(Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics) Chih-Mao Tang - Small States and Hegemonic Competition in Southeast Asia_ Pursuing Autonomy, Security and Development Amid Great Pow
(Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics) Chih-Mao Tang - Small States and Hegemonic Competition in Southeast Asia_ Pursuing Autonomy, Security and Development Amid Great Pow
(Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics) Chih-Mao Tang - Small States and Hegemonic Competition in Southeast Asia_ Pursuing Autonomy, Security and Development Amid Great Pow
Southeast Asia
In the last few decades, Southeast Asia has become generally more peaceful
and more prosperous, with progress in economic development, regional
cooperation and integration. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), in particular, plays a leading role within and beyond the region
in promoting multilateral cooperation in both security and economic
matters. All these developments progress amid increasing hegemonic
competition between the US and China for regional dominance in the Asia-
Pacific region. According to the realist viewpoint of international politics,
Southeast Asian states can do nothing but choose sides at the expense of
international political autonomy in order to maintain their national interests.
However, in this book Chih-Mao Tang argues that in fact there exists an
opportunity for Southeast Asian states to simultaneously reinforce their
military security, economic development and international political
autonomy in face of the US–China hegemonic competition.
Drawing on the ideas of power transition theory and recent works of
capitalist peace, Tang argues that small states can exploit the competition
between great powers to make economic gains and ensure security while
maintaining their autonomy. He outlines the necessity of cooperation
among these small states and of economic liberalization for the
effectiveness of these reinforcing dynamics, applying policy and
econometric analyses to a wide range of qualitative and quantitative data.
Chih-Mao Tang
First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
The right of Chih-Mao Tang to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by
any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including
photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are
used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
Typeset in Galliard
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
For my parents:
Tang Ching-Fu and Tang Wei Chin-Chih
Contents
Acknowledgments
List of abbreviations
1 Introduction
Small states’ pursuit of autonomy, security, and development in the
Asia-Pacific region
Theoretical argument
A brief note on research design
Book outline
6 Conclusion
Index
Acknowledgments
AC ASEAN Community
ACFTA ASEAN–China Free Trade Area
AEC ASEAN Economic Community
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AMM ASEAN Ministers’ Meeting
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN- ASEAN Post-Ministerial conference
PMC
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
BTA Bilateral Trade Agreement
CINC composite index of national capability
COC Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
COW Correlates of War
CPV Communist Party of Vietnam
DOC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea
DOTS Direction of Trade Statistics
EAI Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative
EAS East Asia Summit
EDCA Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
EFW Economic Freedom of the World
FDI foreign direct investment
FTA free trade agreement
HPA Hanoi Plan of Action
IMET International Military Education Training program
LMC Lancang–Mekong Cooperation
LMI Lower Mekong Initiatives
MID Militarized Interstate Dispute
NSS National Security Strategy
OBOR One Belt One Road
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
TIFA Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
The leading role that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
has played in architecting and advancing regional security multilateralism
and economic cooperation for regional peace and prosperity has been one of
the remarkable developments in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold
War era.1 ASEAN states, a group of small states in terms of economic and
military capabilities,2 have significantly advanced the regional economic
and security cooperation of Southeast Asia and placed their economic
development on an ascending trajectory. They have also extended
cooperation and integration beyond Southeast Asia by including the key
Asia-Pacific countries, such as Australia, China, Japan, and the United
States, under the ASEAN-led multilateralism, which heightens
their regional autonomy to some extent in the process. Over the past two
and a half decades, Southeast Asia has witnessed a gradual advance in
regional cooperation and integration, including the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) agreement, initiated in 1992 and implemented in 2010,
ASEAN enlargement, which includes Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and
Vietnam during the second half of the 1990s, and the ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC), effective as of 2015.
Summit (EAS). Southeast Asian states have also become less willing to use
violent military measures to settle
their role in the Asia-Pacific regional order have been the primary motives
prompting Southeast Asian states to act collectively through ASEAN-led
multilateral mechanisms. The ASEAN states succeeded in placing
themselves at the center of regional development to foster a regional
development trajectory that favors their international security, economic
development, and international political status. If we look at it through the
lens of conventional realist international theory that emphasizes the
competence of great powers and assumes that small states can do nothing
more than choose sides between great powers in world
ASEAN states have been striving to accomplish. The objective of this study
is to explain and theorize about how this development was propelled in
Southeast Asia.
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became the most
powerful state in the world. However, in the Asia-Pacific region, US
supremacy, bolstered by its mighty military force and strong alliances and
economic ties, soon faced a growing challenge from China, whose rapid
economic and military growth triggered a shift in the regional distribution
of power and changes in the regional order. China’s high rate of economic
growth has been critical in Beijing’s pursuit to become a great power in the
post-Cold War period. Consequently, the basic tenant of China’s foreign
policy during the 1990s and through the 2000s was to maintain a stable and
peaceful
The hidden rationale here is that China wants to gradually change its role
from participant to conductor as it increases its involvement in the
development of regional multilateralism. Great national capability has
moved
China to the front line of world affairs and piqued its desire to seek
corresponding power and influence by
establishing its own alliance network in order to shape regional order in
favor of its national interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Over the past two
and a half decades, China’s relations
proactive and assertive policy, from the Peaceful Rising under Hu Jintao
from 2002–2012.4 This change is evidenced in China’s attitudes and actions
in dealing with maritime disputes in the South China Sea, such as the
militarization of its claimed islands and reefs, and its Silk Road Fund and
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is created to
support its far-reaching economic project, One Belt (the Silk Road
Economic Belt) and One Road (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road),
together known as the OBOR.5 The Maritime Silk Road goes through
Southeast Asia. Although China’s regional policy is gradually becoming
assertive, the charm offensive policy
(TAC)7 in 2009, regularly attended the ARF and the EAS, held
markets are essentials. As the factory to the world, China has been an
overwhelming competitor of Southeast Asian states for world markets and
investment. Nonetheless, since China has been attempting to reduce the
perception that it poses an economic threat and has wanted to foster positive
reciprocal economic relationships with
This has allowed Southeast Asian states to acquire needed capital and
markets from China or through China from the world. Furthermore, US
economic engagement has also helped channel foreign investment into the
region. That is to say, the competition between the US and China helps
generate trade and investment for Southeast Asia. The risk-averse and
profit-seeking nature of foreign investors has served to encourage the
facilitation of regional cooperation and integration among ASEAN states to
manage regional security as well as make the region
regional security. But the risk is partly mitigated by the US’s explicit
counterbalance to China’s expansionist military actions and China’s own
economic interests in the region, and partly by the collective effort on the
Asia and also enlarges the strategic autonomy and international political
autonomy of Southeast Asian states in regional affairs.
On the other hand, Southeast Asian states today are either currently
adopting or gradually moving toward a liberal capitalist route of economic
development. Employing this approach to development, they will be driven
to improve their domestic environments to facilitate investment and trade
and create open and safe investment
Theoretical argument
As noted, what has happened in Southeast Asia makes for an intriguing case
in our understanding of international interactions. In conventional power-
oriented realist thought, great powers are central actors in steering and
shaping the international system, while small states are passive actors that
conform to the agendas and
material power dominates. They will either ally with one great power
against another threatening great power
system along agendas that help reinforce its international status and power.
Hence, when in alliance activities a state is willing to exchange its
autonomy for security and another is willing to exchange its security for
Although small states might seem fated to accept this type of asymmetric
relationship, it is not necessarily inevitable. The autonomy–security trade-
off between small states and great powers may hinge on the anticipated
trajectory of economic development of small states and hegemonic
competition between great powers. Small states can acquire security
without conceding autonomy—and can even bolster their autonomy—in
their relationships with great powers when they pursue liberal capitalist
economic development and cooperation and when great powers
cooperation with open, free, and efficient institutions. In other words, the
pursuit of liberal capitalist
cost of leaving the status quo can be compensated by the benefit gained
from joining the new status quo that is being established by the rising
power. The dominant power will also offer security and economic benefits
in an attempt to incorporate the rising power’s allies, or at least distance
them from the rising power. In other
words, both the dominant power and the rising power will hesitate at the
idea of using aggression in their
existing allies and making new allies. This creates political and strategic
space for small states to set a
dominant power.
The promotion of strategic and political status, on the other hand, gives
small states leverage when bargaining with great powers for more security,
economic benefits, and autonomy, as well as for cultivating a setting for
political and security development that can help consolidate and reinforce
this promotion of favorable
cooperation so that they can have greater bargaining power to sustain the
promotion of their international
status, which in turn can help them gain better terms for economic and
security interests from great powers.
This study tests the proposed theoretical argument against ten Southeast
Asian states: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. East Timor, which only
recently became independent, is not included in this book due to the lack of
data and information required for empirical analysis. Both quantitative and
qualitative research methods were used to examine the relationships of the
variables of theoretical interest. Regression analysis, the quantitative
method employed here, allows the
chapters.9
Book outline
This book consists primarily of one theoretical chapter and three empirical
chapters. Chapter 2 begins by discussing the formation of asymmetric
relations between small states and great powers. Then it develops a
reinforcing logic of economic development, military security, and
international political autonomy for small states in the international system,
taking into account the effects of the great power competition in the power
transition scenario and the liberal capitalist economic development of small
states. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 provide empirical investigations to test the
reinforcing logic by analyzing the evolution of international interactions
between Southeast Asian states, China, and the US in terms of foreign
policies, economic exchanges, security relations, and diplomatic
interactions. Chapter 3 analyzes the evolution of policies of the US and
China toward Southeast Asia and offers explanation of the effect of US–
China competition on regional cooperation of Southeast Asia, which is then
followed by a quantitative empirical analysis. Chapter 4 appraises the
implications of competing variables, namely democracy, economic
interdependence, and the ASEAN security management, on Southeast
Asian peace, and then it discusses the pacifying effect of Southeast Asian
states’ pursuit of liberal capitalist economic development on regional
interstate conflict. Then, a quantitative empirical analysis is employed to
compare and assess the proposed argument with the competing theories.
Chapter 5 discusses the autonomy of small states and explains how and why
small states can promote their autonomy when faced with great powers in
the international system. Based on the designed operationalization of a
state’s international political and strategic autonomy, it examines the effect
of US–China competition on the promotion of international political
autonomy and strategic autonomy of Southeast Asian states through the
lens of the case of the ARF and individual country cases, including the
Philippines and Vietnam, during the post-Cold War period. It concludes by
reviewing key findings and draws out some broader implications of this
study for scholarship of international security and cooperation as well as
international relations of the Asia-Pacific region.
Notes
1 Unless otherwise noted, the term “ASEAN states” refers to Southeast Asian states that were the
member states of ASEAN at the time. For instance, prior to 1995 the term “ASEAN states”
refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Brunei, but after 1999 it
includes Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia.
2 Throughout this book, the term “small states” refers to countries with relatively small or weak
economic and military capabilities and a lower degree of international autonomy than that of
great powers. Further discussion on the definition of a small state is given in Chapter 2.
3 RCEP was initiated with the ASEAN Framework for Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership, passed in the 19th ASEAN leaders’ meeting in 2011, formally set off in 2012, and
began the first round of negotiation in 2013. It was built on the existing ASEAN + 1 Free Trade
Agreements (FTA).
4 To avoid controversy, the Chinese government soon exchanged the word “rise” for
“development” in its official propaganda, because the word “rise” can be interpreted as
suggesting expansion and threat.
5 When Xi Jinping visited four Central Asian countries (Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
and Kyrgyzstan) in September 2013, he proposed in a speech in Kazakhstan that China would
cooperate with Central Asian countries in the construction and development of the “Silk Road
Economic Belt” (also called the “New Silk Road”). When he visited Indonesia that same year,
he indicated that China would create the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (also called the
“New Maritime Silk Road”) to strengthen maritime cooperation with ASEAN countries. After
that, the OBOR initiative was formally incorporated into future key tasks of the Chinese
government during the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party and the Central Economic Work Conference held in 2013.
6 The TPP, a regional trade agreement connecting Asia, the Pacific, and Latin America, grew out
of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement between New Zealand,
Singapore, Chile, and Brunei in 2005. It is a “high-quality” FTA which involves a wide range of
trading issues, requires the complete opening up of domestic markets, and integrates regional
supply chains. However, the Trump Administration has withdrew the US from the TPP in 2017,
which has not only caused interruption to the establishment of the TPP but also undermined the
confidence of the US’s regional allies about Washington’s commitment to the region. But since
it is still not clear about the Trump Administration’s alternative to dealing with the US economic
relations in the Asia-Pacific region, it might be too arbitrary and early to conclude that US is
retreating from the region. It is also too early to predict the death of the TPP, because Japan now
has taken the leadership from the US in facilitating its establishment.
7 The TAC comprises of the following principles which constitute “the ASEAN Way”: (i) mutual
respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all nations; (ii) the right of
every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, and
coercion; (iii) noninterference in the internal affairs of other states; (iv) settlement of differences
and disputes by peaceful means; and (v) renunciation of the use of force (ASEAN 1976).
