(FREE PDF Sample) China's Economic Engagement in North Korea Bo Gao Ebooks
(FREE PDF Sample) China's Economic Engagement in North Korea Bo Gao Ebooks
(FREE PDF Sample) China's Economic Engagement in North Korea Bo Gao Ebooks
com
https://textbookfull.com/product/chinas-
economic-engagement-in-north-korea-bo-gao/
textbookfull
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
https://textbookfull.com/product/cutting-the-distance-benefits-
and-tensions-from-the-recent-active-engagement-of-china-japan-
and-korea-in-latin-america-nobuaki-hamaguchi/
https://textbookfull.com/product/social-welfare-in-india-and-
china-a-comparative-perspective-jianguo-gao/
https://textbookfull.com/product/environmental-economic-
geography-in-china-canfei-he/
https://textbookfull.com/product/economic-miracle-market-south-
korea-a-blueprint-for-economic-growth-in-developing-nations-1st-
edition-dieter-k-schneidewind-auth/
My Holiday in North Korea The Funniest Worst Place on
Earth 1st Edition Wendy E. Simmons
https://textbookfull.com/product/my-holiday-in-north-korea-the-
funniest-worst-place-on-earth-1st-edition-wendy-e-simmons/
https://textbookfull.com/product/quantitative-regional-economic-
and-environmental-analysis-for-sustainability-in-korea-1st-
edition-euijune-kim/
https://textbookfull.com/product/modernization-through-
globalization-why-china-finances-foreign-energy-projects-
worldwide-bo-kong/
https://textbookfull.com/product/mysterious-pyongyang-cosmetics-
beauty-culture-and-north-korea-1st-edition-nam-sung-wook/
https://textbookfull.com/product/conflict-and-youth-rights-in-
india-engagement-and-identity-in-the-north-east-1st-edition-
haans-j-freddy-auth/
PALGRAVE SERIES IN
ASIA AND PACIFIC STUDIES
China’s Economic
Engagement in
North Korea
Bo Gao
Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies
Series Editors
May Tan-Mullins
University of Nottingham Ningbo China
Ningbo, Zhejiang, China
Adam Knee
Lasalle College of the Arts
Singapore
Filippo Gilardi
University of Nottingham Ningbo China
Ningbo, China
The Asia and Pacific regions, with a population of nearly three billion
people, are of critical importance to global observers, academics, and
citizenry due to their rising influence in the global political economy as well
as traditional and nontraditional security issues. Any changes to the domes-
tic and regional political, social, economic, and environmental systems will
inevitably have great impacts on global security and governance structures.
At the same time, Asia and the Pacific have also emerged as a globally influ-
ential, trend-setting force in a range of cultural arenas. The remit of this
book series is broadly defined, in terms of topics and academic disciplines.
We invite research monographs on a wide range of topics focused on Asia
and the Pacific. In addition, the series is also interested in manuscripts
pertaining to pedagogies and research methods, for both undergraduate
and postgraduate levels. Published by Palgrave Macmillan, in collaboration
with the Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies, UNNC.
China’s Economic
Engagement in North
Korea
Bo Gao
Ningbo University of Finance and Economics
Ningbo, China
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Dr Ivaylo Gatev for his untiring support and guidance, and
for funding my trip to Northeast China in 2014 without whom this project
would have remained a pipe dream. I am also grateful to Dr Catherine
Goetze, Dr Christopher Pierson, Dr Miwa Hirono, Dr Jonathan Sullivan,
and Dr Gregory Moore from the University of Nottingham for their help
during different periods of my research. Thanks to the financial support
from the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies and the Graduate School of the
University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China, to my travel for presenting my
research at conferences in Nottingham, Shenzhen, Seoul, and Beijing was
made possible.
Finally, my family, especially my parents, gave me a reason to believe;
their financial and emotional support made this job more than worthwhile.
v
Published Titles in PSAPS
vii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
6 Conclusion143
Appendix A: Introduction155
Appendix B: China’s Economic Activities in the North Korean
Mineral Resource Sector157
ix
x Contents
Appendix C: China’s Economic Activities in the North Korean
Fishing Industry159
Appendix D: Chinese Cross-Border Economic Activities in
North Korea163
Index169
List of Tables
xi
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Background
China and North Korea had become blood allies since the beginning
of the Cold War, in particular following the friendship built during the
Korean War against US-led UN troops from 25 June 1950 to 27 July 1953
(Haruki, 2014; Seth, 2010). The physical conflict ended though the war
did not. Since then, China has offered large amounts of funds and material
aid to North Korea according to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) signed on 10 September
1961 (Cornell, 2002; Beal, 2005). During the Cultural Revolution from
1966 to 1976, there were harsh ideological disputes about North Korea’s
orthodox schooling and China’s revisionism of socialism especially when
Beijing started to get in touch with Washington, DC, in 1972 (Harrold,
2004; Adrian, 2018: 78–79). After that, China’s establishment of a diplo-
matic relationship with South Korea in 1992 also seriously influenced the
top-level interaction between Beijing and Pyongyang (Liu Jin-zhi et al.,
2006; Cha, 2013: 325–327). Yet these two issues have not halted the
aid from Beijing to North Korea, which maintains the survival of China’s
strategic buffer zone against the US and its allies.
