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Human Rights Practices
during Financial Crises

Rana S. Gautam
 Human Rights Practices during Financial Crises

“A probing and sophisticated analysis of the relationship between ever more pre-
carious human rights and ever more common financial crises.”
—Joel Blau, Professor Emeritus of Social Policy, Stony Brook University, USA

“The central questions Gautam studies here—Which segments of society suffer

the most during financial crises and why—are vital and timely. His thoughtful
investigation teaches us a lot about the distributional implications of financial cri-
ses and how political institutions mitigate or magnify those implications.”
—Joel Simmons, Associate Professor, Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, USA
 Rana S. Gautam

Human Rights
Practices during
Financial Crises
Rana S. Gautam
University of North Georgia
Dahlonega, GA, USA

ISBN 978-3-030-03669-0    ISBN 978-3-030-03670-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03670-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018961435

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
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The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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Mom—Sudha, Dad—Suresh, & Sensei—Daisaku Ikeda
 Acknowledgments

This book is the culmination of an intellectual quest that began as a

­graduate student at the Stony Brook University. I have amassed a great
deal of intellectual and practical debts along the way.
My interest in the human rights consequences of financial crises was
kindled in Daniel Levy’s global sociology seminar at Stony Brook. I went
on to write a dissertation on the topic. While this book is significantly dif-
ferent from my dissertation, I owe an enormous debt to my advisors. I am
especially grateful to Joel Simmons and Joel Blau for their continued sup-
port. Their help has been vital in the development of the present book.
I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the 2012 Oxford Poverty &
Human Development Initiative—Human Development and Capability
Association (HDCA) Summer School on Capability and Multidimensional
Poverty, which infused fresh perspective and shaped my views on the
human rights-based normative evaluation of financial crises.
I am thankful to Bruno Badia for his insightful critique. Mai-Lan
Gustafsson, Michael Lewis, Linda Waldron, and Johnny Finn extended
support at different stages of this project. I have also benefited from my
collaboration with Tina Kempin Reuter on an early version of the analysis
that I presented at the 2015 annual conference of the HDCA. The book
is much better because of the thoughtful suggestions from the reviewers.
I have also enjoyed the support of many excellent colleagues at the
University of North Georgia and beyond. John O’Sullivan has been a mag-
nificent friend and guide. Sara Mason, George Danns, Alexander Wisnoski,
Jeffrey Lentz, Diogo Pinheiro, and Nicole Emmelhainz read various chap-
ters and provided useful comments for improvements. Johanna Luthman

vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

and Marko Maunula shared their historical insights into financial crises.
Molly Daniel, Diane Cook, Michallene McDaniel, Tracy Barth, Arun
Sharma, Jason Carney, Douglas Young, Jr., and Jeff Pardue were graciously
supportive. I am also grateful to the Dean of College of Arts & Letters
Christopher Jespersen for course release.
I must also extend my gratitude to Anca Pusca and Katelyn Zingg at
Palgrave. It was a pleasure working with them. Lastly, I owe much to my
family and friends, especially Sangeeta, Mohit, and Harsh.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Idea of Human Rights 6
1.2 A Case for Human Rights 8
1.3 The Puzzle of Human Rights in Recession10
1.4 Plan of the Book16
References17

2 A Theory of Human Rights During Recession23

2.1 The IMF and Its Influence on Human Rights24
2.2 The Political Economy of Reforms29
2.2.1 The Dilemma of Policy Choice29
2.2.2 The Politics of Policy Choice31
2.3 Working Hypotheses33
2.4 Democracy, War, and Other Determinants36
2.5 Conclusion38
References39

3 An Empirical Investigation of Human Rights in Recession47

3.1 The Sample and Data Sources48
3.2 Data and Variables49
3.2.1 The IMF’s Intervention50
3.2.2 Political Determinants50
3.2.3 Economic and Other Factors52

ix
x Contents

3.3 Estimation53
3.4 Regression Results54
3.5 Robustness Checks62
3.6 Conclusion65
References66

4 Conclusion69
4.1 From One Catastrophe to Another72
4.2 The Need for Human Rights75
References76

Appendix79

Index93
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Women’s economic rights during banking crisis and noncrisis
periods11
Fig. 1.2 Physical integrity rights during banking crisis and noncrisis
periods12
Fig. 3.1 Marginal change in women’s economic rights 56
Fig. 3.2 Marginal change in physical integrity rights 58
Fig. 3.3 Predicted probability for physical integrity rights scores of 1 and
5 as the percentage of opposition seats change 61
Fig. 3.4 Predicated probability for physical integrity scores other than 1
and 5 as the percentage of opposition seats change 63

xi
 List of Tables

Table 3.1 Banking crises and human rights 55

Table 3.2 Banking crises, opposition share of seats, and human rights 60
Table A.1 Brief explanations of variables and data sources 80
Table A.2 Summary statistics 81
Table A.3 Partial proportional odds estimates 83
Table A.4 Sensitivity analyses results for women’s economic rights 85
Table A.5 Sensitivity analysis results for physical integrity rights 87
Table A.6 Instrumental variable estimates 88

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract Financial crises have been a common menace that has plagued
the advanced and the emerging economies alike. These crises have come in
different shapes and forms. In this chapter, Gautam puts forth the argu-
ment for a human rights-based evaluation of systemic banking crises in the
low-income countries. The chapter presents a succinct review of the exist-
ing explanations for why governments renege on their commitments to
women’s economic rights and physical integrity rights during economic
shocks. It provides a synopsis of the theoretical argument developed in this
book that places the political economy of reforms at the center of the expla-
nation. It briefly highlights the important empirical findings of this study.

Keywords Human rights • Financial crisis • Women’s economic rights

• Physical integrity rights • Low-income countries

Far away from the turmoil on the high streets of global finance, Ms. Kry
Chamnan faced a crisis of her own. Not long after the Wall Street melt-
down in 2008, the Cambodian worker first lost a portion of her salary and
eventually her job. As the financial contagion engulfed the global econ-
omy, 30,000 or so mostly female garment workers were laid off in
Cambodia. Like many of the dismissed workers, Ms. Chamnan allegedly
did not receive severance pay or any other benefit. “Since I lost my job
sometimes we eat once or twice a day. I don’t know what to do, we are just

© The Author(s) 2019 1

R. S. Gautam, Human Rights Practices during Financial Crises,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03670-6_1
2 R. S. GAUTAM

camping outside the factory gates, waiting for the company to pay us,” she
told Oxfam International (Emmett 2009, p. 4).
In Africa, Mr. Karamba Dramé allegedly met with a violent death around
the same time (Amnesty International 2009). Soldiers wearing red berets,
according to Amnesty International, hounded and shot dead the Guinean
youth activist on suspicion of organizing public protests against dire socio-
economic conditions brought about by the combination of the global
financial crisis and a food price increase. Across Africa, in Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Somalia, and
Zimbabwe, governments purportedly quashed sometimes-­violent demon-
strations over economic hardship with an iron fist. Numerous people were
allegedly injured, killed, arbitrarily arrested, or sentenced to prison without
a fair trial for asserting their “right to an adequate standard of living” (p. 1).
As the two vignettes indicate, there is more to systemic banking crises,
such as those witnessed in the late 2000s, than the loss of economic out-
put. Financialization—the role financial actors, financial markets, and
financial institutions play in the economy—impacts every aspect of con-
temporary society.1 A financial crisis, the former top human rights official
of the United Nations (2009), Navi Pillay, had reminded a high-level UN
conference, can turn into a crisis of development and human rights.
This book proffers a human rights perspective on systemic banking or
financial crisis vis-à-vis low-income and least developed countries (­ hereafter
low-income countries) between 1981 and 2010. Do women’s economic
rights and basic human rights typically recede amid systemic banking crises
in low-income countries? If so, why does financial turmoil perpetuate a
human rights crisis? Moreover, what forces counteract the downward pres-
sure on government human rights practices during financial shocks? These
are the questions I seek to answer in the book.
The global financial crisis of 2007–08 is the most recent in a long string
of financial calamities befallen since the rise of money and financial m ­ arkets
(Ferguson 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Just as Wall Street’s clever
financial engineering amplified the United States’ subprime mortgage
trouble into the so-called Great Recession, so had Scotsman, John Law,
1
Financialization is a historical trend since the late twentieth century that marks the rise of
financial sector in the working of the economy. Gerald Epstein (2005, p. 3) defines financial-
ization as the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors, and
financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international economies. See Gerald
Davis and Suntae Kim (2015, pp. 203–21) for a review of the causes and consequences of
financialization.
 INTRODUCTION 3