8 The terms “autonomy” and “security,” as used in Morrow’s article, are abstract concepts. For
explanations of the two concepts and their application to this study, see further discussion in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.
9 Since the empirical chapters employ different methods using different types of data for different
variables, for the convenience of reading and understanding, individual research design is given
for each chapter, instead of providing an independent methodological chapter.
References
ASEAN, 1976. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. Bali, Indonesia. Available
from: http://asean.org/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976/
[accessed 2 June 2016].
Eckstein, H., 1975. Case Studies and Theory in Political Science. In: F. Greenstein and N. Polsby,
eds. Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 79–138.
Kivimäki, T., 2016. The Long Peace of East Asia. New York: Routledge.
Morrow, J. D., 1991. Alliances and asymmetry: an alternative to the capability aggregation model of
alliances. American Journal of Political Science, 35(4), 904–933.
Tønnesson, S., 2017. Explaining the East Asian Peace: A Research Story: Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
Walt, S. M., 1985. Alliance formation and the balance of world power. International Security, 9(4),
3–43.
Waltz, K. N., 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
2 Small states’ autonomy, security, and
development
A reinforcing logic
Introduction
The asymmetric relationship between the small state and great power
According to the power transition (the PT) theory (Kugler and Lemke 1996,
2000; Lemke 2002; Organski 1958; Tammen et al. 2000), the world is
hierarchical in the form of a pyramid, consisting of a few strong states and
many weak states in terms of composite capabilities. The strongest state is
the dominant power that develops, conducts, and manages the hierarchical
ordered patterns, i.e., the status quo, in which economic, diplomatic, and
military relations between most states in the world are embedded. In other
words, the status quo is a global cooperation network or an alliance network
managed by the dominant power to reinforce its power in the international
system. The status quo of the international system is also an international
projection of the domestic arrangements of political and economic
resources of the dominant power. Superior capabilities enable the dominant
power to shore up the status quo that can reinforce its internal development
and subsequently its international dominance. In addition to superior
national capabilities, the stability of the status quo also hinges on the
support of subordinate states which is determined by their satisfaction with
or evaluation of the status quo. The PT theory argues that subordinate states
are willing to stay being led by the dominant power because they are
satisfied with benefits obtained from the status quo and share common
interests and compatible preferences with the dominant power. In other
words, if the status quo cannot continually generate sufficient benefits to
satisfy subordinate states, they could contemplate deviating from the status
quo, possibly weakening and deconstructing the status quo. Hence, to keep
the status quo stable, the dominant power will undertake whatever tasks and
efforts are necessary to ensure that the status quo continues to satisfy
subordinate states. It is unlikely, however, that the dominant power’s values
and interests will be unanimously accepted by all states in the international
system or that the operation of the status quo will satisfy all subordinate
states all the time. There are always dissatisfied states that either want to
modify the operational patterns of the status quo or seek to construct an
alternative one in order to have their preferences, interests, and values
realized.
According to the PT theory, the change in power distribution between
the dominant power and the rising power will prompt the latter’s quest to
change the status quo, in effect challenging the former, especially when the
rising power is not satisfied with the status quo. This shift of power is
caused by the rising power’s rapid economic growth that is driven by its
internal development of industrialization. Growing economic development
helps the rising power foster economic and military competence in world
politics. In addition to the promotion of internal power, establishing an
alliance network externally is another primary foundation for recasting the
existing power distribution (Kim 1991). Those who join the newly
developing status quo being formed by the rising power will add impetus to
accelerate the formation of a new power-reinforcing pattern for the rising
power. In other words, internal and external means are two sides of the
same coin for the rising power in the course of achieving power parity with
the dominant power and then taking over the dominant position in the
international system.4 Faced with a rising power enjoying rapid internal
development that is helping it to expand its alliance network, the dominant
power will find it difficult to preserve its predominance in the existing
status quo. Being in a different phase of economic development compared
to the rising power, it would be difficult for the dominant power, whose
mature economy is growing at a lower rate, to maintain economic growth
comparable to that of the rising power, let alone outpace it. Therefore,
consolidating and expanding a military and economic alliance network
becomes a viable option because the subordinate states play a key role by
providing and chaining up external power resources to reinforce the
operation of the status quo, so that the dominant power’s supreme status can
be maintained and the existing status quo kept alive. The alliance network,
therefore, becomes a turf where the dominant power and the rising power
compete: the former wishes to sustain the status quo and the latter wants to
enhance its international power and status.5
Against this background, states subordinated to or dissatisfied with the
status quo become targets for the two competing powers which would like
to include them in their own alliance network, giving the small state a
strategic opportunity to bargain for more military assistance and economic
benefits from the two competing powers to benefit their own security and
development, while promoting their international autonomy. This
opportunity emerges because the dominant and rising powers will more
likely be accommodating than aggressive or threatening when expanding
their alliance networks, so as not to risk pushing the target state to the
opponent’s side. Walt (1985: 14) argues that “restraint and benevolent
foreign policies are best because strong states may be valued as allies not
only by how much they offer their partners but also the level of
threatening.” For the rising power, benign foreign policies, such as offering
economic benefits, security assistance, and respecting foreign or domestic
policy autonomy, clearly will be more effective to furthering its pursuit of
alliance network enlargement, especially when its national capabilities can
afford the cost of the policies. Faced with the rising power’s benevolent
approach to pursuing the subordinate states in the status quo, it would be
unwise and counterproductive for the dominant power to use suppressive
measures, such as economic sanctions and political or military interference,
to maintain ties with the subordinate states as it might simply irritate the
subordinate states and provoke resistance to the dominant power. Moreover,
increasingly greater benefits generated by the rising power’s developing
status quo could increase dissatisfaction among subordinate states with the
weakening benefit output of the status quo caused by the dominant power’s
economic slowdown. As a consequence, the subordinate states could
gradually shift toward the rising power, causing the status quo to fall apart.
The dominant power’s suppressive policies toward the members of the
status quo could also dissuade potential allies from joining the status quo,
hindering the expansion of the alliance network. When approaching
dissatisfied states, the dominant power’s aggressive foreign policies could
result in resistance and hostility, encouraging them to coordinate with the
rising power. In contrast, improvements in the dominant power’s relations
with dissatisfied states could increase the cost of expanding an alliance
network for the rising power, disrupting the rising power’s expansionist
policy. Therefore, the rising power’s charm offensive strategy will serve to
pressure the dominant power into adopting a relatively softer and more
accommodating approach to consolidate the status quo and establish
positive relationships with the potential allies. As a result, the competition
for power between the dominant power and the rising power over the
alliance network could bring about a range of benefits for subordinate and
dissatisfied states.
In this context, the small state, whether subordinate or dissatisfied, can
obtain greater leverage with the dominant power and the rising power when
bargaining over issues of concern, as the two great powers prefer to use
benign and accommodating foreign policies. Hence the targeted small state
will be in a pivotal position that can help them leverage the security
dilemma faced with the rising power and the dominant power on
competition over alliance networks, so that they could acquire more
concessions or offers on issues of interest in negotiations. In other words,
the small state might be able to maintain its autonomy at less cost to its
security in its allying relations with the two competing powers. For
example, the small state could obtain more in such areas as investment,
trade, markets, and security assistance from the two competing powers
while conceding little or none of its international autonomy to shaping the
preferred agenda of regional development and order. Or it could increase its
international political autonomy without any reduction in its economic or
security benefits. Its strategic pivotal position would also allow the small
state to adopt an alternative approach, such as hedging, which is more
flexible than balancing or bandwagoning, to deal with relations with and
increase advantages from the competing great powers.6 In sum, great power
competition in the power transition context makes it possible for the small
state to move away from strong balancing or bandwagoning, meaning that it
could relatively adjust the autonomy–security trade-off relations with great
powers in world politics.
Based on the reinforcing logic, I posit three general hypotheses for the
empirical analyses of the following chapters based on the context of
Southeast Asia:9
Conclusion
In contrast to conventional thinking, this book presents a reinforcing logic
for small states’ autonomy, security, and development in the international
system, suggesting that the small state can enhance these three
competencies in the face of a great power on the condition that it pursues
liberal capitalist economic development and that great powers are
competing with each other for power and influence during power transition.
Obviously, lack of material capabilities serve as a disadvantage to the small
state in international political, economic, and military affairs. As a result, it
is commonly observed that the small state will ally itself with a great power
to enhance its ability to protect what it wants to protect, rather than strive to
achieve it alone. It also commonly noted, however, that the small state pays
for its alliance with a great power through loss in its own autonomy.
Competition for alliance networks between great powers gives the small
state leverage to negotiate how much autonomy to concede and the security
benefits to gain when it allies, because during a power transition the
competing great powers are more willing than usual to increase the
economic, security, or political advantages they offer to maintain and
expand their own sphere of power and influence. In addition, liberal
capitalist economic development not only increases the small state’s
security capabilities, it also pacifies the small state’s external security
environment. When the two conditions come together, the small state can
trigger the reinforcing dynamics to promote autonomy, security, and
development in a world dominated by great powers. Given this opportunity,
the small states in a region can collectively drive the reinforcing dynamics
by reforming the status quo in a way that they can retain the fruits resulting
from this development. In short, the small state might be weak overall but
that does not mean it necessarily has to always have the weaker hand when
faced with great powers. The following chapters will empirically examine
this theoretical statement, using the case of the US, China, and Southeast
Asian states.
Notes
1 Regarding the application of the concepts “autonomy” and “security” to such areas as the
military, economics, and politics, a further discussion is provided in Chapter 5.
2 Morrow (1991: 908) defines a state’s autonomy as “the degree to which it pursues desired
changes in the status quo” and a state’s security as “the ability to maintain the current resolution
of the issues that it wishes to preserve.”
3 One could ask why power competition exists between great powers in the “power transition
system.” Is it necessary to compete? It might be worthwhile to provide in this footnote some
reasons to justify the use of the power transition perspective for the development of the
theoretical argumentation in this book. First, from a theoretical viewpoint, the PT theory
provides a dynamic understanding of the source of power competition between great powers,
i.e., changes in relative power resulting from changes in national capabilities and its impact on
the strategic calculations and actions of a great power, especially toward non-major powers, in
the course of pursuing power and dominance in the international system. Compared with the
balance-of-power perspective, the power transition perspective has an advantage because the
discussion of power competition in the balance-of-power scenario focuses on the function of
alliance in strategic interactions for acquiring power and it does not explain further how changes
in national capabilities can influence the selection of approach or strategy to forge alliance with
other states. Second, the development of the theory offered in this book rests on observation of
the changing dynamics of interaction between China, the US, and Southeast Asian states over
the past decades, a period marked by a rapid growth of China’s national capabilities. The
development of the case here fits well into the PT theory. Therefore, the power transition theory
is a suitable basis for developing the theory presented in this book.
4 The internal and external approaches to establishing a new status quo are similar to what realists
call “internal balance” and “external balance” (Paul et al. 2004).
5 This argument is based on the scenario that a rising power will want to acquire power and
influence corresponding to its increasing national capabilities. A rising power’s pursuit of power
in the international system may prompt it to change the status quo initiated by the dominant
power. Nonetheless, it is possible that the dominant power and the rising power share similar
preferences for the status quo. In this alternative scenario, the status quo could remain the same
or undergo limited modifications. This could result in a declining dominant power deciding not
to challenge the upcoming dominant power because it can still benefit from the new but similar
status quo (Lemke 2004). Accordingly, the current cooperation network (the status quo) may
remain, and thus the wide-ranging competition expected among the allies may not occur.
However, it will be difficult for the dominant power to renounce its dominance as it is a power-
maximizing actor. The competition will still exist but it may be relatively benign and
insignificant. Regardless of whether or not it is satisfied with or attempts to restructure the status
quo, the rising power will seek to build international status and influence corresponding to its
growing national capabilities, driven by rapid development built through industrialization and
modernization.
6 The definition of hedging will be elaborated on in detail in Chapter 5.
7 However, some scholars used alternative measurements of economic interdependence to test the
liberal peace argument in the empirical analysis, and argued that the pacifying effect of trade is
not unconditional and that trade is positively correlated with interstate conflicts. For a succinct
comparison of different views about trade–conflict, see Barbieri and Schneider (1999); for a
comprehensive discussion, see Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch (2003).
8 For an explanation of how economic liberalization policies can encourage economic
regionalism, see Schiff and Winters (2003).
9 In the empirical chapters that follow, these general hypotheses will be rewritten with the context
of Southeast Asia.
