CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

• HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

• Among these 6 Constitution, only 3 effectively govern the country, 35, 73, 87
 February 2, 1987 – 1987 Constitution
 Over 300 yrs of reign of terror, then came the Biak na bato or Filipino Spanish Truce,
paying an amount and exile of agunaldo, however, these truce was an ultimate
failure, as the spanish would not perform what was previously agreed, and so
Aguinaldo went bach to the Phil, and on on June 12, 1898 there was a Declaration of
Philippine independence.
 Treaty of Paris – US-Spain Secret agreement.
 This forced Aguinaldo to issue a decree, a malolos congress, to Constitute the
Malolos Constitution. (January 21, 1899) – First in Phil and in Asia.
 However, it was not fully implemented because of the Phil-US was, it which Phil lost
the battle
 American Colonization
o American inspired constitution was made, 1935, which provided legal basis
for the commonwealth government or transition government before granting
the Philippine independence – it was fully implemented but was interrupted
by the Japanese invasion – WW2
 1943 – Japanese Sponsored Constitution. It did not effectively govern the country as it
was boinding only on the Japanese controlled areas in the country. Ignored by the
American governemnrt and Filipinos exiled. – short lived constitution. Because the
American came back and freed us and gave us our independednce on July 4, 1946.
(From July 4, 1946 up to 1962, the Philippines celebrated Independence Day annually
for a period of 16 years. On May 12, 1964, then President Diosdado P. Macapagal
decided to change the date to June 12 to honor the proclamation of independence by
General Emilio Aguinaldo on June 12, 1898.)
 Soo the 1935 constitution really became effective after the 2nd independence until
  1973 Constitution – Marcos - elected in 1965, re elected in 1969 – the 1935 consti
allowed him 2 full 4yr term. (which would end in 1973,) but of course he must have
anticipated this, a concon began to meet in 1971, so in 1972 0 he declared a martial law
and made the 1973 consti which is align to what he wanted
 Parliamentary Governemnt with prime minister and President
 1976 amendments – the president would be the PM exercising Legilative powers until
the martial law was lifted.
 Benigno – assaninated
People power

 Cory aquino became the President ,a and replaced in with Freedom constitution 1986. –
in which aquino vested in herself both the executive and legislative powers. -the same
with marcos. But this was just a transitional constitution in which a new committee was
tasked to formulate our present constitution.
 1987. Sometime known as anti-marcos constitution . of course it is not a perfect
document but it is the most powerful one as it binds the citixen of the Philippines

Political law. That branch of public law which deals with the organization, and operations
of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the State with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887)
• Classification
1. Written – one whose precepts are embodied in one document or set of documents.
2. Unwritten — consists of rules which have not been integrated into a single, concrete
form but are scattered in various sources, such as statutes of a fundamental character,
judicial decisions, commentaries of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain
common law principles.
3. Conventional - an enacted constitution, formally "struck off" at a definite time and place
following a conscious or deliberate effort taken by a constituent body or ruler.
4. Cumulative - the result of political evolution; "not inaugurated at any specific time but
changing by accretion rather than by any systematic method." (16 CJS 21)
5. Rigid - one that can be amended only by a formal and usually difficult process.
6. Flexible — one that can be changed by ordinary legislation.

Essential Qualities of the Written Constitution

1. It. must be BROAD, it should provide for the entire governmental organization, cover all
persons and things within State territory embody the past, reflect the present, and
anticipate the future.
2. It must be BRIEF having the basic: principles to be implemented with Legislative details
more adjustable to change and easier to amend.
3. It must be DEFINITE/CLEAR: to avoid confusion and divisiveness among the people.
• XPN: Provisions deliberately worded in a vague manner, like due process clause, as to
make them more malleable to judicial interpretation in light of new circumstances.
Essential Parts of the Written Constitution
1. Constitution of Liberty - consists of a series of prescriptions setting forth the
fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of
government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those rights. (Garner, Introduction to
Political Science, 397)
11987 Constitution — Articles II, III, IV, V and XII.
2. Constitution of Government - consists of a series of provisions outlining the
organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down certain rules relative to its
administration and defining the electorate.(Garner, Introduction to Political Science, 397)
• 1987 Constitution - Articles VI to XI.
3. Constitution of Sovereignty - consists of the provisions pointing out the mode or
procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law may be brought
about. (Garner, Introduction to Political Sci-ence, 397)
• 1987 Constitution - Article XVII.

THE PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime
of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Preamble is not a source of substantive right since its purpose is only "to introduce." It is
couched in the first, not third, person to deepen the sense of involvement and participation of
the individual citizens, as the "authors" thereof, in the ordaining and promulgation of the
Constitution. It enumerates the primary aims and expresses the aspirations of the framers.
• Methods of interpreting the Constitution
1. Verba legis - whenever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning
2. Ratio legis et anima - where there is ambiguity, the words of the Constitution must
be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
3. Ut magis valeat quam pereat - the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
• Self-executing provision
A provision which is complete by itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation.
GR: All provisions of the Constitution are self. Executory

 Rationale: A contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be eftective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to
 pass the needed implementing statute. (Manila Prince Hotel v. CSIS. G.R. 122156. Fck
3, 1997)

• Exceptions:
• 1. When it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate; and
• 2. Provisions merely expressing general principles like:
• a. Art. II: *Declaration of Principles and State, Policies*
• b. Art XI: "Social Justice and Human Rights"
NOTE: Such provisions are not ready for enforcement through the courts but are used by the
judiciary as aids or guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in
its enactment of laws. (Tondo Medical Employees Association v. CA, G.R. No. 167324, July 17,
2007)

XPN to the XPN:

• Sec. 16. Art. Il: Right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No.
• 101083, July 30, 1993)
• Sec, 17, Art. III: Right to information (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR. No. 122156, Feb.
3, 1997): and
• Sec. 10, Art. XII: Filipino First Policy. (Manila Prince Hotel v. CSIS. G.R. No. 122156,
Feb 3, 1997)
• NOTE: In case of doubt, the provisions of the Constitution should be construed as self-
executing: mandatory rather than directory and prospective rather than retroactive. (Cruz
and Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 8)

AMENDMENT VS. REVISION

 REVISION broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as
when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
 On the other hand, AMENDMENT broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or
deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
 Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended. (Lambino v. Commission on
Elections, 505 SCRA 160)
TEST TO USE

 The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions
as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions." The court examines only the number of
provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
  The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."
Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of
inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change
in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in
the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the
traditional form of government and the system of check and balances." (Lambino v.
Commission on Elections, 505SCRA 160)
• It is important to determine whether or not a proposed change in the Constitution would
be an amendment or a revision thereof because Section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution allows the people, through the process known as initiative, to propose only
amendments to the Constitution.

• ART. XVII
• Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members (Constituent Assembly);
or
2. A constitutional convention
• Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall
be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
• The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
• Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention

Two stages of the amendment/Revision

1. Proposal - Con-Ass, Con-Con, or Petition for Initiative
2. Ratification - this is when the people approve the amendments or the revisions to the
Constitution. There has to be a vote to subject the people to this exercise and determine
whether or not they approve the changes, amendments, or revisions. - PLEBISCITE

Limitations by which the people can amend or propose amendments to the Constitution
1. The petition for initiative can only introduce or propose amendments to the Constitution not
revisions;
2. Only once every five years; and
3. There must be an enabling law.
• Republic Act 6735
• AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
• Section 5. Requirements.(a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least
ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the
Commission.
• Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition.
• (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
• SANTIAGO VS COMELEC 270 SCRA 106 (1997)
• FACTS: A petition to amend the constitution was filed by Atty, Delfin before the
COMELEC to lift the term limits of elective official. So in other words our representatives
will be holding their offices in perpetuity. And 50, the petition started. He went to the
COMELEC with this petition and he wanted the COMELEC to conduct a signature
campaign in order to gather the 12% and 3% required votes.Remember, before the
petition or initiative can be valid it has to be supported by the 12% of the total number of
registered voters in the country. And within that 12%, every legislative district must be
represented by 3% of its registered voters.
• Atty. Delfin wanted the COMELEC to do the gathering of 12% and 3%.
• The petition says, "Do you approve of lifting the term limits of elective government
officials?" He wanted to submit this petition to the people and after it is signed by che
12% and 3% It will be formally filed in the COMELEC, So, COMELEC will gather and
COMELEC after gathering that will consider it formally filed.
• Now, COMELEC was poised to do what Atty. Delfin wanted it to do. And so, there are
people who questioned COMELEC in doing so:First, Senator Defensor-Santiago
questioned that the provision on the people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be done via legislation and she submits that there has yet to be a law that can
implement this provision. Although, it has been recognized that there is this R.A. 6713,
she argues that this law failed to provide any subtype. The law, in other words, is
deficient in the matter of the petition for initiative on the Constitution.
• Second, Senator Roco, on the other hand, challenged also the COMELEC'S actions
because according to him, the petition itself is not the petition that the COMELEC should
act on. He alleged that before the COMELEC can act on it, it should already have the
12% and 3% vote. Here, Atty. Delfin wanted the COMELEC to gather the 12% and 3%
vote.
• ISSUE: WON R.A. No. 6713 is adequate to provide for the system of an initiative on the
Constitution.
• HELD: In deciding this case, the court sai that the provision in the Constitution Section 2,
Article 17 on this matter is not self-executory. There has to be a law in order to execute
this provision and the limitation is that it can only propose amendments on the
Constitution and not revise it.
• QUESTION: Has Congress provided for the proper law for this?The Constitution pointed
out several provisions in this law that is not consistent with the Constitution itself. The
court noted the inclusion of the word Constitution in the law was only a delayed
afterthought. The law talks about amendments and revisions but it included the initiative
of the Constitution. Not knowing that the Constitution through a petition for initiative, all
you can do with it is to amend the Constitution and not
• revise, but the provision says,", to amend or revise the Constitution via,".The Court said,
that cannot be done.
• Moreover, the law does not provide for the contents of the petition for an initiative. No
subtitle is provided for the initiative of the Constitution in the same law. There are also no
details on the implementation of the initiative on the Constitution. The Court noted that
the law provides for the mechanism by which local legislation as well as national
legislation may be amended via initiative. But in the matter of amending the Constitution
via a petition for initiative, the law is lacking. So, the Court concluded that, this law is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as the
initiative on the amendments in the Constitution is concerned.
• So, since there is no valid law to effect this petition to amend the Constitution, what the
COMELEC did here is that it does not have any basis and it does not have any power
under this law to do what it started to do vis-vt-vis the Atty. Delfin petition. Also, the court
noted that the Delfin petition does not contain the signature of the required number of
voters.
• Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated. The
COMELEC acquires jurisdiction on the power of this petition only after its filing.
• QUESTION: When is it considered filed?
• If it already have the 12% and 3% votes, and only then can COMELEC consider that as
initiatory pleading.
• ii. RATIFICATION
• 1. In case amendments proposed by Congress or
• Convention
• Art. XVIi, Sec. 4, Par. 1
• Section 4 (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
 held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.
• 2. In case of Amendments proposed through Initiative
• Art. XVII, Sec. 4, Par. 2
• Sec, 4 (2) Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite Which shall be held not earlier than sixty days
nor later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.
• 3. Plebiscite to be called by Congress and supervised by Comelec, but the initiative on
Constitution will be called by the Comelec

