Investigation of Cases of Competition Manipulation
Investigation of Cases of Competition Manipulation
Investigation of Cases of Competition Manipulation
OF CASES OF
COMPETITION
MANIPULATION:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE
Cover photo:
@istock / ALFSnaiper
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME
Investigation of Cases
of Competition Manipulation:
A Practical Guide
© 2023, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), Member States or contributory organizations, and neither do they imply any endorsement.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 6
1.1 Why competition manipulation investigations are important 7
1.2 Target audience 7
1.3 Aim of the guide 7
1.4 How to use the guide 8
7. ANNEXES 61
Annex I – Risk involved in competition manipulation investigations 62
Annex II – Examples of types of sports bets 63
Annex III – Investigation log and tips for completing the investigation log 64
Annex VII – Preliminary investigation report template 67
Annex VIII – Investigation report template 68
5
Acknowledgements
The guide has been prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).
UNODC, IOC and INTERPOL wish to acknowledge with profound gratitude those who contributed their expertise,
experience and time at various stages in the development of this guide:
João Paulo Almeida, Director General, National Olympic Committee, Portugal; Dina Antonova, Head, Unit for
International Cooperation, Ministry of Sport, Russian Federation; Stefano Barone, Senior Legal Counsel, Investigatory
Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA); Stephen Bock,
Head of Legal and General Counsel, International Volleyball Federation; María de la Luz Mijangos Borja, Head of the
Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, Mexico; Ennio Bovolenta, Head of Integrity, FIFA; Jack Byrne, Integrity
Analyst, International Betting Integrity Association; Christine Casteels, Advisor, Belgian Federal Police, Belgium;
Steve Cornelius, Professor and Head, Department of Private Law, University of Pretoria, South Africa; Simon Cowell,
Investigator, International Tennis Integrity Agency; Jodie Cox, Legal Case Manager, International Tennis Integrity
Agency; Maria Dimopoulou, Member of the Greek National Platform for Sport Integrity, Hellenic Gaming Commission;
Sergio D’Orsi, Head of Office, European Financial and Economic Crime Centre Analysis Project Corruption, European
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation; Cassandra Matilde Fernandes, Legal and Projects Manager, Global
Lottery Monitoring System; António Folgado, Senior Legal Advisor, Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, Portugal; Jeff
Gough, Director, Sport Integrity, Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Australia; Jonny Gray, Senior Managing
Director – Sport, Ankura; Jonas Grimm, Associate, Hogan Lovells; Tom Harding, Director, Sportradar Intelligence and
Investigation Services; Yann Hafner, Statutory and Regulatory Expert, Union of European Football Associations (UEFA);
Tord Jordet, Attorney at Law, Norwegian Olympic and Paralympic Committee and Confederation of Sports; Danny
Knowles, Associate, Hogan Lovells; Angelina Leder, Partner, Hogan Lovells; Andreas Krannich, Managing Director,
Sportradar Integrity Services; Tom Mace, Director Global Operations, Sportradar Integrity Services; Alex Marshall,
General Manager, Anti-Corruption Unit, International Cricket Council; George Mavrotas, Chairman of the Board of
the Greek National Platform for Sport Integrity and Secretary General of Sport; Jimmy McEntee, Associate, Hogan
Lovells; Joana Gonçalves, Project Manager, National Olympic Committee, Portugal; Sarah Onyango, Associate, Hogan
Lovells; Steve Paine, Betting Integrity, Betting Integrity Lead, Sports Betting Intelligence Unit, Gambling Commission,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Pedro Garrido Pascal, Captain, Economic Crime Group of the
Guardia Civil Criminal Intelligence Unit, Spain; Beatriz Vernet Perna, Major, Economic Crime Group of the Guardia
Civil Criminal Intelligence Unit, Spain; Andy Hines-Randle, Head of Integrity, Badminton World Federation; Crispin
Rapinet, Partner, Hogan Lovells; Guy Reinenbergh, Senior Detective Officer and National Coordinator Sports Fraud,
Belgian Federal Police, Belgium; Guillermo Prieto Redondo, Lieutenant, Economic Crime Group of the Guardia Civil
Criminal Intelligence Unit, Spain; Michael Reed, Senior Integrity Manager, Sportradar Integrity Services; Vincent Rek,
Associate, Hogan Lovells; Pablo Javier Estrada Rodríguez, Anti-Corruption and Transparency Coordinator, Office of
Federal Prosecutor, Mexico; Cintia D. Rosa, Associate, Hogan Lovells; Marta Ruiz, Head of Integrity and Ethics, Judicial
Bodies, FIFA; James Russell, Specialist Investigations Manager, Sportradar Intelligence and Investigation Services; Ben
Rutherford, Senior Director, Legal, International Tennis Integrity Agency; Carlos Schneider Salvadores, Director of
Judicial Bodies, FIFA; Corentin Segalen, Coordinator of the French National Platform against Sports Manipulation and
Chair of the Group of Copenhagen; Costas Solomou, Head of National Sports Program, Cyprus Sports Organization
and National Platform Coordinator, Cyprus; Jason Foley-Train, Independent Sports Betting Integrity Adviser and
Consultant; Jakob Uddeholt, Integrity Officer, Swedish Sports Confederation; Khushaal Ved, Senior Associate, Hogan
Lovells; Vincent Ven, Head of Anti-Match-Fixing, UEFA; Chiel Warners, Information Coordinator, National Platform,
Netherlands, and Vice-Chair of the Group of Copenhagen; Jason Whybrow, Director, Sports Wagering and Competition
Manipulation, Sport Integrity Australia, Australia; Antonio Abdilla Zerafa, Head, Financial Crime Compliance, Malta
Gaming Authority, Malta; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Integrity in Sport and Gaming Program, United States
of America.
The UNODC, IOC and INTERPOL also wish to acknowledge the substantive contributions of Geraldine Noone,
Director, Forensic Investigations and Training Solutions. In addition, they wish to express their appreciation for the
support of Johnny Morgan and Manfred Boemeke, consultant editors, and to recognize UNODC staff members Ronan
O’Laoire and Alexandra Sokolova for ensuring the overall coordination and the substantive development of the guide.
The guide also benefited from the valuable contributions and expertise of the following UNODC, IOC and INTERPOL
staff members: Humaid Alameemi, Evangelos Alexandrakis, Dieter Braekeveld, Camilla Contorni, Abhishek Deshpande,
Giovanni Gallo, Mafaro Kasipo, Claudio Marinelli, Friedrich Martens, Brigitte Strobel-Shaw, Christos Vlassis and
Pâquerette Girard Zappelli.
6 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
1. INTRODUCTION
@istock / matimix
1. INTRODUCTION 7
The implication is that sports organizations cannot deal with this issue on their own and cooperation with law
enforcement agencies and criminal justice authorities can only strengthen the fight against competition manipulation.
Sport organizations only have the power to take disciplinary measures, while criminal justice authorities and law
enforcement agencies have a wider range of measures at their disposal.
Because of the complex and transnational nature of competition manipulation, the investigation of offences can be
challenging for a wide range of stakeholders and jurisdictions. Effective and timely investigations play a crucial role in
prevention strategies. At the same time, the failure to investigate or ineffective investigations can embolden would-be
offenders.