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3 Southeast Asian states’ cooperation in the
context of US–China competition
Introduction
The US–China competition in Southeast Asia after the end of the Cold
War
Figure 3.2 indicates US and Chinese total foreign direct investment (FDI)
in the ASEAN area from 2001 to 2012, using Bilateral FDI Statistics
compiled by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).12 It shows that FDI outflows and outstocks of the US and China
to the region were in general upward trajectories during the same period,
reflecting their increasing economic engagement in the region. Yearly FDI
outward of the US to the region grew at an average annual rate of 107
percent, from US$8.835 billion in 2001 to US$21.429 billion in 2012, while
China’s FDI outflow grew at an average annual rate of 67.8 percent, from
US$119 million in 2003 to US$6.100 billion in 2012. Yearly FDI outstocks
of the US in the region grew at an average annual rate of 10 percent, from
US$70.532 billion in 2001 to US$189.802 billion in 2012, while China’s
FDI outstocks grew at an average annual rate of 55.7 percent, from US$587
million in 2003 to US$28.245 billion in 2012. As of 2012, US regional FDI
stocks stood at 6.7 times that of China, underscoring the deep roots of US
economic connections in the region. However, China’s regional FDI stocks
grew about six times faster than that of the US. In terms of trade and FDI,
the region saw increasing economic engagement on the part of the US and
China in Southeast Asia, reflecting their increasing competition in the
region.
Figure 3.2 The US and China’s foreign direct investment in Southeast
Asia (2001–2012).
Empirical analysis
Research design
The evolution of the US’s and China’s policies toward Southeast Asia and
Southeast Asian states’ responses to the competitive engagement by the two
great powers suggest that the US–China competition generates relatively
favorable economic, security, and strategic conditions that serve to not
merely promote economic development among ASEAN states, but also to
sustain the leverage created to advance ASEAN cooperation and integration.
The trade and investment patterns shown previously in this chapter also
imply this correlation, giving support to the theoretical argument provided in
Chapter 2 that competition between the dominant power striving to maintain
the status quo and the rising power pursuing the dominant role in the power
transition system will benefit and motivate cooperation among small states
that are pursued by the two competing powers. Based on the findings of
analysis of foreign policy and related descriptive statistics, statistical
modeling is employed to systematically compare the concerned factor with
other competing factors in order to provide a more robust empirical
examination and support the argument.
Because interstate cooperation is cooperative interaction between two
states, the undirected dyad is adopted as the unit of analysis.14 As mentioned
previously, although the competition between the US and China can be
traced back to the end of the Second World War, China only became a
compelling challenger to US dominance in Southeast Asia after the Cold
War. This suggests that the post-Cold War period represents a more
meaningful time for empirical analysis. Hence, this analysis is focused on
the period between 1991 and 2010.15 Therefore, in terms of the unit and
timespan of analysis, it creates a time-series cross-sectional dataset,
comprised of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
The dependent variable, cooperation between Southeast Asian states, is
measured by trade. Trade, as a primary economic activity in the
contemporary international system, is not merely commercial exchange, but
also entails a range of international political, social, and security-related
communication (Russett and Oneal, 2001).16 Closer trade relations usually
represent the existence of good political and security relations. When trade
relations between two states are seen to improve, for example, bilateral trade
flows between them increase; this could be a result of them mutually
lowering or removing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, implying a will for
economic integration and preparing to advance cooperation and integration
in other areas. This is what we have seen in Europe. Therefore, it is
reasonable to use trade to gauge interstate cooperation. However, trade
between two states can rise and fall as a result of the growth and decline of
economies. In other words, market size affects trade flow. This means that
the absolute volume of trade may not be an adequate indicator for measuring
changes in cooperative relations between two countries. In this regard, the
ratio of bilateral trade between two countries to their total trade is used to
construct the dependent variable to gauge cooperation between the two
countries. When this trade ratio increases, it captures natural market
dynamics and also conveys information that the bilateral relations of the two
countries are being intentionally promoted with certain policies. Hence, the
dependent variable, Cooperation, is taken as the ratio of bilateral trade to the
sum of the total trade of the two countries, (trade ijt / (total trade it + total
trade jt)), where country A is denoted by i, country B by j, and year by t.
Higher Cooperation indicates higher interstate integration and cooperation.
Trade data is retrieved from the Correlates of War (COW) Trade Data
(version 4.0) (Barbieri and Keshk 2016), which is based on the IMF DOTS.
The core independent variable is US–China competition. As shown
already in this chapter, US–China competition has been witnessed in various
areas in Southeast Asia. While security or military contests between the two
great powers in the region have escalated recently, particularly on the issue
of the South China Sea, the contest has been exercised in an intentionally
restrained manner so as to avoid violent conflict. This has constituted the
dynamics of balance-of-power in the region. Nevertheless, economic
engagement has remained the US’s and China’s primary and continued
policy in developing and consolidating their own relations and interests with
existing and potential Southeast Asian allies, who welcome the economic
benefits as they are helpful for their own domestic as well as region-wide
economic development. Trade is an effective means for realizing economic
growth in the contemporary liberal economic system (Edwards 1993;
Krueger 1997). For Southeast Asian states employing an export-led
approach to economic development, access to US and Chinese markets, now
respectively the largest and second largest in the world, would be a
tremendous plus to their exports and, of course, their economic growth. In
other words, trade is a useful policy tool which China and the US can use in
developing their regional ties and interests in Southeast Asia. Opening
domestic markets is not only a critical step for facilitating a country’s
economic relations with another country, it also represents improvement in
political relations between them and even signifies an attempt to improve
security relations in the future. That is, patterns in trade relations are a
convincing indicator of not only economic relations, but also present and
future dynamics in political and security relations. Based on this rationale,
improvements in the US’s and China’s trade relations with Southeast Asian
states imply the bolstering of regional engagements, namely their regional
competition. In this regard, the influence of US–China competition over a
specific Southeast Asian state is measured by the ratio of trade imports to the
US and China from the Southeast Asian state in a given year, placing the
smaller value in the numerator position and the lager value in the
denominator position, e.g., China’s imports (small)/US imports (large). The
ratio will be between zero and 1. The maximum score of US–China
competition is given as 1, while the minimum one is given as zero. Because
this is a dyadic analysis, it generates two ratio values. The two ratio values
are summed up to construct the main independent variable, Competition,
with a single ratio value representing the overall intensity of the influence of
US–China competition on a specific dyad of Southeast Asian states. A
higher Competition value reflects higher US–China competition on the
Southeast Asian dyad.
In addition to the main independent variable, the model also includes
several control variables that might promote or interrupt trade that is used to
measure Cooperation. It has been argued that interstate conflict disrupts
existing trade and discourages prospective trade in that the damage to
property and infrastructure and loss of human resources caused by
militarized conflict can decrease the ability of consumers to demand imports
and firms to supply exports (e.g., Keshk et al. 2004, 2010; Li and Sacko
2002; Long 2008; Pollins 1989a, 1989b). In this regard, the Conflict variable
is constructed, using the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data
(version 4.0) (Palmer et al., 2015). It defines MID as:
united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of
military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed
towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or
territory of another state … composed of incidents that range in intensity
from threats to use force to actual combat short of war.
(Jones et al. 1996: 163)
Conflict is a dichotomous variable that is coded as 1 when a dyad
experiences an MID of any type, including initiation and ongoing, in a year;
otherwise it is recorded as zero.
Alliances and preferential trading agreements play a positive role in
promoting trade between members (Gowa 1994; Gowa and Mansfield 1993;
Mansfield and Bronson 1997). As mentioned already, after 1976 ASEAN
member states set about to devote themselves to economic cooperation
through PTAs and later the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for
AFTA. According to the COW Formal Alliance data (version 4.1) (Gibler
2009), no formal military alliance existed among Southeast Asian states
from 1991 to 2010. However, ASEAN itself can be seen as a “quasi-
alliance” because it was initiated to stabilize political and security relations
between members and intended to promote the influence of ASEAN
members in regional security development. Therefore, joint membership in
ASEAN serves as a suitable proxy to capture the effects of alliance and
PTAs. JntASEAN is coded as 1 when both Southeast Asia states were
ASEAN members in a given dyad year; otherwise zero.
The third control variable is democracy. Studies on political determinants
of international trade point out that the trade policies of democratic states
tend to be more open, so that a pair of democracies are more likely to agree
on lower trade barriers than a pair of states in which one is a democracy and
the other an autocracy (e.g., Bliss and Russett 1998; Mansfield et al. 2000;
Milner and Kubota 2005; Morrow et al. 1998). That is to say, more trade
would be expected between democratic states, suggesting a positive spiral
that encourages them to put forward economic cooperation that could
augment the welfare of their peoples, thereby furthering regional integration.
JntDem is generated to measure the level of joint democracy in a dyad, using
Polity IV data (Marshall et al. 2015).17 Following Oneal and Russett’s
operationalization (1999), JntDem is calculated by (the polity score of
country A + 10) × (the polity score of country B + 10).
In short, the statistical model used for making estimations is: Cooperation
= α + β (Competition, JntASEAN, Conflict, JntDem) + ε
The model is estimated using the fixed effects ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimator, employing robust standard errors clustered by country-
pairs to correct serial correlation. The fixed effects model accounts for the
effects of unobserved time invariant country-pair (dyadic) specific influence,
such as cultural factors, which can help mitigate estimation bias produced by
omitted variables. I also include a set of year-specific fixed effects to control
for factors such as US dollar value, global business cycles, globalization, and
economic shock, which could affect economic exchanges between countries
(Rose 2004: 100). In order to mitigate problems of reverse causality, the
independent variables are lagged by one year (t − 1) in modeling. As a
robustness check, I re-specify the proposed model in the form of the
standard gravity model of bilateral trade (cf. Anderson and Wincoop 2003;
Frankel 1997: chapter 4; Rose 2004) by adding three variables: gross
domestic production (GDP) of country A, GDP of country B, and distance
between capital cities of the two countries. GDP data is retrieved from the
updated GDP Data Version 6.0 by Gleditsch (2002) in constant US dollar
values (2005 prices) and capital-to-capital distance from Gleditsch and
Ward’s Minimum-Distance Dataset (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001). Since the
gravity model is multiplicative, all continuous independent variables are
transformed in natural logarithm form, but dichotomous independent
variables are kept as is (1 and 0).18 The gravity model is estimated using the
fixed effects panel Poisson maximum likelihood estimator (Silva and
Tenreyro 2006; Westerlund and Wilhelmsson 2011).19 Also, the gravity
model is estimated employing robust standard errors clustered by country-
pairs.
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables.
Conclusion
Through the lens of foreign policy, we found that as China’s engagement in
Southeast Asia profoundly accelerated, paralleling its rapid increase in
national capability, US regional policy also changed from inattention to
proactive involvement as a response to China’s rise in an attempt to maintain
regional dominance, evidencing that the US and China were in an
increasingly intense competition to extend their own power and influence in
Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War era. Competing moves on the part of
the two great powers in the form of economic, political, and security
engagements generated a relatively beneficial climate in which Southeast
Asian states could obtain economic and security benefits for their ongoing
regional cooperation and integration. Therefore, they were strategically
motivated to further their cooperation under ASEAN to maximize the
benefits of the favorable international environment. The findings of the
foreign policy inquiry gained empirical support from the statistical analysis
which systematically compared the effect of US–China competition with
those of other variables, including joint ASEAN membership, joint degree of
democracy, and interstate conflict. The results of the statistical analysis
suggest that US–China competition played a significant role in stimulating
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia, particularly since the end of Cold
War. However, neither ASEAN, democracy nor conflict produced a relevant
effect. Not merely does this result support the theoretical argument proposed
in Chapter 2, that is that the competition between the great powers in the
power transition system can motivate small states targeted to be included in
a great power’s sphere of influence to further their cooperation, it also
refutes constructivists’ frequent emphasis that ASEAN facilitates regional
cooperation and realists’ standing argument that great power rivalry will tear
apart the region, just as it did in the Cold War.
Notes
1 The Policy of Good Neighborliness was adopted to forward political, economic, security, and
cultural engagement with neighboring states. The New Security Concept emphasizes multilateral
dialogues, consultations, and negotiations to establish mutual trust, benefit, equality, and
cooperation.
2 Yoshimatsu (2015) provided a concise review of the development of US and Chinese
involvement in the form of aid in the Mekong Region and also explained the challenges to the
US’s current policies to the region when China is implementing its OBOR.
3 Copper (2016) provides great chronicled information on China’s foreign aid and investments to
individual Southeast Asia states.
4 The meeting is based on the LMC mechanism initiated at the 2014 China–ASEAN summit by the
Mekong River Commission members (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam) and its dialogue
partners (China and Myanmar). For China’s expectations and support of the LMC, see Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of China (2016).
5 For detailed information about the formation background and the policy goals of the OBOR and
the AIIB, please see the official websites of the Belt and Road Initiative
(http://english.gov.cn/beltAndRoad/) and the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank
(www.aiib.org/).
6 Confirmation hearing by Secretary-Designate Colin L. Powell, https://2001–
2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/443.htm, accessed 23 July 2016.
