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Detailed Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Chapter 1. Introduction to Victimology
Chapter 2. Extent, Theories, and Factors of Victimization
Chapter 3. Consequences of Victimization
Chapter 4. Recurring Victimization
Chapter 5. Victims’ Rights and Remedies
Chapter 6. Homicide Victimization
Chapter 7. Sexual Victimization
Chapter 8. Intimate Partner Violence
Chapter 9. Victimization at the Beginning and End of Life: Child and Elder Abuse
Chapter 10. Victimization at School and Work
Chapter 11. Property and Identity Theft Victimization
Chapter 12. Victimization of Special Populations
Chapter 13. Victimology From a Comparative Perspective
Chapter 14. Contemporary Issues in Victimology: Victims of Hate Crimes, Human
Trafficking, and Terrorism
Glossary
References
Index
About the Author

8
Preface

Although offender behavior and the impacts of crime have long been studied, how
victimization shapes the lives of victims was not similarly studied until recently. Now,
policymakers, practitioners, academics, and activists alike have recognized the importance
of studying the other half of the crime–victim dyad. Indeed, it is an exciting time to study
victimology—an academic field that is growing rapidly. Hence, this text fills a void in what
is currently available in the market. This is a text that includes brief chapters covering the
essentials on victimology. Moreover, it uses a consistent framework throughout to orient
the reader, while addressing the latest topics within the field of victimology.

I have attempted to incorporate a general framework in each chapter—one that examines

the causes and consequences of specific types of victimization and the responses to them.
My intent was to create a comprehensive yet accessible work that examines many types of
victimization from a common framework so that similarities and differences can be easily
identified.

Within this framework, I pay particular attention to identifying the characteristics of

victims and incidents so that theory can be applied to understanding why some people are
victims while others remain unscathed. Although the earliest forays into the study of
victimology were focused on identifying victim typologies, theory development in this field
has lagged behind that in criminology. Aside from routine activities and lifestyles theory,
there are few theories that explicitly identify causes of victimization. This is not to say that
the field of victimology is devoid of theory—it is just that the theories that have been
applied to victimization are largely derived from other fields of study. I have included a
chapter that discusses these theories. Furthermore, in each chapter about a specific type of
victimization, I have identified the causes and how theory may apply. Knowing this is a
critical first step in preventing victimization and revictimization.

I also wanted to include throughout the text emerging issues in the field of victimology. To
this end, each chapter discusses current issues germane to its particular topic and the latest
research. For example, same-sex intimate partner violence is covered in depth, as are
cyberbullying, identity theft victimization, and the offender–victim overlap. Other chapters
wholly address contemporary issues. Specifically, there is a chapter devoted to victims of
terrorism, hate crime, and human trafficking; one to recurring victimization; and one to
victims who suffer from mental illness, victims who are incarcerated, and victims who have
disabilities. I believe that the inclusion of the latest issues within the field of victimology
will expose the reader to the topics likely to garner the most attention in the years to come.

This text covers these topics without the “padding” often found in existing texts. As such,
the book is appropriate for undergraduate students as a primary text and for graduate

9
students as a supplement and resource or as a primary text. Given its short length, it will
pair nicely with other supplemental readings and should work for classes taught at
accelerated paces (e.g., some online courses, on quarters). The book is appropriate for
classes within criminal justice and criminology programs (e.g., victimology, crime victims,
gender, and crime) but is also relevant for women’s studies, social work, psychology, and
sociology courses.

The book contains 14 chapters that were selected because they address the topics typically
covered in victimology courses. These chapters are

Introduction to Victimology
Extent, Theories, and Factors of Victimization
Consequences of Victimization
Recurring Victimization
Victims’ Rights and Remedies
Homicide Victimization
Sexual Victimization
Intimate Partner Violence
Victimization at the Beginning and End of Life: Child and Elder Abuse
Victimization at School and Work
Property and Identity Theft Victimization
Victimization of Special Populations
Victimology From a Comparative Perspective
Contemporary Issues in Victimology: Victims of Hate Crimes, Human Trafficking,
and Terrorism

The text also includes a range of features to aid both professors and students:

Each chapter is summarized in bullet points.

Almost every chapter includes a Focus on Research box.
Discussion questions are included at the end of each chapter.
A list of key terms is included at the end of each chapter.
Internet resources relevant for each chapter are provided.
The book has a glossary of key terms.

10
New to This Edition
Two new chapters: New chapters on Homicide Victimization (Chapter 6) and
Victimology From a Comparative Perspective (Chapter 13) have been added.
Focus on Research: A new boxed feature has been added that highlights the connection
and impact research has had in the field of victimology.
Updated victims’ rights information: Sections have been added on the right to
protection, rights related to evidence and legislation related to evidence, the
reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (2013), Justice for Victims of
Trafficking Act of 2015, and the latest on victim compensation.
Updated statistics: The latest data on victimization and types of victimization from
NCVS and UCR are used throughout the chapters, as well as current data on human
trafficking, theft, household burglary, motor vehicle theft, identity theft, victims of
hate crime, victimization of persons with disabilities and of those who are
incarcerated, and victims of terrorism.
New data sources: Information on the Crime in England and Wales Survey and Data,
National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, and the AAU Campus
Climate Survey on Sexual Assault and Sexual Misconduct has been included.
New and expanded topics: The text examines victimization and recurring victimization
and its link to mental illness; risk factors for sexual victimization, such as individual
factors and reasons people engage in risky lifestyles; victimization and mental illness
research outside of the United States; importation and deprivation as explanations of
victimization of prisoners; institutional factors related to victimization of prisoners;
and the connection between immigration and victimization.
Newest theoretical developments regarding recurring victimization: Topics such as
compounding vulnerability, victimization salience, and negative state dependence are
explored along with latest research.

11
Digital Resources
study.sagepub.com/daigle2e

Calling all instructors!

It’s easy to log on to SAGE’s password-protected Instructor Teaching Site for complete and
protected access to all text-specific Instructor Resources. Simply provide your institutional
information for verification and within 72 hours you’ll be able to use your login
information for any SAGE title! Password-protected Instructor Resources include the
following:

Test banks provide a diverse range of pre-written options as well as the opportunity
to edit any question and/or insert personalized questions to effectively assess students’
progress and understanding.
Editable, chapter-specific PowerPoint slides offer complete flexibility for creating a
multimedia presentation for the course.
EXCLUSIVE! Access to full-text SAGE journal articles have been carefully selected
to support and expand on the concepts presented in each chapter to encourage
students to think critically.
Video and multimedia resources have been chosen that appeal to students with
different learning styles.

12
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editorial and production staff at SAGE Publishing for their
assistance. Jerry Westby worked closely with me on the first edition of this text, and helped
shepherd me toward revising my work. I miss working with you, Jerry, but hope that you
are enjoying your retirement! The team at SAGE has provided valuable assistance, though,
and I thank them for their help and feedback. Jessica Miller has been especially kind, and
her editorial assistant, Jennifer Rubio, deserves a special thanks for her positive attitude and
for keeping me on task! Thanks also to Diane DiMura for her copyediting work and to
Amy Lammers, Jillian Oelsen, and Christina Fohl for their work marketing the book.

I owe a great debt to a number of students at Georgia State who assisted me in various ways
—Ali Metalwala and Jane Daquin, who helped update statistics, and Sarah Napper, who
worked to update references. Also thanks to Lisa Muftić, whose work on Victimology was
used in several sections with her permission for this text.

And to my husband, Taylor Anderson, your ability to make me laugh no matter the
circumstance, and your constant love and support mean the world to me. I love you.

A number of scholars provided wonderful feedback that improved this book for the new
edition. I cannot thank them enough for the time and effort they put into providing such
detailed and invaluable reviews. Along with SAGE Publishing, I wish to thank these
reviewers:

Reviewers for the second edition:

Tracy G. Crump, Ph.D., J.D.

Chicago State University
Edna Erez
University of Illinois at Chicago
Iryna Malendevych
University of Central Florida
Laura A. Patterson, Ph.D.
Shippensburg University
Chad Posick
Georgia Southern University
Michael S. Proctor
Texas A&M University—San Antonio
Melissa J. Tetzlaff-Bemiller
University of Memphis

13
Reviewers for the first edition:

Dorinda Dowis
Columbus State University
Kate Fox
Arizona State University
Susan Miller
University of Delaware
Karla Pope
Mississippi Gulf Coast College/University of Southern Mississippi
Lindsey Vigesaa
Nova Southeastern University
Jeff Walsh
Illinois State University
Mary West-Smith
University of Northern Colorado

Portions of Chapter 4 are based on Daigle, L. E., & Fisher, B. S. (2013). The recurrence of
victimization: What researchers know about its terminology, characteristics, causes, and
prevention. In R. C. Davis, A. J. Lurigio, & S. Herman (Eds.), Victims of crime (3rd ed.).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

14
Chapter 1 Introduction to Victimology

Leah E. Daigle

15
What Is Victimology?
The term victimology is not new. In fact, Benjamin Mendelsohn first used it in 1947 to
describe the scientific study of crime victims. Victimology is often considered a subfield of
criminology, and the two fields do share much in common. Just as criminology is the study
of criminals—what they do, why they do it, and how the criminal justice system responds
to them—victimology is the study of victims. Victimology, then, is the study of the
etiology (or causes) of victimization, its consequences, how the criminal justice system
accommodates and assists victims, and how other elements of society, such as the media,
deal with crime victims. Victimology is a science; victimologists use the scientific method to
answer questions about victims. For example, instead of simply wondering or hypothesizing
why younger people are more likely to be victims than are older people, victimologists
conduct research to attempt to identify the reasons why younger people seem more
vulnerable.