triggered the world’s first stock market crash in the 1700s, known as the
Mississippi Bubble, with his financial wizardry.
Financial crises have come in all shapes and sizes. One form of financial
crisis is a currency or exchange rate crisis, such as the Mexican peso or the
Asian financial crash in the 1990s. A country’s currency comes under spec-
ulative attack, and its value erodes swiftly during a currency crisis. Another
class of financial crisis is a sudden stop of a capital account or a balance of
payment crisis that entails a sharp decline or reversal of capital flow into a
country. The third type of financial crisis is a sovereign debt crisis that
impacted many emerging economies in the 1980s. It occurs when a gov-
ernment fails to service its external or domestic debts, or both. And, finally,
there are banking crises, as witnessed in the late 2000s. In a systemic bank-
ing crisis, a section of the banking sector becomes insolvent because of
significant losses, bank runs, or both. Different forms of financial crises
seldom occur in isolation. A combination of a currency crisis, a banking
crisis, and a sudden stop that eventually turns into a sovereign debt crisis
has been common in developing countries (Claessens and Ayhan Kose
2013). I will, therefore, use the terms systemic banking crisis, financial
crisis, and economic crisis interchangeably throughout the book.
With the removal of barriers to global capital flow since the 1970s,
systemic banking crises have become a recurring problem afflicting every
region of the world. An estimated 147 episodes of systemic banking crises
have occurred between 1970 and 2011 around the world (Laeven and
Valencia 2012). As banks occupy a unique position in the modern econ-
omy, a system-wide failure in the banking sector often imposes a consider-
able economic and social cost on society (Lindgren et al. 1996). Normal
economic activities are extremely difficult to resume when crisis grips the
banking sector (Claessens and Ayhan Kose 2013; Reinhart and Rogoff
2009). Financial crises amplify economic downturn. The decline in con-
sumption, investment, industrial output, and employment is far greater
during a recession following a financial crisis than during a recession with-
out a financial crisis.
Human rights have been largely absent from the common discourse on
financial crisis (Nayyar 2012; Saiz 2009). Mainstream macroeconomics
and finance remain divorced from the normative discourse of human rights
and human development. Nayyar notes that human rights and human
development have been marginal at best, and irrelevant at worst, in typical
macroeconomic analyses. For their part, human rights scholars and activists
seldom recognize macroeconomics and its constraints. In fact, human
4 R. S. GAUTAM

rights and economics speak conflicting languages (Branco 2008). The

­standard economics caters to wants, tolerates exclusion and inequality, and
aims to maximize an individual’s utility. In contrast, human rights involve
entitlements, emphasize inclusion and equality, and attempt to promote
collective social, economic, and cultural rights. Mainstream economics pits
human rights against economic efficiency. Moreover, human rights laws are
perceived as incompatible with the practice and policies of development
(McInerney-Lankford 2009). Finally, development is oriented toward an
evidence-based practice, while human rights are predicated toward legal
norms and rules and operate from normative precepts.
To be sure, there is a small but diverse and growing body of literature
that has attempted to bridge the chasm between human rights and global
finance. Balakrishnan, Heintz, and Elson (2016), for example, have pro-
posed a framework for a human rights-based evaluation of economic poli-
cies and outcomes. Similarly, Magdalena Carmona (2014) has examined
how human rights doctrine would guide a government’s response to eco-
nomic shock. Others have explored the symbiotic relationship between
human rights and global finance (Kinley 2018), human rights obligations
of global financial institutions (Genugten 2015), and the nexus between
worker’s rights and financial shocks (Lee 1998). Scholars have also made
important empirical contributions. These studies have analyzed the impact
of financial crises on socioeconomic rights (Balakrishnan et al. 2011; Elson
2012; Nolan 2014; Salomon 2015), worker’s rights (Blanton et al. 2015),
and basic human rights (Gutmann et al. 2017).
This study draws much from earlier scholarship, especially that of
Balakrishnan et al. (2016) and Fukuda-Parr, Heintz, and Seguino (2015),
which appeal to Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach
to buttress the case for a human rights-based assessment of financial crises.
It shares the capability approach’s claim that a normative evaluation of
individual wellbeing, public policy, and social arrangements should be
predicated on capabilities, real freedom, or the opportunities people enjoy
to live the life they desire.
My interest, however, is in the political determinants of human rights.
How governments formulate and implement policies, former UN special
rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Carmona (2014),
­suggests, is as important as the actual content of the policies. The human
rights framework necessitates public participation in the conception,
implementation, and evaluation of policies. It requires governments to
allow for the broadest possible dialogue and ensure public engagement in
 INTRODUCTION 5

its response to an economic crisis. Moreover, Drèze and Sen (2002) point
out, political participation has an important influence on values, social
understanding, and social priorities. In the absence of political pressure,
governments are more likely to ignore public demands when policy failure
occurs. Basic human rights, such as political and civil rights and physical
integrity rights, enable political participation. Nussbaum (1997) asserts
that political liberties are crucial for human wellbeing. They are important
not only for fulfillment but also for the formulation of needs.
Furthermore, I focus on political institutions. As Robeyns (2005) indi-
cates in her theoretical survey of the capability approach, the potential to
combine the capability approach with an analysis of institutions remains
underexplored. How people transform different resources (e.g., income)
into functionings or various beings and doings they value crucially depends
on individual (e.g., metabolism), social (e.g., public policies and norms),
and environmental (e.g., climate and geography) conversion factors. Social
structures and institutions influence the capability set or available func-
tionings. As such, economic and political intuitions matter for the pros-
perity of society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). An inclusive political
institution, which spreads power across different sections and achieves
some level of political centralization, is symbiotically related to an inclusive
economic institution that is more conducive for economic growth, a criti-
cal means of development and wellbeing.
Finally, my focus is on the empirical evaluation of women’s economic
rights and physical integrity rights between 1981 and 2010 in 46 low-­
income countries. Economic or natural disasters can lead to extreme suf-
fering in low-income countries occupying the lowest rung on the ladder of
economic development (Sachs 2005). Consider the global financial crisis
of 2007–08. Women and girls in 33 low-income countries, where pre-­
existing infant mortality was high and female schooling was low, were
highly vulnerable to the worldwide financial downturn (Buvinic 2009).
The risk of gender-specific consequences was particularly high in 15 low-­
income countries, mostly in Africa. Nevertheless, financial crises in Africa
and Asia have received relatively less attention than those in the United
States, Europe, and Latin America (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). With a
few exceptions (e.g., Blanton et al. 2015; Gutmann et al. 2017), there is a
dearth of comparative analysis of human rights consequences of banking
crises in emerging economies. Longitudinal research on the fate of women
during a financial crash is especially lacking (Pearson and Sweetman 2010).
6 R. S. GAUTAM

In what follows, I first clarify the usage of the term human rights for
this study and explain in more detail the rationale for human rights per-
spective on systemic banking crises. I then contrast the existing political
explanations with the one I develop here. The chapter concludes with an
outline for the rest of the book.