7 The Obama Administration had also concluded TIFAs with Burma in 2013 and Laos in 2016.
The information on the agreements were retrieved from the Office of the United States Trade
Representative.
8 The Pivot to Asia-Pacific was first seen in Hillary Clinton’s article, “America’s Pacific Century,”
carried in Foreign Policy on 11 October 2011. Later, the Obama Administration used
“Rebalance” to replace “Pivot” to describe its Asian policy, as seen in Sustaining US Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, published by the US Department of Defense in
January 2012.
9 The statistics of official visits by President Obama and Secretary Clinton were collected from
traveling schedules publicly released by White House and the US Department of State: Cambodia
two times, Burma two times, Thailand two times, Singapore three times, Brunei one time,
Indonesia four times, Laos one time, Vietnam three times, Philippines two times, and Malaysia
one time.
10 Remark by Secretary Clinton at the Press on 23 July 2010,
www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm, accessed 14 February 2015.
11 Trade figures from Hong Kong have been included since 1997 and from Macau since 1999.
12 Here, FDI outflows and outstocks are used to indicate the investment activities of US and
Chinese enterprises in Southeast Asia. FDI outflows are the capital from foreign direct investors
to enterprises in other countries during a given period in time, usually a year. FDI outstock is the
total value of direct investment by resident investors in foreign economies during a given period
in time, reflecting overall investment activities of transnational corporations outside their home
countries (UNCTAD, 1995).
13 For the details of these partnership agreements, please refer to the section about External
Relations on the ASEAN official website, (http://asean.org/asean/external-relations/).
14 The dyadic data for each observation consists of a given state matched with a given partner.
There are two types of dyadic data: directed and undirected. For the directed dyadic data, each
pair of states, A and B, generates two rows of observations in a given year. For instance, in terms
of trade, one row is for the trade flow (exports and imports) from state A to state B in that year
and the other is for the trade flow from state B to state A in that year, namely A → B and B → A.
For the undirected dyadic data, each pair of states generates a single row of observations only,
with the trade flow from A to B and the trade flow from B to A, namely A–B. The undirected
dyadic data format is here adopted because the outcome of cooperation between two states, rather
than which side initiates cooperation with the other, is our only concern.
15 Although trade data which is used to construct the dependent variable here are available up to the
year 2016, the reason of that 2010 is taking as the final year of the period is simply an issue of
data availability for other variables, such as conflict.
16 FDI is also a key economic activity to gauge interstate cooperation. However, FDI data for
Southeast Asia is far less available than trade data.
17 The Polity dataset creates an 11-point index of each state’s democratic characteristics (democ)
and an 11-point index of its autocratic characteristics (autoc). The difference between these
indices, democ–autoc, yields a summary measure of regime type that takes on values ranging
from −10 for a highly autocratic state to 10 for a highly democratic one. This measure captures
variations both within democracies and among autocracies.
18 I transformed zero values to [1/e21] to avoid missing values in continuous variables. See Gartzke
and Li (2003: 563) and Kim and Rousseau (2005: 530). I used the original coding for
dichotomous variables since this is consistent with the logarithmic form of the equation. It is
equivalent to replacing the original zeros with a one while replacing the original values of the one
with the value [1/e21] and then taking natural logarithms of the whole series. The gravity model is
specified as follows: Cooperation = α + β (ln(Competition), JntASEAN, Conflict, ln(JntDem),
ln(GDP of county A), ln(GDP of country B), ln(Capital distance between Country A and country
B)) + ε
19 For further discussion on the application of the Poisson maximum likelihood (ML) model to
gravity model of trade, refer to Prehn (2016) and Martínez-Zarzoso (2013).
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4 Pursuit of economic development and
Southeast Asian peace1
Introduction
Table 4.1 Fatality level of MID onsets between the ASEAN states
(1967–2010)
Empirical analysis
Research design
This section sets out to test the above hypothesis in the context of Southeast
Asia. The dependent variable is the onset of interstate conflict, using the
MID dataset (Palmer et al. 2015) as mentioned previously. This is a
dichotomous variable, coded as 1 for the first year of a new MID in a given
Southeast Asian dyad and zero otherwise. In other words, the subsequent
years of the same MID are dropped from the analysis. In addition, using only
a new MID onset (i.e., dropping all the ongoing records of the same MID)
also addresses the problem of the dependence of the subsequent dispute
years in the statistical analysis because statistical models assume cases are
independent (Boehmer et al. 2004; Gartzke and Li 2003).
Pursuit of liberal capitalist economic development is the independent
variable of primary interest here. Economic liberalization, often measured by
a state’s trade policies, is a common proxy for identifying whether a state has
a propensity for free-market export-oriented economic development. Several
indicators have been used to discern a state’s trade policies, such as average
statutory tariff rate, the ratio of tariff revenues to imports, and the ratio of
total trade to GDP (cf. McDonald 2004; Milner and Kubota 2005).6
However, the lack of data on tariffs and customs revenues as a percentage of
imports of Southeast Asian states for the period 1950–2000 makes it difficult
to obtain meaningful results. In addition, tariffs cannot capture the extent to
which a state uses non-tariff barriers to protect non-competitive domestic
sectors, and customs revenues cannot reflect prohibitive tariffs (McDonald
2004: 557–558). Also, the ratio of total trade to GDP is a relatively poor
indicator for capturing changes of political propensity in certain economic
policies because the value of this outcome indicator may be highly sensitive
to other factor endowments, such as resource supplies, international prices,
natural barriers to trade, technology, and tastes (Leamer 1988). In this
regard, I follow Milner and Kubota (2005) in using the trade regime
indicator developed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and recently updated by
Wacziarg and Horn Welch (2008) to identify a state’s economic development
policies. This indicator is coded as a closed trade regime if any one of the
following criteria is true: non-tariff barriers cover 40 percent or more of
trade; average tariff rates are 40 percent or more; black-market exchange
rates depreciated by 20 percent or more relative to the official exchange rate
during the 1970s or 1980s; a socialist economy is in place; or a state
monopoly on exports exists. This indicator is useful and fitting here because
it provides more comprehensive information as it considers various aspects
of protectionism over time (1950–1999) and across space. Thus, JntELP is a
dichotomous variable coded as 1 when both states in a dyad year t are jointly
open trade regimes and zero otherwise. However, data are not available for
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in Sachs and Warner’s original data
set. So as not to lack information on the four states in the analysis, I assess
the status of their trade regimes using Fukase and Martin’s (2001) report.
Although the four states started at different levels of trade liberalization in
the 1980s, they qualify as closed trade regimes over time using Sachs and
Warner’s criteria. Thus, I code JntELP as zero for these states in any given
dyad year, rather than treating them as missing data.
As mentioned previously, democracy, economic interdependence, and
joint ASEAN membership are regarded as competing variables to JntELP.
The Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2015) is used to measure political
regimes of Southeast Asian states, scaled from −10 (most autocratic) to 10
(most democratic). Following the “weak link” logic (Dixon 1994; Oneal and
Russett 1997), the variable Democracy(L) reports lower democratic values in
a given dyad year. The variable Interdependence(L)—the lower ratio of the
sum of State A’s imports from and exports to State B over State A’s GDP in
current US dollar value—is employed to capture the degree of economic
interdependence between regional states, using Gleditsch’s (2002) Expanded
Trade and GDP dataset. JntASEAN is a dichotomous variable for joint
ASEAN membership, capturing the effect of the ASEAN style of conflict
management on the foreign policy behavior of ASEAN member states. It is
coded as 1 when both states in a dyad year t are the jointly ASEAN members
and zero otherwise.
Several control variables are also included in the model.
Intergovernmental organization is commonly regarded as a positive factor
promoting international peace. They not only facilitate a member’s self-
interests across a variety of issues but also reduce the possibility of conflict
between members by mediating conflicting parties, reducing uncertainty as
information is conveyed, socializing member identities, and shaping
common norms (e.g., Keohane and Nye 1989; Russett and Oneal 2001;
Young 1986). To gauge the potential mediating effect of intergovernmental
organizations, I use the variable IGOs, which is defined as the natural
logarithm of total shared memberships of intergovernmental organizations
summed for each dyad year, using the International Governmental
Organization dataset (V2.3) (Pevehouse et al. 2004). Because the data
contains only observations at five-year intervals before 1965, values are
filled in until 1965 by projecting the summed memberships forward four
years, i.e., values for each dyad’s shared IGO memberships in 1950 are also
used for the years 1951–1954 and so on. I replace zero with [1/e21] to avoid
missing values before natural logarithm transformation.7
Furthermore, similar foreign policy alignments among states may
coincide with better diplomatic relations and indicate a future with less
hostility between those states, thus producing a positive effect on bilateral
trade (Dixon and Moon 1993; Gowa 1994; Gowa and Mansfield 1993;
Mansfield and Bronson 1997; Morrow et al. 1998). In other words, besides
producing a direct pacifying effect, similar portfolios of foreign policy can
indirectly affect the likelihood of MID onset through JntELP, which is
enhanced by increasing bilateral trade. An indirect effect of similarity like
these, therefore, should be controlled to obtain an accurate net effect of
JntELP on MID onsets. The variable Similarity is the weighted S-score
measuring the level of similarity of alliance portfolios for the dyad
(Signorino and Ritter 1999).8 Furthermore, Similarity can also account for
the concern that the open trade policies of a Southeast Asian state may be
closely related to its alliance with the United States (i.e., US–Thailand
alliance 1954–1977; US–Philippines alliance 1951–2000).
Since the outcome of economic development may affect the likelihood of
interstate conflict, as previously mentioned, the variable GDP / pc(L), the
natural logarithm of the lower GDP per capita of a dyad in a given year in
current US dollar value, is created to control this effect, using Gleditsch’s
GDP dataset. Geographical proximity is associated with the likelihood of
interstate conflict (Bremer 1992; Diehl 1991). The variable Contiguity,
which is predicted to increase the likelihood of interstate conflict, is a
dichotomous variable that is coded 1 if states share a land border or are
separated by up to 150 miles of water, and zero otherwise. The variable
Distance is measured in the natural logarithm of the great circle distance
between two national capitals, predicted to be negatively associated with the
likelihood of interstate conflict. The interaction variable, Contiguity × GDP
/ pc(L), is also included as it is argued that economic development decreases
incentives for territorial expansion (Gartzke 2007).
National material capability is always a primary concern of the realist in
studies of war and peace. Power transition theory contends that states which
are vastly different in national power will be much less likely to fight each
other; that is, preponderance brings peace (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Lemke
2002; Organski 1958). However, the balance-of-power tradition argues that
power parity brings peace (Waltz 1979). To account for the effect of power, I
construct the variable Power Parity using the composite index of national
capability (CINC) score provided in the National Material Capability dataset
(v5.0) in the COW project (Singer et al. 1972). Power Parity is represented
by the quotient of the smaller composite indicator of national capability
score over the larger composite indicator of the national capability score.
Thus, a dyad with perfect power parity will score 1 and a dyad with
complete asymmetry in power will score zero.
The Cold War was a prominent contributor to tense rivalry between
communist states and non-communist states in Southeast Asia during much
of the examined period. Therefore, I control for this structural effect by
adding the variable CW Dummy, a dichotomous variable that is coded as 1
when a dyad is between 1950 and 1989 and zero otherwise. This variable is
not included in the models for the subsamples 1950–1975 and 1976–2000
because the separation of time periods already controls for the Cold War
effect.
The statistical model to be estimated is specified as: MID + β
(JntELP, JntASEAN, Democracy(L), Interdependence(L), IGOs, Similarity,
GDP / pc(L), Contiguity, Contiguity × GDP / pc(L), Distance, Power Parity,
CW Dummy, Peace Year) + e The timespan analyzed is 1950–2000 because
the data to construct JntELP is available for the period 1950–1999. The
dataset is pooled time-series cross-sectional, consisting of Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (1954–present), and the
Republic of Vietnam (1954–1975). The unit of analysis is the undirected
dyad year. In addition, the literature commonly characterized tensions as
high in Asia during the Cold War, culminating in the Vietnam War and
gradually lessening afterward. The end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the
emergence of a regional communist bloc (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos),
and uncertainties about US commitments in the region together worked to
motivate the heads of ASEAN states to meet in Bali in 1976 to discuss this
new phase in international relations in the region (Alagappa 2003; Narine,
2008). If different dynamics in international relations in the region exist in
specific periods, it is suggested that those dynamics be examined separately
to avoid heterogeneity in modeling (cf. Goldsmith 2007). In this regard, I
also divide the entire sample period 1950–2000 into two separate periods:
1950–1975 and 1976–2000. I estimate coefficients using logistic regression
with Huber/White robust standard error and adjust for clustering in dyads. I
adopt Beck et al.’s (1998) method of temporal spline variables to control for
temporal dependence of observations in the analysis of cross-sectional time-
series with a binary dependent variable to produce accurate standard errors
and consistent coefficients.9 All independent variables are lagged by one
year in order to mitigate problems of reverse causality.