At the national, regional and international levels, there is growing recognition that more needs to be done to tackle
these threats effectively, including the allocation of more resources. This has been highlighted at the international level,
including by the Conference of the States Parties (the main policymaking body of the United Nations Convention
against Corruption), the General Assembly and the Group of 20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, and by the entry into
force on 1 September 2019 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, the only
legally binding international instrument solely dealing with the issue of competition manipulation.
1 Sportradar Integrity Services estimates that around 165 million euros was generated in match-fixing profits in 2021 – Sportradar, “Betting Corruption and Match-Fixing in
2021: A Review by Sportradar Integrity Services” (2022).
2 In the report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) entitled Criminalization approaches to combat
match-fixing and illegal/irregular betting: a global perspective (Lausanne and Vienna, 2013), it is stated that “the large number of substantial loopholes in the offences established in
the legislation of many countries seriously hamper the efforts of law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities to combat match-fixing at the national, and even more so, at the
international level.” (p.14).
3 UNODC, Global Report on Corruption in Sport (Vienna, 2021), available here.
8 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
• UNODC and International Olympic Committee (IOC), Legal Approaches to Tackling the Manipulations of Sports
Competitions 4
• UNODC and IOC, Reporting Mechanisms in Sport: A Practical Guide for Development and Implementation 5
• International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and IOC, Handbook on Protecting Sport from Competition
Manipulation 6
• UNODC and International Centre for Sports Security, Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Investigation of
Match-Fixing 7
These publications provide a thorough review of the context, scale and practice of competition manipulation. They
also provide officials from relevant criminal justice authorities, sports organizations and other relevant bodies with the
necessary practical tools and approaches to help combat the problem.
Understanding of the challenges posed by and solutions related to the investigation of competition manipulation is
constantly evolving. This guide draws on the lessons learned from past competition manipulation cases and uses these
to illustrate and support the guidance provided with relevant examples and case studies.
This guide is structured in accordance with the key investigative strategies and the essential steps for conducting effective
investigations. The guidance provided throughout is based on a combination of open-source research and international
good practice.
4 UNODC and IOC, Legal Approaches to Tackling the Manipulations of Sports Competitions (Vienna, 2021), available here.
5 UNODC and IOC, Reporting Mechanisms in Sport: A Practical Guide for Development and Implementation (Vienna, 2019), available here.
6 INTERPOL and IOC, Handbook on Protecting Sport from Competition Manipulation (Lausanne, 2016), available here.
7 UNODC and International Centre for Sports Security, Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Investigation of Match-Fixing (New York, 2016), available here.
9
2. UNDERSTANDING
COMPETITION
MANIPULATION
@istock/hxdbzxy
10 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
It can also include actions by athletes and other sport competition stakeholders, such as betting on their own sport,
sharing insider information and failing to report other breaches of the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of
the Manipulation of Competitions.
Various actors with a range of motivations can be involved in an act of competition manipulation. Generally, it cannot
occur without the cooperation of those who are active on or around the field of play. They may be athletes, referees,
managers, coaches, technical staff and club or sport association management. They may also include side-line actors,
such as family members and friends, who may be just as eager to participate in an act of competition manipulation or
may be coerced into doing so. Opportunistic individuals may also be involved: those who use their connections and
knowledge in sport (e.g. former athletes) to approach athletes to manipulate a competition. These actors are often not
the source of the manipulation but are merely conduits in the process who can be replaced when their usefulness or
influence is exhausted.
A growing concern is that would-be corruptors are increasingly approaching athletes directly through social-media
platforms to influence them to engage in competition manipulation and betting-related activities on manipulated
matches. Another form of manipulation is when athletes deliberately underperform to avoid specific opponents during
9
qualifying stages of a tournament to improve their chances of advancement. In addition, in some investigated cases,
former athletes were identified as the main organizers of competition manipulation, displaying a remarkable capability
to recruit other athletes and engaging in betting-related activities on manipulated matches.
Organized crime groups are increasingly involved in competition manipulation, both directly and indirectly. This
activity may include acquiring sports organizations for the purpose of using them to control the performance of players
and athletes through coercion and intimidation.
Another concern is the existence of ghost games, fake games and sports events that fall outside of the remit of sport
10
governing bodies and international federations and that are offered on betting markets. The risk of competition
manipulation posed by these games and events has been exacerbated by the imposition of restrictions relating to the
coronavirus disease (COVID-19) in order to fill the void created by the lack of official sports events.
The United Lotteries for Integrity in Sport reported a significant increase in red alerts in 2019 and
2020, as operators looked for options to offer markets in a greater number of less well-known and/
or obscure competitions, given the large-scale suspension of larger competitions as a result of the
coronavirus disease (COVID-19). Some of these competitions may have simply been fabricated for
betting-motivated reasons.
intimidation and violence, fraud, bribery and extortion. It also serves as a means for organized criminal groups to raise
capital to undertake other more lucrative and serious crimes.
When betting related to competition manipulation is carried out on legal betting markets, or in countries that have
strong and effective regulations, it is easier for investigators to obtain data and evidence from transactions. This is
because licenced betting operators are subject to defined standards in terms of transparency and betting integrity.
The manipulation of a sports competition can be broken down into six distinct stages, depending on whether the act of
manipulation is sports related or betting related. Each stage is an area of focus for an investigation and will have various
evidence-gathering opportunities associated with it.
3. Attempt • Direct physical actions Both • Reporting persons • The undue advantage that
aimed at executing • Informants individuals/entities stand to gain
the act of competition • Witnesses • Manipulation method
manipulation (may • Digital (phone/ • Athlete support personnel who can
include a trial attempt electronic device unfairly influence the natural course
or actual attempt that, analysis) of an event prior to or during the
if not stopped, would • Surveillance event
result in successful • Match analysis • Improper decision-making or
execution) application of sporting rules by
competition official(s) prior to or
during the event
4. Placing a bet • Aimed at making Betting • Reporting persons • The timing of the bet placement
money by related • Informants • The bet placement relating to and the
manipulating betting • Witnesses execution of the manipulation may
markets • Digital (phone/ occur in different jurisdictions and
electronic device involve different parties
analysis) • The nature of the bet placement (for
• Closed-circuit- example, if it involves a combination
television footage of suspicious bets)
• Financial records • Bookmakers affected
• Identification • It will require effective
documents communication between the
(passports, manipulators and the bettors to avoid
identification cards, detection
driving licences, • May be an evidence source. However,
utility bills, etc.) many licenced betting operators have
• Surveillance in place data protection requirements
information from that prohibit them from sharing data
betting entities with other private entities (such as
sports governing bodies) and may
only be able to share betting data
through a regulatory authority
5. Execution • Physical, direct actions Both • Reporting persons • Analysis of on-field action as it relates
aimed at ensuring • Informants to the betting transaction
that the competition • Witnesses • Improper decision-making or
manipulation takes • Digital (phone/ application of sporting rules by
place as planned and electronic device competition official(s) prior to or
ensuring that the analysis) during the event
actions are undetected • Match analysis • Athletes and/or officials who can
by the betting industry, • Betting monitoring influence the natural run of play
betting monitoring reports
companies, national • Information from
and international betting entities
regulatory bodies
and criminal justice
authorities
6. Collecting • Collecting the Betting • Reporting persons • How winnings were collected: in
winnings and ensuring related • Informants person or by remittance
that the transactions • Witnesses • Any specific betting or bank account
are undetected by • Digital (phone/
the betting industry, device analysis)
betting monitoring • Closed-circuit
companies, any television footage
national regulatory • Match analysis
body and criminal • Financial records
justice authorities • Betting monitoring
reports
• Information from
betting entities
Note: The stages may differ in terms of chronology and priority depending on whether the manipulation is inside or
external to the sporting event.
