THE LEGAL VALIDITY & FEASIBILITY OF

IMPLEMENTING ONE NATION, ONE ELECTION IN

INDIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Research paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award
of the degree of
Bachelor of Laws (BA/BCom/BBA/BSc/BSW LLB)

Submitted To:

Submitted By:
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................... 2

II. THE PRELIMINARIES ........................................................................ 3

1. STUDENT DECLARATION....................................................... 4

2. CERTIFICATE BY RESEARCH SUPERVISOR ............................ 5

3. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................ 6

4. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ....................................................... 7

5. LIST OF CASES ........................................................................ 9

III. CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 10

IV. CHAPTER II: CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF ONE NATION ONE

ELECTION IN INDIA ........................................................................ 19

V. CHAPTER III: INTERPLAY OF ONE NATION ONE ELECTION WITH

VOTER RIGHTS IN INDIA ................................................................. 26

VI. CHAPTER IV: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH FOREIGN

JURISDICTIONS (BELGIUM, SWEDEN & SOUTH

AFRICA) ......................................................................................... 30

VII. CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS & SUGGESTIONS ............................... 33

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VIII. BIBLIOGRAPHY .............................................................................. 35

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 STUDENT DECLARATION

Appendix II

DECLARATION

DECLARATION
I hereby declare that the research paper titled “THE LEGAL VALIDITY &
FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING ONE NATION, ONE ELECTION IN
INDIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS” is an original work of mine and no part of the
research paper has been submitted for award of any degree or for any publication.

Signature:

Name of the Candidate:

Date: 10th April 2024

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 CERTIFICATE BY RESEARCH SUPERVISOR

Appendix III

The Supervisor(s) Certificate

Dr. Ishita Sharma

Assistant Professor of Law,
Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that AMAR SINGH has pursued and prepared the research paper for
Elective Course (Seminar Paper)-4 ELECTION LAW titled ‘THE LEGAL VALIDITY
& FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING ONE NATION, ONE ELECTION IN
INDIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS’ in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
award of the degree of Bachelor of Laws (BA/BCom/BBA/BSc/BSW LLB) under my
supervision. To the best of my knowledge, the research paper is the outcome of his/her
own research.

( )
Signature

Prof. Dr. Girish. R

Assistant Professor of Law,
Gujarat National Law University (GNLU)

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It has been a wonderful opportunity for me to prepare this research project. I am

thankful to a number of people aiding me in the preparation of this research paper. I
would like to thank our respected director Prof. (Dr.) S. Shanthakumar for giving me
the opportunity and support required to conduct this research. I am grateful to Dr.
Girish. R, Assistant Professor of Law, for assigning me this topic and helping me at all
times during the completion of this project. I am also thankful to my friends who in one
way or the other have helped me in the preparation of this research project.

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And
@ At
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Bom Bombay
Bros. Brothers
C.I.O Chief Information Officer
Co. Company
CONST. Constitution
CPIO Central Public Information Officer
Cr LJ Criminal Law Journal
Del Delhi
Dr. Doctor
ECI Election Commission of India
ed. Edition
ET. AL. Et Alia
Govt. Government
ILLJ Indian Labour Law Journal
ILR India Law Reports
ITR Income Tax Reports
J and K Jammu and Kashmir
J&K Jammu and Kashmir
L.L.J. Labour Law Journal
Ltd. Limited
M.S.D. Murshidabad Sadar Diwani
M/s Messieurs

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Mad Madras
Mad. Madras
Mys Mysore
No. Number
ONOE/onoe/unified elections One Nation One Election
Ors. Others
Pvt. Private
S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
Secy. Secretary
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
U.S. United States
UOI Union of India
US United States
v. Versus

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 LIST OF CASES

1. Fazlul Quader Chowdhry & Ors. v Muhammad Abdul Haque PLD

1963 SC 486 Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845
2. K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) & Ors. v Union of India & Anr. (2010) 7
SCC 202
3. Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain 1975 Supp SCC 1
4. Golakhnath v State of Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762
5. M Nagaraj v Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 12.
6. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225

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THE LEGAL VALIDITY & FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING ONE NATION,
ONE ELECTION IN INDIA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea of "One Nation One Election" seeks to harmonise the election dates for India's
State Assemblies and Lok Sabha. The Lok Sabha and State Assemblies typically have
general elections every five years. But other states also hold separate elections for their
individual State Assemblies, placing a significant financial burden on the government.

Contrary to popular belief, India has always used the system of one election, even
before the concept of "One Nation, One Election" was introduced. In fact, the Lok
Sabha and state assemblies were elected together in 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967 by the
Indian Election Commission.

This practise was stopped in 1968–1969 primarily as a result of some Legislative

Assemblies being prematurely dissolved for a variety of reasons. Since then, India has
struggled to implement the old voting system, but getting political parties to agree has
proven to be a difficult process.

The Central Government has announced the creation of the committee led by former
Indian President Ramnath Kovind on the issue of "One Nation One Election".1

1
Anupam Shrivastava, ‘Constitutional Validity of one nation one election’ NewsX (India, 1 September
2023) https://www.newsx.com/constitutional-validity-of-one-nation-one-election/
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2. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The research problem entails analysing the Constitutional and Practical Consequences
of "One Nation, One Election" in India to Determine its Legal Validity and Suitability.
This study subject entails a thorough examination of the idea of "One Nation, One
Election" in the context of India, with a focus on its applicability and practicality. It
necessitates a thorough understanding of the Indian Constitution, electoral regulations,
and the logistical difficulties brought on by holding simultaneous national and state
elections in India. Aiming to critically assess whether such a reform is both legally
possible within the current constitutional framework and logistically feasible given
India's diverse political scene.

