CL 0272

CL-0272
The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC

and other Investment Protection Treaties
by Christoph Schreuer
(revised 20 May 2005)
Outline
1. General Remarks
2. Indirect Expropriation
3. Creeping Expropriation
4. Expropriation of Intangible Property
5. Breach of Contract and Expropriation
6. Regulatory Measures and Expropriation
Summary
1. Expropriations, in order to be legal, must be in the public interest, non-discriminatory,

must take place under due process of law and against prompt adequate and effective
compensation.
2. Direct and overt expropriations have become rare. The typical form in which
expropriations take place nowadays is indirect expropriations or measures having an
equivalent effect. The concept of indirect expropriation has been known for some time and is
reflected in contemporary treaties for the protection of investments. The concept of indirect
expropriation is also well established in international judicial practice.
3. Creeping expropriation takes place step by step through a series of actions. It is widely
recognized in international practice. It has its counterpart in the law of State responsibility in
the concept of a breach consisting of a composite act.
4. Intangible property, including rights arising from a contract are susceptible of an
expropriation in the same way as tangible property. This principle is reflected in the definitions
of the term “investment” in the treaties for the protection of investments. Judicial practice
supports a wide concept of “property” that includes intangible rights, especially rights under
contracts, for purposes of expropriation.
5. Not every breach of contract by a State that results in economic loss to the investor is
an expropriation. The most important criterion for distinguishing between the simple breach of
a contract and the expropriation of contract rights is whether the State acts in its commercial
role as a party to the contract or in its sovereign capacity.
6. A legitimate public purpose underlying a regulatory measure does not exclude the
existence of an expropriation. The distinction between normal regulatory action and a
regulatory expropriation requiring compensation depends on the extent, severity and duration of
the deprivation. The government's intention to expropriate is not relevant in this context.
1
1. General Remarks
1. Expropriation is not illegal per se under international law. It has always been beyond doubt
that a State has the power and the right to expropriate the property of nationals and of
foreigners, in principle. But a legal expropriation of foreign owned property is subject to certain
conditions. These conditions are commonly referred to as a public interest, absence of
discrimination, due process of law and compensation that is prompt, adequate and effective.
2. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is in line with most contemporary treaties for the
protection of investments, especially BITs, in following these accepted principles. Article 13(1)
of the ECT provides:
(1) Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting
Party shall not be nationalized, expropriated or subjected to a measure or measures
having effect equivalent to nationalization or expropriation (hereinafter referred to as
“Expropriation”) except where such Expropriation is:
(a) for a purpose which is in the public interest;
(b) not discriminatory;
(c) carried out under due process of law; and
(d) accompanied by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
Such compensation shall amount to the fair market value of the Investment expropriated
at the time immediately before the Expropriation or impending Expropriation became
known in such a way as to affect the value of the Investment (hereinafter referred to as
the “Valuation Date”).1
Such fair market value shall at the request of the Investor be expressed in a Freely
Convertible Currency on the basis of the market rate of exchange existing for that
currency on the Valuation Date. Compensation shall also include interest at a commercial
rate established on a market basis from the date of Expropriation until the date of
payment.
3. It follows from provisions such as this one that the fact that a measure is in the public
interest and non-discriminatory cannot be the answer to the question whether an expropriation
has occurred. An expropriation may take place under perfectly legitimate circumstances.
Arbitrariness, bad faith, lack of proportionality and other improprieties are not constitutive
elements of expropriation. Their absence does not mean that an expropriation could not have
taken place.
1
34 International Legal Materials (ILM) 381, 391 (1995). Paras. 2 and 3 of Article 13 address the right to prompt
review and shareholders' rights.
2
2. Indirect Expropriation
4. Direct expropriations or nationalizations have become relatively rare. The unfavorable

publicity engendered by such a drastic step and the negative effect on the host State’s
investment climate make it unwise to seize foreign owned property openly. At the same time,
the significance of indirect forms of expropriation or measures having an equivalent effect has
increased dramatically. The UNCTAD study on Taking of Property has described this
development in the following words:
It is not the physical invasion of property that characterizes

nationalizations or expropriations that has assumed importance, but the
erosion of rights associated with ownership by State interferences. So,
methods have been developed to address this issue.2
5. Today the most difficult question for a tribunal faced with an allegation of expropriation is
not so much whether the requirements for a legal expropriation have been met but whether
there has been an expropriation in the first place. If there has been an expropriation there will
be an obligation, in principle, to pay compensation. If there has not been an expropriation the
investor will bear the economic consequences of the action unless another title for
compensation can be established.
6. International documents dealing with the protection of foreign investment invariably include
provisions on indirect expropriations and measures equivalent or tantamount to expropriation.
This includes private codification attempts such as the Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention,3 the
Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens by
Professors Sohn and Baxter4 and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
2
UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements, Taking of Property 20 (2000).
3
The Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad of 1959 contained the following language in its
Article III: "No Party shall take any measures against nationals of another Party to deprive them directly or indirectly
of their property except ..." See UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: ACompendium, Volume V, p. 396
(2001).
4
L. B. Sohn/R. R. Baxter, Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens, 55 AJIL 545, 553
(1961). Article 10 of the Draft Convention contains the following language: "3. (a) A “taking of property” includes
not only an outright taking of property but also any such unreasonable interference with the use, enjoyment, or
disposal of property as to justify an inference that the owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the
property within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such interference.
(b) A “taking of the use of property” includes not only an outright taking of use but also any unreasonable
interference with the use or enjoyment of property for a limited period of time."
3
United States5 It also includes documents prepared by international organizations such as the
OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of 1967,6 the draft for a United
Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations,7 the World Bank Guidelines on the
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment8 and the OECD Draft Negotiating Text for a
Multilateral Agreement on Investment.9
7. In addition to the ECT, which has been quoted above, treaties in force that deal with the
protection of investments typically address also indirect expropriations or measures having
equivalent effect.10 The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
of 1985 contains the following provision in its Article 11 on Covered Risks:
(ii) Expropriation and Similar Measures

any legislative action or administrative action or omission attributable to
the host government which has the effect of depriving the holder of a
guarantee of his ownership or control of, or a substantial benefit from,
his investment, with the exception of non-discriminatory measures of
general application which governments normally take for the purpose of
regulating economic activity in their territories.11
5
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute, Vol 2, pp. 196,
200 (1986): "§ 712 A State is responsible under international law for injury resulting from: (1) a taking by the state
of the property of a national of another state ..." Comment g. on this provision explains: "Subsection (1) applies not
only to avowed expropriations in which the government formally takes title to property, but also to other actions of
the government that have the effect of “taking” the property, in whole or in large part, outright or in stages
(“creeping expropriation”)."
6
The OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of 1967 contained the following provision in its
Article 3 entitled “Taking of Property”: "No Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or indirectly, of his
property a national of another Party unless the following conditions are complied with ...". See UNCTAD,
International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Volume II, p. 114 (1996).
7
United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations in its 1983 version contained the following
language: "In the exercise of their sovereignty, States have the right to nationalize or expropriate foreign-owned
property in their territory. Any such taking of property whether direct or indirect, consistent with international law,
must be ... See UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Volume I, p. 161, 174 (1996).
8
The Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, adopted by the Development Committee of the
Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1992, provide as follows in their
Section IV dealing with “Expropriation and Unilateral Alterations or Termination of Contracts”: "1. A State may not
expropriate or otherwise take in whole or in part a foreign private investment in its territory, or take measures which
have similar effects, except... See UNCTAD, International Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Volume I, p.
247, 252 (1996).
9
The OECD Draft Negotiating Text for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment9 of 1998 contained the following
text in its section on investment protection: "2.1. A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalise directly or
indirectly an investment in its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or take any measure or measures
having equivalent effect (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) except..." See UNCTAD, International
Investment Instruments: A Compendium, Volume IV, p. 107, 148 (2001).
10
See also UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements, Taking of Property 41 (2000).
11
24 ILM 1605, 1611 (1985).
4
8. In the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1992 the issue is addressed in Article 1110
entitled “Expropriation and Compensation”. The Article is introduced by the following words:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an

investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment (“expropriation”), except: ...12
9. Most bilateral investment treaties also contain provision on indirect expropriation or

measures having an equivalent effect. Dolzer and Stevens, after explaining that a host State can
take a number of measures which have an effect similar to expropriation, write:
The expropriation clause in most BITs therefore commonly includes

expropriation and nationalization as well as a reference to indirect
measures, and accords them all the same legal treatment.13
10. These examples demonstrate that provisions on indirect expropriation, equivalent measures
or measures with tantamount effect are a standard feature of documents dealing with the
protection of investments.
11. Most treaties do not go beyond a broad generic reference to indirect expropriation or
measures equivalent or tantamount to dispossession. The reason is the great variety of possible
measures, amounting to a de facto taking of foreign owned property, which defies any more
specific description. In the words of Dolzer and Stevens:
Such apparent reluctance to attempt a definition of “expropriation” in the

