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The Puzzle of Peace
The Puzzle of Peace
The Evolution of Peace
in the International System
Gary Goertz, Paul F. Diehl
and
Alexandru Balas

1
1
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the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
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© Oxford University Press 2016

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ISBN 978–0–19–930103–4 (pbk : alk. paper) — ISBN 978–0–19–930102–7 (hbk : alk. paper)

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 CON T E N T S

Acknowledgments  vii

1. Introduction   1

PART I: The Evolution of International Peace

2. Conceptualizing Interstate Peace and Constituting
the International System   23
3. The Evolution of Peace 1900–2006   56
4. Territorial Issues and the Evolution of Peace   73

PART II: International Territorial Norms, Conflict Management, and Peace

5. The Development of Territorial Norms and the Norm
against Conquest   99
6. Managing New States: Secession, Decolonization, and Peace   120
7. When Territorial Change Happens: The Norm
of Uti Possidetis  138
8. Managing Territorial Conflict and Promoting Peace: Mediation and
Legally Binding Approaches   151
9. Peace at Sea: Managing Maritime Boundaries   183

PART III: Summary and Extensions

10. Conclusions and Implications   201

Afterwords: Some Speculations about the Causes of Peace   213

References  227
Author Biographies   239
Index  241
 AC KNOW L E DG M E N T S

This book began with an exploration of the processes underlying the ter-
mination of enduring rivalries, and much of the initial data collection was
supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. As the proj-
ect developed and data were collected (including historical narratives),
our sense developed that there was something more going on than the end
of rivalries. Rather, larger-scale dynamics involving peaceful interactions,
largely ignored in much of international conflict research, were at work. Even
as we developed a new rivalry data set (Journal of Peace Research, 2006), we
began to expand our focus to create the first version of our “peace scale”
along which state relationships could be placed (Conflict Management and
Peace Science, 2008). We are grateful to James Klein, who helped develop
those early ideas and collected some of the initial data, as well as serving as
lead author for those initial articles.
As the project evolved to track the evolution of peace, data collection
was supported by the Henning Larsen Fund at the University of Illinois and
later by the Kroc Institute for International Peace at the University of Notre
Dame. Supplementing the data collection efforts of the three authors were
those by our assistants David Bowden, Tyler Pack, and Gina Riccardella.
We thank those institutions and individuals.
Portions of this work were presented in several workshops and lectures.
We received valuable feedback and suggestions from faculty and students
at Göttingen University, Princeton University, the University of Tennessee,
Michigan State University, the University of California, Berkeley, the
University of Massachusetts Amherst, Northwestern University, and the
University of Pittsburgh. Early versions of the book’s chapters were also
presented at annual meetings of the International Studies Association and
the Peace Science Society (International).
Constructive suggestions were also provided by a wide range of indi-
viduals, including Karen Alter, Frank Baumgartner, Reşat Bayer, Kyle
Beardsley, David Carter, Michael Colaresi, Christian Davenport, Ben
Denison, Tanisha Fazal, Derrick Frazier, Douglas Gibler, Nils Petter
Gleditsch, Hein Goemans, Joshua Goldstein, Ryan Griffiths, Paul Hensel,
 ( viii )   Acknowledgments

Adam Irish, Joshua Kertzer, Jason Klocek, Jacek Kugler, Jack Levy, Andrew
Mack, Aila Mantock. Michaela Mattes, Molly Melin, Sara Mitchell, Andrew
Owsiak, Steven Pinker, Brandon Prins, Pat Regan, Gennady Rudkevich,
Megan Shannon, Jaroslav Tir, Konstantinos Travlos, John Vasquez, Peter
Wallenstein, Frank Wayman, and Krista Wiegand. We thank all these indi-
viduals, although, of course, final responsibility is ours.
The Puzzle of Peace
 CH A P T E R 1

Introduction

T here has been a decline in international war over time; that is the
conclusion of three major works published in this decade.1 Each
has received extensive media, scholarly, and policymaking attention. The
Human Security Report (2012), Joshua Goldstein’s Winning the War on War
(2011), and Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) all track
the incidence of high-level armed conflict over various periods. The general
theme of the latter two books is that war and its direct human costs (e.g.,
battle deaths) have declined over time, and this conclusion holds regard-
less of the historical baseline used for comparison. Pinker’s work makes
an even broader claim, indicating that all forms of violence—from war to
rape to crime to animal cruelty—are less common than they used to be.
The Human Security Report is less sanguine but nevertheless provides strong
empirical evidence that humankind is less prone to interstate war, even as
some other forms of armed conflict (e.g., civil wars) exhibit greater fluctua-
tions. There is a broad consensus that war has been on the decline. Whether
these trends will continue into the future is subject to some debate (Hegre
et al., 2013; National Intelligence Council, 2012).
These empirical analyses provide evidence on the evolution of war and
violence but not on peace per se. In their conception, and indeed in the
modal approach in international conflict research and national security
discourses, peace is defined negatively, as merely the absence of war or