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables.
Basic analysis
Table 4.3 shows the empirical results for the three periods (1950–2000,
1950–1975, and 1976–2000). In Models 1 and 3, JntELP shows the
statistically significant and negative effect on MID onset. It is dropped due
to the perfect prediction in Model 2, indicating that no new MID occurred
between the Southeast Asian dyads sharing common economic liberalization
policies in the period 1950–1975. These results confirm the proposed
argument that common economic liberalization policies might mitigate
conflicting behaviors between pairs of states. Regarding the two classical
liberal peace variables, Democracy(L) is negatively but insignificantly
associated with MID onset, but Interdependence(L) significantly increases
the likelihood of MID onset in Models 1 and 3. The statistical outcomes of
Interdependence(L) thus support the argument that increasing frequency of
contact can increase the likelihood of conflict (Waltz 1979). The outcomes
of the two variables affirm weak implication of classical liberal peace in
Southeast Asia. In addition, JntASEAN demonstrates no significant pacifying
effect in Models 1 and 2, but that significant pacifying effect exists in Model
3. This suggests that the constructivist’s claim about the effect of ASEAN
security management might be correct only for the post-Vietnam War period,
but it should not be exaggerated when taking into account the entire Cold
War period.10
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics of variables (1950–2000)
Note
Except for MID onset, all variables are lagged by one year.
Substantive effect
Although statistical significance is important in quantitative research, it does
not necessarily make a finding statistically meaningful when a large number
of observations are taken in analysis. If a sample size is very large, small p-
values can occur even though the difference between the true value of the
parameter and the null hypothesis value is small (cf. Gujarati 2003). Given
this concern, the empirical analysis further compares the substantive effects
of JntELP, Democracy(L), Interdependence(L) and JntASEAN. Table 4.4
reports the difference value (maximum minus minimum) of the predicted
probability of a new MID onset for the four variables in Model 1.12
JntELP’s predicted probability of a new MID onset declines by about
0.26 percentage points when its value changes from minimum to maximum;
Democracy(L) decreases predicted probability by about 0.19 percentage
points; Interdependence(L) increases predicted probability by about 25.59
percentage points; and JntASEAN increases predicted probability by about
0.11 percentage points. But the substantive effects of Democracy(L) and
JntASEAN have to be interpreted cautiously because of their statistical
insignificance. This result suggests that commonly adopting economic
liberalization policies plays a more important role in reducing the likelihood
of MID onsets in Southeast Asia.
Robustness tests
One concern to the above empirical result is collinearity which can result in
imprecise outcomes. As Table 4.5 shows, JntELP and JntASEAN are highly
correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.6920). This is because most
Southeast Asian states that have adopted economic liberalization policies
were also ASEAN member states for most of the sample period. However,
rule of thumb suggests a potential problem of collinearity at the stage of
estimation. In addition, although the correlation between JntELP and
Interdependence(L) (0.4477) is not so high that it raises serious collinearity
concerns, the two variables theoretically, to some extent, could share the
same information, because increasing economic interdependence can also
reinforce the adoption of economic liberalization policies. Therefore, to
address this issue of collinearity, I make a check based on a reduced form of
Model 1 in Table 4.3 in which JntASEAN or Interdependence(L) is dropped
from the original empirical equation, thereby estimating the independent
effect of JntELP. For brevity, Table 4.6 only reports the results of the
variables of interest here, which confirm that JntELP is statistically
meaningful in terms of a conflict-reducing effect. Also, the inclusion of
interaction variable Contiguity × GDP / pc(L) could result in a less efficient
estimation (i.e., greater uncertainty) for the effect of JntELP. Therefore, I re-
estimate Model 1 without Contiguity × GDP / pc(L) and find that JntELP
still holds statistical significance with a slightly bigger coefficient (−8.3738).
Note
All variables are lagged by one year. All values are significant below 1%.
The second concern comes from the operationalization of economic
liberalization policies. Recoding Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam,
which were originally missing observations, could affect the evaluation of
JntELP’s statistical significance. I, therefore, re-estimate Model 1 with the
data for the four states as missing. JntELP still holds negative and
significant. In addition, as previously mentioned, previous literature
proposes different indicators to discern a state’s economic policies in terms
of trade. Although Sachs and Warner’s (1995) trade regime indicator
provides temporal and economics information on the trade policies of
Southeast Asian states that is more complete, I employ McDonald’s (2004)
use of the ratio of customs revenues to imports (import duties) in their higher
values to re-estimate Model 1, expecting a positive sign of outcome from
this alternative variable.13 But the import duty variable was insignificantly
negative, counter to the expectation. A similar statistical result applies to the
use of Hiscox and Kastner’s (2008) measurement of a state’s trade
openness.14 The inconsistent outcomes shown here could imply that these
alternative indicators might capture different parts of trade policies,
suggesting a need for a more comprehensive trade policy indicator. None of
these findings, however, provides strong evidence to refute the current
empirical findings using Sachs and Warner’s indicator.
Conclusion
Previous literature on the formation of Southeast Asian peace revolves
primarily around the pacifying effects of democracy, economic
interdependence, and ASEAN security management. But statistical analysis
shows that democracy and economic interdependence, contrary to the
predictions of the liberal peace theory, have not operated favorably to bring
about peaceful coexistence between Southeast Asian states in recent
decades. This is not a surprising outcome because the two variables have
improved at a rather slow pace in the region. In addition, although ASEAN
states experienced no wars—defined as conflicts causing more than 1,000
battle deaths—among themselves since 1967, there were still militarized
disputes, showing that ASEAN security management did not effectively
prevent ASEAN states from using force in interstate disputes. This is in line
with the usual criticism that ASEAN could have been no more than a
“talking shop” in recent decades due to its low institutionalization and weak
coercive power. Thus, the popular constructivist contention about the
effectiveness of the ASEAN security management may need a reappraisal.
However, in comparison with the above three variables, a state’s intent of
pursuing liberal capitalist economic development, as a separate factor, is a
compelling force encouraging Southeast Asians to live with each other
peacefully and cooperatively. In other words, common liberal capitalist
preferences and interests in national economic development exert a
significant influence on Southeast Asian states’ decision making in regards
to foreign policy toward each other in the past decades. Therefore, Southeast
Asia has enjoyed a long period of capitalist peace.
Table 4.7 Models of MID onset in Southeast Asia (1970–2010)
Notes Robust standard errors (clustering by dyad) in parentheses.
***
**
2
* Significance tests are two-tailed: p < 0.01; p < 0.05; p < 0.1.
3 IGOs is included in Models 4, 6, and 8, but it is excluded in Models 5, 7, and 9.
Notes
1 This chapter is revised from the author’s article (Tang, 2012) previously published in
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific by Oxford University Press.
2 I use the variable ‘polity2’ from the dataset to construct Figure 4.1. It is also used in the empirical
analysis that follows. The threshold for recognizing a democracy is diverse in the democratic
peace literature (for a nice review, see Moon, 2009: 123). Here, I adopt the recent Polity
codebook’s recommendation to use a Polity score of +6 or more as the criterion for recognizing a
democracy. As I focus on traditional Southeast Asian states throughout the book, East Timor is
excluded in the figure. In the Polity dataset, Brunei is not taken into coding for whole period,
since it became an independent state in 1984, Cambodia is coded as missing values from 1979 to
1987, and Vietnam is split into the Republic of Vietnam (South) and the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (North) from 1955 to 1975 and then merged into one from 1976.
3 In order to extend the timespan in Figure 4.2, I use here the COW Trade dataset which goes to the
year 2014, instead of Gleditsch’s (2002) Expended Trade dataset which only goes up to 2000.
But, Gleditsch’s data is used for the following statistical analysis because it reduces the amount
of missing data by using various data sources and imputations. For the debate over the treatment
of missing trade data, please refer to the comments of Barbieri et al. (2009) and the reply of
Gleditsch (2010) to the former’s comments. Abbreviations of country names in Figure 4.2 are as
follows: Brunei: BRU; Cambodia: CAM; Democratic Republic of Vietnam: DRV; Indonesia:
INS; Laos: LAO; Malaysia: MAL; Myanmar: MYA; the Philippines: PHI; Republic of Vietnam:
RVN; Singapore: SIN; and Thailand: THI.
4 The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset sets the conflict threshold at 25 casualties, which is
different from that of the MID dataset. In addition, it may be controversial to use all levels of
armed conflicts, including extra-systematic, interstate, intra-state, and internationalized, to assess
ASEAN peace, because ASEAN is basically designed to deal with interstate relations and the
various levels of armed conflict differ in definition. Kivimäki also used onsets as well as ongoing
conflicts together when determining the number of armed conflicts, which needs justification.
5 Wacziarg and Horn Welch updated the dataset by Sachs and Warner (1995). See the section on
research design in this chapter for a detailed discussion.
6 Reviews offered by McDonald (2004) and Hiscox and Kastner (2008) are helpful to
understanding the debate on measurements of trade protection and openness.
7 Recent empirical analyses on the pacifying effect of IGOs is mixed (see review by Dorussen and
Ward 2008) and some scholars have warned that the aggregate count variable of IGOs may
mislead our understanding of the role of IGOs in promoting international peace (Boehmer et al.
2004). The exclusion of this variable in the modeling, however, does not change the significant
effect of JntELP.
Recently, Bailey et al. (2015) adopted an ideal point model to dynamically estimate a state’s
8 foreign policy preference, based on votes in the United Nations General Assembly. They
suggested that this estimate is better than S-score for capturing dyadic similarity of foreign
policy. Therefore, as a robustness check, I replace S-score with the absolute distance score of
ideal points of two countries in dyad (ideal point of state A − ideal point of state B), using the
United Nations General Assembly Voting dataset (Voeten 2013). As a result, JntELP still has a
significant pacifying effect.
9 I also re-estimate the models by replacing Beck et al.’s method with Carter and Signorino’s
(2010) method (peace years, peace years squared, peace years cubed) as well as generalized
estimation equations (GEEs) (Liang and Zeger 1986) with the first order autoregressive process
(cf. Boehmer and Sobek 2005; Gartzke 2007; Oneal and Russett 1999a, 1999b) to control for
temporal dependence. After these alternative treatments, the pacifying effect of JntELP still
holds. However, it is noteworthy here that the GEE model with first order autoregressive process
for control temporal dependence is called into question (Beck 2003).
10 Recently, Hsueh (2016) found that the pacifying effect of the ASEAN security management is
conditioned on an ASEAN member state’s economic performance (growth), thereby refuting
Tang’s (2012) claim of the existence of capitalist peace in Southeast Asia and that ASEAN
security management was not effective for the period 1950–2000. However, Hsueh’s contention
in essence is not far from what Tang has argued. This is because Hsueh’s emphasis on pursuing
state-building by promoting economic development as a condition for the effectiveness of
ASEAN security management already implies the ineffectiveness of ASEAN security
management on its own and the positive implication of pursuing economic development on
Southeast Asian peace. This is basically identical to Tang’s argument. Also, what makes Tang’s
analysis different from that of Hsueh is that the former focuses on a government’s or a leader’s
policy intent to pursue capitalist liberal economic development and the latter on the outcome of
economic policy (GDP growth rate). While many factors can cause growth in the modern
economic system, liberal capitalist economic policy is obviously one of them. Economic growth
is a result of a state’s shifting of economic policy toward a liberal capitalist one; that is, better
economic performance itself implies a pursuit of liberal capital economic policy (JntELP).
Therefore, we can say that Hsueh’s empirical findings support Tang’s argument. In fact, Hsueh’s
(2016: 53) robustness check does not reject the importance of JntELP for Southeast Asian peace,
which is emphasized by Tang (2012) and in this book.
11 However, when Similarity is replaced with the new measuring method by Bailey et al. (2015),
foreign policy similarity becomes positive and insignificant.
12 Predicted probabilities are calculated by simulation of the Clarify program (King et al. 2003)
while holding all other continuous variables at their means and dummy variables at their median.
13 Import duty data is replicated from McDonald’s (2004) data, which is based on the World Bank
Development Indicator.
14 The statistical outcome of Hiscox and Kastner’s measurement is based on the 2002 version of
their dataset which is replicated from McDonald (2004). It has to be noted that the dataset only
includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand for the period 1960–1992. Although
Hiscox and Kastner (2008) updated the data to 2000, it only provides for Thailand, the
Philippines, and Indonesia, constituting 123 dyad-year observations. When using the 2008
version of the data, the logit modeling cannot be executed data because no MID occurred in those
123 observations. I therefore report here the outcome of their 2002 dataset which gives more
country cases but shorter timespans, which could leave out a great deal of information on trade
policy.
15 The construction criteria of Freedom to Trade Internationally includes tariffs, regulatory trade
barriers, black-market exchange rates, and controls of the movement of capital and people
(Gwartney et al. 2016: 278–280). Using Freedom to Trade Internationally helps maintain as much
measurement consistence with JntELP as possible.
