Studia Gilsoniana 4:3 (July–September 2015): 229–240 | ISSN 2300–0066

Robert A. Delfino
St. John’s University
Staten Island, NY
USA

THE FAILURE OF NEW ATHEISM MORALITY

In his book God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to

Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens, the Roman Catholic theologian John F.
Haught discusses the recent growth of new atheism. According to Haught
the new atheists—who include both scientists and philosophers—subscribe
to a belief system known as “scientific naturalism.” The central dogma of
scientific naturalism is the following: “[O]nly nature, including humans
and our creations, is real; that God does not exist; and that science can give
us complete and reliable knowledge of reality.”1 As Haught’s description
makes clear, scientific naturalists are committed to two beliefs: (1) scien-
tism, which is the view that only science can give us complete and reliable
knowledge of reality, and (2) metaphysical naturalism, which is the view
that no supernatural entities exist. 2 In holding both of these beliefs, scien-
tific naturalists separate themselves from the majority of scientists and
philosophers who reject at least one of these beliefs. 3 In addition, as others
have noted, there is an “evangelical” nature to the new atheism, “which
assumes that it has a Good News to share, at all cost, for the ultimate future
of humanity by the conversion of as many people as possible.”4
Because of their commitment to scientism and to metaphysical natu-
ralism, new atheists have claimed that the methods of science can success-

1
John F. Haught, God and the New Atheism: A Critical Response to Dawkins, Harris, and
Hitchens (London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), x. Throughout this essay I use
“scientific naturalism” exclusively as Haught defines it.
2
For a good discussion of metaphysical naturalism and the new atheists, see Stewart Goetz
and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 2008), especially 1–11.
3
Most scientists only affirm methodological naturalism, not metaphysical naturalism. And
most philosophers reject scientism.
230 Robert A. Delfino

fully study topics traditionally considered outside of the bounds of science,

4

such as ethics. For example, in his book The God Delusion, the evolution-
ary biologist Richard Dawkins puts forth an argument that “our sense of
right and wrong can be derived from our Darwinian past.”5 And Sam Har-
ris, in his book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Hu-
man Values, argues that “morality can and should be integrated with our
scientific understanding of the natural world.” 6
I have treated the topic of scientism and its serious problems else-
where.7 As such, here I shall focus on the metaphysical naturalism that new
atheists and other naturalists accept, with the goal of answering the follow-
ing question: Can metaphysical naturalism provide an adequate foundation
for objective moral values? I shall argue that the answer is “no” and I will
discuss several serious problems inherent in a naturalistic account of the
foundation of morality. Before I can do this, however, I must clarify what I
mean by objective moral values.
First, I hold that moral values are prescriptive. That is, they tell us
how we should act. The word “should,” however, can be used in different
ways. For example, if you want to climb Mount Everest you should buy a
very warm coat, and you should pack enough food and supplies, and you
should get a good Sherpa to guide you. Of course, instead of doing all of
that you could simply decide not to climb the mountain. After all, moun-
tain climbing is optional. Morality, however, is not optional. This raises a
second point, namely, that moral prescriptions carry with them a force of
inescapable necessity. Immanuel Kant, in insisting that the supreme moral
principle was not hypothetical, but categorical (and thus binding on all
rational beings at all times) recognized this type of necessity. Third, and
finally, I hold that a moral proposition such as “parental child abuse is
wrong” is either true or false. In this particular case, I would argue that the
proposition is true. As such, I will not entertain the view that moral values
are neither true nor false as non-cognitivist philosophers hold, or that they
are merely subjectively true or culturally true as moral relativists hold.

4
Jeffrey W. Robbins and Christopher D. Rodkey, “Beating ‘God’ to Death: Radical Theol-
ogy and the New Atheism,” in Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal, ed.
Amarnath Amarasingam (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 35.
5
Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 214.
6
Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New
York: Free Press, 2010), 195, note 9.
7
Robert A. Delfino, “The Cultural Dangers of Scientism and Common Sense Solutions,”
Studia Gilsoniana 3:supplement (2014): 485–496.
 The Failure of New Atheism Morality 231

Since at least as far back as Plato, the majority of Western philoso-

phers have sought a metaphysical foundation or ground to support objec-
tive moral values in the sense I have described above—that is, prescrip-
tions about good and evil that are objectively true and necessarily binding.
Whereas for Plato the Form-of-the-Good provided this metaphysical
ground and for medieval thinkers God provided this metaphysical ground,
scientific naturalists cannot appeal to such supernatural entities. So, the
question remains—can the scientific naturalist provide a metaphysical
foundation that explains how moral values are objectively true, prescrip-
tive, and carry with them an inescapable necessity? Let us examine that
question next.