• GENERAL CONSIDERATIONSCONDITIONS FOR EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Requisites of Judicial Review (FUNA VS AGRA)

• 1)There must be an actual case or controversy callingfor the exercise of judicial power;

• (2)The person challenging the act must have the standing to assail the validity of the
subject act or issuance, that is, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (locus standi)

• For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
• For voters, there must be a showing of obvious Interest in the validity of the election law
in question;
• For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
• For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators,
3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
• FUNA VS AGRA
691 SCRA 196(2013)
FACTS: Agra holds two offices namely the Secretary of justice and the Solicitor General. Under
the Article VII, Section 13, cabinet members, among the other officials enumerated in that
article, cannot hold any other position-members of the cabinet, etc.,[are prohibited] from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the constitution.
Now, Agra was appointed as the acting Secretary of Justice. So he is the SOj and therefore, a
cabinet member. But, he was appointed also as acting SolGen so he is now holding 2 offices in
violation of this provision.
 • ISSUE: WON the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of justice, concurrently
with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against
dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.
• HELD: The court set aside the technicality on standing as well as the fact that it is
already moot because Agra already resigned in his position as the Solicitor General.
• Ruling on the merits, the Court said that Agra cannot validly hold any office while he is
the Solgen or if he is the Secretary of Justice because he will be member of the cabinet
and is proscribed under the Constitution unless the constitution itself allows it.
• FUNA VS MANILA ECON
715 SCRA 247
• FACTS: MECO was, at first, not audited by the COA, but later on this Funa, he sent
COA a letter requesting for a copy of the latest financial report of this MECO. the COA
replied and said that the MECO was not among the agencies audited by any of the three
cluster it was not being audited by the COA. It had never audited and examined the
amounts of this MECO. And So, because of this Funa went to the Supreme Court
challenging this act of the COA because according to him it is neglecting its duty under
the Constitution to audit the accounts of a bona fide GOCC or a government
instrumentality.
• While the case was pending, the COA claimed that it already Issued the office order
2011-298 where it conceded its jurisdiction over the accounts of MECO. It is now
auditing the MECO.
• COA alleged there's no more need for the SC to resolve this case because it has
become moot and academic.
• ISSUE: WON the issuance of office order render the case moot?
• HELD: Yes, the Court said, it mooted the case. The case was for mandamus, it
compelled the COA to audit and to do its legal duty.
• CORPUZ VS PEOPLE (2014)
FACTS: Corpuz, the accused here, loiters in casinos and then looks at the people to bet then he
would offer to buy their jewelry. So, some of these losers they went to this person,) pledged
their jewelry but he was not able to pay them. Here, the amount involves 98 thousand pesos. He
was supposed to be the middleman, he would sell the jewelry, he would return the proceeds to
the person who pledged but was not able to do that so then he was accused and charged to the
felony of estafa. He was convicted by the RTC of imprisonment up to 14 years and there is a
discussion here on the incremental penalty rule because the amount-there is this provision in
the RPC that if the amount exceeds 22 thousand pesos, there is this incremental penalty.
• ISSUE: WON there is an actual case or controversy.
• HELD: The Court dismissed that argument because according to the Court, the remedy
is not with them but the remedy is to go to Congress to amend the law. The Court cannot
uphold his contention to lessen his penalty because the Court would now be engaging in
judicial legislation.
• SEC VS BAGUIO COUNTRY CLUB
• 766 SCRA 300 (2015)
• FACTS: There was a dispute of several stockholders of the Baguio Country Club
because there was a provision in their amended by-laws extending the term of the BOD
or the Board of Directors of this corporation to two years, according to some of the
stockholders, that, that is prohibited under the Corporation Code which only limits the
term of office of the board of directors to only one year and so the case went to the
Securities and Exchange Commission to resolve who's correct.
• The SEC ruled in favor of the challengers of this provision of the amended by-laws.
• While it the case was pending, the corporation filed a motion
• or relief to admit a manifestation. It manifested that in a meeting held sometime in 2005,
the BOD already approved the amendment of its by-laws to remove the two-year term
• of land which is part of the public property so this is important
• and now one year. So in other words, there is no more reason
• for Court to resolve and the same did set aside the procedural
• for the Court to continue hearing the matter because the issue defect on standing.
• is already moot and academic.
• Insofar as the substantive issue is concerned, the Court reversed the ruling of CA and
held that reverent Cortez could,
• ISSUE: WON the case becomes moot and academic.
• HELD: Yes, the case is academic/moot if it ceases to présent a. justiciable controversy.
In this case, it happened with the amendment restoring term of the board to one year,
there is no more illegal provision to speak of, there is no more actual controversy that
warrants the exercise of judicial power.
• SM LAND VS BCDA
769 SCRA 310
• FACTS: This BCDA opened for disposition properties somewhere in Taguig. These
properties formerly used for defense purposes now converted to alienable property.
• Because of that, SM Land Inc. (SMLI) wanted to get hold of that property so it submitted
to BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the development of this land through a public-
private joint venture agreement. Because of that BCDA created a joint venture selection
committee. This committee negotiated with SMLI. They agreed to pursue this
competitive challenge procedure as laid down by the Neda JV guidelines in developing
properties or infrastructures of such sort and so they embarked on detailed negotiations
until a certification of successful negotiation was reached.
• In this certification the BCDA undertook to subject the original proposal of SMLI to a
competitive challenge. However, instead of proceeding with this competitive challenge,
 the BCDA wrote a letter to SMLI stating that it will welcome any voluntary conditional
proposal,etc. but eventually the BCDA itself categorically recommended to the Office of
the President the cancellation and termination of this competitive challenge. SMLI,
stating that they had an agreement, questioned "Why did BCDA not follow that
agreement?" SMLI urged BCDA to proceed with the competitive challenge. Eventually,
Supplemental Notice No. 5 was issued informing that the BCDA shall no longer dispose
this property through competitive challenge. In other words, the agreement was not
followed which caused SMLI to sue BCDA before the courts.
• Now, there are also parties here that want to intervene namely the Department of
National Defense and AFP. These two entities claim that they are the statutory
beneficiaries of the proceeds if the property is sold there they can intervene.
• ISSUE: 1. WON the BCDA abused its discretion in issuing the Supplemental Notice No.
5, cancelling the competitive challenge.
• 2. WON the Department of National Defense and the AFP have legal standing or interest
in order to intervene.
• HELD: 1. Yes, they already have an agreement to that certification and therefore they
must comply with their obligations so they cannot unilaterally reneged their obligation
and return the money. SMLI here has the right to the completed competitive challenge
pursuant to the Neda JV guidelines and the certification issued by the BCDA. There was
a completend followed between the parties and must be respected and followed.
2. No, to have a legal interest, it must be direct and immediate, not contingent, indirect, remote,
or conjectural. In this case, the right of the AFP are merely inchoate, because their right to the
proceeds is not vet actual because it rests on the success of the bidding process. Since there
was still no winner, there is no right to speak of over the proceeds.
• LAUDE VS GINEZ- ABALDE 775 SCRA 408 (2015)
• FACTS: The sister of Jennifer Laude filed a complaint for murder before the City
Prosecutor's Office (CPO). After preliminary investigation, an information was filed for
murder.
• During the pendency of the case, laude filed a motion to compel the AFP to surrender
the custody of Pemberton to the Olongapo city jail.
• Judge Ginez-Jabalde denied this urgent motion so the case went to the SC. Pemberton,
before the SC, argues that laude is only a private complainant and therefore lacks the
legal personality to file the motion.
• Since she was not able to get the conformity of the public prosecutor, according to
Pemberton she does not have legal standing.
• ISSUE: WON Laude have standing?
• HELD: Court said NO.
• In all criminal cases, it is the people that is the real party-in-interest which means that
allowing a private complainant (e.g., rape case) to pursue a criminal action is only a rare
exception.
• If you want any relief, you course that through the prosecutor.
• You have to get his/her conformity.
• In this case, Laude wasn't able to prove that the judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying her motion. She wasn't also able to prove that the exception
applies to this case,
• RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS VS REYES
G.R No. 180771 (2015)
• FACTS: There are whales, dolphins, tortoises, and other cetacean species which inhibit
the tanon strait and they also have their stewards/caretakers. There was this contract
between this JAPEX, a firm, suggesting to conduct a geophysical survey and exploration
of this tanon strait. The Government and this JAPEX entered into an agreement, which
became G-SEC 102 and later on SC-46. The purpose of this contract was to explore,
develop, produce petroleum resources in the tanon strait and so these creatures,
through their representatives or stewards filed a case to enjoin the operation of SC-46.
In the meantime, JAPEX already began to drill and explore and it is argued by their
stewards that there has been fishkill; there have been significant reduction in the catch.
In other words, the water has been contaminated.
• ISSUE:
• 1. WON the case has become moot and academic
• 2. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the case
• HELD: 1. it is indeed moot because the contract has already been done. But even if the
case is already moot, we already know the exception to the general rule, if:
• 1.there is a grave violation of the Constitution,
• 2.the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved,
• 3. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public, and
• 4.the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
• The Court said that it is necessary because almost all of the foregoing exceptions are
present in this case. The Court said that it is not required that all must be present
because almost all is allowed.
• 2. The Court did not rule on that issue. It did not categorically said that they have