16 FTI(L) has 282 observations and the modified FTI(L) has 858 observations for 1970–2010.
17 One possible reason for this situation could be the high collinearity between GDP/pc(L) and
JntASEAN (0.7657) and between GDP/pc(L) and FTI(L) (0.6809). Pearson’s correlation
coefficients are estimated on a pairwise base for the period 1970–2010.
18 The insignificant outcome of FTI(L) in Model 5 could be a result of the difference between Sachs
and Warner’s indicator and the EFW indicator for “Freedom to Trade Internationally” in terms of
measurement criteria, even though the two indicators are similar.
19 Ideally, all original FTI(L) (282 observations) and the modified FTI(L) (858 observations) would
be used in modeling. However, data unavailability and the situations like perfect prediction
failure and collinearity could reduce observations of certain independent or control variables,
which in turn could affect the final number of observations to be used in modeling. In the cases
here, CW Dummy’s perfect prediction failure resulted in 60 observations not being used in
Models 4 and 5, meaning that at least 60 observations will be left out of the estimations for
Model 4 and Model 5. Contiguity’s perfect prediction failure caused 198 observations to be
dropped from the estimation for Model 6 and Model 7.
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5 US–China competition and Southeast Asian
states’ international political and strategic
autonomy
Introduction
Research design
The Philippines
In the first decade after the Cold War, uncertainty about the US’s East Asian
policy disrupted the traditional alliance relationship between the Philippines
and the US, while the economic rise of China inclined the Philippines to
emphasize its relationship with China. China’s rising assertiveness in the
disputed South China Sea, however, contaminated improving Philippines–
China relations and led to the US’s return to the region, impelling Manila to
hedge against China to secure economic benefits and deter security threats
from China.
The Philippines has been an ally in the US hub-and-spoke alliance
structure in the Asia-Pacific region since the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty
was signed. The close security relations lost forward momentum from
1992–1999 after US forces were withdrawn from military bases in the
Philippines in 1992, including the Subic Bay Naval Base and the Clark Air
Base, the US’s largest bases in Asia that projected US power throughout
Southeast Asia. Stagnation in their security relations was a result of
unsatisfactory financial compensation to lease the military bases in the
Philippines by the US, which was experiencing economic difficulties at the
time, and domestic nationalist opposition in the Philippines which led to the
failed ratification for a new basing package in the Philippines Senate in
1991 (Park 2011: 273–274, 279). However, a turning point was reached in
their suspended alliance with China’s occupation and fortification of
Mischief Reef in 1995, a move which challenged Philippine maritime
territorial sovereignty and struck a blow to Manila’s economic and political
engagement policy with China. Consequently, Manila attempted to renew
military ties with the US. Washington also raised concerns about the impact
of China’s assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea on its regional
maritime and strategic interests, even though Washington tried to steer clear
of the troubled waters. During negotiations with China for a peaceful
resolution over the disputed islands, it was reported that the Ramos
Administration intended to use Mischief Reef to stir up domestic support
for bringing US troops back (Storey 1999b: 111, 118). Because regional
security had taken an undesired trajectory, Manila and Washington reached
the VFA, providing legitimacy for US military personnel to once again
participate in defense-related activities covered by the 1951 Mutual Defense
Treaty (De Castro 2009: 404–405).
Already warming up, bilateral security relations were further
reinvigorated by the US’s anti-terrorism policy following the 9/11 attacks in
2001. The Philippines’ Arroyo Administration viewed the US’s worldwide
anti-terrorism policy as an opportunity to bring back US assistance to
bolster national military capabilities to tackle internal insurgency issues and
terrorism. From the vantage point of the US under the Bush Administration,
deepening security relations with Manila—by helping with reforms, shoring
up the Philippines’ military capabilities, and developing interoperability for
mutual military mobilization through regular military exchanges via new
collaboration mechanisms and the Balikatan Exercise—would not only be
good for countering global terrorism, it would also serve a broader purpose:
it would function as a hedge against the challenge to the US’s regional
hegemonic position posed by China’s comprehensive emergence and
growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region (De Castro 2009; Park
2011: 274). Amid intensifying maritime territorial disputes in the South
China Sea, Washington and Manila signed the Manila Declaration in 2011
against the background of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing to Asia,
reaffirming the bilateral security relationship and calling for multilateral
talks to resolve maritime disputes in the region. Since then, the US has
provided increased amounts of security assistance to the Philippines and
strengthened military cooperation between the two states via the Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), reached in April 2014 to allow
for a greater presence of US military forces, ships, aircraft, and equipment
in the Philippines on a nonpermanent basis, and greater access for US
forces to Philippine military bases (Lum and Dolven 2014: 15–16). Due to
the increased military cooperation, US President Barack Obama publicly
visited the Philippine Navy’s flagship vessel, the BRP Gregorio del Pilar (a
former US Coast Guard cutter given to the Philippines by the US in 2011)
on a trip to the APEC Summit in Manila in 2015 to underscore US maritime
security assistance to the Philippines and commitment to regional security.
In 2016, the growing security relationship was further boosted by the
EDCA, which was reaffirmed by the Philippine Supreme Court amid
protests by left-wing domestic political groups (De Castro 2016). US
assistance to the Philippines to improve government services, facilitate
business activities, strengthen the rule of law, expand healthcare coverage,
and bolster military capabilities increased steadily from US$131.7 million
in 2008 to US$203.5 million (requested) in 2015 (Lum and Dolven, 2014:
9). In addition, Washington helped Manila, which has shown interest in the
TPP, to prepare to join TPP.
While continuing to seek and receive US military and economic aid,
both of which are vital to the national development of the Philippines and
the relations between the Philippines and China were tense because of
maritime disputes, Manila did not dismiss the importance of engagement
with China and even used China as a leverage to obtain US assistance (De
Castro 2009: 411–412). Based on the official reports of the number of trips
to foreign countries (Republic of the Philippines 2016), the US remained
the top foreign destination for Philippine Presidents, but each President of
the Philippines from Corazon Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to Benigno S. Aquino III, paid at least one state
visit to China. President Arroyo, in particular, visited China ten times
between 2001 and 2010, including four state visits, far more than any of her
predecessors. Besides increasing maritime disputes, economic benefits are
at the core of Philippine engagement with China. Against the background of
frequent high-level visits between Manila and Beijing by the Arroyo
Administration, Manila explicitly reached out to China for security and
economic cooperation. In return, Beijing signed an agreement with Manila
for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the disputed waters of the South
China Sea and provided economic benefits in the form of trade concessions,
investments, and large-scale Official Development Assistance projects for
such areas as agriculture, mining, dam construction, North Luzon railway
upgrades, and the establishing of a national broadband network by China’s
ZET Corporation (De Castro 2009: 409–411). According to the IMF DOTS,
although the US remains an important economic and political partner, as of
2007 it is no longer the Philippines’ largest trading partner. The Philippines’
combined trade with China and Hong Kong represented 16.8 percent of
total trade in 2007 compared with only 15.5 percent for trade with the US.
Trade with China and Hong Kong continued to grow by 7 percent between
2007 and 2015.
Nonetheless, while enjoying economic benefits from China, the
Philippines has not been deterred from proactively protecting its security
interests with a two-pronged strategy in the face of China’s expansive
claims and aggressive actions in the disputed South China Sea. Manila, on
the one hand, has continued bilateral negotiations with China, while on the
other it has been working toward multilateralizing the maritime disputes
within ASEAN processes and beyond. The most striking action taken by the
Philippines to internationalize the maritime disputes was its application for
arbitration with the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013.
In the end, this provided it with strong international legitimacy to rebuke
China after the final results for the South China Sea Arbitration were
handed down on 12 July 2016 (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2016).
Developments before and after the award of the South China Sea
Arbitration bared to light Manila’s two-pronged approach for dealing with
Beijing. On 14 June 2016, China was attempting to mitigate potential
negative impacts stemming from the results of the arbitration by hosting a
special meeting with all ASEAN states in Kunming, China, but it was
reported that during the meeting, diplomatic struggles occurred over
whether the final joint statement that had been agreed by ASEAN states,
with strong wording referring to recent developments in the South China
Sea, should be read out loud on Chinese soil. Faced with pressure from and
maneuvering by China, the statement was withdrawn within a few hours of
its release on Chinese soil; the statement, explicitly iterating strong
concerns about the impact of China’s actions in the South China Sea on
relations, was instead released by individual states after the meeting
(Thayer 2016). The Philippines is the one of the countries that publicly
issued the statement through its Department of Foreign Affairs (Department
of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines 2016a). While the arbitration ruled in
overwhelming favor of the Philippines, Manila opted to respond in an
affirmative but restrained manner (Department of Foreign Affairs of the
Philippines, 2016b) and in turn signaled its willingness to continue bilateral
talks with China over the South China Sea issue.10 Manila also attempted to
have the ruling of the arbitration included in the joint statement of the 49th
ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting held in Laos in 2016, demonstrating its
firm support for the arbitration result. Therefore, as shown previously, it can
be seen that Manila continued to hedge as it continued with its political and
economic engagements with Beijing while reinforcing security ties with
Washington. It has become increasing emboldened in regard to its hedging
as the US has become comprehensively re-involved in the region.
Vietnam
Vietnam has undoubtedly been one of East Asian countries most sensitive
to the rise of China. Given its geographic position and historical experience,
Vietnam formulated a mixed post-Cold War China policy consisting of a
number of features, including balance, deference, solidarity, and
enmeshment, each of which waxed and waned along with changes in
Vietnamese leadership composition that can be divided into anti-
imperialists and integrationists (Vuving 2006). Vuving argues that anti-
imperialists make protecting socialist ideology and countering Western
influence the top priority of their foreign policy and emphasize deference
and solidarity in maintaining conflict-averse and close relations with China,
while integrationists give “diversification and multi-directionalization”
linchpin status in their foreign policy to promote national security and
socioeconomic development and regard balancing and enmeshment as
better approaches to dealing with China. Despite differences in terminology,
Vuving’s typology of Vietnam’s foreign policy toward China is similar to
Hiep’s (2013) description of Vietnam’s hedging strategy with China, which
is comprised of hard balancing, direct engagement (deference and
solidarity), soft balancing (enmeshment and solidarity), and economic
pragmatism (enmeshment). Since a strategy of “cooperating while
struggling (vua hop tac vua dua tranh)” was introduced in the third plenum
of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s (CPV) Central Committee in 1992
and was officially adopted by the CPV Politburo in 1994 to improve foreign
relations by utilizing common interests and minimizing discrepancies
between Vietnam and other countries in the region and the world, Vietnam
has, in essence, been moving incrementally toward a hedging strategy. This
foreign policy guideline was further elaborated on and supplemented by
CPV Central Committee in 2003 with the two concepts doi tac (“objects of
cooperation”) and doi tuong (“objects of struggle”), showing that Vietnam
views its relations with other countries, including the US and China, as
being comprised of cooperation and struggle as it pursues national interests
(Hiep 2013: 343; Thayer 2011: 351–352). Against this backdrop of policy
conduct, Vietnam has, on the one hand, been accelerating its military
modernization to upgrade its military capabilities, steadily increasing its
defense budget in the process, to deter China’s assertiveness, especially in
the disputed South China Sea, while on the other hand, because Chinese
trade and investment contributes to Vietnam’s economic growth and that, in
turn, has been critical to regime stability, it continued to deepen economic
relations with China and deal with cooperation and disputes between Hanoi
and Beijing through frequent high-level political exchanges and multilateral
institutions like ASEAN (Hiep 2013). According to the IMF DOTS, China
is Vietnam’s biggest trading partner and importer of Vietnamese goods,
representing 29 percent of Vietnam’s total trade in 2015.
In the course of dealing with relations with China, the US is clearly the
most crucial third party of which Vietnam can take advantage to utilize
hedging against China to maximize national interests. Given ideological
differences and the experience of a bitter war, one would have never
guessed that Vietnam–US relations would progress so quickly over the last
two decades. Most recently, a historic move in Vietnam–US relations was
made during US President Obama’s first visit to Vietnam, when an
announcement was made on 23 May 2016 that the US would completely lift
the embargo on sales of lethal military equipment that had been in place
since 1984. This meant that security relations of the two countries would
take another significant step forward after sales of non-lethal defense items
were allowed in 2007. This move explicitly indicates that Vietnam is taking
advantage of strengthened security relations with the US to balance China’s
expanding assertiveness in the South China Sea. It took more than four
decades after the end of Vietnam War, however, to reach this high point in
the bilateral relations. Vietnam’s diplomatic and economic relations with
the US were essentially nonexistent after the US lost the Vietnam War
against communist North Vietnam in 1975. Even though overtures were
made to resume bilateral relations during the Carter Administration, the
US’s approach did not receive a positive response and Vietnam’s later
invasion of Cambodia in 1978 undid all US efforts at the time. The frozen
relations continued for more than another decade until 1990 when the
George H. W. Bush Administration decided to help with a peace agreement
in Cambodia after Vietnam withdrew its forces from Cambodia in 1989 and
agreed to launch a compromise peace settlement. Following the contact
made during the settlement process on Cambodia, the US laid out a
roadmap for normalizing relations with Vietnam in 1991. In return, that
same year, Vietnam allowed the US to open an office in Hanoi to handle
affairs related to US prisoners of war/missing in action.