2. UNDERSTANDING COMPETITION MANIPULATION 13
Stages 4 and 6 involve interacting with betting entities that are well placed to provide information relating to competition
manipulation under certain conditions. In stage 4, the placing a bet stage, while individuals may place bets anonymously,
there is a possibility that account information would be available to the betting entity that processed the bets. In addition,
a voice recording or closed-circuit-television footage of the suspect(s) placing the bets may exist and be available from
the same betting entity.
If online betting platforms are used, it may be possible for investigators from criminal justice authorities to track down
the unique Internet protocol address that was used. This, in turn, will provide evidence of the specific digital device
used. However, it should be noted that criminals and persons involved in corruption are reportedly stealing identities
or misusing personal details belonging to third parties to place bets in order to further hide their identity. Criminals
may also use virtual private networks (VPNs) to hide their online betting operations. In addition, many betting sites
now accept cryptocurrencies as a form of payment and, when also combined with cryptocurrency mixing services, this
presents new challenges12 to investigations of cases of competition manipulation.
Evidence gathering opportunities may also exist with third-party financial entities such as banks and payment providers,
which may hold relevant information regarding the identity of customers who make deposits into and withdrawals from
the betting accounts that are used to place suspicious bets.
At stage 5, the execution stage, if the act of competition manipulation is motivated by betting, the timing of the bet
placement will be important information to ascertain. This is because there will be a correlation between the time the
bets were placed and the on-field action in the competition associated with the suspicious betting transaction.
At stage 6, the collecting stage, if the course and/or the result of a competition has been successfully manipulated,
the winnings will need to be collected either in person or by remittance to a specific account. This may leave a trace of
relevant information about the details of that transaction with the betting entity.
12 For more information on new challenges, see Asian Racing Federation, “A report on blockchain and cryptocurrencies in illegal betting” (May 2021) and Word Lottery
Association, “Blockchain and cryptocurrencies in lotteries and gaming,” 2021.
14 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
3. KEY
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR INVESTIGATING
COMPETITION
MANIPULATION
There are four key considerations associated with competition manipulation investigations, namely:
• The purpose of the investigation into alleged competition manipulation
• Issues to be considered when launching an investigation into alleged competition manipulation
• Relationships between a criminal justice-led investigation and a sport organization-led investigation
• Ethical principles relevant to competition manipulation investigations
investigations are operating under it (i.e. under the remit of the Olympic Movement)
• Recognize the fundamental rights of all those that may be involved in the investigation (athletes, coaching staff,
administrative staff, etc.), including fundamental human rights as well as those relating to privacy, data protection
and self-incrimination
• Be conducted in a timely manner
• Be objective and thorough
• Be free from any conflict of interest (actual, perceived or potential) and independent of any subsequent hearing or
disciplinary process
All investigators should be aware of the ethical responsibilities associated with their role and observe the highest
standards of integrity and professional conduct when investigating.
A reactive investigation faces challenges that can be different from a proactive investigation, such as the following, 14
including:
• The act or attempt of competition manipulation may already have taken place
• The integrity of the sport and competition has already been compromised as a result of the manipulation having
already taken place
• Winnings on bets placed on manipulated competitions may have already been paid out
• There is a risk to potential witnesses and persons of interest
• Opportunities for identifying and securing digital, forensic and other evidence are reduced
• Over time, the power and influence of criminals increase and corrupt practices become embedded in a group or a
sports organization
When an allegation, report or alert of competition manipulation is received and is deemed sufficient for the purposes of
initiating a criminal or a sports investigation, or both, it is important for the credibility and success of the investigation
that the response is managed in a timely fashion. If not, the deterrent effect, detection options and the potential for an
effective investigation may be significantly affected.
Reduced evidence-
gathering
opportunities
Increased Increased risk of
risk to further offenders evading
competitions justice/sanction
Increased risk of
Increased witness hesitancy,
reputational intimidation,
damage to sports
Risks of collusion or
organizations
delaying an contamination
investigation
facts that support their case in relation to the charges brought by producing evidence. In cases relating to competition
manipulation, the burden to prove a case rests with the prosecuting body. The burden of proof is distinct from the
standard of proof. Once the burden of proof is established, it is necessary to consider the standard according to which
the relevant party must prove the particular facts at issue.
There is no universal approach to the standard of proof applied in cases of competition manipulation brought by sport
governing bodies. The standards applied range from the civil standard of the balance of probabilities and comfortable
satisfaction to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.
In the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions, it is stipulated that the balance
of probabilities standard is used for disciplinary investigations, while the comfortable satisfaction standard is used for
17
certain international federations, such as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). 18
Consistent decisions issued by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) has reinforced the autonomy of sports governing
bodies to select their own applicable standard of proof. CAS case law provides that in cases where the applicable rules
19
do not contain any explicit standard of proof, the comfortable satisfaction should be the standard.
15 This concept mostly relates to common law legal theory and may not be easy to discern in other legal jurisdictions
16 Ibid.
17 IOC, Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the Manipulation of Competitions (Lausanne, 2022), Art 3.3.
18 According to Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) jurisprudence on competition manipulation cases: FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v. UEFA, Case No.
CAS 2009/A/1920, Award, 15 April 2010; Besiktas Jimnastik Kulübü v. UEFA, Case No. CAS 2013/A/3258, Arbitral Award, 23 January 2014.
19 For example, Mohamed Bin Hammam v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), Case No. CAS 2011/A/2625, Award, 19 July 2012, and Daniel Köllerer v.
Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP), Women’s Tennis Association, International Tennis Federation (ITF) & Grand Slam Committee, Case No. CAS 2011/A/2490, Award, 23
March 2012.
3. KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INVESTIGATING COMPETITION MANIPULATION 19
Besiktas Jimnastik Kulübü v. UEFA, Case No. CAS 2013/A/3258, Arbitral Award,
23 January 2014:
The panel held that even in the absence of a specific identification and agreement to the standard
of proof, the standard of proof to be applied in competition manipulation cases is the standard of
comfortable satisfaction, or even of only balance of probabilities, but in no way shall the criminal law
standard of beyond all reasonable doubt be applied.
Source: Court of Arbitration for Sport, Besiktas Jimnastik Kulübü v. UEFA, Case No. CAS 2013/A/3258, Arbitral Award, 23 January
2014, available here.
The standard of comfortable satisfaction is considered higher than the standard of balance of probabilities but lower than
the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.