1.1   The Idea of Human Rights

An idea that has languished at the margins of the UN system for much of its
existence, human rights have witnessed a remarkable reversal of fortune,
especially since the end of the Cold War. Human rights have come to repre-
sent, to borrow Samuel Moyn’s (2012, 2018) words, our highest ideals: the
last utopia when others’ ideals fell by the wayside. Over the course of its his-
tory, human rights have donned different appearances and served multiple
purposes. As Moyn puts it, human rights promise everything to everyone
and can end up meaning anything to anyone. I do not intend to offer a com-
prehensive review of the debate about the precise definition of human rights.2
The United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, is
commonly considered the main purveyor of the contemporary conception
of human rights (Donnelly 2013; Nickel 2007). The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, grants recognition to basic
political and civil rights or the so-called first-generation human rights. The
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966,
acknowledges socioeconomic rights or the so-called second-generation
rights. Human rights are considered fundamental to the dignity of the
people. All women and men possess human rights by being born humans.
Our interest here is in governmental practices of human rights, that is, the
action of the state or its agents in the realization of human rights, specifi-
cally women’s economic rights and physical integrity rights.
The precise nature of human rights—whether human rights are legal
entitlements or a last-resort option when other alternatives have been
exhausted, universal or relative, minimal or maximal, and so on—remains a
contested issue. Many scholars (Beitz 2009; Donnelly 2013; Levy and
Sznaider 2010; Nickel 2007; Sen 2004a) converge on the notion of human
rights as norms that help protect people everywhere from political, legal,

2
See Chaps. 1 and 2 (Donnelly 2013, pp. 7–39) for general discussion, Chaps. 1, 2, and 3
(Nickel 2007, pp. 7–52) and (Beitz 2009, pp. 1–47) for philosophical perspectives, and
Chaps. 1 and 2 (Levy and Sznaider 2010, pp. 1–44) and a review of human rights (Somers
and Roberts 2008, pp. 385–425) for sociological perspectives.
 INTRODUCTION 7

and social mistreatments. Sen claims that human rights are principally ethi-
cal demands that can strengthen existing laws or pave the way for new laws.
Human rights emphasize freedom, protection, or benefits. They provide a
reason for evaluation, criticism, and change to domestic and international
institutions. Human rights are of paramount importance, and their viola-
tions are a great affront to justice. These rights are inherent, inalienable,
and equal to all people, irrespective of their membership to a group.
The rise of human rights discourse has come about amid a declining
welfare state and rising inequality. Moyn (2018, p. 216) writes:

The tragedy of human rights is that they have occupied the global imagina-
tion but have so far contributed little of note, merely nipping at the heels of
the neoliberal giant whose path goes unaltered and unresisted. And the criti-
cal reason that human rights have been a powerless companion of market fun-
damentalism is that they simply have nothing to say about material inequality.

Other human rights scholars, such as Emilie Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru

Tsutsui (2005), also lament that human rights are a paradox of empty
promises. The endorsement of human rights doctrine by governments
around the world has not translated into an actual improvement in their
human rights practices.
Legal scholar, Eric Posner (2017, p. 1), also cautions that human rights
“imperialism” should be resisted. Human rights law is too ambiguous,
contested, and politically charged to provide useful guidance. They are
too onerous for developing countries that lack resources or the capacity to
fulfill their human rights obligations (Posner 2014). Human rights regimes
are too rigid, as they do not allow states to make tradeoffs between, say,
political rights and welfare objectives. Others suggest that human rights
do not provide an effective blueprint for public policy, development, or
social justice (Dean 2008; McLachlan 2005; Osiatynski 2007). Critics
argue that human rights obscure the hard politics and class-based strug-
gles that have influenced not only the institutionalization of social policy
but also the redistribution of income and wealth.
In passing, many of the doubts, such as the juridification of politics or
the encroachment of law on the political process, stem from a rigid, legal-
istic interpretation of human rights. To be sure, I do not wish to suggest
in any way that laws are unimportant for human rights. Effective legisla-
tion indeed can go a long way in closing the gap between the rhetoric and
reality of human rights. The point I want to make here is that a strict law-­
centered approach to human rights is not necessary.
8 R. S. GAUTAM

1.2   A Case for Human Rights

A leading development expert, Richard Jolly (2010), calls for a change in
how we approach development and respond to economic exigencies. The
dominant policy framework, which global institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), have admin-
istered for the past 30 years, aims to achieve economic efficiency in the
allocation and utilization of resources on a global scale. It not only has
failed to bring about stability but has also exacerbated the problem of
inequality. Jolly suggests that the new framework should be less dogmatic,
more flexible, and multidisciplinary. Long-term goals of sustainability, sta-
bility, equity, and human rights should guide the new agenda.
Human rights doctrine provides a normative framework for the design,
implementation, and evaluation of institutions, policies, and outcomes
(Balakrishnan et al. 2016; Carmona 2014). It assigns rights and responsi-
bilities to individuals, groups, and states. From the perspective of human
rights, political and social processes shape policies. These processes should
adhere to the human rights standards. In brief, the human rights frame-
work requires states to recognize their obligation toward socioeconomic
rights.3 It warrants governments to utilize the maximum available resources
to realize economic and social rights progressively. States are expected to
abide by the principle of nonretrogression. They should avoid actions, such
as cutbacks in education and health spending, detrimental to the enjoy-
ment of socioeconomic rights. Governments must fulfill minimum core
obligations to satisfy at least a minimum essential level of socioeconomic
rights, such as the right to food and health care. They should ­prioritize the
rights of the poorest and most vulnerable people. Governments should
respect principles of nondiscrimination and equity that prohibit discrimina-
tion in all forms, including policy biases. They should uphold the principles
of participation, transparency, and accountability, enabling the public to
participate in public life. Governments will make available relevant infor-
mation to the public and provide access to remedies in case of violation.
Governments are also required to address specific concerns with regard to
gender, age, and disability. The human rights framework does not provide
a defined set of technocratic solutions. Instead, it emphasizes democratic

3
See Chap. 2 (Balakrishnan et al. 2016, pp. 12–29) and also Chap. 1 (Carmona 2014,
pp. 23–56) for an in-depth discussion about the application of human rights principles to
economic analysis and policy.
 INTRODUCTION 9

participation and accountability. It aims to achieve social justice through

the realization of basic political, civil, and socioeconomic rights.
Human rights, which emphasize human dignity and freedom, are intrin-
sically valuable. Notwithstanding the concerns that a legalistic interpreta-
tion of human rights gives rise to, the importance of human rights for
development, justice, and public policy is well established (Blau 1989;
Nussbaum 2000; Pogge 2007; Sen 1999). Social norms and institutions are
as consequential for policies and societies as market outcomes and econom-
ics are (Basu 2003). Moral norms, such as human rights, mark out issues
involving significant harm or benefits, override other considerations, trigger
sanctions against violators, and help determine preferences among compet-
ing alternatives (Hausman and McPherson 2006). Human rights also serve
as a standard for assessment and reform for domestic and international eco-
nomic and political institutions (Beitz 2009; Levy and Sznaider 2010).
Moreover, the process of financialization has gone hand in hand with
the diminishing role of the states in the regulation of financial markets.
Human rights doctrine can be consequential for economic governance in
the era of financialization (Balakrishnan et al. 2016). It provides a set of
rights and obligations that provide an alternative framework for regulating
finance that has become global in scope.
There are other reasons for a human rights perspective. First, as the
former prime minister Mario Monti declared during Italy’s financial dis-
tress, social fairness and economic growth should balance unavoidable
austerity (“Italy PM Sets out Plan for Crisis” 2011). How policymakers
balance austerity, growth, and social fairness could depend on their overall
objectives, such as fiscal cost containment, accelerated recovery and
growth, and political optimality (Alesina et al. 2006). These goals fre-
quently pose tradeoffs. For example, accelerated recovery and growth can
come with a high fiscal cost. A swift stabilization of the economy may
come with a more unfair distribution of cost. Sen (2004b) suggests that
freedom, not any concept of welfare, is the appropriate space to resolve
efficiency-equity and other conflicts. Human rights reinforce freedom.
There is, then, conflict over the distribution of the burden of crisis
across social groups, which mars the government’s attempt to revive the
economy (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Stiglitz 1999). Social planners do
not necessarily attempt to maximize the wellbeing of the typical member
of society. In fact, politically stronger groups shift the cost of the crisis
onto others, resulting in politically weaker groups shouldering a dispro-
portionate share of the burden. Two Ecuadorian presidents, Leon Febres
10 R. S. GAUTAM