1. This is also a broad consensus across a series of other recent studies—see Gat (2013) for
a review. Nevertheless, this is neither a new proposition nor one that is universally shared.
For example, Mueller (1989) touted the “obsolescence of major war” decades before, and
early decline-of-war claims were made by Woods and Baltzly (1915). Others (Richardson,
1960) took a middle position. There is also no shortage of critics of the proposition that war
has become less frequent, ranging from Sorokin (1937) to, more recently, Sarkees and Wayman
(2010), Braumoeller (2013), and Fazal (2014).
 ( 2 )   The Puzzle of Peace

violence. Indeed, Gleditsch et al. (2014) reviewed the contents of two

aptly named journals, Journal of Peace Research and Journal of Conflict
Resolution, since their inception and found that the focus on negative
peace, the prevention of war and violence, has been predominant, and
especially so in the last twenty-five years. Even those articles that dealt
with human rights, cooperation, and other related topics increasingly
emphasized how these elements serve to reduce armed conflict, thereby
reinforcing the focus on the absence of war.
In the peace-as-not-war conception, North Korea would be considered
at peace with South Korea and the United States, and has been so for more
than six decades. Major military engagements in the form of sustained and
direct fighting between the protagonists have not occurred since 1953.
Similarly, the Iranian-Israeli relationship at least through the first decade
and a half of the twenty-first century is largely “peaceful” in that the only
violence between those two states has involved sporadic, covert acts, such
as the assassination of diplomats and nuclear scientists or the planting of
computer viruses in the software that operates nuclear power plants. Most
policymakers and other observers would scoff at the notion that these rela-
tionships are defined as peaceful. They might be equally incredulous at
lumping together these states with those such as modern-day France and
Germany, historical enemies that now have close political and economic
cooperation and have even integrated elements of their militaries.
The aforementioned works are not unique in how they define peace
as the absence of war. Many prominent examples can easily be found.
An extensive scholarly literature, often quoted by national and inter-
national leaders, explores the “democratic peace” (Russett and Oneal,
2001; for a summary, see Chan, 2012). This is the empirical finding that
democratic states do not fight one another. The empirical regularity is
built on the absence of a bona fide war between two democracies, not
the absence of militarized interactions per se. Even competitors to the
democratic peace, such as the “territorial peace” (Gibler, 2012) and the
“capitalist peace” (Schneider and Gleditsch, 2010), which seek alterna-
tive explanations for the democratic peace, concentrate on the absence
of war rather than more positive conceptions of peace. Similarly, many
have called the post–World War II period the “Long Peace” (Gaddis,
1987), defined as the longest period of history without a war between
major power states. Yet, the Cold War was a period of superpower com-
petition characterized by the development of extensive nuclear arse-
nals, unprecedented military spending, and a variety of proxy wars,
both interstate and civil.
 I n t ro d u c ti o n    ( 3 )

What is missing from these analyses, and even from their critics,
is a clear conception of what it means for actors to be at peace, which
moves beyond the inadequate not-war conceptualization.2 In this book, we
address this limitation by considering the broad range of state relationships
from long-standing rivalry (e.g., India-Pakistan) to integrated friendship (e.g.,
European Union) and various possibilities in between.
As the subtitle of the book indicates, we focus on international conflict
and peace at the system level. We trace the evolution of state relationships
at the international system level to assess not merely whether war and
other militarized conflict are less common (as other authors contend), but
also whether such changes have resulted in more peaceful relationships or
merely represent a shift from the most violent forms of rivalry to others that
still represent significant hostility and heightened risk of armed conflict in
the future.
Why are scholars and decision-makers so focused on war and not
peace more broadly? Most obviously, the costs of war in terms of lives and
expense are substantial, with millions of people directly killed in all forms
of warfare in the twentieth century; this does not even take into account
millions of other deaths indirectly associated with war.3 The costs of war are
also transparent, obvious to policymakers and the domestic constituencies
to which many of them are answerable. Scholarly projects have virtually no
choice other than to look at the decline in war because these are the only
data that they have.
In contrast, peace is considerably more nebulous, with less agreement
on what characteristics constitute the essential core of a peaceful relation-
ship. War can be seen as a distinct event, confined to a relatively narrow
time frame and space, and involves primarily military interactions. Peace
involves many different kinds of interactions; many are diffuse, involve
different actors, and are less subject to easy observation than are mili-
tary encounters. The benefits of peace are also less obvious because they
often involve not paying the costs of war but also create opportunities for
trade and the like that might not be easily traced back to the state of peace.
Researchers also do not have data on peace; they have data sets on conflict

2. There are some exceptions, as we discuss in the next chapter. Kupchan (2010) is one
study that moves beyond the absence of war, but his focus is exclusively on the state-state level
and not at the system level. Furthermore, his concern is only with slowly improving relations
between former rivals and not peace between states that lack hostile interactions in their pasts.
3. These deaths can be civilian ones directly attributable to war but not counted because
most data compilations record only battle deaths of combatants, or they can be indirect fatali-
ties during or after the war related to disease, government reallocation of resources away from
health care, and the like that are the result of a country’s war participation; see Iqbal (2010) and
Ghobarah et al. (2003).
 ( 4 )   The Puzzle of Peace

management, peace treaties, and agreements on ceasefires and the end of

wars, which reflect a very limited conception of peace.
In this volume, we offer the first systematic and comprehensive data
set on international peace. With these data, we hope to encourage others
to begin exploring the causes and consequences of peaceful relationships
between states.

