Friendless in the face of her too powerful adversary,
Servia directed her Minister at Vienna on March 31,
1909, to make the following formal declaration to
the Austro- Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs :
"Servia declares that she is not affected in her

rightsby the situation established in Bosnia, and
that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions
at which the Powers are going to arrive in reference
to Art. 25 of the Berlin Treaty. By following the
councils of the Powers, Servia binds herself to cease
the attitude of protest and resistance which she has
assumed since last October, relative to the annexa-
tion, and she binds herself further to change the
direction of her present policies towards Austria-
Hungary, and, in the future, to live with the latter
in friendly and neighbourly relations."
The crisis passed. was the

Servia's humiliation
price of European peace. Germany had shown her
determination to stand squarely behind Austria-
Hungary in her dealings with Servia. It was a
lesson for the future. Five years later history
repeated itself except that Russia did not back
down!
We have already told the story of Austria-Hun-
gary's dealings with Servia after the first victorious
month of the Balkan War with Turkey: how Servia
was compelled, owing to lack of supportfrom Russia,
to give satisfaction to Austria-Hungary in the Pro-
chaska incident, to withdraw her troops from Durazzo
and from before Scutari; and how the Powers saved
the peace of Europe in May, 1913, by compelling
Montenegro to abandon Scutari.
Ever since the Treaty of Bukarest, Austria-Hun-
gary watched Servia keenly for an opportunity to
pick a quarrel with her. It is marvellous how the
Servians, elated as they naturally were by their
military successes against Turkey and Bulgaria,
avoided knocking the chip off the shoulder of their
jealous and purposely sensitive neighbour.
It was one thing to be able to keep a perfectly
correct official attitude towards the Austro-Hunga-
rian Government. This the Servian Government
had promised to do in the note wrung from it on
March 31, 1909. This it did do. But it was a
totally different thing to expect the authorities at
Belgrade to stifle the national aspirations of twelve
million Servians, the majority of whom were outside
of her jurisdiction. Even if it had been the wiser
course for her to pursue and this is doubtful,
could Servia have been able to repress the thoroughly
awakened and triumphant nationalism of her own
subjects who had borne so successfully and so hero-
ically the sufferings and sacrifices of two wars within
one year?
Individual Servians, living within the kingdom of
372
Servia, were irredentists, but without official sanc-
tion. They were undoubtedly in connection with
by Austrian and Hunga-
the revolutionaries created
rian methods in the Servian provinces of the Dual
Monarchy. There was undoubtedly a dream of

Greater Servia, and a strong hope in the hearts of
nationalists on both sides of the frontiers that the
day would dawn by their efforts when Greater Servia

would be a reality. No government could have
continued to exist in Servia which tried to suppress
the Narodna Odbrana. I make this statement
without hesitation. King Peter did not intend to
become another Charles Albert.
Ought the Vienna and Berlin statesmen to have
expected Servia to do so? What answer would
Switzerland or Holland or Belgium or Brazil receive,
were their ministers to present a note at Wilhelm-
strasse or Ballplatz, calling attention to themenace
to their independence of the Pan-Germanic move-
by eminent professors
ment, citing speeches delivered
in universities, books written by officials of the
imperial Governments, and asking that certain

societies be suppressed and certain geographies be
removed from use in German schools? Their cause
would have been as just, and their right as clear,
for exactly the same reasons, as that of the Austrian
Government in its attitude towards Servia. The
only difference between Pan-Servianism and Pan-
Germanism and you must remember that the latter
is not only encouraged, but also subsidized, by the
Berlin and Vienna governments is that the former
is the aspiration of twelve millions while the latter
373
is the aspiration of ninety millions. Is not the
answer the old Bismarckian formula that might
makes right?
r,tm>^
During the winter following the Treaty of Bukarest
the Austro-Hungarian agents and police continued
their careful surveillance of the Narodna Odbmna,
and followed all its dealings with Servians of Austro-
Hungarian nationality. But it could find no casus
belli. The attitude of the Servian Government was
perfectly correct at all times. Traps were laid, but
Servian officials did not fall into them. The occasion
for striking Servia came in a most tragic way.
It seems like tempting Providence to have sent
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife to
Sarajevo on the anniversary of the battle of Kossova.
Things had been going from bad to worse in Bosnia.
Flags of the Dual Monarchy had been burned in
Sarajevo and Mostar, and the garrisons called upon
to intervene to restore order. The Constitution of
1910 had been modified in 1912, so that the military
Governor was invested with civil power. The local
Bosnian Diet had been twice prorogued. In May,
1913, the constitution was suspended, and a state
of siege declared in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through-
out the winter of 1913-1914, incipient rebellions
had to be checked by force in many places. It was
known to the police that Servian secret societies
were active, and that the provinces were in a state
of danger and insecurity. The Servian Govern-
ment was apprehensive concerning the announced
visit of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne.
In fact, so greatly was it feared that some attempt
374
might be made against the life of Franz Ferdinand,
and that this would be used as an excuse for an
attack upon Servia, that the Servian Minister at
Vienna, a week before the date announced for the
visit, informed the Government that there was
reason to fear a plot to assassinate the Archduke.
On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand
and Duchess of Hohenberg, were assas-
his wife, the
sinated in the streets of Sarajevo.
Austria-Hungary
realized that her moment had come. Germany
was sounded, and found to be ready to prevent
outside interference in whatever measures Vienna
might seefit to take with Belgrade.
In the spring of 1914, the Pasitch Cabinet had

almost succumbed in the struggle between civil and
military elements. Premier Pasitch retained his
power by agreeing to a dissolution of Parliament,
and binding himself to the necessity of following the
leadership of the military part. So far were the
chiefs of the military party from being in a mood
to consider the susceptibilities of Austria-Hungary
that they were actually, according to a telegram from
a well-informed source in Agram on June 26, 1914,
debating the means of uniting Servia and Monte-
negro. The difficult question of dynasties was in the
way of being solved, and, despite Premier Pasitch's
misgivings, the ballon d'essai of the project of union
had been launched in Europe. It was at this critical
and delicate moment for the Belgrade Cabinet that
the storm broke.
I was surprised by the spirit of optimism which
seemed to pervade the French press during the
375
period immediately following the assassination of
Franz Ferdinand. For three weeks the telegrams
from Vienna repeated over and over again the state-
ment that the ultimatum which Austria-Hungary
intended to present at Belgrade as a result of the
Sarajevo assassination would be so worded that
Russia could not take offence. This optimistic
opinion, which seems to have been given almost
official sanction by the Ballplatz, was shared by the
French Government. France is a country in which

the inmost thoughts of her statesmen are voiced freely
in the daily newspapers of Paris. If there had been
any serious misgivings, the protocol for the visit of