3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Given that it touches on a crucial component of India's democratic process, research on

"One Nation, One Election" in India is of utmost importance. The idea proposes to
combine all election cycles, including those for the Lok Sabha, state assemblies, and
local bodies, into a single election cycle. Such study can offer insightful information
about the possible advantages and difficulties of this change, as well as its effects on
governance effectiveness, financial savings, political stability, and the general operation
of India's democracy. In addition, it can aid in comprehending the political, logistical,
and constitutional difficulties involved in putting this theory into practise, which will
ultimately help the nation make educated policy decisions.

4. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Sumit Howladar (2014)2 argues that the restoration of the one-nation, one-election
system, is not in the best interests of the country's democratic fabric given the altered
sociopolitical environment. From the standpoint of democratic fructification, this
system is certain to be backwards-looking and ineffective.

2
Sumit Howladar, ‘Simultaneous Elections: A Sure Recipe for Democratic Disaster’ (2014) (9) NBUJ
<https://ir.nbu.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/3725/1/Vol.%2009%20March%202014_12.pdf> accessed 5
September 2023
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Prathik Karthikeyan (2018) notes 3 that the conclusion that can be safely drawn is that
without a better check and balance mechanism there could be unintended consequences.
It is extremely difficult to determine whether or not simultaneous elections would in
fact violate the Basic Structure of the Constitution because participating in elections
and challenging them are established legal rights but the democratic process itself is
part of the Basic Structure.

Dr. Prayas Dansana (2019)4 notes that there is a difference in the total number of votes
counted in parliamentary constituencies compared to assembly constituencies of a
parliamentary constituency after taking into account simultaneous elections in the
States of Arunachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, and Sikkim and calls for more
public scrutiny and debate on this issue.

Arun Kumar Kaushik & Yugank Goyal5 (2019) analyse the rigour of the arguments
made on both sides of the one nation, one election debate and the raw electoral statistics.
Their initial conclusion is that there is no reason to reject the plan, but careful re-
engineering is necessary to make it practical and, more significantly, agreeable.

Adi Suryanto6 et al. (2021) note the huge issues with the current simultaneous election
have led to the preference for asymmetric elections as an alternative to the Indonesian
model. Political decentralisation must coexist with significant decentralisation of
administration because of the vast population, high number of votes, physical
differences across the islands, and strong support for social accountability and public
services. Decentralisation model proposed by Starfish might be the best way to explain
why asymmetric elections are necessary and why local voices matter.

3
Prathik Karthikeyan, ‘Basic Structure Doctrine and the Possibility of Simultaneous Elections’ (2018)
SSRN < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3666391> accessed 5 September 2023
4
Dr. Prayas Dansana, ‘Acrimonious Facts of Simultaneous Elections in Odisha’ (2019) SSRN <
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3426269> accessed 5 September 2023
5
Arun Kumar Kaushik & Yugank Goyal, ‘The Desirability of One Nation One Election in India:
Simultaneous Elections’(2019) 44 (1-2) JSPE < https://pure.jgu.edu.in/id/eprint/556/> accessed 5
September 2023
6
Adi Suryanto et al., ‘Asymmetric Election: Political Decentralization as A Lesson Learnt from
Indonesia 2019 Simultaneous Election Problems’ (2021) 12 (3) JSP <
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356429172_Asymmetric_Election_Political_Decentralization
_As_A_Lesson_Learnt_From_Indonesia_2019_Simultaneous_Election_Problems> accessed 5
September 2023
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Parindu Bhagat7 (2020) observes that the idea of "One Nation, One Election" can
essentially result in power centralization. Its importance must be assessed in light of
how much it has an impact on the Indian federal system. Voters across borders, social
classes, and linguistic divides are supporting a trustworthy and likeable leader.
However, despite the fact that this One Nation-One Election is a novel idea that is
advantageous in many ways, it is indisputable that every original idea has complexity
in terms of implementation. In the early going, there may be one or more constitutional
and legal difficulties.
8 9
Shubhank Khare and Ashutosh Bairagi (2022) note that, to the extent that it is
practical, simultaneous elections will save costs and speed up the adoption of the Model
Code of Conduct (with the exception of bye-elections and the required application of
Article 356). It will be challenging to build the necessary infrastructure, and
international best practises must be taken into account.

10
B. Muthu Kumar (2018) argues that because there is no commitment in the
Constitution to be implemented, there should be no hurry in synchronising and
proposing constitutional reforms to create one nation, one election. However, to lessen
the frequency of elections and their negative effects, the author does favour
simultaneous elections.

Yashwanth A. S.11 (2020) noting that holding simultaneous elections is about more than
just elections, all political parties should be in agreement that it is important to maintain
stable governance. He contends, however, that significant electoral changes need to be
implemented before any political party should consider holding simultaneous elections.

7
Parindu Bhagat, ‘Conceptual Reforms One Nation – One Election’ (2020) 19 (4) IOEEO <
https://www.ilkogretim-online.org/fulltext/218-1620999893.pdf> accessed 5 September 2023
8
Shubhank Khare, 'One Nation One Election in India' (2022) 5 Int'l JL Mgmt & Human 1309
9
Ashutosh Bairagi, 'One Nation One Election in India: A Contemporary Need vis-a-vis a Matter of Mere
Discussion' (2022) 5 Int'l JL Mgmt & Human 1726
10
B. Muthu Kumar, 'One Election, Two Votes: The Feasibility of Reviving the Past Trend' (2018) 5
GNLU L Rev 139
11
Yashwanth A. S., 'Simultaneous Elections in India' (2020) 3 Int'l JL Mgmt & Human 1862
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Vivek Kumar12 (2023) notes that if one nation one election could be implemented with
effective execution of rules and regulations, taking care of the growing demand for
good administrative staff and security as indicated by the standing committee, it might
be a significant transformation to the Indian election system.