In the post-Cold War era, especially since the early 2000s, the Sino-
DPRK relationship has become commercialised. It started with the entry of
a small number of Chinese companies into North Korea in the early 2000s
and officially began with the signing in 2005 of the Agreement between
the Government of the PRC and the Government of the DPRK for the
Promotion and Protection of Investment. Chinese economic activities in
North Korea expanded rapidly in several fields such as mineral resources,
the fishing industry, physical infrastructure, tourism, and labour coopera-
tion. The commercialisation of the Sino-DPRK relationship can be
observed from three specific changes. The first change is the reduction of
official economic assistance and rapid increase of investment. The number
of Chinese investment projects in the DPRK increased rapidly since 2002
(Choo, 2008: 343–350; Ford and Kwan, 2008). The second change con-
cerns multiple economic actors. The new Chinese economic activities have
been implemented by not only the central government but also the sub-
state-level economic actors. The latter, such as local companies and regional
governments (city and province), are also more active than the central gov-
ernment in the huge field of investment in North Korea. Such investment
includes those made in the marketplace, the construction of social infra-
structure (such as roads and railways), mineral extraction, computer pro-
duction, marine production, and fishing licensing. The third change relates
to the measures taken to support North Korea, which has been transformed
from direct official assistance to a mixture of official assistance and invest-
ment in order to help Pyongyang develop its own economic strength. The
Chinese government aims to encourage Pyongyang to follow the Chinese
style of economic reform and achieve integration into the international
economy. This idea, however, is rejected, or at least resisted, by Pyongyang.
The response from China has been to promote and encourage investment
in North Korea and to use technical assistance in exchange for natural
resources with a view to improving North Korea’s technological capability
in the short term and building the long-term comprehensive economic self-
development abilities of North Korea rather than directly aid.
Tumen River Initiative. Many South Korean scholars, such as Lee (2003:
1–8), Kim (2006: 898–916), Joo and Kwak (2007), Choo (2008: 360–370),
and Yoon and Lee (2013: 19–31) see the rapid increase of Chinese invest-
ment as Beijing’s strategic objective of leading North Korea towards eco-
nomic reform, increasing its dependence on China and finally achieving
denuclearisation of North Korea. Kim (2011: 257–271) also takes the exam-
ple of Sinuiju, a North Korean city on the Sino-DPRK border, as an indica-
tion that the intention of Chinese economic investment in North Korea is to
develop Northeast China.
Indeed, the previous research outlined above is helpful in understand-
ing the Sino-DPRK economic relationship. However, little work has been
done on the specific activities in the field of China’s economic activities in
North Korea from the non-military security drivers and actors below the
state level. This research is not about the structural change of Chinese
economic activities; rather, it considers Beijing as the one who controls
and orchestrates the actions of the other Chinese actors and recognises
traditional security as the main motivation of Beijing. Even though they
contributed to the non-traditional security problems, the major impact is
still discussed around the central government with two major weaknesses.
Firstly, Chinese economic activities have changed with the rapid increase
of Chinese investment and the reduction of official assistance. Its role has
been weakened as a result of domestic decentralisation of the economy
(because Beijing has recentralised political power since Xi became
President) and active engagement of actors below the state level with
North Korea. Meanwhile, the requirement of developing Northeast China
is both too wide and too partial for two reasons. On the one hand, com-
pared to the northeast provinces of Jilin and Liaoning, Heilongjiang prov-
ince (also in Northeast China) is almost irrelevant to the border economy
with North Korea except the oil transportation from Daqing to North
Korea. However, it has benefited from developing a cross-border econ-
omy with the Russian Far East. On the other hand, Chinese economic
actors in the DPRK are not only from Northeast China but also from
other coastal provinces. The spread of ethnic Korean businesses towards
other coastal areas of China has created multiple identities for these busi-
nessmen and expanded the relationship between North Korea and d ifferent
provinces outside Northeast China. For instance, Zhejiang province in
Southeast China encourages ethnic Korean businesses to join the local
chamber of commerce. Thus, the requirement of developing Northeast
China is only one reason for Chinese economic engagement with DPRK.