Cordero (1985–88) and his successor Rodrigo Borja (1989–92), had con-
trasting policies in the wake of their country’s economic crisis, which are
instructive. Cordero implemented a set of classical neoliberal policies that
were in line with the interests of his support base, comprised of agricul-
tural exporters and banking groups from the coastal region (Janvry et al.
1994). The election of 1989 saw a policy reversal when Borja was elected
into office on the plank of greater government intervention, job creation,
and social welfare. Philippines’ response to their financial crisis is another
case in point. The then-President, Marcos, created structural adjustment
measures that protected the interest of his cronies within the agriculture
sector (Dohner and Haggard 1994).
Moreover, gender, class, race, geography, and other forms of stratifica-
tions mediate the impact of crisis. Poorer and marginalized populations
tend to bear a much higher share of the burden of economic shock.
Feminist and heterodox critiques (e.g., Fukuda-Parr et al. 2015;
Karamessini and Rubery 2014; Rai and Waylen 2014) draw attention to
the gendered consequences of financial shocks. Women in both emerging
and advanced economies share additional costs of financial crises and sub-
sequent austerity measures. Existing social norms and biases in macroeco-
nomic policy compound the impact of the crisis. For example, male
breadwinner bias relegates women to the status of secondary workers with
fewer rights (Elson 2014).
Finally, basic human rights, such as physical integrity, political, and civil
rights, deserve a closer look. As Sen (1999) has argued, these basic rights
are important for their instrumental and constructive functions. The gov-
ernment’s respect for personal integrity and other basic rights are necessary
for the enjoyment of other rights. Basic rights not only allow people to
voice their opinions and preferences, but also incentivize political ­leaders to
acknowledge and respond to public demands. Basic rights also play a con-
structive role, as they are essential for the formulation of values and priori-
ties. Physical integrity rights can change over the short-run (Poe and Tate
1994). Governments become more coercive and abuse of physical integrity
rights become more common when they perceive a domestic threat.

1.3   The Puzzle of Human Rights in Recession

Figure 1.1 compares women’s economic rights during systemic banking
crisis periods to those in years without a financial crisis in the sampled
countries. It plots the cross-national distribution of the level of women’s
 INTRODUCTION 11

Fig. 1.1 Women’s economic rights during banking crisis and noncrisis periods

economic rights from 1981 to 2010, based on CIRI human rights data
(Cingranelli et al. 2014).
CIRI’s women’s economic rights measure is an additive index that
ranges between 0 and 3. A higher value indicates that women enjoy inter-
nationally recognized rights, such as equal pay for equal work, equality in
hiring and promotion practices, job security, nondiscrimination by
employers, and freedom from sexual harassment at the workplace. A score
of 0 points to the absence of women’s economic rights in law and system-
atic discrimination based on sex.
A value of 1 indicates the presence of some economic rights for women
under law, but a lack of effective enforcement of those laws. A score of 2
implies a low level of discrimination against women in economic matters
and that some women’s economic rights existed under the law and the law
was also enforced. Finally, a score of 3 indicates that the law guaranteed all
or almost all women’s economic rights and those rights were also fully
implemented in practice. Only Bhutan, between 2007 and 2010, and Lao,
in 2008, had a score of 3 for women’s economic rights. As there were only
five data points, I have re-coded these values (women’s economic rights
equal to three) as 2. Therefore, the data in the graph range from a mini-
mum of 0 to a maximum of 2.
The variation in the level of women’s economic during banking crisis
and noncrisis periods is stark in Fig. 1.1. About 20% of the observations in
12 R. S. GAUTAM

Fig. 1.2 Physical integrity rights during banking crisis and noncrisis periods

the sample have a score of 0 during noncrisis periods. The proportion of

observations with a score of 0 is greater than 20% during crisis periods.
There is also a perceptible decrease in the proportion of observations with
a maximum score of 2 during crisis periods relative to noncrisis years.
Figure 1.2 compares CIRI’s physical integrity rights scores in crisis and
noncrisis years. Physical or personal integrity rights entail freedom from
arbitrary physical harm and coercion by governments or their agents, such
as police forces.
CIRI’s physical integrity measure is also an additive index based on
torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance
indicators. It ranges from a minimum score of 0, indicating no respect for
the four aforementioned rights, to a maximum of 8, suggesting full gov-
ernment respect for these four rights. Figure 1.2 presents a more complex
picture. There is no noticeable variation in the proportion of observations
between the lowest and highest scores in banking crisis and nonbanking
crisis periods. The difference between the two periods at the other levels
of physical integrity is less pronounced.
Why should governments, if at all, renege on their commitment to
human rights during systemic banking crises? One approach stresses the
twin factors of the political regime and the financial resources available to
maintain the loyalty of citizens. Gutmann et al. (2017) suggest that politi-
cal leaders in autocratic regimes were more likely to repress human rights
 INTRODUCTION 13

during banking crises. Autocrats should either dole out benefits to secure
the loyalty of their constituents or oppress their political opponents and
citizens to stay in power. When buying loyalty becomes too expensive, the
argument goes, oppression will be the preferred strategy to retain power.
On the one hand, tax revenue falls and debt rises during financial crises.
On the other hand, soaring unemployment and welfare loss breed discon-
tent, which prompts citizens to challenge the political status quo. The
threat of political instability, coupled with significant resource constraints,
arguably increases the chance of repression.
Political regimes indeed are an important determinant of human rights
practices. It is well established that democratic regimes show greater com-
mitment to human rights than autocratic ones. Unlike autocrats, political
leaders in democratic regimes are exposed to electoral cycles and subjected
to checks and balances. Excessive reliance on regime type can be problem-
atic, however. As Remmer (1990) points out, the socioeconomic com-
plexities of policy formation cannot be reduced to simple categories of
democratic or autocratic regimes. A host of factors—the capacity of the
state, economic conditions, ideology of the dominant party, role of tech-
nocrats, relationships between the state and business groups, and so on—
can exert influence on economic and social policies.
As for revenue shortfall and the inability to address socioeconomic
grievances, the relationship between public social expenditures and finan-
cial crises is complex. If the public expenditure of 128 developing c­ ountries
in 2008–09 is any indicator, the average social expenditure increased in
the immediate aftermath of the recent global financial crisis (Ortiz and
Cummins 2015). However, the trend reversed, and social spending
decreased during 2010–12. Financial crises do not impose any particular
outcome on the welfare state or social policy (Haggard and Kaufman
2008; Prasad and Gerecke 2010). These crises have served as a spring-
board to launch new social welfare schemes. Mexico during the 1994 eco-
nomic crisis, Argentina during the 2002 financial crisis, and Peru during
the 1990–2001 economic recession had introduced new social safety pro-
grams (World Bank 2008). Crises have also paved the way for a reduction
in social welfare programs. Often social actions, such as demonstrations,
strikes, and, in some cases, riots during economic shock, prompted offi-
cials to undertake social policy measures to minimize social tensions
(Birdsall and Haggard 2002) and extend social safety benefits to politically
vocal groups (Gupta et al. 2000).
14 R. S. GAUTAM