16
The History of Victimology: Before the Victims’ Rights
Movement
As previously mentioned, the term victimology was coined in the mid-1900s. Crime was, of
course, occurring prior to this time; thus, people were being victimized long before the
scientific study of crime victims began. Even though they were not scientifically studied,
victims were recognized as being harmed by crime, and their role in the criminal justice
process has evolved over time.

Before and throughout the Middle Ages (about the 5th through the 16th century), the
burden of the justice system, informal as it was, fell on the victim. When a person or
property was harmed, it was up to the victim and the victim’s family to seek justice. This
was typically achieved via retaliation. The justice system operated under the principle of lex
talionis, an eye for an eye. A criminal would be punished because he or she deserved it, and
the punishment would be equal to the harm caused. Punishment based on these notions is
consistent with retribution. During this time, a crime was considered a harm against the
victim, not the state. The concepts of restitution and retribution governed action against
criminals. Criminals were expected to pay back the victim through restitution. During this
time, a criminal who stole a person’s cow likely would have to compensate the owner (the
victim) by returning the stolen cow and also giving him or her another one.

Early criminal codes incorporated these principles. The Code of Hammurabi was the basis
for order and certainty in Babylon. In the code, restoration of equity between the offender
and victim was stressed. Notice that the early response to crime centered on the victim, not
the state. This focus on the victim continued until the Industrial Revolution, when
criminal law shifted to considering crimes violations against the state rather than the victim.
Once the victim ceased to be seen as the entity harmed by the crime, the victim became
secondary. Although this shift most certainly benefited the state—by allowing it to collect
fines and monies from these newly defined harms—the victim did not fare as well. Instead
of being the focus, the crime victim was effectively excluded from the formal aspects of the
justice system.

Since then, this state-centered system has largely remained in place, but attention—at least
from researchers and activists—returned to the crime victim during the 1940s. Beginning
in this period, concern was shown for the crime victim, but this concern was not entirely
sympathetic. Instead, scholars and others became preoccupied with how the crime victim
contributes to his or her own victimization. Scholarly work during this period focused not
on the needs of crime victims but on identifying to what extent victims could be held
responsible for being victimized. In this way, the damage that offenders cause was ignored.
Instead, the ideas of victim precipitation, victim facilitation, and victim provocation
emerged.

17
The Role of the Victim in Crime: Victim Precipitation,
Victim Facilitation, and Victim Provocation
Although the field of victimology has largely moved away from simply investigating how
much a victim contributes to his or her own victimization, the first forays into the study of
crime victims were centered on such investigations. In this way, the first studies of crime
victims did not portray victims as innocents who were wronged at the hands of an offender.
Rather, concepts such as victim precipitation, victim facilitation, and victim provocation
developed from these investigations. Victim precipitation is defined as the extent to which
a victim is responsible for his or her own victimization. The concept of victim precipitation
is rooted in the notion that, although some victims are not at all responsible for their
victimization, other victims are. In this way, victim precipitation acknowledges that crime
victimization involves at least two people—an offender and a victim—and that both parties
are acting and often reacting before, during, and after the incident. Identifying victim
precipitation does not necessarily lead to negative outcomes. It is problematic, however,
when it is used to blame the victim while ignoring the offender’s role.

Photo 1.1 A person left his keys in his car while he went shopping. By doing so, the person
inadvertently made it easier for an offender to steal his car, thus facilitating his
victimization.

© iStockphoto.com/Toa55

Similar to victim precipitation is the concept of victim facilitation. Victim facilitation

occurs when a victim unintentionally makes it easier for an offender to commit a crime. A
victim may, in this way, be a catalyst for victimization. A woman who accidentally left her
purse in plain view in her office while she went to the restroom and then had it stolen
would be a victim who facilitated her own victimization. This woman is not blameworthy
—the offender should not steal, regardless of whether the purse is in plain view. But the
victim’s actions certainly made her a likely target and made it easy for the offender to steal

18
her purse. Unlike precipitation, facilitation helps understand why one person may be
victimized over another but does not connote blame and responsibility.

Contrast victim facilitation with victim provocation. Victim provocation occurs when a
person does something that incites another person to commit an illegal act. Provocation
suggests that without the victim’s behavior, the crime would not have occurred.
Provocation, then, most certainly connotes blame. In fact, the offender is not at all
responsible. An example of victim provocation would be if a person attempted to mug a
man who was walking home from work and the man, instead of willingly giving the
offender his wallet, pulled out a gun and shot the mugger. The offender in this scenario
ultimately is a victim, but he would not have been shot if not for attempting to mug the
shooter. The distinctions between victim precipitation, facilitation, and provocation, as you
probably noticed, are not always clear-cut. These terms were developed, described, studied,
and used in somewhat different ways in the mid-1900s by several scholars.

Hans von Hentig

In his book The Criminal and His Victim: Studies in the Sociobiology of Crime, Hans von
Hentig (1948) recognized the importance of investigating what factors underpin why
certain people are victims, just as criminology attempts to identify those factors that
produce criminality. He determined that some of the same characteristics that produce
crime also produce victimization. We return to this link between victims and offenders in
Chapter 2, but for now, recognize that one of the first discussions of criminal victimization
connected it to offending.

In studying victimization, then, von Hentig looked at the criminal-victim dyad, thus
recognizing the importance of considering the victim and the criminal not in isolation but
together. He attempted to identify the characteristics of a victim that may effectively serve
to increase victimization risk. He considered that victims may provoke victimization—
acting as agent provocateurs—based on their characteristics. He argued that crime victims
could be placed into one of 13 categories based on their propensity for victimization: (1)
young; (2) females; (3) old; (4) immigrants; (5) depressed; (6) mentally defective/deranged;
(7) the acquisitive; (8) dull normals; (9) minorities; (10) wanton; (11) the lonesome and
heartbroken; (12) tormentor; and (13) the blocked, exempted, and fighting. All these
victims are targeted and contribute to their own victimization because of their
characteristics. For example, the young, the old, and females may be victimized because of
their ignorance or risk taking, or may be taken advantage of, such as when women are
sexually assaulted. Immigrants, minorities, and dull normals are likely to be victimized due
to their social status and inability to activate assistance in the community. The mentally
defective or deranged may be victimized because they do not recognize or appropriately
respond to threats in the environment. Those who are depressed, acquisitive, wanton,
lonesome, or heartbroken may place themselves in situations in which they do not

19
recognize danger because of their mental state, their sadness over a lost relationship, their
desire for companionship, or their greed. Tormentors are people who provoke their own
victimization via violence and aggression toward others. Finally, the blocked, exempted,
and fighting victims are those who are enmeshed in poor decisions and unable to defend
themselves or seek assistance if victimized. An example of such a victim is a person who is
blackmailed because of his behavior, which places him in a precarious situation if he reports
the blackmail to the police (Dupont-Morales, 2009).

Benjamin Mendelsohn
Known as the father of victimology, Benjamin Mendelsohn coined the term for this area
of study in the mid-1940s. As an attorney, he became interested in the relationship between
the victim and the criminal as he conducted interviews with victims and witnesses and
realized that victims and offenders often knew each other and had some kind of existing
relationship. He then created a classification of victims based on their culpability, or the
degree of the victim’s blame. His classification entailed the following:

1. Completely innocent victim: a victim who bears no responsibility at all for

victimization; victimized simply because of his or her nature, such as being a child
2. Victim with minor guilt: a victim who is victimized due to ignorance; a victim who
inadvertently places himself or herself in harm’s way
3. Victim as guilty as offender/voluntary victim: a victim who bears as much responsibility
as the offender; a person who, for example, enters into a suicide pact
4. Victim more guilty than offender: a victim who instigates or provokes his or her own
victimization
5. Most guilty victim: a victim who is victimized during the perpetration of a crime or as
a result of crime
6. Simulating or imaginary victim: a victim who is not victimized at all but, instead,
fabricates a victimization event

Mendelsohn’s classification emphasized degrees of culpability, recognizing that some

victims bear no responsibility for their victimization, whereas others, based on their
behaviors or actions, do.

Stephen Schafer
One of the earliest victimologists, Stephen Schafer (1968) wrote The Victim and His
Criminal: A Study in Functional Responsibility. Much like von Hentig and Mendelsohn,
Schafer also proposed a victim typology. Using both social characteristics and behaviors, his
typology places victims in groups based on how responsible they are for their own
victimization. In this way, it includes facets of von Hentig’s typology based on personal
characteristics and Mendelsohn’s typology rooted in behavior. He argued that people have a

20
functional responsibility not to provoke others into victimizing or harming them and that
they also should actively attempt to prevent that from occurring. He identified seven
categories and labeled their levels of responsibility as follows:

1. Unrelated victims—no responsibility

2. Provocative victims—share responsibility
3. Precipitative victims—some degree of responsibility
4. Biologically weak victims—no responsibility
5. Socially weak victims—no responsibility
6. Self-victimizing—total responsibility
7. Political victims—no responsibility

Marvin Wolfgang
The first person to empirically investigate victim precipitation was Marvin Wolfgang
(1957) in his classic study of homicides occurring in Philadelphia from 1948 to 1952. He
examined some 558 homicides to see to what extent victims precipitated their own deaths.
In those instances in which the victim was the direct, positive precipitator in the homicide,
Wolfgang labeled the incident as victim precipitated. For example, the victim in such an
incident would be the first to brandish or use a weapon, the first to strike a blow, and the
first to initiate physical violence. He found that 26% of all homicides in Philadelphia
during this period were victim precipitated.