President Poincare to Petrograd and to the Scan-
dinavian capitals would certainly have been modified.
The President of France sailed for the Baltic on
July 1 5th. At six o'clock in the evening of the 23d,
the note of the Austro-Hungarian Government
concerning the events of the assassination of Sarajevo
was given to the Servian Government. It com-
menced by reproducing the text of the Servian de-
claration of March 31, 1909, which we have quoted
above. Servia was accused of not having fulfilled
the promise made in this declaration, and of permit-
ting the Pan-Servian propaganda in the newspapers
and public schools of the kingdom. The assassina-
tion of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was stated
to be the direct result of Servian failure to live up
to her declaration of March 31, 1909. Austria-
Hungary claimed that the assassination of the heir
to her throne had been investigated, and that ample
proof had been found of the connivance of two Ser-
376
vians, one anarmy officer and the other a functionary
who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana; that the
assassins had received their arms and their bombs
from these two men, and had been knowingly allowed
to pass into Bosnia by the Servian authorities on
the Serbo-Bosnian frontier. Being unable to endure
longer the Pan-Servian agitation, of which Belgrade
was the foyer and the crime of Sarajevo a direct
result, the Austro-Hungarian Government found
itself compelled to demand of the Servian Govern-
ment the formal assurance that it condemned this

propaganda, which was dangerous to the existence
of the Dual Monarchy, because its final end was to
detach from Austria-Hungary large portions of her
territory and attach them to Servia.
After this preamble, the note went on to demand
that on the first page of the Journal Officiel of July
26th the Servian Government publish a new de-
claration, the text of which is so important that
we quote it in full.
"The Royal Servian Government condemns the

propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, i. e.,
the entirety of those machinations whose aim it is
to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincere-
ly the ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.
"The Royal Servian Government regrets that
Servian officers and officials have participated in
the propaganda cited above, and have thus threat-
ened the friendly and neighbourly relations which the
Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate
by its declaration of March 31, 1909.
"The Royal Government, which disapproves and
377
rejects every thought or every attempt at influencing
the destinies of the inhabitants of any part of
Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty to call most
emphatically to the attention of its officers and
officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom,
that it will hereafter proceed with the utmost severity
against any persons guilty of similar actions, to
prevent and suppress which it will make every
effort."
Simultaneously with the publication in the Journal

Austria-Hungary demanded that the declara-
Officiel,
tion be brought to the knowledge of the Servian
army by an order of the day of King Peter, and be
published in the official organ of the army. The
Servian Government was also asked to make ten
promises :
1. To suppress any publication which fosters

hatred and contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian
of,
Monarchy, and whose general tendency is directed
against the latter's territorial integrity
;
2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of

the society Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate its entire
means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same
manner against the other societies and associations
in Servia which occupy themselves with the pro-
paganda against Austria-Hungary, and to take the
necessary measures that the dissolved societies may
not continue their activities under another name or
in another form ;
3. To eliminate without delay from the public

instruction in Servia, so far as the teaching staff as
well as the curriculum is concerned, whatever serves
or may serve to foster the propaganda against
Austria-Hungary ;
4. To remove from military service and public

378
office in all officers and officials who are
general
guilty of propaganda against Austria-Hungary and
whose names, with a communication of the evidence
which the Imperial and Royal Government pos-
sesses against them, the Imperial and Royal Govern-
ment reserves the right to communicate to the
Royal Government; .
5. accept the collaboration in Servia of mem-

To
bers of the official machinery (organes) of the Im-
perial and Royal Government in the suppression
of the movement directed against Austro-Hungarian
territorial integrity;
6. To commence a judicial investigation (enquete
judiciaire) against the participants of the conspiracy
of June 28th, who are on Servian territory members
of the official machinery (organes) delegated by the
Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the
researches (recherches) relative thereto;
7. To proceed immediately to arrest Major Voija
Tankositch and a certain Milan Ciganovitch, a
functionary of the Servian State, who have been
compromised by the result of the preliminary in-
vestigation at Sarajevo;
8. To prevent, by effective measures, the partici-
pation of the Servian authorities in the smuggling
of arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss
and punish severely the functionaries at the frontier
at Shabatz and at Loznica, guilty of having aided
the authors of the crime of Sarajevo by facilitating
their crossing of the frontier ;
9. To give to the Austro-Hungarian Government

explanations concerning the unjustifiable remarks
of high Servian functionaries, in Servia and abroad,
who, in spite of their official position have not
hesitated, after the crime of June 28th, to express
themselves in interviews in a hostile manner against
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy;
379
10. To notify without delay to the Austro-
Hungarian Government the execution of the meas-
ures included in the preceding points.
Annexed to the note was a memorandum which

declared that the investigation of the police, after
the assassination of the Archduke and his wife, had
established that the plot had been formed at Bel-
grade by the assassins with the help of a commandant
in the Servian army, that the six bombs and four
Browning pistols with their ammunition had been

given at Belgrade to the assassins by the Servian
functionary and the Servian army officer whose
names were cited in the note, that the bombs were
hand grenades which came from the Servian army
headquarters at Kragujevac, that the assassins
were given instruction in the use of the arms by
Servian officers, and that the introduction into Bos-
nia and Herzegovina of the assassins and their arms
was facilitated by the connivance of three frontier
captains and a customs official.
The wording of this note seemed to have been

entirely unexpected. The intention of the ulti-
matum was clear. It was understood that Russia

would not accept an attack upon the integrity of
Servia. Six years had passed since 1908, and two
since 1912. Russia had recuperated from the Japan-
ese War, and her Persian accord with Great Britain
had borne much fruit. She was sure of France.
Was this not a deliberate provocation to Russia?
Forty-eight hours had been given to Servia to

respond. Russia and France had both counselled
380
Servia to give an answer that would be a general
acceptance of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum.
Neither France nor Russia wanted war. So anxious
were they to avoid giving Austria-Hungary the
opportunity to precipitate the crisis before they were
ready for it that for the third time in six years Servia
was asked to swallow her pride and submit. On the
night of July 24th, a memorable council was held in
Belgrade. The Premier and the leaders of the
opposition, together with some members of the Na-
rodna Odbrana were shown clearly what course they
must follow, if they expected the loyal support of
Russia. The answer to the ultimatum must be
worded in such a way that Austria-Hungary would
have no ground upon which to stand in forcing im-
mediately the war. Servia must once more "eat
humble pie." But this time the promise of Russian
support was given to defend the territorial integrity
and the independence of Servia.
The Servian answer was far more conciliatory than
was expected. The allegations of the Austro-Hun-
garian preamble were denied, but the publication
of the declaration in the Journal Officiel and in the
army bulletin, and its incorporation in an order of