Shivani13 (2021) discusses the benefits and difficulties of adopting the one nation, one
election policy in a large country like India while noting the history of unified elections.

Dr. Meenakshi Bansal14 (2019) begins by noting that the concept of holding state
elections alongside federal elections is not new in India since it was used up to 1967,
but that because of the early dissolution of the fourth Lok Sabha, elections were
separated. She then goes on to present a full examination of the benefits and drawbacks
of the idea of one nation, one election.

Dr. Bimal Prasad Singh 15 (2013) notes simultaneous elections would not only ensure
that the federal and state governments carry out their duties smoothly, but will also help
reduce needless election spending.

Sudha. U16 (2020) notes that unified elections have advantages of their own that will
undoubtedly improve Indian democracy and serve its broader and long-term interests.

Nivedha Parthasarathy17 (2023) analyses the benefits and drawbacks as well as the
factors that need to be taken into consideration before implementing the system of

12
Vivek Kumar, ‘One nation one election: Indian perspective’ (2023) 5 (1) IJPSG <
https://doi.org/10.33545/26646021.2023.v5.i1c.217>
13
Shivani, 'One Nation One Election: A New Electoral Reform in India' (2021) 24 Supremo Amicus
[201]
14
Dr. Meenakshi Bansal, ‘The Concept of One Nation One Election: An Analysis from Indian
Perspective’ (2019) 22 (4) <https://thinkindiaquarterly.org/index.php/think-
india/article/view/9479/5229> accessed 5 September 2023
15
Dr. Bimal Prasad Singh, ‘Electoral Reforms in India – Issues and Challenges’ (2013) 2 (3) IJHSSI <
https://www.ijhssi.org/papers/v2(3)/version-2/A230105.pdf> accessed 5 September 2023
16
Sudha. U, ‘Concept Of “One Nation, One Election in Democratic India’ (2020) 10 (40) BIRJ
<https://govindadasacollege.edu.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/concept-of-one-nation.pdf> accessed 5
September 2023
17
Nivedha Parthasarathy, ‘One nation one election – a critical analysis’ (2023) 4 (1) DME Journal of
Law <https://www.dmejournals.com/index.php/DMEJL/article/view/285/133> accessed 5 September
2023
|P a g e 14
unified elections, such as constitutional amendments, the preparations that the Election
Commission must make, etc. in order to determine whether it is currently possible to
implement the "one nation, one election" system and all related steps that need to be
taken to do so.

5. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

To investigate if implementing One Nation One Election is constitutionally permissible.

To examine the political and legal ramifications of implementing One Nation One
Election on the current electoral system, including potential difficulties in
synchronising state and federal elections, the effect on local parties, and the legal
framework needed for synchronising election cycles.

To evaluate the effects of One Nation One Election on voting rights and representation
in order to determine whether holding concurrent elections could weaken the
electorate's ability to hold both state and federal governments responsible as well as
whether it would have an impact on India's political landscape's diversity and pluralism.

To compare and contrast the legal systems and electoral practises of other countries
(Belgium, Sweden, and South Africa) that have implemented synchronised election
cycles. Determine the best practises and lessons learnt that can guide the legality and
execution of One Nation One Election in India.

6. HYPOTHESIS

Null Hypothesis:

Implementation of one nation on election in India is neither legal nor feasible.

Void Hypothesis:

Implementation of one nation on election in India is legal and feasible.

7. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

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1. What are the Indian Constitution's guiding principles and clauses that apply to the
One Nation One Election implementation and how do they interact with one another?

2. In the context of synchronised elections, are there any potential conflicts or

inconsistencies between the ideas of federalism, the separation of powers, and the role
of the Election Commission?

3. How much would constitutional revisions or modifications be necessary to guarantee

One Nation One Election's legal conformity with the Indian Constitution?

4. How would India's move to One Nation One Election affect the country's current
electoral system? What are the legal and political ramifications?

5. How would One Nation One Election impact the rights of voters, including their
capacity to hold both local and national governments accountable for their deeds?

6. What legal frameworks and lessons may be learned from those countries that have
effectively implemented synchronised election cycles?18

8. SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The objective of this study is to evaluate the constitutionality and viability of holding
one nation, one election in India. One nation, one election will be the subject of an
analysis of pertinent constitutional clauses, judicial rulings, and legal views. It will also
examine the political and social ramifications of one nation, one election, as well as the
logistical and budgetary difficulties involved.

The following are some of the study's limitations:

The scope of the study is restricted to one nation, one election's legal and constitutional
issues.

18
Yudhajit Das, ‘One nation, one election? India will enter a 3-country club’ India Today (Delhi, 1
September 2023) https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/one-nation-one-election-india-will-be-among-
countries-that-hold-simultaneous-polls-2429716-2023-09-01
|P a g e 16
The analysis does not take into consideration any potential future changes to the
Constitution or the law because it is based on the existing situation of the law.

The study does not claim to be thorough and is based on a small number of sources.

Despite these drawbacks, the study is nonetheless useful in that it offers a critical
evaluation of the viability and legality of India's one-nation, one-election policy. The
study can help guide future investigations towards one nation, one election and
contribute to the discussion of the advantages of this idea.

9. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A qualitative research methodology will be used for this investigation. Reviewing

pertinent constitutional clauses, court rulings, and one-nation, one-election legal
opinions will be part of this process. The legal and constitutional foundation for one
nation, one election, as well as the political and social ramifications of this proposition,
will be understood using the qualitative methodologies. A number of qualitative
methods, including thematic analysis and discourse analysis, will be used to analyse the
data gathered through qualitative methods. The analysis' findings will be used to make
judgements about the constitutionality and viability of holding one nation, one election
in India.