MOVING BEYOND THE ABSENCE

OF WAR TO PEACE

All the works cited earlier and the associated literatures they have gener-
ated rely fundamentally on a “battle-death” view of international conflict.
They reach similar conclusions regarding the evolution of international war
because they all use the same data sets on international conflict (i.e., Uppsala
Conflict Data Program—see Themnér and Wallensteen, 2014),4 which
define wars in terms of the number of people killed or battle deaths.5 Pinker
and others refer to “declining violence” or “declining war,” an event-based
notion of international conflict in which the event is the individual battle
death; the peacefulness of the international system is the aggregation of
individual battle deaths. Such an approach is fundamentally unable to deal
with peace, except as the absence of fatalities.
To conceptualize and measure peace, one must move from an
events-based perspective to a relationship one: peace is a relationship, while
war is an event. This fundamental change in perspective has dramatic rami-
fications for how one looks at international war and peace and its changes
over time. For the most conflictual relationships, we start not with battle
deaths but rather with serious militarized relationships, often designated
as “rivalries” (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi et al., 2007). War is one
consequence—and cause as well—of rivalry, but there are many other
behavioral manifestations such as large militaries, arms races, support of
rebel groups in the other state, militarization of society, and the like. In
rivalry relationships, the threat of war is present and states are preparing for
its occurrence; war does not necessarily occur, and battle deaths might be
absent even when lesser military confrontations do occur.
Because peace is a relationship as well, we leverage the concept of rivalry
to think about peace in terms of positive, cooperative relationships between

4. http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/.
5. Generally, there must be twenty-five or more battle deaths in a conflict for it to appear in
the data set; other collections, such as those from the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees and
Wayman, 2010), have a higher standard of one thousand or more battle-related fatalities.
 I n t ro d u c ti o n    ( 5 )

states. Unlike realists who believe that war always has a nontrivial likelihood
of occurring, war and the use of military force for peaceful states is not even
an option that leaders consider. States can have many disagreements, but
neither side thinks about managing them with the threat or use of force.
For example, the United States and members of the European Union have
numerous differences over trade but never resort to, or even consider, using
military force against one another to protect their interests.
The relationship perspective makes it clear that the international system
is one composed of states and more specifically relationships between the
governments of those states.6 Thus, we regard the international system as
becoming more peaceful when the number and proportion of interstate
relationships that are peaceful, or at least less hostile, increase. This presents
a much stiffer test than the decline of violence thesis that is only concerned
with the absence of war. There are many very hostile relationships (e.g., the
Cold War between the United States and the USSR) that extend for long
periods of time with no or few battle deaths. In cases such as the sixty-plus
years of postwar relations between South and North Korea, the small num-
ber of fatalities is counted as evidence for the decline of violence—we do
not regard that as movement toward peace.
The next chapter discusses in detail how we conceptualize peace. It
goes beyond past conceptions in the scholarly literature, including “stable
peace” and related ideas. Peace is not the absence of war or rivalry, but
rather includes additional features. This produces a very different focus
than the democratic peace and decline of violence literatures. We develop
our own conception of peace and construct five different levels of a peace
scale: severe rivalry, lesser rivalry, negative peace, warm peace, and security
communities, respectively. This chapter also includes operational criteria
for placing state relationships on this peace scale and presents a methodol-
ogy for measuring rivalry and peace in international relationships. To sum-
marize, peace is conceptualized in terms of relationships, not individual
events. We do not rely on battle deaths or counts of wars (which are usually
defined by the number of battle deaths) as a measure of hostility (or peace
in their absence).
Unlike most studies of international conflict, our focus is on the evo-
lution of peace at the international system level. The second chapter also
provides our definition of the international system as a set of state relation-
ships. We look systematically at the behavior of state relationships in the
aggregate rather than individually. Thus, our project is similar to the decline

6. Throughout the book, we concentrate on government relationships rather than those

between private individuals, groups, corporations, or national organizations that cross national
boundaries.
 ( 6 )   The Puzzle of Peace

of war and violence literature, which also explores international system

level trends. We do not focus on major power subsystems as synonymous
with systemic peace, as is the case of many classic (e.g., Waltz, 1979) or
newer (e.g., Braumoeller, 2013) systemic theories. This is not to say that
great power states are not significant in systemic peace; indeed, such states
tend to have more relationships and interactions than others. Rather, they
alone do not define the international system, and it is conceivable that
even a “long peace” (Gaddis, 1987) between leading states in the system
could be accompanied by more violent conflict among lesser states as well
as between major powers and smaller states. For example, the “peaceful”
nineteenth century is one of significant war between European states and
local political entities when European states expanded in almost all regions
of the Global South.
Chapter 2 provides our conceptualization of peace along with an iden-
tification of what constitutes the international system in terms of interstate
relationships. With these important basics under our belt, we can explore
our key system-level query: Is the world becoming more peaceful? To
answer this question, we ask: What would a more peaceful international
system look like? It would be characterized by an increasing number and
percentage of state relationships that fall on the right-hand side of our peace
scale and/or a concordant decrease in hostile relationships (e.g., rivalries).
To understand this involves looking at the dynamics of change. In simple
terms, are the odds of a relationship moving from negative peace to rivalry
lower than the reverse? If this is true, over time the system is becoming
less militarized and conflictual. Similarly, if the probability of moving from
negative peace to positive peace is greater than the inverse, the system is
also becoming more peaceful.
Shifts involving positive peace (warm peace and security commu-
nities) are expected to be hard to reverse; positive peace is a virtual
“absorbing state” (to use the terms of Markov change analysis) or a con-
dition that once achieved does not change. Once relationships reach
positive peace, they are stable. These dynamic processes—if maintained
over significant periods—will produce a more peaceful international
system.
The vast majority of interstate relationships are located in the negative
peace zone (see c­ hapter 3). Relationships can move from this middle zone,
in and out of peace and rivalry. If both were to happen at the same time,
then the system would simultaneously become more peaceful and more
conflictual. As we document, there is almost no movement from posi-
tive peace to negative peace, but significant net movement from rivalry to
negative peace.
 I n t ro d u c ti o n    ( 7 )