Regardless of standard of proof, the evidence gathered and presented must be sufficient to prove that the relevant
criminal or disciplinary offence took place
prosecution. 22
However, corruption offences in sport are being increasingly criminalized, standards of conduct of public officials and
participants in sport have been introduced, good governance has been promoted and specialized entities have been
created to deal with various corruption prevention and detection issues. 23
In jurisdictions that have no specific legal provisions relating to the manipulation of sports competitions, laws relating to
the following areas have been used in cases relating to competition manipulation (sometimes various offences have been
applied in the same case – see the case study below): 24
20 For guidance, see UNODC and IOC, Legal Approaches to Tackling the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (Vienna, 2021).
21 Ibid.
22 UNODC, Global Report on Corruption in Sport.
23 Ibid.
24 Malta Football Association, “Attard FC handed 9-point penalty, €1,000 fine”, 31 May 2021.
20 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
• Bribery
• Fraud (including tax fraud)
• Public and private corruption
• Organized crime
• Illegal betting and betting fraud
• Transmission of wagering information
• Money-laundering
• Participation, attempt and conspiracy
• Abuse of authority
• Trading in influence
• Unexplained wealth and revenue
The effective use of legislation as a framework for competition manipulation investigations is essential. The UNODC
and IOC publication entitled Legal Approaches to the Tackling the Manipulation of Sports Competitions provides insights
and guidance into the use of legislation to tackle competition manipulation. In addition, it would be important to
review the application of anti-corruption legislation in the domain of sport. In this regard, readers are also encouraged
to consult section 2 of the UNODC Global Report on Corruption in Sport on applying the United Nations Convention
against Corruption to sport.
are required to adopt and implement the Code, as stipulated in Olympic Charter rules 25 and 43. Furthermore, a 25
combination of rules 25 and 29 of the Charter require national sports federations to have rules in place that are in line
with the Code.
According to the Code, certain obligations are placed on sports organizations and their members to cooperate with any
investigation conducted by a sports organization.
Some sports regulations may confer specific powers on investigators to take certain actions (e.g. to demand access to a
mobile device or financial records). Gaining access to information or devices by consent is always an option. However, it
should also be noted that an investigator may not have the authority to demand information other than what is specified
in the given regulations.
apparently not telling the truth, who may have been instrumental in those convictions, would certainly be
a reason to look at those convictions again and to examine them to see whether they are safe.”d
Mahmood had previously claimed during the Leveson Inquiry (into the practices and ethics of the British
press) that his work had led to 261 successful criminal prosecutions.e Therefore, it was entirely possible that
many of these cases could be open to review. Mahmood’s actions ultimately led the Crown Prosecution
Service to close the ongoing National Crime Agency investigationsf into Sodje and the other footballers
citing the fact there was no longer enough evidence to “provide a realistic prospect of conviction”.g Some
of the affected players, unsurprisingly perhaps, claimed to be victims of entrapment by Mahmood.h
a. Mazher Mahmood, “Ex Prem stars in match fix probe”, The Sun, 8 December 2013.
b. The Telegraph, “Sam Sodje at centre of new match-fixing allegation”, 8 December 2013.
c. BBC News, “DJ Campbell held in football fixing probe”, 9 December 2013.
d. BBC News, “Fake Sheikh entrapped victims, BBC investigation finds”, 12 November 2014; John Sweeney, “Call to probe ‘Fake Sheikh’ stories”,
BBC News, 12 November 2014.
e. Leveson Inquiry, Transcript of morning hearing of 12 December 2011, p. 3, lines 4-5.
f. National Crime Agency, “NCA statement on match fixing investigation”, 14 January 2015.
g. BBC News, “Football ‘spot-fixing’ case dropped”, 15 January 2015.
h. Sky Sports, “Sam Sodje speaks about match-fixing allegations which were dropped”, 12 January 2015.
While it is not possible to control media reports, it is important to have a strategy in place to monitor and manage them.
It is also important to assess the risk relating to investigative steps in terms of potential media attention, as emphasized
in the following case study.
4. INVESTIGATION
OF COMPETITION
MANIPULATION
@istock / Motortion
24 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
The primary focus of an investigation into competition manipulation is to determine if a law has been broken or if a
breach of sports regulation has occurred and to gather evidence to substantiate the allegation. It should be borne in
mind that the following steps do not have to be followed in a linear fashion, and should be constantly evaluated and re-
evaluated over the course of the investigation. Furthermore, it is conceivable that steps 4 to 7 can operate in parallel as
the investigation progresses.
26 For guidance on model criminal law provisions, see UNODC and IOC report entitled “Model Criminal Law Provisions for the Prosecution of Competition
Manipulation” (Lausanne, 2016).
4. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION 25
Prevalence Investigators may choose to prioritize investigations into potential competition manipulation that are more
common or prevalent in specific organizations or competitions. This can help address a pervasive problem
and set an example showing that such actions will not be tolerated. These investigations instigate institutional
changes (e.g. new ethical standards and improved awareness and training), which help reduce the likelihood of
recurrence.
Viability and When making decisions about how to deploy resources, it is important to consider investigations and
likelihood of investigative steps with the greatest likelihood of success. Considerations may include whether the suspect is
success being investigated or prosecuted by other agencies, whether the suspect is in a jurisdiction without an extradition
process or where cooperation would be difficult and how easily evidence could be obtained.a
Availability of If resources needed to complete an investigation far outweigh the severity of the suspected offence, the
resources investigation may not be viable.b
a,b. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Best Practices in Investigating and Prosecuting Corruption Using Financial Flow Tracking Techniques and Financial Intelligence (2015).
Terms of reference may also include a process for expanding and re-examining the scope of the investigation should this
prove necessary.
Usually, a competition manipulation investigation is focused on gathering information and evidence to help establish
if there has been a breach of relevant legislation or a disciplinary code. However, if an investigation is also tasked with
gathering information relating to specific events or suspects only, it should have a framework to avoid straying outside
these boundaries. Many investigations suffer from “mission creep” – a phenomenon whereby new leads or information
take the investigation into unplanned or irrelevant directions to the detriment of its original objectives. In the context
of an investigation conducted by a sports body, the scope of the investigation might include consideration of whether a
statutory reporting duty exists and has not been complied with.
Competition manipulation investigations may require certain investigative techniques that require
specific legal frameworks or are expensive, such as electronic surveillance, wiretaps, reviewing
financial records and forensic accounting.
Competition manipulation investigations take time. They can often last for months or years. Pressure
to deliver a quick conclusion may result in failing to fully develop the necessary evidence to dismantle
a criminal network or to hold all involved targets accountable.
Risk management involves a constant process of monitoring, communicating and consulting with stakeholders to make
informed decisions and to identify alternative actions.
Each area of risk should be examined and rated so that risk-control measures can be identified and put in place. It is
important that the full range of relevant issues is examined to evaluate the likelihood of them occurring, the impact they
will have if they do occur and the scale of this impact. All issues that are known or should have been known need to be
highlighted.
Having a risk-rating system in place is useful for dynamic risk assessment. Law enforcement authorities that conduct
investigations into competition manipulation will have internal risk-management strategies. The mnemonic MANU is
recommended as a risk-rating system for sports bodies conducting investigations into competition manipulation:
28 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
U Unknown risk
Having identified a risk or a potential risk and rated the level of this risk, there are several things to consider:
• What is already controlled?