Beyond simply identifying the extent to which homicides were victim precipitated,
Wolfgang also identified those factors that were common in such homicides. He
determined that often in this kind of homicide, the victim and the offender knew each
other. He also found that most victim-precipitated homicides involved male offenders and
male victims and that the victim was likely to have a history of violent offending himself.
Alcohol was also likely to play a role in victim-precipitated homicides, which makes sense,
especially considering that Wolfgang determined these homicides often started as minor
altercations that escalated to murder.

Photo 1.2 Marvin Wolfgang studied homicides in Philadelphia and found that about a
quarter were victim precipitated. He has been recognized as one of the most influential
criminologists in the English-speaking world (Kaufman, 1998).

21
Almanac, University of Pennsylvania

Since Wolfgang’s study of victim-precipitated homicide, others have expanded his

definition to include felony-related homicide and subintentional homicide. Subintentional
homicide occurs when the victim facilitates his or her own demise by using poor judgment,
placing himself or herself at risk, living a risky lifestyle, or using alcohol or drugs. Perhaps
not surprising, a study of subintentional homicide found that as many as three-fourths of
victims were subintentional (N. H. Allen, 1980).

Menachem Amir
The crime of rape is not immune from victim-blaming today, and it certainly has not been
in the past either. Menachem Amir, a student of Wolfgang’s, conducted an empirical
investigation into rape incidents reported to the police. Like Wolfgang, he conducted his
study using data from Philadelphia, although he examined rapes that occurred from 1958
to 1960. He examined the extent to which victims precipitated their own rapes and
identified common attributes of victim-precipitated rape. Amir labeled almost 1 in 5 rapes

22
as victim precipitated. He found that these rapes were likely to involve alcohol and that the
victim was likely to engage in seductive behavior, wear revealing clothing, use risqué
language, and have a bad reputation. What Amir also determined was that it is the
offender’s interpretation of actions that is important, rather than what the victim actually
does. The offender may view the victim—her actions, words, and clothing—as going
against what he considers appropriate female behavior. In this way, the victim may be
viewed as being “bad” in terms of how women should behave sexually. He may then choose
to rape her because of his misguided view of how women should act, because he thinks she
deserves it, or because he thinks she has it coming to her. Amir’s study was quite
controversial—it was attacked for blaming victims, namely women, for their own
victimization. As you will learn in Chapter 7, rape and sexual assault victims today still
must overcome this view that women (because such victims are usually female) are largely
responsible for their own victimization.

23
Focus on Research
Even though the first study examining victim precipitation and homicide was published in 1957, this
phenomenon is being examined in contemporary times as well. In recent research examining 895 homicides
that occurred in Dallas, Texas, Lisa Muftić and Donald Hunt (2013) found that 48.9% (n = 438) were
victim precipitated. They further found that homicides in which the victim had a previous history of
offending were more likely to be victim precipitated than homicides in which the victim had no such
history.

Source: Muftić, L. R., & Hunt, D. E. (2013). Victim precipitation: Further understanding the linkage
between victimization and offending in homicide. Homicide Studies, 17, 239–254.

24
The History of Victimology: The Victims’ Rights Movement
Beyond the attention victims began to get based on how much they contributed to their
own victimization, researchers and social organizations started to pay attention to victims
and their plight during the mid-1900s. This marked a shift in how victims were viewed not
only by the public but also by the criminal justice system. As noted, scholars began to
examine the role of the victim in criminal events, but more sympathetic attention was also
given to crime victims, largely as an outgrowth of other social movements.

During the 1960s, concern about crime was growing. This period saw a large increase in
the amount of crime occurring in the United States. As crime rates soared, so too did the
number of people directly and indirectly harmed by crime. In 1966, in response to the
growing crime problem, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice was formed. One of the commission’s responsibilities was to
conduct the first ever government-sponsored victimization survey, called the National
Crime Survey (which later became the National Crime Victimization Survey). This survey
is discussed in depth in Chapter 2. Importantly, it showed that although official crime rates
were on the rise, they paled in comparison with the amount of victimization uncovered.
This discrepancy was found because official data sources of crime rates are based on those
crimes reported or otherwise made known to the police, whereas the National Crime
Survey relied on victims to recall their own experiences. Further, victims were asked in the
survey whether they reported their victimization to the police and, if not, why they chose
not to report. For the first time, a picture of victimization emerged, and this picture was far
different than previously depicted. Victimization was more extensive than originally
thought, and the reluctance of victims to report was discovered. This initial data collection
effort did not occur in a vacuum. Instead, several social movements were under way that
further moved crime victims into the collective American consciousness.

The Women’s Movement

One of the most influential movements for victims was the women’s movement. In
recognition that victimizations such as sexual assault and domestic violence were a by-
product of sexism, traditional sex roles, emphasis on traditional family values, and
economic subjugation of women, the women’s movement took on as part of its mission
helping female victims of crime. Feminists were, in part, concerned with how female
victims were treated by the criminal justice system and pushed for victims of rape and
domestic violence to receive special care and services. As a result, domestic violence shelters
and rape crisis centers started appearing in the 1970s. Closely connected to the women’s
movement was the push toward giving children rights. Not before viewed as crime victims,
children were also identified as being in need of services, for they could be victims of child
abuse, could become runaways, and could be victimized in much the same ways as older

25
people. The effects of victimization on children were, at this time, of particular concern.

Three critical developments arose from the recognition of women and children as victims
and from the opening of victims’ services devoted specifically to them. First, the movement
brought awareness that victimization often entails emotional and mental harm, even in the
absence of physical injury. To address this harm, counseling for victims was advocated.
Second, the criminal justice system was no longer relied on to provide victims with
assistance in rebuilding their lives, thus additional victimization by the criminal justice
system could be lessened or avoided altogether. Third, because these shelters and centers
relied largely on volunteers, services were able to run and stay open even without significant
budgetary support (M. A. Young & Stein, 2004).

The Civil Rights Movement

Also integral to the development of victims’ rights was the civil rights movement. This
movement advocated against racism and discrimination, noting that all Americans have
rights protected by the U.S. Constitution. The civil rights movement, as it created
awareness of the mistreatment of minorities, served as a backdrop for the victims’ rights
movement in that it identified how minorities were mistreated by the criminal justice
system, both as offenders and victims. The ideologies of the women’s movement and the
civil rights movement merged to create a victims’ rights movement largely supported by
females, minorities, and young persons who pushed forward a victims’ agenda that
concentrated on making procedural changes in the operation of the criminal justice system
(Smith, Sloan, & Ward, 1990).

