PDF Security and Law Legal and Ethical Aspects of Public Security Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Security Anton Vedder Ebook Full Chapter
PDF Security and Law Legal and Ethical Aspects of Public Security Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Security Anton Vedder Ebook Full Chapter
PDF Security and Law Legal and Ethical Aspects of Public Security Cyber Security and Critical Infrastructure Security Anton Vedder Ebook Full Chapter
https://textbookfull.com/product/cyber-security-erickson-karnel/
https://textbookfull.com/product/critical-infrastructure-
homeland-security-and-emergency-preparedness-fourth-edition-
edition-allan-mcdougall/
https://textbookfull.com/product/cyber-security-power-and-
technology-martti-lehto/
https://textbookfull.com/product/cyber-security-intelligence-and-
analytics-zheng-xu/
Cyber Security Cryptography and Machine Learning Itai
Dinur
https://textbookfull.com/product/cyber-security-cryptography-and-
machine-learning-itai-dinur/
https://textbookfull.com/product/cyber-security-in-critical-
infrastructures-a-game-theoretic-approach-stefan-rass/
https://textbookfull.com/product/principles-of-computer-security-
comptia-security-and-beyond-conklin/
https://textbookfull.com/product/socio-political-order-and-
security-in-the-arab-world-from-regime-security-to-public-
security-1st-edition-andreas-krieg-auth/
Anton Vedder
Jessica Schroers
Charlotte Ducuing
Peggy Valcke
(eds.)
Security and Law. Legal and Ethical Aspects of Public Security, Cyber Security and
Critical Infrastructure Security
© Anton Vedder, Jessica Schroers, Charlotte Ducuing en Peggy Valcke (eds.) 2019
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form,
or by any means, without prior written permission from Intersentia, or as expressly permitted by
law or under the terms agreed with the appropriate reprographic rights organisation. Enquiries
concerning reproduction which may not be covered by the above should be addressed to Intersentia
at the address above.
ISBN 978-1-78068-890-9
NUR 827
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from
the British Library.
CONTENTS
Chapter 1.
Introduction: Security and Law in a Digitizing World
Charlotte Ducuing, Jessica Schroers and Anton Vedder . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2.
Safety, Security and Ethics
Anton Vedder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Definitions and distinctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Security and safety as values in ethics and normative political theory . . 15
4. Security and safety in conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chapter 3.
National and Public Security within and beyond the Police Directive
Plixavra Vogiatzoglou and Stefano Fantin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. The scope of the Data Protection Law Enforcement Directive . . . . . . . . . . 29
3. Security in international law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1. Theoretical bases from philosophy of law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2. International law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3. Council of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4. Security in European Union law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1. EU treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2. Jurisprudence on security as derogation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3. EU Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.4. Security and personal data in secondary EU law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.5. EU Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5. Competent authorities under the DPLE Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.1. General guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Intersentia v
Contents
Chapter 4.
Criminal Profi ling and Non-Discrimination: On Firm Grounds for
the Digital Era?
Laurens Naudts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2. Criminal and algorithmic profi ling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3. The Law Enforcement Directive: special categories of data as non-
discrimination grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4. Equality and non-discrimination in the European Convention of
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1. Discrimination grounds and the European Court of Human
Right’s case law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2. Ground or status: a divergent approach by the ECtHR . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3. Recent illustrations: settling on the past? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4. Big data profi ling: new grounds? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.5. Differential treatment: reasonable and objective justification . . . . . 84
4.6. Ethnic profi ling: an example? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5. Future research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Chapter 5.
Operationalization of Information Security through Compliance with
Directive 2016/680 in Law Enforcement Technology and Practice
Thomas Marquenie and Katherine Quezada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2. Principles of information security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.2. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3. Information security in data protection for law enforcement . . . . . . . . . 103
vi Intersentia
Contents
3.1.
The EU legal framework on cybersecurity and data protection . . . 104
3.2.
Data protection principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.3.
Data processing obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.4.
Data protection impact assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.5.
Reporting of data breaches and supervisory oversight . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.6.
Representation of IS requirements in the DPLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.7.
The scope and purpose of information security and data
protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4. Operationalization of security in law enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Chapter 6.
Protecting Human Rights through a Global Encryption Provision
Danaja Fabčič Povše . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
2. Encryption, (cyber)security and human rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3. Fragmented provisions in international human rights law. . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.1. General human rights framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.2. Security measures and standards in data protection laws . . . . . . . 140
3.2.1. European Union (EU). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.2.2. Convention no. 108 of the Council of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.2.3. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) . . 144
3.2.4. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.3. Recommendations of expert bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.4. Other upcoming initiatives by regional organisations . . . . . . . . . . 148
4. Enabling global encryption obligations in the absence of specific
treaty provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.1. Option 1 – a global treaty with encryption requirements . . . . . . . . 149
4.2. Option 2a – globalisation by means of accession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.3. Option 2b – globalisation by GDPR’s ‘adequate protection’
standard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.4. Option 3 – maintain the status quo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Chapter 7.
Identity Management and Security
Jessica Schroers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
2. What is identity management? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Intersentia vii
Contents
Chapter 8.
Towards an Obligation to Secure Connected and Automated Vehicles
“by Design”?
Charlotte Ducuing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
2. Technological developments in CAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
2.1. Increased connectivity of vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
2.2. Driving automation, towards vehicle autonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
3. Overview of vehicle technical regulations and type-approval
legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
3.1. EU type-approval process legislation in a nutshell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
3.2. The proposal for a General Safety Regulation: cybersecurity as
part of safety requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
3.3. The UNECE mandate to develop vehicle technical regulations . . . 193
4. Legal analysis of the proposed recommendations of UNECE on
cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
4.1. An extensive interpretation of ‘the CAM vehicle’ in space . . . . . . . 194
4.2. Extending the scope of vehicle technical regulations to the
whole lifecycle of vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.3. Extension of the scope of technical regulation to the
manufacturer’s organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
5. Is type-approval legislation fit for the purpose of securing CAM
vehicles? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
5.1. Where technical regulation calls for further regulation of the
manufacturer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
5.2. A limit of type-approval legislation: the integration of the
CAM vehicle in its spatial environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
viii Intersentia
Contents
Chapter 9.