the day to the army, were promised. But there were
to be two changes in the text of the declaration.
Instead of "the Royal Servian Government con-
demns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary," the
Servians agreed to declare that "the Royal Servian
Government condemns every propaganda which should
be directed against Austria-Hungary," and instead of
"the Royal Government regrets that Servian officers
and officials . . . have participated in the pro-
paganda cited above," the
King could Servian
say no more than "the Royal Government regrets
that according to a communication of the Imperial
and Royal Government certain officers and function-
aries . . . etc."
The German White Book makes a special point of
the bad faith of Servia in altering the text of the
declaration in this way. But what government
could be expected to admit what was only a supposi-
tion, and what king worthy of the name would de-
nounce as a regicide openly before his army one of his
officers upon the unsupported statement of a political
document? The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum had
given no proof of its charges against the man named
in its note, and forty-eight hours was too short a
time for the Servian Government to investigate the
charges to its own satisfaction.
In order to make clear just what was the nature
of the demands which Austria-Hungary made upon
Servia, I have cited the ten articles in full.
One can readily see that the demands of Articles
1,2, and 3, in their entirety, meant the extinction of
the Pan-Servian movement and Servian nationalism.
Austria-Hungary was asking of Servia something
that neither member of the Dual Monarchy had suc-
ceeded in accomplishing in its own territories! The
German White Book attempts to sustain the justice
of the demands of its ally in striking at the press, the
nationalist societies, and the schools. The methods
of arousing a nationalistic spirit in the Servian people
through the press, through the formation of societies,

382
and through the teaching of irredentism by school-
books, were borrowed from Germany. But Servia
agreed to make her press laws more severe, to dis-
solve the Narodna Odbrana and other societies; and
"to eliminate from the public instruction in Servia
anything which might further the propaganda
directed against Austria-Hungary, provided the
Imperial and Royal Government furnishes actual
proofs."
was agreed to only so far as it could be
Article 4
actually proved that the officers and officials in
question had been "guilty of actions against the
monarchy." To promise
territorial integrity of the
"
to remove all who were guilty of propaganda against
Austria-Hungary" would have meant the disband-
ing of the Servian army and the Servian Government !
Is there any man with red blood in his veins who can
be prevented from having hopes and dislikes, and
expressing them? Could Servia prevent Servians
from stating how they felt about the political status
of their race in Croatia and in Bosnia? Did Austria-
Hungary ever make a similar request to her ally,

Italy, about irredentist literature and speeches?
Articles 5 and 6 are open to discussion. There is
no doubt that the newspapers of nations hostile to
Austria-Hungary and Germany have been unfair in
their interpretation and in their translation of these
two articles. The Servian answer deliberately gives
a meaning to the Austrian request here, and
false
represents it as an attack upon the independence of

her courts. Servia had enough good grounds for
resistance to the ultimatum without equivocating
383
on this point. In her answer she refused what had
not been actually demanded, a co-operation in the en-
qudte judiciaire of Austro-Hungarian organes. What
Austria-Hungary demanded was the co-operation
of her police officials in the recherches.
Articles 7 to 10 were accepted by Servia in toto.
As a proof of her good faith, the Servian answer
declared that Major Tankositch had been arrested
on the evening of the day on which the ultimatum
was received.
In conclusion, Servia offered, if her response to the
ultimatum were found insufficient, to place her case
in the hands of the Hague Tribunal and of the
different Powers at whose suggestion she had signed
the declaration of March 31, 1909, after the excite-
ment over the Austro-Hungarian annexation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The answer to the ultimatum was taken by Premier
Pasitch in person to the Minister of Austria-Hungary
at Belgrade before six o'clock on the evening of July
25th. Without referring the response to his Govern-
ment, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, acting on
previous instructions that no answer other than an
acceptance in every particular of the ultimatum would
be admissible, replied that the response was not
satisfactory. At half -past six, he left Belgrade with

all members of the legation.
While the European chancelleries were trying to
find some means to heal the breach, Austria-Hungary
formally declared war on Servia on the morning of
July 28th. The same evening, the bombardment
of Belgrade from Semlin and from the Danube
384
AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVTA
was begun. The Servian Government retired to
Nish.
Only the intervention of Germany could now
prevent the European cataclysm.
385
CHAPTER XX
GERMANY FORCES WAR UPON RUSSIA
AND FRANCE
title of this chapter seems to indicate that I
have the intention of taking sides in what
THEmany people believe to be an open question.
But this is not the case. The German contention,
that Russia caused the war, must be clearly distin-
guished from the contention, that Russia forced the
war. There is a great deal of reason in the first
contention. No impartial student, who has written
with sympathy concerning Great Britain's attitude
in the Crimean War, can fail to give Germany just
as strong justification for declaring war on Russia
in 1914 as Great Britain had in 1854. But, when we
come down to the narrower question of responsibility
for launching the war in which almost all of Europe
is now engaged, there can be no doubt that it was
deliberately willed by the German Government, and

that the chain of circumstances which brought it
about was carefully woven by the officials of Wilhelm-
strasse and Ballplatz. There may be honest differ-
ence of opinion as to whether Germany was justified
in forcing the war. But the facts allow no difference
of opinion as to whether Germany did force the war.
386
GERMANY FORCES THE WAR
A war to crush France and Russia has for many
years been accepted as a necessary eventuality in the
evolution of Germany's foreign policy. That when
thiswar came, Great Britain would take the oppor-
tunity of joining in order to strike at German com-
merce, which had begun to be looked upon by British
merchants as a formidable rival in the markets of
the world, was thought probable. The leading men
of Germany, especially since the passing of Morocco
and Persia, have felt that this war was vital to the
existence of the German Empire. During recent
years the questions, "Ought there to be a war?"
and "Will there be a war?" ceased to be debated in
Germany. One heard only, "Under what circum-
stances could the war be most favourably declared?"
and "How soon will the war come?"
Germany has believed that the events of the past
decade have shown the unalterable determination
of Great Britain and France to make impossible the
political development of the Weltpolitik, without
which her commercial development would always
be insecure. This determination has been consist-
ently revealed in the hostility of her western rivals
to her colonial expansion in Africa and Asia. The
world equilibrium, already decidedly disadvan-
tageous to the overseas future of Germans at the
time they began their career as a united people, has
been disturbed more and more during the past forty
years.
The Balkan wars, resulting as they did in the
aggrandizement of Servia, threatened the equilibrium
of the Near East, where lay Germany's most vital
387
and most promising external activities. We must
remember, when we are considering the reasons for
the consistent backing given to Austria-Hungary
by Germany in her treatment of Servian aspirations,
"
the words of Wirth: To render powerful the Servian
people would be the suicide of Germany"
Germany has had as much reason, in the develop-
ment of the present crisis, for regarding Servia as
the outpost of Russia as had Great Britain for award-
ing this r61e to Bulgaria in 1876. Germany has had
as much reason for declaring war on Russia to prevent
the Russians from securing the inheritance of the
Ottoman Empire as had Great Britain and France to
take exactly the same step in 1854. The extension,
in 1914, of Russian influence in what was until re-
cently European Turkey would be just as disastrous