Unlike conventional scholarly studies of war and peace, we are look-

ing for an explanation for increasing peace at the system level. Thus, we
are working in what is often called “causes-of-effects” mode: we want
to explain why Y (here peace) has evolved in a particular manner. In
this approach, one starts with a discussion of the occurrence of some
phenomenon (Y) the thing to be explained. After charting the evolu-
tion of peace and rivalry at the international level, we then move to our
explanation of those trends. In this way, our project is different from,
for example, the democratic peace literature, in which the question con-
cerns the effect of democracy on war, an effects-of-causes mode (see
Goertz and Mahoney, 2012, for a brief discussion of causes-of-effects
versus effects-of-causes).
Given that we want to explain a system-level phenomenon, we focus
on change at the system level. Specifically, we focus on how the system has
been altered, which produces changing levels of peace. A classic exam-
ple of this kind of analysis is found in the debate over the war proneness
of bipolar versus multipolar versus unipolar systems (classic studies are
Waltz, 1964; Deutsch and Singer, 1964; Wohlforth, 1999). We argue that
significant changes in international norms explain much of the move to
peace since 1945. These international norms are closely connected to
international law and function—as is true of all law—at the system or
society level. Fundamentally, this is not any different from studies that
assess the impact of domestic laws on the behavior of individuals. In
assessing the effects of those norms, we look at individual state relation-
ships (what has been called the “dyadic level”) and aggregate those on
a global level; the result is a system-level snapshot at any given time of
peace and rivalry writ large.7
We concentrate on state-state relationships and associated conflict and
cooperation, and thus do not take into account civil or intrastate conflict. We do
include cases in which the civil war influences state relationships, (e.g., Rwanda
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or South Africa and neighboring
states during apartheid). This is not to dismiss the importance of such civil war,
but that is beyond the scope of our study.8 Thus, when we refer to an increasingly
peaceful international system, we mean the interstate system of relationships.

7. Thus, whereas our dependent variables are the aggregate or sum of the individual units
(relationship) of the system, the independent variables, such as international norms, are sys-
tem properties that are not aggregates of individual and dyadic factors. Conflict studies almost
always work at the individual state or dyadic level whereas system-level factors are typical in
studies of international norms.
8. In c­ hapter 3, we demonstrate that the world is not merely exchanging one type of conflict
(interstate) for another (civil). Indeed, peaceful relationships are actually positively correlated
with civil war occurrence after 1989.
 ( 8 )   The Puzzle of Peace

INCREASING PEACE IN THE

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Our contention is that World War II constitutes the tipping point in the
international system’s movement toward more peace: international peace
is fundamentally a post–World War II phenomenon. In other words, inter-
national peace was virtually nonexistent before World War II. Most schol-
ars of the decline of war and violence look only at the post-1945 period.
Implicit in some analyses, even those with long time horizons, is the notion
of relatively constant linear change over time.9 In contrast, our view is that
these changes have been extremely nonlinear. World War II constitutes a
punctuation point. Considering system-transforming events, most scholars
focus on the world wars. Nevertheless, the two system-transforming events
after 1945 were relatively peaceful: decolonization and the end of the Cold
War. These are periods in which the key international norms about territory
are decisively reinforced.
Our central analysis about patterns in state relationships extends from
1900 through 2006, the latter representing the last year for which we have
data on state relationships. Throughout the book, however, the tempo-
ral period of analysis varies somewhat. For example, to demonstrate the
changes in conflict propensity over territorial issues, a central part of our
argument, we go back to 1648 in one case but more commonly begin with
1816. This is a function, in part, of data availability, but more importantly, it
helps us chart the evolution of changes in the international system; patterns
in earlier eras help us demonstrate the differences that appear after 1945.
In other instances, looking back permits the reader to see the development
of international norms and conflict management mechanisms during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, again in contrast to the period in
which international peace increases. Thus, we often report data patterns in
1816–1899 and 1900–1945 aggregates, as well as five-year periods thereaf-
ter; ultimately, we let the empirical patterns dictate the temporal configura-
tions and discuss patterns within periods as appropriate. In a few cases, we
have data and examples that go beyond 2006 and report those as evidence
for or against our thesis.
With these conceptual and data tools in hand, we demonstrate that the
international system has become increasingly peaceful over time, albeit
with some limitations. Chapter 3 tracks changes along the peace scale over