The Cybersecurity Requirements for Operators of Essential Services
under the NIS Directive – An Analysis of Potential Liability Issues from
an EU, German and UK Perspective
Daniela Brešić . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
2. The scope of CI protection on an EU and national level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
2.1. The EU regulatory Framework of CI protection compared to
the scope of the NIS Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
2.2. The scope of CI protection from the German perspective . . . . . . . 220
2.3. The scope of CI protection from the UK perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . 221
3. The security requirements and incident notification for operators of
essential services from an EU and national perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
3.1. The security requirements and incident notification set out by
the NIS Directive, Article 14 and 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
3.2. The security requirements set out by the German BSI Act,
section 8, 8a and 8b BSI Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
3.3. The security requirements set out by the UK NIS Regulation,
section 10 and 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
4. Deliberations on liability issues from an EU and national perspective . 228
4.1. The uncertain meaning of the NIS Directive, Article 14 NIS
Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
4.2. The national implementation of Article 14 NIS Directive from
an UK and German perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
4.3. The problem of fault / the burden of proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
4.4. State liability in the context of CI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Chapter 10.
The ‘by Design’ Turn in EU Cybersecurity Law: Emergence, Challenges
and Ways Forward
Domenico Orlando and Pierre Dewitte . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
2. Decoding ‘security by design’: a tale of ‘security’ and ‘design’ . . . . . . . . . 239
Intersentia ix
Contents
Chapter 11.
Promoting Coherence in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy
Alessandro Bruni . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
2. The concept of coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
2.1. Coherence vs consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
2.2. Coherence principle in the EU cybersecurity legislative
framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
3. The EU cybersecurity context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
3.1. The EU and cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
3.2. The initial EU cybersecurity legislative initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
4. EU cybersecurity Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
4.1. ENISA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
4.2. Public-private partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
5. The EU Cybersecurity Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
5.1. The European Union Cybersecurity Strategy 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
5.2. The European Union 2017 Cybersecurity Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
Chapter 12.
Challenges of the Cyber Sanctions Regime under the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP)
Yuliya Miadzvetskaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
2. Current EU sanctions framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
x Intersentia
Contents
Chapter 13.
International (Cyber)security of the Global Aviation Critical
Infrastructure as a Community Interest
Ivo Emanuilov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Intersentia xi
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
All contributors are affiliated to the KU Leuven Centre for IT and IP law (CiTiP)
and members of CiTiP’s security research team.
Daniela Brešić completed her legal clerkship in the district of the Higher
Regional Court Munich, after graduating from Ludwig-Maximilians-University
Munich, Germany. She also obtained an LL.M. degree in Law and Technology
from Tilburg University, the Netherlands.
Ivo Emanuilov is a PhD fellow in public international law working on the (in)
adequacy of the concept of control in risk-based international law. His research
is centered around problems of (shared) international responsibility, non-
state actors, due diligence, risk analysis and new technologies in international
humanitarian law, air and space law and cyber law. Ivo has degrees in
international and EU law, English law, ICT law, and soft ware engineering.
He is a visiting lecturer on legal and ethical aspects of artificial intelligence at
the University of Sofia and biometrics and privacy law at the Swiss Distance
Learning University (UniDistance), Switzerland.
Stefano Fantin joined CITIP in 2017 after previous public sector and
e-Government experiences. His research now covers various aspects of
Intersentia xiii
List of Contributors
Thomas Marquenie obtained his master’s degree of Laws from the University of
Leuven in 2015 and specialised in Criminal, International and European Law. In
2016, he obtained an Advanced Master’s (LL.M.) in Intellectual Property Rights &
ICT Law at the University of Leuven. At CiTiP, his research focuses on human rights
and data protection as well as the legal aspects of Artificial Intelligence, security
and law enforcement. He has contributed to several European Commission projects
on the development and implementation of innovative police technologies, such
as FP7 VALCRI and the ongoing H2020 MAGNETO, and is currently preparing a
PhD project regarding fairness and accountability in law enforcement AI.
Danaja Fabčič Povše focuses her research activities on legal and ethical aspects
of data security, data protection and privacy within organisations and in design
processes.
xiv Intersentia
List of Contributors
Intersentia xv
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: SECURITY AND
LAW IN A DIGITIZING WORLD
Few people would doubt the importance of security of a state, society, its
organizations and institutions, and individuals as an unconditional basis
for personal and societal flourishing. Equally few people would deny being
concerned by the often-occurring conflicts between security and other values
and fundamental freedoms and rights, such as individual autonomy or privacy
to name but a few. While the search for a balance between these public values is
far from new, ICT and data-driven technologies have undoubtedly given it a new
impulse. These technologies have a complicated and multifarious relationship
with security.
Based on their knowledge discovery capacity – e.g. in the form of big data
analysis – they are powerful tools in the hands of public authorities in charge
of public and national security. In other words, they can have an instrumental
function to security. Protection of citizens and individuals from abuses
committed by public authorities having a monopoly of legitimate violence is
far from new and has been a major task of the law, especially at national and
EU levels. By significantly reinforcing the security public authorities, these new
technologies may affect the balance of power to the detriment of citizens in
many ways. There is a need for reconsidering the balance between the pursuit of
public and national security, on the one hand, and the legitimate interests and
fundamental rights of citizens, on the other.
Moreover, these new technologies have pervaded our daily environment to
the point that they have become critical to the functioning of the economy and
of society at large. Against this background, they themselves are increasingly
perceived as requiring security, for example when they lie at the core of
essential societal services such as healthcare, energy, education or mobility.
Safeguarding the security of ICT and data-driven technologies is, however,
a challenging endeavour. Amongst others, one has to deal with their inherent
connectedness, which makes them liable to the ‘least secured link of the chain’
risk. The anonymity and global scale of the internet multiplies their risk
Intersentia 1
Charlotte Ducuing, Jessica Schroers and Anton Vedder
Part I sets the scene, by looking at the definition of security. On the one hand,
security must be distinguished from neighbouring concepts. On the other hand,
security itself is subject to sub-categories which, while they are of paramount
importance to delineate the reach of the law, appear to be difficult to ascertain in
practice such as the distinction between public and national security.
With the aim to define security in a technological environment, part I
begins with “Safety, security, and ethics” (chapter 2), where Anton Vedder sets
out to clarify definitions of security and safety and to analyse these notions as
normative concepts. According to him, many recent authors on safety and
security seem to agree – albeit often tacitly – that safety is primarily concerned
with the adverse effects an entity might have on (the integrity of) the entities
2 Intersentia
Chapter 1. Introduction: Security and Law in a Digitizing World
Part II questions whether and to what extent the law has been able to regulate the
use of ICT and data-driven technologies as a means to maintain, create or protect
Intersentia 3
Charlotte Ducuing, Jessica Schroers and Anton Vedder
security in search of a balance between security and other public values, such
as privacy and equality. These technologies may be used by public authorities in
charge of security. Interestingly, they may also be used by citizens as a means
to ‘fire back’ and secure themselves from (perceived) intrusions and insecurity
stemming from third parties or from the State (e.g. encryption). Both chapters
4 and 5 discuss under which legal conditions public authorities in charge of
security may use these technologies, while keeping a balance with other public
values. In chapter 4 “Criminal Profiling and Non-Discrimination: on firm
grounds for the digital era?”, Laurens Naudts focusses on the value of equality.