• Can the risk be avoided?
• If not, what needs to be done to transfer, mitigate or accept the risk?
See annex I for examples of areas where investigations into competition manipulation may be exposed to risk and
recommended control measures.
Source: Carl Roberts, “Port Talbot: Crown Prosecution Service ends match-fixing investigation”, BBC Sport, 15 June 2020.
This logging of an investigation facilitates effective supervision, teamwork and accountability. Anyone with access to
the log can check it to see current progress, reasons for delays and potential risks. Any review process can make use
of the log to evaluate proposed investigative strategies and timelines and to review the progress of an investigation
and the decision-making relevant to it. The log can also aid in compiling the investigation report. In the absence a
centralized electronic case management system, the investigation log template included in annex III is recommended
for competition manipulation investigators.
4.5.1 Evidence
Evidence can take many forms and come from many sources. Each piece tends to prove a relevant fact, and it can be direct
or circumstantial. An investigation should attempt to gather all available evidence and it should be relevant, reliable and
have probative value (the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the
existence of a fact at issue).
The material gathered during an investigation will include information, intelligence, evidence and exhibits. It important
to understand the distinction between them.
a. See also Giulio Palermo and Bryce Williams, “Match-fixing and the evolution of CAS Jurisprudence”, CAS Bulletin, No. 2 (2018), pp. 8-25, where the observations of the CAS
awards per specific type of evidence have been elaborated.
Evidentiary material gathered during an investigation can take many forms. The table below illustrates some categories
of evidence that CAS has considered in determining cases of competition manipulation. However, national criminal
laws may take a different approach and not all the categories of evidence described below will necessarily be admissible
in criminal proceedings.
Source: Madalina Diaconu, Surbhi Kuwelker and André Kuhn, “The court of arbitration for sport jurisprudence on match-fixing: a legal update”, The International Sports Law
Journal, vol. 21 (April 2021).
a,b. Surbhi Kuwelker, Madalina Diaconu and André Kuhn, “Competition manipulation in international sport federations’ regulations: A legal synopsis”, The International Sports
Law Journal, vol. 22 (March 2022).
32 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
Gathering information that may be potential evidence involves effective techniques to ensure that the information is
relevant and usable. Knowing the source and strength of information (and if it is, has or can be established as a fact) will
inspire confidence to make assertions about it. It will also enable sound conclusions to be drawn.
Evidence can be categorized into four types: physical, documentary, electronic and testimony evidence.27 While these
are separate categories, they may be linked and there is often a relationship between them. For example, a witness may
provide testimony about available documentary evidence and physical evidence. Closed-circuit television footage and
the analysis of telephone messages may help to identify witnesses or co-conspirators and link them together at specific
times in specific locations.
Depending on the nature of the allegation, the examination of routine systems and records of an organization (match
footage, match reports, contracts, electronic devices, storage systems, email, voicemail records, expense records,
personnel information, time records, Closed-circuit television footage, diaries and calendars) can be a good starting
point to get a handle on context and sequence of events and routines. The planning process should consider issues such
as access and permission to examine such records. Individuals may hold relevant information on personal devices (or
may have shared it on social media or elsewhere on the Internet).
In a criminal investigation, because of the standard of proof, it is important to gather as much evidence as possible
and the best evidence rule (original of a document is superior evidence) usually applies. However, in all investigative
contexts, the temptation to cast the net wide or to engage in a “trawling expedition” should be avoided because of the
risk of gathering irrelevant information or information that may be private, commercially sensitive or legally privileged.
It is essential that an accurate record of all new information is maintained. Investigators should routinely review evidence
as further information and evidence is discovered to evaluate its relevance and admissibility. The investigation should
remain focused on the investigative objectives and be guided by the terms of reference.
While there is a less stringent standard of proof in sports disciplinary investigations, competition manipulation is a
serious allegation with serious implications for individuals and organizations. Therefore, it is important that all available
evidence is collected and managed in compliance with the procedural rules of the relevant sports federation.
27 Testimony evidence is also known as direct evidence in a court or a hearing. Interviews with witnesses and subjects provide information for an investigation that can be
subsequently submitted as oral evidence to a court or a hearing.
4. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION 33
4.5.2 Exhibits
There are clear procedures and rules of evidence for exhibit handling in the context of criminal investigations. In the
context of sports investigations, CAS stipulates that submissions must be accompanied by all exhibits and specification
of other evidence upon which the relevant party intends to rely. The authenticity of exhibits must be established and
28
any required translations should be completed. If the authenticity of an exhibit is contested, the panel may order the
production of the original document or exhibit for inspection and/or require that an independent investigation be
conducted of the exhibit.
In all investigative contexts, the “chain of custody” (also known as the “chain of evidence”) should be maintained and
recorded. The chain of custody is the documentation or creation of an audit trail of the collection, movement, control,
transfer and disposition of each item of evidence from the time it was obtained until it is presented to the court.
The record should clearly identify who obtained the evidence, where and when the evidence was obtained, who secured
the evidence and who had control or possession of the evidence during the lifetime of the investigation.
29 Court of Arbitration for Sport, FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec and Nikolce Zdraveski v. UEFA, Case No. CAS 2009/A/1920, Award, 15 April 2010.
4. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION 35
The credibility of the initial report of competition manipulation and all subsequent information provided to investigators
influences investigative decision-making and the outcome of investigations. Information is the cornerstone of any
investigation. All information coming into possession of the investigation should be analysed for credibility and risk. The
background of the person providing information should be examined to establish his or her credibility and motivation
for doing so. In addition, the strength of the evidence provided will have an impact on subsequent proceedings, especially
in the context of criminal prosecutions, where the standard of proof is high. Therefore, the content of the information
also needs to be assessed and corroborated.
A high level of competence is required to evaluate and categorize the information gathered so that it adds value to the
investigation. Knowing the source and strength of the information, and potentially establishing it as a fact, provides the
confidence to make assertions about it. It will also enable sound conclusions to be drawn. If untested information is
going to be relied on, this reliance should be reasonable under the circumstances.
Competition manipulation investigations are often highly sensitive in nature and must be treated in the strictest of
confidence because of the many risks associated with such investigations. Risks include:
• Damage to the reputation of a specific competition
• Risk to the reputation and livelihood of individual athletes
• Risk to reporting persons and witnesses
• Risk to the integrity of the investigation if details are revealed inappropriately
• Risk of loss of potential evidence
• Risk to information-sharing agreements and trust between partners
The safety and security of individuals, the integrity of competitions and the integrity of criminal or disciplinary
investigations depend on collecting and sharing information in a systematic and confidential manner.