26
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 [2718] Cic. Imp. Pomp. 15. 44; Livy, ep. xcix; Eutrop. vi. 12.
[2719] Plut. Pomp. 26; Dio Cass, xxxvi. 37. 1; Cic. Imp. Pomp.
19. 57 f.
[2720] Sall. Hist. v. 13; cf. Klebs, in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-
Encycl. i. 256.
[2721] Cf. Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, ii. 76. Another
comitial act on foreign affairs was the plebiscite of unknown
authorship providing for a commission of ten to aid Lucullus in
settling the affairs of Asia; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 43. 2.
[2722] Ascon, p. 64 ff.; Dio Cass. xxxvi. 42. 1-3.
[2723] Cic. Frag. A. vii (Cornel. i). 3.
[2724] Cic. Mur. 23. 47.
[2725] Ascon. 65 f. The Cn. Manlius mentioned by Ascon. 45 f.
is probably to be identified with this Manilius; Drumann-Gröbe,
Gesch. Roms, iii. 19, n. 9.
[2726] XXXVI. 42. 3.
[2727] Ascon. 66, or more simply the “lex de imperio Cn.
Pompeii”; Cic. Imp. Pomp. Inscr.
[2728] Dio Cass. xxxvi. 42.4; Plut. Pomp. 30; Lucull. 35; App.
Mithr. 97; Livy, ep. c; Vell. ii. 33. 1; Eutrop. vi. 12.
[2729] Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 219; Willems, Sén. Rom. ii. 586 f.
[2730] Cic. Imp. Pomp. 17. 51 ff.; 20. 59 ff.; Plut. Pomp. 30.
[2731] Dio Cass. xxxvi. 43. 2, and especially Cicero’s oration
De imperio Pompeii ad quirites. Long, Rom. Rep. iii. 131 f.,
severely criticises Dio Cassius for his treatment of Cicero’s
motives.
[2732] P. 354.
[2733] P. 370.
[2734] P. 397; Cic. Off. iii. 11. 47; Brut. 16. 63; Balb. 21. 48; 23.
52; 24. 54; Arch. 5. 10; Leg. Agr. i. 4. 13; Ascon. 67; Schol. Bob.
296, 354; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 9. 5; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 229;
Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 140.
[2735] Gell. i. 12. 11 f.; Suet. Aug. 31; Lange, ibid. ii. 675 f.; iii.
229; Wissowa, Relig. u. Kult. d. Röm. 439.
[2736] P. 391.
 [2737] P. 416. On the lex Atia, see Dio Cass. xxxvii. 37. 1;
Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 243. This act had no effect on the supreme
pontificate, which had remained elective (p. 416 above) and
which was conferred on Caesar soon after (Drumann-Gröbe,
Gesch. Roms, iii. 155 f.) the enactment of the Atian law; Dio
Cass. ibid.; Suet. Caes. 13; Vell. ii. 43. 3. The same Atius,
together with T. Ampius Balbus, a colleague, proposed and
carried a plebiscite for granting to Pompey the privilege of
wearing the triumphal ornaments in the Circensian games and the
toga praetexta and laurel (or golden?) crown at the theatres; Vell.
ii. 40. 4; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 21. 3 f.
[2738] Cic. Leg. Agr. iii. 2. 4.
[2739] Ibid. i. 2. 4; ii. 5. 13.
[2740] Ibid. ii. 7. 16-8; 8. 21.
[2741] Ibid. ii. 13. 34; 24. 64.
[2742] Ibid. ii. 9. 24.
[2743] Ibid. i. 5. 15; ii. 13. 33; 27. 72.
[2744] From (1) an extensive sale of houses, lands, and other
property belonging to the state (ibid. i. 1. 3; 3. 10; ii. 14. 35; 15.
38). (2) vectigalia (i. 4. 10; ii. 21. 56), and (3) other public moneys
(i. 4. 12 f.; ii. 22. 59).
[2745] Ibid. ii. 25. 66.
[2746] Ibid. i. 5. 16 f.; ii. 13. 34; 20. 55; 24. 63; 25. 66; 26. 68;
27. 74 f.
[2747] These are the second and third Orations on the Agrarian
Law, the first having been delivered in the senate. On the purpose
of the rogation, see Neumann, Gesch. Roms, ii. 223 ff.; Drumann-
Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 143; Ferrero, Rome, i. 231-3.
[2748] P. 431.
[2749] Cic. Mur. 32. 67.
[2750] Cic. Vat. 15. 37; p. 359 above.
[2751] CIL. i². p. 156.
[2752] Cic. Mur. 2. 3; 3. 5; 23. 47; 32. 67; Schol. Bob. 269, 309,
324, 362.
[2753] Cic. Mur. 23. 47.
 [2754] Cic. Vat. 15. 37; Sest. 64. 133 (cf. Har. Resp. 26. 56);
Schol. Bob. 309.
[2755] Cic. Mur. 23. 47; 41. 89; Planc. 34. 83; Schol. Bob. 269,
362; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 29. 1.
[2756] Cic. Mur. 23. 47. On the law in general, see Lange,
Röm. Alt. iii. 245; Hartmann, in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encycl. i.
1801.
[2757] Cic. Leg. Agr. ii. 9. 24, proves that no such law existed at
the beginning of 63, and in 62 its existence is assumed by the
Caecilian rogation for dispensing Pompey from its provisions;
Schol. Bob. 302.
In 61 M. Aufidius Lurco, tribune of the plebs, attempted a
curious modification of the statute concerning corruption at
elections, proposing that promises of money to the tribes should
not be binding, but that a candidate who actually paid should be
liable for life to a payment—apparently annual—of three thousand
sesterces to the tribe. His measure failed to become a law; Cic.
Att. i. 16. 12 f.; 18. 3; Hartmann, ibid. i. 1802.
[2758] Cic. Fam. xi. 1. 2; Att. ii. 18. 3.
[2759] Cic. Leg. iii. 8. 18.
[2760] Cic. Fam. xii. 21.
[2761] Cic. Leg. Agr. i. 3. 8; 17. 45; Flacc. 34. 86.
[2762] Cic. Leg. iii. 8. 18.
[2763] Cic. Flacc. 34. 86; Fam. xii. 21; Att. ii. 18. 3; xv. ii. 4;
Suet. Tib. 31; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 244.
Several unpassed bills of the year 63 are mentioned. (1) The
rogation of L. Caecilius, tribune of the plebs, for lightening the
penalty upon P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla, who had
been condemned for ambitus; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 25. 3; Cic. Sull.
22 f.; cf. Leg. Agr. ii. 3. 8; 4. 10.—(2) A proposal to restore to the
children of those whom Sulla had proscribed the right to become
candidates for offices; Dio Cass. ibid.; Plut. Cic. 12; Cic. Att. ii. 1.
3.—(3) A proposal for the cancellation of debts and (4) another for
the allotment of lands in Italy. All these measures were quashed
by Cicero; Dio Cass. ibid. § 3 f.
[2764] Suet. Caes. 28. 3; Plut. Cat. Min. 17.
 [2765] Schol. Bob. 310. These same magistrates established a
penalty for violations of the lex Caecilia Didia (Cic. Phil. v. 3. 8),
whether by the law above mentioned or a separate enactment
cannot be determined.
[2766] Val. Max ii. 8. 1. In 62 falls the unpassed bill of Q.
Caecilius Metellus Nepos, tribune of the plebs (cf. p. 437, n. 1),
directing Pompey to come to the defence of Italy against Catiline;
Dio Cass. xxxvii. 43; Schol. Bob. 302. In the following year (61)
the consuls, M. Pupius Piso and M. Valerius Messala, proposed a
resolution for the appointment of a special commission to try
Clodius on charge of having intruded in a religious festival
exclusively for women; Cic. Att. i. 13. 3; Mil. 5. 13; 22. 59; 27. 73;
Ascon. 53; Suet. Caes. 6; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 46. The bill provided
that the jurors should not be drawn by lot in the usual way but
appointed by the praetor; Cic. Att. i. 14. 1. It was withdrawn in
favor of the plebiscite de religione for the same purpose but more
favorable to the accused, presented by Q. Fufius Calenus, and
accepted by the tribes; Cic. Att. i. 16. 2; Parad. iv. 2. 31; Plut.
Caes. 10; Mommsen, Röm. Strafr. 198 f.
[2767] Dio Cass. xxxvii. 51. 3; Cic. Att. ii. 16. I; Q. Fr. i. 1. 11.
33; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 274. These taxes were made
unnecessary by Pompey’s acquisitions in the East.
[2768] Cic. Att. i. 18. 6; 19. 4; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 50; Plut. Cat.
Min. 31.
[2769] P. 162.
[2770] P. 386.
[2771] Dio Cass. xxxviii. 1. 4. On the later inclusion of this
territory, see p. 440 below.
[2772] Suet. Caes. 20.
[2773] Cic. Fam. xiii. 4. 2.
[2774] Dio Cass. xxxviii. 1. 4 f.; Cic. Dom. 9. 23.
[2775] Dio Cass. xxxviii. 1. 3; App. B. C. ii. 10. 35; Plut. Cat.
Min. 31; Pomp. 47; Cic. 26.
[2776] App. B. C. iii. 2. 5; 7. 24.
[2777] Varro, R. R. i. 2. 10; Cic. Att. ii. 6. 2; 7. 3; ix. 2 a. 1; Vell.
ii. 45. 2; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 1. 6 f.; Suet. Aug. 4.
[2778] Dio Cass. ibid.
 [2779] CIL. vi. 3826 (Elogium of M. Valerius Messala, consul in
61); Cic. Att. ii. 7. 4; Prov. Cons. 17. 41.
[2780] Röm. Staatsr. ii. 628, n. 4.
[2781] Dio Cass. xxxviii. 2.
[2782] Ibid. 3 f.; Plut. Caes. 14; App. B. C. ii. 10.
[2783] Dio Cass. xxxviii. 6. 1.
[2784] P. 116.
[2785] The assembly met in the Forum, and was therefore
tribal; Suet. Caes. 20; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 6. 2; Plut. Cat. Min. 32.
[2786] Cic. Att. ii. 18. 2: “Ut ex legibus Iuliis” seems to be official
language. The explanation of Marquardt, Röm. Staatsv. i. 114 f.,
which identifies one of the Julian laws with the lex Mamilia,
Roscia, etc., is not satisfactory, though accepted by Drumann-
Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 182. A plurality is also mentioned by
Livy, ep. ciii; Schol. Bob. 302; Plut. Pomp. 47 f.; Caes. 14; App. B.
C. ii. 10-2.
[2787] Att. ii. 18. 2.
[2788] Att. ii. 3. 3 (Dec. 60); 6. 2; 7. 3.
[2789] Att. ii. 16. 1.
[2790] XXXVIII. 1. 4; 7. 3.
[2791] Cat. Min. 31, 33.
[2792] Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 279-88, maintains that there were
two agrarian laws; cf. Ferrero, Rome, i. 287-91. The opposite
view is held by Marquardt, Röm. Staatsv. i. 114 f.; Drumann-
Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 182.
[2793] Dio Cass. xxxviii. 7. 3; Cat. Min. 33; Suet. Caes. 20; Vell.
ii. 44. 4. Whereas Cicero was of the opinion that this district could
provide not more than five thousand with lots of ten iugera,
Suetonius and Velleius state that twenty thousand were settled in
it. Some Campanian land remained undivided in 51; Cic. Fam.
viii. 10. 4. Many settlements under the Julian law are mentioned
in the liber coloniarum, in Gromat. 210, 220, 231, 235, 239, 259,
260.
It was in accord with Caesar’s policy of colonization and of the
extension of the franchise that P. Vatinius, tribune of the plebs in
this year, carried a law for sending five thousand new settlers to
Comum, a Latin colony in northern Italy. Some of the new
residents he honored with the citizenship; Strabo v. 16; Suet.
Caes. 28; App. B. C. ii. 26. 98; Plut. Caes. 29; Cic. Att. v. 11. 2;
Fam. xiii. 35. 1. The franchise was afterward withdrawn by a
decree of the senate; Suet. and Plut. ibid.
[2794] Dio Cassius, xxxviii. 7. 1 f. (cf. Schol. Bob. 302; App. B.
C. ii. 12. 42), is probably wrong in saying that death was the
penalty for refusal to swear. Cicero (Sest. 28. 61) and Plutarch
(Cat. Min. 32) speak simply of heavy penalties.
[2795] Cic. Att. ii. 18. 2. The provision regarding the oath was
not introduced till it was found that the senate opposed.
Supplementary to these Julian laws is the lex Mamilia Roscia
Peducaea Alliena Fabia, three articles of which are contained in
Gromat. 263-6; Bruns, Font. Iur. 96-8; Girard, Textes, 69 f. Other
references to a lex Mamilia are Gromat. 11. 5; 12. 12; 37. 24; 144.
19; 169. 7; Cic. Leg. i. 21. 55. The last proves it to have been
passed before 51. The seeming citation of the third article as an
agrarian law of Gaius Caesar by Dig. xlvii. 21. 3, may indicate
merely a borrowing of this article from the earlier law of Caesar,
just as article 2 is substantially repeated in Lex Col. Genet. 104.
Mommsen, in Röm. Feldmess. ii. 221-6; Röm. Staatsr. ii. 628, n.
4, considers it the work of a second sub-committee (Vviri) of the
vigintiviri provided for by the agrarian law, enacted to furnish rules
for the administration of the latter. Lange (Röm. Alt. ii. 690; iii.
288) and more decidedly Willems (Sén. Rom. i. 498, n. 5) prefer
to regard it as a tribunician law and to assign it to 55.
[2796] Cf. Polyb. vi. 17. 5; p. 345 above.
[2797] Suet. Caes. 20; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 7. 4; App. B. C. ii. 13.
48; Cic. Att. ii. 16. 2; Schol. Bob. 259, 261.
[2798] Cic. Fam. viii. 8. 3.
[2799] Pompey in his second consulship, 55, attempted in vain
to displace it by a still severer measure; p. 448.
[2800] Cic. Att. v. 10. 2; 16. 3.
[2801] Cic. Pis. 16. 37; 21. 49 f.; 37. 90; Dom. 9. 23; Prov.
Cons. 4. 7.
[2802] Cic. Pis. 37. 90.
[2803] Cic. Att. vi. 7. 2; Fam. ii. 17. 2, 4; v. 20. 2, 7; Pis. 25. 61;
cf. Plut. Cat. Min. 38; Dio Cass. xxxix. 23. 3.
 [2804] Dig. xlviii. 11.
[2805] Cic. Rab. Post. 4. 8 f.; 11. 30.
[2806] Suet. Caes. 43; Otho, 2; Tac. Hist. i. 77; Paul. Sent. v.
28.
[2807] Vat. 12. 29. See further on the law, Sest. 64. 135; Schol.
Bob. 310, 321; Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 195-7; Lange,
Röm. Alt. iii. 292; Mommsen, Röm. Strafr. 709; Greenidge, Leg.
Proced. 427, 483, 485.
[2808] Ci. Vat. ii. 27; Planc. 15. 36; Schol. Bob. 235, 321, 323.
“It is indifferently described as a method of challenging alternate
benches (consilia) and alternate iudices”; Greenidge, Leg.
Proced. 451. It seems to have permitted the rejection not simply
of individual jurors as heretofore, but of an entire panel; Drumann-
Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 197.
[2809] Dio Cass, xxxviii. 8. 1; Schol. Bob. 235.
[2810] Pliny, N. H. xxxiii. 10. 136; Joseph. Ant. Iud. xiv. 34 f.
[2811] Cic. Att. ii. 16. 2.
[2812] Caes. B. C. iii. 107. 6; Suet. Caes. 54; Dio Cass, xxxix.
12. 1; Cic. Rab. Post. 3. 6.
[2813] Dio Cass, xxxviii. 7. 5; App. B. C. ii. 13. 46; Plut. Lucull.
42; Pomp. 48; Vell. ii. 44. 2; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 289; Drumann-
Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 194. Several other laws on foreign
affairs, having especial reference to treaties, were proposed and
carried by P. Vatinius, tribune of the plebs in this year, acting
probably as Caesar’s instrument; Cic. Vat. 12. 29; Fam. i. 9. 7;
Att. ii. 9. 1.
[2814] P. 163.
[2815] Dio Cass. xxxviii. 8. 5; Suet. Caes. 22; Cic. Sest. 64.
135; Vat. 15. 35 f.; Prov. Cons. 15. 36; Caes. B. G. ii. 35. 2; iii. 7.
1; v. 1. 5.
[2816] Caes. B. G. i. 10.
[2817] Caes. B. G. i. 21.
[2818] Suet. Caes. 22; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 8. 5; Plut. Caes. 14;
Pomp. 48; Crass. 14; Cat. Min. 33. The resolutions of people and
senate are combined by App. B. C. ii. 13. 49; Vell. ii. 44. 5; Zon. x.
6; cf. Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 198 f.
 [2819] Cf. Ferrero, Rome, i. 290.
[2820] Drumann-Gröbe, ibid.
[2821] On the consulship of Caesar see further Long, Rom.
Rep. III. ch. xix; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 278-96; Herzog, Röm.
Staatsverf. i. 550-3; Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 177 ff.;
the histories of Mommsen, Peter, Ferrero, etc., and the various
biographies of Caesar.
[2822] Cic. Sest. 25. 55; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 13. 1; Ascon. 9;
Schol. Bob. 300 ff.
[2823] Six and a third asses to the modius; p. 372. The
frumentarian law of Appuleius Saturninus for lowering the price to
five-sixths of an as had been annulled (p. 395 f.), and the law in
force in 82, whether the Sempronian or the Octavian, was
repealed by Sulla (p. 422). Lepidus, consul in 78, carried a law for
the distribution of five modii of grain to the citizen, at what price
and at what interval is not stated (p. 423, n. 8). There was also a
lex frumentaria of the consuls of 73, C. Cassius Varus and M.
Terentius Varro (Cic. Verr. iii. 70. 163; v. 21. 52; cf. Sall. Hist. iii.
48. 19). It must have restored, or maintained, the Sempronian
price, which according to the sources was displaced by the
Clodian provision for free grain. Probably by an article of this law,
rather than by a new enactment, Sex. Clodius, a dependent of the
tribune, was given charge of the distribution; Cic. Dom. 10. 25.
See further Humbert, in Daremberg et Saglio, Dict. ii. 1346 f.
[2824] Cic. Sest. 25. 55.
[2825] Cic. ibid.; Red. in Sen. 13. 33; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 13. 1 f.;
Plut. Cic. 30.
[2826] Cic. Pis. 4. 9; Sest. 25. 55; Ascon. 9, 67; Dio Cass.
xxxviii. 13. 2; Liebenam, Röm. Vereinswes. 21; Waltzing, Corp.
prof. i. 92.
[2827] Cf. Ferrero, Rome, i. 300.
[2828] P. 117.
[2829] Cic. Sest. 15. 33; p. 471.
[2830] Ascon. 9: Dio Cass. xxxviii. 13. 2; Schol. Bob. 300; cf.
Cic. Pis. 4. 9; Sest. 25. 55.
[2831] Suet. Dom. 9. 3: Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 308.
 [2832] Vell. ii. 45. 1; Livy, ep. ciii; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 14. 4; Plut.
Cic. 30; cf. Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, ii. 208 f.
[2833] P. 371.
[2834] We hear many echoes of this theory in the speeches of
Cicero which refer to the Catilinarian conspiracy; cf. Cat. ii. 2. 3;
8. 17; iv. 5. 10 (admitted by C. Caesar); 7. 15; 10. 22.
[2835] This act accorded with earlier usage; p. 249, 267, 395.
On the original rogation of Clodius concerning the exile of Cicero
and its amendment, see Gurlitt, in Philol. N. F. xiii (1900). 578-83;
Sternkopf, ibid. 272-304; xv (1902). 42-70. See also Mommsen,
Röm. Strafr. 970, n. 2, 978, n. 1.
The remaining Clodian laws may pass with briefer mention: (1)
A plebiscite which converted the kingdom of Cyprus into a
province, confiscated the property of the reigning king, and
commissioned Cato to bring the treasury of the latter to Rome;
Livy, ep. civ; Cic. Dom. 8. 20; Sest. 26. 57; 27. 59; Schol. Bob.
301 f.; Dio Cass. xxxviii. 30. 5; App. B. C. ii. 85 f.—(2) The