standing but it invoked the provisions of the rules of procedure for environmental cases
and these rules eliminated the requirement of legal standing for these resident marine
mammals, Locus Standi in environmental cases have been given a more liberalized
approach. In fact, the rules of procedure for environmental cases allow for a citizen suit
 and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before a court for violation of our
environmental laws. So any Filipino citizen, in the guise of a citizen suit that can sue
before the court, in representation of others including minors or Benerations yet unborn.
So this is the pervasive approach provided by the rules of procedure for environmental
cases.
• FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Checking
2. Legitimating
3. Symbolic
• ABS-CEN VS COMELEC
323 SCRA 811 (2000)
• FACTS: Commission on Elections en banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dates April 21, 1998
restrained ABS-CBN and any other groups from conducting exit survey. The electoral
body believed that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well
as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Election (NAMFREL).
• ISSUE: WON the petition is moot.
• HELD:
• The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the
May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of
expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a baste
feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up wi
elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only
• postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
• In any event, in Salonga vs. Pane, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has
the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent
of protection given by constitutional guarantees." Since the fundamental freedoms of
speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the
guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the
dissemination of data derived therefrom.
• This was overtaken by events of the election of 1998. The Sol Gen suggested that it was
moot and academic. Because of the important question of constitutionality raised, the 5C
opted to resolve the issue stating that the election in the Phil. is a continuing democratic
process (every 3 yrs). In the symbolic function, the SC decided the issue. The objection
was that such exit polls would give a trend. With the passage of the Fair Elections Act,
that puts to rest the question on whether or not! exit polls are allowable:
• ALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW
 • This stems from Art VIII Sec. 4 (2) - that the SC exercises appellate jurisdiction involving
constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreements and one of those
cases is the constitutionality of any law, act, order, presidential Issuances.
• This means that even the most inferior court has the authority to declare an act as
unconstitutional. It is also traceable to the requirement of judicial Review that we must
raise it at the earliest opportunity, and that if you raise it on appeal for the first time
(Miranda v. Aguirre) the Court will not discuss the constitutional question because it is a
collateral matter (supra).
• Remember:
• 1. Only courts vested with judicial power can exercise judicial review. Thus, if it is a body
created by law other than the Supreme Court and such lower courts as may be
established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution), then these bodies do not have
power to exercise judicial review.
• 2. Quasi-judicial bodies, as the term suggests, are not actually exercising judicial power
(They do not have the right and do not exercise the power of judicial review).
They are merely exercising administrative powers but with a right to adjudicate matters (rights)
while these bodies are implementing the laws.
• 3. The (lower) courts' decision as to a law's constitutionality is subject to review by the
Supreme Court, under Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2)
• EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
• Article 7, New Civil Code:
• ".. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern."
ORTHODOX VIEW
• The Civil Code has stated that an unconstitutional law is considered to be non-existent,
The Civil Code provision adheres to the traditional view as to the declaration of
unconstitutionality i.e. that a law ceases to have effect, it ís as if it does not exist at all, it
is not a basis for any right, obligation or duty.
• Operative Fact Doctrine
UNORTHODOX/MODERN VIEW
But in recent times, the SC took a different stand. As to certain declaration of unconstitutionality,
simply because of the reality that for certain time that the act or law complained of has been
effective prior tO the declaration of unconstitutionality, people may have acted based on the
provisions of that act or law. In the interim, there may have been acts committed or performed,
or avoided in order to avoid or gain liability. That is an operative fact that the courts cannot close
their eyes on.
• HACIENDA LUISITA VS PARC
660 SCRA 525 (2011)
 • FACTS: There was this Executive Order No. 229 providing for the machinations
for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. This CARP created the
PARC or the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. It is the highest policy making body that
formulates all policies, rules, and regulations necessary to implement the CARP. And this
PARC, under then Sec. Defensor-Santiago, issued a Resolution 89-12-2 which approved the
stock distribution plan consistent with the provisions of the CARL (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law) approving the stock distribution plan of TADECO and Hacienda Luisita Inc. PARC,
however, revoked the stock distribution plan under Resolution 89-12-2 pursuant to another
Department of Agrarian Reform, Administrative Order No. 10 (DAO 10). So because of this,
Resolution 89-12-2 was revoked. Under the law, it is the PARC that has the power to approve
the stock distribution plans and it did so when it issued Resolution 89-12-2 and it revoked it
under DAO 10.
The Court said that the question here is what is the effect now that the stock distribution plan
has become ineffective because of this subsequent issuance. The Court apply the application of
the operative fact doctrine.
• The revocation of the stock distribution plan was challenge before the SC and it upheld
the act of the PARC to do so because it had the power under the law. Of course, even if
it was valid, the Court recognized the time this stock distribution plan was valid, parties
would rely in good faith on the validity of this Stock Distribution Plan and had in fact done
acts pursuant to that stock distribution plan.
• Therefore, the actual existence of this act is, prior to such determination of its nullity, is
that operative fact, and may have consequences which cannot be ignored.
• ISSUE: WON the Operative Fact Doctrine is only applicable to laws which are declared
to be unconstitutional?
• HELD: The Court said that it is not limited to laws.
It applies to Executive acts such as in this case which involves the approval by the PARC of this
Stock Distribution Plan. So, operative fact doctrine can be applied to presidential ssuances,
executive acts. So it's not limited to laws.
• POLITICAL QUESTION VS JUSTICIABLE QUESTION
• There was that question on whether or not the political question concept still exist.
• If the question to be resolved refers to that question on which the people on their
discretionary authority with respect to what have been delegated to Congress or the
executive, to decide, then it is still a political question.
• With respect to statutes, we go by the rule in the case of Tanada v. Angara. If the
question is wisdom or propriety of an act then it is deemed as a political question. Other
than that, it is justiclable. The expanded definition of judicial power made it clear, When
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then the
courts can intervene.
• OPOSA VS FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792 (1993)
 • FACTS: This case was initlally filed by minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents and by the Philippine Ecological Network (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of the environment and natural resources.
The defendant, on the other hand is Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
• The complaint was instituted as a class suit and it alleged that the plaintiff represented
the Citizens of the Philippines who are entitled to the fill benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure.
• Plaintiffs move to prevent the misappropriation or impairment of the Philippines
rainforest and prayed for the cancellation of all existing timber license agreements
(TLA's) in the country and also cease and desist trom receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new LA's. It further asserts that the continued trend of
deforestation causes adverse effects, disastrous consequences, and irreparable
damage to incoming generation.
• Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the
respondent judge Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
WON the plaintiffs have a legal standing and cause of action;
WON the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government.
• The case is held to be a valid class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. The
petitioner-minors can for themselves, for others or their generation and for the succeedin
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the suceeding
generations can only be based on the concept of international responsibility in sofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
• Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment ofa balanced and healthful ecology. The minors
assertion o their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations
to come.
• A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. A cause of action is an act or
omission of 1 party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
• It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the polltical question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable dostacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from Judicial inquiry or review. Commenting on
 the 2nd par. of Sec. 1, Art. Vill of the Constitution, in his book, Philippine Political Law,
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
• The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept° judicial power, involving
the settlement of conflicting rights ds conferred by law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what
was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion
of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess
of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."
• "In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:..
• VINUYA VS ROMULO
619 SCRA 533 (2010)
• FACTS: This case involves the discretion of the executive to present a claim by these
comfort women who suffered injustices abuses from the Japanese military during the
time of war. They want to be compensated for damages and they want their claims to be
presented by through the executive department before Japan. So, these women are
members of the Malaya Lolas, they wanted to be given compensation because they
were victims of rape by the Japanese military forces during the second world war. They
went to the executive department particularly the DOJ, the DFA and the Solicitor
General to assist them in the filing of their claims against the Japanese officials.
• However the executive did not favorably act, declined to endorse and present the claim
before Japan because it would be inimical to the relations with japan.