9. Pinker (2011) is an exception in that he notes multiple trends across history, some coun-
tervailing, such as wars becoming shorter and fewer while being more destructive prior to
1945. He does agree with us that the decline of war is a post-1945 phenomenon (personal
communication).
 I n t ro d u c ti o n    ( 9 )

the 1900–2006 period for two sets of state relationships. First, we look at all
state-state relationships in the international system, considering different
decades and where these relationships fall along the peace scale. Most nota-
bly, we consider, by decade and at various other breakpoints (e.g., before
and after the Cold War), whether there are trends away from more hostile
relationships and toward more peaceful ones.
Second, we focus on state pairs that can be classified as rivalries during
some portion of the period under study; these are the states that consti-
tute the greatest threats to international peace and security. Accordingly,
we examine whether or not these most dangerous state relationships are
moving in a more peaceful direction, with appropriate concern for key tran-
sition points. Although several such rivalries are persistent, there has been
a notable decrease in such competitions as many have moved away from
the highest levels of hostility. They have moved into the “negative peace”
category as part of a substantial peaceful shift in relationships.
Our empirical findings for all relationships in the 1900–2006 period
indicate movement in the aggregate toward a more peaceful international
system. Most relationships still fall within the middle range, or negative
peace portion, of the peace scale, neither primarily hostile nor peaceful.
That is, positive peace and rivalry are less common than relationships that
are characterized by neither strong enmity nor close friendship. There has
been a significant increase in the number and percentage of more peace-
ful relationships as states (most notably those in the European Union)
achieve or approach integrated security communities. The trends in a par-
ticularly conflict-prone subset—pairs of states that had been rivals during
the period—indicate greater support for the proposition that the world has
become more peaceful. Starting late in the twentieth century, more peace-
ful relationships developed and former rivals moved toward less hostile
relationships. There is still significant militarized conflict—much of which
does not involve large numbers of battle deaths and thus is more success-
fully managed in one sense. We conclude, based on the first systematic anal-
yses of peace and rivalry, that progress has been made in moving toward a
more peaceful international system.

EXPLAINING INCREASING PEACE

AND DECREASING RIVALRY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

It is one thing to show that the international system is becoming more peace-
ful and another to explain its evolution. Indeed, the decline-of-war studies
offer much more compelling evidence for the trends noted than they do
 ( 10 )   The Puzzle of Peace

in providing explanations for why violence is less common. Furthermore,

those explanations offer little purchase in accounting for peace.
Our theoretical argument is not designed to serve as a general theory of
international relations in the ways that realism, liberalism, and other “isms”
purport to do. Rather, our story about territorial conflict, norms, and con-
flict management mechanisms is one designed to explain the evolution of
international peace and not a broader set of phenomena. In addition, we
do not direct much attention to alternative explanations for the increasing
peacefulness of the international system. First, we know of very few expla-
nations for system-wide trends that we explore in this volume (again the
focus or dependent variable is peace in the international system). Second,
those that argue for the decline of war do not provide appropriate or con-
vincing explanations for peace, a point we make in subsequent chapters.
Third, we ignore any ad hoc theories that one might develop, but which
no one has systematically explored. Our goal is to thoroughly develop and
present our explanation. We leave to others to explore alternative accounts.
Our approach begins with the well-established empirical fact that dis-
agreements over territorial control are at the heart of the vast majority of
militarized conflicts, wars, and rivalries (Tir and Vasquez, 2012). Thus, if
the international system can manage territorial conflicts—their occur-
rence and consequences—then the international system experiences less
hostility among its constituent units, and that opens up more possibilities
for peaceful interactions between states. If there are three main issues over
which states fight and the most salient of the three is removed or reduced,
the system becomes more peaceful.10
The control of territory lies at the heart of realpolitik, the central tenet
of which is that states act in their national interest to enhance their power.
This orientation has guided scholars of international relations for decades
and is perhaps even more pervasive among national leaders whose policies
of deterrence and coercive measures are predicated on realist notions. Our
argument is that this territorial heart of realpolitik has slowly eroded over
the last century, with the rate accelerating since 1945 and around 1990.
Territorial disputes have long been the source of violent conflict in the
international system. These not only led to wars but also stood as barri-
ers to the development of more peaceful relations between states. In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, competition over territory was often
between empires: imperialism by definition means increasing state power
through territorial acquisition, thereby generating disputes over borders
and land claims. Thus, territorial disputes were the disagreements that kept

10. This implies a ceteris paribus claim that there are not new issues that replace territory.
 I n t ro d u c ti o n    ( 11 )

many states as rivals with one another and were also the defining issue of
many wars and lesser militarized confrontations.
Core to our argument for why this has taken place are the various ways
that international society has dealt with conflicts over territory. Chapter 4
outlines an issue approach to war and peace with a focus on territory. What
states are willing to fight over has varied quite a bit over the centuries, and
understanding how and why issues enter and leave the agenda for milita-
rized conflict is critical for understanding the rise in peace in the twentieth
century. The second part of the chapter documents empirically how wars
over territory, militarized confrontations short of war over territory, and
territorial claims have decreased over time, often in raw numbers but clearly
vis-à-vis the number of state relationships in the international system. These
patterns are consistent with those in ­chapter 3, which showed a decline in
rivalries and an increase in positive peace relationships.
The causal mechanism by which international society is able to reduce
territorial disputes on the militarized issue agenda is the key to understand-
ing why the international system has become more peaceful. Figure 1.1
illustrates our basic framework. The international system has agreed on a set

International
Territorial Norms
• Against
Conquest Sanctions:
• Against Violent non-recognition
Secession
• Peaceful
Decolonization

Uti Possidetis Territorial Peace

Integrity

Conflict
Management
Processes
• Mediation
• Adjudication

Figure 1.1: Theoretical Framework.