10. SCHEME OF CHAPTERIZATION

The following is the scheme of chapterization:

Chapter I: Introduction

This chapter will introduce the topic including the historical background, significance,
objectives, hypotheses, research questions, scope of the study, research methodology.

Chapter II: Constitutional validity of one nation one election in India

This chapter will study the implementation of one nation one election in India in the
backdrop of the Constitution and consider whether it valid and/or would require
amendments to the Constitution.

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Chapter III: Interplay of one nation one election with voter rights in India

This chapter will study how the implementation of one nation one election affect voter
rights in India both from a legal and practical viewpoint.

Chapter IV: Comparative Analysis with Foreign Jurisdictions (Belgium, Sweden

& South Africa)

This chapter will study how the situation in India compares with the only 3 countries in
the world which have unified elections i.e. Belgium, Sweden & South Africa.
Additionally, it would consider the case of Indonesia which went from simultaneous
elections to more decentralised format due to various issues faced.

Chapter V: Conclusions & Suggestions

This chapter will conclude the findings of the research study and put forward
suggestions on ways to tackle the research problem.

Bibliography

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 CHAPTER II: CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF ONE NATION ONE ELECTION IN INDIA

1. The background of the situation

This chapter explores whether holding Simultaneous Elections would alter the Basic
Structure Doctrine of the Indian Constitution and whether it infringes on the process of
elections. The term “simultaneous elections‟ is taken to mean elections to the House of
the People and the State Assemblies only.19 In the backdrop of the existing provisions
in the constitution, it is not possible to conduct simultaneous elections. The exercise
will require extensive amendments to articles 83, 174 and 356 of the Indian
20
Constitution. Due to The Indian polity is perennially in elections. Barring a few
exceptional years within a normal 5-year tenure of the Lok Sabha, the country
witnesses, on an average, elections to about 5-7 State Assemblies every year.21As a
result, a serious need to evolve a mechanism to end this frequent election cycles has
been expressed by various stakeholders since quite some time now. The idea of
undertaking simultaneous elections is being seriously considered as a potential solution
to the above problem. Several prominent political leaders have also consistently voiced
their support for the above idea at various forums. Some expert committees have also
examined this issue in the past like the Law Commission of India22 and the Department
related Parliamentary Standing committee on Personnel, Public grievances, Law and
justice in its 79th report23 had also examined the feasibility of holding simultaneous
elections.

The reason simultaneous elections were considered because frequent elections lead to
24
disruption of normal public life and impact the functioning of essential services.
According to a study undertaken by Mr Csaba Nikolenyi, a Montreal-based professor
at Concordia University studying Indian elections, used basic formulae to calculate
voter motivation among others, and drew the conclusion that separate elections in India

19
Law Commission of India, Draft Report on Simultaneous Elections, (Law Com 2018)
20
Constitution of India 1950, art 356
21
NITI Aayog, Analysis of Simultaneous Elections
22
Law Commission of India, Reform of Electoral Laws (Law Com No 170, 1999)
23
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public grievances, Law and justice, Feasibility of
Holding Simultaneous Elections to the House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assemblies
(Report No 79, 2015)
24
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public grievances, Law and justice, Feasibility of
Holding Simultaneous Elections to the House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assemblies
(Report No 79, 2015)
|P a g e 19
were preventing more people from participating in the democratic process. After
comparing voter turnouts in Indian state and national elections held concurrently and
separately with this and other formulae, Nikolenyi drew the hypothesis that voter
turnout in national elections will be higher in those states where state elections are also
conducted at the same time.25

However, there is a larger concern that simultaneous elections the ruling party would
tend to turn autocratic and will dramatically shrink the choice of the electorate. It is
canvassed that it will be an advantage to the national parties over regional or local
parties and national issues might eclipse the local ones. 26 Furthermore, there is no
country in the world as big and diverse as India that has managed to hold and sustain
simultaneous elections to Federal and Provincial Legislatures. South Africa and
27
Sweden still hold simultaneous elections to national and provincial legislatures
however the additional consideration needs to be taken that the electoral system in these
countries is based on party-list proportional representation. we cannot expect such
political stability in a country like India and it will not be possible to provide for all the
situations and eventualities and still protect the spirit of democracy. The very idea of
simultaneous elections undermines the parliamentary system itself. It is not feasible to
conduct simultaneous elections in Westminster model for long term. One of the basic
features of the parliamentary system is that it offers the prerogative of dissolution of
legislature to the executive, which will end if the term of the central and state
legislatures is fixed through amendment of the constitution. The introduction of
Simultaneous elections to the central and the state legislature will make article 356 a
rule rather than an exception. It would be against the wishes of our constitutional
forefathers. B.R. Ambedkar, chairman of Drafting Committee of the Constitution,

25
Aratrika Choudhuri, ‘Response Paper and Recommendation for Simultaneous elections’ (2018) NUJS
Law Review < http://nujslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/NUJS-Law-Review-Working-
Paper_Response-Paper-to-Law-Commission-Draft-Recommendations-on-Simultaneous-Elections.pdf>
accessed 25 September 2023
26
Alok Prasanna Kumar, ‘Simultaneous elections in India’ (First Post, 20 June 2019) <
https://www.firstpost.com/india/simultaneous-elections-in-india-hard-to-see-any-benefits-but-list-of-
drawbacks-continues-to-grow-4332007.html > accessed 25 September 2023
27
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public grievances, Law and justice, Feasibility of
Holding Simultaneous Elections to the House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assemblies
(Report No 79, 2015)
|P a g e 20
discussed in reference to article 356, “Such Articles will never be called into operation
and they would remain a dead letter”.28

The first elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies were held
simultaneously in 1951-52. The practice continued in the next three elections held after
that till 1967 but got disrupted post 1967 due to premature dissolution of some
Legislative Assemblies. Thereafter, due to political instability across various states and
the Lok Sabha, it became impossible to hold simultaneous elections.29The circling back
to simultaneous elections once historical circumstances have proven that holding
simultaneous elections are not feasible would be not accounting for the changes that
were made.