He discusses the regulation of criminal profi ling practices. He explains how,
from a legal perspective, new forms of differentiation generated by data-driving
analytics tools, might constitute illegal forms of discrimination. The DPLE
Directive provides clear and concrete guidelines regarding the use of specific
types of information in building profi les, indicating quite well when, and under
what conditions, profiling practices could be allowed. Moreover, the Directive
includes equality-sensitive considerations, noting the potential discriminatory
nature data-driven techniques might have. It does so in particular where special
categories of data are involved. Nevertheless, considering the requirement that
profi ling practices should not be discriminatory, public bodies should still
consider the fundamental right to equality and non-discrimination as it has
been enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights, and as it has
been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. The Court’s case law
is at times both complex and confusing. Through the open-ended phrasing of
article 14, the Convention’s non-discrimination clause can, in principle, allow
the Court to condemn new forms of discrimination. Yet, the case law shows that
the Court’s reasoning might be ill-equipped to tackle the risks new technologies
pose. Perhaps, so Naudts argues, a heightened level of awareness across society
regarding the dangers that profi ling techniques pose to the fundamental
principles of equality and non-discrimination, could become a common ground
amongst Member States and in turn increase the level of protection afforded to
citizens in the case of criminal profiling.
In chapter 5 entitled “Operationalization of information security through
compliance with Directive 2016/680 in law enforcement technology and
practice”, Thomas Marquenie and Katherine Quezada discuss the close
connection between information security and data protection law in the
law enforcement sector. Information security is the set of processes aimed
at protecting information from unauthorized access, modification, use or
destruction. At the basis of these practices lies the so-called CIA-triad which
envisions the preservation of the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability of
information. While European Union legislation has previously covered specific
aspects of these security principles, it has been marked by a limited scope of
application and has not introduced extensive obligations in the law enforcement
4 Intersentia
Chapter 1. Introduction: Security and Law in a Digitizing World
sector. This might now be subject to change with the adoption of the DPLE
Directive. While not explicitly conceived as an information security instrument,
the Directive nevertheless harmonizes data management practices and institutes
numerous data protection requirements for criminal justice authorities and
police agencies in the European Union. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze
to what extent the fundamental principles of information security are reflected
in the provisions of the Directive and whether law enforcement agencies can
rely on their compliance with data protection law to adhere to the fundamental
principles of information security. Following an analysis of the three tenets
of information security, the chapter reviews the current legal framework on
cybersecurity and data protection in order to examine the relationship between
both disciplines and assess whether the Directive mandates high standards of
security which correspond to the triad. This assessment concludes with an
overview of a number of concrete measures identified in EU research projects
serving as a case study of the practical implementation of legal requirements
as a means of realizing information security in a law enforcement context.
The findings of this chapter convey that while information security and
data protection are separate concepts with a diverging scope of application
and general purpose, there exists a significant overlap between the two and
compliance with the Directive is expected to result in a standard of security that
satisfies and conforms with the fundamental tenets of information security.
Data protection law is also discussed in other contributions of the book,
although from different angles. Chapter 6 discusses whether EU data protection
law – and especially the GDPR – can constitute an international legal standard
for a legal right to encryption by data subjects. Chapter 10 discusses data
protection law as an illustration of a growing pattern in EU law to impose
‘compliance by design’ obligations in the ICT environment.
Chapter 6 (“Protecting human rights through a global encryption provision”)
by Danaja Fabčič Povše concentrates on encryption as a security measure for
citizens to defend themselves against (perceived) intrusions by third parties,
including public authorities. The elementary texts of human rights law, such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights all provide for the right to privacy, including
privacy of communications, with the EU Charter also explicitly providing
for the right to personal data protection. None of those, however, mentions
explicitly the need for security – let alone encryption – measures. More detailed
rules on data protection can be found in regional instruments. Fabčič Povše’s
chapter examines the EU framework (GDPR, ePrivacy Directive and the
proposed ePrivacy Regulation), Convention 108 of the Council of Europe, the
ECOWAS’s Model Data Protection Act and the APEC Privacy Framework.
The EU legal framework specifically refers to encryption as a security or data
Intersentia 5
Charlotte Ducuing, Jessica Schroers and Anton Vedder
masking measure, whereas the other instruments require data security measures
in general. Recommendations on encryption by the OECD and ENISA both
explicitly argue for use of encryption in order to facilitate online commerce
and data security. The OECD 1997 guidelines provide, however, for potential
backdoors or plaintext access by law enforcement, which puts the strength
of encryption in jeopardy. Lastly, ensuring a global encryption obligation is
discussed – a global treaty, possibly under the United Nations or World Trade
Organisation, is unlikely. As an alternative, globalisation of the GDPR or of
the Convention 108+ is proposed, although such globalisation does not come
without drawbacks. Should the states decide to maintain the status quo, further
ripple effects of seemingly domestic policy are to be expected.
Part III investigates the regulatory means that are or can be leveraged by the
law-maker in its attempt to ‘secure’ products, organizations or entities in a
technological and multi-actor’ environment. In order to feed this delicate
‘how’ question, this part includes two types of pieces. Some contributions
analyse various sector-specific case studies, such as security and online identity
management or connected transport means. Others provide horizontal
background on regulatory means leveraged by the EU law-maker. For instance,
the ‘by design’ approach is increasingly gaining traction in EU legislation and
recently culminated with the adoption of the Cybersecurity Act (Regulation
(EU) 2019/881) laying down the ground for EU-wide cybersecurity certification.
The first sectorial case study is provided by Jessica Schroers in her
chapter 7, “Identity management and security”. She discusses security
aspects of identification and authentication technologies. She describes the
different requirements a user has to comply with and challenges the over-
responsabilization of the users inherent to these requirements. The level of
expertise required to address the risks is rather high, and no only the individual
but also the community can be affected by the risks involved. She takes a look
at the standard of care in tort law. The standard of care is generally interpreted
in terms of the standard of reasonable care, the care an average person would
take. Further research into this ‘care an average person would take’ with regard
to the electronic identification means and the environment they are used in, is
therefore deemed to be necessary.
The concern about over-responsibilizing certain (weak) actors in the
value chain illustrates a more general challenge in the ICT and data-
driven technological environment. While these technologies are inherently
interconnected, who should be burdened with the obligation to secure?