BITs may be explained by the fact that a host State, as is well known,
can take a number of measures which have a similar effect to
expropriation or nationalization, although they do not de jure constitute
an act of expropriation; such measures are generally termed “indirect,”
“creeping,” or “de facto” expropriation.14
12. The decisive element in an indirect expropriation is the substantial loss of control or
economic value of a foreign investment without a physical taking.15 This may take place
through a large variety of forms of indirect interference with the investors’ economic interests.16
12
32 ILM 641 (1993).
13
R. Dolzer/M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 99 (1995).
14
Op. cit., p. 99. Footnote omitted.
15
I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 534 (5th ed., 1998); R. Higgins, The Taking of Property by the
State: Recent Developments in International Law, 176 Recueil des Cours 263, 351 (1982-III); W. Kühn/U. Wiegel,
5
13. The recognition of the concepts of indirect expropriation, de facto expropriation, measures
equivalent to expropriations or acts tantamount to expropriation is well established in judicial
practice. Even before the introduction of pertinent treaty provisions, international courts and
tribunals have treated indirect takings and equivalent measures in the same way as direct
expropriations. For instance, in the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Chorzów
Factory) Case17 the Permanent Court of International Justice held that the expropriation of the
Chorzów Factory also constituted an indirect expropriation of the patents and contracts of a
different company “Bayerische”. The latter company merely had rights of management in the
expropriated factory and the Polish authorities never purported to expropriate it.
14. In Revere Copper v. OPIC18 the Claimant, through its subsidiary RJA, had entered into an
agreement with the Government of Jamaica containing a stabilization clause with respect to
taxes and other financial burdens. In 1974 the Government, in violation of that agreement,
drastically increased the taxes and royalties. The Claimant claimed under an insurance contract
providing cover for “expropriatory action”. OPIC, the insurer, argued that there was no
deprivation of effective control. The Tribunal rejected this contention and said:
In our view the effects of the Jamaican Government’s actions in

repudiating its long term commitments to RJA have substantially the
same impact on effective control over use and operation as if the
properties were themselves conceded by a concession contract that was
repudiated ... OPIC argues that RJA still has all the rights and property
that it had before the events of 1974: it is in possession of the plant and
The Application of International Law and Treaty Provisions by Arbitrators, 4 The Journal of World Investment 451,
464 (2003); UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements, Taking of Property 4, 41 (2000).
16
For descriptions and examples see G. C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International
Law?, 38 British Year Book of International Law 305, 309, 310 (1962); B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings” under
International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of “Creeping Expropriation”, 16 Virginia Journal of
International Law 103-175 (1975); R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID Review-Foreign
Investment Law Journal 41-65 (1986); G. Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment
Protection, 269 Recueil des Cours 251, 382 et seq. (1997); P. E. Comeaux/N. S. Kinsella, Protecting Foreign
Investment Under International Law, Legal Aspects of Political Risk 12-15 (1997); R. Dolzer, Indirect
Expropriations : New Developments? 11 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 64-93 (2002); B. M. Cremades/D. J. A.
Cairns, The Brave New World of Global Arbitration, 3 The Journal of World Investment 173, 194 et seq. (2002); W.
M. Reisman/R. D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation, 74 The British Year Book
of International Law 115-150 (2003); G. H. Sampliner, Arbitration of Expropriation Cases Under U.S. Investment
Treaties – A Threat to Democracy or the Dog That Didn’t Bark?, 18 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal
1, 5-11 (2003); K. Hobér, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe: Recent cases on Expropriation, 14 The
American Review of International Arbitration 377, 381 et seq. (2003).
17
Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Judgment, 15 May 1926, PCIJ Ser. A, No. 7 (1927).
18
In the Matter of Revere Copper and Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Award, 24 August
1978, 56 ILR 268.
6
other facilities; it has its Mining Lease; it can operate as it did before.
This may be true in a formal sense but ... we do not regard RJA’s
‘control’ of the use and operation of its properties as any longer
‘effective’ in view of the destruction by Government actions of its
contract rights.19
15. Biloune v. Ghana20 concerned a hotel project through a local subsidiary MDCL, on the
basis of an investment agreement. The project had proceeded substantially when the authorities
issued a stop work order, demolished part of the project and arrested and expelled the investor.
The Tribunal said:
Given the central role of Mr Biloune in promoting, financing and

managing MDCL, his expulsion from the country effectively prevented
MDCL from further pursuing the project. In the view of the Tribunal,
such prevention of MDCL from pursuing its approved project would
constitute constructive expropriation of MDCL’s contractual rights in the
project and, accordingly, the expropriation of the value of Mr Biloune’s
interest in MDCL ...21
16. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has also held consistently that for purposes of
interpreting the phrase “expropriations or other measures affecting property rights” in the
Algiers Declaration22 the decisive element was not any formal transfer of title but loss of
effective use and benefit of the investment.
17. In Starrett Housing v. Iran23 the foreign investor had not been expropriated formally but a
local “temporary manager” had been put in charge of the project. The Tribunal found that this
amounted to an expropriation:
… it is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State can interfere

with property rights to such an extent that these rights are rendered so useless that
they must be deemed to have been expropriated, even though the State does not
purport to have expropriated them and the legal title to the property formally
remains with the original owner.24
19
At pp. 291/92.
20
Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of Ghana, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability, 27 October 1989, 95 ILR 184.
21
At p. 209.
22
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of
Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran
(“Claims Settlement Declaration”), 19 January 1981, reproduced in 1 Iran-US CTR 9.
23
Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 19 Dec. 1983, 4 Iran-US CTR 122.
24
At p. 154.
7
18. The Tippetts case25 also concerned the imposition of a temporary manager. In this case too,
the Tribunal found that a taking of property had taken place. It said:
A deprivation or taking of property may occur under international law

through interference by a state in the use of that property or with the
enjoyment of its benefits, even where legal title to the property is not
affected.26
19. Recent awards in investment arbitration cases are unanimous on the wide reach of
provisions in BITs and other treaties dealing with expropriation and measures having
equivalent or similar effect. In Goetz v. Burundi27 the host State had revoked the investor’s free
zone status without any formal taking of property. The Tribunal held that the government’s
action fell under the concept of measures having an effect similar to expropriation. It said:
Since ... the revocation of the Minister for Industry and Commerce of the
free zone certificate forced them to halt all activities ... , which deprived
their investments of all utility and deprived the claimant investors of the
benefit which they could have expected from their investments, the
disputed decision can be regarded as a “measure having similar effect” to
a measure depriving of or restricting property within the meaning of
Article 4 of the Investment Treaty.28
20. In Metalclad v. Mexico29 the Claimant had been assured by the federal government that his
project for a landfill facility had complied with all relevant environmental and planning
regulations. Subsequently the local municipal authorities denied a construction permit. In
addition, the regional government declared the land in question a national area for the
protection of rare cactus. The Tribunal upheld the investor’s claim under the NAFTA’s
provision on expropriation. It said:
103. Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open,

deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright
seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favor of the host State,
but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which
has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of
25
Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, 22 June 1984, 6 Iran-US CTR
219.
26
At p. 225. This passage was quoted in Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S. A. v. Republic of Costa Rica,
Award, 17 February 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 153, at para. 77; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award, 8
December 2000, 6 ICSID Reports 68, para. 98 and CME v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001,
para. 608.
27
Goetz and Others v. Republic of Burundi, Award, 2 September 1998, 6 ICSID Reports 5.
28
At para. 124.
29
Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 August 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 209.
8
the use or reasonably-to-be expected economic benefit of property even
if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.30
21. S.D. Myers v. Canada31 concerned an export ban by Canada of PCB waste to the United
States for remediation. One of the claims was that this amounted to a measure tantamount to
expropriation under Article 1110 of the NAFTA. The Tribunal said:
The primary meaning of the word “tantamount” given by the Oxford

English Dictionary is “equivalent”. Both words require a tribunal to look
at the substance of what has occurred and not only at form. A tribunal
should not be deterred by technical or facial considerations from
reaching a conclusion that an expropriation or conduct tantamount to an
expropriation has occurred. It must look at the real interests involved and
the purpose and effect of the government measure.32
22. In the particular case, the Tribunal found that, while there was a breach of the fair and
equitable standard under Article 1105 of the NAFTA (see paras. 303, 304 below), there was no
measure tantamount to expropriation since the measure had only been temporary.33
23. In CME v. Czech Republic34 the Claimant complained about interference in its contract
rights by a regulatory authority, the Media Council. This had led to a situation that made it
possible for the investor’s local partner to cancel the contract on which the investment
depended. The Tribunal found that the regulatory authority had reversed its earlier position and
had forced the investor into accepting amendments to the contract which resulted in a loss of
legal security.35 Therefore, a violation of the relevant BIT provision on expropriation had
occurred. The relevant provision in Article 5 of the Czech-Netherlands BIT provided:
Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or

indirectly, investors of the other Contracting Party of their investments
unless ...
The Tribunal said:
The Respondent’s view that the Media Council’s actions did not deprive
the Claimant of its worth, as there has been no physical taking of the
30
At para. 103. This passage was quoted in CME v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001, at para.
606.
31
S. D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award, 12 November 2000, 40 ILM 1408 (2001).
32
At para. 285.
33
At para 287.
34
CME v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001.
35
At paras. 591-609.
9
property by the State or because the original Licence ... always has been
held by the original Licensee and kept untouched, is irrelevant. What
was touched and indeed destroyed was the Claimant’s and its
predecessor’s investment as protected by the Treaty. What was destroyed
was the commercial value of the investment ... by reason of coercion
exerted by the Media Council ...36
24. More generally, with respect to de facto or indirect expropriations the Tribunal said:
The expropriation claim is sustained despite the fact that the Media
Council did not expropriate CME by express measures of expropriation.
De facto expropriations or indirect expropriations, i.e. measures that do
not involve an overt taking but that effectively neutralize the benefit of
the property of the foreign owner, are subject to expropriation claims.
This is undisputed under international law ...37
25. In Lauder v. The Czech Republic38 the Tribunal also accepted the concept of an indirect
expropriation. It said:
Indirect expropriation or nationalization is a measure that does not