Another explanation, which dominates the discussion about developing

countries in the throes of financial crises, points to the IMF and its Bretton
Woods twin, the WB. Countries in financial distress generally turn to the
IMF for assistance. As US senator Bernie Sanders once remarked at a
Congressional hearing, the IMF behaves like a “loan shark” and only
adds to the economic and social woes of fledgling countries seeking its
help (Sanger 1998). IMF-imposed austerity and reforms, it is argued,
weaken the state and fuel domestic conflict that negatively impacts human
rights practices. Leaders are more likely to resort to political repression in
the face of a threat when resources are limited and IMF restrictions are in
force (Franklin 1997).
Whether it is Shylock in William Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice or
Dattadin in Munshi Premchand’s Hindi classic Godan, moneylenders have
had to endure quite a bit of notoriety across the ages. Financiers rarely
have been applauded for the risks they take or the services they provide
(Ferguson 2008). The IMF, some contend, has been only a scapegoat.
The IMF has to step into crisis or near-crisis situations. Moreover, govern-
ments do not always abide by the conditions governing an IMF loan. We
will revisit the debate on IMF influence on governments’ human rights
practices in Chap. 2. I would like to point out here that the empirical sup-
port for the argument related to the IMF and WB is mixed. For example,
Abouharb and Cingranelli’s (2009) longitudinal analysis of physical integ-
rity rights reinforces the conclusion of a large number of case studies that
the IMF program worsened overall human rights conditions in developing
countries. Eriksen and de Soysa (2009), however, show that physical
integrity rights improve when an IMF loan is received. Human rights
practices deteriorate when payback exceeds new disbursement. Debt and
budgetary constraints have a greater influence on the repression of dissent
than IMF conditions.
I assert that the political economy of reforms helps explain govern-
ments’ human rights practices during systemic banking crises. The argu-
ments put forth in this book are not a radical departure from earlier
political explanations. I acknowledge and account for the influence of
global forces like the IMF, the domestic political regime, and social unrest
exert on human rights practices. Indeed, the prior studies mentioned ear-
lier have greatly enriched our understanding of how these forces shape
governments’ policies and human rights practices. They, however, ignore
the complexity of policy response in a diverse society where different
groups can have conflicting distributional interests.
 INTRODUCTION 15

Financial crises generate considerable negative externalities. They

adversely impact the wellbeing of the entire society, but welfare loss is
uneven in a heterogeneous society. Common policy reforms to steer the
economy out of crisis entail measures such as fiscal austerity, privatization,
and a safety net. These policy measures vastly differ in their concern for
human rights. They also impose competing and contradictory demands
and may require tradeoffs. For example, macroeconomic stabilization may
necessitate a fiscal consolidation that, in turn, may reduce the fiscal space
for social policies. Moreover, reforms are rolled out in crisis or near-crisis
situations. They can also be socially disruptive.
How then do social planners resolve the conundrum that financial cri-
ses present? A short answer is the political economy. I will propose that
forces of political economy, especially conflicts over the distribution of the
burden of crises, which influence how governments respond to crisis, have
consequences for human rights practices.
Following the seminal works of scholars like Alesina and Drazen (1991),
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), and Stiglitz (1999), I argue that political
leaders do not always attempt to maximize the wellbeing of the average
citizen when economic reforms have major distributional consequences.
Instead, leaders are more likely to act in politically beneficial ways. We see
in Chap. 2 that it is not unusual for the government to delay the policy
reforms necessary for the revival of the economy. The process of reforms
tends to get bogged down in a political stalemate over the distribution of
the burden of economic shock. Stabilization comes about when a ­politically
stronger group manages to transfer the cost of the crisis onto others. A
disproportionately higher share of the burden falls on the poor and mar-
ginalized sections of the society.
Governments, as Sen (1999) posits, tend to prioritize the financial
incentive of the market over the political incentive of democracy in their
effort to steer the economy out of the economic crisis. Concern for mac-
roeconomic stabilization tends to dominate the immediate response to the
crisis. Monetary and fiscal policies are the two most direct instruments of
economic growth. An unstable economy is also Pareto inferior.
Macroeconomic policies, however, pay scant regard to fairness and human
rights (Stiglitz 1999). They are also biased against women (Elson 1995).
Deflationary bias or preference to maintain paid employment and gross
national product (GNP) below their potential interacts and reinforce male
breadwinner bias. Macroeconomic policies also show privatization and
individualization of risks that negatively impact women.
16 R. S. GAUTAM

Furthermore, I will argue that the nature of political institutions and

conditions shape the distribution of power between competing groups in
a society. It will influence the ruling coalition’s ability to impose its will
and transfer the cost of the crisis onto another group. A veto player can
resist the ruling group’s efforts to shift the burden of the financial crisis. I,
therefore, reach my argument’s main hypothesis, namely that opposition
party strength in the national legislature mediates the human rights prac-
tices of governments during financial downturns. However, I expect that
political opposition will boost basic human rights but will not bolster
women’s economic rights within patriarchal societies.

1.4   Plan of the Book

In Chap. 2, I develop this theoretical framework in more detail. In Chap. 3,
I use cross-national secondary data, primarily from Cingranelli et al. (2014)
and Laeven and Valencia (2012), but supplemented by other political and
economic data sources wherever necessary, for a set of 46 low-­income coun-
tries to examine the postulates that emerge from the theory.
First, I test whether women’s economic rights deteriorate in the course
of systemic banking crises in Chap. 3. If it is indeed the case that politically
weak and marginalized groups are made to bear the extra cost of the crises,
then women’s economic rights should erode during the period of financial
shock in the low-income countries where patriarchy has deep roots. The
multivariate analysis lends strong support to the theoretical expectation.
The statistics indicate that the odds of worsening commitment to women’s
economic rights are higher during the period of systemic banking crises than
otherwise. Afterward, I investigate governmental respect for physical integ-
rity rights during financial shock. A technocratic solution, along with con-
cern for the reaction of market forces, drives governments’ efforts to restore
the economy. They arguably ignore the “political incentive of democracy,”
and pay little attention to human rights. The expectation then is that gov-
ernmental respect for physical integrity rights would decline during crisis.
The results suggest that the impact on physical integrity rights is statistically
weak. Next, I assess an important implication that emerges from the role of
veto player or the opposition. A strong opposition could dampen the gov-
ernment’s impulse to ignore the “political incentive of democracy” com-
pletely. It can act as a check on the government and increase the political
cost of reforms. I indeed find that the strength of opposition parties in the
national legislature boosts the government’s respect for physical integrity
 INTRODUCTION 17

rights but not for the commitment to women’s economic rights. Finally, in
Chap. 3, I attempt to control for endogeneity, relax parallel regression
assumption, and alter model specifications to the check sensitivity of the
results. I find the results are robust to alternative specifications.
The book concludes with Chap. 4, which situates the argument for a
human rights perspective in the broader conversation about financial cri-
ses. It contrasts the empirical findings here with prior human rights studies
and points out the primary theoretical contribution of this study. I con-
clude by highlighting the salience of human rights during systemic bank-
ing crises.