This question also lies at the core of the following chapter, with regard to the
cybersecurity in the connected and automated driving environment. The right
allocation of cybersecurity responsibilities and the (sometimes unexpected)
case for shared responsibility are discussed in chapter 9 dealing with the liability
6 Intersentia
Chapter 1. Introduction: Security and Law in a Digitizing World
consequently arising from NIS obligations. They also lie at the core of the
enquiry about the legal status of cybersecurity obligations in international air
law in chapter 13.
In chapter 8 “Towards an obligation to secure connected and automated
vehicles “by design”?”, Charlotte Ducuing provides another sectoral case-
study. Road transport is undergoing significant changes by data-driven
technologies. Two technological developments are especially visible, namely the
development towards automated and autonomous driving on the one hand and
the growing connected character of vehicles on the other. Both developments are
increasingly converging for technical reasons but also for reasons of road safety,
environment-friendly mobility and optimization of the use of infrastructure and
vehicle capacity. They are referred to together here as ‘connected and automated
mobility’ (CAM). CAM has a paradoxical relation to safety. Road safety
constitutes one of the main political motives for moving to CAM. But increased
connectivity and automation – or even autonomy – of vehicles will also result in
increasing cybersecurity sensitivity. Both the European Union and the UNECE
at an international level are active in revising type-approval legislation so as to
include cybersecurity as part of vehicle safety requirements. The purpose of this
book chapter is to evaluate whether and to what extent type-approval legislation,
and the ‘by design’ approach at its heart, are fit for the purpose of ensuring
cybersecurity of CAM vehicles. To do so, Ducuing analyses the two recently
proposed recommendations of UNECE dealing with cybersecurity of CAM
vehicles, as part of vehicle technical regulations, which interestingly reflect the
changing nature of vehicles when growing in connectivity and autonomy.
Chapter 8 analyses the intrinsic limitations of the ‘security by design’
approach in the complex field of connected and automated vehicles. The
discussion surrounding the ‘by design’ regulatory approach reverberates in
several other chapters. Chapter 5 discusses the interactions between the data
protection by design approach in the DPLE Directive and the discipline of
information security. ‘Security by design’ is contemplated in chapter 7 as a
potential factor in the assessment of a required standard of care in the field of
identity management. Finally, chapter 10 is entirely dedicated to the ‘by design’
approach in both cybersecurity and data protection law, both being often
intertwined.
After the sectoral case-studies in chapters 7 and 8, the remaining chapters
of Part III provide horizontal analysis of cybersecurity legal frameworks, and
especially aim to assess the regulatory ‘toolbox’ used by the EU law-maker. In
chapter 9, “The cybersecurity requirements for operators of essential services
under the NIS Directive – An analysis of potential liability issues from an
EU, German and UK perspective”, Daniela Brešić provides an overview of
responsibilities and potential liability issues that may occur in the context
of critical infrastructure protection for operators of essential services. She
Intersentia 7
Charlotte Ducuing, Jessica Schroers and Anton Vedder
pays special attention to the NIS Directive as the first legislative initiative
enhancing cybersecurity protection for the EU, and to the implementation of
the Directive into national legislation in Germany and the United Kingdom.
Her chapter concludes with a deliberation on potential drawbacks in terms of
a shared responsibility between stakeholders, as well as on liability and critical
infrastructure protection from a broader perspective.
The NIS Directive is also critically discussed in chapter 11 as one of the main
components of EU cybersecurity legislation. In chapter 13, the NIS Directive
is referred to as a measurement standard with regard to the qualification of a
service as “essential”, from an international law perspective.
In chapter 10 “The ‘by Design’ Turn in EU Cybersecurity Law: Emergence,
challenges and ways forward”, Domenico Orlando and Pierre Dewitte
analyse the ‘by Design’ turn in the EU security and data protection legislative
frameworks. The ‘by design’ approach in EU legislation is on the rise. Both data
protection and cybersecurity law are involved in this trend, with the former
ahead. After an introduction on definitions, the chapter describes the steps made
by security by design, its focus in gaining attention and consideration in EU
and soft law. Finally, the authors assess the challenges posed for consistent and
effective development of the concept of ‘by design’ in general and of ‘security by
design’ in particular.
Chapter 11 by Alessandro Bruni evaluates the regulatory initiatives from the
EU institutions in the field of cybersecurity and pleads for “Promoting coherence
in the EU cybersecurity strategy”. Bruni explains how the commitment of the
European Union to establish secure and trustworthy cyberspace resulted in two
different but complementary European cybersecurity strategies. He explains
why their coherence has been questioned and which factors have hampered the
development of a coherent EU cybersecurity strategy. In his chapter, he intends
to understand the impact, if any, of key elements and actors, namely, the EU
cybersecurity agency ENISA and the role of public-private partnerships in the
development of EU cybersecurity. By doing so, this chapter intends to assess if
the progress that has been made that EU cybersecurity legislation can be labelled
as coherent.
The final part IV discusses international aspects of ICT. On the one hand,
their global, border-crossing, character requires appropriate international
response to secure the EU. On the other hand, cybersecurity can represent an
international collective good, especially in the case of safety-sensitive assets
(e.g. aviation). In chapter 12, Yuliya Miadzvetskaya analyses the new regime
concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks as a new tool of the EU
Cyber diplomacy toolbox, in her contribution “Challenges of the cyber sanctions
regime under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)”. She sheds some
light on the main shortcomings for the efficient implementation of sanctions,
8 Intersentia
Chapter 1. Introduction: Security and Law in a Digitizing World
Intersentia 9
CHAPTER 2
SAFETY, SECURITY AND ETHICS
Anton Vedder*
1. INTRODUCTION
What are safety and security? Why should we value safety and security? These
questions may sound redundant at first sight. Are safety and security not to
be considered as elementary conditions for a minimally functioning human
being? Exactly because of this apparent self-evidence, policy and law makers,
as well as researchers of the legal dimensions or technical or economic aspects
of safety and security might benefit from a more precise understanding of the
concepts and the normative starting points behind them. This is especially so
where specific measures or policies for ensuring or protecting safety and security
must be balanced against other values or principles. In this chapter, the notions
of security and safety will be clarified as normative concepts from an analytical
ethical perspective. In the next section, current discussions on the definitions
and conceptual distinctions with regards to the notion of security and the related
notion of safety will be discussed. In section 3, the focus will be on security and
safety as values. In section 4, the possibility of moral conflicts between safety and
security on the one hand and individual rights and interests on the other, will be
discussed.
Although the notions of safety and security have received an occasional modest
dose of attention during the last decades from the side of philosophers in some
subdomains of applied ethics, such as technology ethics and medical ethics,1
* Special thanks are due to Margaret Warthon, research intern at the KU Leuven Centre for IT
and IP Law 2018–19, for her support with bibliographical research.