Natural Foundations of Objective Moral Values

Objective moral values cannot exist if there are no moral agents. A
necessary condition for moral agency is metaphysical freedom, which is
the ability of an agent to have acted otherwise than she did because she has
control over her actions. Even Immanuel Kant, who was certainly skeptical
of traditional metaphysics, affirmed that freedom of the will is a necessary
postulate of pure practical reason without which morality is not possible. 8
Obviously, scientific naturalists cannot appeal to supernatural moral
agents. Therefore, if it turns out that metaphysical naturalism is not com-
patible with the freedom of living physical beings, then metaphysical natu-
ralism cannot serve as a satisfactory metaphysical foundation for objective
moral values. As such, the problem of freedom is an important issue that
we must address.
The Problem of Freedom
There certainly have been some scientists and philosophers who
have understood metaphysical naturalism to preclude human freedom.
Consider, for example, the comments of neuroscientist and new atheist
Sam Harris. In a chapter section titled “The Illusion of Free Will,” he
writes the following:

8
“These postulates are those of immortality, of freedom considered positively (as the causal-
ity of a being so far as this being belongs to the intelligible world), and of the existence of
God” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapo-
lis, IN: Hackett, 2002), 168 [5:132]).
232 Robert A. Delfino

[Y]ou tend to feel that you are the source of your own thoughts and
actions. You decide what to do and not to do. You seem to be an
agent acting of your own free will. As we will see, however, this
point of view cannot be reconciled with what we know about the
human brain . . . All of our behavior can be traced to biological
events about which we have no conscious knowledge . . . you are no
more responsible for the next thing you think (and therefore do) than
you are for the fact that you were born into this world. 9
Obviously, when metaphysical naturalism is understood in this nar-
row, reductive, and determinist way, it cannot serve as an adequate founda-
tion for objective moral values. For this reason, many naturalists have em-
braced a broader understanding of metaphysical naturalism—one, they
claim, that is compatible with human freedom. Indeed, even some Chris-
tian philosophers and theologians have embraced a view very similar to
this—that everything which exists, except for God, is a physical being. For
example, Nancey Murphy—in her book Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bod-
ies?—asserts the following: “My central thesis is, first, that we are our
bodies—there is no additional metaphysical element such as a mind or soul
or spirit. But, second, this ‘physicalist’ position need not deny that we are
intelligent, moral, and spiritual.”10
Murphy calls her position non-reductive physicalism; and apart
from her stance on God, non-reductive physicalism seems like the only
option left for metaphysical naturalists if they wish to defend human free-
dom and objective moral values. I have argued elsewhere, however, that
there are serious reasons to doubt that non-reductive physicalism can ac-
count for human freedom.11 I cannot reproduce all of those arguments here,
but let me briefly discuss the main difficulty, which has to do with the
problem of emergence.
In order for non-reductive physicalism to be different from the nar-
row understanding of physicalism discussed above, non-reductive physi-

9
Harris, The Moral Landscape, 102–104 (emphasis in the original). Harris tries to salvage
(unsuccessfully in my judgment) some notion of moral responsibility based on the overall
complexion of one’s mind and character. See id., 106–112. See also Harris, Free Will (New
York: Free Press, 2012), 48–60.
10
Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2006), ix.
11
See Robert A. Delfino, “Christian Physicalism and Personal Identity,” in Global Spiral
[www.metanexus.net/essay/christian-physicalism-and-personal-identity, accessed on Sept
28, 2015].
 The Failure of New Atheism Morality 233

calists must hold that new causal powers, such as freedom, can emerge in
living organisms over time. Because scientific naturalists do not want to
appeal to souls or non-material entities, they must hold that these new cas-
ual powers emerge, ultimately, from complex arrangements of microphysi-
cal parts. However, with the exception of quantum indeterminacy, the
microphysical world is a world of determinism. In addition, quantum inde-
terminacy, which is a kind of statistical randomness, is not enough for
genuine freedom. Even if quantum events are random, I will not be free if
my actions are caused by quantum events over which I have no control. As
such, it does not seem possible that the causal power to make genuinely
free choices can emerge from the microphysical world—quantum or oth-
erwise.
If the above arguments are correct, then neither the narrow nor the
broad understanding of metaphysical naturalism can account for freedom.
In such a case, neither human beings nor any living physical being would
be a moral agent, and thus the attempt to provide a naturalistic ground for
objective moral values would have failed. Still, for sake of argument, let us
assume that the ability to make free choices can emerge during the course
of biological evolution. Even in this case, however, there would be doubts
about whether biological evolution could serve as a satisfactory metaphysi-
cal foundation for objective moral values. So, let us explore that possibility
next.
The Problem of Evolution
A common strategy employed by scientific naturalists has been to
argue that morality is the product of, and thus has its foundation in, bio-
logical evolution. For example, as I mentioned above, Dawkins made a
Darwinian argument for the existence of moral values in his book The God
Delusion. There he discusses how evolution can select for various things,
including altruism towards kin and reciprocal altruism. 12 But is this an
adequate metaphysical foundation for objective moral values? Can the fact
that evolution has selected for altruism toward kin, for example, make the
proposition “parents should not abuse their children” objectively true? It
seems to me that the answer is “no” for several reasons.
First, as Richard Joyce argues, even if morality is the product of
evolution, and thus it is useful for the survival of the species, it still could
be a fiction. This serves to undermine, in the sense of casting doubt upon,