• And so the case went to the Supreme Court arguing these Malaya Lolas argued that the
Executive department, DOJ, DFA and OSG gravely abused its discretion when they did
not favorably act or declined to act on their complaint
ISSUE: whether or not the government should espouse claims of Malaya Lolas against a foreign
national a political question?
• HELD: The Court said that it is. It is a foreign relations matter the authority for which is
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches, particularly
the executive. And since here, the executive department to the DOJ, DFA and Sol Gen
had already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims
against Japan. The wisdom of such decision is not for our courts to question. This case
is controversial.
 • So the Court here rejected the petition because it presents a political question. The
exercise of discretion is solely lodged before the executive and legislative department
that an inquiry on the exercise thereof would result to the examination of policy. This is a
recognition therefore that it is not within the power or competence of the judiciary to
determine the wisdom of these acts. The Court recognizes the conduct of foreign
relations full of complexities and consequences. It Is our President, the sole organ, that
possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign
countries for our diplomatic and consular officials and in the exercise thereof the
President is traditionally given a wider degree of discretion particularly the conduct of
foreign affairs so much so that the courts had to when there's a question involving this
kind of conduct. For the Court to overturn the executive department's determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
• QUESTION: What is an example of a case which presents a political question?
• Questions which involve foreign relations as in this case. The conduct of the foreign
relations is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--the political--
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of their political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision as a general rule. That
is the general rule. Now what is the exception? The rule is not absolute. Not all cases
implicating foreign relations present political questions because courts had the power to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements, So when matters involve these
treaties and executive agreements, they are beyond this political question doctrine. They
can be resolved by the courts. So the rule is not absolute.
• SOVEREIGNTY
"Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which the State is
governed.”
Doctrine of Auto-limitation
• Doctrine where the Philippines adhere to international law, and the adoption of the
principles of international law become limitations to our exercise of sovereignty.
• People vs Gozo 53 SCRA 476 (1973)
• FACTS: Gozo bought a house and lot and located inside a US Naval Reservation in
Olongapo City. House was demolished and a new one was built. However, a building
permit was not secured from the city mayor. She was charged with the violation of a city
ordinance and was sentenced to imprisonment of 1 month.
• The respondent argued that this ordinance is invalid and not applicable to her or to her
property which is inside the Naval Base. She claimed that the city has no jurisdiction
insofar as the naval base is concerned because it is not part of the Philippine territory.
• ISSUE: WON the city has no jurisdiction over her property which is inside the naval
base.
• HELD: It has jurisdiction. On the discussions regarding military bases, after the
expiration of the agreement, the US seceded to us the territory which belong to them
 after the expiration But, we still have agreements with them insofar as exercises are
concerned, but we did not return to US the control of these territories. Now, no part of
the Phillippines is under US territory,
• This has been recognized by the Court in several cases-because of this agreement
between the US and the Philippines, the Philippine government merely consented that
the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases, not all the time. This consent was given as
a matter comity and expediency.
• But, the Philippines has not abnegated its sovereignty over
these bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein.
• Under the terms of the treaty, the US government has prior or preferential, but not
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses.
• As a sovereign, the Philippines can limit, by this agreement, the extent that we could
exercise our jurisdiction precisely because we are sovereign. We can limit our
sovereignty in an agreement with another sovereign. But, that does not mean that we
are relinquishing altogether our sovereignty in that area. The Philippine government not
only retains its jurisdictional rights not granted, but also other rights ceded by the US for
the purposes of holding to make use thereof.
• The case has been reiterated in other cases.
• The Philippines be independent and sovereign; its authority may be exercised over its
entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power; its commands is
paramount.
• As such, the argument of Gozo to escape liability is wrong because the Philippines has
jurisdiction even if that is a naval base.
• The Court recognized here the concept of auto-limitation - a state may, with its consent,
expressed or implied, submit itself to a restriction of its sovereign rights. Thus, there may
be a curtailment of what otherwise would be power plenary in character.
• This is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation. This is the property of the State
force due to which there is exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-
restriction. So, if it chooses, it may refrain from the exercise of that, otherwise, it would
be an illimitable competence.
• PRINCIPLE OF INCORPORATION (Art. 2, Sec. 2)
• The generally accepted principles of international law form part of the laws of our land.
• Pacta sunt servanda - obedience or compliance with our obligations in good faith
• Pacta sunt servanda
We, by signing in an agreement, we have to perform whatever it is in our obligation in good
faith. By doing that, we recognize the existence of this agreement and the application to that.
The Court also emphasized here that treaties are not mere moral obligations, but they really
create a legally-binding obligation between the parties.
What are the effects of treaties?
• Aside from the international laws which involve general principles which we adopt under
this doctrine of incorporation, we also have the power to enter into treaties.
• In the same way, by entering into a treaty, we also limit ourselves, our sovereignty.
Treaties limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty because we recognize that we
have obligations that we have to comply with.
• DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION AND ITS RELATIONS TO TREATIES AND
AGREEMENTS
• TANADA VS ANGARA
• 272 SCRA 18 (1997)
• FACTS: This case deals with the agreement signed by Philippines to the World Trade
Organization. It is one of the founding members of this WTO. Being a member of the
organization entails obligation.
• It is argued that these WTO agreements are unconstitutional in that these require the
Philippines to place the products of other countries in the same footing as Filipinos and
local products. This therefore would "invalidate" the Filipino first policy - local products
will not be consumed by the people as entry of these foreign products would be easier.
• They also claim that the WTO intrudes and limits the powers of the SC and Congress,
among other things. These are the arguments against WTO.
• ISSUE: WON the provisions of WTO violate the constitution?
• HELD: No. The case was dismissed by the SC.
• Provisions raised by the contending party in the case
• Art. 2, Sec. 19 - The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
• National economy and patrimony [Filipino First Policy] - In rights, privileges, and
concessions governing the economy, qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
• Art. 12, Sec. 12 - There should be preferential use of Philippine labor, materials, etc.
• Court answer
• Some of these principles are not self-executing. Also, reading through the others which
may be self-executing, they should not be read in isolation. They should be read with the
entire document and the Constitution.
• As such, they should be read, these economic-nationalist concepts, with other
constitutional mandates in order to build a balanced development of the economy.
 • If we read these provisions in isolation, how can we compete with the rest of the world?
We would be isolating ourselves, restricting entry. We would not get the development
that wel have today if we won't open ourselves to the evolution of trade, among other
things.
• QUESTION: Is this not inconsistent with the ruling of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS? NO!
• This is because the principle invoked there - the Filipino First Policy - only apply to
rights, privileges, and concessions which cover the national economy and patrimony and
not to every aspect of trade and commerce. The Manila Prince case is in fact the
exception rather than the general rule
• The Court also determined that there are enough balancing provisions that allow the
operation of the WTO agreement so that it would not be inimical to our country. Even if
the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, it would still recognize the
need for business exchange with the rest of the world.
• DEUTSCHE BANK VS CIR
G.R. No 188550 (2013)
• FACTS: Under the Tax Code, there Is this requirement for foreign banks that their taxes
payable in our country are withheld at this 15% rate.
• Deutsche Bank which paid this 15% pursuant to such law.
• Later on, it claimed a refund, because according to this bank, there is an agreement
between our country and Germany.
• We have a tax treaty provision instead of withholding 15% tax, it will be only 10%. So,
there's this excess of 5% which amounts to P22.5M. So, it asked for a refund from the
Commissioner.
• The Commissioner, however, denied the claim because there is this RMO 1-2000 which
requires: you violated the order when you did not present your claim 15 days prior to the
occurrence of the transaction. Because of that, the reclaim for refund will not be granted.
• ISSUE: The case went to the SC, arguing which is stronger - the
• RMO or the treaty?
• HELD: The Court upheld the force of the treaty. Why?
Due to pacta sunt servanda:
• The treaty of our country and Germany has to be complied with in good faith.
• One of the obligations was that we could only tax this bank With 10% instead of 15%
• QUESTION: Why do our country enter into tax treaties?
• It is to reconcile national
• fiscal administrations of the
• contracting parties, otherwise, it would be very cumbersome.
 • There should be a tax relief, and we could do that by entering into treaties.
This will be discussed thoroughly in PIL
INTERNATIONAL LAW VS MUNICIPAL LAW
Hard law vs Soft Law
Incorporation vs Transformation
Customary International Law – habituality and opinio juris sive necessitatis
• State immunity / Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty
• Sec. 3, Art. XVI. The State may not be sued without its consent.
- This is inherent power of the State, as the term suggest, would not need Constitutional
conformity to be exercisable by the State.
• This is based on 2 grounds:
1. There can be no legal right as against the authority which granted the rights
2. If the State is not immune, there is that thought that the propensity of people for filing cases