1 Of course, security and safety play important substantial normative roles in the development
of technologies and in the regulatory field of standardization. The claim here merely concerns
conceptual analysis.
Intersentia 11
Anton Vedder
they have been most intensively debated in philosophy of law2 and in a branch
of practical philosophy, perhaps best referred to as normative political theory.
So-called “realist” or “neo-realist” political theorists – from Thucydides, over
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Morgenthau to Waltz – start from the assumption that
as individual human beings are fundamentally selfish and driven by a lust for
power, only (voluntary) subjection to a sovereign state that is able to provide
protection can offer security and safety for one individual from intrusions
by others or for one state from others. In the controversies among realists
themselves and in the debates between realists and their opponents, the
notions of safety and security have therefore been articulated primarily on
deep theoretical levels as global value-laden characteristics of individuals and
of societies or states overall.3 As a consequence, there exists an understandable
tendency of philosophers when reflecting on the concepts of safety and security
to treat these first and foremost as global concepts, indicating the overall
security or safety of either individuals or societies or states. Walt defines the
notion of security as such a global dimension when he claims that security is
the “preservation of the state territorial integrity and the physical safety of its
inhabitants,” meaning that a state is secure when it is able to defend itself from
hostile attacks and prevent other states from compelling it to adjust its behaviour
in significant ways or to sacrifice important political values.4 Focusing on the
differences between security and safety, Rigterink contends that safety is the
individual state of freedom from threats while security is the collective state of
freedom from threats.5
Over the last decades, the theoretical debate on security and safety has
incrementally expanded in scope and is slowly seeping into other fields than
political philosophy. Boholm et al., Ceccorulli and Lucarelli, Balzacq et al. have
contributed to the debate with intricate linguistic and semantic analyses on the
notions in general.6 Especially in connection with technology, the interest in
2 See also section 3.1 in the chapter by Plixavra Vogiatzoglou and Stephano Fantin in this
volume.
3 Lawrence Freedman, ‘The concept of security’ Encyclopedia of Government and Politics (2nd
edn, 2003).
4 Stephen Martin Walt, ‘Realism and Security’ Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
International Studies (2010) <https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/view/10.1093/
acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-286> accessed 25 June 2019.
5 Anouk Rigterink, ‘Does Security Imply Safety? On The (Lack of) Correlation Between
Different Aspects of Security’ (2015) (4) Stability: International Journal of Security &
Development <http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.fw> accessed 24 June 2019.
6 Max Boholm, Niklas Möller, Sven Ove Hansson, ‘The Concepts of Risk, Safety, and Security:
Applications in Everyday Language’ (2016) 36 Risk Analysis <https://doi 10.1111/risa.12464>
accessed 24 June 2019; Michela Ceccorulli, Sonia Lucarelli, ‘Security governance: making
the concept fit for the analysis of a multipolar, global and regionalized world’ 2014 41 Global
Governance Programme-98; European, Transnational and Global Governance <http://hdl.
handle.net/1814/31282> accessed 25 June 2019; Th ierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, Jan Ruzicka
‘‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases’ (2016) 30 International Relations <https://doi.
org/10.1177/0047117815596590> accessed 24 June 2019.
12 Intersentia
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
where her roystering boys may not in some mad Saturday afternoon
pull them down or burn their fingers. The sea and the iron road are
safer toys for such ungrown people; we are not yet ripe to be birds.
In the next place, to fifteen letters on Communities, and the
Prospects of Culture, and the destinies of the cultivated class,—what
answer? Excellent reasons have been shown us why the writers,
obviously persons of sincerity and elegance, should be dissatisfied
with the life they lead, and with their company. They have exhausted
all its benefit, and will not bear it much longer. Excellent reasons they
have shown why something better should be tried. They want a
friend to whom they can speak and from whom they may hear now
and then a reasonable word. They are willing to work, so it be with
friends. They do not entertain anything absurd or even difficult. They
do not wish to force society into hated reforms, nor to break with
society. They do not wish a township, or any large expenditure, or
incorporated association, but simply a concentration of chosen
people. By the slightest possible concert, persevered in through four
or five years, they think that a neighborhood might be formed of
friends who would provoke each other to the best activity. They
believe that this society would fill up the terrific chasm of ennui, and
would give their genius that inspiration which it seems to wait in vain.
But, “the selfishness!” One of the writers relentingly says, “What
shall my uncles and aunts do without me?” and desires distinctly to
be understood not to propose the Indian mode of giving decrepit
relatives as much of the mud of holy Ganges as they can swallow,
and more, but to begin the enterprise of concentration by
concentrating all uncles and aunts in one delightful village by
themselves!—so heedless is our correspondent of putting all the
dough into one pan, and all the leaven into another. Another
objection seems to have occurred to a subtle but ardent advocate. Is
it, he writes, a too great wilfulness and intermeddling with life,—with
life, which is better accepted than calculated? Perhaps so; but let us
not be too curiously good. The Buddhist is a practical Necessitarian;
the Yankee is not. We do a great many selfish things every day;
among them all let us do one thing of enlightened selfishness. It
were fit to forbid concert and calculation in this particular, if that were
our system, if we were up to the mark of self-denial and faith in our
general activity. But to be prudent in all the particulars of life, and in
this one thing alone religiously forbearing; prudent to secure to
ourselves an injurious society, temptations to folly and despair,
degrading examples, and enemies; and only abstinent when it is
proposed to provide ourselves with guides, examples, lovers!
We shall hardly trust ourselves to reply to arguments by which we
would too gladly be persuaded. The more discontent, the better we
like it. It is not for nothing, we assure ourselves, that our people are
busied with these projects of a better social state, and that sincere
persons of all parties are demanding somewhat vital and poetic of
our stagnant society. How fantastic and unpresentable soever the
theory has hitherto seemed, how swiftly shrinking from the
examination of practical men, let us not lose the warning of that most
significant dream. How joyfully we have felt the admonition of larger
natures which despised our aims and pursuits, conscious that a
voice out of heaven spoke to us in that scorn. But it would be unjust
not to remind our younger friends that whilst this aspiration has
always made its mark in the lives of men of thought, in vigorous
individuals it does not remain a detached object, but is satisfied
along with the satisfaction of other aims. To live solitary and
unexpressed, is painful,—painful in proportion to one’s
consciousness of ripeness and equality to the offices of friendship.
But herein we are never quite forsaken by the Divine Providence.
The loneliest man, after twenty years, discovers that he stood in a
circle of friends, who will then show like a close fraternity held by
some masonic tie. But we are impatient of the tedious introductions
of Destiny, and a little faithless, and would venture something to
accelerate them. One thing is plain, that discontent and the luxury of
tears will bring nothing to pass. Regrets and Bohemian castles and
æsthetic villages are not a very self-helping class of productions, but
are the voices of debility. Especially to one importunate
correspondent we must say that there is no chance for the æsthetic
village. Every one of the villagers has committed his several blunder;
his genius was good, his stars consenting, but he was a marplot.