plebiscite de inuriis publicis, the terms of which are not known;
Cic. Dom. 30. 81.—(3) The plebiscite which transferred the title of
king and the priesthood of the Great Mother at Pessinus from
Deiotarus to his son-in-law Brogitarus; Cic. Sest. 26. 56; Har.
Resp. 13. 28 f.; 27. 59; Dom. 50. 129; Q. Fr. ii. 7. 2; Lange, Röm.
Alt. iii. 308; Niese, in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encycl. iv. 2401-4.—
(4) The plebiscite de provinciis and (5) de permutatione
provinciarum, which assigned to the outgoing consuls of the year
provinces according to their desires; Cic. Sest. 25. 55; Dom. 9. 23
f.; 26. 70; Prov. Cons. 2. 3; Plut. Cic. 30; (Aurel. Vict.) Vir. Ill. 81.
4. There were, too, several unpassed rogations. In general on
Clodius and his legislation, see Lange, ibid. 296 ff.; Long, Rom.
Rep. III. ch. xxi; Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, ii. 202 ff.;
Fröhlich, in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encycl. iv. 82-8; White, Cicero,
Clodius, and Milo, 16 ff.
[2836] Cic. Dom. 33. 90; Pis. 15. 35 f.; Red. in Sen. 11. 27; p.
127 above. Among the tribunician rogations for the purpose,
preceding the enactment of the centuriate law, were the Ninnia
(Dio Cass. xxxviii. 30. 4; Cic. Sest. 31. 68), the Messia (Cic. Red.
in Sen. 8. 21), that of eight tribunes (Cic. Sest. 33. 72; Pis. 15. 35;
Fam. i. 9. 16), and the Fabricia (Cic. Red. in Sen. 8. 22; Mil. 14.
38). The last was proposed early in 57; the others near the end of
58.
 [2837] Cic. Att. iv. 1. 7; Livy, ep. civ; Dio Cass. xxxix. 9. 2 f.;
Plut. Pomp. 49; App. B. C. ii. 18. 67.
In 56 a rogation of C. Porcius Cato, tribune of the plebs, for
abrogating the proconsular imperium of P. Cornelius Lentulus
failed to become a law (Cic. Q. Fr. ii. 3. 1; Fam. 1. 5 a. 2); also the
rogation of his colleague L. Caninius for commissioning Pompey
with pretorian power for the purpose of restoring Ptolemy, the
exiled king of Egypt, to his throne; Dio Cass. xxxix. 12 ff.; Cic. Q.
Fr. ii. 2. 3; Plut. Pomp. 49.
[2838] An interregnum was forced in order to secure a more
favorable chairman for the elections than were the consuls of 56.
[2839] Plut. Caes. 21; Pomp. 51; Crass. 14; Cat. Min. 41; App.
B. C. ii. 17. 62 f. The postponement of the comitia was effected by
C. Porcius Cato (Dio Cass. xxxix. 27. 3; Livy, ep. cv; Cic. Q. Fr. ii.
4. 6) and a colleague in the tribunate (Cic. Att. iv. 15. 4).
[2840] Cic. Att. iv. 9. 1; Dio Cass. xxxix. 33. 1 f.; Plut. Cat. Min.
43; Crass. 15; Pomp. 52; App. B. C. ii. 18. 65; Livy, ep. cv; Vell. ii.
46. 1 f.; p. 442 above.
[2841] Dio Cass. xxxix. 34 f.; Plut. and Livy, ibid.
[2842] Dio Cass. xxxix. 33. 3 f.
[2843] Dio Cass. xxxix. 37. 1.
[2844] Cic. Planc. 15. 36; 16. 40; 17. 41.
[2845] Ibid. 15. 36 ff.; Schol. Bob. 253 f., 261.
[2846] Cic. Planc. 16. 40; Schol. Bob. 262; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii.
340 f.
[2847] Cic. Att. x. 4. 8; xiii. 49. 1; App. B. C. ii. 23. 87; Dio Cass.
xl. 52. 3; 55. 2; Plut. Cat. Min. 48; Pomp. 55.
[2848] Paul. Sent. v. 24; Dig. xlviii. 9; cf. i. 2. 2. 2. 32, which is
inexact; Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 667.
[2849] Cic. Rab. Post. 6. 13. As the equites did not participate
in the government of Italy and the provinces, they had not been
rendered liable to the earlier leges repetundarum, although it was
possible to bring action against them for corrupt jury service; cf. p.
378, n. 3.
[2850] Dio Cass. xxxix. 37.
 [2851] Cic. Pis. 39. 94; Phil. i. 8. 20; Ascon. 16; Pseud. Sall.
Rep. Ord. ii. 3. 2 f.; cf. 7. 11 f.; 12. 1; cf. Greenidge, Leg. Proced.
448.
[2852] Cic. Mil. 5. 13; 6. 15; 26. 70; 29. 79; Ascon. 31 ff., 37,
40, 53; Schol. Bob. 276; Schol. Gronov. 443; Gell. x. 20.
[2853] Cic. Att. vii. 1. 4; 3. 4; viii. 3. 3; Fam. vi. 6. 5; xvi. 12. 3;
Phil. ii. 10. 24; Suet. Caes. 26; Caes. B. C. i. 32; Dio Cass. xl. 51.
2.
[2854] Dio Cass. xl. 56. 1; Suet. Caes. 28. 3.
[2855] Dio Cass. xl. 46. 2.
[2856] Ibid, and 56. 1; cf. 30. 1.
[2857] P. 381.
[2858] Hirschfeld, in Klio, iv (1904). 76-87; Drumann-Gröbe,
Gesch. Roms, iii. 720 ff.
[2859] It suffices to mention (1) the unpassed bill of C. Lucilius
Hirrus and M. Coelius Vinicianus, 53 (in rivalry with a tribunician
rogation for the establishment of tribuni militum consulari
potestate), to name Pompey dictator; Cic. Fam. viii. 4. 3; Q. Fr. iii.
8. 4; Plut. Pomp. 54.—(2) The repeal of the Clodian plebiscite of
58 concerning the censorial stigma (p. 445) by a law of Q.
Caecilius Metellus, colleague of Pompey in 52; Dio Cass. xl. 57.
1.—(3) The unpassed bill of the famous P. Clodius, praetor in 52,
concerning the suffrage of the libertini—somewhat similar to the
Manilian law of 67 (p. 433); Ascon. 52; Schol. Bob. 346.—(4)
Possibly a lex Scribonia de usucapione servitutum was the work
of C. Scribonius Curio, tribune in 50, though more probably it
belongs to an earlier date; p. 424, n. 4.—(5) An unpassed
alimentary rogation of the same Scribonius for ordering the
aediles to control the weights and measures of the markets in a
way to give justice to the poor; Cic. Fam. viii. 6. 5; App. B. C. ii.
27. 102.—(6) Another unpassed Scribonian bill for limiting the
travelling expenses of senators; Cic. Att. vi. 1. 25.—(7) An
unpassed Scribonian bill concerning the Campanian land; Cic.
Fam. viii. 10. 4.—(8) An unpassed Scribonian rogatio viaria, like
the agrarian rogation of Servilius Rullus (p. 435); Cic. Fam. viii. 6.
5.—(9) An unpassed Scribonian bill for confiscating the realm of
King Juba; Caes. B. C. ii. 25; Dio Cass. xli. 41. 3. One or two
other unpassed bills of the same tribune are still less important.
 [2860] Dio Cass. xli. 36. 1 f.; Caes. B. C. ii. 21; App. B. C. ii. 48.
196; Plut. Caes. 37.
[2861] Caes. B. C. iii. 2; App. B. C. ii. 48. 196 f.; Plut. Caes. 37.
[2862] Here seems to belong the plebiscite of A. Hirtius
concerning the partisans of Pompey (Cic. Phil. xiii. 16. 32; CIL. i.
p. 627 f.; Willems, Sén. Rom. i. 592), though Mommsen (CIL. l. c.)
assigns it to 46.
[2863] Dio. Cass. xlii. 20.
[2864] Ibid. 21. That his appointment was for an indefinite time,
not for a year as Dio Cassius, ibid. 20, states, is proved by CIL. i.²
p. 28, 41. He held the office till news of the victory at Thapsus
reached Rome.
[2865] Dio Cass. xlii. 20.
[2866] Dio Cass. xliii. 14; cf. Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii.
48 f.
[2867] Dio Cassius, xliii. 42-6, describes them at great length,
whereas Suetonius, Caes. 76, is content with a brief enumeration.
[2868] Dio Cass. xliii. 44; CIL. ix. 2563; cf. Mommsen, Röm.
Staatsr. ii. 767, n. 1.
[2869] The right to the consulship was granted according to Dio
Cassius, xliii. 45. 1 (προεχειρίσαντο), by a vote of the people. In
general it is impossible to determine which senatus consulta for
conferring these and future honors were ratified by the comitia.
The perpetual dictatorship was assumed February, 44; Drumann-
Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 739.
[2870] Dio Cass. xliv. 5. 3.
[2871] Ibid. 7. 3; Suet. Caes. 52. 3. Two laws of the consul M.
Antonius were also enacted in his honor, the first changing the
name of the month Quinctilis to Julius (Macrob. Sat. i. 12. 34), the
second dedicating to Caesar the fifth day of the Roman games
(Cic. Phil. ii. 43. 110).
[2872] Cf. Bondurant, Dec. Jun. Brut. 40.
[2873] Caes. B. C. iii. 1; Cic. Att. vii. 11. 1.
[2874] Caes. B. C. iii. 1; Suet. Caes. 42; Dio Cass. xli. 37 f.;
App. B. C. ii. 48. 198; Plut. Caes. 37. Possibly the lex Iulia de
bonorum cessione (Gaius iii. 78; Theod. Cod. iv. 20; Justin. Cod.
vii. 71. 4) may be identical with this law.
 [2875] Dio Cass. xli. 38. 1 f.; Cic. Att. ix. 9. 4.
[2876] Agitation leading to this measure found expression in a
rogation of M. Caelius Rufus, praetor in 48, for the payment of
debts in six years without interest (Caes. B. C. iii. 20) and
somewhat later in a rogation for an extensive, perhaps complete,
abolition of debts (Caes. B. C. iii. 21; Livy, ep. cxi; Vell. ii. 68. 1 f.;
Dio Cass. xlii. 22-5); in a rogation of P. Cornelius Dolabella,
tribune of the plebs in 47, for the complete abolition of debts (Livy,
ep. cxiii; Plut. Ant. 9; Dio Cass. xlii. 29. 32); and in rogations by
these two officials respectively for the remission of rents (treated
by the sources in connection with their bills on insolvency).
[2877] Suet. Caes. 38; Dio Cass. xlii. 51. 1.
[2878] On the similar measure of Octavianus, see p. 459. See
also Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 694; iii. 435.
[2879] This measure seems to have been brought about by no