will leave the government or the state in countering the suits.
SUABILITY
LIABILITY
EXECUTION
STATE IMMUNITY UNDER THE CONSTI VS STATE IMMUNITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
When is a suit against the State?
1. When the Republic is sued by name, except when ultimate liability will fall on the official
[Republic v.
Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124 (1993) (shooting of marchers:
"Military and police officers who were responsible for the attrocities can be held personally liable
for damages"
2. When the suit is against.an.unincorporated.government entity
3. When it is against a government officer, but ultimate liability will fall not to the officer but
to the government [PC-Sucia]
QUESTION: When is a Suit against the State?
Not all cases are considered as suits as against the state. In the cases that have been taken
under immunity, there is a common denominator for suits against the State that the principles
shall apply. The common denominator is that if in case the State or defendant loses in the case,
it will require affirmative action on the part of the State in the form of:
1. Appropriating some money for the public treasury; OR
2. It will mean loss of government property.
Meaning:
The doctrine is not available in suits for injunction and mandamus. The reason is that will not
result to monetary or property loss to the government.
Also Philippine Agila Satellite v. Trinidad-Lichauco, 489 SCRA 160 (2006)
• llustration for No. 2:
• Hermano Oil v. TRB, 742 SCRA 395 (2014)
• Petitioner owned a parcel of land located at the right side of the Sta. Rita Exit of the
NLEX situated at Barangay Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan. The parcel of land was
bounded by an access fence along the NLEX. Petitioner requested that respondent Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of right of way, contending that it had been
totally deprived of enjoyment and possession of its property by the access fence that
had barred its entry into and exit from the NLEX. When it was denied, it sued the TRB
and the DPWH demanding specific performance, the grant of easement and damages.
Can the suit prosper?
HELD: No. the TRB and the DPWH correctly invoked the doctrine of sovereign immunity in their
favor. The TRB and DPWH performed purely or essentially government or public functions. As
such, they were invested with the inherent power of Sovereign. Being unincorporated agencies
or entities of the National Government, they could not be sued as such. An unincorporated
government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from
suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated
Calub v. CA, 331 SCRA 55 (2000)
A motor vehicle loaded with illegally sourced lumber was apprehended by officers of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) while enforcing Sec. 78-A and Sec. 89 of the Forestry Code.
Criminal cases were filed against the owner of the vehicle but were dismissed on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the owner of the application or replevin against the DENR officers
before he Regional Trial
Court. Is the complaint for replevin a suit against the State?
Held: A suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its
purpose is to hold the state ultimately liable.
However, the protection afforded to the public officers by this doctrine generally applies only to
activities within the scope of their authority done in good faith. In the present case, in enforcing
the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, the DENR officers were performing their
functions and they did so within the limits of their authority. Hence, a suit against then who
represent the DENR is a suit against the State and it cannot prosper without the State's
consent.
• 1990 bar question
• The Secretary of Public Works, after an investigation, ordered the demolition of the fish
pond of X as a nuisance per se on the ground that it encroached on navigable rivers.
The Supreme Court later found that the rivers were manmade and were constructed on
private property owned by X. May X recover damages from the Secretary? (Mabutol v.
Pascual, 124
• SCRA 876)
• SUABILITY VS LIABILITY
• Suability is the ability to sue and be sued; it is the result of the express or implied
consent of the State to be sued. Liability, on the other hand, is determined after hearing
on the basis of the relevant laws and the established facts.
• REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR
54 SCRA 83 (1973)
• FACTS: Judge Guillermo P. Villasor issued a writ of execution directed against the funds
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This was rendered in favor of respondents P. J.
Kiener Co., Ltd.,Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation.
The Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment. The funds of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine
National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the
payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
• ISSUE: WON public funds can be garnished when state gave its consent to be sued.
HELD:
• Government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. Public funds cannot be the
object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously
granted and the state liability adjudged.
• Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego
• The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or speclal law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to the completion
of proceedings, anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of the Courts ends
when the judgment is rendered, since Government funds and properties may not be-
seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, obvious
considerations of public policy based on Disbursements of public funds must be covered
by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
• The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law."
 • What happens to the favorable judgement against the State?
• Suability will be determined in the presence or absence of consent. Consent, may be
express - by reason of a law, or implied. Act 3083, is still a good law; it is the general law
on consent.
In the same law itself, although it is the basis for consent on all money claims arising from
contracts, express or Implied, the same law suggests the scope of consent is only good from
the Inception of the action up to the rendition of the judgment. No execution will lie against the
government
• So even if the State has given its consent and even if based on the facts of the law of
the case the State is liable, there can be no execution issued against the State. It is
required under Act 3038 that the money judgment shall have to be submitted to the
proper government office, before the Auditor General - now with the COA, to determine
Whether there is an excess fund for the payment of money judgment. If there is none,
then there has to be an appropriation to be made by Congress.
• That's the reason why, money judgment coming from the COA is submitted to the
President, which is the basis for the President to be included in the budget for the next
year, who then files a proposal, which Congress, may or may not appropriate money for
that.
• In case of incorporated government entities since we have made mention that there is
already appropriation of a different juridical person under the law, and since the money
(although they are considered to have public character), they are not considered public
money coming from the treasury.
• For which reason, in cases of judgment against incorporated government entities, there
can be issuances of writs of execution, because to satisfy the judgment would not
require the appropriation coming from the Congress.
• Another example of express consent:
Republic v. Yahon, 726 SCRA 438 (2014)
S/Sgt. Yahon was an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a consequence of the
firected him, romeo ofers, to gih long it 50% of whale er tetrement beRefts and
other claims that may be due or released to him from the government and the said share of
petitioner shall be automatically deducted from respondent's benefits and claims."
Considering that said money in the hands of a government agency remain as public funds, may
the AFP Financial Center be directed to comply with the order without violating the doctrine of
State Immunity?
Held: No. Sec. 8 of RA No. 9262 authorizes the court to order that
"an appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent be automatically remitted
directly to the woman. The law used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage
the military institutions, when the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish.
Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether government or private. As this provision
was designed to avoid
sovereign immunity problems" and provide that "moneys payable by the Government to any
individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended to
"create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders
directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession.
• PROFESSIONAL VIDEO INC. VS TESDA
591 SCRA 83
FACTS: Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) and TESDA executed an addendum to the contract
agreement: PVC ID Card Issuance whose terms will bind PROVI to deliver 100% of the supplies
TEDA needed in the contract agreement. TESDA undertook to pay PROVI 30% of the total cost
of the supplies after the receipt and acceptance of the contracted supplies, with the balance
payable within 30 days after the initial payment. TESDA however left an outstanding balance
and despite two demand letters sent, the remaining outstanding balance remained unpaid.
PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for the collection for sum of money with damages against
TESDA praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary garnishment/attachment against
TESDA.
• TESDA argued mainly that public funds cannot be subject of garnishment and that the
addendum was in performance of its governmental function and thus is immune from
suit, even if there was an implied consent, TESDA posits public funds.
ISSUE: WON TESDA is immune from suit.
HELD: YES, First, RA 7796 (Organizing TESDA) is an unincorporated instrumentality of the
government operation under its own charter. Under Its several responsibilities lies the
constitutional command of affirming primary social economic force, protecting the rights of
workers and promoting the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and taking
appropriate steps to make such education available to all. Under such terms, both constitutional
and statutory, the role of TESDA cannot seriously be contested. in effect as an unincorporated
instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and implied
powers and all state immunities fully apply to it. Second, the proscribed suit that the state
immunity principle covers takes on varlous forms namely suits against the Republic,
unincorporated governmental agencies, governmental agencies with a chater with respect to the
agencys performance of governmental functions and those which in its face suits against
governmental officers. Lastly, even assuming that TESDA entered into a propriety contract with
PROVI with its implied consent to be sued, TESDA's funds are still public in nature and thus
cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment/attachment since is also covered under the
General Appropriations Act.
• Incorporated vs Unincorporated
1. Incorporated (GOCC w/ or w/o a special charter) has a charter of its own that invest it
with a separate juridical personality (ex. SSS, UP, PNB,City of Davao, municipal corp)