Despite the large number of reported investigations into corruption in sport, including abuse in sport, a relatively small
number cases of these investigations have led to a trial and have concluded in the securing of a criminal conviction. There
are a variety of reasons for this, including:
• A historic absence of established mechanisms at the national level (such as specialized units, national platforms,
task forces and working groups) to act as information-generating and exchange hubs and points of contact for
international cooperation to support proactive and reactive detection and investigation
• A lack of awareness of how to apply national legislation to deal with competition manipulation, in addition to
outdated legislation or legislation that is not fit for purpose
• Absence of or ineffective systems used to store and share relevant intelligence between key stakeholders (law
enforcement agencies, criminal justice authorities, relevant ministries, betting regulators and sports organizations)
• Challenges relating to accessing multi-jurisdictional support and mutual legal assistance
• Different attitudes and approaches of law enforcement authorities
• Limited resources
• Competition manipulation can be considered a low priority area
• Inconsistent approaches to data protection issues in different jurisdictions or misunderstandings relating to data
protection regulations
• A lack of specialist skills and knowledge required to develop intelligence in this context
Although sports organizations do not have the same coercive powers as law enforcement agencies, they have more
opportunities to gather and share information for disciplinary investigations. Furthermore, they do not necessarily need
to work under the umbrella of national and international governing bodies, and are in a position to identify, gather and
share information relating to their relevant sport regardless of jurisdictional borders, albeit while respecting local data
protection regulations.
36 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
4.5.4 Intelligence
When conducting investigations, sharing information and reporting findings, it is important to understand the
distinction between information and intelligence and to realize what can be used as evidence.
The intelligence process involves a cycle of collection, processing, integration, evaluation, interpretation and analysis of
available information. The output from the intelligence process are the insights and understanding that are developed
into a product that can support decision-making at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. The key clients of the
intelligence cycle are decision-makers – intelligence is used to help inform decision-making.
Planning
and
tasking
Dissemination Collection
Processing
Analysis and
exploitation
If information was provided to a sports organization for intelligence purposes only and accepted as such, it is unlikely
that it can be entered as evidence in any subsequent proceeding. It is also important to understand the source of
the information and/or intelligence, and how it was obtained and handled before it came into the possession of the
investigation. While there are restrictions on using intelligence as evidence, it may generally be used in affidavits and
applications for wiretaps and search warrants, depending on the applicable legal framework.
In a criminal investigation, national legislation dictates the way intelligence can be used for law enforcement purposes
and determines if intelligence is protected from disclosure in criminal proceedings.
It is important that high ethical and handling standards apply to evidence collection. While illegally obtained evidence
4. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION 37
is very likely to be excluded from criminal and civil courts, it is not automatically inadmissible in sports disciplinary
hearings. Information or intelligence grading is an essential step in the intelligence process. In this process, when
information is received, it goes through a grading process during which a handling code is assigned to the intelligence and
the source of the intelligence. Grading allows for an easy numeric initial risk assessment. This also allows the intelligence
receiver to have confidence in the information and to understand how it may be used and if any special consideration
needs to be attached to the source.
There are several information grading systems. For example, information can be graded according to:
• Source evaluation – how reliable the source of the information or intelligence is (graded A, B or C)
• Information evaluation – how accurate the information is likely to be (graded 1, 2 or 3)
• Handling code – with whom the information can be shared (graded X, R or O)
Standardized intelligence grading allows for more efficient information-sharing between organizations, while ensuring
that sources are protected and information is handled appropriately. This can increase trust between organizations.
Grading also improves the standard of the information held by an organization and strengthens data and privacy policies.
The perception that law enforcement investigations take precedence over sports disciplinary proceedings is often
influenced by the following:
• The concept of double jeopardy
• The existence of a statute of limitations in the criminal context
• The fear that the sports investigation may compromise the integrity of the criminal investigation
• The principal of nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare (i.e. the right against self-incrimination) is also sometimes referred
to, although in the case of Jérôme Valcke v. FIFA, Case No. CAS 2017/A/5003, the Court for Arbitration for Sport
dismissed this argument
The argument has been made that concurrent disciplinary and criminal proceedings and sanctions are unlikely to
constitute the legal principle of double jeopardy because they serve different purposes. The charges brought under
the respective procedures are significantly different, for the most part, because they will target different persons and
require different evidence. The issue of double jeopardy would only arise if a case could be made that a sanction, albeit
disciplinary in form, reveals a punitive intent and thus must be qualified as a criminal penalty. Even a lifetime ban, with
severe consequences for the athlete concerned, would not render the sanction criminal.
A sports organization will often have examined the initial report and carried out inquires before it would establish
whether there may be a criminal element to the activities reported. Because of the higher standard of proof in criminal
prosecutions and the requirements to preserve the chain of custody, as well as for procedural fairness, any inquiries
conducted, or evidence gathered before there is an opportunity to consult with law enforcement authorities may
compromise a subsequent criminal prosecution.
It is imperative that sports investigations document their investigative steps and the resulting information and evidence
so that they can be shared and be, potentially, admissible in criminal proceedings and sports disciplinary proceedings.
Competition manipulation is not a specific criminal offence in many jurisdictions and law enforcement authorities do 31
not necessarily have access to expertise in, or insight into, sports competitions. Therefore, when sports organizations
cooperate with law enforcement authorities, they will often prove invaluable in providing the law enforcement with
background information regarding the alleged manipulation and offer potential evidential leads. Often, when a sports
organization uncovers a case of manipulation, the organization will need to make a criminal complaint and provide
enough evidence to initiate a criminal investigation.
A coordinated approach requires cooperation between sports organizations and law enforcement authorities, where
these entities respect each other and contribute to achieving each other’s objectives regarding allegations of competition
manipulation. Such a coordinated approach is facilitated by platforms such the IOC IBIS (sport) and the Enlarged
Transnational Integrity Competition Analysis (ETICA) (law enforcement).
The UNODC Global Report on Corruption in Sport includes many examples of corruption in sport, including competition
manipulation, that has involved the commission of a crime. In such circumstances, the responsibility to investigate lies
with the relevant law enforcement or criminal justice authorities, including anti-corruption bodies. In the report, it is
argued that, given the powers and resources available to these authorities, the effectiveness of an investigation that is
conducted by law enforcement authorities is often beyond what can be achieved by a sports organization. However,
the number of successful investigations into corruption in sport led by law enforcement is limited, with only few
investigations going to trial and resulting in a conviction.
30 Ben Van Rompuy, “Effective sanctioning of match-fixing: The need for a two-track approach”, International Centre for Sports Security Journal, vol.1, No.3 (September 2013),
pp.69-73.
31 UNODC and IOC, Legislative Approaches to Tackling the Manipulation of Sports Competitions.
4. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION 39
In the UNODC Global Report on Corruption in Sport, it is stated that sports organizations can strengthen the
detection and reporting of corruption and other forms of wrongdoing in sport by “committing to the principle to report
all suspected corruption in their sport to the appropriate authorities in the jurisdiction where the criminal acts are
believed to have been committed, and to assist all law enforcement authorities in the investigation of such cases.” In 33
this context, a partnership approach between law enforcement authorities and sports organizations is essential to an
effective outcome.
The benefits that a sports governing body can offer a criminal investigation include:
• Expertise in the rules and regulations of their sport
• Rules that allow investigators access to financial data, such as bank records and information held on the electronic
devices of suspects
• Analysis of on-field actions
• Access to betting data (many sport organizations have contractual arrangements with licenced wagering service
providers that offer markets on their sport)
• Information on the identity of athletes, officials, etc.