to the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary
far more so than it would have been to Great
Britain and France sixty years ago. What she has
in Asia-Minor to-day is as great a stake for Germany
to fight for as what Great Britain had in India in the
middle of the nineteenth century.
There is, however, this
important difference.
Germany, in
supporting the
Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum, was not responding to the overt act of
an enemy. She calculated carefully the cost, waited
for a favourable moment, and, when she decided
that the favourable moment had come, deliberately
provoked the war.
Germany, looking for the opportunity to strike
her two powerful neighbours on the east and west,
believed that the propitious moment had come in the
388
summer of 1914. Her rivals were facing serious
internal crises. Russia was embarrassed by the
menace of a widely-spread industrial strike. But
Russia did not count for much in the German calcula-
tions. Itwas the situation in France that induced
the German statesmen to take advantage of the assassi-
nation of Franz Ferdinand. The spring elections
had revealed a tremendous sentiment against the
law recently voted extending military service for
three years. The French Parliament had just
overthrown the admirable Ribot Cabinet for no
other reason than purely personal considerations of
a bitter party strife. An eminent Parliamentarian
had exposed publicly from the tribune the alarming
unpreparedness of France for war. The trial for
murder of the wife of the former Premier Caillaux
bade fair to complicate further internal Parliamen-
tary strife.
These were the favourable circumstances of the

end of June and the beginning of July.
But the decision had wider grounds than the ad-
vantages of the moment. The German Government
was finding it more and more difficult every year
to secure the credits necessary for the maintenance
and increase of her naval and military establish-
ments. Socialism and anti-militarism were making
alarming progress in the German Reichstag. On
the other hand, the Russian military reorganization,
commenced after the Japanese War, was beginning
to show surprising fruits. And was France to be
allowed time for the spending of the eight hundred
and five million francs just borrowed by her in June
389
to correct the weak spots in her fortifications and war
material, and for the application of the loi des trois
ans to increase her standing army?
Furthermore, would Great Britain be able to
intervene on behalf of France and Russia? The
crisis over the Home Rule Bill seemed to have
developed so seriously that civil war was feared.

Sir Edward Carson, leader of the Protestant irre-
concilables in the north of Ireland, had formed an
army that was being drilled in open defiance of the
Government.
The Archduke Franz Ferdi-
assassination of the
nand and the Duchess of Hohenberg came at this ad-
vantageous moment. A casus belli against Servia,
so provokingly lacking, had at last been given.
Austria-Hungary was only too ready for the chance
to crush Servia. If there were any misgivings about
the risk of doing this, they were immediately allayed
by Germany, who assured Austria-Hungary that she
would not allow Russia even to mobilize. Austria-
Hungary was given by Germany carte blanche in the
matter of her dealings with Servia. It is possible,
as the German Ambassador at Petrograd declared to
M. Sasonow, that the text of the Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum had not been submitted beforehand for
the approval of Wilhelmstrasse. But the general
tenor of the ultimatum had certainly been agreed
upon. Germany knew well that the ultimatum
would be so worded as to be a challenge to Russia.
Either Russia would accept once more the humilia-
tion of a diplomatic defeat and see Servia crushed, or
she would intervene to save Servia. In the latter
390
contingency, Germany could declare war upon
Russia on the ground that her ally, Austria-Hungary,
had been attacked. The Franco-Russian Alliance
would then be put to the test, as well as whatever
understanding there might be between Great Britain
and France.
Subsequent events proved that Germany left no
means, other than complete submission to her will,
to France and Russia for avoiding war. Negotia-
tions were so carried on that there would be no loop-
hole for escape either to Servia, or to the Great
Powers that were her champions. She did not even
wait for Russia to attack Austria-Hungary, or for
France to aid Russia. As for Great Britain, it is
not yet clear whether Germany really thought that
she was making an honest effort to keep her out
of the war!
From the very beginning of the Servian crisis,
Germany associated herself "for better or for worse
with Austria-Hungary." On the day that the ulti-
matum to Servia was delivered, Chancellor von Beth-
mann-Hollweg wrote to the German Ambassadors
at London, Paris, and Petrograd, requesting them to
call upon the Foreign Ministers of the governments
to which they were accredited and point out that the
ultimatum was necessary for the "safety and in-
"
tegrity of Austria-Hungary, and to state with special
"emphasis" that "in this question there is concerned
an affair which should be settled absolutely between
Austria-Hungary and Servia, the limitation to which
it must be the earnest endeavour of the Powers to ensure.
We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict,

because any intercession by another Power would
precipitate, on account of the various alliances,
inconceivable consequences."
The position of Germany is admirably stated in
these instructions, which I quote from Exhibit I of
the German official White Book. To this position,
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg consistently held
throughout the last week of July. In the four words
"localization of the conflict" the intention of Germany
was summed up. There was to be a conflict between
Austria-Hungary and Servia. That could not be
avoided. The only thing that could .be avoided was
the intervention of Russia to prevent the approaching
attack of Austria-Hungary upon Servia. If the
Powers friendly to Russia did not prevail upon the
Czar to refrain from interfering, there would be,
"on account of the various alliances, inconceivable
1 '
consequences.
The next day, July 24th, a telegram from the
German Ambassador at Petrograd to the Chancellor
stated that M. Sasonow was very much agitated,
and had "declared most positively that Russia could
not permit under any circumstances that the Servo-
Austrian difficulty be settled alone between the
parties concerned."
There was still time for Germany, warned by the
attitude taken by Russia, to counsel her ally to accept
whatever conciliatory response Servia might give.
But this was not done. As we have already seen in
the previous chapter, the Austro-Hungarian Minister
at Belgrade, without communicating with his Govern-
ment, declared the Servian response unsatisfactory,
392
FRANCO -GERMAN
even though it gave an opening for further negotia-
tions, and withdrew from Belgrade with all the
members of the legation staff.
This precipitate, and, in view of the gravity of
the international situation, unreasonable action could
have been avoided, had Chancellor von Bethmann-
Hollweg telegraphed the word to Vienna.
Not only was the Austro-Hungarian Minister
allowed to leave Belgrade in this way, but, after
three days had elapsed, Austria-Hungary took the
irrevocable step of declaring war on Servia.
During these three days, Sir Edward Grey re-
quested the British Ambassadors at Rome and Vienna
and Berlin to make every possible effort to find
ground for negotiation. On the morning of July
27th, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador
at Vienna, submitted to Count Berchtold the pro-
position of Sir Edward Grey, which was made
simultaneously at Petrograd, that the question at
issue be adjusted in a conference held at London.
In the meantime, after a conversation with Sir
Rennell Rodd, the Marquis di San Giuliano, the
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to
Berlin, suggesting that Germany, France, Great
Britain, and Italy mediate between Austria-Hungary
and Russia. In sharp contrast to the efforts being
made by the British Ambassadors, the German
Ambassador at Paris, in an interview with Premier
Viviani, insistedupon the impossibility of a confer-
ence of mediation, and announced categorically that
was a common
the only possible solution of the difficulty
French and German intervention at Petrograd. In
393
other words, France could avoid war by assisting
her enemy in humiliating her ally !
On July 28th, the German position was: "That