And though the recuperative force in every man may be relied on
infinitely, it must be relied on before it will exert itself. As long as he
sleeps in the shade of the present error, the after-nature does not
betray its resources. Whilst he dwells in the old sin, he will pay the
old fine.
More letters we have on the subject of the position of young men,
which accord well enough with what we see and hear. There is an
American disease, a paralysis of the active faculties, which falls on
young men of this country as soon as they have finished their
college education, which strips them of all manly aims and bereaves
them of animal spirits; so that the noblest youths are in a few years
converted into pale Caryatides to uphold the temple of conventions.
They are in the state of the young Persians, when “that mighty
Yezdam prophet” addressed them and said, “Behold the signs of evil
days are come; there is now no longer any right course of action, nor
any self-devotion left among the Iranis.” As soon as they have
arrived at this term, there are no employments to satisfy them, they
are educated above the work of their times and country, and disdain
it. Many of the more acute minds pass into a lofty criticism of these
things, which only embitters their sensibility to the evil and widens
the feeling of hostility between them and the citizens at large. From
this cause, companies of the best-educated young men in the
Atlantic states every week take their departure for Europe; for no
business that they have in that country, but simply because they
shall so be hid from the reproachful eyes of their countrymen and
agreeably entertained for one or two years, with some lurking hope,
no doubt, that something may turn up to give them a decided
direction. It is easy to see that this is only a postponement of their
proper work, with the additional disadvantage of a two years’
vacation. Add that this class is rapidly increasing by the infatuation of
the active class, who, whilst they regard these young Athenians with
suspicion and dislike, educate their own children in the same
courses, and use all possible endeavors to secure to them the same
result.
Certainly we are not insensible to this calamity, as described by
the observers or witnessed by ourselves. It is not quite new and
peculiar; though we should not know where to find in literature any
record of so much unbalanced intellectuality, such undeniable
apprehension without talent, so much power without equal
applicability, as our young men pretend to. Yet in Theodore Mundt’s
account of Frederic Hölderlin’s “Hyperion,” we were not a little struck
with the following Jeremiad of the despair of Germany, whose tone is
still so familiar that we were somewhat mortified to find that it was
written in 1799. “Then came I to the Germans. I cannot conceive of a
people more disjoined than the Germans. Mechanics you shall see,
but no man. Is it not like some battle-field, where hands and arms
and all members lie scattered about, whilst the life-blood runs away
into the sand? Let every man mind his own, you say, and I say the
same. Only let him mind it with all his heart, and not with this cold
study, literally, hypocritically, to appear that which he passes for,—
but in good earnest, and in all love, let him be that which he is; then
there is a soul in his deed. And is he driven into a circumstance
where the spirit must not live? Let him thrust it from him with scorn,
and learn to dig and plough. There is nothing holy which is not
desecrated, which is not degraded to a mean end among this
people. It is heart-rending to see your poet, your artist, and all who
still revere genius, who love and foster the Beautiful. The Good!
They live in the world as strangers in their own house; they are like
the patient Ulysses whilst he sat in the guise of a beggar at his own
door, whilst shameless rioters shouted in the hall and asked, Who
brought the ragamuffin here? Full of love, talent and hope, spring up
the darlings of the muse among the Germans; some seven years
later, and they flit about like ghosts, cold and silent; they are like a
soil which an enemy has sown with poison, that it will not bear a
blade of grass. On earth all is imperfect! is the old proverb of the
German. Aye, but if one should say to these God-forsaken, that with
them all is imperfect only because they leave nothing pure which
they do not pollute, nothing holy which they do not defile with their
fumbling hands; that with them nothing prospers because the godlike
nature which is the root of all prosperity they do not revere; that with
them, truly, life is shallow and anxious and full of discord, because
they despise genius, which brings power and nobleness into manly
action, cheerfulness into endurance, and love and brotherhood into
towns and houses. Where a people honors genius in its artists, there
breathes like an atmosphere a universal soul, to which the shy
sensibility opens, which melts self-conceit,—all hearts become pious
and great, and it adds fire to heroes. The home of all men is with
such a people, and there will the stranger gladly abide. But where
the divine nature and the artist is crushed, the sweetness of life is
gone, and every other planet is better than the earth. Men
deteriorate, folly increases, and a gross mind with it; drunkenness
comes with a disaster; with the wantonness of the tongue and with
the anxiety for a livelihood the blessing of every year becomes a
curse, and all the gods depart.”
The steep antagonism between the money-getting and the
academic class must be freely admitted, and perhaps is the more
violent, that whilst our work is imposed by the soil and the sea, our
culture is the tradition of Europe. But we cannot share the
desperation of our contemporaries; least of all should we think a
preternatural enlargement of the intellect a calamity. A new
perception, the smallest new activity given to the perceptive power,
is a victory won to the living universe from Chaos and old Night, and
cheaply bought by any amounts of hard fare and false social
position. The balance of mind and body will redress itself fast
enough. Superficialness is the real distemper. In all the cases we
have ever seen where people were supposed to suffer from too
much wit, or, as men said, from a blade too sharp for the scabbard, it
turned out that they had not wit enough. It may easily happen that
we are grown very idle, and must go to work, and that the times must
be worse before they are better. It is very certain that speculation is
no succedaneum for life. What we would know, we must do. As if
any taste or imagination could take the place of fidelity! The old Duty
is the old God. And we may come to this by the rudest teaching. A
friend of ours went five years ago to Illinois to buy a farm for his son.
Though there were crowds of emigrants in the roads, the country
was open on both sides, and long intervals between hamlets and
houses. Now after five years he had just been to visit the young
farmer and see how he prospered, and reports that a miracle had
been wrought. From Massachusetts to Illinois the land is fenced in
and builded over, almost like New England itself, and the proofs of
thrifty cultivation abound;—a result not so much owing to the natural
increase of population, as to the hard times, which, driving men out
of cities and trade, forced them to take off their coats and go to work
on the land; which has rewarded them not only with wheat but with
habits of labor. Perhaps the adversities of our commerce have not
yet been pushed to the wholesomest degree of severity. Apathies
and total want of work, and reflection on the imaginative character of
American life, etc., etc., are like seasickness, and never will obtain
any sympathy if there is a wood-pile in the yard, or an unweeded
patch in the garden; not to mention the graver absurdity of a youth of
noble aims who can find no field for his energies, whilst the colossal
wrongs of the Indian, of the Negro, of the emigrant, remain
unmitigated, and the religious, civil and judicial forms of the country
are confessedly effete and offensive. We must refer our clients back
to themselves, believing that every man knows in his heart the cure
for the disease he so ostentatiously bewails.