involve an overt taking, but that effectively neutralizes the enjoyment of
the property. It is generally accepted that a wide variety of measures are
susceptible to lead to indirect expropriation, and each case is therefore to
be decided on the basis of its attending circumstances.39
26. Middle East Cement v. Egypt40 concerned the revocation of a free zone license through the
prohibition of import of cement. The Tribunal found that the investor had been deprived of the
use and benefit of its investment even though it retained the nominal ownership of its rights.
Therefore, Article 4 of the Egypt-Greece BIT protecting the investor from expropriation or
other measures the effects of which would be tantamount to expropriation had been violated.
The tribunal said:
When measures are taken by a State the effect of which is to deprive the
investor of the use and benefit of his investment even though he may
retain nominal ownership of the respective rights being the investment,
the measures are often referred to as a “creeping” or “indirect”
36
At para. 591.
37
At para. 604, citing Sacerdoti, the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia case and SPP v. Egypt.
38
Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, Award, 3 September 2001.
39
At para. 200. For an extensive discussion of the CME and Lauder cases see K. Hobér, Investment Arbitration in
Eastern Europe: Recent cases on Expropriation, 14 The American Review of International Arbitration 426 et seq.
(2003).
40
Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S. A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award, 12 April 2002, 7 ICSID
Reports 178.
10
expropriation or, as in the BIT, as measures “the effect of which is
tantamount to expropriation.” As a matter of fact, the investor is
deprived by such measures of parts of the value of his investment. This
is the case here, and, therefore, it is the Tribunal’s view that such a
taking amounted to an expropriation within the meaning of Art. 4 of the
BIT and that, accordingly, Respondent is liable to pay compensation
therefor.41
27. Tecmed v. Mexico,42 concerned the revocation of a license for the operation of a landfill.
The Tribunal found that the failure to renew the operating permit had violated Article 5 of the
Mexico-Spain BIT protecting investors from expropriation or equivalent measures. The
Tribunal said:
114. Generally, it is understood that the term “…equivalent to

expropriation…” or “tantamount to expropriation” included in the
Agreement and in other international treaties related to the protection of
foreign investors refers to the so-called “indirect expropriation” or
“creeping expropriation”, as well as to the above-mentioned de facto
expropriation. Although these forms of expropriation do not have a clear
or unequivocal definition, it is generally understood that they materialize
through actions or conduct, which do not explicitly express the purpose
of depriving one of rights or assets, but actually have that effect.43
28. Tokios Tokel s v. Ukraine44 concerns allegedly wrongful acts by Ukrainian governmental
authorities including unwarranted and unreasonable investigations of the Claimant’s business,
unfounded judicial actions to invalidate the Claimant’s contracts and false public accusations of
illegal conduct by the Claimant. After stating that obligations with respect to investments relate
not only to physical property but also to business operations, the Tribunal said in its Decision
on Jurisdiction:
States’ obligations with respect to “property” and “the use of property”

are well established in international law. For example, the Draft
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to
Aliens, defines a “taking of property” to include “not only an outright
taking of property but also any such unreasonable interference with the
use, enjoyment, or disposal of property as to justify an inference that the
owner thereof will not be able to use, enjoy or dispose of the property
within a reasonable period of time after the inception of such
41
At para. 107.
42
Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S. A. v. The United Mexican States, Award, 29 May 2003, 43 ILM 133
(2004).
43
At para. 114.
44
Tokios Tokel s v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004.
11
interference.” Further, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal found that “[a]
deprivation or taking of property may occur under international law
through interference by a state in the use of that property or with the
enjoyment of its benefits.”45
29. Waste Management v. Mexico46 concerned the failure of the City of Acapulco to pay
amounts due under a concession contract. The Tribunal held that this did not amount to an
indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to an expropriation.47 But the Tribunal made the
following general statement:
143. It may be noted that Article 1110(1) distinguishes between direct or

indirect expropriation on the one hand and measures tantamount to an
expropriation on the other. An indirect expropriation is still a taking of
property. By contrast where a measure tantamount to an expropriation is
alleged, there may have been no actual transfer, taking or loss of
property by any person or entity, but rather an effect on property which
makes formal distinctions of ownership irrelevant.48
30. In Occidental v. Ecuador49 the claim was directed at the inconsistent practice of the
Respondent’s authorities in reimbursing value added tax paid on purchases in connection with
the Claimant’s exploration and exploitation activities and the ultimate exportation of the oil
produced. The Claimant relied on the provision in the Ecuador – United States BIT granting
protection against indirect expropriation or measures tantamount to expropriation. The Tribunal
said:
85. The Tribunal agrees with the Claimant in that expropriation need not
involve the transfer of title to a given property, which was the distinctive
feature of traditional expropriation under international law. It may of
course affect the economic value of an agreement. Taxes can result in
expropriation as can other types of regulatory measures.50
31. The Tribunal found that in the case before it, although there had been a violation of the fair
and equitable treatment standard, there was no indirect expropriation since there had been no
deprivation of the use or reasonably expected economic benefit of the investment or a
substantial deprivation.
45
At para. 92, citing Sohn and Baxter and the Tippetts case. Footnotes omitted.
46
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 April 2004.
47
At para. 175.
48
At para. 143.
49
Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, Award, 1 July 2004.
50
At para. 85, citing Higgins, the Feldman case, and Wälde/Kolo. Footnotes omitted.
12
32. The European Court of Human Rights has applied similar standards when applying Article
1 of Additional Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights guaranteeing the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions and granting protection against deprivation of possessions.
In the leading case Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden51 it held:
In the absence of formal expropriation, that is to say a transfer of

ownership, the Court considers that it must look behind the appearances
and investigate the realities of the situation complained of … Since the
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are “practical and
effective”…, it has to be ascertained whether that situation amounted to
a de facto expropriation, as was argued by the applicants.52
33. The practice, as outlined above, is well summarized by Reisman and Sloane:
In short, international tribunals, jurists, and scholars have consistently

appreciated that states may accomplish expropriation in ways other than
by formal decree; indeed, often in ways that may seek to cloak
expropriatory conduct with a veneer of legitimacy. For this reason,
tribunals have increasingly accepted that expropriation must be analyzed
in consequential rather than formal terms. What matters is the effect of
governmental conduct—whether malfeasance, misfeasance or
nonfeasance, or some combination of the three—on foreign property
rights or control over an investment, not whether the state promulgates a
formal decree or otherwise expressly proclaims its intent to expropriate.
For purposes of state responsibility and the obligation to make adequate
reparation, international law does not distinguish indirect from direct
expropriations.53
34. The above survey demonstrates that a wide variety of steps affecting or destroying the
investment’s commercial value, taken by the host States’ authorities, have been held to
constitute indirect expropriations or equivalent measures. These measures include:
the taking of a third Party’s property which renders worthless the patents and contracts of
a managing company (Chorzów Factory).
51
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, ECHR judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52.
52
At para. 63. See also Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece, ECHR judgment of 24 June 1993, Series A no.
260-B, para. 42: “Since the Convention is intended to safeguard rights that are “practical and effective”, it has to be
ascertained whether the situation complained of amounted nevertheless to a de facto expropriation, […]”;
Brum rescu v. Romania [GC], 28 October 1999, no. 28342/95, ECHR 1999-VII, para. 76: “it is necessary not only
to consider whether there has been a formal taking or expropriation of property but to look behind the appearances
and investigate the realities of the situation complained of. Since the Convention is intended to guarantee rights that
are ‘practical and effective’, it has to be ascertained whether the situation amounted to a de facto expropriation […]”;
Fredin v. Sweden, ECHR judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 14, para. 42.
53
W. M. Reisman/R. D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation, 74 The British Year
Book of International Law 115, 121 (2003).
13
an increase in taxes to an extent that the investment becomes economically unsustainable
(Revere Copper).
the expulsion of a person who plays a key role in the investment (Biloune).
the replacement of the owner’s management by government imposed managers (Starrett,
Tippetts).
revocation of a free zone permit (Goetz, Middle East Cement).
denial of a construction permit contrary to prior assurances (Metalclad).
interference with contract rights leading to a breach or termination of the contract by the
investor’s business partner (CME).
revocation of an operating license (Tecmed).
3. Creeping Expropriation
35. Creeping expropriation is a form of indirect expropriation that takes place incrementally or
step by step. Like indirect expropriation, it is not a new concept but has been recognized in
international practice for some time. Several international documents refer to creeping
expropriation. These include the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign
Property54 and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States55
36. Creeping expropriation takes place through a series of actions, none of which might qualify
as an expropriation by itself, but the aggregate effect of which is to destroy the value of the
investment.56 UNCTAD’s 2003 World Investment Report describes this phenomenon in the
following terms:
54
The OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property of 196754 contains a provision in its Article 3
entitled “Taking of Property”. The Notes and Comments on that provision contain the following language: "...
Article 3 is meant to cover 'creeping nationalisation', recently practised by certain States. Under it, measures
otherwise lawful are applied in such a way as to deprive ultimately the alien of the enjoyment or value of his
property, without any specific act being identifiable as outright deprivation." 7 ILM 125/126 (1968).
55
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, American Law Institute Vol. 2, pp. 196,
200 (1986). Comment g. on § 712, dealing with a State's responsibility for a taking of the property of another State,
provides: "Subsection (1) applies not only to avowed expropriations in which the government formally takes title to
property, but also to other actions of the government that have the effect of “taking” the property, in whole or in
large part, outright or in stages (“creeping expropriation”)."
56
See especially B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings” under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem
of “Creeping Expropriation”, 16 Virginia Journal of International Law 103, 109, 148-151 (1975); R. Higgins, The
14
Indirect takings include creeping expropriations, involving an
incremental but cumulative encroachment on one or more of the range of
recognized ownership rights until the measures involved lead to the
effective negation of the owner’s interest in the property.57
37. Professor Reisman and R. D. Sloane, in their article on indirect expropriation,58 devote an
entire chapter to the issue of creeping expropriation.59 They write:
Discrete acts, analyzed in isolation rather than in the context of the