Austria-Hungary must be left a free hand in her
dealings with Servia, and that it must be pointed
out to Russia, if France and Great Britain really
wanted to save the peace of Europe, that she should
not mobilize against Austria-Hungary." Diplo-
matic intervention, then, could do nothing except
attempt to force Russia to refrain from interfering
between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Germany
would aid the other Powers in coercing Russia, but
she would not urge herself, or aid them in urging,
upon Austria-Hungary, who had started the trouble,
the advisability of modifying her attitude towards
Servia, and postponing hostilities that were bound to
lead to a European war.
Germany had refused all intervention at Vienna.
She agreed, however, to prove her goodwill by letting
it be known that Austria-Hungary was willing to
make the promise to seek no territorial aggrandize-

ment in her war with Servia, but to limit herself to
a "punitive expedition." But this suggestion did
not come until Russia had already committed herself to
defend Servia against invasion.
There was another way in which the peace of
Europe could have been saved, and that was by a
declaration on the part of Germany that she would
allow Russia and Austria-Hungary to fight out the
question of hegemony in south-eastern Europe. But
there was no proposition from Germany to France
suggesting a mutual neutrality. On the other hand,
394
Germany be known that she would stand by
let it
Austria-Hungary if Russia attacked her, and, in the

same breath, warned France against the danger of
being loyal to the Russian alliance!
On July 29th, it was announced from Petrograd
that a partial mobilization had been ordered in the
south and south-east. The German Ambassador
in Petrograd, in an interview with M. Sasonow,
pointed out "very solemnly that the entire Austro-

Servian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general
European conflagration, and endeavoured to present
to the Secretary the magnitude of this danger. It was
impossible to dissuade Sasonow from the idea that
Servia could now be deserted by Russia." On the
same day, Ambassador von Schoen at Paris was
directed by the German Chancellor to "call the
attention of the French Government to the fact
that preparation for war in France would call forth
counter-measures in Germany." An exchange of
telegrams on the 29th and 3Oth between the Kaiser
and the Czar showed the irreconcilability between the
Russian and German points of view. The idea of
the Kaiser was that the Czar should give Austria-
Hungary a free hand. The idea of the Czar was
that the attack by Austria-Hungary upon Servia
absolutely demanded a Russian mobilization "di-
rected solely against Austria-Hungary."
On July 3 ist, the German Ambassador at Petro-
grad was ordered to notify Russia that mobilization
against Austria-Hungary must be stopped within
twelve hours, or Germany would mobilize against
Russia. At the same time a telegram was sent to
395
the German Ambassador at Paris, ordering him
to "ask the FrenchGovernment whether it intends
to remain neutral in a Russo-German war."
On August 1st, at 7.30 P.M., the German Ambassa-
dor at Petrograd handed the following declaration
of war to Russia :
"The Imperial Government has tried its best from

the beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peace-
ful solution. Yielding to a desire which had been
expressed to Him by His Majesty the Emperor of
Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in
accord with England, was engaged in accomplishing
the role of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna
and of Petrograd, when Russia, without awaiting
the result of this mediation, proceeded to the
mobilization of its forces by land and sea.
"As a result of this threatening measure, which
was actuated by no military preparation on the part
of Germany, the German Empire found itself facing
a grave and imminent danger. If the Imperial
Government had failed to ward off this danger, it
would compromise the security and very existence
of Germany. Consequently the German Govern-
ment saw itself forced to address itself to the Gov-
ernment of His Majesty, the 'Emperor of all the
Russias, insisting upon the cessation of the said
military acts. Russia having refused to accede,
and having manifested by this refusal that this
action was directed against Germany, I have the
honour of making known to Your Excellency the
following order from my Government :
"His Majesty, the Emperor, my august Sovereign,

in the name of the Empire, accepts the challenge,
and considers himself in the state of war with
Russia."
396
The same afternoon, President Poincare ordered
a general mobilization in France. What Ambassador
von Schoen tried to get from Premier Viviani, and
what he did get was expressed in his telegram sent
from Paris three hours before the call to mobilization
was issued :
"Upon the repeated definite enquiry whether

France would remain neutral in the case of a Russo-
German War, the Premier declared that France
would do that which her interests dictated."
Germany violated the neutrality of Luxemburg
on August 2d, and of Belgium on August 3d, after
vainly endeavouring to secure permission from
Belgium for the free passage of her troops to the
French frontier. On Sunday morning, August 2d,
French soil was invaded. But Ambassador von
Schoen stayed in Paris until Monday evening "wait-
ing for instructions." Then he called at the Quai
d'Orsay, and handed the following note to Premier
Viviani, who was acting also as Minister of Foreign
Affairs:
"The German and military authorities have