As far as our correspondents have entangled their private griefs
with the cause of American Literature, we counsel them to
disengage themselves as fast as possible. In Cambridge orations
and elsewhere there is much inquiry for that great absentee
American Literature. What can have become of it? The least said is
best. A literature is no man’s private concern, but a secular and
generic result, and is the affair of a power which works by a
prodigality of life and force very dismaying to behold,—every trait of
beauty purchased by hecatombs of private tragedy. The pruning in
the wild gardens of nature is never forborne. Many of the best must
die of consumption, many of despair, and many be stupid and
insane, before the one great and fortunate life which they each
predicted can shoot up into a thrifty and beneficent existence.
VIII.
He has seen but half the universe who never has been shown the
house of Pain. As the salt sea covers more than two thirds of the
surface of the globe, so sorrow encroaches in man on felicity. The
conversation of men is a mixture of regrets and apprehensions. I do
not know but the prevalent hue of things to the eye of leisure is
melancholy. In the dark hours, our existence seems to be a
defensive war, a struggle against the encroaching All, which
threatens surely to engulf us soon, and is impatient of our short
reprieve. How slender the possession that yet remains to us; how
faint the animation! how the spirit seems already to contract its
domain, retiring within narrower walls by the loss of memory, leaving
its planted fields to erasure and annihilation. Already our own
thoughts and words have an alien sound. There is a simultaneous
diminution of memory and hope. Projects that once we laughed and
leapt to execute, find us now sleepy and preparing to lie down in the
snow. And in the serene hours we have no courage to spare. We
cannot afford to let go any advantages. The riches of body or of mind
which we do not need to-day, are the reserved fund against the
calamity that may arrive to-morrow. It is usually agreed that some
nations have a more sombre temperament, and one would say that
history gave no record of any society in which despondency came so
readily to heart as we see it and feel it in ours. Melancholy cleaves to
the English mind in both hemispheres as closely as to the strings of
an Æolian harp. Men and women at thirty years, and even earlier,
have lost all spring and vivacity, and if they fail in their first
enterprises they throw up the game. But whether we and those who
are next to us are more or less vulnerable, no theory of life can have
any right which leaves out of account the values of vice, pain,
disease, poverty, insecurity, disunion, fear and death.
What are the conspicuous tragic elements in human nature? The
bitterest tragic element in life to be derived from an intellectual
source is the belief in a brute Fate or Destiny; the belief that the
order of nature and events is controlled by a law not adapted to man,
nor man to that, but which holds on its way to the end, serving him if
his wishes chance to lie in the same course, crushing him if his
wishes lie contrary to it, and heedless whether it serves or crushes
him. This is the terrible meaning that lies at the foundation of the old
Greek tragedy, and makes the Œdipus and Antigone and Orestes
objects of such hopeless commiseration. They must perish, and
there is no over-god to stop or to mollify this hideous enginery that
grinds or thunders, and snatches them up into its terrific system. The
same idea makes the paralyzing terror with which the East Indian
mythology haunts the imagination. The same thought is the
predestination of the Turk. And universally, in uneducated and
unreflecting persons on whom too the religious sentiment exerts little
force, we discover traits of the same superstition: “If you balk water
you will be drowned the next time;” “if you count ten stars you will fall
down dead;” “if you spill the salt;” “if your fork sticks upright in the
floor;” “if you say the Lord’s prayer backwards,”—and so on, a
several penalty, nowise grounded in the nature of the thing, but on
an arbitrary will. But this terror of contravening an unascertained and
unascertainable will, cannot coexist with reflection: it disappears with
civilization, and can no more be reproduced than the fear of ghosts
after childhood. It is discriminated from the doctrine of Philosophical
Necessity herein: that the last is an Optimism, and therefore the
suffering individual finds his good consulted in the good of all, of
which he is a part. But in destiny, it is not the good of the whole or
the best will that is enacted, but only one particular will. Destiny
properly is not a will at all, but an immense whim; and this the only
ground of terror and despair in the rational mind, and of tragedy in
literature. Hence the antique tragedy, which was founded on this
faith, can never be reproduced.
After reason and faith have introduced a better public and private
tradition, the tragic element is somewhat circumscribed. There must
always remain, however, the hindrance of our private satisfaction by
the laws of the world. The law which establishes nature and the
human race, continually thwarts the will of ignorant individuals, and
this in the particulars of disease, want, insecurity and disunion.
But the essence of tragedy does not seem to me to lie in any list of
particular evils. After we have enumerated famine, fever, inaptitude,
mutilation, rack, madness and loss of friends, we have not yet
included the proper tragic element, which is Terror, and which does
not respect definite evils but indefinite; an ominous spirit which
haunts the afternoon and the night, idleness and solitude.
A low, haggard sprite sits by our side, “casting the fashion of
uncertain evils”—a sinister presentiment, a power of the imagination
to dislocate things orderly and cheerful and show them in startling
array. Hark! what sounds on the night wind, the cry of Murder in that
friendly house; see these marks of stamping feet, of hidden riot. The
whisper overheard, the detected glance, the glare of malignity,
ungrounded fears, suspicions, half-knowledge and mistakes, darken
the brow and chill the heart of men. And accordingly it is natures not
clear, not of quick and steady perceptions, but imperfect characters
from which somewhat is hidden that all others see, who suffer most
from these causes. In those persons who move the profoundest pity,
tragedy seems to consist in temperament, not in events. There are
people who have an appetite for grief, pleasure is not strong enough
and they crave pain, mithridatic stomachs which must be fed on
poisoned bread, natures so doomed that no prosperity can soothe
their ragged and dishevelled desolation. They mis-hear and mis-
behold, they suspect and dread. They handle every nettle and ivy in
the hedge, and tread on every snake in the meadow.
“Come bad chance,
And we add to it our strength,
And we teach it art and length,
Itself o’er us to advance.”
Frankly, then, it is necessary to say that all sorrow dwells in a low
region. It is superficial; for the most part fantastic, or in the
appearance and not in things. Tragedy is in the eye of the observer,
and not in the heart of the sufferer. It looks like an insupportable load
under which earth moans aloud. But analyze it; it is not I, it is not
you, it is always another person who is tormented. If a man says, Lo!