 ( 12 )   The Puzzle of Peace

of norms regulating territory. Collectively, these norms support “territorial

integrity” or the principle that territorial control should not be transferred
or altered, except peacefully and with the consent of the parties involved.
Thus, norms forbid territorial changes effected via military force and coer-
cion. These norms are embodied in state practice, a host of international
treaties in all regions of the world, and the UN Charter; accordingly, some
have achieved the status of international law.
These international territorial norms embody a theory of conflict man-
agement. Essentially, they posit that an international system with stable ter-
ritorial boundaries is a more peaceful one. We argue that this is empirically
true, and the analyses in subsequent chapters confirm this. International
norms therefore have played a major role in making the international sys-
tem more peaceful, consistent with the empirical patterns described in
­chapters 3 and 4.
Changing norms in the international system imply two things: chang-
ing preferences and increasing costs. Over time, states slowly remove ter-
ritorial expansion from their lists of foreign policy goals. This goes hand
in hand with stable territorial boundaries; to support territorial integrity
means that the state has renounced territorial acquisition as a goal vis-à-
vis other states. To acquire territory legitimately and to gain sovereign
control over it requires that the international system—that is, the United
Nations and major powers—recognizes that territorial change. This con-
stitutes a major constraint on territorial expansion. A country might gain
de facto control or independence, but the territory remains contested and
the costs of occupation continue. For example, foreign direct investment
is very unlikely in such contested areas because property rights are not
clear. The primary sanction, therefore, against violations of the territo-
rial norms is the nonrecognition by the international community of any
ill-gotten territorial gains. Violators of international norms might also be
subject to costs in the form of sanctions or other punishments from states
in the system.
As an illustration of normative change, consider the pre-twentieth-cen-
tury international system and its patterns of behavior and norms. For exam-
ple, in the eighteenth century international norms regarding the conquest
of territory were characterized by the following rules:

• Conquest is legal.
• Conquest is a normal and accepted goal of governments.
• Peace treaties confirm and legalize territorial conquest.
• The primary criterion for territorial transfers is effective control over
territory.
 I n t ro d u c ti o n    ( 13 )

If we jump to the post–World War II international system, these norms

have changed:

• Conquest is illegal.
• Territorial integrity is the norm.
• Postwar/postconflict peace agreements after 1945, which in fact become
very rare, do not confirm territorial gains during war.
• The primary criterion for territorial acquisition is recognition by the
international community.

Violating the territorial integrity principle has become much less fre-
quent over time and particularly in the post-1945 period. For example, con-
sider the aftermath of one of those violations. What are the internationally
recognized boundaries of Israel? Israel gained control over a substantial ter-
ritory in Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights as a result of the 1967
war. It has built settlements and exercised substantial control over most of
these areas. By eighteenth-century rules, this territory would have been rap-
idly accepted as part of Israel by peace treaty with its opponents and by the
international system as a whole (e.g., major powers). Yet, as we approach
the fiftieth anniversary of this war, these are still regarded as “occupied ter-
ritories,” and UN Resolution 242 calling for the return to prewar borders
remains a focal point for any final settlement.
If we can document that the international system is becoming more peace-
ful, how do we know that international norms (and subsequently conflict
management mechanisms) are responsible? To do this, we explore these new
norms of nonviolent territorial change in several ways. Although a full expla-
nation of their origins is beyond the scope of this book, we chart international
law and norms about the use of force and international boundaries over time.
This norm development roughly mirrors the patterns of increasingly peace-
ful relationships noted earlier. Thereafter, we consider how the norms are
reflected in the behavior of states with respect to territorial conflict.
If states recognize the value of stable boundaries and the difficulty of
changing them, then there should be behavioral traces in the evolution of
territorial claims and disputes. The dynamics should be that fewer territo-
rial conflicts occur over time as conflict management mechanisms help
states resolve those disagreements and the disincentives for new claims
increase over time. Our analyses of mediation and adjudication-arbitration,
respectively, indicate that this is the case. In short, the methodology con-
sists of showing that behavioral changes are consistent with the history and
content of international norms and conflict management institutions, as
well as the accompanying changes in aggregate state behavior.
 ( 14 )   The Puzzle of Peace

