Chapter 6
Chapter 6
Chapter 6
INTRODUCTION
Before the introduction of the high-yielding varieties of food
grain in the late 1960s the argument for land reform ‘was a simple
one. It was observed that small farms had a higher yield per acre than
large farms,1 so it was argued that a re-redistribution of owned land in
favour of the smaller mere would improve average yields hi
agriculture. Hence and reforms were considered advisable both on
grounds that they would reduce the degree of inequality of rural
incomes, as well as on grounds of efficiency. The efficiency argument
or land reforms in Pakistan gathered momentum in the 1950s when
agricultural stagnation began to fetter the growth of industry.2
Agriculture provided not only food grains for the rising urban
population but also provided most of the foreign exchange with which
industrial machinery and raw materials were imported. Accordingly,
slow agricultural growth generated both a crisis in the balance of
payments as well as food shortages in the urban sector.4 In such a
situation event the technocrats who were merely interested in the
growth of GNP joined the cry of the social reformers for a land
reform. It began to be seen as a necessary instrument for
accelerating
Note: This paper was originally published in the Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, January 1984, Colorado, U.S.A.
agricultural growth and thereby releasing the constraint on
industrial growth.
When the Green Revolution technology became
available in the late 1960s, the ruling classes could breathe a
sigh of relief. The new technology made it possible to
accelerate agricultural growth substantially through an ‘elite-
farmer strategy’ which concentrated the new inputs on large
farms. Now the crucial determinant in yield differences
became not the labour input per acre in which small farms
had been at an advantage, but the application of the seed-
water-fertilizer package over which the large farmers with
their greater financial power had superior access. Thus the
technocrats felt that the Green Revolution had made it
possible to accelerate agricultural, growth without having to
bring about any real change in, the rural power structure.
Today after more than decade and a half of the ‘elite-
farmer strategy,’ the imperative of land reform is re
emerging, albeit in a more complex form than in the pre-
Green revolution period. As the large farms approach the’
ceiling on yield per acre with the available technology,
further growth in agricultural output will increasingly depend
on raising the yield per acre of smaller farms.
The small farm sector whose yield potential remains to be
fully utilized, constitutes a substantial part of the agrarian
economy. According to the Pakistan Census of Agriculture
1972, ‘below 25 acres constitute 88 percent of the total
number of farms, an4 57 percent of total farm area. From
the viewpoint of raising the yield per acre of small farms,
the critical consideration is that 54 percent of the farm area
in the small farm sector (below 25 acres) is tenant operated.
Since tenants lose half f any increase in output to the
landlord, they lack the incentive to invest in raising yields.
Tenants also lack the ability to raise yields in a situation
where, because of their financial and social position, they are
unable to ensure optimum quantity and timing of inputs. The
ability of the tenant to invest in increasing yields is further
eroded by a whole nexus of social and economic dependence
on the landlord which deprives the tenant of much of his
investable surplus.
The objective of raising yields in the small farm sector
is clearly inseparable from removing the institutional cone.
trains to growth arising out of the fact of tenancy. A land
Wireworm program that gives land to the tiller is therefore
Essential first step in providing both the incentive and the
ability to the small farmer to raise yields. The imperative for
land reform today arises not only from the need to accelerate
agricultural growth, but also from the need to pre vent the
developing social crisis associated with the impact of the
Green Revolution on Pakistan’s rural society. I shall argue in
the paper that in a situation where the distribution of
landownership was highly unequal the adoption of the preen
Revolution technology set in motion powerful economic
forces which rapidly enriched the large farmers and brought a
sharp increase in rural poverty, unemployment and he
pressure on big urban centers. I shall discuss the’ following
four contradictions generated by the growth process in
Pakistan’s agriculture during the Green Revolution period:
(1) The rapid mechanization of large farms in an
economy characterized by a ‘labour surplus.
(2) The polarization in the size distribution of farms
accompanied by a growing landlessness of the poor
peasantry. The polarization consisted of an increase in
the percentage shares of large and small farms at the
expense of medium-sized farms (8 to 25 acres).
(3) The growth of capitalist farming together with a
growing n: social and economic dependence of the
poor peasantry on large landowners.
(4) An absolute deterioration m the economic condition
of the poor peasants alongside the growing affluence
of the large farmers.
The Attempts at Land Reform and their Failure
Before embarking on an analysis of the four
contradictions specified above and their link with an unequal
distribution of landownership, the land reforms of 1959 and
1972 will be briefly examined.