civil
number of definite acts of hostility
reported a certain
committed on German territory by French military
aviators. Several of these have clearly violated
the neutrality of Belgium in flying over the territory
of this country. One of them tried to destroy
structures near Wesel; others have been seen in the
region of Eiffel, another has thrown bombs on the
railway near Karlsruhe and Nurnberg.
"I am charged, and I have the honour to make
known to Your Excellency that, in the presence of
these aggressions, the German Empire considers
397
itself in state of war with France by the act of this
latter Power.
"I have at the same time the honour to bring to
the knowledge of Your Excellency that the German
authorities will detain the French merchant ships
in German ports, but that they will release them if
in forty-eight hours complete reciprocity is assured.
"My diplomatic mission having come to an end,
there remains to me no more than to beg Your
Excellency to be willing to give me my passports and
to take what measures you may judge necessary to
assure my return to Germany with the staff of the
embassy, as well as with the staff of the legation of
Bavaria and of the German Consulate-General at
Paris."
In communicating this declaration of war to the
Chamber of Deputies on the following morning,
August 4th, Premier Viviani declared formally that
"at no moment has a French aviator penetrated into
Belgium; no French aviator has committed either in
Bavaria or in any part of the German Empire any
act of hostility."
398
CHAPTER XXI
GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR
balance of power in European diplomacy
led inevitably to a rapprochement between
THE France and Russia and Great Britain to offset
the Triple Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary
and Italy.
The Triple Alliance, however, while purely de-
fensive, was still an alliance. It had endured for
over thirty years, and the three Powers generally
sustained each other in diplomatic moves. Their
military and naval strategists were in constant com-
munication, and ready at any time to bring all their
forces into play in a European war.
France and Russia had also entered into a defen-
sive alliance. This had not been accomplished with-
out great difficulty. Were it not for the constant
menace to France from Germany, the French Parlia-
ment would not have ratified the alliance in the first
place, nor would it have stood the strain of increas-
ing Radicalism in French sentiment during the last
decade. While there is much intellectual and tem-
peramental affinity between Gaul and Slav, there is
no political affinity between democratic France and
autocratic Russia.
The commercial rivalry of Great Britain and
399
Germany led to a rivalry of armaments. The struggle
of German industry for the control of the world
markets the real cause of the creation and rapid
is
development of the German navy to threaten the

British mastery of the seas. It is possible that the
statesmen of Great Britain, by a liberal policy in
regard to German colonial expansion in Africa and
Asia and in regard to German ambitions in Asiatic
Turkey, might have diverted German energy from
bending all its efforts to destroy British commerce.
such a policy might have enabled
It is possible that
the German democracy to gain the power to prevent
Prussian militarism from dominating the Confedera-
tion. But that would have been expecting too much
of human nature. Nations are like individuals.
There never has been any exception to this rule.
What we have we want to keep. We want more than
we have, and we try to get it by taking it away from
our neighbour. Thus the world is in constant struggle.
Until we have the millennium, and by the millennium
I mean the change of human nature from selfishness
to altruism, we shall have war. Then, too, the
British have seen in themselves so striking an illus-
tration of the proverb that the appetite grows with

eating that they could hardly expect anything else of
the Germans, were they to allow them voluntarily
"a place in the sun."
The rapid growth of Germany along the lines
similar to the development of Great Britain has
made the two nations rivals. As a result of this
rivalry,Great Britain has been forced to prepare for
the eventuality of a conflict between herself and
400
Germany by giving up the policy of "splendid
isolation," and seeking to enter into friendly re-
lationship with those European Powers that were
the enemies of her rival. The first decade of the
twentieth century saw British diplomacy compound-
ing colonial rivalry with France in Africa and with
Russia in Asia. The African accord of 1904 and the
Asiatic accord of 1907 marked a new era in British
foreign relations. Since their conclusion, Great Brit-
ain has drawn gradually nearer to France and Russia.
But British statesmen have had to reckon with the
development of Radical tendencies in the British
electorate. These tendencies have become more and
more marked during the very period in which British
foreign policy found that its interests coincided with
those of Russia and France. British democracy had
the same antipathy to a Russian alliance as had
French democracy. But the menace of Germany,
which threw France into the arms of Russia, has not
seemed as real to the British electorate. There was
also the sentiment against militarism, which has
made it difficult for the Liberal Cabinet to secure
from Parliament sufficient sums for the maintenance
of an adequate naval establishment, and has blocked
every effort to provide even a modified form of
compulsory military service and military training in
Great Britain and Ireland.
When one considers all that Sir Edward Grey has
had to contend with during the years that he has held
the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in the British Cabinet,
admiration for his achievements knows no limits. It
is never safe to make comparisons or form judgments
26 401
in the appreciation of contemporary figures in his-
tory. But I cannot refrain from stating my

belief
that British foreign policy has never
passed
through a more trying and critical period, and
British interests have never been more ably served,
than during the years since the conference of
Algeciras.
The menace of a war between Great Britain and
Germany has disturbed Europe several times during
the past decade. There has not been, however, a
direct crisis, involving the interests of the two rival
nations, to make an appeal to arms inevitable, or
even probable. But, although British public senti-
ment might have been slow in supporting the inter-
vention of the Cabinet in favour of France, had
Germany attacked France in 1905, in 1908, or in 1911,
to have stayed out of the war would have been
suicidal folly, and Great Britain would soon have
awakened to this fact.
The over the ultimatum of Austria-Hungary
crisis
to Servia became acute after the terms of the ulti-
matum were known. Sir Edward Grey, seconded by
as skilful and forceful ambassadors as have ever
represented British interests on the continent of
Europe, honestly tried to prevent the outbreak of
war. It was not to the interests of Great Britain that
this war should be fought. All sentimental con-
siderations to one side, the moment was peculiarly
unfavourable on purely material grounds. The
British Parliament was facing one of the most ser-
ious problems of its history. The confidence of the
country in the wisdom of the measures in Ireland
402
that the Government seemed determined to cany
out was severely shaken. The interest of the British
public in the troubles between Austria-Hungary and
Servia was not great enough to make the war popular.
The efforts of Lord Haldane had done much to im-
prove the relationship between Great Britain and
Germany. Sympathy with Russia had been alien-
ated by the increasingly reactionary policy of the
Czar's government towards the Poles, the Finns, and
the Jews. The British press was disgusted by the
overthrow of the Ribot Ministry and by the revela-
tions of the Caillaux trial.
As there was no actual alliance between Great
Britainand France, and no understanding of any
nature whatever with Russia, French public opinion
was far from being certain that British aid would be
given in the approaching war, and British public
opinion was far from being certain as to "whether it
would be necessary to give this aid, or whether it
wanted to do so. I amspeaking here of the feeling

among the electorate, which, accurately represented
by Parliament, is the final court of appeal in Great
Britain. There was no doubt about the opinion
of Sir Edward Grey and the majority of his col-
leagues in the Cabinet, as well as of the leaders of the
Opposition. There was, however, very serious doubt
as to the attitude of Parliament. Would it sustain
France and Russia over the question of Servia, at a
time when there was so serious a division in the
nation concerning the Home Rule Bill even the
open menace of civil war?
When Germany decided to declare war on Russia,
403
and was seen that France would be drawn into
it
the struggle, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg de-