2. Basic structure doctrine in Indian Constitutional Law

The roots of the Basic Structure Doctrine can be traced to In Golakhnath v. State of
Punjab30 the doctrine of implied limitations was brought forth by M.K. Nambiar, a
constitutional lawyer, but was not accepted by the Supreme Court which took it’s
inspiration from the German Jurist Dietrich Conrad that explicitly barred amendments
to the provisions concerning the federal structure and the basic principles laid down in
article 1 to 20, This German connection was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in M
Nagaraj v. Union of India.31

In the Indian context the doctrine of implied limitations or as it is known in India the
Basic Structure Doctrine was discussed extensively in the Kesavananda Bharati32 case
where the constitutionality of the 24th, 25th and the 29th amendments to the
Constitution had a relationship altering effect between the Parliament and the judiciary.
The petitioner in this case contented that there were certain basic freedoms meant to be
permanent and that there were other basic features besides fundamental rights like

28
B. R. Ambedkar (1949), Constituent Assembly Debates (4 August, 1949, vol. IX, no. 5, p. 177)
29
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public grievances, Law and justice, Feasibility of
Holding Simultaneous Elections to the House of People (Lok Sabha) and State Legislative Assemblies
(Report No 79, 2015)
30
Golakhnath v State of Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762
31
M Nagaraj v Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 12.
32
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225
|P a g e 21
sovereignty and integrity of India, right to vote and elect representatives, independence
of judiciary et cetera, and that the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution
under article 368 is limited with implied limitations on it. The respondents claimed an
unlimited power for the amending body and short of total abrogation or repeal of the
Constitution the amending body was omnipotent under article 368, and the Constitution
could be amended by way of variation, addition or repeal so long as no vacuum left in
the governance of the country.33

The special bench consisting of 13 judges gave 7:6 verdict based on shared arguments
of eleven judgments. Validity of the 24th amendment was upheld unanimously,
however the scope of the amending power was something which was not unanimously
agreed upon. S.M. Sikri, Shelat, Grover, Hegde, Mukerjee and Jagan Mohan Reddy JJ,
supported the inherent limitations and held that the amending power could not be used
to emasculate the basic structure of the constitution and the fundamental rights. M.H.
Beg, D.G. Palekar, A.N. Ray, K.K. Mathew and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ, held that the
amending power under article 368 was unrestricted and could be used to amend any
basic feature including the fundamental rights. Khanna J felt that the amending power
should not be used to alter the basic structure of the Constitution but declared that the
fundamental rights including the right to property were not the basic features and
therefore could be amended. The judgment of Khanna J was the decisive one and titled
the majority in favour of declaration of the basic structure of the Constitution by a slim
majority of 7:634 in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain35 also known as the Elections case, two
years later, Khanna, J “clarified” his judgment in the Kesavananda Bharati case. He
now said that he had given clear indications in his judgment that fundamental rights
were part of the basic structure.

3. Analysing in the backdrop of the basic structure doctrine and constitution

Article 83(2) of the Indian Constitution provides that the House of the people shall
continue for five years form the date of its first meeting.36A similar provision under

33
A. Lakshminath, Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments – Limitations and Justiciability
(Deep & Deep Publications 2002)
34
A. Lakshminath, Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments – Limitations and Justiciability
(Deep & Deep Publications 2002)
35
Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain 1975 Supp SCC 1
36
Constitution of India 1950, art 83
|P a g e 22
article 172(1) provides for five-year tenure from the date of its first meeting for the state
governments. For the government to conduct Simultaneous elections, tenure of the State
Legislative assemblies must be either curtailed or extended which is not provided under
the current provisions in normal circumstances. Article 85(2)(b) of the Indian
Constitution grants the power to dissolve the Lok Sabha to the president.37A similar
provision for dissolution of state legislative assemblies by the governor is mentioned
under Article 174 (2)(b). In the backdrop of the existing provisions in the constitution,
it is not possible to conduct simultaneous elections. The exercise will require extensive
amendments to articles 83, 174 and 356 of the Indian Constitution.38

So how do the concepts of elections and basic structure of the constitution interact, The
Supreme Court of Pakistan, in Fazlul Quader Chowdhry & Ors. v. Muhammad Abdul
Haque39, while considering a Presidential Order under Article 224 of the Constitution
dealing with elections, observed: “The aspect of the franchise, and of the form of
Government are fundamental features of a Constitution, and to alter them, in order to
placate or secure the support of a few persons, would appear to be equivalent not to
bringing the given Constitution into force, but to bringing into effect an altered or
different Constitution.” In the Indian Context the Supreme Court, in Sajjan Singh v.
State of Rajasthan observed that the Constitution “formulated a solemn and dignified
preamble which appears to be an epitome of the basic features of the Constitution. Can
it not be said that these are indicia of the intention of the Constituent Assembly to give
a permanency to the basic features of the Constitution.40

However, in the same breadth The Supreme Court has held that “it is a well-settled
principle in Indian Law, that the right to vote and contest elections does not have the
status of fundamental rights. Instead, they are legal rights”41 and “the right to vote and
the right to contest election are not fundamental rights. These are the rights germinating
from the Constitution, and are, therefore, constitutional rights, given further shape by
the Representation of People Act, 1951, thereby also making them statutory rights. The
foregoing discussion leads to the further conclusion that given their placement in the