law but merely through his censorial power; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii.
448; Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 557.
[2880] A Julian colonial law is mentioned by Lex Col. Genet.
97. The veterans were settled in Italy probably under the agrarian
law of 59; Suet. Caes. 81. 1. The known colonies founded under
the dictatorial law are included in Kornemann’s list, in Pauly-
Wissowa, Real-Encycl. iv. 524 ff.; cf. Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch.
Roms, iii. 604-6. His most famous colonies were Carthage (App.
Lib. 136; Dio Cass. xliii. 50. 3 f.; Plut. Caes. 57; Strabo xvii. 3. 5)
and Corinth (Dio Cass. ibid. § 4; Plut. ibid.; Strabo viii. 6. 3; xvii. 3.
15; Paus. ii. 1. 2; 3. 1). The colonia Genetiva Iulia Urbanorum in
Spain was founded in 44 after the death of Caesar, but iussu C.
Caesaris dict. imp. et lege Antonia senat(us)que c(onsulto)
pl(ebi)que (scito)—by a consular law of Antonius for the founding
of the colony, supplemented by a plebiscite of unknown
authorship.
The inscription known as the lex Coloniae Genetivae Iuliae
(CIL. ii. supplb. 5439; Bruns, Font. Iur. 123-40; Girard, Textes, 87-
103) is a part of the lex data (§ 67), or charter, granted the colony
by its founder. It was called Urbanorum because it was made up
of proletarians from Rome; cf. Kornemann, ibid. 527.
[2881] Suet. Caes. 42. At the same time measures were taken
to prevent those residents of Italy who were liable to military
service from absenting themselves unduly from the country. To
give employment to the poor, the owners of herds were ordered to
make up one-third of their shepherds from freemen; ibid.
[2882] Dio Cass. xli. 18. 2; xliv. 47. 4; Plut. Caes. 37; Suet.
Caes. 41; cf. Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 416.
[2883] Caes. B. C. iii. 1; cf. Suet. Caes. 41.
[2884] Cic. Phil. xii. 4. 10; Tac. Ann. xi. 24; Dio Cass. xli. 36. 3;
cf. xxxvii. 9. 3-5. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. iii. 134; 159, n. 1;
Krüger-Brissaud, Sourc. d. droit Rom. 97, for the authorship of the
law.
The so-called lex Rubria de Gallia Cisalpina (CIL. i. 205 = xi.
1146; Bruns, Font. Iur. 98-102; Girard, Textes, 70-76) seems to be
a lex data, probably of 49 [Mommsen, in Wiener Studien, xxiv
(1902). 238 f.; Ephem. Ep. ix. 1903. p. 4]. As the lex Rubria cited
in § 20 is not this document but an earlier plebiscite, the name of
the author has not been determined. It regulated the
administration of justice in Cisalpina, which remained a province
till 42. The fragment of a law found at Ateste (Bruns, ibid. 102 f.;
Girard, Textes, (76-8) is of the same nature and belongs to the
same period, though probably not to the Rubrian law itself, as
Mommsen (Hermes, xvi. 24-41) once assumed.
[2885] Dio Cass. xli. 24. 1; cf. Livy, ep. cx. The monarchical
quality of his rule shows itself in his bestowal of the citizenship on
individuals at his own pleasure; cf. Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. iii.
134.
In 44 the lex Iulia de Siculis, published by Antonius after the
death of Caesar, gave the full citizenship to the Sicilians, who had
received the Latinitas from Caesar. This law, Antonius asserted,
had been carried through the comitia by the dictator, whereas
Cicero, Att. xiv. 12. 1, states positively that no mention was even
made of such a proposition in the dictator’s lifetime.
[2886] Dio Cass. xlii. 51. 4; Suet. Caes. 41; wrongly
Pomponius, in Dig. i. 2. 2. 2. 32. The two additional aediles
(cereales) were not instituted till 44; Dio Cass. xliii. 51. 3.
[2887] Dio Cass. xlii. 51. 3; cf. Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 437; p. 416
above. The addition of one to the fifteen members of the great
sacerdotal colleges (Dio Cass. ibid.; cf. Cic. Fam. xiii. 68. 2) refers
to his right to commend candidates for supernumerary
membership (Wissowa, in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encycl. ii. 2317),
and hence does not imply a comitial act.
 [2888] Cic. Phil. vii. 6. 16.
[2889] Suet. Caes. 41; cf. Dio Cass. xliii. 51. 3. The pretext was
the impending Parthian war. In 46 he had been given the right to
name all the magistrates but had rejected it; Dio Cass. xliii. 14. 5;
45. 1; 47. 1; cf. Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 612, n. 3.
[2890] Livy, ep. cxvi; Dio Cass. xliv. 10. 1-3; xlvi. 49. 2. In the
following year a tribune was similarly deposed by a plebiscite of P.
Titius, a colleague (Dio Cass. xlvi. 49. 1); and in 43, before the
establishment of the triumvirate, the city praetor was deprived of
his office by his colleagues, probably through a comitial act; App.
B. C. iii. 95. 394 f.; Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. i. 630, n. 4.
[2891] P. 427.
[2892] Suet. Caes. 41; Dio Cass. xliii. 25. 1. Cicero, Phil. i. 8.
19, intimates, without positively stating, that this was a centuriate
law; p. 236 above.
[2893] Cf. Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 455; Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch.
Roms, iii. 558.
[2894] We are informed that he increased the penalties for
crimes, and enacted that a person condemned to exile should
forfeit half his estate, and the murderer of a relative the whole;
Suet. Caes. 42; cf. Dio Cass. xliv. 49. 3.
[2895] Cic. Phil. i. 9. 23.
[2896] The Julian laws on these subjects in the Digesta, xlviii. 4
(de maiestate), 6 f. (de vi) prove by their contents to belong to
Augustus; Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 560. 4; cf. Lange,
Röm. Alt. iii. 455. The leges Iuliae which abolished what remained
of the legis actiones (Gaius iv. 30) are also supposed to belong to
Augustus; Poste, Gaius, 474.
[2897] Cic. Att. xiii. 7.
[2898] Cic. Fam. ix. 15. 5; 26. 3; Suet. Caes. 43.
[2899] Cic. Att. xii. 35; 36. 1.
[2900] Cic. Att. xiii. 7; Suet. Caes. 43; Dio Cass. xliii. 25. 2; cf.
Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch. Roms, iii. 559; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 450.
The officials failed to enforce it effectively; Suet. ibid.
[2901] P. 164.
[2902] Dio Cass. xliii. 25; Cic. Phil. i. 8. 9; iii. 15. 38; v. 3. 7; viii.
9. 28. The lex Iulia et Titia, which gave provincial governors the
right to name tutors (Gaius i. 185, 195; Ulp. xi. 18; frag. d. Sin. 20;
Inst. i. 20) may be a part of the lex de provinciis (Voigt, Röm.
Rechtsgesch. i. 840 f.), or a supplement to it. The expression may
refer either to one law or to two related laws. The Julian lex de
liberis legationibus, limiting their duration (Cic. Att. xv. 11. 4), also
belongs to 46.
[2903] CIL. i. 206; Bruns, Font. Iur. 104-13; Dessau, ii. 6085;
Girard, Textes, 78-87. The extant fragment, originally known as
the Table of Heraclea (Lucania) from the place where it was
found, is inscribed on a bronze tablet now in the National
Museum at Naples. As it disqualified for office any who had taken
part in the proscriptions (§ 121), it must have followed the
downfall of the Cornelian régime in 70, and the mention of the
month Quinctilis (§ 98) proves that it preceded the renaming of
that month in 43. A reference to one of its provisions (§§ 94, 104)
by Cicero, Fam. vi. 18. 1 (Jan., 45) as of a law freshly passed,
proves it to be no later than January, 45; cf. Savigny, Verm. Schr.
iii (1850). 279-412; Karlowa, Röm. Rechtsgesch. i. 438; Girard,
Textes, 78. It must have been passed, therefore, before Caesar
set out for Spain, about November, 46; Drumann-Gröbe, Gesch.
Roms, iii. 569.
[2904] For the various hypotheses, see Hackel, in Wiener
Studien, xxiv (1902). 552-62.
[2905] Kalb, in Jahresb. ü. Altwiss. 1906. 37. The identification
of this law with the lex Iulia municipalis cited in an inscription
found at Padua (CIL. v. 2864) and with the lex municipalis of the
Digesta (1. 9. 3; Cod. vii. 9. 1), proposed by Savigny, ibid., is not
certain; Girard, Textes, 78.
[2906] Lex Iul. Mun. 1-19.
[2907] Lex Iul. Mun. 20-82.
[2908] Ibid. 83-142.
[2909] Ibid. 143-59.
[2910] Ibid. 160-4.
[2911] Savigny, Verm. Schr. iii. 329, was of the opinion that the
inclusion of articles 1 and 2 with articles 3-5 formed a lex satura
(p. 396) having no other motive than convenience. Hackel, Wien.
Stud. xxiv. 560, supposes that Caesar had intended to bring the
provisions of this measure before the comitia as two separate
laws, but in his haste to be off for Spain, combined them in one.
At all events the interpretation given above is true of the result if
not of the intention.
[2912] Many of his regulations were effected through edicts.