overall flow of events, may, whether legal or not in themselves, seem
innocuous vis-à-vis a potential expropriation. Some may not be
expropriatory in themselves. Only in retrospect will it become evident
that those acts comprised part of an accretion of deleterious acts and
omissions, which in the aggregate expropriated the foreign investor’s
property rights.60 ... Because of their gradual and cumulative nature,
creeping expropriations also render it problematic, perhaps even
arbitrary, to identify a single interference (or failure to act where a duty
requires it) as the ‘moment of expropriation’.61
38. Arbitral practice confirms that incremental steps leading to a de facto dispossession are to
be treated as measures equivalent to expropriation.62 In Biloune v. Ghana63 the authorities had
issued a stop work order, had subjected the investment to intrusive financial scrutiny, had
demolished part of the project and had arrested and expelled the investor. The Tribunal said:
What is clear is that the conjunction of the stop work order, the
demolition, the summons, the arrest, the detention, the requirement of
filing assets declaration forms, and the deportation of Mr Biloune
without possibility of re-entry had the effect of causing the irreparable
cessation of work on the project.64 … The Tribunal therefore holds that
the Government of Ghana, by its acts and omissions culminating with
Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in International Law, 176 Recueil des Cours 261, 353 (1982-
III). P. E. Comeaux/N. S. Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law, Legal Aspects of
Political Risk 8-9 (1997).
57
World Investment Report, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 110 (2003). See also UNCTAD
Series on issues in international investment agreements, Taking of Property 11/12 (2000).
58
W. M. Reisman/R. D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation 74 The British Year
Book of International Law 115-150 (2003).
59
At pp. 122-128.
60
At pp. 123/124. Footnote omitted.
61
At p. 125.
62
See also Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Congo, Award, 8 August 1980, 1 ICSID Reports 330; Liberian Eastern Timber
Corporation v. Republic of Liberia, Award, 31 March 1986, 2 ICSID Reports 343, 367 and the analysis by Reisman
and Sloane, op. cit. at pp. 125/126. Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award, 26 June 2000, 7 ICSID Reports 69, at para. 99.
63
64
At p. 209.
15
Mr Biloune’s deportation, constructively expropriated MDCL’s assets,
and Mr Biloune’s interest therein.65
39. In Tradex v. Albania66 the Claimant had alleged an expropriation of its agricultural
investment mainly through announcements by politicians concerning a future land reform as
well as by the destruction of crops and the occupation of its land by villagers. The Tribunal first
looked at the various damaging acts one by one. Then it said:
191. While the above examination ... has come to the conclusion that
none of the single decisions and events alleged by Tradex to constitute
an expropriation can indeed be qualified by the Tribunal as
expropriation, it might still be possible that, and the Tribunal, therefore,
has to examine and evaluate hereafter whether the combination of the
decisions and events can be qualified as expropriation of Tradex’ foreign
investment in a long, step-by-step process by Albania.67
40. On the specific facts of the case, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that even the
combined evaluation of events in this case did not qualify as an expropriation primarily because
the acts of the villagers could not be attributed to the Albanian government.68
41. In the Santa Elena case,69 the fact that there had been an expropriation was not in dispute.
In the course of its decision on valuation, the Tribunal made the following statement about the
deprivation of property:
... the period of time involved in the process may vary—from an

immediate and comprehensive taking to one that only gradually and by
small steps reaches a condition in which it can be said that the owner has
truly lost all the attributes of ownership. It is clear, however, that a
measure or series of measures can still eventually amount to a taking,
though the individual steps in the process do not formally purport to
amount to a taking or to a transfer of title.70
65
At p. 210.
66
Tradex Hellas SA v. Republic of Albania, Award, 29 April 1999, 5 ICSID Reports 70.
67
Para. 191.
68
At paras. 197, 203.
69
Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S. A. v. Republic of Costa Rica, Award, 17 February 2000, 5 ICSID
Reports 153.
70
At para. 76.
16
42. In his dissenting opinion in Waste Management71 arbitrator Keith Highet described a
creeping expropriation in the following words:
… a ‘creeping’ expropriation is comprised of a number of elements,

none of which can – separately – constitute the international wrong.
These constituent elements include non-payment, non-reimbursement,
cancellation, denial of judicial access, actual practice to exclude, non-
conforming treatment, inconsistent legal blocks, and so forth. …
8. A nationalization or expropriation – in particular a “creeping
expropriation” comprised of numerous components – must logically be
more than the mere sum of its parts …72
43. In Tecmed v. Mexico,73 the Tribunal found that the revocation of a license for the operation
of a landfill had violated Article 5 of the Mexico-Spain BIT protecting investors from
expropriation or equivalent measures. After explaining the concept of an action “equivalent to
expropriation” it said:
This type of expropriation does not necessarily take place gradually or

stealthily —the term “creeping” refers only to a type of indirect
expropriation—and may be carried out through a single action, through a
series of actions in a short period of time or through simultaneous
actions. Therefore, a difference should be made between creeping
expropriation and de facto expropriation, although they are usually
included within the broader concept of “indirect expropriation” and
although both expropriation methods may take place by means of a
broad number of actions that have to be examined on a case-by-case
basis to conclude if one of such expropriation methods has taken place.74
44. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has also recognized the significance of expropriatory
measures that take place step by step. In Phillips Petroleum v. Iran75 the authorities of Iran had
taken a number of steps against the Claimant. These included announcements of a forthcoming
nationalization of the oil industry, a significant reduction of production rates, replacement of
the management by directors appointed by the Iranian authorities and nullification of the joint
venture agreement.76 The Tribunal said:
71
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 2 June 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 443 (Keith Highet,
dissenting at 462).
72
At paras. 17, 18.
73
(2004).
74
At para. 114.
75
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran, 29 June 1989, 21 Iran-US CTR 79.
76
At paras. 90-96.
17
100. The conclusion that the Claimant was deprived of its property by
conduct attributable to the Government of Iran, including NIOC, rests on
a series of concrete actions rather than any particular formal decree, as
the formal acts merely ratified and legitimized the existing state of
affairs. … in circumstances where the taking is through a chain of
events, the taking will not necessarily be found to have occurred at the
time of either the first or the last such event, but rather when the
interference has deprived the Claimant of fundamental rights of
ownership and such deprivation is “not merely ephemeral”, or when it
becomes an irreversible deprivation”.77
45. Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine78 confirms the relevance of creeping expropriation although
it denies its application to the facts of the particular case. The case concerned a construction
project for an office building. The main complaint was the failure by the Kyiv City State
Administration to issue the necessary lease agreements. The Claimant contended that this
refusal was the culmination of a series of other prejudicial acts amounting to a creeping
expropriation.79 The Tribunal said:
20.22 Creeping expropriation is a form of indirect expropriation with a

distinctive temporal quality in the sense that it encapsulates the situation
whereby a series of acts attributable to the State over a period of time
culminate in the expropriatory taking of such property.80
46. The Tribunal in Generation Ukraine rejected the claim of a creeping expropriation because
the investment did not yet exist at the relevant time and hence could not be expropriated. In
addition, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the conduct of the administration did not
come close to creating a “persistent or irreparable obstacle to the Claimant’s use enjoyment or
disposal of its investment.”81
47. The concept of creeping expropriation has its counterpart in the law of State responsibility.
The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the
International Law Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001 state in Article 15:
ARTICLE 15
Breach consisting of a composite act
77
At paras. 100, 101.
78
Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003.
79
At para. 20.21.
80
At para. 20.22. Emphasis original.
81
At para. 20.32.
18
(1) The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series
of actions or omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful, occurs when
the action or omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or
omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act.82
48. The ILC’s Commentary on this provision states that
Paragraph 1 of article 15 defines the time at which a composite act

‘occurs’ as the time at which the last action or omission occurs which,
taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the
wrongful act, without it necessarily having to be the last of the series.83
49. It follows from the above authorities that the concept of creeping expropriation is well
established in international law.
4. Expropriation of Intangible Property
50. Protection from expropriation relates not only to tangible property or physical assets but to
a broad range of rights that are economically significant to the investor.84 In the words of
Professor Giorgio Sacerdoti:
All rights and interests having an economic content come into play,
including immaterial and contractual rights.85
51. This principle is reflected in the definitions of the term "investment" in the treaties for the
protection of investments. The ECT in Article 1(6) refers not only to tangible but also to
intangible property. In addition it lists, among others, claims to money and claims to
82
J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility 141 (2002).
83
Op. cit. at p. 143.
84
See e.g. G. C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?, 38 British Year Book of
International Law 305, 311 (1962); B. H. Weston, “Constructive Takings” under International Law: A Modest Foray
into the Problem of “Creeping Expropriation”, 16 Virginia Journal of International Law 103, 112/13 (1975), who
uses the term “wealth deprivation” in this context; R. Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent
Developments in International Law, 176 Recueil des Cours 263, 271 (1982-III); T. Waelde/A. Kolo, Environmental
Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 International and Comparative
Law Quarterly 811, 835 (2001); G. H. Sampliner, Arbitration of Expropriation Cases Under U.S. Investment Treaties
– A Threat to Democracy or the Dog That Didn’t Bark?, 18 ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 1, 14
(2003); J. Paulsson/Z. Douglas, Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaty Arbitrations, Arbitrating Foreign
Investment Disputes (N. Horn, S. Kröll eds.) 145, 152 (2004); S. Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of
Treaty, The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v.
Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, 5 The Journal of World Investment & Trade 555, 559 (2004).
85
G. Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 Recueil des Cours 251,
381 (1997).
19
performance pursuant to contract, intellectual property and generally any right conferred by law
or contract among protected investments. The NAFTA86 and BITs87 contain similarly
comprehensive definitions.
52. UNCTAD in its study on Taking of Property has described the situation in the following
terms:
In the past, the concern was only with the physical property of a foreign
investor. In modern times, the concern is not so much with the physical
property but with the antecedent rights that are necessary for the
enjoyment of these property rights as well as with incorporeal property
... Most recent BITs include intellectual property within the definition of
investment so that, if there are infringements of intellectual property
rights by State interference, there would be a taking. So too, contractual
rights and regulatory rights associated with the making of an investment
are included within the definition of foreign investment in treaties.88
53. Judicial practice unanimously supports a wide concept of “property”, that includes
intangible rights especially rights under contracts, for purposes of expropriation and equivalent
measures. Already in 1903 in the Rudloff case, before the US-Venezuela Mixed Calims
Commission, Commissioner Bainbridge said:
[T]he taking away or destruction of rights acquired, transmitted, and