37
Constitution of India 1950, art 85 (b)
38
Constitution of India 1950, art 356
39
Fazlul Quader Chowdhry & Ors. v Muhammad Abdul Haque PLD 1963 SC 486
40
Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC 845
41
K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) & Ors. v Union of India & Anr. (2010) 7 SCC 202
|P a g e 23
Constitutional scheme and their objects and purposes, these rights are not included in
the basic structure‟ of the Constitution”.42

So it becomes extremely difficult to conclude whether or not simultaneous elections

would indeed infringe upon the Basic Structure of the Constitution because voting in
elections and contesting them are settled legal rights but the democratic process itself
is part of the basic structure, the conclusion we can safely reach is that without a better
check and balance mechanism on the electoral process and the ability of the central
government to cement control over the state governments as well as better instruments
available to the general public for making more informed democratic decisions or an
alteration in the first past the poll system such an immensely large upheaval like
changing the entire process of elections and making them simultaneous would have
immediate ramifications and far reaching unforeseeable issues and would be unwise to
have at such a critical juncture.

4. Constitutional amendments that will be required

It43 is known that the commencement of the “One Nation-One Election” is subject to
consensus being given by all the political parties, but some constitutional amendments
are be required to bring simultaneous elections to the forefront. These would involve:

• Amendment to Article 83, which deals with the period of the Parliament Houses

• Amendment to Article 85, which deals with the dissolution of the Lok Sabha by the
President

• Amendment to Article 172, which is related to the period of State legislatures

• Amendment to Article 174, which relates to the dissolution of State assemblies

• Amendment to Article 356 dealing with President’s rule in the State

• The Representation of the People Act Amendment, 1951

42
Law Commission of India, Draft Report on Simultaneous Elections, (Law Com 2018)
43
Parindu Bhagat, ‘Conceptual Reforms One Nation – One Election’ (2020) 19 (4) IOEEO <
https://www.ilkogretim-online.org/fulltext/218-1620999893.pdf> accessed 5 September 2023
|P a g e 24
The first hurdle in adopting simultaneous elections is the extension or curtailment of
the tenure being served by the involved parties in the Assembly. The term of the State
Assemblies and the House of the People is guided by Articles 83(2) and 172(1) of the
Indian Constitution. The Articles state that the elected parties will serve 5 years, “unless
sooner dissolved” by the State Governors and the President. Lok Sabha has witnessed
the introduction of a Private member Bill which suggested amendments to the
Constitution’s Articles 356,83 and 172. Similarly, another Constitution Amendment
Bill was introduced in the Council of States to discuss and understand the feasibility of
simultaneous elections. The bill highlighted the need for amendments to be made to the
Constitution’s Articles 83 and 172.

The changes, as mentioned above, will be pivotal in the synchronization of the elections
across the House of the People or State Legislative Assemblies. Though the
Constitution gives an allowance to curtail the tenure voluntarily, the phrase “unless
sooner dissolved,” but the enhancement of the term can only be brought to play with an
amendment to the Constitution only. In addition to the above, the Constitution doesn’t
have a provision for extending the State Assemblies' term.

Article 356 talks about the President’s rule in the State and is brought into action if the
constitutional machinery fails in a State. Unfortunately, this framework cannot be used
as an instrument to reach synchronization of elections and would require amendment(s)
to Constitution’s Article 172. On similar lines, a new clause can also be inserted into
the Article, enabling the bringing in of the desired extension/curtailment of the State
Legislative Assemblies synchronizing elections.

44
Coming to the “Representation of the People Act, 1951” that concerns the
announcement for polls to the State Legislative Assemblies and the House of the
People, an amendment also required as a one-time measure, if not permanently.

44
Representation of the People Act 1951
|P a g e 25
 CHAPTER III: INTERPLAY OF ONE NATION ONE ELECTION WITH VOTER RIGHTS IN
INDIA

It has been argued45 that the restoration of the one-nation, one-election system, is not
in the best interests of the country's democratic fabric given the altered sociopolitical
environment. From the standpoint of democratic fructification, this system is certain to
be backwards-looking and ineffective. This is because of the various issues which will
undermine the rights of voters in the country such as:

i. The fundamental ethos of the Constitutional provision of elections: The

fundamental ethos of the Constitutional provision of elections in a democracy is the
rule of the people and a proper representation of their wishes and demands. The basic
ethos behind this exercise of elections is the primacy of people’s mandate over any
other technocratic preferences. What this simultaneous election scheme does is to
undermine or rather challenge this very central Constitutional ethos and tries to
subsume it under the spurious argument of economic benefit and administrative
efficiency.
ii. Plurality of Indian Democracy: Post-independence and especially after the
discontinuation of simultaneous elections, the socio-political scenario of the country
has gone fundamental and drastic changes. Reintroducing simultaneous elections in the
present times will hit at the concept of plural democracy which has evolved over-time
and has now entrenched in the political system of the country. With this system in place,
there is a high risk of the dominance of a single political force.
iii. The fairness of the election process: For democracy to be really meaningful and
profound, the implementation aspect is as important as the concept itself. As far as the
logistical aspect of conducting elections, simultaneous elections will increase the risk
of use of corrupt practices as the monitoring capacity of the EC will get severely limited.
This is going to have a profound impact on the democratic credentials of the system of
electing political representatives.
iv. Democratic accountability of the representatives: Reintroduction of simultaneous
elections will further shrink the already paltry democratic space when the electorate

45
Sumit Howladar, ‘Simultaneous Elections: A Sure Recipe for Democratic Disaster’ (2014) (9) NBUJ
<https://ir.nbu.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/3725/1/Vol.%2009%20March%202014_12.pdf> accessed 5
September 2023
|P a g e 26
and the representatives can meet and have to some extent a fair discussion. With
elections taking place in one go, the representatives will not have to face the electorate
at regular intervals. This has the potential of having a negative impact on the sense of
accountability of the representatives.
v. The federal structure of the polity: In a country like India, especially whose
formation has witnessed the amalgamation of diverse socio-cultural groups and
identities’, maintaining the federal structure of the polity is important. The basic idea
of maintaining uniformity and in the process compromising on the tenure of state
assemblies (which represent regional aspirations) goes against the federal structure of
the polity and even crosses the quasi-federal mechanism on which there has been some
agreement.