Relations made a major advance when the Clinton Administration lifted
the trade embargo on Vietnam in 1994 and re-established formal diplomatic
relations in 1995, when Vietnamese integrationists, who underscored
balancing and enmeshment, were in charge of foreign policy (Vuving 2006:
814). Bilateral economic relations improved incrementally and were
highlighted by the US–Vietnam BTA signed in 2000 and implemented in
2001. Since 2002, the US has become Vietnam’s biggest export destination.
However, the BTA was ratified during domestic political struggles between
the integrationist camp and the anti-imperialist camp (Vuving 2006: 816).
With Vietnam’s agreement to extend domestic market liberalization, the
2001 BTA, which was granted conditional status with annual reviews,
became permanent one month after US President Bush visited Vietnam in
November 2006. The rapid progress in Vietnam–US economic relations
was driven by Vietnam’s eagerness to promote economic development
under Doi Moi that took place in 1986, as well as a bid for WTO
membership in 2007 to facilitate integration into global and regional
economic system. Soon after joining WTO, Vietnam started TPP
negotiations led by the US in late 2008. In the last two decades, Vietnam’s
trade with the US skyrocketed by an average annual rate of 130 percent
from US$139 million in 1994 to US$42,318 million in 2015.
In addition to economic relations, political engagement was intensely
undergone at the same time. During a visit by Vietnamese President Truong
Tan Sang to Washington in July 2013, one month after he paid a state visit
to China, Vietnam–US relations were upgraded to a comprehensive
partnership in which maritime capacity building, economic engagement,
climate change and environmental issues, educational cooperation, and
human rights issues were underscored (White House of the US 2013). CPV
General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong visited the US in July 2015, the
highest-ranking official to do so since the end of the Vietnam War. During
his visit, the two sides agreed to boost economic and defense ties, including
easing US restrictions on arms sales (White House of the US 2015b),
demonstrating that the two countries had entered a new phase in bilateral
relations. In return, President Obama made a state visit in May 2016 to
Vietnam during which Washington lifted the ban on arms sales, mentioned
earlier. In fact, General Secretary Nguyen’s visit to China in April 2015,
taken before his first trip to the US, can be regarded as a move to raise the
stakes in Hanoi’s subsequent negotiations with the US in July. General
Secretary Nguyen’s visit to the US was immediately followed in September
2015 by President Truong’s visit to China during which the two sides
agreed to handle South China Sea disputes through dialogue (Xinhua 2015).
However, in a press interview later in September, President Truong publicly
expressed his concerns about China’s assertiveness and stated that China’s
island building in the disputed South China Sea violated international law
and threatened maritime security. He also urged the US to lift the ban on
lethal weapons sales to Vietnam (Daniszewski and Pennington 2015). Two
months later, Hanoi and Beijing reached several cooperation agreements
during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Vietnam in November 2015,
including a loan of US$200 million from the Chinese Development Bank to
Vietnam, to mend bilateral relations strained over disputes over the South
China Sea (Associated Press 2015). Like the Philippines, Vietnam publicly
released a joint statement through its national news agency after the special
China–ASEAN meeting in Kunming (Vietnam News Agency 2016) and
Vietnam officially voiced support for the arbitration result (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Vietnam 2016).
In light of the recent developments in Vietnam–US relations and
Vietnam–China relations, it is clear that, on the one hand, Vietnam has
gradually been taking advantage of the US’s comprehensive return to Asia
to deal with its disputes with China, while, on the other hand, it has been
attempting to acquire economic and/or security benefits from both great
powers. Vietnam has also been utilizing ASEAN as a platform to reinforce
its capacity in dealing with relations with China and the US. In other words,
Vietnam is hedging, both bilaterally as well as multilaterally, for better
economic and security benefits and a less negative impact amid the grand
competition between the US and China.
Conclusion
To cultivate close ties with regional states and maintain a stable external
environment, China has moved to embrace ASEAN-centered
multilateralism since the mid of 1990s. As its national capabilities have
increased rapidly, Beijing has gradually become confident of being
involved in the development of regional multilateral institutions and, in
turn, has used multilateral engagements to bolster its regional influence.
The growth of China’s influence in regional security and economic affairs
has prompted Washington to reconsider the utilities of multilateralism in its
bilateralism-centered regional policy and turn to participate in ASEAN-led
multilateralism. As a result, ASEAN-led multilateral mechanisms have
become important arenas for both Washington and Beijing to negotiate
regional affairs with each other, with Southeast Asian states, and with
others. For the US and China, taking part in the ARF is a rational choice.
However, their moves toward ASEAN-led multilateralism at the outset
necessitated accommodations to the ASEAN norm and its agenda of
regional security, namely they have had to concede to some extent their
own political power of agenda setting. This implies that Southeast Asian
states have acquired more political autonomy to formulate a preferred
blueprint of regional development. The competition over regional alliance
networks has placed Beijing and Washington in a security dilemma, giving
ASEAN states a relatively flexible strategic environment. ASEAN states,
therefore, have been able to hedge against the two great powers to mitigate
uncertainty and, in turn, enhance their international political autonomy. The
case studies of the ARF, the Philippines, and Vietnam demonstrated above
show this tendency in Southeast Asia. This empirically supports the
theoretical argument that small states can obtain greater international
political and strategic autonomy amid great power competition in the power
transition context.
Notes
1 The ASEAN-PMC is an annual meeting that takes place in two phases. ASEAN member states
meet annually with their external dialogue partners (as of 2015 it consisted of Australia, Canada,
China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the
United States). The first phase is a closed meeting in which ASEAN foreign ministers discuss
with dialogue counterparts as a group (ASEAN + 10) a wide range of international economic,
political, and security issues. The second phase is a separate session of a meeting between
ASEAN and each dialogue partner (ASEAN + 1) to examine their bilateral relationships.
However, the PMC ASEAN + 10 has been terminated and to some extent folded into the ARF
with regards to security issues (Weatherbee 2015: 109–111).
2 The ARF consists of two processes: the official one (Track I) and the unofficial one (Track II).
The core of Track I is the annual ministerial meetings held in the summer. They are supported
by the ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting that is designed to prepare agendas to be explored at the
ministerial meetings. In addition, meetings of Inter-sessional Support Group on Confidence
Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy and inter-sessional meetings on Counter-
terrorism and Transnational Crime, Disaster Relief, Marine Security, and Non-proliferation and
Disarmament also operate as channels of communication. Track II activities include researchers
of strategic studies institutions linked to the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
and government officials in private capacities (Weatherbee 2015: 134–135). Diplomacy in the
ARF, at both the official level and the unofficial level, in effect is not solely constrained to
multilateral exchanges, as sideline bilateral communications and negotiations also take place
simultaneously. As of 2015, the ARF consisted of 27 intra-regional as well as extra-regional
participants, including Australia, Brunei, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan,
Lao PDR, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea,
Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Vietnam (1994), Cambodia (1995), India
and Myanmar (1996), Mongolia (1999), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea/North
Korea (2000), Pakistan (2004), Timor-Leste (2005), Bangladesh (2006), and Sri Lanka (2007).
3 In this regard, Thailand is the typical case with a long record of security aligning with both the
US and China at the same time since the Vietnam War (Ciorciari 2010: 56–91).
4 China ready to take part in Asian security dialogues, excerpts from speech by Qian Qichen,
Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister at Foreign Correspondents’ Association, Singapore,
24 July 1993. Beijing Review, 9–15 August 1993.
5 As of 2015, the EAS consisted of all the ASEAN states plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New
Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States.
6 Winston Lord in his confirmation hearing on 31 March 1993 for Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs identified ten priority policy goals. See http://1997-
2001.state.gov/www/regions/eap/930331.html [accessed 11 August 2015].
7 Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell (attended four times in a row),
Condoleezza Rice (attended three times, but missed the one in 2005—she did, however, send a
positive signal of US commitment to the ARF by attending the 2006 meeting in Malaysia
despite the various crises occurring in the Middle East), Hillary Clinton (attended four times in a
row), John Kerry (attended four times in a row).
8 Remarks by Secretary Panetta at ASEAN Meeting, Siem Reap, Cambodia.
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5152 [accessed 10 August
2015].
9 Press availability in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/08/245768.htm [accessed 10 August 2015].
10 Manila sent former President Fidel Ramos as a special envoy to hold talks with his Chinese
counterpart in Hong Kong (Manila Times, 2016).
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6 Conclusion
capability become middle or small states. A great power is more able than a
small state to realize what it desires to acquire, protect what it wants to
secure, and promote what it wishes to develop. Consequently, the difference
in material power defines relationships between great powers and small
states. Less capability impels a small state to seek external resources and
assistance to help it retain its desired level of economic
Since small states can continue to receive economic benefit and security
assistance from great powers at
relatively low or no cost to their autonomy, and since they are more able
to determine their economic and
security matters and manage their relations with great powers in ways
that they prefer, small states can
Not only do the empirical findings confirm that small states themselves
can play an important role in defining and creating routes of international
development more to their liking, a fact which contradicts the conventional
realist thought that only great powers can play non-trivial roles in the
operations of the international system, they also present some findings that
differ from mainstream explanations concerning interstate interactions in
general and regional development of Southeast Asia in particular. One of
the different outcomes is that ASEAN’s performance in facilitating regional
integration and managing regional
Given the highly diverse political regimes and various levels of national
economic development that characterize Southeast Asian states, this finding
is not a surprise. Nonetheless, whether liberal peace is applicable to
Southeast Asia hinges on future political and economic development in the
region. But it is obvious that the pursuit of economic development,
currently a central concern of regional governments, outperforms traditional
liberal peace variables in generating interstate peace in the region.
In addition to the preceding insights, this study also offers some practical
implications. Southeast Asian states and small states in East Asia alike need
to seize and take cooperative advantage of the geopolitical opportunity that
stems from US–China competition in the power transition context. They
need to keep hedging against but not choose sides between the US and
China, at either the bilateral or multilateral level. In this regard, Southeast
Asian states in particular have to continue to collectively advance the
institutionalization process of ASEAN and establish robust regional unity in
order to maintain their pivotal role in the region. They also have to keep
unity in ASEAN-led regional multilateral institutions, such as the ARF, the
EAS, ASEAN + 3, and other
Asia-Pacific-wide multilateral institutions where they are hedging
against the US and China. Second, they have to continue to facilitate intra-
regional and inter-regional cooperation to broaden and deepen liberal
capitalist economic development, as this can help effectively enhance
national capability and reduce security burdens.
While this book has disclosed the conditions in which small states can
reinforce their autonomy, security, and development, it also brings forward
several interesting issues which deserve further research in the future.
Third, the ARF is just one of many venues where ASEAN states execute
hedging, even though it is the most
This issue is not only critical for the development of reinforcing logic in
the academic sense, but also
It is true that the world is comprised of a few great powers and many
small states, yet the world is dominated by the few, not the many. This
asymmetric reality is not the whole story, however. Amid the competition
between great powers lies room for small states to reinforce their autonomy,
security, and development for now and for the future, fueled by their pursuit
of liberal capitalist economic development. Hence, small states can adjust
their asymmetric relations with great powers and be the masters of their
fate. Admittedly, such reinforcing dynamics are not easy to propel and
maintain, but neither are they entirely impossible when small states are
collectively committed to them.