defined by a contract is as much a wrong, entitling the sufferer to
redress, as the taking away or destruction of tangible property;89
54. In the case of the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims,90 decided by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, the United States, during World War I, had requisitioned ships being built by US
shipyards for use and operation by the government in its war effort. The requisition order
included contracts by private US shipyards with Norwegian subjects for ships yet to be built.
The Arbitral Tribunal deciding the case found:
The order contained in the letter of August 3rd expressly requisitioned

not only the ships and the material, but also the contracts, the plans,
detailed specifications and payments made, ...91
86
Article 1139 NAFTA.
87
See R. Dolzer/M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, pp. 26-30 (1995).
88
UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements, Taking of Property 36 (2000).
89
RudIoff Case, Interlocutory Decision, 1903, 9 Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) 244, 250 (1959).
90
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v. United States), Award, 13 October 1922, 1 RIAA 307.
91
At p. 318.
20
55. The Tribunal entertained no doubt that the violation of intangible property rights arising
from a contract amounted to an expropriation. It said:
... whatever the intentions may have been, the United States took, both in
fact and in law, the contracts under which the ships in question were
being or were to be construed.92
56. In the Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Chorzów Factory) Case93 the
Permanent Court of International Justice held that the expropriation of the Chorzów Factory
also constituted an indirect expropriation of the patents and contract belonging to the managing
company “Bayerische” which had contractual rights for the management and operation of the
factory. The Court held that not only the owner of the factory, but also the company holding
contractual rights had been expropriated:
... it is clear that the rights of the Bayerische to the exploitation of the
factory and to the remuneration fixed by the contract for the management
of the exploitation and for the use of its patents, licences, experiments,
etc., have been directly prejudiced by the taking over of the factory by
Poland. As these rights related to the Chorzów factory and were, so to
speak, concentrated in that factory, the prohibition contained in the last
sentence of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention applies in all respect to
them.94
57. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has also recognized that intangible property, such as
contractual rights, can be expropriated.95 In Starrett Housing96 the Tribunal noted with approval
that the Claimants
… rely on precedents in international law in which cases measures of

expropriation or taking, primarily aimed at physical property, have been
deemed to comprise also rights of a contractual nature closely related to
the physical property.97
58. In the Amoco case98 the Iran-US Claims Tribunal said with respect to rights arising from a
concession agreement:
92
At p. 325.
93
94
At p. 44.
95
See also G. H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 88 AJIL 585, 598 (1994).
96
97
At p. 156.
98
Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, 14 July 1987, 15 Iran-US C.T.R. 189.
21
Expropriation, which can be defined as a compulsory transfer of
property rights, may extend to any right which can be the object of a
commercial transaction ...99
59. In the Phillips Case100 the Iran-US Claims Tribunal also dealt with rights arising from a
concession agreement. It held that expropriation of the property of an alien gives rise under
international law to liability for compensation
… whether the expropriation is formal or de facto and whether the

property is tangible, such as real estate or a factory, or intangible, such as
the contractual rights involved in the present Case.101
60. ICSID and NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunals have held similarly. The Tribunal in SPP v.
Egypt102 examined whether the measures by Egypt affecting rights under a contract to build
hotels may amount to an expropriation. The Tribunal said:
164. Nor can the Tribunal accept the argument that the term
“expropriation” applies only to jus in rem. The Respondent’s
cancellation of the project had the effect of taking certain important
rights and interests of the Claimants. … Clearly, those rights and
interests were of a contractual rather than in rem nature. However, there
is considerable authority for the proposition that contract rights are
entitled to the protection of international law and that the taking of such
rights involves an obligation to make compensation therefor.
165. Moreover, it has long been recognized that contractual rights may
be indirectly expropriated. In the judgment of the Permanent Court of
International Justice concerning Certain German Interests in Polish
Upper Silesia, the Court ruled that, by taking possession of a factory,
Poland had also “expropriated the contractual rights” of the operating
company. (PCIJ, Series A, No. 7, 1926, at p. 44.)
166. Decisions of international claims tribunals have been to the same

effect. Thus, in the Amoco Int’l Finance Corp v Iran case (15 Iran-US
CTR, p. 189), the Iran-US Claims Tribunal said:
Expropriation, which can be defined as a compulsory transfer of property

rights, may extend to any right which can be the object of a commercial
transaction... (para. 108.)
99
At para. 108.
100
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran, 29 June 1989, 21 Iran-US CTR 79.
101
At para. 76.
102
SPP v. Egypt, Award, 20 May 1992, 3 ICSID Reports 189.
22
167. And in the Phillips Petroleum Co Iran v Iran case (21 Iran-US
CTR, p. 79) the Iran-US Claims Tribunal held that expropriation gives
rise to liability for compensation
whether the expropriation is formal or de facto and whether the property is

tangible, such as real estate or a factory, or intangible, such as the
contractual rights involved in the present Case. (para.
76.) 103
61. In Wena Hotels v. Egypt104 the contractual right of which the investor had been deprived
was the operation of a hotel. The Tribunal said:
98. It is also well established that an expropriation is not limited to

tangible property rights. As the panel in SPP v. Egypt explained, “there
is considerable authority for the proposition that contract rights are
entitled to the protection of international law and that the taking of such
rights involves an obligation to make compensation therefore.”105
62. In Tokios Tokel s v. Ukraine106 the Respondent had argued that that the dispute did not
“arise directly out of an investment” because the allegedly wrongful acts by Ukrainian
governmental authorities (including unwarranted and unreasonable investigations of the
Claimant’s business, unfounded judicial actions to invalidate the Claimant’s contracts, and
false, public accusations of illegal conduct by the Claimant) were not directed against the
physical assets owned by the Claimant, i.e., its facilities and equipment.107 The Tribunal
rejected this argument and said:
… the Respondent’s obligations with respect to “investment” relate not

only to the physical property of Lithuanian investors but also to the
business operations associated with that physical property.108
63. In CME v. Czech Republic109 the Claimant successfully claimed that its contract rights had
been expropriated through the interference by a regulatory authority, the Media Council. The
interference by the Media Council had enabled the investor’s local partner to cancel the
contract. The Tribunal found that the loss of legal security caused by the regulatory authority
103
At pp. 228/229.
104
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award, 8 December 2000, 6 ICSID Reports 68.
105
At para. 98. Footnote omitted.
106
Tokios Tokel s v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004.
107
At para. 90.
108
At para. 92.
109
23
constituted a violation of the relevant BIT provision on expropriation. 110 The Tribunal held that
the investor’s rights based on the contract had been expropriated. It said:
The Respondent’s view that the Media Council’s actions did not deprive
the Claimant of its worth, as there has been no physical taking of the
property by the State or because the original Licence ... always has been
held by the original Licensee and kept untouched, is irrelevant. What
was touched and indeed destroyed was the Claimant’s and its
predecessor’s investment as protected by the Treaty. What was destroyed
was the commercial value of the investment ... by reason of coercion
exerted by the Media Council ...111
64. This survey of practice demonstrates clearly that “it is well established under international
law that the taking of a foreign investor’s contractual rights constitutes expropriation or a
measure having an equivalent effect.”112 The law of expropriation proceeds not from a
traditional concept of tangible property but from a broad concept of economic rights that are
necessary for the investor to pursue its business successfully. In the words of Wälde and Kolo:
In modern understanding, the key function of property is less the

tangibility of ‘things’, but rather the capability of a combination of rights
in a commercial and corporate setting and under a regulatory regime to
earn a commercial rate of return.113
5. Breach of Contract and Expropriation
65. A breach of contract by a State may result in severe wealth deprivations on the part of the
investor. As set out above, expropriation may be indirect and the object of an expropriation
may be a contract. Does it follow that every violation of a contract by a government amounts to
an expropriation? The answer is clearly no.
110
At paras. 591-609.
111
At para. 591.
112
S. Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty, The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration
Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, 5 The Journal of World
Investment & Trade 555, 559 (2004).
113
T. Waelde/A. Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International
Law, 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 811, 835 (2001).
24
66. The most important criterion for distinguishing between the simple breach of a contract and
the expropriation of contract rights is whether the State acts in its commercial role as a party to
the contract or in its sovereign capacity.114
67. In the Shufeldt Claim115 the arbitrator found that the abrogation of a concession contract
through the exercise of public authority gave rise to an international claim.116
68. In the Jalapa Railroad case117 the legislature of Veracruz had issued a decree declaring a
vital clause in a contract between the State and the investor to be void. The American Mexican
Claims Commission said:
In the circumstances, the issue for determination is whether the breach of