Further, in a quantitative study conducted in 201946 it has been noted that there is a
difference in the total number of votes counted in parliamentary constituencies
compared to assembly constituencies of a parliamentary constituency after taking into
account simultaneous elections in the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh,
Odisha, and Sikkim and calls for more public scrutiny and debate on this issue. It notes
that considering the arrangement of an election booth, it is highly improbable that a
willing voters vote is not registered, unless a voter after casting his / her vote in the
EVM for Lok Sabha ‘refused to vote’ for the Assembly. In fact, in case a voter after
entering his / her name in the register maintained by 2nd polling officer, refused to vote
in the EVM than the presiding officer of the booth has to make necessary entry in the
said register as well as inform the same to the Returning Officer in the appropriate form.
Omission of registration of such staggering number of votes clearly indicates a flaw in
the existing system. One may argue, such omission is caused due to negligence of the
election officers. It is quite possible also. But, when these omissions are prevalent
across all the constituencies, it indicates some serious flaw in the existing mechanism
of conducting simultaneous election. In 2014 also, simultaneous elections were
conducted in Odisha. If we examine the 2014 report47 of the Chief Electoral Officer,

46
Dr. Prayas Dansana, ‘Acrimonious Facts of Simultaneous Elections in Odisha’ (2019) SSRN <
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3426269> accessed 5 September 2023
47
CEO Orissa, Elections Reports (CEO Orissa, 2014)
http://www.ceoorissa.nic.in/docs/Election/2014/Reports/General%20election%20report%20Final%20-
1.9.2014.pdf
|P a g e 27
Odisha on the simultaneous election in State of Odisha, similar differences between
total votes for Lok Sabha seats and total votes of Assembly seats is also visible. Though
differences of vote in 2014 election is not as big as that of 2019 elections, nonetheless
there are omissions of votes. Unfortunate, in the 2014 reports of Chief Electoral Officer
of Odisha, no explanation of such omissions has been made. Similarly, the Law
Commission of India48, in its draft report on ‘Simultaneous Election’, too has not
discussed this aspect of election in Odisha.
It is very difficult to fathom that such a large number of electioneering officers cannot
be negligent at the same time. If that would be the case, election commission must look
into the matter scrupulously to trace reasons of such wide spread negligence. One
reason might be the mental and physical fatigue of the polling officers those were
deputed in booth. On the date of election, polling officers have to be on their toes for
more than 10 hours. So, possibility of missing few electors vote cannot be ruled out.
But, this cannot be a justifiable excuse for violation of Section 62 of the People
Representation Act, 1951 which speaks about the entitlement of an elector’s right to
vote. On reverse analogy, State is under the liability to ensure this power of the citizens.
Unfortunately, during conduct of simultaneous election in 2019, State has not
discharged its liability in cases where electors’ votes are not registered.

49
In the context of Indonesian model it has been noted the huge issues with the
simultaneous election have led to the preference for asymmetric elections as an
alternative to the Indonesian model. In fact, political researchers and experts in
Indonesia argue that political decentralisation must coexist with significant
decentralisation of administration because of the vast population, high number of votes,
physical differences across the islands, and strong support for social accountability and
public services (all of which are factors common to the Indian context).

48
Law Commission of India, Draft Report on Simultaneous Elections, (Law Com 2018)
49
Adi Suryanto et al., ‘Asymmetric Election: Political Decentralization as A Lesson Learnt from
Indonesia 2019 Simultaneous Election Problems’ (2021) 12 (3) JSP <
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356429172_Asymmetric_Election_Political_Decentralization
_As_A_Lesson_Learnt_From_Indonesia_2019_Simultaneous_Election_Problems> accessed 5
September 2023
|P a g e 28
Other researchers in Indian context have also noted that50 that the idea of "One Nation,
One Election" can essentially result in power centralization. Its importance must be
assessed in light of how much it has an impact on the Indian federal system since its not
clear how voters across borders, social classes, and linguistic divides would support a
trustworthy and likeable leader.

50
Parindu Bhagat, ‘Conceptual Reforms One Nation – One Election’ (2020) 19 (4) IOEEO <
https://www.ilkogretim-online.org/fulltext/218-1620999893.pdf> accessed 5 September 2023
|P a g e 29
CHAPTER IV: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS (BELGIUM,
SWEDEN & SOUTH AFRICA)

India51 seems to be moving towards holding elections simultaneously for the Lok Sabha
and the state assemblies. We have a committee under former President Ram Nath Kovind
to explore the feasibility of ‘one nation, one election’. If India makes that happen, it will
be only the fourth country in the world to hold polls simultaneously. The other three
countries that hold simultaneous elections are Belgium, Sweden and South Africa.

Sweden52

The fact that Sweden holds elections for county and municipal councils concurrently
with general elections (Riksdag elections) every four years is not commonly known.
General elections for the Riksdag, regional or county council assemblies, and municipal
councils are held in Sweden every four years. The polls are usually held in September.
What's most interesting is that all these elections in Sweden take place on the same day.
Sweden has a proportional electoral system, which means that political parties are
assigned a number of seats in the elected assembly based on their share of the vote.

Belgium53

In Belgium, Federal Parliament elections are held every five years, in sync with
European elections, which impact regional elections.

