International and European Security

Law
A call for a Change

Prof. Laura Íñigo Álvarez

Ana Filipa Ferreira Novo | 9582

Reform. What does this mean? When I think about this expression, I immediately think
about change, regardless of its context. However, when we talk about the Reform of the
United Nations Security Council, we must be especially careful, since we are bringing a
topic of intense debate and discussion among member states, which involves global
security challenges. This is a broader term that includes more than normative,
institutional and bureaucratic change. It is about reshaping the decision-making
processes, in this case, of the Security Council, to promote not only greater competency,
and efficiency, but also transparency and accountability, two words very important for the
UN Secretary-General, António Guterres.1

United Nations was charged with the courageous mission to bring stability to a climate of
political and social chaos, after the most destructive global conflict in history. To achieve
international peace and security, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, the United
States, and the Republic of China were granted not only “permanent seats”, but also
individual veto power over any proposed action, which means they have “the right to
oppose any decision or proposal to settle a certain dispute without mentioning a reason”2.
This implies that even if supported by the majority of member states, they can block any
decision solely based on their interests.
The UN Charter establishes the UNSC as an ‘international watchdog’, which means that
the Five Permanent members are seen as guarantors of global peace.
Almost sixty years ago, it started to be discussed the expansion of the Council, in order
to maintain its legitimacy and efficacy. Nevertheless, since the addition of four more
members in 1965, no further changes have been made, due to the fact that changes to the
Council’s membership require two-thirds agreement in the General Assembly, along with
ratification by two-thirds of member states, including the five permanent members of the
Security Council.
I believe it is important to go back to the 1965 expansion to get some inspiration as we
discuss this reform. This historical amendment demonstrates that a “well-organized bloc
of developing countries can press UNSC reform over the reservations of Permanent
members”, giving us hope for the future. 3

1) Is it possible to reconcile the notion of egalitarianism among UN member

states established in the UN Charter with the privileged role of the 5 permanent
members of the Security Council?

Embodying international cooperation, UN aspire a world where all member states stand
on equal ground. However, this principle of egalitarianism faces a significant hurdle, in
the form of five permanent members of the Security Council. This discrepancy exposes a
fundamental inconsistency between the UN Charter’s professed ideals and the structure
of the UNSC.
The UN Charter, adopted in 1945, guarantees the principle of sovereign equality among
all member states. It emphasizes voluntary association, respect for national sovereignty
and equal participation in the UN decision-making processes.

1
“Transparency and accountability are probably the two most important demands.” – explained António
Guterres, when asked about the future of the UN “The Economist Asks” podcast
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l73yTLza95s.
2
Medhat, Ahmad and Medhat, Ahmad, A Critical Analysis to the United Nations' Performance in the light
of Contemporary Global Challenges (April 1, 2020).
3
McDonald, K., & Patrick, S. (2010, Dec).UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests, page 35.
Balancing the egalitarian principle with the hierarquical reality of global power is often
seen as one of the UN’s main strengths: while the Security Council is responsible to adopt
resolutions that are binding on UN member states, ensuring international peace and
security, the General Assembly serves as a forum where all the member states are given
equal voice and equal rights. However, the existence of the five permanent members with
veto power creates an exceptional form of immunity that functions as a privilege rather
than a mechanism for accountability.

Richard Butler’s statement “there clearly were Five who were vastly more equal than their
equals”4 finds wide support. This interesting affirmation could have served as the perfect
sentence to begin this discussion, illustrating the challenge of reconciling the dominance
of the Big Five and their privileged status with the principle of equal representation for
other member states.
Trying to smooth over this discrepancy involves realizing whether these are two
completely different and incompatible realities or whether, on the other hand, they have
points where they can converge. The problem is that this special status granted to the
permanent members, also known as the P5, can be seen as contradicting the egalitarian
principle among states for many critics, since it reduces Security Council’s effectiveness
and legitimacy, by potentially undermining the majority of member states’ collective will
through the abuse of veto power.
These two notions didn’t need to be exactly incompatible if the power given to the P5
was justified and correspondent to their responsibilities and accountability. As Kishor
Mahbubani, the Permanent Representative of Singapore to the UN when Singapore
served on the Council in 2001-02 said: “the P5 have been given power without
responsibility; the E10 have been given responsibility without power.”