• Information on venues and competition schedules
• Information on relevant individuals or competitions
• Additional information/intelligence about relevant individuals or matches that may substantiate or refute any
allegations
• Expert witnesses for court
Cooperation and coordination between agencies is an important factor, ensuring early intervention and action in
competition manipulation cases. This provides a broader perspective of the issues and facilitates:
• Early risk management
• Improved information-sharing
• Coordinated decision-making
• Coordinated action to assess, manage and reduce risk
32 Council of Europe, “Mapping of actors involved in fighting the manipulation of sports competitions” (2017).
33 UNODC, Global Report on Corruption in Sport, chapter 4, p. 133.
40 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
It is recognized that the level of cooperation between the four groups varies significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
In the Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, Member States are urged to take part in further
cooperation and co-ordination through national platforms, in accordance with domestic law. Provided by article 13 of
the Convention, these national platforms are a unique place for the exchange of information between the various actors
in the fight against competition manipulation: public authorities, sports organisations, sports betting operators and law
enforcement agencies.
Given the number of stakeholders involved, it is imperative that the stakeholders operate in a coordinated manner to
ensure a comprehensive approach to receiving and sharing information. The success of an investigation depends on
recognizing the relevant stakeholders and potential partners and having protocols in place to ensure the integrity of the
investigation.
• Legal departments
• Federation presidents, secretaries general and human resources departments
• Team managers, chefs de mission and coaches
• Athletic associations and unions
• Athlete/team sponsors
• Disciplinary panels
• Referees and referees’ associations
• Integrity officers
• Single points of contact on sport integrity issues within international sports federations
• Betting monitoring operations companies and sports integrity services
• Betting entities
• Banking and financial institutions
• Revenue services
• Broadcasting rights owners
Gambling regulators are also likely to have established “betting integrity” contacts within numerous betting operators,
which could save investigators a lot of time in targeting their enquiries to the correct departments and individuals within
such organizations.
Some gambling regulators (for example, in France) have real-time oversight of all bets placed within their regulatory
jurisdiction, which provides access to highly valuable datasets. It allows for both the technical surveillance of bets being
placed as well as the capability of quickly identifying abnormalities in expected betting patterns.
34 For example: Gambling Commission, “15.1.2 – Reporting suspicion of offences etc – betting licences.”, available here.
4. INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION 43
Court for the Arbitration of Sport, Klubi Sportiv Skënderbeu v. UEFA, Case. No CAS
2016/A/4650, Arbitral Award, 21 November 2016
In this case, the CAS panel, referring to evidence from the Betting Fraud Detection System (BFDS),
concluded that because “the statistical information cannot be explained by ‘normal’ circumstances does
not necessarily entail that it must hence be concluded that the results are to be explained by competition
manipulation. The reporting of an ‘escalated’ match deriving from the BFDS is by no means conclusive
evidence that such match was indeed fixed but remains subject to review.”
The panel considered quantitative data sets from BFDS and ULIS to be “valuable evidence if corroborated
by further evidence”. In this case, the panel considered match-analysis video evidence from a betting entity
and evidence from betting experts and experts in the statistical and mathematical models.
Sequence of events:
• January 2015: the Royal Dutch Football Association received some alerts regarding a possible
manipulated match by an Albanian club, KF Skënderbeu Korçë. This club played friendly matches
against Dutch clubs during a winter break in Spain.
• The Royal Dutch Football Association approached ULIS through its member De Lotto (now
Nederlandse Loterij), asking for insights into the betting patterns of the matches in question.
• A few hours later the Royal Dutch Football Association received reports from ULIS based on odds
movements from the international, Asian and lottery markets and from ULIS members.
• July 2016: CAS dismissed an appeal from Skënderbeu against the decision of the Union of European
Football Associations (UEFA) to ban the club from the UEFA Champions League for one season
because of its involvement in fixed matches.
specific sports competition. Betting experts can help determine if irregular patterns have a legitimate explanation or if
they may indicate potential competition manipulation. The tactics or patterns employed in competition manipulation
provide clues, to various degrees, which may enable an investigation to act and use in seeking specific evidence.
The use of experts from betting entities is common in court cases or hearings involving complex technical issues relating
to competition manipulation. Party-appointed experts are not required to be independent and impartial. However, the
more independent and impartial the expert is, the more intrinsic weight the expertise will be afforded. In particularly
complex cases, the panel or court might also want to appoint an independent expert to assist the arbitrators in
understanding the expertise brought forward by the parties. 36
35 Council of Europe, Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions (2020) Art.3.5.b:“Irregular sports betting shall mean any sports betting activity inconsistent with usual or
anticipated patterns of the market in question or related to betting on a sports competition whose course has unusual characteristics.”
36 Antonio Rigozzi and Brianna Quinn, “Evidentiary issues before CAS”, in International Sports Law and Jurisprudence of the CAS, Michele Bernasconi, ed. (Bern, Editions
Weblaw, 2014).
44 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
through betting on sport. Many betting entities and national regulators have already signed memoranda of understanding
with the IOC. They are responsible for monitoring betting activity during IOC competitions and other major sports
events and alerting the IOC system directly when suspicious activity is detected.
Betting patterns relating to the competition can be considered alone or in conjunction with subjective sport-specific
expert analysis of incidents on the field of play. The analysis of actions in a competition can also provide an indication
of competition manipulation.
Betting monitoring reports may indicate irregular betting patterns but fall short of attributing suspicious actions
to specific players during the match. Analysis of video footage can help to identify match activity that may indicate
competition manipulation. On rare occasions, the analysis can constitute direct evidence that confirms that the
manipulation occurred.
Match analysis helps to establish a recognizable standard of performance from individual players, which can be used
to build performance-related evidence to refute potential suggestions that players are not capable of playing at a higher
standard than exhibited. In team games, team formations and the individual roles of the players within these formations
are analysed. Comparative analysis can occur whereby the actions of individual competitors can be compared, from
game to game (or within a game), with certain criteria included to determine what is an acceptable level of effort, tactical
awareness and performance. This can be applied to players of any standard, including players at the international level.
of Europe International Network of National Platforms and the UNODC Global Operational Network of Anti-
41
countries that are signatories to the Convention, as well as several observer countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, North
America and Oceania. It is a network intended for the collection and exchange of information at the international level,
bringing together public authorities, sports organizations, sports betting operators and law enforcement agencies.
Sports investigators can access or submit information to IBIS through a single point of contact within the relevant
international sports federation.
Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) connects law enforcement agencies of European Union member States and
Europol operational partners. It provides a fast and secure official platform to exchange information and operational data
on ongoing investigations related to serious international and organized crime, including on cases of corruption in sport.
The exchange of information through Europol also allows the subsequent operational analysis of the data exchanged
through the Europol Analysis System and the identification of links to different countries’ investigations and to other
areas of organized crime. In particular, the Europol Corruption Analysis Project facilitates the exchange of criminally
relevant information and the analysis of relevant cases of sports corruption and competition manipulation.