a.Test of suability: found in its charter; suable if its charter says so, regardless of
the function it is performing
 1. Unincorporated (not a GOCC) no separate juridical personality but is merged in the
general machinery of the gov't (ex. DOJ, Gov't printing Office)
a. no charter to consult; any suit filed against it is necessary action against the
Phil. govt
b. determine the nature of functions: suable if proprietary; not suable
c. if governmental If the proprietary and non-governmental function is taken as an
incident to its governmental function, immunity is not lost.
• Suits against Public Officers:
1. Immunity applies if the official acted within the scope of his authority.

2. Immunity does not apply on unauthorized acts of government officials:

a. when the act was ultra vires, or showed bad faith, malice or gross negligence
b. public official was sued in his personal capacity.
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145,
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, et al., Respondents
• Facts
• On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (Northrail), represented by its
president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a possible railway
line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
• On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department
of Finance of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug
30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine
government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM
Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower.
Under the Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD
400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at
the rate of 3% per annum.
• On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb.
Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing
him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime Contractor for the Northrail Project.
• On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the
construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to
Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The contract price for the Northrail
Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.
• On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a
counterpart financial agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the
Loan Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential
Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government
in order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.
• On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and
Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts
and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and
Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic
Development Authority and Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued an Order dated 17 March
2006 setting the case for hearing on the issuance of injunctive reliefs. On 29 March
2006, CNMEG filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Order. Before RTC Br.
145 could rule thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing
that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the
Chinese government, making it immune from suit.
• Issue
• Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local
court.
• Ruling
• There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard
to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or
acts jure gestionis.
• Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal
nature of the act involved – whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental,
as opposed to proprietary, functions. The restrictive application of State immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does
not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
• It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The
Feasibility Study was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise
of sovereign functions by the Chinese government but was plainly a business strategy
employed by CNMEG with a view to securing this commercial enterprise.
• The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its
nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the
Primary Contractor did not imply that it was acting on behalf of China in the performance
of the latter’s sovereign functions. To imply otherwise would result in an absurd situation,
 in which all Chinese corporations owned by the state would be automatically considered
as performing governmental activities, even if they are clearly engaged in commercial or
proprietary pursuits.
• DOH vs Phil Pharma health
Phil Pharma Wealth Inc. has been included in an Administrative Order by the Department of
Health which marked some of their drugs as unsafe for human consumption. Undersecretary
Galon of the DOH required the pharmacy to send a reply but instead they received a letter,
beyond the 10-day period given, informing them that the pharmacy's lawyers will send one. The
DOH then suspended the accreditation of Phil Pharma, so the latter filed a civil case against
DOH Undersecretary Galon and DOH Secretary Romalduez claiming, among others, damages.
The DOH sought to dismiss the case due to the Doctrine of State Immunity to Suit.
They posit that the State cannot be sued without it's consent; that because the complaint is
claiming damages, it would require the State to reach in its pockets; that the actions complained
of were done in their official public functions as Secretary and Undersecretary of the DOH
The issue is if the case should be dismissed for being a suit against the State.
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It held that the State cannot be sued without its
consent. This is the general rule, and while there are exceptions, none of which apply in this
case. The DOH is an unincoporated government agency without any separate juridical
personality. Accordingly, a claim for damages cannot prosper otherwise the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is violated. The Court also held that the mantle of non-suability extends to
complaints filed against public officials for acts in performance of their official duties. Petition
granted, case dismissed.
Key takeaway on Express consent
• If express, it must come in the form of a law. Meaning, Congress has passed a law
allowing a particular person to sue the government. It can't come in the form of
agreement. It cannot come in the form of a proclamation issued by the President, or any
executive issuance. Admission made by the President in a speech like in the case of
Sandoval, where Cory said: we will have to pay. That cannot take the form of express
consent. It must be in a form of legislation.
• Immunity of the State can only be given up by Congress, not In any manner. So even if
there's an executive order, but it is an executive issuance - a part of the ordinance
powers of the President - that will not be sufficient. That's the reason why, if that is a
Congressional act providing for a separate personality of a government owned or
controlled corporation, meaning it has original charter, any suit against that is no longer
a suit. against the State. That's why the principle does not apply to GOCCs with original
charters - S55, GSIS, PNB, DBP, they are quasi-public corporation. But if you file a case
against them, they cannot invoke immunity, even if the money has the public funds
characteristic, because the money there is not from the public treasury.
• Implied Consent
(1) When the government initiates action for affirmative relief.
 • You as a defendant can interpose a counterclaim. It is allowed by that law. But even if
not allowed by that law, it is still considered an implied consent because the government
has initiated the action.
• The principle is that, the State is considered an ordinary party-litigant, so therefore it
opens itself to any form of counterclaim.
• (2) Entering into a business contract
• If the State enters into a business contract, just like filing a suit, the State is considered
to have descended to the level of ordinary party to a business contract. Therefore any
breach will result into a liability. And the State, if it is guilty of breach will be liable under
a contract. But it should be clear that the contract must be business or proprietary. If it is
entered in its sovereign capacity, not business or proprietary, that entering into the
contract is not considered waiver. It is not considered implied consent.
(3) If it is inequitable for the government to claim immunity.
• Almost all the cases under that implied consent or waiver would refer to actual
expropriation. If the government needs private property for public use, the Constitution
requires that they must pay just compensation. The Rules of Court requires that they
must initiate a proceeding under eminent domain or expropriation.
• So if the government expropriates actually without going through the proceedings, the
landowner affected by the actual expropriation filed a suit for the payment of just
compensation. Ordinarily looking at it, it will have to have its consent because the
adverse ruling if it is clear will require the government to expropriate (should be
appropriate, ed.) money for that. But it is considered as implied consent by reason of the
SC rulings because it will be inequitable for the government to claim immunity.
• REPUBLIC VS. UNIMEX
• NHA VS HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO
GR. No. 154411-404 SCRA 389 (2003)
• FACTS: NHA expropriated the land of the respondents.
• While the negotiation for the amount was ongoing, NHA decided not to continue the
project because of the land's high price, rendering it impossible to implement the
socialized housing project, RTC did not agree aand garnished NHA's bank account
• HELD: NHA must continue with the expropriation; NHA's funds can be garnished.
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct
from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is
because when the government enters into a commercial business, it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. Having juridical
personality separate from the government, the funds of such GOCCs and non corporate
agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.
• Diplomatic Immunity
 • DFA VS NLRC 262 SCRA 39 (1996)
• FACTS: Private respondent alleged that he was illegally dismissed by ADB and the
latter's violation of the "labor-only" contracting law. Two summonses were served, one
sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs
("DFA"), both with a copy of the complainant.
• ADB and the DFA answered that they were covered by an immunity from legal process
except for borrowings guaranties or the sale of securities. The Labor Arbiter took
cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic
immunity from suit. The Labor Artibter declared the complainant as a regular employee
of respondent ADB and the termination of his services as illegal.
• The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC,
In its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." Dissatisfied, the
DFA lodged the instant petition.
WON the doctrine on diplomatic immunity applies to ADB
• Held:
The stipulations of both ADB's Charter Headquarters Agreement should be able, to establish
that, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the AD enjoys immunity from legal process of
every form. The Bank's officers, on this part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by
them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these
immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government which must be respected. World Health Organization vs. Aquino: "It is a
recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic
immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government... it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal
law officer of the government, ... or other officer acting under this direction.
• Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction ... as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting
foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that 'in such cases the judicial department of
government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the latter by
assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction."
• The ADB is immune from suits unless it arises out of ordinary transactions of the bank.
Other than that it is supposed to be Immune from any suit from court, Immune from civil
jurisdiction from the host country.
• The SC even went further to discuss that an international entity, if created for non-
political purpose by several countries, may be immune from suits, by reason of its
functions.
They are immune because they are non-political in character and by reason of the agreement
entered into by several countries; they are supposed to be immune from the jurisdiction of the
local or host country. The reason for this is it's difficult to bring them to the jurisdiction of which
country - because they are by reason of agreement, of several countries.
• A. QUASI-DELICT COMMITTEE BY AN AGENT
• Art. 2180, NCC.
• The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live their company….
• THE STATE IS RESPONSIBLE IN LIKE MANNER WHEN IT ACTS THROUGH A
SPECIAL AGENT; BUT NOT WHEN THE DAMAGE HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE
OFFICIAL TO WHOM THE TASK DONE PROPERLY PERTAINS, IN WHICH CASE
WHAT IS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 2176 SHALL BE APPLICABLE.
• DE jure vs De Facto Government
• CO KIM CHAN VS. TAN KEH 72 PHIL 113 (1945)
• LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO 210 SCRA 588
• REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
• SEPARATION OF POWERS
In the discourse of Constitution as well as the government, there is that principle of separation
of powers. The three great branches of the government are supreme in their own realms.
QUESTION: Why are they separated?
So that power will not be concentrated to one entity or individual. It has to be separated.
However, just because they are separated does not mean that they are isolated from each
other. The Constitution itself provides for checks and balances mechanism so that these
departments can check each other.
• RE: COA OPINION
678 SCRA 1 (2012)
FACTS: Here, five (5) SC Justices where involved. They could purchase properties from the
Court at a discounted rate under their formula.
They purchased the property. CoA went in, examined the accounts of the Court, and found that
there was an underpayment amounting to P221,000 due to the purchase of the properties of the
retired justices.
QUESTION: Why was there an underpayment?
• The CoA attributed it to the formula used by the Property Division of the SC; they
claimed it is wrong.
• QUESTION: What was the formula used by the Property Division?
 • It applied CFAG (Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group) Joint Resolution, No. 35 under
that Joint Resolution., instead of the formula set by the CoA under its own memoranda.
• So, using the CFAG formula, CoA daims what SC Property Division did was wrong.
• ISSUE: So which formula is correct? Is the Property Division correct in applying CFAG,
or should the CoA formula be used?
• HELD: The Court said that it should be the formula of CFA that must be applied. This is
because it is their formula.
• Indeed, CoA has the authority to conduct post-audit examination. It is the job of CoA to
audit these transactions after they occur, but this authority must read not only in light of