The veto power, initially designed to promote global balance of power and to avoid
unilateral decisions, became a tool for the P5 to promote their national interests, as well
as their ally’s interest, which translates in the Council’s inability to resolve conflicts. More
than perpetuating conflict, the fact that the veto power is not subject to any form of
accountability not only leads to decisions that are not in the best interest of the global
community, but also contributes to block reform process, which has a high threshold for
approval. The abuse of the veto power is evident when it results in selective intervention
by the Security Council, as some conflicts may be addressed while others are neglected
due to the strategic interest of the veto-wielding powers. This imbalance of power is
clearly not aligned with principles of fairness, neither does it fulfil the UN’s mandate to
maintain international peace and security through inclusivity.

The fact that permanent members are unlikely to approve amendments that would dilute
their own power, the so called ‘lock-in effect’, puts in evidence the difficulty to reform
the veto system, which has a “cascade effect” (page 31): humanitarian efforts, such as
sanctions or military interventions, intended to alleviate suffering in conflict zones,
become more susceptible to disruption.
If the P5 retain their autonomy, while “weaker” states have to comply with UN directives,
it is almost impossible to reconcile these two notions.

2) Do you agree with the proposals to reform the Security Council offered by the

4
Butler, R. (2012). Reform of the United Nations Security Council. The Penn State Journal of Law &
International Affairs, page 29.
 author? Would you suggest any other type of reforms?

The UNSC aspires to be a forum where the “great Powers” – the most influential nations
on the global stage – collaborate to maintain global security. However, the composition
of the Permanent members is a relic of the past. Therefore, three main issues were
identified by the Ambassador Richard Butler to reform the United Nations Security
Council: i) the constituency of the Security Council and its way to ensure that a diverse
range of voices and perspectives are included in decision-making process; ii) the
decision-making methodology, which includes distinguishing between substantive and
procedural matters, considering the role of veto power in Council decisions; and the iii)
role of permanent members, addressing concerns related to their dominance, in order to
promote greater equity and accountability within the Security Council.

i) The first proposal concerning the representativeness of the Security Council engenders
a debate surrounding its potential enlargement, resulting in many different opinions
among member countries. While some advocate for expanded membership to rectify
historical injustices and reflect current geopolitical realities, others argue that expansion
could hinder decision-making and consensus building.
The UN’s permanent members no longer accurately represent the world’s key populations
as they once did in the colonial era –rising powers like India and Brazil, and regions like
Africa and Latin America are still absent from the permanent table.
Shouldn’t the Security Council truly represent the actual great powers if it is to serve as
a forum for these competitive nations? We can’t forget that any amendment to the Charter
require approval by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, including the consent
of the P5, which makes substantial reforms challenging to achieve, since it would mean
new entrants with similar privileges.

Supporting Ambassador Richard Butler’s perspective, I would add that establishing a

criteria for membership is imperative. While factors such as military power, financial
contributions, stability and legitimacy are crucial and have been considered, the definition
of a “Great Power” eligible for Security Council membership remains not that clear today.
Countries like Germany, despite their economic prowess, lack significant military
capabilities to project power and contribute effectively to collective security efforts.
Similarly, Brazil and other Latin American powers face questions regarding their military
capacities and stability, raising doubts about their suitability for Security Council
membership. This separation of economic and military power, largely facilitated by the
US security guarantee system, creates another difficulty in defining “Great Power” status.
Also, the concept of regional representation, often emphasized by the UN system,
introduces additional complexities. Besides promoting stability, by ensuring that diverse
geographical perspectives are considered, powerful regional actors can be viewed with
suspicion by their neighbors, which raises a question, perhaps difficult to solve. What is
“representation” if a permanent seat on the UNSC translates to dominance rather than
collaboration?

ii) and iii) I agree with Butler’s perspective, when he points out that the failure of one
permanent member to agree to a substantive proposition should not automatically block
that proposition. Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, permanent members of the Security
Council can vote against any non-procedural draft resolution, regardless of worldwide
support or popularity. Ahmad Kamal (2013), former Pakistani Ambassador to the UN,
said that “in a democracy no one can be more equal than the others”, naming the veto
‘anachronistic’ and ‘undemocratic’.
Requiring the consensus of two or three permanent members to negate a proposition, to
avoid that a single permanent member unilaterally veto substantive propositions is giving
one step forward to combat the potential misuse of the veto power.
Other possible solution that could be proposed is to evaluate the weight of non-permanent
members’ votes in the face of veto actions by permanent members, meaning that if a
substantial majority of non-permanent members, such as 70% or 80%, support a draft
resolution, their collective vote would have the power to override any veto issued by one
or two permanent members.
From my perspective, this mechanism is crucial to rebalance the influence between
permanent and non-permanent members, giving voice to the latter in the decision-making
process of the council. At least, it could encourage the P5 to consider the broader
perspective of the international community, having in mind the importance to combine a
shared leadership with a rising powers vision.
Empowering the General Assembly to balance the authority of the Security Council could
also serve as a promising strategy to address concerns regarding power concentration and
conflicting interests. With all UN members represented, the General Assembly serves as
a democratic forum for inclusive decision-making between the organization.