INTRODUCTION 5
1. What is the relationship between Beijing and actors below the state
level in their economic activities in North Korea since 2002?
2. What are the drivers of actors below the state level to implement
economic activities in North Korea and what are their differences
from the national interests?
3. What is the impact of Chinese economic activity in North Korea on
regional security and China’s grand strategy in Northeast Asia?
4. What does this mean to the making of China’s foreign policy?
The first question aims to make clear the specific activities of the cen-
tral government and actors below the state in North Korea first. Then
the relationship between Beijing and actors below the state is described
by outlining and comparing the amount, the types, and the funding of
economic activities implemented by actors at the state level (central
6 B. GAO
the national interests in some cases. This book aims to improve new insights
from the sub-state view but does not attempt to trivialise the military fac-
tors behind Beijing’s motivations of promoting and encouraging Chinese
economic activities in North Korea. These significant military factors
include consolidating North Korea’s domestic stability and avoiding a ref-
ugee wave led by the regime collapse, which have been frequently dis-
cussed and mentioned in the previous scholarships. Before presenting the
methods and organisation of this book, a few important concepts used in
the empirical chapters need to be outlined first in the section below.
Significant Concepts
Decentralisation in China
China is a single party system country with several decades of decentralisa-
tion since its economic reform in the 1980s. During the last thirty years, the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the State
Council in Beijing have introduced a number of documents to implement
the gradual decentralisation of power. Jiang (2008: 58–59) and Cao (2013:
122) outline relevant documents which include ‘Notice about the problems
in the party and political organisation reforms of province, city and autono-
mous region’ in December 1982; ‘Notice about the problems in the local,
city and distinction party and political organisation reform’ in February
1983; ‘Notice about the problems in the town level party and government
organisation reform’ in December 1983; ‘The advice of Central Committee
of CCP (Chinese Communist Party) and the State Council to the local
government organisation reform’ in January 1991; ‘Plans for Party and
government organisation reform’ and ‘The notice about the implementa-
tion of party and government organisation reform plans’ in July 1993; and
finally, ‘The decision of Central Committee of CCP about problems in
improving socialist market economic institution’ in 2003 (Translated by
author; see original names in Mandarin and pinyin in Appendix A, point 1).
In particular, the decision of 2003 clearly pointed out ‘a reasonable
division of rights and responsibilities of central government and local gov-
ernments on managing socio-economic affairs’ and ‘the national and
cross-province (as well as autonomous regions and municipalities) affairs
will be managed by central government in order to ensure the national
unification of legal system, political order and market. The regional affairs
belonging to the local administrative region will be managed by local gov-
INTRODUCTION 9
Non-traditional Security
This section aims firstly to define traditional security and non-traditional
security (NTS), and then to outline the types of NTS problems which exist
in the current context and connect them to the research topic. Traditional
security threats are those factors that could threaten the security of sover-
eign states. Normally these are military threats, but the concept also
includes political and diplomatic conflicts (Burgess, 2010: 1–5). Depending
on the differences in the level of threat, traditional threats may be divided
into three types: military competition, military deterrence, and war. War
may be categorised by different levels, such as world war, regional war, and
civil war, and by different types such as conventional war and nuclear war
(Burgess, 2010: 1–5). In contrast to traditional security, the NTS threats
refer to the non-military, non-political, and non-diplomatic factors, which
could threaten the general survival and development of human beings and
sovereign states (Tsuneo Akaha, 2002: 1–2). NTS threats cover a wider
and more complex range of threats than do traditional ones. They could
be economic security, financial security, environmental security (pollution,
collapse of natural systems and diversity), information security (hacker,
virus, and other illegal activities of transporting and stealing information),
resource and energy security, terrorism, proliferation of weapons (espe-
cially weapons of mass destruction), spread of disease, cross-border crime,
smuggling and drug problems, illegal immigration, piracy attacks, or
money laundering (Tsuneo Akaha, 2002: 1–2).