Nepal’s Simultaneous Elections In 201754

51
Yudhajit Das, ‘One nation, one election? India will enter a 3-country club’ India Today (Delhi, 1
September 2023) https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/one-nation-one-election-india-will-be-among-
countries-that-hold-simultaneous-polls-2429716-2023-09-01
52
Dipanjan Chaudhary, ‘Sweden inspires India for simultaneous elections’ Economic Times (Stockholm,
17 April 2018) https://m.economictimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/sweden-inspires- india-for-
simultaneous-elections/articleshow/63792441.cms
53
Diter Stiers, ‘EU Issue Voting in Simultaneous Elections: The Case of Belgium’ (2023) Springer
<https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-29187-6_7> accessed 25 September 2023
54
Anonymous, ‘Elections in Nepal: 2017 House of Representatives and State Assembly Elections’
(2017) IFES <https://www.ifes.org/tools-resources/faqs/elections-nepal-2017-house-representatives-
and-state-assembly-elections> accessed 25 September 2023

|P a g e 30
Closer to home, Nepal has the experience of holding national and state elections
simultaneously once in 2017. On August 21, 2017, the Nepal government ordered the
holding of national and state elections across the country simultaneously. This was to
be Nepal's first election after the country adopted a new Constitution in 2015. But the
Election Commission of Nepal raised concerns about the difficulty of organising such
concurrent elections across the country. The government then went for a two-phase
election with a gap period. As a result, the election in Nepal was divided into two
phases. The first phase took place on November 26, 2017, followed by the second phase
on December 7 that year.

South Africa

Area-wise, Belgium, Nepal and Sweden are smaller countries, and holding
simultaneous polls there isn’t that big a logistical challenge. A better example, though
not exactly proportionate to the Indian scale, therefore, would be South Africa. The
world’s largest democracy, India is seventh biggest in terms of area, whereas South
Africa is the 24th. Provincial and national elections are held simultaneously every five
years in South Africa. The African country has nine provinces. Separate voting papers
are provided to voters to cast ballots for the national and provincial legislatures. South
Africa's electoral system is based on a proportional representation (PR) framework for
choosing members of parliament and provincial legislatures. The national Parliament
has 400 MPs, but the makeup of the nine provincial legislatures varies, ranging from
30 to 90 seats depending on the population of the province.

The execution of these elections is entrusted to the Independent Electoral Commission

(IEC), a body responsible for the overall administration of the electoral process, in order
to maintain its integrity and impartiality. The role of the IEC is very similar to that of
the Election Commission of India (ECI).

South Africa’s electoral process, however, is very different from India’s. Before the
elections, political parties draw up a list of candidates for each of the legislatures they
wish to contest. For the national assembly, parties can submit half their candidates on a
national list and half on provincial lists, according to a South African government
website. When the poll results are announced, the IEC works out how many people
from each party list should take up seats in the legislature.
|P a g e 31
However, South Africa and Sweden use variations of proportional representation in
their elections, while India uses the first-past-the-post system.55

Apart from the debates around the pros and cons, there are multiple logistical challenges
in conducting polls simultaneously for the Lok Sabha and the state assemblies. Though
they might be conducted in multiple phases, simultaneous elections would need
manpower to be deployed around the same time at a stretch. It would also require
greater numbers of electronic voting machines (EVMs) and voter verifiable paper audit
trail (VVPAT) machines. Also, complexities could arise if any state government
collapses or gets dissolved before their scheduled five-year term. This is exactly what
happened earlier.

55
Anonymous, ‘Indian Democracy and Simultaneous Elections’ (2023) EPW 58 (37)
<https://www.epw.in/journal/2023/37/editorials/indian-democracy-and-simultaneous-
elections.html?0=ip_login_no_cache%3Db891b99f353ce6046f8a0ee8e79185c0> accessed 25
September 2023
|P a g e 32
 CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS & SUGGESTIONS

In conclusion, this research revolves around the concept of holding simultaneous

elections in India, considering its potential impact on the Basic Structure Doctrine of
the Indian Constitution, the necessary constitutional amendments, and the implications
on voter rights and the federal structure of the country. The proposal for simultaneous
elections stems from the desire to curb frequent disruptions caused by regular elections,
increase voter participation, and streamline administrative efficiency. However, there
are significant challenges and concerns associated with this idea.

One major concern is the potential infringement on the Basic Structure Doctrine of the
Indian Constitution. The doctrine, established through landmark cases like
Kesavananda Bharati, safeguards certain fundamental principles and rights from being
amended or altered. While the argument for simultaneous elections aims at
administrative efficiency, it must be carefully balanced against the constitutional
framework. Constitutional amendments would be required to implement simultaneous
elections, affecting articles related to the tenure of legislative bodies and dissolution
powers. These changes would need careful consideration and consensus among
political parties.

Moreover, there are concerns regarding the impact on voter rights and democratic
accountability. Simultaneous elections could limit the frequency of interactions
between representatives and constituents, potentially reducing democratic
accountability. Additionally, logistical challenges in conducting simultaneous elections
may lead to irregularities and errors in the voting process, as seen in past elections in
certain states. The federal structure of India's polity is another significant consideration.
Maintaining the diversity and regional aspirations of states is vital, and simultaneous
elections may not align with this principle.

Comparisons with countries like Belgium, Sweden, and South Africa, which hold
simultaneous elections, provide some insights, but the scale and complexity of India's
elections make it a unique case.

In conclusion, while the idea of simultaneous elections has merits in terms of

administrative efficiency, it must be approached with caution to ensure it aligns with

|P a g e 33
the Basic Structure Doctrine, protects voter rights, maintains the federal structure, and
addresses logistical challenges. Further deliberation and consensus among political
stakeholders are necessary before implementing such a substantial change in India's
electoral system.

|P a g e 34
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