Ambassador Richard Butler’s proposal to establish a Council on Weapons of Mass

Destruction is not only very intriguing but also very compelling, since he suggests a fresh
approach and a new way of thinking about such a delicate and special matter.
Nuclear weapons are the greatest threat to the world security and their continued existence
undermines efforts to prevent further proliferation. The responsibility for nuclear
disarmament lies primarily with the five legally recognized nuclear-weapon states,
emphasizing the need for them to fulfill their obligations under the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty. The existence of these nuclear weapons creates insecurity and
increases the risk of accidental or deliberate detonation.
Disarmament is not only a Nuclear Weapons States responsibility, but it is also a
commitment from the Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Since the first ones have continuously
failed to meet their obligations, weakening their credibility, and creating animosity
among Non-Nuclear Weapon States, some countries can start interpreting this inertia as
a green flag for their own nuclear ambitions.
Therefore, an establishment of an International Council on weapons of Mass Destruction
to oversee compliance with nonproliferation agreements seems crucial to overcome
political inertia to achieve genuine cooperation between States.
This example illustrates how extremely important is to Ambassador Butler to establish a
more stringent threshold for the use of the veto, as it has been giving an unilateral power
to the P5, allowing them to protect their own nuclear arsenals while preventing action
against proliferators. I would say that he is trying to call us for the need of a change of
mindset, advocating for a collective commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons that
is much more than just a diplomatic exercise, but a moral imperative.

I find the final proposal, a “Modest Proposal”, as Butler terms it, both smart and bold.
Firstly, because I believe that the point that Ambassador Richard is trying to evidence is
clear: sometimes, significant changes result from seemingly small adjustments.
In this instance, we are discussing the United States role on the Security Council and how
it may have become outdated, since its political actions aren’t pleasing any country
anymore.
A lot has evolved since 1946. Back then, France and Britain controlled much of the
territory in Africa and Asia through colonial subjugation. Additionally, the P5 enjoyed a
monopoly on nuclear weapons, during the Cold War, a scenario that no longer exists
today. What remains is an increasingly outdated power structure that lacks diversity –
geographically, ethnically, or religiously – and thus fails to represent the world as it stands
today. Back then, there were 51 States. Today, there are 193. The original ratio was one
permanent member for 10 countries. Today, it is one permanent member for nearly 40
countries.

It is undeniable the power that United States and China still have nowadays, remaining
the top two economies, which explains why Butler only considers the abolition of the
veto and mentions it as a moderated approach.
Nevertheless, even if change is desirable, I wonder whether the United States can strip
away their egos to lead the effort and effectuate it in such a complex diplomatic world we
live in.
President Obama’s announcement in November 2010 of U.S., supporting a permanent
UNSC seat for India, reveals a potential and a crucial initial move, that more than
enhancing the long-term effectiveness of the UNSC, could serve as a strategic maneuver
for the United States to safeguard their interests. By suggesting a concrete criteria aligned
with obligations and responsibilities for the new members, United States could secure the
opportunity to shape and lead discussions, instead of being dragged by other member
states. Given the historical behaviors of China and Russia since 1965 and in recent years,
the United States hold a significant influence in establishing constructive dialogue and
achieving consensus on UNSC enlargement. Such a proposition would not only benefit
them, but also the Security Council as an unified entity.
That explains why I find Ambassador Richard Butler’s proposal on this matter both
creative and very smart, albeit somewhat ambitious. It is true that some argue that this
enlargement could happen without the USA leadership, but at the same time others
believe that they are capable to build a criteria-based approach, which could “galvanize
movement for constructive reform while placing the onus on leading aspirants to prove
their bona fides”5.

3) Considering current geostrategic divisions, to what extent do you think the

Council’s authority and credibility is severely undermined? Please, offer
examples.