I suffer—it is apparent that he suffers not, for grief is dumb. It is so
distributed as not to destroy. That which would rend you falls on
tougher textures. That which seems intolerable reproach or
bereavement, does not take from the accused or bereaved man or
woman appetite or sleep. Some men are above grief, and some
below it. Few are capable of love. In phlegmatic natures calamity is
unaffecting, in shallow natures it is rhetorical. Tragedy must be
somewhat which I can respect. A querulous habit is not tragedy. A
panic such as frequently in ancient or savage nations put a troop or
an army to flight without an enemy; a fear of ghosts; a terror of
freezing to death that seizes a man in a winter midnight on the
moors; a fright at uncertain sounds heard by a family at night in the
cellar or on the stairs,—are terrors that make the knees knock and
the teeth clatter, but are no tragedy, any more than seasickness,
which may also destroy life. It is full of illusion. As it comes, it has its
support. The most exposed classes, soldiers, sailors, paupers, are
nowise destitute of animal spirits. The spirit is true to itself, and finds
its own support in any condition, learns to live in what is called
calamity as easily as in what is called felicity; as the frailest glass-
bell will support a weight of a thousand pounds of water at the
bottom of a river or sea, if filled with the same.
A man should not commit his tranquillity to things, but should keep
as much as possible the reins in his own hands, rarely giving way to
extreme emotion of joy or grief. It is observed that the earliest works
of the art of sculpture are countenances of sublime tranquillity. The
Egyptian sphinxes, which sit to-day as they sat when the Greek
came and saw them and departed, and when the Roman came and
saw them and departed, and as they will still sit when the Turk, the
Frenchman and the Englishman, who visit them now, shall have
passed by,—“with their stony eyes fixed on the East and on the Nile,”
have countenances expressive of complacency and repose, an
expression of health, deserving their longevity, and verifying the
primeval sentence of history on the permanency of that people,
“Their strength is to sit still.” To this architectural stability of the
human form, the Greek genius added an ideal beauty, without
disturbing the seals of serenity; permitting no violence of mirth, or
wrath, or suffering. This was true to human nature. For, in life,
actions are few, opinions even few, prayers few; loves, hatreds, or
any emissions of the soul. All that life demands of us through the
greater part of the day, is an equilibrium, a readiness, open eyes and
ears, and free hands. Society asks this, and truth, and love, and the
genius of our life. There is a fire in some men which demands an
outlet in some rude action; they betray their impatience of quiet by
an irregular Catalinarian gait; by irregular, faltering, disturbed
speech, too emphatic for the occasion. They treat trifles with a tragic
air. This is not beautiful. Could they not lay a rod or two of stone wall,
and work off this superabundant irritability? When two strangers
meet in the highway, what each demands of the other is that the
aspect should show a firm mind, ready for any event of good or ill,
prepared alike to give death or to give life, as the emergency of the
next moment may require. We must walk as guests in nature; not
impassioned, but cool and disengaged. A man should try Time, and
his face should wear the expression of a just judge, who has nowise
made up his opinion, who fears nothing, and even hopes nothing,
but who puts nature and fortune on their merits: he will hear the case
out, and then decide. For all melancholy, as all passion, belongs to
the exterior life. Whilst a man is not grounded in the divine life by his
proper roots, he clings by some tendrils of affection to society—
mayhap to what is best and greatest in it, and in calm times it will not
appear that he is adrift and not moored; but let any shock take place
in society, any revolution of custom, of law, of opinion, and at once
his type of permanence is shaken. The disorder of his neighbors
appears to him universal disorder; chaos is come again. But in truth
he was already a driving wreck, before the wind arose which only
revealed to him his vagabond state. If a man is centred, men and
events appear to him a fair image or reflection of that which he
knoweth beforehand in himself. If any perversity or profligacy break
out in society, he will join with others to avert the mischief, but it will
not arouse resentment or fear, because he discerns its impassable
limits. He sees already in the ebullition of sin the simultaneous
redress.
Particular reliefs also, fit themselves to human calamities; for the
world will be in equilibrium, and hates all manner of exaggeration.
Time, the consoler, Time, the rich carrier of all changes, dries the
freshest tears by obtruding new figures, new costumes, new roads,
on our eye, new voices on our ear. As the west wind lifts up again
the heads of the wheat which were bent down and lodged in the
storm, and combs out the matted and dishevelled grass as it lay in
night-locks on the ground, so we let in time as a drying wind into the
seed-field of thoughts which are dark and wet and low bent. Time
restores to them temper and elasticity. How fast we forget the blow
that threatened to cripple us. Nature will not sit still; the faculties will
do somewhat; new hopes spring, new affections twine and the
broken is whole again.
Time consoles, but Temperament resists the impression of pain.
Nature proportions her defence to the assault. Our human being is
wonderfully plastic; if it cannot win this satisfaction here, it makes
itself amends by running out there and winning that. It is like a
stream of water, which is dammed up on one bank, overruns the
other, and flows equally at its own convenience over sand, or mud,
or marble. Most suffering is only apparent. We fancy it is torture; the
patient has his own compensations. A tender American girl doubts of
Divine Providence whilst she reads the horrors of “the middle
passage;” and they are bad enough at the mildest; but to such as
she these crucifixions do not come: they come to the obtuse and
barbarous, to whom they are not horrid, but only a little worse than
the old sufferings. They exchange a cannibal war for the stench of
the hold. They have gratifications which would be none to the
civilized girl. The market-man never damned the lady because she
had not paid her bill, but the stout Irishwoman has to take that once
a month. She however never feels weakness in her back because of
the slave-trade. This self-adapting strength is especially seen in
disease. “It is my duty,” said Sir Charles Bell, “to visit certain wards
of the hospital where there is no patient admitted but with that
complaint which most fills the imagination with the idea of
insupportable pain and certain death. Yet these wards are not the
least remarkable for the composure and cheerfulness of their
inmates. The individual who suffers has a mysterious
counterbalance to that condition, which, to us who look upon her,
appears to be attended with no alleviating circumstance.” Analogous
supplies are made to those individuals whose character leads them
to vast exertions of body and mind. Napoleon said to one of his
friends at St. Helena, “Nature seems to have calculated that I should
have great reverses to endure, for she has given me a temperament
like a block of marble. Thunder cannot move it; the shaft merely
glides along. The great events of my life have slipped over me
without making any demand on my moral or physical nature.”
The intellect is a consoler, which delights in detaching or putting
an interval between a man and his fortune, and so converts the
sufferer into a spectator and his pain into poetry. It yields the joys of
conversation, of letters and of science. Hence also the torments of
life become tuneful tragedy, solemn and soft with music, and
garnished with rich dark pictures. But higher still than the activities of
art, the intellect in its purity and the moral sense in its purity are not
distinguished from each other, and both ravish us into a region
whereinto these passionate clouds of sorrow cannot rise.
FOOTNOTES:
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also
govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most
countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside
the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to
the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying,
displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works
based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The
Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright
status of any work in any country other than the United States.