the Court's fiscal autonomy, but also with Constitutional provisions.
• Here, the Court had the opportunity to discuss the concept of Separation of Powers and
related it to Judicial Independence.
• The Separation of Powers is a fundamental principle in our Government. It is not
because the Constitution says that there should be a Separation of Powers, but
precisely because of division of the Articles. There are specific Articles for Executive,
Legislative, and Judiciary. With that, we could deduce that there is a Separation of
Powers. But, it does not follow that these powers are to be kept separate and distinct
from each other; that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained. The
Constitution provides for an elaborate checks and balances mechanism so that they
could check each other.
• Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that even with that mechanism, they also had to
enjoy a certain form of independence. That is why the Gourt here discussed the concept
of Judicial Independence.
• It has to be independent because it is tasked with ruling on matters/issues. If it is not
independent, then there would be no trust in the Courts.
• QUESTION: How can Judicial Independence be achieved?
• One of the ways in which that could be achieved is when you give fiscal autonomy - the
power to collect fees for it to spend its savings in a manner it sees fit If such
independence is not given, then it would be reliant on the appropriation done by
Congress; there would be a possibility that it would be controlled by this branch of the
government. i.e. reducing the budget if the Court will decide a case on a certain manner
• In order to stop that from happening, the Constitution gave judiciary Fiscal Autonomy.
Garcia vs Drilon 699 SCRA 352 (2013) – Wisdom of VAWC law
Mamiscal vs Abdullah
FACTS: Mamiscal has a wife which he had a heated argument with and because of that he
divorced her. The both of them are Muslims. They have this Shari-a law. They have their own
provisions for divorce. They underwent the process, they went to this Abdullah who is the
assigned officer of the civil registrar of that locality. Abdullah issued a certificate of registration of
divorce which finalize the divorce between Mamiscal and his wife. Later on, Mamiscal sought
the revocation of this certificate, questioning the validity of the document in which it was based.
He alleged that there was no proper documentation, initiated without his consent etc. and
therefore it should have been acted upon by this Abdullah. So Mamiscal filed an administrative
complaint against Abdullah before the SC because he works in the judiciary also (Sharia court).
ISSUE: Can Abdullah be administratively liable?
HELD: The court said No.
Abdullah is a clerk of court of the sharia court, but he has the privilege of wearing two hats. He
has two functions, clerk of court in the Sharia court and second as a circuit registrar within this
territorial jurisdiction.
• QUESTION: When acting in the divorce issue on what capacity was he acting?
• He was acting as a circuit registrar and not as sharia clerk of court. So the Court said it
has no jurisdiction over this employee because the function he committed which he
assail to be improper was one which pertains to his duties as a senior registrar.
Therefore the complaint should have been filed with the mayors and not in SC.
(Executive Department)
• CARPIO MORALES VS CA
774 SCRA 431
FACTS: Here we have the case against Binay involving the overpriced Makati city Hall parking
building. So complaints were filed against him before the office of the ombudsman.
After the administrative proceedings, the ombudsman ruled that he is administratively liable and
among others, he charged with grave misconduct, serious dishonesty-ultimately finding him
guilty for the offenses and was dismissed from the service. The order was not serve to Binay
because they locked the building, dili makasulod tong mag serve sa order.
Later on, Binay went to the CA to challenge the authority of the Ombudsman under the law. In
the meantime, the CA issued a TRO to stop the ombudsman from doing anything insofar as the
matter is concerned. The ombudsman went to SC to challenge this issuance by the CA because
under the Ombudsman law, no writ of injunction shall be issued by any. other court against the
ombudsman under RA 6770 section
14
"The ombudsman act of 1989". Because of that, the issuance of TRO by the CA was illegal.
ISSUE: Does the CA or any courts have the power to issue injunctions against Ombudsman?
Does this provision stop the courts from issuing injunctions?
HELD: The Court said that this provisions collide with the power of the SC to issue rules and
regulations which is part of its constitutionally mandated power to do.
Why?
The court emphasized the concept of separation of powers.
Congress can create Courts. It can delineate the jurisdiction of the RTC, the sandiganbayan
was made by law. The CA also was made by law. But once the Court is created, the procedure
by which the court will follow is issued by the SC. It is the one that issues the rules and
regulations that's why we have the rules of court.
Under the rules of court, this courts have the power to issue this TRO/ injunctions pursuant to
the exercise of their judicial power. Once the Court acquires jurisdiction over the case, it can
exercise the judicial power that is required to settle the issue among others, writ of injunction.
That is pursuant to the provisions of the rules of court.
The power to issue injunctions is lodge with the court and this Is controlled by the SC under its
rule of court. That's why that Provision can't be said to be valid because Congress went beyond
its powers. Congress intruded into the realm of the SC when it prohibited it from issuing TRO/
injunctions against the ombudsman, because these processes is within the power of the SC to
promulgate.
• Courts therefore has the power to issue TRO/ Writ of injunctions against the office of the
ombudsman. The Court however said that this provision clashes with its power to issue
rules and therefore, in the meantime, should not be given effect unless it adopts this
provision. If it does not adopt this provision prohibiting the issuance of injunction against
the ombudsman, then it cannot be done. It is the court who has the power to adopt this
rule.
• CHECK AND BALANCES
CASES INVOLVING IMPEACHABLE OFFICERS
Consistent with the discussion of separation of powers we have this concept of checks and
balances. Checks and Balances in order to check the abuses of the government. One of the
provisions that is very relevant is ARTICLE 11 or the accountability of public officers particularly
on the provisions on the impeachment.
Section 1 provides for the general rule that the "public office is a public trust".
Section 2 provides for impeachment.
Who are impeachable officers? The list is exclusive.
1. The President,
2. The VP,
3. Members of the SC
4. Members of the Constitutional Commission (COA, COMELEC, CSC
5. Ombudsman
What grounds for impeachment?
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
2. Treason;
3. Bribery:
4. Graft and corruption;
5. Other high crimes; and
6. Betrayal of public trust.
REPUBLIC VS SERENO G.R. No. 237428 (2018)
An impeachment complaint was filed before the lower house against Former Chief Justice
Sereno. But this was overtaken by this Quo warranto petition filed by the Solicitor General
directly before the SC. One of the argument in the quo warranto proceeding was that Sereno
was an impeachable officer, therefore this quo warranto proceeding is improper because it
circumvents the rule of the Constitution that impeachable officers can only be removed from
office by way of impeachment.
The Court did not agree because quo warranto and impeachment
Are different. When we talk about impeachment, you commit acts during your tenure. Quo
warranto deals with the validity of your appointment.
Those are the issues that are determined separately by those proceedings.
The Court said here impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed
elected official can be removed in the office. So this case deviates from previous jurisprudence
that we learned from our time that these impeachable officers can only be removed by
impeachment because apparently you can remove them through some other means including
quo warranto.
The cases cited by Sereno are not pertinent to the issue. They involved other matters. They
involved the disbarment of an impeachable officer. In fact even the Constitution allows that the
President can be removed under the rules of the PET.
Therefore, the remedy is not exclusive that impeachment is the sole means because they be
removed through an electoral protest.
Also the plain meaning rule. "May be removed from office" the court construed
This as alternative. This gives the appropriate party the alternatives to remove these officials.
They may be removed by impeachment and they may be removed through other means.
So the Court concluded here that the impeachable officers can be removed via quo warranto. If
you remove that power from the SC, it would result to an absurdity where a person who was
invalidly or not qualified to the position may be able to skip the requirements or being tested if
she has the proper credentials by the mere holding of her office that she becomes an
impeachable officer. The Court did not subscribe to that. In fact, quo warranto could be resorted
to for these individuals because they are holding the highest ranking offices in the government.
Any invalidity in their appointment would be an important issue because they yield powers and
influence on matters of law.
• DELEGATION OF POWERS – Potestas delegate non delegari potest
General rule: Cannot delegate. Especially the power to legislate
Exceptions: Constitutional provision that allows it if delegation passes the Two fold test:
INSTANCES ALLOWED BY THE CONSTITUTION
(Article VI, Sections 23(2) and 28(2))
Under the Constitution, the instances where the Congress may validly delegate its powers to the
President particularly Article 6 Section 23 and Section 28.
Under Sec 23 this is the grant of emergency powers to the president on certain instances. Sec
23 provides that "in times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy." This power
can be withdrawn by a resolution of the Congress.
Under Sec 28 this provides for the tariff powers of the president, as a general rule it is Congress
that has the power to impose taxes and generate revenue but this is an exception.
Under Sec 28 "Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts."
Delegation to Local Governments:
The power of eminent domain and, under the gen-welfare clause, the police power have been
dele gated by the legislature to lawmaking bodies. (Francia
v. Municipality of Meycauayan, 549 SCRA 53) The power of taxation is, however, derived by
them directly from the Constitution, subject only to limitations that may be imposed by the
Congress. (Constitution, Article X, Section 5; City of Iriga v. Camarines Sur III Electric
Cooperative, G.R. No. 192945, September 5, 2012)
The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability,
by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances,"
and to "main-tain public order in the barangay. (Not violative of the principle of delegation.)
(Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352; Tua v. Mangro-bang, G.R.
No. 170701, January 22, 2014)
Delegation to Administrative Bodies
An administrative agency may be generally described as a body endowed with quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it for
enforcement or execu-tion.
Note that the exercise of quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power would merely be incidental to
the main function of administrative agencies, which is the enforcement of the law. It is thus
possible for administrative agencies not to be conferred with either or both powers, as in the
case of Carino v. Commission on Human Rights (204 SCRA 483), where the Supreme Court
held that the Commission on Human Rights had the power merely to investigate but not to
adjudicate.
Quasi-Legislative Power
Power of subordinate legislation - "With the grow. ing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a
large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and
vesting a large amount of discretion in administrative and executive of. ficials, not only in the
execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to
promote public interest." (Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726)
Quasi-legislative power may be defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to
the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of a
law and implement legislative policy. In general, rules and regulations issued by administrative
or executive officers pursuant to the procedure or authority conferred by law upon the
administrative agency have the force and effect, or partake the nature, of a statute. Philippine
National Oil Companyv. Court of Appeals, 457 SCRA 32)
• REQUISITES OF VALID DELEGATION
Two tests "determine whether there is a valid delegation of power:
1) the completeness test - the law is already
complete before you can delegate the power to issue the IRR pursuant to that law
2) sufficient standard test - the law must not be vague; there has to be specific standards that
would guide the agency implementing the same insofar as the issuance of its IRR is concerned.
QUESTION: When is a law complete?
The law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate, which is the executive of this body.
QUESTION: When does it have a sufficient standard?
When it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to back out boundaries, delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
• NATIONAL TERRITORY
Sec. 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its
o territorial sea,
o the seabed,
o the subsoil,
o the insular shelves, and o other submarine areas.
The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breath and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
• Four (4) Items contained in Section 1:
1. The Philippine archipelago
2. All other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
3. Terrestrial, fluvial, territorial sea, sea bed, subsoil and insular shelves and other
submarine areas
Terrestrial will include the land area
Fluvial pertains to the river
Territorial sea is the 12-nautical mile extent from the base line
Sea bed will be the underwater portion
Subsoil, insular shelves, and other submarine areas are the underwater portion.
3. Aerial domain [“air space” aerial domain- ] Bar Question 2003, No. 19. What is outer
space?
Note: For legal purposes, the outer space is the portion that belongs to no state at all. It is like
the high seas. It is free for exploration by any state, assuming that they have the capacity.
• UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas)
- The Batasang Pambansa ratified the UNCLOS through Resolution No. 121 adopted on
February 27, 1984. Through this process, the UNCLOS attained the force and effect of
municipal law.
• In the Constitution, we do not have the term “archipelagic waters” because we call it
internal waters.
• 1) Archipelagic Waters/Internal Waters – the waters around, between and
connecting [ABC] the island[s] of the archipelago.
• They are part of our national territory.
• Note:
• GR: Foreign ships CANNOT navigate without the consent, • XPN: except in hot pursuit
• 2) Territorial Sea – the waters within 12 nautical miles from the baseline.
What do you mean by the “exercise of full sovereignty and jurisdiction”?