We focus on several specific territorial norms that together constitute the

core of the international regime supporting territorial integrity. The first is the
basic norm by which states, the UN, and other major players reject territorial
gains made by military force, or what we refer to as the norm against con-
quest. This was not firmly established until after World War II. For example,
colonial empires as well as settler states, such as the United States, expanded
for many centuries based on the military conquest of territory. Beginning in
Latin America and picking up momentum after World War I, states began to
sanction such behavior by refusing to recognize the gains if those territorial
acquisitions were achieved through the barrel of a gun. This was famously
embodied in the Stimson Doctrine, the US declaration of nonrecognition in
those cases. After World War II, the norm was incorporated in Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”
Our analysis of the norm against conquest in c­ hapter 5 traces its history
from inception to modern manifestations. Our empirical assessment of the
norm demonstrates that conquests and annexations are significantly less
frequent after 1945 than in previous eras to the point that they are virtually
nonexistent since 1975. Territorial claims pressed through the use of military
force have also declined, and there are a series of other state behaviors consis-
tent with the norm against conquest.
A second set of territorial norms deals with the entry of new states into the
international system. It is well documented that new states are particularly
prone to militarized conflicts. Historically, the norms about state entry into
the international system were similar to the interstate rules about conquest.
If the government—secessionist or former colony—of the territory in ques-
tion had effective control over the territory, then it would be accorded rec-
ognition by the major powers and hence in practice by everyone else. The
consent of the population or the method of attaining effective military and
administrative control was not relevant.
In the twentieth century, normative changes modified this new-state
norm and replaced it with several others. The first was the domestic ver-
sion of the international territorial integrity norm and denied legitimacy
to militarized secessionist groups in homeland areas. To become a new
state in this secessionist context via military force was no longer accepted
by the international community. The secession norm legitimated only
new states that emerged out of existing states through peaceful means,
including the permission of those existing states. Critical to the new sys-
tem was that it no longer rested on the classic criterion of effective con-
trol. Thus, the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland and the Kurdish
 I n t ro d u c ti o n    ( 15 )

sector of Iraq have not been recognized as states, even though they exer-
cise autonomy in a given geographic area and share many characteristics
of independent states.
The second is what we call the decolonization norm. Colonies were no
longer legitimate, and colonial peoples had a right to independence. This
placed an obligation on colonial states to permit self-determination and
independence and to do so voluntarily and without military resistance.
Starting with the limited League of Nations mandate system and continu-
ing with United Nations support, the decolonization movement took off
such that the number of independent states in the international system
increased dramatically, most of them through peaceful transitions and
increasingly so over time.
We examine these two new-state norms in ­chapter 6, describing their
development through the twentieth century. Data demonstrate that both
norms gained increasing acceptance over time. Decolonization accelerated
after World War II, and an increasing portion of new state entrances into
the international system were completed peacefully with the consent of
colonial powers. In contrast, secessionist movements were not often suc-
cessful, and in particular violent secessionist movements rarely led to new
states. Most relevant for our purposes, these norms paved the way for more
peaceful relations between states. Nonviolent secession and decolonization
limited interstate conflict between host states and those who might sup-
port groups seeking independence. In the postindependence period, the
state independence processes were less frequently militarized and subse-
quent state relationships were friendlier when independence was achieved
by peaceful means.
Our final territorial norm—uti possidetis—requires that the new interna-
tional boundaries should follow preexisting administrative ones. This idea
started with the independence of countries in Latin America in the nine-
teenth century and was formalized most notably in Africa after decoloniza-
tion. This most obviously applies to when new states enter the international
system, but it also can play a role in managing territorial claims challenging
existing boundaries.
Territorial changes do not disappear when these new international norms
are put into place. Thus, the international system needs a way to manage ter-
ritorial change and potential territorial conflicts that result. If there is going
to be a territorial change—peaceful or militarized—there needs to be guide-
lines on how to draw boundaries, either of the new state or changed bound-
aries of existing states. The classic rule of effective control has already been
rejected, and in any case would be a recipe for future war over territory; as
power relationships change, states would be encouraged to revisit the territo-
rial boundaries through military means.
 ( 16 )   The Puzzle of Peace

Our analysis charts the uti possidetis norm from its inception and summa-
rizes the evidence in favor of its use by states (­chapter 7). Empirical analysis
shows that the norm has been the basis for drawing new state boundar-
ies, even on the African continent where borders were drawn by colonial
powers without regard to ethnic, racial, tribal, and other demographics.
Significantly, Africa subsequently experienced less conflict than would be
predicted, evidence that following the norm has reduced hostility between
states on that continent.
As an international norm, uti possidetis often provides a relatively clear
basis for initially drawing new state lines as well as demarcating the rights
of existing states. Uti possidetis serves as a focal point for negotiation when
disagreements do arise, and for third parties, such as international media-
tors and courts, who seek to manage a conflict.
In figure 1.1, uti possidetis has causal arrows going in two directions. The
first is directed toward the international norms of territorial integrity as it
supplements and supports those norms. The second arrow leads toward
the processes that manage peaceful territorial change as it assists those pro-
cesses in finding peaceful outcomes to disagreements that do occur.
Nonviolent territorial change is acceptable within international norms.
This presumes that there is consent of the two parties, permission or acquies-
cence that is not the result of threats or acts of military force. Peaceful seces-
sions are not problematic in international law (though in practice they may
raise many problems). For example, the breakup of Czechoslovakia was rap-
idly accepted by the European community.
Managing the transfer of territory does not eliminate disagreements or dis-
putes over territory. Yet international norms restrict the ability to use military
force to resolve territorial issues, and therefore states and the international
system need ways to manage conflicts peacefully. We believe that there are
two international institutions or practices that are particularly important in
managing territorial conflicts as noted in figure 1.1, these are mediation and
legally binding mechanisms (adjudication-arbitration). Both are forms of
third-party conflict management; mediation is usually more ad hoc, whereas
adjudication-arbitration involves formal processes and legally binding
decisions.
Our analysis demonstrates that the international system has experienced
a concomitant increase in the type and frequency of conflict management
mechanisms that allow territorial conflicts to be resolved peacefully. In doing
so, they pave the way for an improvement in state relations through trade,
common initiatives, and other forms of cooperation. In some cases, these
mechanisms had already been in existence, such as various legal tribunals,
arbitration processes, and international mediation. Nevertheless, normative
change precipitated a dramatic expansion in their usage, especially to deal with
 I n t ro d u c ti o n    ( 17 )