Index
alliance network 15; benefits for subordinate and dissatisfied states 17; competition over 17; military
and economic 16; rising power pursuit of 16
Angkor Sentinel 108
anti-China alliance, formation of 105
anti-terrorism policy 3; following the 9/11 attacks 110
APEC Leaders’ Meeting 107
arms embargo: imposition of 31; by US on Vietnam 113, 115
ASEAN + 1 1, 91; free trade agreement 10n3, 11n6, 43
ASEAN + 3 1, 33, 91, 126
ASEAN + 6 91
ASEAN Community 27; ASEAN Economic Community 27, 40, 43; ASEAN Political-Security
Community 43; ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 43; establishment of 27; Roadmap for 43;
three pillars of 43
ASEAN Concord II see Bali Concord II
ASEAN Connectivity for Trade and Investment 38
ASEAN Cooperation Plan 35
ASEAN Economic Community 1, 27, 40, 43, 70
ASEAN Finance Work Program 70
ASEAN Foreign Minister Conference 32, 112
ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services 70
ASEAN Free Trade Area 1, 4, 27, 41, 42, 43, 47, 70; Common Effective Preferential Tariff 47
ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme 70
ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures 70
ASEAN Industrial Projects 70
ASEAN Ministers’ Meeting 104, 108, 109
ASEAN Post-Ministerial conference 100, 105, 116n1
ASEAN Regional Forum 1, 3, 5, 27, 28, 30, 42, 91, 101, 125–126; China and 104–106; on Code of
Conduct for the South China Sea 44; code of conduct governing relations 106; collective arena of
103–104; Confidence Building Measures 105; cooperative security approach 32; Inter-sessional
Support Group 105, 116n2; Senior Officials’ Meeting 116n2; on South China Sea territorial
issues 44; Track I and Track II activities 116n2; United States and 106–109
ASEAN Surveillance Process 70
ASEAN Vision 2020 41, 43
ASEAN Way 11n7, 32, 65, 101
ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 3, 28, 33, 35
ASEAN–China relations: ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 3, 28, 33, 35; ASEAN–China summit see
ASEAN–China Summit; on Asia Debt Reduction Plan 33; China–ASEAN Investment
Agreement 34; on confidence-building measures 106; Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea 33, 105; economic and trade relations 32, 38, 39; on formation of Greater
Mekong Subregion 33; Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC 106, 108; on
South China Sea issue 105; Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity with ASEAN 33;
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 33
ASEAN–China Summit 32; Asia Debt Reduction Plan 33; Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea 33, 105; Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
33; landmark agreements 33; Track II meetings 32
ASEAN–US relations: Angkor Sentinel 108; ASEAN–US Summit 37; on bilateral peacekeeping
exercise 108; on case of Philippines 109–112; Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 108;
on defense cooperation 37; Enhanced Partnership to the Strategic Partnership 108; Lower
Mekong Initiative 38, 127; on maritime security 108; on South China Sea dispute 37; Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation 36; Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 3, 35, 37; trade
relations 38; US–ASEAN Connect 38
ASEAN–US Summit 36
Asia Debt Reduction Plan 33
Asian Financial Crisis 11n6, 31, 32, 41, 70, 105
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 3, 28, 34
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 31, 33, 35, 36, 37, 110, 127
Asia-Pacific regional integration 43
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1, 3–5; agenda of regional development 5; attractiveness as a
global production base 42; bargaining power and geopolitical influence 42; centrality in Asia-
Pacific regionalism 101; Charter of 43; defense cooperation with US 37; economic and security
cooperation 42; economic development of 27; economic integration and development 35;
effectiveness on regional economic integration 67; establishment of 27, 60, 67; expansion of 42,
67; fatality level of MID onsets 66; foreign direct investment 39, 41, 43, 53n12, 67; founding
states of 40; as hedge against US and China 5; impact of competition between the US and China
on 27; institutionalization of 126; Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity 106; liberal peace perspective of 60; membership countries 27, 42; performance in
facilitating regional integration 126; political ideologies of 27; process of state-building 27, 60;
process to establish AFTA 27; pursuit of regional resilience 40; quasi-alliance 47; rapprochement
with Vietnam 42; regional multilateralism 32; on regional security development 47; Roadmap for
43; Secretariat 36; security management of 60, 61–67, 83; Statement on the Six-Point Principles
on the South China Sea 108; trade with China 32
asymmetric alliance 6; between small states and great powers 7, 14; small states’ opportunity to
change 15–17; “symmetric” model of 14
autocracy–anocracy dyads 62
autonomy of small states 7, 92; advantages of 97–99; approach to reinforce 17–22; causal process
observation 100; characteristics of 94; defined 92; friendly/cooperative relationship 95; against
great power 97; measurement of 96–97; method, case, and time for measurement of 100–103;
objectives of 92–94; promotion of 94–95; relation-based 95; research design for measurement of
96–97; in world politics 92–95
autonomy–security mix 21–22
autonomy–security outcomes, of alliances for small states 21
autonomy–security tradeoff alliance 6–8, 12, 124; motives and needs between states to form 14–15;
between small state and great power 14, 17; “symmetric” model of 14
Baker, James 107
balance-of-power 14, 23n3, 46, 73, 101, 104
balancing strategy, of small states 6, 12, 14, 17, 92, 99
Bali Concord I 40
Bali Concord II 43, 70
Bali Summit: in 1976 40; in 2003 43
bandwagoning strategy, of small states 6, 12, 14, 17, 91
bargaining model of war 68
bargaining power 8, 93, 95; of ASEAN states 5, 42; of small state with great power 21, 41
bilateral trade agreement: between US and Laos 35; between US and Vietnam 114
Bosnian War 30
Brunei 9, 35, 45, 53n9, 72, 74, 83n2; ASEAN membership 10n1, 37; economic liberalization policies
78; relation with China 32, 105; Trans-Pacific Partnership 11n6
Bush, George H.W. 30, 106, 113
Bush, George W. 3, 34, 107; Southeast Asian policy 35
Cambodia 9, 27, 32, 33, 35, 45, 72; ASEAN membership 1, 42; ASEAN Ministers’ Meeting 108;
defense cooperation with US 37, 108; economic dependence 62; Lower Mekong Initiative 38;
Paris Agreements 41; relation with US 28; Vietnam pulled out of 30, 113; Vietnam’s invasion of
113
capability aggregation 14
capitalist economy see liberal capitalist economic development
capitalist peace, theory of 124
Carter, Jimmy 30
charm offensive strategy 2, 17, 28
Chiang Mai Initiative 70
China: and ASEAN Regional Forum 104–106; ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 3; Asia Debt
Reduction Plan 33; charm offensive strategy 2, 17, 28, 106; diplomatic relations with ASEAN
states 29, 32; domestic reforms in 29; economic and military development of 2; economic and
military expansion 91; economic links and political leverage in Mekong region 38; efforts to
improve relations with ASEAN 106; foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia 39; foreign
policy toward Southeast Asia 2–3, 29, 104; Four Modernizations 29; friction with Soviet Union
29; insurgencies supported by 40; Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking 111; Mischief Reef,
occupation of 109–110; New Security Concept 31, 52n1; Open Door policy 29–30; Policy of
Good Neighborliness 31, 52n1, 104; reconciliation with ASEAN states 49; relations with
Southeast Asia 3; rivalry with US see US–China competition; security and economic impact of
rise of 33; Sino-Vietnam War 60; South China Sea dispute see South China Sea dispute;
Tiananmen incident 31; trade with ASEAN states 32, 38–39
China–ASEAN Investment Agreement 34
China–ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund 34
China–Japan–South Korea Free Trade Agreement 33
Chinese Communist Party 10n5, 31
Clark Air Base, Philippines 30, 109
Clinton, Hillary 36–37
CLMV countries 42
Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 37, 44, 106, 108
Cold War 14, 27, 52, 73, 91, 102, 104, 106; collapse of Soviet Union 30; end of 41; militarized
interstate disputes during 66; US–China competition after 30–40; US–China competition during
28, 29–30
Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme 47
common security threat 14
composite index of national capability 73
Concert of Southeast Asian Nations 41
Conference on Security and Co-operation Europe 104
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia 106
Confidence Building Measures 106, 116
conflict resolution: mechanism of 101; peaceful approaches to 61
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training 108
cooperative security in Asia-Pacific region, implications of 31
Correlates of War: Formal Alliance data 47; Militarized Interstate Dispute data 47, 65, 70, 71, 79;
Trade Data 46
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific 116n2
currency swap agreements 70
East Asia Summit 1, 3, 28, 36, 91, 106, 107, 116n5, 126
East Asian Littoral 34
East China Sea dispute 28, 91
East Timor: human rights violations 35; independence referendum 31; militias’ terror campaign 31
economic alliance network 16
economic development: of ASEAN countries 27; and bargaining model of war 68; cooperative
foreign policies for 20; driven by improvement of industry and technology 18; economic
liberalization policies for 70; effect on state’s propensity for international conflict 18, 20;
effectiveness of trade for 68; empirical analysis of 71–80; export-oriented development model 70;
financial and human resources for 17–18; import-substituting development model 70; liberal
capitalist 7, 18, 68–69; national 18; non-tariff barriers 71–72; in processes of nation-making 67;
pursuit of, as a pacifying factor 67–71; relation with interstate conflict 67; research design to
study impact of 71–74; of rising power 16; of small states 7, 13; through forceful territorial
acquisition 18
Economic Freedom of the World 79
economic globalization 42
economic growth 42, 69, 127; of ASEAN states 41; of China 2, 31; in liberal economic system 46;
and national defense 20; power transitions 67; of rising power 15, 16; use of military force for 18;
of Vietnam 113
economic interdependence: among Southeast Asian countries 62, 63–64; implications of 61–67; in
post-Cold War period 62; of regional dyads 62; through trade 18–19, 68
economic liberalization, policy of 30, 61, 71; for economic development 70; operationalization of 78;
of Southeast Asian states 71
economic policy making 20
economic sanctions 7, 16
economic slowdown, of dominant power 17
economic wealth 17
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 110
Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative 35
European Union 41, 43
Export–Import Bank of China 34
export-oriented economic policies 19, 71
external balance, to establish status quo 23n4
Indonesia 9, 36–37, 45, 53n9, 74, 84n14; arms embargo on 31; ASEAN membership 10n1, 66; on
ASEAN security management 65; East Timor’s militias’ terror campaign 31; economic
dependence of regional dyads 62; human rights violations, issue of 35; International Military
Education Training program 31, 35; Konfrontasi policy 67; relation with China 32; relation with
US 3, 28; on South China Sea dispute 108–109; Statement on the Six-Point Principles on the
South China Sea 108; Trade and Investment Framework Agreement 35; Trans-Pacific Partnership
3, 37
innovation and technology 13
internal balance, to establish status quo 23n4
international autonomy 16; and bandwagoning strategy 14, 92; bargain for greater 13; cost of 18; of
great powers 124; promotion of 6, 21, 94–95; for regional development 17; and security
management 12, 21; in world politics 92–95
international conflicts: effect of economic development on state’s propensity for 18; impact on
economic exchanges 69
International Governmental Organization dataset 72
International Military Education Training program 3, 31, 35
International Monetary Fund 32, 38, 44, 46, 111, 113
international security 1, 10, 12, 14, 93, 125; role of small states in 14
international status, of small states 6, 8, 13, 93, 94, 96
interruption of trade links, economic and political costs of 18, 68
Inter-sessional Support Group 105, 116n2
interstate conflicts 19, 47; economic development and 67; see also militarized interstate dispute
Kantian peace 75
Karen ethnic rebels 66
Korean War 29
Kuwait War 30
Malaysia 9, 28–29, 45, 62, 74; ASEAN membership 10n1, 66; ASEAN Ministers’ Meeting 104;
conflict with Philippines 66; defense cooperation with US 37; economic interdependence 65;
export-oriented strategy 70; Indonesia’s Konfrontasi policy against 67; Reformasi protest
movement (1998) 31
maritime security 36–37, 101, 108, 115
Maritime Silk Road 3, 10n5, 34
Marshall Plan 34
material capacity, of small states 13–14
Mekong River Commission 38, 52n4
militarized interstate dispute 60–62, 65, 70, 71; and ASEAN membership 65; during Cold War period
66; fatality level among ASEAN states 66, 66; predicted probability of 77
military alliance network 16
military measures: to accumulate wealth 18; for economic growth 18
Mischief Reef dispute 109–110
Morrow, J.D. 6, 11n8, 14, 21, 23n2, 92
multilateral cooperation 20
multinational exercise: between Thailand and US 35
Mutual Defense Treaty 109–110
Myanmar 1, 3, 9, 27–28, 45, 74; ASEAN membership 31, 42; conflict with Thailand 66; defense
cooperation with US 37; Lancang–Mekong Cooperation 52n4; Lower Mekong Initiatives 38
Obama, Barack 3, 36, 113, 114; Asian policy doctrine 36; economic rebalancing toward Asia-Pacific
region 37; “Rebalancing to Asia” policy 107; visit to Philippine Navy’s flagship vessel 110; visits
to Southeast Asia states 36
One Belt One Road 3, 28, 34, 52n2, 91
Open Door policy 29–30
open trade regime 70, 72
Reagan, Ronald 30
“Rebalancing to Asia” policy 3, 36, 40, 91, 107, 110
Reformasi protest movement, Malaysia 31
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 1, 3, 28, 33, 43, 127
regional development, agenda of 17; approach by small state to reinforce 17–22
regional distribution of power 2
regional economic cooperation 20
regional multilateralism: ASEAN-led 32; development of 2
Rice, Condoleezza 36, 116n7
rising power: alliance network 8; charm offensive strategy 17; coercive measures against dominant
power 7–8; cost of expanding an alliance network for 17; economic development 16;
expansionist policy of 7, 17; foreign policies of 16; power transition process 7; power-reinforcing
pattern 16; pursuit of alliance network 16; relation with subordinate states 16–17
War on Terror 34
Washington consensus 30
Western liberalism, values of 31
World Trade Organization 41, 114
World War II 28–29, 34, 45