The Council’s ability to take decisive action has been hindered by geostrategic divisions
among permanent members. In the case of the Syrian Civil War, the UNSC’s inability
to take decisive action can be attributed to the veto powers exercised by the permanent
members like Russia. The veto power wielded by these members has led to a deadlock
in the Council, preventing the adoption of resolutions that could potentially address the
conflict, humanitarian crises, and hold perpetrators of atrocities accountable.
Similarly, in the context of the Darfur Genocide, China’s use of the veto power to shield
Sudan has impeded the UNSC from effectively responding to mass atrocities and
ensuring accountability for those responsible.
On the other hand, nowadays, it is almost inevitable to think about Russia’s repeated use
of veto power to block resolutions on conflicts in Crimea and Ukraine, undermining the
Council’s ability to address this crisis.

5
McDonald, K., & Patrick, S. (2010, Dec).UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S. Interests, page 24.
This misuse of the veto power combined with selective enforcement of resolutions based
on political interest has delayed the Council’s ability to fulfill its mandate of maintaining
international peace and security, weakening its credibility. 6

As mentioned before, the position of the primary guardians of world order can be
questioned nowadays. The Council's diminishing authority and credibility is becoming
more and more evident. Equitable geographic representation is one of the main issues
that can be easily pointed out. Western Countries dominate the Council, while Africa
and Latin America are absent from its permanent membership. This is particularly
concerning given that many UN peace operations are deployed in sub-Saharan Africa,
where there is no representation. So, here lies the challenge: how can we effectively
address matters of war and peace for these countries without their input?
If we want to have a paradigm shift in this direction, to embrace regional representation,
we must think beyond safeguarding international peace. Reviewing the European
membership on the Security Council, combining the seats currently held by Great
Britain and France into a single seat, and potentially including Germany, could also be
a viable position.

Despite the Charter not mentioning geographic representation as a criteria for permanent
membership, when it provides ten additional seats elected for two-year terms, it means
that those elected seats have been chosen according to regional blocs. 7 Because this
tacit solution is still not enough according to Richard Butler’s point of view, he proposes
a division in nine electoral regions, where each one of them can choose a Permanent
Member.
In my opinion, this could be an easy way to solve many problems, regarding the
emergency of new powers with the deep-rooted problem of lack of representation of
some regions. If we are lucky to have a breakpoint here, it would mean that we could
expect a power transaction, with new crucial managers. This transition would also
transform regional leaders into “responsible” global actors. On the other hand, if each
‘regional bloc’ designates a permanent seat, as suggested by Butler, many problems
could rise from it. Unpredictable choices of members can lead to other type of conflicts
between States, compromising not only its relationships, but also the harmonization of
the Security Council. On the one hand we have Brazil, India, Japan and Germany, but
on the other side we have Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan and South Korea. As we
can imagine, lots of disputes and rivalries could arise over the allocation of the
permanent seat, due to ideological affinities or regional interests. For example, Germany,
would probably tend to align with the U.S. and France, while Brazil is frequently not in
accordance with the U.S. Additionally, if member states are worried with internal
disputes over permanent seat allocation, they may be less inclined to cooperate on
critical global issues. Furthermore, the selection process for these permanent seats could
also become politicized, leading to accusations of favoritism, bias or unfairness.

A failure to reform the composition of the UNSC it is very plausible for all we have been
mentioning: multilateral security cooperation can be jeopardized and potential member
states can reduce their investments and commitment. However, I think this is only a
temporary status, a part of any breakthrough to achieve something better, even if
imperfect at first glance. May this serve as a call for a change!

6
.Blank, R., Laurie, Collective Security, International Conflict and Security Law, 2023.
7
As Article 23 of the UN Charter points out as a secondary criteria: “...equitable geographic distribution”.
References:

Butler, R. (2012). Reform of the United Nations Security Council. The Penn State Journal
of Law & International Affairs

Blank, R., Laurie, Collective Security, International Conflict and Security Law, 2023.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2012). Chapter 2: World Opinion on International

Institutions. In Public Opinion on Global Issues: A Web-based Digest of Polling from
Around the World.

McDonald, K., & Patrick, S. (2010, Dec). UN Security Council Enlargement and U.S.
Interests.

Kelly, Michael J., United Nations Security Council Permanent Membership and the Veto
Problem (December 31, 2019). Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol.
52, No. 1, 2019.

Chetail, Vincent, The Reform of the United Nations after the 2005 World Summit (July
19, 2006). Relations Internationales, No. 128, pp. 79-92, 2006.

Anderson, Kenneth, United Nations Collective Security and the United States Security
Guarantee in an Age of Rising Multipolarity: The Security Council as the Talking Shop
of the Nations (June 18, 2009). Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1,
2009, American University, WCL Research Paper No. 2009-19