territorial conflict. In other instances, new institutions (e.g., regional organi-

zations) were created and even those with purportedly economic purposes
contained conflict resolution processes. The net effects of the emergence of
norms and mechanisms for conflict resolution were that the international sys-
tem has gradually removed much of the source of its violent conflict, but also
provided the bases on which peaceful relations could develop.
We assess the frequency and success in the use of third-party media-
tion and adjudication-arbitration in ­chapter 8. This includes exploring the
evolution of mediation and the availability of mediators at the system level
and over time. This provides evidence about increasing mediation leading
to more peaceful relationships. Specifically, we look at the use of media-
tion in territorial and related conflicts at different levels of dispute severity.
In addition, analyses consider the effectiveness of mediation in achieving
conflict management success according to short- and medium-term per-
spectives. The end result is that mediation has substantially increased over
time, even among major powers, which are generally thought not to avail
themselves of third-party conflict management. Mediator availability has
also increased over time, and mediation has produced a number of settle-
ments to territorial disagreements. We also focus on the use of adjudica-
tion and arbitration to manage conflicts peacefully. Again, the frequency
of use of such techniques and the very high compliance rates suggest
that states are now better able to manage their conflicts than in previous
historical eras.
In ­chapter 9, we argue that the same conflict management philosophy
and principles that the international system has used to manage territorial
conflicts have been implemented for dealing with maritime territory and
boundaries. These include principles of fixed boundaries with nonrecogni-
tion of militarized boundary changes. This illustrates how territorial integ-
rity norms, conflict management approaches, and institutionalization of
those can facilitate more peaceful state interactions. Historically, maritime
disputes were among the most contentious aspects of interstate interac-
tions, and changes in international law made the governing legal regime
much more complex and open to disagreement. After World War II, there
was a radical reshaping of international norms dealing with maritime terri-
tory and boundaries. The basic logic of land boundaries and territories is
applied to the more complicated set of issues regarding managing the seas.
The new system is one based on fixed boundaries. With well-defined rules
and detailed conflict management mechanisms, the international system
has been able to forestall many disagreements and manage most of those
that do occur through peaceful means.
A summary of the book and its findings is provided in ­chapter 10, where
we return to the original concerns that motivated this study and what patterns
 ( 18 )   The Puzzle of Peace

and conclusions have emerged from our analysis. Finally, we attempt to draw
out policy implications that follow from this study, specifically as they relate
to resolving territorial disputes and strengthening conflict management
institutions.
The impact of our territorial norms and conflict management institutions
at any given point in time might appear weak, but the cumulative dynam-
ics over time can be significant. For example, when states abandon territorial
claims, it usually does not make international news and if so only fleetingly.
Moving to negative or positive peace, slow processes, sometimes over many
years rather than single events, are rarely noticed, except in retrospect.
The analysis of trends in relationships shows both movements away
from hostile relationships and the development of what we call “positive
peace” relationships. We acknowledge that our arguments about chang-
ing international norms and conflict management mechanisms are better
able to account for the former rather than the latter. These processes help
remove territorial disagreements from the conflict agenda and assist states
in resolving their disputes peacefully. They have the effect of moving sets
of states that are rivals to less hostile relationships, what we term “nega-
tive peace.” This is a critical stop on the road to positive peace. By provid-
ing incentives and mechanisms for peaceful resolution of disputes, norms
and conflict management approaches also prevent states from moving into
extended rivalries. States in negative peace are the clear majority of rela-
tionships (see c­ hapter 3). Nevertheless, it takes far more than avoiding seri-
ous disagreements to be in positive peace. Positive peace requires varying
levels of integration, harmonization of policies, close political ties, and the
like. These cannot be explained by reference to territorial norms and con-
flict management mechanisms; they only set the stage for positive peace
but do not create it.
We largely leave explanations for positive peace to future work, even as
we document its existence here. The final chapter, “Afterwords,” explores
some of the missing pieces of a comprehensive account of the rise of inter-
state peace. An account of international peace requires looking at the role
of stable, legitimate, democratic institutions, both domestically and inter-
nationally. Going back to Karl Deutsch (Deutsch et al., 1957)—a key fig-
ure in the history of peace studies—creating security communities means
having strong, stable democracies along with strong, effective international
institutions. It is not surprising that Bruce Russett (a student of Deutsch)
has talked about the absence of war in terms of democracy and interna-
tional governmental organizations (IGOs; Russett and Oneal, 2001).
This research needs to be continued with a focus on peace in addition
to not-war. Democracy needs to be thought of in terms of the quality of
democracy rather than a simple operational measure after a state reaches
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