contract alleged to have resulted from the nullification of clause twelfth
of the contract was an ordinary one involving no international
responsibility or whether said breach was effected arbitrarily by means
of a governmental power illegal under international law ... the 1931
decree of the same Legislature, ... was clearly not an ordinary breach of
contract. Here the Government of Veracruz stepped out of the role of
contracting party and sought to escape vital obligations under its contract
by exercising its superior governmental power. Such action under
international law has been held to be a confiscatory breach of
contract...118
69. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran119 the Iran-US Claims Tribunal dealt with a claim that the
termination of contract rights under a concession agreement constituted an expropriation of
contract rights. The Claimant had asserted that the expropriation had resulted from concerted
actions of the Government of Iran which effectively deprived the Claimant of its property.120
The Tribunal said:
The Tribunal considers that the acts complained of appear more closely
suited to assessment of liability for the taking of foreign-owned property
114
See also T.W. Wälde & K. Hobér, The First Energy Charter Treaty Arbitral Award, 22 Journal of International
Arbitration 98 (2005).
115
Shufeldt Claim, Award, 24 July 1930, 2 RIAA 1079.
116
At pp. 1094-1096.
117
Jalapa Railroad and Power Co., American Mexican Claims Commission, 1948, 8 Whiteman, Digest of
International Law 908-909 (1976).
118
Loc. cit.
119
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 29 June 1989, 21 Iran-US CTR 79.
120
At paras. 89 et seq.
25
under international law than to assessment of the contractual aspects of
the relationship, and so decided to consider the claim in this light.121
70. Consortium RFCC c/ Royaume du Maroc arose from a contract for the construction of a
road. A penalty for late performance, provided for in the contract, had been imposed and a
performance bond had been retained. The Tribunal held that, while it was perfectly possible to
expropriate rights under a contract,122 this had not occurred in the case before it. The Moroccan
partner of the investor had merely exercised rights under the contract and had not acted in a
public capacity. This, the Tribunal pointed out, was evidenced by the fact that there was no
passage of a law, government decree or execution of a judgement.123
71. Waste Management v. Mexico124 arose from a failed concession for the disposal of waste
that involved a number of grievances, including the municipality’s failure to pay its bills,
exclusivity of services, difficulties with a line of credit agreement and proceedings before
Mexican courts. The Tribunal found that there had not been an expropriation. The Tribunal
pointed out that, although the investor had lost some of its benefits, it had at all times retained
the control and use of its property.125 In the Tribunal’s view, the business failed essentially as a
consequence of over-optimistic business assumptions.126 The Tribunal said:
160. In the Tribunal’s view, an enterprise is not expropriated just

because its debts are not paid or other contractual obligations towards it
are breached. There was no outright repudiation of the transaction ...
72. In Waste Management the nearest the Claimant came to showing a repudiation of the
concession contract was a political statement by the mayor that the exclusivity of the investor’s
services ought to be abolished. The Tribunal found that this was not an exercise of legislative
public authority and therefore not tantamount to expropriation.127 The City of Acapulco at no
stage purported to terminate the contract.128
121
At para. 75
122
Paras. 60-62.
123
Paras. 65-66, 69, 85-89.
124
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 April 2004.
125
At para. 159.
126
At para. 160.
127
At para. 161.
128
At para. 165.
26
73. The Tribunal in Waste Management adopted a number of criteria to distinguish mere
contractual non-performance from expropriation. It identified the following three groups of
cases in which an expropriation would be present:
First and perhaps best known are the cases where a whole enterprise is
terminated or frustrated because its functioning is simply halted by
decree or executive act, usually accompanied by other conduct.129
74. The second category, according to the Waste Management Tribunal’s analysis, “are cases
where there has been an acknowledged taking of property, and associated contractual rights are
affected in consequence.”130
75. The third category would be cases “where the only right affected is incorporeal”. The
decisive criterion would be as follows:
The mere non-performance of a contractual obligation is not to be

equated with a taking of property, nor (unless accompanied by other
elements) is it tantamount to expropriation. Any private party can fail to
perform its contracts, whereas nationalization and expropriation are
inherently governmental acts131
76. The Waste Management Tribunal added that “one could envisage conduct tantamount to an
expropriation which consisted of acts and omissions not specifically or exclusively
governmental.”132
77. In SGS v. Philippines133 the investor claims for outstanding payments under a contract for
pre-shipment inspections. The Tribunal said:
161. In the Tribunal’s view, on the material presented by the Claimant

no case of expropriation has been raised. Whatever debt the Philippines
may owe to SGS still exists; whatever right to interest for late payment
SGS had it still has. There has been no law or decree enacted by the
Philippines attempting to expropriate or annul the debt, nor any action
tantamount to an expropriation. The Tribunal is assured that the
limitation period for proceedings to recover the debt before the
Philippine courts under Article 12 has not expired. A mere refusal to pay
a debt is not an expropriation of property, at least where remedies exist
129
At para. 172. Footnotes omitted.
130
At para. 173.
131
At para. 174.
132
Loc. cit.
133
SGS v. Philippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004.
27
in respect of such a refusal. A fortiori a refusal to pay is not an
expropriation where there is an unresolved dispute as to the amount
payable.134
6. Regulatory Measures and Expropriation
78. Regulatory measures that are taken by State authorities in the exercise of their public order
function frequently have negative effects on private property rights including those of foreign
investors. It is impossible to compensate a foreign investor for every measure taken by the host
State that has some adverse effect, however minimal, on its business operation. Such a
requirement would severely impair the State in its sovereign functions. On the other hand, the
fact that a regulatory measure serves some legitimate public purpose cannot automatically lead
to the conclusion that no expropriation has occurred and that, therefore, no compensation is
due.
79. Under most treaty provisions dealing with expropriation including the ECT, the existence
of a public purpose is a requirement for the legality of an expropriation. It follows that a
legitimate public purpose cannot be the basis of an argument that no expropriation has
occurred. Rather, the existence of a public purpose is a requirement for the expropriation's
legality in addition to compensation. Therefore, the task is to identify the line between normal
regulation, the economic consequences of which have to be borne by the investor, and
regulatory expropriation which may be perfectly legal but carries an obligation to compensate.
80. Two criteria lend themselves for establishing the threshold between simple regulation and
regulatory expropriation: one is a quantitative test that looks at the severity of the measure's
effect on the investment. The other is a motive or purpose oriented test that would look for the
existence of an intention to expropriate.
81. Judicial practice indicates that the severity of the economic impact is the decisive criterion
when it comes to deciding whether an indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to
expropriation has taken place. An expropriation occurs if the interference is substantial and
134
Para. 161. Footnote omitted.
28
deprives the investor of all or most of the benefits of the investment. 135 The deprivation would
have to be permanent or for a substantial period of time.136
82. There is broad consensus in academic writings that the intensity and duration of the
economic deprivation is the crucial factor in identifying an indirect expropriation or equivalent
measure.137 Professor Dolzer writes:
No one will seriously doubt that the severity of the impact upon the legal
status, and the practical impact on the owner’s ability to use and enjoy
his property, will be a central factor in determining whether a regulatory
measure effects a taking.138
83. Arbitral Tribunals have consistently looked at the degree and duration of deprivations to
determine whether an expropriation has occurred.139
84. In Metalclad v. Mexico140 the refusal of a construction permit by the municipality had
completely destroyed the investor’s ability to pursue its previously approved project. The
Tribunal found that there had been an indirect expropriation. It said:
135
See also of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Vol. 2, pp. 196, 200
(1986). Section 712 dealing with expropriation, is accompanied by the following Comment g.: "Subsection (1)
applies not only to avowed expropriations in which the government formally takes title to property, but also to other
actions of the government that have the effect of 'taking' the property, in whole or in large part ..." (emphasis added).
See also Annex B para. 4 (a)(i) to the United States 2004 Model BIT which explains that whether action constitutes
an indirect expropriation is determined, among other factors, by “the economic impact of the government action”.
136
For comment on the duration of the deprivation see K. Hobér, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe: Recent
cases on Expropriation, 14 The American Review of International Arbitration 399 (2003).
137
G. H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 88 AJIL 585, 588, 593, 609 (1994); R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID
Review-Foreign Investment Law Journal 48/49 (1986); G. H. Sampliner, Arbitration of Expropriation Cases Under
U.S. Investment Treaties – A Threat to Democracy or the Dog That Didn’t Bark?, 18 ICSID Review-Foreign
Investment Law Journal 1, 11-13 (2003); T. Waelde/A. Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and
‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law, 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 811, 837/38 (2001); B.
H. Weston, “Constructive Takings” under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of “Creeping
Expropriation”, 16 Virginia Journal of International Law 103, 119/20 (1975); R. Dolzer/M. Stevens, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, p. 100 (1995); K. Hobér, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe, op. cit. at p. 418
138
R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations : New Developments? 11 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 64, 79 (2002).
139
See also the First ECT Arbitral Award, 16 December 2003 (unpublished). It is reported that "[t]he tribunal stated
that the decisive factor in drawing the line between expropriation and legitimate government measures must
primarily be the degree of possession-taking or control over the enterprise that the disputed measures give rise to."
See K. Hobér, Investment Arbitration in Eastern Europe: Recent cases on Expropriation, 14 The American Review
of International Arbitration 377, 438, 441 (2003). See also T.W. Wälde & K. Hobér, The First Energy Charter Treaty
Arbitral Award, 22 Journal of International Arbitration 83, 89 (2005).
140
29
… expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and
acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or
obligatory transfer of title in favor of the host State, but also covert or
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or
reasonably-to-be expected economic benefit of property …141
85. In Wena Hotels v. Egypt,142 the Tribunal found that the seizure of the investor’s hotel
lasting for nearly a year was not “ephemeral” but amounted to an expropriation.143
86. In CME v. Czech Republic144 the Tribunal, citing Metalclad, referred to indirect
expropriation as
... covert or incidental interference with use of property which has the
effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use
or reasonably to be expected economic benefit of property ...145
87. Tecmed v. Mexico,146 concerned the revocation of a license for the operation of a landfill.
The Tribunal found that the failure to renew the operating permit had violated Article 5 of the
Mexico-Spain BIT protecting investors from expropriation or equivalent measures. The
Tribunal said:
115. To establish whether the Resolution is a measure equivalent to an