That means that our legal system, the entire Revised Penal Code is effective within the 12
nautical miles area. If you commit a crime while aboard a Philippine ship, you can be charged in
a Philippine court because that is part of our territory. Relate that with Criminal Law
• Innocent Passage, defined
• Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State.
• Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping and
anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are
 rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of rendering
assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.
• 3) Contiguous zone (adjacent) – the waters not exceeding 24 miles from the base line.
State exercises control to prevent and punish breach of customs, immigration and
sanitary laws.
• Discussion:
• • Territorial sea - from the baseline to the first 12 nautical miles
• Contiguous zone - the next 12 nautical miles from the territorial sea
4) Exclusive economic zone – the waters within 200 miles from the baseline. State can
explore, manage and exploit living and non-living resources. [freedom of navigation, right of
over-flight]
What can we do in EEZ? It is exclusive, the state can explore, manage and exploit living and
non-living resources. It is not part of the territory. The contiguous zone is not part of the territory,
with more reason that the EEZ is not part of the territory but we are allowed to exploit living and
non-living resources.
• 5) Continental Shelf – the sea bed and subsoil, which extends throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the extent of 350 miles or to within 200 miles if the
natural prolongation does not go beyond. State can explore and exploit living and non-
living resources.
• How do you distinguish EEZ from Continental Shelf?
• The continental shelf pertains to the seabed and subsoil, but EEZ pertains to the waters
within 200 nautical miles. Continental shelf is the underwater portion. The area is also a
bit different. In all cases, the EEZ cannot go beyond 200 nautical miles while the
Continental Shelf can go beyond 200 nautical miles depending on the natural
prolongation of the submarine areas. The point is if the prolongation falls down
immediately, the continental shelf will still extend up to 200 miles, never less than 200
miles. If the prolongation extends, it can go as far as 350 miles but not more.
Sometimes, there’s a problem when the Continental Shelf overlaps with the other
countries that’s why we enter into agreements to define the limits.
• 6) High Seas – It is beyond the EEZ. It belongs to all mankind. No can exercise
exclusive right to exploit.
• The same thing by the way, in Continental shelf, you can explore and exploit living and
non-living resources, but a little bit larger and also this is the underwater portion unlike
the EEZ.
• REPUBLIC v. PROVINCE OF PALAWAN, G.R. No. 170867, December 4, 2018
• Facts: The Republic of the entered into Service Contract with Shell Philippines
Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, Inc., for the exclusive conduct of petroleum
operations in the area known as "Camago- Malampaya" located about 80 kilometers
offshore northwest of Palawan.
 • The Provincial Government of Palawan asserted its claim over forty percent (40%) of the
National Government's share in the proceeds of the project. It argued that since the
reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said share under
Section 290 of the Local Government Code.
• Issue: Is the Province of Palawan correct? -NO.
• Held: An LGU cannot claim territorial jurisdiction over an area simply because its
government has exercised a certain degree of authority over it. “Territory" has
reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the
political unit exercises control.
• Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law that creates
it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but by physical
boundaries as fixed in its charter. If the marginal sea is not included in the LGU's
territory, with more reason should the continental shelf, located miles further, be
deemed excluded therefrom.
• The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not, by the doctrine of
incorporation or transformation, apply to the LGU. Thus, utilization of natural resources
found outside the land area as delimited by law is not subject to the 40% LGU share.
Bar Question 1989, No. 20. What do you understand by the archipelagic doctrine? Is this
reflected in the 1987 Constitution?
• Suggested Answer: The ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE emphasizes the unity of land
and waters by defining an archipelago either as a group of islands surrounded by waters
or a body of waters studded with islands. For this purpose, it requires that baselines be
drawn by connecting the appropriate points of the “outermost islands to encircle the
islands within the archipelago. The waters on the landward side of the baselines
regardless of breadth or dimensions are merely internal waters.
• Yes, the archipelagic doctrine is reflected in the 1987 Constitution. Article I, Section 1
provides that the national territory of the Philippines includes the Philippine archipelago,
with all the islands and waters embraced therein; and the waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions,
form part of the internal waters of the Philippines
• Bar Question 2000, No. 19 a): What is the basis of the Philippine’s claim to a part of the
Spratly islands? Discuss briefly.
• Suggested Answer: The basis of the Philippine claim is effective occupation of a
territory not subject to the sovereignty of another state. The Japanese forces occupied
the Spratly Island group during the Second World War. However, under the San
Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 Japan formally renounced all right and claim to the
Spratlys. The San Francisco Treaty or any other International Agreement, however, did
not designate any beneficiary state following the Japanese renunciation of right.
Subsequently, the Spratlys became terra nullius and was occupied by the Philippines in
the title of sovereignty. Philippine sovereignty was displayed by open and public
occupation of a number of islands by stationing of military forces, by organizing a local
government unit, and by awarding petroleum drilling rights, among other political and
 administrative acts. In 1978, it confirmed its sovereign title by the promulgation of
Presidential Decree No. 1596, which declared the Kalayaan Island Group part of
Philippine territory.
• Do you consider the Spratlys Group of Islands as part of Philippine Archipelago?
Spratlys Group of Islands is not part of the Philippine Archipelago because it is too far
away from the three main islands of the Philippines. It is found, geographically, almost in
the middle of the South China Sea. It is not part of the Philippine Archipelago.
Historically, when we talk about Philippine Archipelago, we refer to those islands and
waters that were ceded by the Spain to the United States by virtue of Treaty of Paris in
1898. And that did not include the Spratlys Group of Islands yet. Under the treaty, the
islands that were ceded by Spain were identified – the main islands – Luzon, Visayas
and Mindanao. Clearly, it did not include the Spratlys Group of Islands.
• Do you consider the Spratlys group of Islands as part of our National Territory?
Yes. Article I provides: “The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, x xx,
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, x xx.”
The Spratlys Group of Islands falls under the second phrase “and all other territories
over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction”. It is part of our national
territory because Philippines exercise sovereignty (through election of public officials)
over Spratlys Group of Islands.
• Bar Question 2000, No. 19 c.) Enumerate the rights of a coastal state in the Exclusive
Economic Zone.
• Suggested Answer: The UNCLOS provides that in the exclusive economic zone, the
coastal State shall have the:
1. sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing
the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds;
2. jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
3. i. the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
ii. marine scientific research;
iii. the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
4. other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
• Bar Question 2015, No. 2: Describe the following maritime regimes under UNCLOS
(4%)
• Suggested answer:
• a. Territorial sea
• According to UNCLOS, the territorial sea can be defined as the area which extends up to
12 nautical miles from the baseline of a country’s coastal state. The territorial sea is
under the jurisdiction of that particular country;
• however, foreign ships (both merchant and military) ships are allowed passage through
it.
• This type of passage of territorial passage of foreign ships is known as an innocent
passage. However, the right to the innocent passage can be suspended if there is a
threat to the security of the coastal state.
• The coastal state can also exercise jurisdiction if:
1. Any kind of activities in the territorial vessel has consequences extending to the
coastal state
2. There is a threat to the peace of the coastal country
3. There is illicit traffic or smuggling of drug
• b. Contiguous zone
• The contiguous zone can be defined as the belt which extends 12 nautical miles beyond
the territorial sea limit.
• A coastal state’s control on this area is limited to prevention of actions which can infringe
its customs, fiscal, and immigration laws. It can also act if any activity in the contiguous
zone threatens regulations in the territorial sea.
• It is possible that vessels carrying noxious dangerous substances or waste may be
turned away on public health or environmental grounds.
• c. Exclusive Economic Zone
• The exclusive economic zone can be defined as a belt of water which extends up to 200
nautical miles from the baseline of the coastal state. Thus it includes both territorial sea
and contiguous zone.
• The exclusive economic zone provides the coastal state control over all economic
resources such as fishing, mining, oil exploration, and marine research.
• The coastal state also has jurisdiction regarding protection and preservation of natural
resources and marine environment.
• d. Continental shelf
• The continental shelf can be defined as the area whose outer limit shall not exceed 350
nautical miles from the baseline or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2500
meters isobaths.
• The coastal state has exclusive rights for exploring and exploiting its natural resources in
this area. The state also has the exclusive rights to authorize and regulate drilling on the
shelf for all purposes.
• Baseline – is a line from which the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone
and the exclusive economic zone is measured in order to determine the maritime
boundary of the coastal state.
 • Types of baseline:
a) Normal Baseline Method
• b) Straight Baseline method – Imaginary straight lines are drawn joining the outermost
points of outermost islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which
should not be more than 9:1 (water to land); provided that the drawing of baselines shall
not depart, to any appreciable extent, from the general configuration of the archipelago.
The waters within the baselines shall be considered internal waters, while the breadth of
the territorial sea shall then be measured from the baselines.
• 2016, No. -XVII-
• [b] Section 2 of RA 9522 declared the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough
Shoal as "Regimes of Islands." Professor Agaton contends that since the law did not
enclose said islands, then the Philippines lost its sovereignty and jurisdiction over them.
Is his contention correct? Explain. (2.5%) [See Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476
(2011)
• Magallona vs Ermita,GR no. 187167; August 16, 2011,En Banc; Carpio, J
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to
draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG,
"weakens our territorial claim" over that area. Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough
Shoal’s) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000
square nautical miles of territorial waters," prejudicing the ivelihood of subsistence fishermen. A
comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the
extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA
9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS
III, belie this view.
• The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA
9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the
length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS III’s limitation on the maximum
length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This
undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA
9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that
baselines are relevant for this purpose.
• Petitioners’ assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters"
under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by
optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space
(covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216
square nautical miles xxx xxx
 • Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because
the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself.
Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
• SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands"
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
• a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
• b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have
committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires
that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length
of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total
number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
• Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the
Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago,33 such
that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably
"depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
• The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-
• Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the
Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our
baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The
drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago." So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga
islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin
although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is
defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang
maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is
Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin
ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila
magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied) XXXXXXXXX
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal,
Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "‘Regime[s] of Islands’
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121"36 of UNCLOS III manifests the
Philippine State’s responsible observance of itspacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS
III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water at high tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
"regime of islands," whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
• Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446,
which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial
sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of
the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
• Can the President allow Chinese fishermen to fish within the EEZ, particularly the
Recto Bank?
• Art. XII, Sec. 2: The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
• NO