Such were probably the imposition of duties on goods imported
into Italy—an abolition of the law of 60 (Suet. Caes. 43; cf. p.
438), the leasing of the emery mines in Crete (Dig. xxxix. 4. 15),
and the suppression of the collegia which had been organized
under the Clodian law of 58; Suet. Caes. 42; Joseph. Ant. Iud. xiv.
10. 8. 213 ff.; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 435; Liebenam, Röm.
Vereinswes. 27.
[2913] Cic. Phil. v. 4. 10; App. B. C. iii. 5. 16; 22. 81; Dio Cass.
xliv. 53. 2; xlv. 23. After the Antonian laws had been annulled by
the senate, February, 43, on the ground that they had been
passed with violence and contrary to the auspices (Cic. Phil. vi. 2.
3; Dio Cass. xlv. 27), the acts of Caesar are confirmed anew by a
centuriate law of C. Vibius Pansa, consul in that year; Cic. Phil. x.
8. 17; Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 526. The policy of using the departed
Caesar as a means of self-aggrandizement readily lent itself to
Octavianus, at whose instigation Q. Pedius, his colleague in the
consulship in 43, caused a comitial act to be passed for the
establishment of a special court to try the murderers of the
dictator. The act specified the punishment to be inflicted on the
guilty and offered rewards to informers; Vell. ii. 69. 5; Suet. Ner. 3;
Galb. 3; Dio Cass. xlvi. 48 f.; App. B. C. iii. 95; Aug. Mon. Ancyr. i.
10; Mommsen, Röm. Strafr. 199.
The lex Rufrena in honor of Caesar (CIL. i. 626) probably
belongs to 42; Lange, ibid. 556; Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. ii. 89,
n. 3. In te same year falls the lex of the triumvirs which changed
the birthday of Caesar from July 12 to 5 (Fowler, Rom. Fest. 174)
and compelled all to celebrate it; Dio Cass. xlvii. 18. 5.
[2914] Cic. Phil. v. 4. 10; Lex Col. Genet. 104.
[2915] Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 499. After this law had been
annulled by a senatus consultum (p. 457, n. 7), the settlements
made by Antonius were confirmed by a centuriate law of C. Vibius
Pansa, consul in 43; Cic. Phil. xiii. 15. 31.
[2916] Dio Cass. xlv. 9. 1.
[2917] Cicero, Phil. v. 3. 7, says all Italy; 7. 20; vi. 5. 13.
[2918] Ibid. v. 7. 21; vi. 5. 14; viii. 9. 26; xii. 9. 23.
[2919] Ibid. v. 7. 21; vii. 6. 17.
 [2920] Ibid. ii. 38. 99; v. 12. 33; Alt. xv. 19. 2.
[2921] Cic. Phil. v. 3; vi. 5. 14; xi. 6. 13.
[2922] Dio Cass. xliv. 53. 7; cf. Livy, ep. cxvii; Vell. ii. 63. 1; cf.
p. 341, 391. No comitial act is suggested, and it may have been
one of the false laws of Caesar. Ferrero’s theory (Rome, iii. 38)
has nothing in its favor.
[2923] P. 455.
[2924] Cic. Phil. i. 8. 19; v. 5 f.; viii. 9. 27; cf. Greenidge, Leg.
Proced. 449 f. This law with his others was annulled in the
following year by the senate; Cic. xiii. 3. 5; p. 457, n. 7.
[2925] Cic. Phil. i. 9. 21 f.
[2926] Ibid.
[2927] Cic. Phil. v. 4. 10; p. 457, n. 7. The lex Antonia on the
dictatorship was doubtless renewed by a lex Vibia; Cic. l. c.
[2928] Dio Cass. xlvi. 55. 3.
[2929] Aug. Mon. Ancyr. i. 8; App. B. C. iv. 7. 27; Herzog, Röm.
Staatsverf. ii. 84, 89.
[2930] Dio Cass, xlvii. 15. 4 (ἐψηφίσαντο ordinarily implies a
comitial vote); cf. Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 680. The grant of lictors to
the Vestals in 42 may also have been effected by a comitial act;
Dio Cass. xlvii. 19. 4. In the same year a consular lex of L.
Munatius Plancus ordered the erasure of the names of L. Julius
Caesar and Sergius from the list of the proscribed; App. B. C. iv.
37. 158; 45. 193.
[2931] Dio Cass. xlviii. 9. 5. Lange, Röm. Alt. iii. 565, assumes
a vote of the comitia.
[2932] Dio Cass. xlviii. 33. 5; Gaius ii. 227; Dig. 35. 2. Closely
related is the lex Glitia of unknown date, mentioned by Gaius only
(Dig. v. 2. 4), which aimed to prevent a parent from ill-humoredly
wronging a child in his testament. Lange, Röm. Alt. ii. 662,
regards the word Glitia as a copyist’s error for Falcidia.
[2933] Dio Cass. xlvii. 13. 3.
[2934] Dio Cass. xlix. 38. 1.
[2935] Aug. Mon. Ancyr. ii. 1; Tac. Ann. xi. 25; Dio Cass. lii. 42.
5; cf. Herzog, Röm. Staatsverf. ii. 130.
 [2936] Plut. Ti. Gracch. 9; Cic. Att. iii. 23. 4; Lange, Röm. Alt. ii.
649; Karlowa, Röm. Rechtsgesch. i. 427.
[2937] Cic. Leg. Agr. ii. 5. 13; Dion. Hal. x. 57. 5; Livy iii. 34. 1;
Dio Cass. xlii. 32. 2 f. A bronze tablet was sometimes used for a
mere rogation; Cic. Mil. 32. 87; Suet. Caes. 28. For leges
promulgatae, see Livy iii. 9. 5; iv. 1. 1; 48. 1, 9; vi. 35. 4; 39. 1; x.
6. 6; xliii. 16. 6. On the requirement of the trinum nundinum, see
p. 397. The proposer was called rogator or lator (Livy iv. 48. 10);
his supporters adscriptores; Cic. Leg. Agr. ii. 9. 22. The names of
the latter, provided they were magistrates, were often published
with the bill for the sake of influence; Cic. Pis. 15. 35; Red. in Sen.
2. 4; 9. 22; Sest. 33. 72; Fam. i. 9. 16.
[2938] Cic. Att. i. 19. 4; Inv. ii. 45. 130 f.; Ascon. 57; Livy iii. 34.
4 ff.
[2939] Cic. Sull. 22. 62.
[2940] Cic. Leg. Agr. ii. 9. 22.
[2941] Frontinus, De aquis urbis Romae, ch. 129; Bruns, Font.
Iur. 115; Girard, Textes, 103-5; Lex Agr. 1 (CIL. i. 200).
[2942] The Italics supply lacunae. See also Cic. Phil. i. 10. 26;
Probus, in Gramm. Lat. iv. 272 (Keil).
[2943] Or the several names of a group of rogatores (cf. Livy iv.
1. 2; Cic. Sest. 33. 7. 2), as in the Lex de Termessibus (p. 425)
and the lex Mamilia Roscia, etc. (p. 441, n. 1); see also
Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. iii. 315, n. 2.
[2944] Cf. Probus, in Gramm. Lat. iv. 272.
[2945] He was either taken by lot or appointed by the presiding
magistrate; Cic. Planc. 14. 35.
[2946] As in the Lex de Termess. 1.
[2947] Ex h(ace) l(ege) plebive scito; Lex Lat. Bant. (3). 15;
Bruns, Font. Iur. 55; Girard, Textes, 31; Lex Agr. 2 (CIL. i. 200).
[2948] Sometimes K. (kaput) or K. L. (kaput legis) followed by a
number is used, or the title may be preceded by R. (rubrica);
Egbert, Lat. Inscr. 349; Cagnat, Épigr. Lat. 266.
[2949] Dig. xlviii. 19. 41; Cic. Att. iii. 23. 2 f. The substance of
the sanctio comprising the extant fragment of the Lex Lat. Bant. is
given on p. 379. On the lex sacrata, see p. 264 f.
 [2950] Macrob. Somn. Scip. ii. 17. 13. A lex minusquam
perfecta prescribes a penalty but allows the violating act to stand.
The lex Furia testamentaria (p. 352), for instance, declares that
the beneficiary of a legacy above the legal limit must pay fourfold,
but does not rescind the legacy itself; Ulp. Reg. 1. A lex perfecta
not only prescribes a penalty but nullifies a contravening act.
These distinctions apply only to the civil law. Cf. Ulp. l. c.;
Karlowa, Röm. Rechtsgesch. i. 428; Poste, Gaius, 566. Other
terms connected with the enactment, repeal, and alteration of
laws are explained by Ulp. Reg. 3: “Lex est rogatur, id est fertur,
aut abrogatur, id est prior lex tollitur, aut derogatur, id est pars
primae legis tollitur, aut subrogatur, id est adiicitur aliquid primae
legi, aut obrogatur, id est mutatur aliquid ex prima lege.” The
classification of laws as curiate, centuriate, and tribal according to
the form of the comitia, and as consular, tribunician, etc.
according to the office of the lator does not need explanation.
[2951] Dig. xiii. 2. 1; Gromat. 265.
[2952] Cf. Frag. Atest. in Bruns, Font. Iur. 101; Girard, Textes,
78; Lex Acil. rep. 78 (CIL. i. 198).
[2953] “Si quid ius non est rogarier, eius ea lege nihilum
rogatur”; Cic. Caec. 33. 95; Dom. 40. 106; Lex Tudert. (CIL. i.
1409) 10 f. A far more detailed formula is given by Cic. Att. iii. 23.
3.
[2954] “Si quid sacri sancti est, quod non iure sit rogatum, eius
hac lege nihil rogatur”; Probus, in Gramm. Lat. iv. 273.
[2955] P. 233 f.
[2956] Lex de imp. Vesp. in CIL. vi. 930; Bruns, Font. Iur. 193 f.;
Girard, Textes, 106: “Si quis huiusce legis ergo adversus leges
rogationes plebisve scita senatusve consulta fecit fecerit, sive,
quod eum ex lege rogatione plebisve scito senatusve consulto
facere oportebit, non fecerit huius legis ergo, id ei ne fraudi esto,
neve quit ob eam rem populo dare debeto, neve cui de ea re actio
neve iudicatio esto, neve quis de ea re apud se agi sinito.”
Although this document may have been a senatus consultum, it
has the form of a law and is so called by itself; cf. Mommsen,
Röm. Staatsr. ii. 876-9. All such formulae were indicated by the
series of initial letters of the component words; Probus, in
Gramm. Lat. iv. 272 f.
[2957] Fest. 314. 29: “Neve per saturam abrogato aut
derogato”; Lex Tudert. 9; Cic. Att. iii. 23. 3.