12
Dawkins, The God Delusion, 219–220.
234 Robert A. Delfino

the truth of our moral beliefs: “[O]ur moral beliefs are products of a proc-
ess that is entirely independent of their truth, which forces the recognition
that we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.
They could be true, but we have no reason for thinking so.”13
Second, insofar as objective moral values have to be prescriptive,
how can we move from the historical fact that evolution selected for X to
the moral fact that parents should do X? This is directly related to David
Hume’s point that we cannot derive an ought (how things should be) from
an is (the way things are).14 It is not enough to respond that parents should
treat their children well because it is a fact that good treatment will be
beneficial for the future of the human species. This is the type of “should”
we discussed earlier when I said a person planning to climb Mount Everest
should buy a warm coat. Such “shoulds” are merely conditional on whether
you decide to pursue the end in question; they do not carry the inescapable
necessity of a moral prescription.
Instead, to argue against Hume we need a way to overcome the “is-
ought problem.” Unlike the new atheists, I think theists have a philosophi-
cal advantage here. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre argued in After Vir-
tue that the “is-ought problem” can only be overcome by recognizing that
human nature has an essential purpose and function, which has its ultimate
foundation in God.15 In other words, teleology is the key to overcoming the
“is-ought problem.” Yet the new atheists, aside from rejecting God, also
seem unanimous in their rejection of teleology in nature. Dawkins’s fa-
mous book The Blind Watchmaker expresses this position:
Natural selection, the blind, unconscious, automatic process which
Darwin discovered, and which we now know is the explanation for
the existence and apparently purposeful form of all life, has no pur-
pose in mind. It has no mind and no mind’s eye. It does not plan for
the future. It has no vision, no foresight, no sight at all. If it can be
said to play the role of watchmaker in nature, it is the blind watch-
maker.16

13
Richard Joyce, The Evolution of Morality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2006),
211.
14
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, book III, part I, section I, ed. L. A. Selby-
Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1978), 469.
15
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2nd ed.,
1984), 58.
 The Failure of New Atheism Morality 235

Some naturalist philosophers have argued for a kind of teleology in 16

nature that requires no supernatural foundation. 17 But even if that were

possible (and I don’t think it is), the problem is that such teleology would
be a contingent, brute fact—with no reason for its being.18 And this leads
to two additional arguments why I think that a person would be justified in
holding that evolution, as understood by the scientific naturalists, is neither
an adequate foundation for the truth of moral prescriptions nor for their
inescapable necessity.
The Radical Contingency Argument
The first argument I call the radical contingency argument. In The
God Delusion, Dawkins suggests that the benevolent actions of noble peo-
ple, such as those who adopt children, could be the result of a misfiring of
an evolutionary rule of thumb.19 He gives the example of how mother birds
are programmed by evolution to feed the little birds in their nest, but the
rule misfires if “another baby bird [from a different mother] somehow gets
into the nest.”20 Following this train of thought, we might say that the vir-
tuous actions of Blessed Theresa of Calcutta are nothing more than misfir-
ings. Yet, significantly, would not this undermine the inescapable necessity
that moral prescriptions are supposed to carry? After all, if this type of
activity is the result of a misfiring, then should not Mother Theresa correct
her behavior? As Haught has argued:

16
Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996),
5.
17
Some examples include, Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-
Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2012), Stephen R. Brown, Moral Virtue and Nature: A Defense of Ethical Naturalism
(New York: Continuum, 2008), and Richard Cameron, “How to Be a Realist about sui
generis Teleology Yet Feel at Home in the 21st Century,” The Monist 87:1 (2004): 72–95.
18
Aquinas in the fifth way (Summa theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3) and in other passages (e.g.,
Summa theologiae, I–II, q. 1, a. 2, responsio, Summa contra gentiles, II, 23, n. 6, and De
Veritate, q. 5, a. 2, responsio) successfully argues, in my judgment, that the teleology in
natural things must have its foundation in intelligence (a willed, rational order). One reason
intelligence is necessary is because only intelligence as an immaterial power can envision an
end that does not yet exist yet order something to that end of being (essence and existence).
In contrast, matter by itself cannot transcend what is here and now. For an excellent discus-
sion of this topic see, Leszek Figurski, Finality and Intelligence: Is the Universe Designed?
(Wydawnictwo Bezkresy Wiedzy, 2014), especially chapter four.
19
Dawkins, The God Delusion, 220–221.
20
Id.
236 Robert A. Delfino

How can the amoral process of natural selection become the ulti-
mate court of appeal for what is moral? Even if our ethical instincts
evolved by natural selection, we still have to explain why we are
obliged to obey them here and now, especially since they may be
evolutionary misfirings. 21
Misfirings in the course of evolution show that there is a contingency prob-
lem when trying to use biological evolution as a metaphysical foundation
for objective moral values. But the contingency problem is much deeper
than this. It extends also to the nature of the physical universe—for exam-
ple, the laws and constants of physics and the natures of things such as
electrons and quarks. If an intelligent cause is not responsible for them,
then there is no reason why the aforementioned things have the natures
they do.22 As such, they could have had different natures and that raises a
second contingency problem. We are still not finished, however, for the
contingency problem runs even deeper than this.
There is a third contingency problem concerning the existence of the
universe itself. Why, we might ask, does anything exist at all? Again,
unlike the new atheists, I think theists have a philosophical advantage here.
Theists can argue that in the absence of a necessary being there is no rea-
sonable explanation for why anything exists at all. 23 Of course, some phi-
losophers, such as Hume, have suggested that the material universe is a
necessary being. 24 However, Thomas Aquinas has argued (correctly in my
judgment) that a composite being cannot be a necessary being (and cer-
tainly the universe taken as a whole is a composite of many beings). 25

21
Haught, God and the New Atheism, 73.
22
As argued in note 18 above, only intelligence can ground teleology. However, in the world
of the scientific naturalists, intelligence emerges very late in history. It is not prior and
foundational to reality, as in a theistic world-view.
23
The Ultimate Why Question: Why Is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatso-
ever?, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
2011).
24
David Hume, The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indi-
anapolis, IN: Hackett, 1980), part IX, 56.
25
Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, I, 18 and 42, 8–11. In Summa theologiae, I, q. 2,
a. 3, Aquinas makes a distinction between a necessary per se being and a necessary per aliud
being. But even if the material universe were a necessary per aliud being that would not be
enough to salvage Hume’s objection. For Hume to succeed he must argue that the universe is
a necessary per se being, yet he cannot do that for the reason I gave above and for other
reasons. For example, to be a necessary per se being precludes a real distinction between
being and essence. But even if the material universe were one thing, as opposed to a collec-
 The Failure of New Atheism Morality 237

Moreover, even if things could exist in the absence of a necessary being,

then surely their existence would be contingent. At best, then, scientific
naturalists are faced with a contingency that runs through everything—that
is, they have a radical contingency problem.
Given this radical contingency, two important questions arise. First,
how can nature, understood as radically contingent, ground objectively true
and necessarily binding moral prescriptions? The answer is that it cannot
because whatever moral inclinations or moral values emerge in such a
world would be radically contingent and there would be no ultimate reason
for why they should be this way and not another way or, even, why they
should exist at all. This nullifies the necessary force moral prescriptions are
supposed to have. A second question that arises is the following: Why
should I, as a rational being, feel obliged to obey something that is non-
rational and thus clearly inferior to me? Let us examine this next.
The Transcendence of Persons Argument
The last question leads to a second argument which I call the tran-
scendence of persons argument. Recall that we have been assuming (for
the sake of argument) that human persons with reason and freedom can
emerge from biological evolution as understood by the scientific natural-
ists. In such a case, however, there would be several senses in which hu-
man persons would transcend the mechanisms of evolution and thus would
not be subject to them. For example, evolution might explain why I have
the inclination and desire to have children, but does this put upon me a
moral obligation to have children? No, for unlike lower life forms, my
ability to freely choose to mate or not allows me to transcend the mecha-
nisms of evolution. Also, I transcend the mechanisms of evolution in the
sense that, unlike other life forms, I have the power to alter the course of
evolution through genetic engineering. Finally, as a rational and free being,
I am superior to the non-rational and non-free mechanisms of evolution
and thus transcend them. As such, any moral inclination or rule of thumb
produced by evolution lacks the necessary force required for moral pre-
scriptions.
There is something of an irony here for scientific naturalists who
embrace non-reductive physicalism. The very non-reductive physicalism
they hope makes the emergence of reason and freedom possible for hu-