The Land Reforms of 1959
The 1959 land reforms fixed the ceiling on the private
ownership of land at 500 acres irrigated and 1,000 acres
un1rr1gated The fundamental feature which rendered this
reform incapable of reducing the power of the big landlords
was that the ceiling on ownership was fixed In terms of
Individual rather than family holdings. This enabled most of
the big landlords to circumvent the ceiling by transferring
their excess land to various real and fictitious family
members. Moreover, a number of additional provisions in the
1959 land reform allowed landlords o retain land far in
excess of the ceiling even on an individual basis. For
example, an individual could keep land in excess of the
ceiling so long as his holding was an equivalent of 36,000
Produce Index Units (PIUs). A PIU was estimated as a
measure of the gross value of output per acre of land by type
of soil and was therefore seen as a measure of land
productivity. The flaw in this provision was that the PIUs
were based on repartition revenue settlements. Since the
gross value of output was dependent on the quality of land
and prices, values of PIUs fixed before 1947 would grossly
underestimate land productivity in 1959. M.H. Khan
estimates that even if the PIU values published in 1959
were taken as a correct representative of land productivity,
the allowance of 36,000 PIUs for an individual holding
would leave a substantially larger area than
specified in the ceiling. Another provision which enabled
landlords to retain land above the ceiling s area allowed for
orchards.
Given the fact that In the 1959 land reforms the
ceiling was fixed in terms of individual rather than family
ho1dii and given the existence of additional lacunae in the
provisions, Most big landlords were able to circumvent’ the
ceiling and retain their land without declaring any land In
‘excess of the, ‘Those who actually declared excess and were
super large landlords who even after making use of
exemptions still could not conceal their entire holding. Thus
the average owned area per declarant landlord in Pakistan
was as’ much as 7,028 acres and was 11,810 acres in the
Punjab province. It is interesting that even out of the land
declared in excess of the ceiling only 85 percent (1.9 million
acres) could be resumed by the government. After the
‘government had resumed whatever excess land It could, the
average owned holding retained by the declarant landlords
was as much as 4 acres in Pakistan and 7,489 acres in Punjab
province 6 Thus the land reforms of 1959 failed to have a
significant on the economy power of the landed elite in
Pakistan The final gesture of benevolence by the government
towards the landlords was to be seen in the fact that of the
land (actually reshuffled under the 1959 land reforms, as
much as 7 percent was uncultivated Most of this area needed
considerable land improvement before it could be cultivated
Yet ‘government paid Ra. 89.2 million to the former owners’
as for surrendering land which. was producing nothing.7
The Land Reforms of 1972
Summary table
*The columns may not add up to exactly 100 in every case due to rounding errors.
Source: 1960 Pakistan Census of Agricultural and 1972 Pakistan Census of Agricultural
labour and capital Investment. The particular form of the
development of capitalism in Pakistan’s agriculture was such
that instead of being accompanied by a growing
independence of the poor peasantry (as in Europe), in
Pakistan’s case capitalism in agriculture was accompanied by
an increased social and economic dependence of the poor
peasantry on the landowners. The reason i this was that
capitalist farming in Pakistan developed in a situation where
the power of the landlords was still intact. Consequently the
emerging market was mediated by the social and political
power of the landlords. The local institutions for the
distribution of agricultural inputs and credit and of sale of
output, are heavily influenced by the big landlords. In order
to acquire the inputs, credit and facilities for transport of
output to the market the poor peasant has to depend on help
from the landlord. In many cases the poor peasant in the
absence of collateral cannot get credit from the official
agencies at all, and has to depend on the landlord for loans In
addition to this he or she often has to purchase the tube well
water from the landlord and use landlord transport for taking
output for sale to the market. Thus as the inputs for
agricultural production become monetized and insofar as the
access to the market is i1a the landlord, the poor peasant’s
dependence has intensified with the development of
capitalism in agriculture.
With the development of capitalist farming, the poor
peasant is subject to a triple squeeze on his real income 18
CONCLUSION
NOTES
1. There was a lively debate on the factors underlying the inverse
relationship between farm size and productivity. One of the
more elegant explanations for this phenomenon was offered by
A,K. Sen who suggested that with traditional technology small
family farms could produce a higher yield per acre than large
farms through a higher labour input per acre. This could happen
be cause Rmall farms using family labour applied labor Input
beyond the point where the marginal product equaled the wage
rate, while large farms using hired labour could not afford to 40
so.
8. Ibid.
10. As late as 1972, 46 percent of the total farm area in Pakistan was
tenant-operated, and of this tenant area, 50 per cent had been
rented out by large landowners (owning 150 acres and above).
My estimates show that as much as 75 percent of area owned by
large landowners in 1972 was rented out to smaller tenants. See.:
A, Hussain, op. cit., chap. 3.
17. This picture emerges when the 1960 Census data is adjusted for
biases inherent in its methodology in order to make it
comparable with the 1972 Census methodology. A. Hussain, op.
cit., chap. 3.