According to Lou and Teng (2007: 15), NTS problems normally
include five important characteristics: firstly, both causes of and solutions
to NTS problems are normally transnational; they may appear not only in
one country but in one region and then create negative influences at the
regional or even the global level; secondly, the creators of NTS problems
are uncertain, they could be state or non-state actors such as individuals,
organisations, or groups; thirdly, once NTS problems intensify, they may
transform into traditional security problems which may then be resolved
by military means, such as violent conflict or even regional war; fourthly,
the state remains the main actor in the resolution of NTS problems and
has the autonomous right to resolve the problem; finally, the settlement of
INTRODUCTION 11
Methods
This book uses qualitative research methodology to study how the Chinese
economic activities in North Korea are motivated by the NTS concerns of
actors below the state, the relative central-local relations, and their regional
impacts. Triangulation occurs through documentary analysis, media
information, and elite interview techniques, which draw a full picture of
Chinese economic activities in North Korea. In telling the story of how
the NTS concerns of actors below the state drive the commercialisation of
China-North Korea relations, this book is guided by a certain investigative
empiricism that seeks to take it beyond what is already known about
China-North Korea relations around the Six Party Talks and North
Korea’s nuclear weapons.
INTRODUCTION 13
Organisation
Following this introductory chapter, there are three empirical chapters.
The first of these, Chap. 2, discusses activities in the sector of mineral
resources, for example, direct investment and the foundation of joint ven-
tures, the drivers here being the prevention of environmental pollution,
the development requirements of local industry, and the reduction of eco-
nomic costs. In this section, actors below the state level are the major
actors in Chinese economic activities in North Korea whereas the central
government in Beijing remains directly involved in a few economic activi-
ties in North Korea relevant to central state-owned companies. Meanwhile,
Beijing also provides aid to North Korea in order to help the achievement
of economic activities of several local Chinese state-owned companies.
Chapter 3 discusses activities in the fishing industry, such as the civil
cooperation programme, direct investment, and buying fishing licences,
the drivers being the foundation of alternative fishing areas to combat
reduced traditional fishing fields, seeking a cleaner environment, and the
impact of the Japanese Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011. Actors below
16 B. GAO
the state level are the major actors of Chinese economic activities in North
Korea while Beijing plays the role of opportunities supplier and diplomatic
emergency mediator.
Chapter 4 discusses activities in the sector of cross-border movements,
including physical infrastructure, tourism, and light industry, with the
drivers being improvement of the local economic conditions, reduction of
population outflow, and border controls. Actors below the state level are
the major actors of Chinese economic activities in North Korea whilst
Beijing plays the role of the agent who builds the connection between
North Korea and governments at the province and city level. Beijing also
offers assistance to increase the attractiveness of the ‘Chang-Ji-Tu project’
in Jilin province to the national strategy in name only, that is, without any
other practical support.
Chapter 5 is a discussion of the impact of China’s economic activities in
North Korea on the regional security order of Northeast Asia, with a focus
on the Korean Peninsula. The chapter follows the previous logic that the
impact of China’s economic activities has more divergence than consis-
tency with the national strategy of Beijing in maintaining regional peace
and stability as well as in sustaining positive relationships with neighbour-
ing countries. On the one hand, the positive impact is pushing North
Korea’s economic ‘opening up’ and avoiding regime collapse in Pyongyang.
China’s economic activities offer enough funding to North Korea to
improve its attractiveness in terms of physical infrastructure to external
funding from other countries, and, at the same time, because of Pyongyang’s
concern of economic overdependence on China to push it to enlarge its
scale of use of non-Chinese foreign investments. On the other hand,
China’s rapid increase of economic engagement in North Korea has made
South Korea increasingly anxious about the weakened sovereignty of
North Korea and even the practical status of a fourth province of Northeast
China. Meanwhile, China’s increasing control of North Korea fishery
resources also reduces South Korea’s opportunities to develop its fishery
industry in North Korea. Thus, the dispute between China and South
Korea over oceanic economic zones has intensified and caused several
rounds of negotiations to fail. Furthermore, Chinese economic activities
reduce the effectiveness of US economic aid and subsequently delay the
denuclearisation of North Korea through dialogue in the Six Party Talks.
China’s economic programmes in North Korea, backed by large amounts
of funding, actually increase the expectation of North Korea for aid from
the US. This aid is used to exchange the denuclearisation of North Korea
INTRODUCTION 17
so that the national security and survival of Kim’s family (Kim Jung-Il, the
second generation of North Korean leader who succeeded the leadership
from his Father Kim Il-Sung) is assured. However, the aid from the US has
always been extremely small in contrast to Chinese economic funding. This
book concludes with some thoughts on the drivers of economic activities
in North Korea, central-local relationships in China, and the regional
impacts of Chinese economic participation in North Korea as well.
References
Adrian, Buzo (2018) Politics and leadership in North Korea: the guerrilla dynasty
(2nd ed.). London; New York: Routledge.