expropriation under the terms of section 5(1) of the Agreement, it must
be first determined if the Claimant, due to the Resolution, was radically
deprived of the economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if
the rights related thereto—such as the income or benefits related to the
Landfill or to its exploitation—had ceased to exist. In other words, if due
to the actions of the Respondent, the assets involved have lost their value
or economic use for their holder and the extent of the loss. This
determination is important because it is one of the main elements to
distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, between
a regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of
the state’s police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a
de facto expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real
substance. 147
141
At para. 103. Emphasis added.
142
Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award, 8 December 2000, 6 ICSID Reports 68.
143
At para. 99.
144
145
At para. 606. Emphasis added.
146
(2004).
147
At para. 115 citing Pope & Talbot. Footnote omitted.
30
88. Therefore, the Tribunal distinguished between a radical or total deprivation of the
investment and a mere decrease of rights as a consequence of regulatory action. Regulatory
measures would amount to de facto expropriation if their effects are permanent and total:
... the measures adopted by a State, whether regulatory or not, are an

indirect de facto expropriation if they are irreversible and permanent and
if the assets or rights subject to such measure have been affected in such
a way that “…any form of exploitation thereof…” has disappeared; i.e.
the economic value of the use, enjoyment or disposition of the assets or
rights affected by the administrative action or decision have been
neutralized or destroyed. Under international law, the owner is also
deprived of property where the use or enjoyment of benefits related
thereto is exacted or interfered with to a similar extent, even where legal
ownership over the assets in question is not affected, and so long as the
deprivation is not temporary.148
89. Consortium RFCC c/ Royaume du Maroc149 arose from a contract for the construction of a
road. A penalty for late performance, provided for in the contract, had been imposed and a
performance bond had been retained. In discussing the existence of an indirect expropriation,
the Tribunal emphasized that the measures needed to have a certain intensity to qualify as
measures equivalent to an expropriation:
Les effets des mesures prises doivent avoir une certaine intensité pour
que celles-ci puissent être qualifiées de mesures équivalentes à
l’expropriation.150
90. The measures would have to show substantial effects and an intensity that reduces or
removes the benefits of the investment to a point that renders them useless:
... effets substantiels d’une intensité certaine qui réduisent et/ou font
disparaître les bénéfices légitimement attendus de l’exploitation des
droits objets de ladite mesure à un point tel qu’ils rendent la détention de
ces droits inutile.151
91. The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has also adopted the approach of looking at the severity of
the deprivation in order to determine whether an indirect expropriation has occurred. In Starrett
Housing v. Iran152 the Tribunal found that the appointment of a “temporary manager” by the
148
At para. 116 citing decisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Tippetts and Phelps Dodge. Footnote omitted.
149
Consortium RFCC c/ Royaume du Maroc, Award, 22 December 2003.
150
At para. 67.
151
At para. 69.
152
31
authorities of Iran amounted to an expropriation. The decisive criterion was whether the State
did
… interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are
rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been
expropriated.153
92. In the Tippetts case154 it was not the appointment by the government of an Iranian manager
that was seen as an expropriation, but the degree of interference by the manager with the
owners’ property rights that constituted a taking of property:
While assumption of control over property by a government does not

automatically and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has
been taken by the government … such a conclusion is warranted
whenever events demonstrate that the owner was deprived of
fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is
not merely ephemeral.155
93. The European Court of Human Rights has developed a similar doctrine which adopts the
degree of interference with property rights as the decisive criterion for deciding whether an
individual has been “deprived of his possessions”. In Papamichalopoulos and Others v.
Greece156 the Applicant’s land had been taken over by the Navy which had set up facilities on
it. Although there was never any formal expropriation, the Court found that the previous
owners had become entirely unable to make any use of their property. The Court said:
45. The Court considers that the loss of all ability to dispose of the land
in issue, taken together with the failure of the attempts made so far to
remedy the situation complained of, entailed sufficiently serious
consequences for the applicants de facto to have been expropriated in a
manner incompatible with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their
possessions.157
94. This approach of looking at the severity of the economic consequences of a measure is
reinforced by cases in which the tribunals determined that the effect of adverse government
action was not sufficiently serious or sufficiently permanent to amount to an expropriation.
153
At p. 154. See also G. H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AJIL 585, 588 (1994).
154
Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 22
June 1984, 6 Iran-US CTR 219.
155
At p. 225.
156
Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece, Eur.Ct.H.R., 24 June 1993, A/260-B.
157
Para. 45.
32
95. In Pope & Talbot v. Canada158 the investor had complained about an export control regime
that reduced its ability to export a product. The Tribunal found that the regulatory measures did
not constitute an expropriation since they were not sufficiently substantial.159 The Tribunal said:
102. Even accepting (for the purpose of this analysis) the allegations of
the Investor concerning diminished profits, the Tribunal concludes that
the degree of interference with the Investment’s operations due to the
Export Control regime does not rise to an expropriation (creeping or
otherwise) within the meaning of Article 1110. While it may sometimes
be uncertain whether a particular interference with business activities
amounts to an expropriation, the test is whether that interference is
sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property has been
“taken” from the owner. … under international law, expropriation
requires a “substantial deprivation”160
96. In S.D. Myers v. Canada161 the investor’s ability to export hazardous waste for disposal was
affected by an export ban that lasted for eighteen months. The Tribunal said:
283. An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability

of an owner to make use of its economic rights although it may be that,
in some contexts and circumstances, it would be appropriate to view a
deprivation as amounting to an expropriation, even if it were partial or
temporary.162
97. In view of the temporary nature of the measure, the Tribunal found that there had not been
an expropriation.
98. Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine163 concerned a construction project for an office building.
The main complaint was the failure by the Kyiv City State Administration to provide lease
agreements. The Tribunal said:
20.32 The Tribunal finds that the conduct of the Kyiv City State
Administration ... does not come close to creating a persistent or
irreparable obstacle to the Claimant’s use, enjoyment or disposal of its
investment.164
158
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award, 26 June 2000, 7 ICSID Reports 69.
159
At para. 96.
160
161
S. D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award, 13 November 2000, 40 ILM (2001) 1408.
162
Para. 283.
163
Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003.
164
At para. 20.32.
33
99. The standard of a “persistent or irreparable obstacle to the investor’s use, enjoyment or
disposal of its investment” appears to be a useful standard for the question of whether a
deprivation rises to the level of an expropriation or equivalent measure.
100. In Occidental v. Ecuador165 the claim was directed at the inconsistent practice of the
Respondent’s authorities in reimbursing value added tax. The Tribunal denied that this
amounted to an expropriation. After quoting from the Metalclad and CME cases, the Tribunal
said:
... there has been no deprivation of the use or reasonably expected

economic benefit of the investment, let alone measures affecting a
significant part of the investment. The criterion of “substantial
deprivation” under international law identified in Pope & Talbot is not
present in the instant case.166
101. In GAMI v. Mexico167 a number of sugar mills had been expropriated temporarily by
the government. The Tribunal said:
With knowledge of the magnitude of diminution one might be in a

position to consider whether a line is to be drawn beyond which the loss
is so great as to constitute a taking. But GAMI has staked its case on the
proposition that the wrong done to it did in fact destroy the whole value
of its investment. ... This posture is untenable. The Tribunal cannot be
indifferent to the true effect on the value of the investment of the
allegedly wrongful act. ... GAMI has not proved that its investment was
expropriated for the purposes of Article 1110.168
102. In CMS v. Argentina169 the claim concerned the suspension by Argentina of a tariff
adjustment formula for gas transportation applicable to an enterprise in which the claimant had
an investment. The Tribunal denied the existence of an expropriation even though it admitted
that the measures under dispute had an important effect on the Claimant's business.170 The
Tribunal found that
[t]he essential question is [...] to establish whether the enjoyment of the

property has been effectively neutralized. The standard that a number of
165
Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, Award, 1 July 2004.
166
167
Gami v. The Government of the United Mexican States, 15 November 2004.
168
At para. 133.
169
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, Award, 12 May 2005.
170
At para. 260.
34
tribunals have applied in recent cases where indirect expropriation has
been contended is that of substantial deprivation.171
103. After citing Lauder, Metalclad, Tippetts, CME and Pope & Talbot, the Tribunal
accepted Argentina's argument that the investor was in control of the investment, that the
Government did not manage the day-to-day operations of the company and that the investor had
full ownership and control of the investment.172
104. In Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden173 the authorities had announced plans for the
expropriation of the Applicants’ properties and had imposed a construction ban. The European
Court of Human Rights held that the effect of these measures was not sufficiently severe to
amount to an expropriation. The Court said:
In the Court’s opinion, all the effects complained of ( ... ) stemmed from
the reduction of the possibility of disposing of the properties concerned.
Those effects were occasioned by limitations imposed on the right of
property, which right had become precarious, and from the consequences
of those limitations on the value of the premises. However, although the
right in question lost some of its substance, it did not disappear. The
effects of the measures involved are not such that they can be assimilated
to a deprivation of possessions. ...174
105. Another approach would be to look at the intention of a government to expropriate.