clared to Sir Edward Goeschen, British Ambassador
to Germany, that "the neutrality of Great Britain
once guaranteed, every assurance would be given to
the Cabinet at London that the Imperial Govern-
ment did not have in view territorial acquisitions at
the expense of France." Sir Edward questioned the
Chancellor about the French colonies, "the portions
of territories and possessions of France situated
outside of the continent of Europe." Heir von
Bethmann-Hollweg answered that it was not within
his power to make any promise on that subject.
There was no hesitation or equivocation in the
response of the British Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs to this proposition. He said that neutrality
under such conditions was impossible, and that
Great Britain could not stand by and see France
crushed, even if she were left her European territory
intact, for she would be reduced to the position of
a satellite of Germany. To make a bargain with
Germany at the expense of France would be a dis-
grace from which Great Britain would never recover.
It was pointed out to the Chancellor that the only
means of maintaining good relations between Great
Britain and Germany would be for the two Powers to
continue to work together to safeguard the peace of
Europe. Sir Edward Grey promised that all his
personal efforts would be directed towards guarantee-

ing Germany and her Allies against any aggression
on the part of Russia and France, and hoped that, if
Germany showed her good faith in the present crisis,
404
more friendly relations between Great Britain and
Germany would ensue than had been the case up to
that moment.
This dignified and manly response could have left
no doubt in the minds of German statesmen as to the
stand which the British Cabinet intended to take.
Did they believe that Parliament and the people
would not support Sir Edward Grey?
The position of Great Britain was explicitly put
before the House of Commons on the evening of
August 3d. Because of her naval agreement with
France, by which the French navy was concentrated
in the Mediterranean in order that the British Ad-
miralty might keep its full forces in home waters,

Great Britain was bound in honour to prevent an
attack of a hostile fleet upon the Atlantic seacoast of
France. If Germany were to make such an attack,
Great Britain would be drawn into the war without
any further question. There had also been since
November, 1912, an understanding between the
British and French military and naval authorities
concerning common action on land and sea "against
"
an enemy. But, at the time this understanding was
made, it was put in writing that it was merely a
measure of prudence, and did not bind Great Britain
in any way whatever to act with France either in a
defensive or offensive war.
Great Britain was drawn into the war by the
German violation of the neutrality of Belgium.
On Sunday evening, August 2d, at seven o'clock,
Germany gave the following ultimatum to Belgium:
"The German Government has received sure news,
405
according to which the French forces have the inten-
tion of marching on the Meuse by way of Givet and
Namur; this news leaves no doubt of the intention of
France to march against Germany by way of Belgian
territory. The Imperial German Government cannot
help fearing that Belgium, in spite of its very good
will, will not be able to repulse, without help, a
forward march of French troops which promises
so large a development.
"In this fact we find sufficient certitude of a
threat directed against Germany; it is an imperious
duty for self-preservation for Germany to forestall
this attack of the enemy.
"The German Government would regret exceed-
ingly should Belgium regard as an act of hostility
against it the fact that the enemies of Germany
oblige her to violate, on her side, the territory of
Belgium. In order to dissipate every misunder-
standing, the German Government declares as fol-
lows:
"i. Germany has in view no act of hostility
against Belgium, if Belgium consents, in the war
which is going to commence, to adopt an attitude of
benevolent neutrality in regard to Germany. The
German Government, on its side, promises, at the
moment of peace, to guarantee the kingdom and its
possessions in their entire extent. 2. Germany
promises to evacuate Belgian territory, under the con-
dition above pronounced, immediately peace is con-
cluded. 3. If Belgium observes a friendly attitude,
Germany is ready, in accord with the authorities of
the Belgian Government, to buy, paying cash, all
that would be necessary for her troops, and to
indemnify the losses caused to Belgium. 4. If Bel-
gium conducts herself in a hostile manner against
the German troops and makes in particular difficul-
ties for their forward march by an opposition of the
fortifications of the Meuse or by the destruction of
406
roads, railways, tunnels, or other constructions, Ger-
many will be obliged to consider Belgium as an
enemy.
"In this case, Germany will make no promise in
regard to the kingdom, but will leave the subsequent
adjustment of the relations of the two states one
toward the other to the decision of arms.
"The German Government has the hope with
reason that this eventuality will not take place, and
that the Belgian Government will know how to take
the necessary measures suitable for preventing it
from taking place.
"In this case, the relations of friendship which
unite the two neighbouring states will become
narrower and more lasting."
Belgium did not hesitate to respond promptly as

follows :
"By its note of August 2, 1914, the German Gov-

ernment has made known that according to sure news
the French forces have the intention of marching on
the Meuse by way of Givet and Namur, and that
Belgium, in spite of her very good will, would not be
able to repulse without help the forward march of the
French troops.
"The German Government would believe itself
under the obligation of forestalling this attack and
of violating the Belgian territory. In these condi-
tions, Germany proposes to the Government of the
King to adopt in regard to her a friendly attitude,
and she promises at the moment of the peace to
guarantee the integrity of the kingdom and of its
possessions in their entire extent.
"The note adds that if Belgium makes difficulty
for the forward march of the German
troops, Ger-
many will be obliged to consider her as an enemy
but will leave the subsequent adjustment of the
407
relations of the two states one towards the other by
the decision of arms.
"This note has aroused in the Government of
the King a deep and grievous astonishment. The
intentions that it attributes to France are in con-
tradiction with the formal declarations which have
been made to us on August ist, in the name of the
Government of the Republic.
"However, if in opposition to our expectation
a violation of the Belgian neutrality is going to be
committed by France, Belgium would fulfil all her
international duties, and her army would oppose
itself to the invader with the most vigorous re-
sistance. The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the
treaties of 1870, make sacred the independence and
the neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the
Powers and notably of the Government of His
Majesty the King of Prussia.
"Belgium has always been faithful to her inter-
national obligations; she has accomplished her duties
in a spirit of loyal impartiality, she has neglected no
effort to maintain and to make respected her neu-
trality. The attack upon her independence with
which the German Government menaces her would
constitute a flagrant violation of international law.
"No strategic interest justifies the violation of
international law. The Belgian Government in
accepting the propositions of which it has received
notice would sacrifice the honour of the nation at
the same time as it would betray its duties toward
Europe. Conscious of the role that Belgium has
played for more than eighty years in the civilization
of the world, it does not allow itself to believe that
the independence of Belgium can be preserved only
at the price of the violation of her neutrality. If
this hope is deceived, the Belgian Government is
firmly decided to repulse by every means in its
"
power every attack upon its rights.
408
Longitude D West
* M J so N"
\ EUKOPE
In 1914
As two statements, there is before
I record these
me a cartoon from a recent issue of Punch. The
Kaiser, with a leer on his face, is leaning over the
shoulder of King Albert, who is looking out with
folded arms upon the smoking ruins of his country,
and the long defile of refugees. The Kaiser says,
''See, you have lost all." King Albert answers,
"Not my soul."
To be just to Germany, necessary for us to quote
is
the explanation of this action made by Chancellor

von Bethmann-Hollweg to the Reichstag, on August
4th, when Germany had commenced to carry into
execution her threat:
"Here is the truth. We are in necessity, and