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Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
esforzandome lo mejor que pude
la hablé desta manera: Hermosa
pastora, que para hazerme
quedar sin libertad, o para lo que
la fortuna se sabe, tomaste el
habito de aquella que el de amor
a causa tuya ha professado,
bastara el tuyo mismo para
uencerme sin que con mis armas
proprias me vieras rendido. Mas
quién podra huir de lo que la
Fortuna le tiene solicitado?
Dichosa me pudiera llamar si
uuieras hecho de industria lo que
a caso hiziste: porque a mudarte
el habito natural, para solo verme
y dezirme lo que desseauas,
atribuyeralo yo a merecimiento
mio y a grande afeccion tuya, mas
ver que la intencion fue otra
aunque el efecto aya sido el que
tenemos delante, me haze estar
no tan contenta como lo
estuuiera, a ser de la manera que
digo. Y no te espantes, ni te pese
deste tan gran desseo: por que no
ay mayor señal de una persona,
querer todo lo que puede, que
dessear ser querida de aquel a
quien ha entregado toda su
libertad. De lo que tú me as oydo
podras sacar, qual me tiene tu
uista. Plegue a Dios que vses
tambien del poder que sobre mi
as tomado, que pueda yo
sustentar el tenerme por muy
dichosa hasta la fin de nuestros
amores, los quales de mi parte,
no lo ternán en quanto la uida me
durare. La cautelosa Ysmenia me
supo tambien responder a lo que
dixe, y fingir las palabras que para
nuestra conuersacion eran
necessarias, que nadie pudiera
huyr del engaño en que yo cay, si
la fortuna de tan difficultoso
laberinto con el hilo de prudencia
no le sacara. Y assi estuuimos
hasta que amanescio, hablando
en lo que podria imaginar, quien
por estos desuariados casos de
amor ha passado. Dixome que su
nombre era Alanio, su tierra
Gallia, tres millas de nuestra
aldea: quedamos concertados de
uernos muchas uezes. La
mañana se uino, y las dos nos
apartamos con más abraços, y
lagrimas, y sospiros de lo que
aora sabré dezir. Ella se partio de
mi, y boluiendo atras la cabeça
por uerla, y por uer si me miraua,
ui que se yua medio riendo, mas
crey que los ojos me auian
engañado. Fuese con la
compañia que auia traydo, mas
yo bolui con mucha más porque
lleuaua en la imaginacion los ojos
del fingido Alanio, las palabras
con que su vano[1232] amor me
auia manifestado, los abraços que
dél auia recebido, y el crudo mal
de que hasta entonces no tenia
experiencia. Aora aueys de saber,
pastores, que esta falsa y
cautelosa Ysmenia tenia un
primo, que se llamaua Alanio, a
quien ella más que a si queria:
porque en el rostro, y ojos, y todo
lo demas se le parecia, tanto que
si no fueran los dos de genero
differente, no uuiera quien no
juzgara el uno por el otro. Y era
tanto el amor que le tenia que
quando yo a ella en el templo le
pregunté su mismo nombre,
auiendome de dezir nombre de
pastor, el primero que me supo
nombrar fue Alanio: porque no ay
cosa más cierta, que en las cosas
súbitas encontrarse la lengua con
lo que está en el coraçon. El
pastor la queria bien mas no tanto
como ella a él. Pues quando las
pastoras salieron del templo para
boluerse a su aldea, Ysmenia se
halló con Alanio su primo, y él por
usar de la cortesia que a tan
grande amor como el de Ysmenia
era deuida, dexando la compañia
de los mancebos de su aldea,
determinó de acompañarla (como
lo hizo) de que no poco
contentamiento recibio Ysmenia,
y por darsele a él en alguna cosa,
sin mirar lo que hazia, le contó lo
que comigo auia passado,
diziendoselo muy particularmente,
y con grandissima risa de los dos,
que tambien le dixo, como yo
quedaua, pensando que ella
fuesse hombre, muy presa de sus
amores. Alanio quando aquello
oyo, dissimuló lo mejor que él
pudo, diziendo que auia sido
grandissimo donayre. Y
sacandole todo lo que comigo
auia passado que no faltó cosa,
llegaron a su aldea. E de ay a
ocho dias (que para mí fueron
ocho mil años) el traydor de
Alanio (que assi lo puedo llamar
con más razon que él ha tenido
de oluidarme), se uino a mi lugar,
y se puso en parte donde yo
pudiesse uerle, al tiempo que
passaua con otras zagalas a la
fuente que cerca del lugar estaua.
E como yo lo uiese, fue tanto el
contentamiento que recibi, que no
se puede encarescer, pensando
que era el mismo que en habito
de pastora auia hablado en el
templo. E luego yo le hize señas
que se uiniesse hazia la fuente a
donde yo yua y no fue menester
mucho para entendellas. El se
uino, y allí estuuimos, hablando
todo lo que el tiempo nos dio
lugar: y el amor quedó (a lo
menos de mi parte) tan confiado
que aunque el engaño se
descubriera, (como de ay a poco
dias se descubrio) no fuera parte
para apartarme de mi
pensamiento. Alanio tambien creo
que me queria bien, y que desde
aquella hora, quedó preso de mis
amores, pero no lo mostró por la
obra tanto como deuia. Assi que
algunos dias se trataron nuestros
amores con el mayor secreto que
pudimos, pero no fue tan grande,
que la cautelosa Ysmenia no lo
supiesse: y uiendo qne ella tenia
la culpa, no solo en auerme
engañado, mas aun en auer dado
causa a que Alanio
descubriendole lo que passaua,
me amasse a mi, y pusiesse a
ella en oluido, estuuo para perder
el seso, mas consolose con
parezelle, que en sabiendo yo la
uerdad, al punto oluidaria. Y
engañauase en ello, que despues
le quise mucho más, y con muy
mayor obligacion. Pues
determinada Ysmenia de
deshazer el engaño, que por su
mal auiame hecho, me escriuio
esta carta:

CARTA DE YSMENIA PARA

SELUAGIA
Seluagia, si a los que nos quieren
tenemos obligacion de quererlos,
no ay cosa en la uida a quien más
deua que a ti, pero si las que son
causa que seamos oluidadas
deuen ser aborrescidas, a tu
discrecion lo dexo. Querria te
poner alguna culpa, de auer
puesto los ojos en el mi Alanio,
mas ¿qué hare desdichada, que
toda la culpa tengo yo de mi
desuentura? Por mi mal te ui. ¡O
Seluagia! bien pudiera yo escusar
lo que passé contigo, mas en fin
desembolturas demasiadas las
menos uezes succeden bien. Por
reyr una hora con el mi Alanio,
contandole lo que auia passado,
lloraré toda mi uida, si tú no te
dueles d'ella. Suplicote quanto
puedo, que baste este
desengaño, para que Alanio sea
de ti oluidado, y esta pastora
restituyda en lo que pudieres, que
no podras poco, si amor te da
lugar a hazer lo que suplico.
Quando yo esta carta ui, ya
Alanio me auia desengañado de
la burla que Ysmenia me auia
hecho, pero no me auia contado
los amores que entre los dos
auia, de lo qual yo no hize mucho
caso, porque estaua tan confiada
en el amor que mostraua
tenerme, que no creyera jamas,
que pensamientos passados, ni
por venir, podrian ser parte para
que él me dexasse. Y porque
Ysmenia no me tuuiesse por
descomedida, respondi a su carta
desta manera:

CARTA DE SELUAGIA PARA

YSMENIA
No sé, hermosa Ysmenia, si me
quexe de ti, o si te dé gracias, por
auerme puesto en tal
pensamiento, ni creo sabria
determinar quál destas cosas
hazer, hasta que el successo de
mis amores me lo aconseje. Por
vna parte me duele tu mal, por
otra veo que tú saliste al camino a
recebille. Libre estaua Seluagia al
tiempo que en el templo la
engañaste, y aora está subiecta a
la uoluntad de aquel a quien tú
quesiste entregalla. Dizesme que
dexe de querer a Alanio: con lo
que tú en esse caso harias,
puedo responderte. Vna cosa me
duele en estremo, y os uer que
tienes mal de que no puedes
quexarte, el qual da muy mayor
pena a quien lo padesce.
Considero aquellos ojos con que
me uiste, y aquel rostro que
despues de muy importunada me
monstraste, y pesame que cosa
tan parescida al mi Alanio,
padezca tan estraño descontento.
Mira qué remedio este para poder
auello en tu mal. Por la liberalidad
que comigo has usado en darme
la más preciosa joya que tenias,
te beso las manos. Dios quiera
que en algo te pueda seruir. Si
uieres allá el mi Alanio, dile la
razon que tiene de quererme; que
ya él sabe la que tiene de
oluidarte. Y Dios te dé el
contentamiento que desseas, con
que no sea a costa del que yo
recibo en uerme tan bien
empleada.
No pudo Ysmenia acabar de leer
esta carta, porque al medio della,
fueron tantos los sospiros y
lagrimas que por sus ojos
derramaua, que penso perder la
uida llorando. Trabajaua quanto
podia porque Alanio dexasse de
querer, y buscaua para esto
tantos remedios, como él para
apartarse donde pudiesse uerla.
No porque la queria mal, mas por
parecelle que con esto me
pagaua algo de lo mucho que me
deuia. Todos los dias que en este
proposito biuio, no vuo alguno
que yo dexasse de uerle: porque
el camino que de su lugar al mio
auia jamas dexaua de ser por él
passado. Todos trabajos tenia en
poco, si con ellos le parescia que
yo tomaua contento. Ysmenia los
dias que por él preguntaua, y le
dezian que estaua en mi aldea,
no tenia paciencia para suffrillo. E
con todo esto no auia cosa que
más contento le diesse, que
hablalle en él. Pues como la
necessidad sea tan ingeniosa que
uenga a sacar remedios donde
nadie penso hallarlos, la
desamada Ysmenia se auenturó a
tomar uno, qual pluguiera a Dios,
que por el pensamiento no le
passara, y fue fingir que queria
bien a otro pastor llamado
Montano, de quien mucho tiempo
auia sido requerida. Y era el
pastor con quien Alanio peor
estaua: y como lo determinó, assi
lo puso por obra por uer si con
esta subita mudança podria atraer
a Alanio a lo que desseaua,
porque no ay cosa que las
personas tengan por segura,
aunque la tengan en poco, que si
de subito la pierden, no les llegue
al alma el perdella. Pues como
uiesse Montano que su señora
Ysmenia tenia por bien de
corresponder al amor que él tanto
tiempo le auia tenido, ya
oyreys[1233] lo que sintiria. Fue
tanto el gozo que recibio, tantos
los seruicios, que le hizo, tantos
los trabajos en que por causa
suya se puso, que fueron parte
juntamente con las sin razones
que Alanio le auia hecho, para
que saliesse uerdadero, lo que
fingiendo la pastora auia
començado; y puso Ysmenia su
amor en el pastor Montano con
tanta firmeza, que ya no auia
cosa a quien más quisiesse que a
él, ni que menos deseasse uer
que al mi Alanio. Y esto le dio ella
a entender lo mas presto que
pudo, paresciendole, que en ello
se vengaua de su oluido, y de
auer puesto en mí el
pensamiento. Alanio aunque
sintio en estremo el ver a
Ysmenia perdida por pastor con
quien él tan mal estaua, era tanto
el amor que me tenia, que no
daua a entenderlo quanto ello era.
Mas andando algunos dias, y
considerando que él era causa de
que su enemigo fuesse tan
favorescido de Ysmenia, y que la
pastora ya huía de uelle
(muriendose no mucho antes
quando no le ueia) estuuo para
perder el seso por enojo, y
determinó de estorbar esta buena
fortuna de Montano. Para lo qual
començo nueuamente de mirar a
Ysmenia, y de no uenir a uerme
tan publico como solia ni faltar
tantas uezes en su aldea, porque
Ysmenia no lo supiesse. Los
amores entre ella y Montano yuan
muy adelante, y los mios con el
mi Alanio, se quedauan atras todo
lo que podian, no de mi parte,
pues sola la muerte podria
apartarme de mi proposito, mas
de la suya, que jamas pense uer
cosa tan mudable. Porque como
estaua tan encendido en colera
con Montano, la qual no podia ser
executada, sino con amor en la su
Ysmenia, y para esto las uenidas
a mi aldea era gran impedimiento,
y como el estar ausente de mi, le
causasse oluido, y la presencia
de la su Ysmenia grandissimo
amor, el boluio a su pensamiento
primero, y yo quedé burlada del
mio. Mas con todos los seruicios
que a Ysmenia hazia, los recados
que le embiaua, las quexas que
formaua della, jamas la pudo
mouer de su proposito, ni uuo
cosa que fuesse parte para
hazelle perder un punto d'el amor
que a Montano tenia. Pues
estando yo perdida por Alanio,
Alanio por Ysmenia, Ysmenia por
Montano, succedio que a mi
padre se le offresciessen ciertos
negocios sobre las dehesas del
Estremo, con Phileno, padre del
pastor Montano; para lo qual los
dos uinieron muchas uezes a mi
aldea, y en tiempo que Montano,
o por los sobrados fauores que
Ysmenia le hazia (que en algunos
hombres de baxo espiritu causan
fastidio) o porque tambien tenia
celos de las diligencias de Alanio,
andaua ya un poco frio en sus
amores. Finalmente que él me uio
traer mis ouejas a la majada, y en
uiendome començo a quererme,
de manera (segun lo que cada dia
yua moustrando) que ni yo a
Alanio, ni Alanio a Ysmenia, ni
Ysmenia a él, no era possible
tener mayor afection. Ved qué
estraño embuste de amor. Si por
uentura Ysmenia yua al campo,
Alanio tras ella, si Montano yua al
ganado, Ysmenia tras él, si yo
andaua al monte con mis ouejas,
Montano tras mi. Si yo sabia que
Alanio estaua en un bosque
donde solia repastar, allá me yua
tras el. Era la más nueua cosa del
mundo oyr cómo dezia Alanio
sospirando, ¡ay Ysmenia!, y cómo
Ysmenia dezia ¡ay Seluagia!, y
cómo Seluagia dezia ¡ay
Montano! y cómo Montano dezia
¡ay mi Alanio! Succedio que un
dia nos juntamos los quatro en
una floresta, que en medio de los
dos lugares auia, y la causa fue,
que Ysmenia auia ydo a uisitar
unas pastoras amigas suyas, que
cerca de alli morauan; y quando
Alanio lo supo, forçado de su
mudable pensamiento, se fue en
busca della, y la halló junto a un
arroyo, peinando sus dorados
cabellos. Yo siendo auisada por
un pastor, mi uecino, que Alanio
yua a la floresta del ualle (que
assi se llamaua) tomando delante
de mí unas cabras que en un
corral junto a mi casa estauan
encerradas, por no yr sin alguna
occasion, me fuy donde mi
desseo me encaminaua, y le hallé
a él llorando su desuentura, y a la
pastora riendose de sus
escusadas lagrimas, y burlando
de sus ardientes sospiros.
Quando Ysmenia me uio, no poco
se holgo comigo, aunque yo no
con ella; mas antes le puse
delante las razones que tenia
para agrauiarme del engaño
passado; de las quales ella supo
escusarse tan discretamente, que
pensando yo que me deuia la
satisfaction de tantos trabajos, me
dio con sus bien ordenadas
razones a entender, que yo era la
que le estaua obligada, porque si
ella me auia hecho una burla, yo
me auia satisfecho tan bien que
no tan solamente le auia quitado
a Alanio, su primo, a quien ella
auia querido mas que a si, mas
que aun tan aora tambien le traya
al su Montano muy fuera de lo
que solia ser. En esto llegó
Montano, que de una pastora
amiga mia, llamada Solisa, auia
sido auisada que con mis cabras
uenia a la floresta del ualle. E
quando alli los quatro
discordantes amadores nos
hallamos, no se puede dezir lo
que sentíamos, porque cada uno
miraua a quien no queria que le
mirasse. Y preguntaua al mi
Alanio la causa de su oluido; él
pedia misericordía a la cautelosa
Ysmenia, Ysmenia quexauase de
la tibieza de Montano; Montano
de la crueldad de Seluagia. Pues
estando de la manera que oys,
cada uno perdido por quien no le
queria, Alanio al son de su rabel
començo a cantar lo siguiente:
 No más, nympha cruel: ya
estas vengada,
no prueues tu furor en un
rendido:
la culpa a costa mia está
pagada.
Ablanda ya esse pecho
endurescido,
y resuscita un alma sepultada
en la tiniebla escura de tu
oluido;
que no cabe en tu ser, ualor y
suerte,
que un pastor como yo pueda
offenderte.
Si la ouejuela siempre ua
huyendo
de su pastor, colerico y
ayrado,
y con temor acá, y allá
corriendo,
a su pesar se alexa del
ganado;
mas ya que no la siguen,
conosciendo
que es más peligro auerse
assi alexado,
balando buelue al hato
temerosa,
será no recebilla justa cosa.
Leuanta ya essos ojos que
algun dia,
Ysmenia, por mirarme
leuantauas,
la libertad me buelue que era
mia,
y un blando coraçon que me
entregauas.
Mira (Nympha) que entonces
no sentia
aquel senzillo amor que me
mostrauas,
ya triste lo conozco y pienso
en ello,
aunque ha llegado tarde el
conoscello.
¿Cómo que fue possible, di,
enemiga,
que siendo tú muy más que yo
culpada,
con titulo cruel, con nueua
liga,
mudasses fe tan pura y
estremada?
¿Qué hado, Ysmenia, es este
que te obliga
a amar do no es possible ser
amada?
Perdona, mi señora, ya esta
culpa,
pues la occasion que diste me
desculpa.
¿Qué honra ganas, di, de
auer uengado
vn yerro a causa tuya
cometido?
¿qué excesso hize yo, que no
he pagado,
qué tengo por suffrir, que no
he suffrido?
¿Qué animo cruel, qué pecho
ayrado,
qué coraçon de fiera
endurescido,
 tan insuffrible mal no
ablandaria,
sino el de la cruel pastora
mia?
Si como yo he sentido las
razones,
que tienes, o has tenido de
oluidarme:
las penas, los trabajos, las
passiones,
el no querer oyrme, ni aun
mirarme,
llegasses a sentir las
occasiones,
que sin buscallas yo, quissiste
darme:
ni tú ternias que darme más
tormento,
ni aun yo más que pagar mi
atreuimiento.