tion of things, there would still be a real distinction between the being and essence of the
material universe.
238 Robert A. Delfino

mans would also make humans transcend, in the ways described above, the
physical world and its processes—including biological evolution. Because
of this transcendence, there is a sense in which a human being would oc-
cupy a position similar to God for scientific naturalists. This is because in
the world of the scientific naturalists human beings, at least as far as we
know, are the supreme form of life. Humans alone, it appears, exist with
freedom and reason in a physical universe largely filled with lifeless matter
and mostly (or exclusively) non-intelligent and lesser life forms.
With no God and humans occupying the role of supreme beings,
why should humans look to evolution or anything else in nature as a foun-
dation for objective moral values? This opens the door to the dark path of
Friedrich Nietzsche that Étienne Gilson warned about in his essay “The
Terrors of the Year Two thousand.”26 It is the path of asserting your own
will and creating your own moral values without being limited by nature or
the values of the masses. It is a dangerous path and one that is incompatible
with objective moral values.

Conclusion
Although the arguments above are not exhaustive, they cast serious
doubt on the view that metaphysical naturalism can provide a satisfactory
metaphysical foundation for objective moral values. Indeed, the new athe-
ist attempt to ground objective morality in metaphysical naturalism fails
for three reasons. First, metaphysical naturalism cannot account for free-
dom or moral agency. Second, the “is-ought problem,” in the context of
metaphysical naturalism, precludes the prescriptive nature of objective
moral values. Third, and finally, the problems of radical contingency and
transcendence of persons, which result from metaphysical naturalism, pre-
clude the necessary force that is supposed to accompany objective moral
values.
If this analysis is correct, then only two options remain. One option
is, simply, to reject objective moral values. Perhaps some naturalists will
be content with a much weaker understanding of moral values. Indeed,
some of them might feel liberated to view morality as an illusion—as
something foisted upon us by our genes for the sake of reproductive suc-
cess—and something from which we can finally rid ourselves. However, I

26
Étienne Gilson, The Terrors of the Year 2000 (Toronto: St. Michael’s College, 1949).
 The Failure of New Atheism Morality 239

am sure many will find this position unacceptable. Indeed, I agree with
Joyce, who has made the argument that:
Moral naturalism without clout [i.e., without the inescapability of
moral prescriptions] . . . seems to enfeeble our capacity to morally
criticize wrong-doers; . . . might actually encourage wrongdoing for
certain persons; and . . . renders moral language and moral thinking
entirely redundant. Such a value system is . . . surely too wimpy to
be mistaken for morality. 27
The only other option is to argue that objective moral values have a
non-natural foundation. I think this is the correct course to take, and as I
alluded to above, I think the solution can be found in theism, specifically as
understood in the Thomistic tradition. God, as the intelligent cause respon-
sible for both the existence and natures of things, can account for the tele-
ology that is necessary for the prescriptive nature of moral values. God, as
intelligent, necessary, and Supreme Being avoids the problems of radical
contingency and transcendence of persons that undermined the necessary
force that is supposed to accompany objective moral values. Of course, to
provide an adequate and detailed defense of God as the only satisfactory
metaphysical foundation for objective moral values would require much
more space than I have here, so I will have to argue for it elsewhere. 28

THE FAILURE OF NEW ATHEISM MORALITY

SUMMARY
New atheists, such as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris, generally speaking, are committed
to two main beliefs. The first is scientism, which is the view that only science can give us
complete and reliable knowledge of reality. The second is metaphysical naturalism, which is
the view that no supernatural entities exist. In this article the author focuses on the
metaphysical naturalism that new atheists and other naturalists accept, with the goal of
answering the following question: Can metaphysical naturalism provide an adequate
foundation for objective moral values? He argues that the answer is “no” and he discusses
several serious problems inherent in a naturalistic account of the foundation of morality.

27
Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, 208.
28
I would like to thank Marie George, Jon Weidenbaum, Tony Spanakos, and an anonymous
reviewer for helpful suggestions on this paper. My gratitude also extends to Peter Redpath,
Curtis Hancock, and Fulvio Di Blasi for their encouragement. Et Deo Gratias.
240 Robert A. Delfino

KEYWORDS: atheism, ethics, evolution, metaphysical naturalism, objective moral values.