necessity knows no law.
"Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and
have perhaps already put their foot upon Belgium
territory.
"It is against the law of nations. The French
Government has, it is true, declared at Brussels that
it would respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as
the enemy respected it. We knew, however, that
France was ready for the aggression. France could
wait we, no. A French attack upon our flank in the
;
Lower Rhine might have been fatal to us. So we

have been forced to pass beyond the well-founded
protestations of Luxemburg and the Belgian Gov-
ernment. We shall recompense them for the wrong
that we have thus caused them as soon as we shall
have attained our military end.
"When one is as threatened as we are and when
one fights for that which is most sacred to him, one
can think only of one thing, that is, to attain his end,
cost what it may.
409
"I repeat the words of the Emperor; 'It is with
' '
pure conscience that Germany goes to the combat.
On the afternoon of August 3d, as Sir Edward Grey

was leaving for Parliament to make his expose of
Great Britain's position in the European crisis, he
received from the King a telegram that had just
arrived from King Albert of Belgium :
"Remembering the numerous proofs of friendship

of Your Majesty and of Your predecessor, and the
friendly attitude of Great Britain in 1870, as well as
of the new gage of friendship that she has just given
me, I address a supreme appeal to the diplomatic
intervention of Your Majesty to safeguard the
"
integrity of Belgium.
Sir Edward Grey read this telegram to Parliament,

and explained that the diplomatic intervention asked
for had already been made both at Paris and Berlin,
for this eventuality had been foreseen. To the ques-
tions of the British Ambassadors concerning their
intentions towards Belgium, to respect and maintain
the neutrality of which each of these Powers was equally
bound with Great Britain by the treaty of 1839, France
responded :
"The French Government is resolved to respect

the neutrality of Belgium, and it would be only in
the case where some other Power would violate the
neutrality that France might find herself in the
necessity of acting otherwise."
Germany answered :
"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is in

410
the impossibility of giving a response before having
"
consulted the Emperor and the Chancellor.
When Sir Edward Goeschen expressed the hope

that the answer would not be delayed, Herr von
Jagow gave him clearly to understand that he
doubted whether he could respond, "for any response
on his part would not fail, in case of war, to have the
regrettable effect of divulging a part of the German
plan of campaign!"
There was no doubt about the sentiment of Parlia-
ment. The Cabinet saw that party lines had been
obliterated, and that the country was behind them.
The following day, August 4th, Great Britain pre-
sented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding an
assurance that the neutrality of Belgium should be
respected. Germany gave no answer. Her army
had already invaded Belgium. A few hours after the
reception of the British ultimatum, the advance on
Liege was ordered. After waiting until evening,
Great Britain declared war on Germany.
It is probable that Germany counted the cost
before she invaded Belgium. Whatever may have
been said at Berlin, the intervention of Great Britain
was not the surprise that it has been represented to
be. In deciding to violate Belgian neutrality, in
spite of the British ultimatum, the German argu-
ment was: It is morally certain that Great Britain
will intervene if we enter Belgium. But what will
this intervention mean? She has no army worth the
name. Her navy can do practically nothing to harm
us while we are crushing France and Russia. The
411
participation of Great Britain in the war is a cer-
tainty a few weeks later. By precipitating her in-
tervention, we are less harmed than we would be
by refusing to avail ourselves of the advantage of
attacking France through Belgium.
In believing that the eventual participation of
Great Britain was certain, even if there were no
Belgian question, Germany was right. The violation
of the neutrality of Belgium was not the cause, but
the occasion, of Great Britain's entry into the war.
It was, however, a most fortunate opportunity for
the British Cabinet to secure popular sympathy and
support in declaring war upon Germany. For it is
certain that Great Britain ought not to have delayed
entering the war. The nation might have awakened
too late to the fact that the triumph of Germany in
Europe would menace her national existence. There
is no room in the world for the amicable dwelling
side by side of British idealism and German mili-
tarism. One or the other must perish.
In August, 1914, the only way to have avoided the
catastrophe of a general European war would have
been to allow Germany to make, according to her
own desires and ambitions, the new map of Europe.
412
3S966
University of California
SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY
405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1388
Return this material to the library
from which it was borrowed.
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5

MR. & MRS. RICHARD KORNHAUSER

THE STORY OF THE RECENT EUROPEAN

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS, PH.D.

Ptdlished, November, 1914

III. THE "BAGDADBAHN" ... 58

V. THE PASSING OF PERSIA ... 84

X. RACIAL RIVALRIES IN MACEDONIA . 161

XL THE YOUNG TURK REGIME IN THE

STATES AND TURKEY . . .

I. THE POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION OF POLAND .

III. EUROPE IN AFRICA IN 1914 . . .

VI. EUROPE IN 1914 . ... . 408

ON who had chosen to spend the first days of their

along the High Street in Oxford, when their attention

century was forgotten in the absorbing and compelling

bour of Smyrna on a French steamer which was bringing

Greece, and Albania, back westward to Austria, Italy,

origin in the Eastern question to the great European

ation, the writer does not expect that his

The writer has used his own correspondence to the New

is acknowledged to the admirable British Annual Register.

PARIS, September, 1914.

GERMANY IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE

justice of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by

generation, which knew nothing of France and to

haphazard from the journals of Strasbourg and Metz

ously enough was the son of a notorious German

To understand the Alsace-Lorraine question, from

kingdoms, duchies, principalities, and free cities,

ereign, and could not enter into the confederacy on

have cast their lot definitely with the country, and

their absence. Those bidden to confer with Herr

had wanted, although representation in the Bundes-

The Lower Chamber has sixty members, elected by

forty-five three votes.

trolling the Alsatian Landtag. Many Socialists, how-

munication of the purposes for which the money

"Listen. Up to here you have only known the

This typically Prussian speech, which in a few

Emperor Wilhelm on the floor of the Reichstag.

"We words as the confession,

This speech caused the Chancellor to leave the

Among the boys, the influence of this teaching

sentiments of a child, especially in the boarding-

Mulhouse, Strasbourg, Neuf-Brisach, Bischwiller,

the Kaiser's soldiers. Windows in von Forstner's

appeared on the streets they were hooted. Saverne

feeling aroused on both sides of the Rhine, in Ger-

"The Chamber invites the Statthalter to instruct

The mismanagement of the Reichsland has done

political vision. As for conceptions of toleration,

Mercy and pity, according to Nietzsche, were signs

THE "WELTPOLITIK" OF GERMANY

WHEN German Empire were added to France in

possibly have made her new territories an integral

European colonization. Europe began to follow its

acquisitions of territory by European nations in the

called, has drifted into a spirit of common general

tion, one's wealth, one's industrial and maritime