Such an approach has not found general acceptance. For one thing, intent to expropriate would
be difficult to prove. A government’s protestation that it never meant to expropriate cannot be
decisive. As Professor Dolzer wrote:
... the mere post-event statement of a government that a taking was not
intended cannot, in itself, carry in the weight in the relevant analysis.175
106. One solution might be to infer intent from the facts. Thus, if all the circumstances
point towards a plan to deprive the investor of its investment, an underlying motive to
expropriate can be construed. In the words of K.A. Byrne:
In the case of a de jure nationalization, there is express intent to

expropriate; in the case of a de facto nationalization, the intent is latent,
171
At para. 262.
172
At paras. 261-264.
173
Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Eur.Ct.H.R., 23 September 1982, A 52 (1982).
174
At para. 63.
175
R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations : New Developments? 11 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 90 (2002).
35
yet can be determined from an examination of all the circumstances, in
particular, the result of government measures.176
107. Another approach is to deny the relevance of an intention to expropriate, whether that
intention is explicit or implicit. This latter approach is prevalent in international practice. It is
termed the “sole effect doctrine”.177 Under this approach, an expropriation may take place
without or regardless of any intention to expropriate on the part of the host State. Professor
Reisman and R.D. Sloane call this form of taking a “consequential expropriation”. They write:
In consequential expropriations, states do not form an express intent to

expropriate; indeed, they may not have such an intent at all. Even though
a state’s responsibility to pay compensation for expropriation does not,
in any event, ‘depend on proof that the expropriation was intentional’,
the manifestation of that intent at some level of the state’s government
generally furnishes a tribunal with a useful demarcation.178
108. International judicial practice is almost unanimous in holding that an intention of the
host State to expropriate is not essential. Professor Christie in his seminal study on
expropriation179 summarized the issue of intent to expropriate in the Certain German Interests
in Polish Upper Silesia (Chorzów Factory) Case180 and in the Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims
Case181 in the following terms:
The Norwegian Claims and the German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia
cases show that a State may expropriate property, where it interferes
with it, even though the State expressly disclaims any such intention.
More important, the two cases taken together illustrate that even though
a State may not purport to interfere with rights to property, it may, by its
actions, render those rights so useless that it will be deemed to have
expropriated them.182
109. In Biloune v. Ghana183 the authorities had issued a stop work order, demolished part
of the project and arrested and expelled the investor. The Tribunal said:
176
K. A. Byrne, Regulatory Expropriation and State Intent, 38 Canadian YBIL 89, 96 (2000).
177
R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations pp. 64, 79/80.
178
W. M. Reisman/R. D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the BIT Generation 74 The British Year
Book of International Law 130/31(2003). Footnote omitted.
179
G. C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law?, 38 British Year Book of
International Law 305, 310 (1962).
180
181
Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway v. United States), Award, 13 October 1922, 1 RIAA 307.
182
Christie, op.cit. at p. 311. See also R. Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
International Law, 176 Recueil des Cours 259, 322-323 (1982-III).
183
36
The motivations for the actions and omissions of Ghanaian
governmental authorities are not clear. But the Tribunal need not
establish those motivations to come to a conclusion in this case.184
110. The Tribunal held that the effect of these actions in causing an irreparable cessation
of work on the project was enough for a holding that there had been a constructive
expropriation.185
111. In Metalclad v. Mexico186 the Tribunal identified as an additional ground for its
finding of expropriation an Ecological Decree that had the effect of barring forever the
operation of the investor’s landfill. The Tribunal said:
111. The Tribunal need not decide or consider the motivation or intent of
the adoption of the Ecological Decree.187
112. Tecmed v. Mexico,188 has been discussed above. The Tribunal found that there had
been an indirect expropriation. After explaining the concept of indirect or de facto
expropriation, the Tribunal said:
The government’s intention is less important than the effects of the

measures on the owner of the assets or on the benefits arising from such
assets affected by the measures; and the form of the deprivation measure
is less important than its actual effects.189
113. Important authority for the “sole effect doctrine” or “consequential expropriations”
also comes from the practice of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal.190 In Starrett Housing v. Iran191
the Tribunal said:
184
At p. 209.
185
Loc. cit.
186
187
Para. 111. See also the discussion by W. M. Reisman/R. D. Sloane, Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the
BIT Generation 74 The British Year Book of International Law 126-127 (2003).
188
(2004).
189
At para. 116 citing the decisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Tippetts and Phelps Dodge. Footnote omitted.
190
A counterexample is sometimes perceived in Sea-Land Service Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran-US
Claims Tribunal, 20 June 1984, 6 Iran-US CTR 149. In that case the Tribunal said: “A finding of expropriation
would require, at the very least, that the Tribunal be satisfied that there was deliberate government interference with
the conduct of Sea-Land’s operation, the effect of which was to deprive Sea-Land of the use and benefit of its
investment.” At p. 166. See especially G. H. Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The
Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 88 AJIL 585, 603 (1994). A closer reading of the passage
would suggest that the Tribunal did not require intent to expropriate. It is the government interference as such that
would have to be deliberate. For the deprivation of the use and benefit of the investment it is the effect that is
decisive.
191
Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 19 Dec. 1983, 4 Iran-US CTR 122.
37
… it is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State
can interfere with property rights to such an extent that these rights are
rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been expropriated,
even though the State does not purport to have expropriated them and
the legal title to the property formally remains with the original owner.192
114. In the Tippetts case193 the Tribunal said in an often quoted passage:
The intent of the government is less important than the effects of the
measures on the owner, and the form of the measures of control or
interference is less important than the reality of their impact.194
115. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran195 the Tribunal, after summarizing the measures
taken by the authorities of Iran against the Claimant, said:
97. The effects of these events on the Claimant’s property are not in
dispute.196
116. Then, after quoting the above passage in Tippets, it said:
Therefore, the Tribunal need not determine the intent of the Government
of Iran;197... a government’s liability to compensate for expropriation of
alien property does not depend on proof that the expropriation was
intentional, ...198
117. Professor Dolzer, after an examination of the relevant practice, concludes as follows:
… the more recent jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals reveals a

remarkable tendency to shift the focus of the analysis away from the
context and the purpose and focus more heavily on the effects on the
owner.199
118. A rare exception that seems to point to the relevance of intent is Olguín v. Republic of
Paraguay.200 In that case the Claimant had purchased “investment bonds” upon which the State
192
At p. 154. Emphasis added.
193
Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 22
June 1984, 6 Iran-US CTR 219.
194
At pp. 225/26. The passage was quoted in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 19 March 1986,
10 Iran-US CTR 121, 130, in Payne v. Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 8 August 1986, 12 Iran-US CTR 3, 11 and in
International Systems & Controls Corp. v. Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 26 September 1986, 12 Iran-US CTR 239,
263.
195
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Iran, Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 29 June 1989, 21 Iran-US CTR 79.
196
At para. 97.
197
Loc. cit.
198
At para. 98.
199
R. Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations : New Developments? 11 N.Y.U. Environmental Law Journal 64, 91 (2002).
200
Award, 26 July 2001, 6 ICSID Reports 192.
38
had defaulted. The Tribunal found that there had not been an expropriation but merely a
business loss due to a financial crisis. It added in an obiter dictum: “Expropriation therefore
requires a teleologically driven action for it to occur; omissions, however egregious they may
be, are not sufficient for it to take place.”201 The context suggests that the Tribunal’s point was
that mere non-payment of a debt did not constitute an expropriation. The words “teleologically
driven action” may suggest the requirement of an intention to expropriate. But it is also possible
that what the Tribunal meant was simply that there had to be some positive action rather than a
mere omission.
119. It follows from the above analysis that for the determination of whether an
expropriation has occurred, the decisive standard is the effect of the measures on the investor’s
property. An intention to expropriate is not necessary. The purpose or motive, including a
purpose that serves the public interest, is not decisive. This is not to say that the existence of a
legitimate public purpose for an expropriation is irrelevant. Absence of legitimate purpose
would inject an element of illegality that should lead to an award of damages which would be
conceptually different from and possibly higher than compensation.
201
At para. 84.
39

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CL-0272

The Concept of Expropriation under the ETC

1. Expropriations, in order to be legal, must be in the public interest, non-discriminatory,

4. Direct expropriations or nationalizations have become relatively rare. The unfavorable

It is not the physical invasion of property that characterizes

(ii) Expropriation and Similar Measures

1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an

9. Most bilateral investment treaties also contain provision on indirect expropriation or

The expropriation clause in most BITs therefore commonly includes

Such apparent reluctance to attempt a definition of “expropriation” in the

In our view the effects of the Jamaican Government’s actions in

Given the central role of Mr Biloune in promoting, financing and

… it is recognized in international law that measures taken by a State can interfere

A deprivation or taking of property may occur under international law

103. Thus, expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open,

The primary meaning of the word “tantamount” given by the Oxford

Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures depriving, directly or

The Tribunal said:

Indirect expropriation or nationalization is a measure that does not

114. Generally, it is understood that the term “…equivalent to

States’ obligations with respect to “property” and “the use of property”

143. It may be noted that Article 1110(1) distinguishes between direct or

In the absence of formal expropriation, that is to say a transfer of

In short, international tribunals, jurists, and scholars have consistently

Discrete acts, analyzed in isolation rather than in the context of the

... the period of time involved in the process may vary—from an

… a ‘creeping’ expropriation is comprised of a number of elements,

This type of expropriation does not necessarily take place gradually or

20.22 Creeping expropriation is a form of indirect expropriation with a

48. The ILC’s Commentary on this provision states that

Paragraph 1 of article 15 defines the time at which a composite act

4. Expropriation of Intangible Property

[T]he taking away or destruction of rights acquired, transmitted, and

The order contained in the letter of August 3rd expressly requisitioned

… rely on precedents in international law in which cases measures of

… whether the expropriation is formal or de facto and whether the

166. Decisions of international claims tribunals have been to the same

Expropriation, which can be defined as a compulsory transfer of property

whether the expropriation is formal or de facto and whether the property is

98. It is also well established that an expropriation is not limited to

… the Respondent’s obligations with respect to “investment” relate not

In modern understanding, the key function of property is less the

5. Breach of Contract and Expropriation

In the circumstances, the issue for determination is whether the breach of

160. In the Tribunal’s view, an enterprise is not expropriated just

The mere non-performance of a contractual obligation is not to be

161. In the Tribunal’s view, on the material presented by the Claimant

6. Regulatory Measures and Expropriation

115. To establish whether the Resolution is a measure equivalent to an

... the measures adopted by a State, whether regulatory or not, are an

While assumption of control over property by a government does not

283. An expropriation usually amounts to a lasting removal of the ability

... there has been no deprivation of the use or reasonably expected

With knowledge of the magnitude of diminution one might be in a

[t]he essential question is [...] to establish whether the enjoyment of the

105. Another approach would be to look at the intention of a government to expropriate.

In the case of a de jure nationalization, there is express intent to

In consequential expropriations, states do not form an express intent to

The government’s intention is less important than the effects of the