Akaha, Tsuneo. Non-traditional Security Issues in Northeast Asia and Prospects
for International Cooperation. Prepared for UN University Seminar ‘Thinking
Outside the Security Box: Non-traditional Security in Asia: Governance,
Globalization and the Environment’. March 15, 2002, 1–2.
Akaha, Tsuneo (ed.) (2002) A Future of North Korea. London and New York:
Routledge.
Bai, Jie (2013) North Korea Observation Notes (朝鲜半岛观察笔记 Chaoxian
Bandao Guancha biji). Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House.
Beal, Tim (2005) North Korea: The Struggle Against American Power. London
and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press.
Burgess, J. P. (ed.) (2010) The Routledge handbook of new security studies. London;
New York: Routledge.
Cao Guiquan. The distribution mode of multi-government and the systemic
reform of China’s administrative and management. Theory and Modernization,
Vol. 103, No. 3 (May, 2013), pp. 121–127.
Cha, Victor (2013) The Impossible state: North Korea, past and future. New York:
Ecco.
Choo, Jaewoo. Mirroring North Korea’s Growing Economic Dependence on
China: Political Ramifications. Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 2 (2008),
pp. 343–372.
Cornell, Erik (2002) North Korea under Communism: Report of An Envoy to
Paradise. London and New York: Routledge Curzon, Taylor and Francis
Group.
Cui Junyong. Research about strategy to the drug trafficking in Yanbian area
related to South Korea. Academic Communication (学术交流 Xue Shu Jiao
Liu), Vol. 191, No. 2 (February 2010), pp. 55–58.
Dai Xiao-song. Developing Sea Circular Economy, Improving the Sustainable
Development of Liaoning Sea Economy. Territory and Natural Resource,
Vol. 2 (2007), pp. 255–260. 发展海洋循环经济, 促进辽宁海洋经济可持续
发展, 国土和自然资源, 2007 年 02 期, 255–260.
18 B. GAO
Suomen Kielestä.
(Sekasaatuja).
B. Sianimuet mi, ku, ken; mit, kut, ket ovat Nimennässä pian
tuntemattomat, paitsi jatkettuna, jotta kuuluvat: mikä, kuka, kenkä,
mitkä, kutka, ketkä, Wenäjän puolella asuvissa Suomalaisissa niitä
vielä ilman jatkottaki käytetään, joka tapa meilläki pitäisi uudelle
tutuksi tulla, jo senki muoksi, että kielemme ykstamuisissa sanoissa
köyhä, tästäki vähän rikastuisi, eikä juuri niin ylen väheä, sillä vaikka
oivat ainoastaan kolme, niin Sianimuita kuitenki käytetään
usiammasti, kun mitänä muita sanoja.
Ilman näyttää, kun olisi jatko ka, joka näihin ja muihinki sanohin
(eikä, taikka, vaikka, elikkä) liitetään, ollut alusta sama kun
tavallisesti kirjotettu kaan (kan, kana, an). Enkä luule haittaavan, jos
sitä, kuten muuten sopii, vaikka joka tavallaki kirjotetaan. Onko
sensähden Greikan kieli vähemmin somempi, että siinä sekaluutta
yhdessäki kirjassa luemma κεν, κεε, νυν, νυ, ενι, εν, με, εμε, ρα, αρα
jne?
E. Tämä, tuo, se taisivat ensimmältään kuulua tä, to, si, sitte ta,
tai, taa, teä, tämä; toi tuo, toa, taa, toma; se. Samalla tamalla
kuulemma monikkoin esinnä olleen nät, not, nit, sitte näät, neät,
nämät; nut, nuot, nomat; ne, net. Näissä sanoissa on Yksikön
alkukirjain kummanlaisesti toiseksi Monikossa vaihetettu. Waan
harvassa muussa kielessä taitaan näitä Sianimuita niin täydellisinä
löytää kun suomessa.
Terveyden hoidosta.
(Lisää ja loppu).
Satuja.
1. Hiiret ja Tammi.
taikka
Nälkä maansa myönehellä, siemenensä syönehellä
taikka
2. Kettu ja Kukko.
O sä kuulusa Kaleva!
Esi isämme ilonen,
Joka suodun Suomen maalla
Perustit majat metiset
Asunmajat ihanaiset
Sukukuntasi suloksi;
Jo o'ot meiltä ammon mennyt,
Armahin Esi isämme,
Poikinesi, pereinesi;
Mutta vielä vanhat runot,
Weisut vierreistä ajoista,
Muistelevat miehuuttasi,
Jalouttasi juttelevat,
Selittävät sulosesti
Eloasi onnellista,