Ansi acabó mi Alanio el suaue

canto y aun yo quisiera que
entonces se me acabara la uida, y
con mucha razon, porque no
podria llegar a más la desuentura,
que a uer yo delante mis ojos
aquel que más que a mí queria,
tan perdido por otra, y tan
oluidado de mí. Mas como yo en
estas desuenturas no fuese sola,
dissimulé por entonces, y tambien
porque la hermosa Ysmenia,
puestos los ojos en el su
Montano, començaua a cantar lo
siguiente:
 ¡Qvan fuera estoy de pensar
en lágrimas escusadas,
siendo tan aparejadas
las presentes, para dar
muy poco por las passadas!
Que si algun tiempo trataua
de amores de alguna suerte,
no pude en ello offenderte,
porque entonces m'ensayaua,
Montano, para quererte.
Enseñauame a querer,
suffria no ser querida:
sospechaua quan rendida,
Montano, te auia de ser,
y quan mal agradescida.
Ensayéme como digo,
a suffrir el mal de amor:
desengañese el pastor
que compitiere contigo,
porque en balde es su dolor.
Nadie se quexe de mi,
si me quiso, y no es querido;
que yo jamas he podido
querer otro sino a ti,
y aun fuera tiempo perdido.
Y si algun tiempo miré,
miraua, pero no uia;
que yo, pastor, no podia
dar a ninguno mi fe,
pues para ti la tenia.
Vayan sospiros a cuentos,
bueluanse los ojos fuentes,
resusciten accidentes:
que passados pensamientos
no dañarán los presentes.
Vaya el mal por donde va,
y el bien por donde quisiere:
 que yo yre por donde fuere,
pues ni el mal m'espantará,
ni aun la muerte si uiniere.

Vengado me auia Ysmenia del

cruel y desleal Alanio, si en el
amor que yo le tenia cupiera
algun desseo de vengança, mas
no tardó mucho Alanio en castigar
a Ysmenia, poniendo los ojos en
mí, y cantando este antiguo
cantar.

Amor loco ¡ay amor loco!

yo por uos, y uos por otro.
Ser yo loco, es manifiesto:
por uos ¿quien no lo será?
que mayor locura está
en no ser loco por esto;
mas con todo no es honesto
que ande loco,
por quien es loca por otro.
Ya que uiendoos, no me
ueys,
y moris porque no muero,
comed aora a mi que os
quiero
con salsa del que quereys
y con esto me hareys
ser tan loco,
como uos loca por otro.

Qvando acabó de cantar esta

postrera copla, la estraña agonia
en que todos estauamos no pudo
estoruar que muy de gana no nos
riessemos, en uer que Montano
queria que engañasse yo el gusto
de miralle, con salsa de su
competidor Alanio, como si en mi
pensamiento cupiera dejarse
engañar con apariencias de otra
cosa. A essa hora comence yo
con gran confiança a tocar mi
çampoña, cantando la cancion
que oyreys; porque a lo menos en
ella pensaua mostrar (como lo
mostre) quanto mejor me auia yo
auido en los amores, que ninguno
de los que alli estauan.

Pves no puedo descansar

a trueque de ser culpada,
guardeme Dios de oluidar,
más que de ser oluidada.
No solo donde ay oluido
no ay amor ni puede auello,
mas donde ay sospecha dello
no ay querer, sino fingido.
Muy grande mal es amar,
do esperança es escusada;
mas guardeos Dios de oluidar,
que es ayre ser oluidada.
Si yo quiero, ¿por que
quiero,
para dexar de querer?
¿que más honrra puede ser,
que morir del mal que muero?
El biuir para oluidar,
es uida tan afrentada,
que me está mejor amar,
hasta morir de oluidada.
Acabada mi cancion, las lagrimas
de los pastores fueron tantas,
especialmente las de la hermosa
pastora Ysmenia, que por fuerça
me hizieron participar de su
tristeza, cosa que yo pudiera bien
escusar, pues no se me podia
atribuir culpa alguna de mi gran
desuentura (como todos los que
alli estauan, sabian muy bien).
Luego a la ora nos fuymos cada
uno a su lugar, porque no era
cosa que a nuestra honestidad
conuenia estar a horas tan
sospechosas fuera dél. E al otro
dia mi padre sin dezirme la causa,
me sacó de nuestra aldea, y me
ha traydo a la nuestra, en casa de
Albania mi tia, y su hermana, que
uosotros muy bien conoceys,
donde estoy algunos dias ha, sin
saber qué aya sido la causa de mi
destierro. Despues acá entendi,
que Montano se auia casado con
Ysmenia, y que Alanio se
pensaua casar con otra hermana
suya, llamada Syluia. Plega a
Dios que ya que no fue mi
uentura podelle yo gozar, que con
la nueua esposa se goce, como
yo desseo (que no seria poco)
porque el amor que yo le tengo,
no suffre menos, sino dessealle
todo el contento del mundo.
Acabado de dezir esto la hermosa
Seluagia començo a derramar
muchas lagrimas: y los pastores