While law enforcement authorities may be legally restricted from providing evidence to sports federations, they may be
willing to provide intelligence under certain conditions. They may do so, for example, if a memorandum of understanding
(a formal agreement between two or more parties) exists.
In order to build trust in this regard, it is important that sports investigators develop an understanding of the nature of the
information provided and the restrictions surrounding it. For example, if the information was provided as “intelligence
only,” it is unlikely that it can be used in sports disciplinary proceedings. If the information provided is “restricted
access” or “confidential,” it should be shared only with nominated individuals. The terms of the specific memorandum of
understanding will outline the criteria for the sharing of the information.
4.6.8.3 INTERPOL
National Central Bureau Network
National Central Bureaus are special offices within the police organizations of each member country of INTERPOL.
National Central Bureaus can share police information through INTERPOL I-24/7, the secure global police
communications system. This system links law enforcement agencies in the 195 INTERPOL member countries and
enables authorized INTERPOL National Central Bureaus and border agencies to share sensitive and urgent police
information with their counterparts around the globe and with the General Secretariat. Communication with the
National Central Bureaus is carried out through the relevant police station in the region.
The INTERPOL databases contain information related to criminals and crimes and comprises millions of records
with information on individuals (such as names and fingerprints), stolen property (such as passports and vehicles)
and weapons and threats (such as firearms). Law enforcement agencies can search the databases and contribute to the
databases on a voluntary basis through their National Central Bureau.
Enlarged Transnational Integrity Competition Analysis
Enlarged Transnational Integrity Competition Analysis (ETICA) is a specific police information tool managed by
INTERPOL through which participating law enforcement agencies can share, store, access and cross-check police
information specifically related to corruption in sport and illegal betting cases. It is a criminal information system
project created with a view to promoting the sharing of information in this area. At present, all member jurisdictions of
INTERPOL are using the system to share case data related to sport corruption cases.
The INTERPOL Match-Fixing Task Force forms the focus of the operational response of the International
Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) in this area. It brings together law enforcement agencies
around the world to tackle match-fixing and corruption in sport.
The Task Force has around 100 member units, with more than 150 national points of contact worldwide.
It focuses on sharing experiences and best practices and acts as a platform for investigations and
international case coordination. Specific INTERPOL tools are available to law enforcement worldwide,
including Enlarged Transnational Integrity Competition Analysis (ETICA) and Financial Crime Analysis
(FINCAF).
As a result of its global outreach, the Task Force is uniquely placed to connect criminal investigative
units in all INTERPOL member countries, relevant integrity units from the main international sporting
federations and dedicated monitoring services to unite efforts to counter any wrongdoing in sport. In
recent years, cooperation frameworks have also been established to protect major sporting events from
criminal exploitation.
Source: INTERPOL Match-Fixing Task Force, available here.
exchange platform for the recovery of criminal assets. Authorized law enforcement officers from each member country
are designated as focal points and can respond quickly when another country requires assistance. The aim of this
initiative is to support asset freezing and the seizure, confiscation and recovery of stolen assets. It facilitates the secure
exchange of sensitive information between the focal points from anti-corruption and asset recovery agencies. Through
the network, focal point members have access to the network and other focal points, legislative and judicial frameworks
from member countries and a 24-hour initial action checklist for an asset recovery investigation.
the UNODC GlobE Sport Network will build on the foundations of the existing UNODC GlobE Network and will
complement existing platforms for such cooperation. It will empower a wider range of countries and, for the first time,
actively involve sports organisations, at all levels, to engage in informal international cooperation to disrupt, investigate
and sanction those looking to exploit sport for illicit gain.
around the world, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Türkiye, as well as some states in the United
States of America, have introduced similar data protection regulations.
The General Data Protection Regulation requires that the personal data of any natural person must be handled in a
lawful, fair and transparent manner and only processed for specific purposes laid down by law. Organizations subject to
the General Data Protection Regulation or similar regulations must obtain consent for collecting and storing personal
data. In addition, they must erase data if requested to do so. In this context, organizations that collect and store data on
individuals must ensure that risk assessments are in place regarding data storage.
45 INTERPOL Global Focal Point Network on Anti-Corruption and Asset Recovery, available here.
46 UNODC GlobE Network, available here.
47 The was adopted in 2016 and entered into application on 25 May 2018. More information is available here.
48 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
Data privacy regulations do not always supersede the rights of an organization to collect and retain personal data. There
may be legal or administrative grounds permitting data collection without the consent of the subject. For example, in
workplace contexts, a legitimate interest can be a reasonable suspicion of misconduct based on specific facts.
Notwithstanding data protection regulations, sports federations have developed regulations that aid in gathering
information during an investigation. These include cooperating and reporting obligations. Athletes subject to these
obligations have a duty to provide personal information upon request of the investigating sports federation. Any failure
to comply with such a demand may incur sanctions. These obligations entitle the integrity units of sports federations
to request all information relating to an alleged offence, which may include telephone records, bank statements, text
messages received and sent, Internet service records and records stored on computer hard drives and other devices. This
is because participation in specific events organized by these sports bodies is predicated on a waiver of data protection
rights. In other words, consent to access personal data is implied in these specific circumstances.
National data protection laws may be cited as a reason for not exchanging relevant information or intelligence in
relation to competition manipulation, and they can determine the capacity to access key evidence such as telephone
and betting records. However, as is stated in article 43 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption: “States
Parties shall consider assisting each other in investigations of and proceedings in civil and administrative matters relating
to corruption.” In this regard, law enforcement agencies and public prosecutors are already collaborating with sporting
bodies in some cases, and this cooperation is not affecting independent sporting sanction systems, including bans,
relegations and penalties. 48
Data protection laws are aimed at safeguarding the privacy of individuals. However, they are not designed to hinder the
investigation of wrongdoing, including competition manipulation, and the exchange of information when it is in the
public interest to do so. It is specifically outlined in the General Data Protection Regulation that law enforcement and
national security agencies are not required to obtain consent from individuals to collect their data.
The European Commission stipulates that: “Any processing of personal data must be lawful, fair, and transparent in
relation to the natural persons concerned, and only processed for specific purposes laid down by law. This does not
in itself prevent the law-enforcement authorities from carrying out activities such as covert investigations or video
surveillance. Such activities can be done for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats
to public security.” 49
Law enforcement authorities must create and maintain safeguards to protect the personal data they collect and retain.
48 KEA European Affairs, Match-fixing in sport: A mapping of criminal law provisions in EU 27 (2012) and UNODC and IOC, Reporting Mechanisms in Sport: A Practical Guide for
Development and Implementation (Vienna, 2019).
49 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016, para.26.
49
5. INVESTIGATIVE
TECHNIQUES AND
APPROACHES
TO CASES OF
COMPETITION
MANIPULATION
@istock / thomas-bethge
50 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
An understanding of the perspective and motivation of a potential offender and the methods used to engage in
competition manipulation is important for effective evidence collection and interviewing of witnesses and suspects.
This includes understanding which athletes, players, managers or officials might be vulnerable to approaches for the
purpose of competition manipulation (at risk or susceptible to succumbing to approaches or temptation because of
emotional, physical, economic, social or cultural factors) or who have the motivation and opportunity to engage in
competition manipulation.
In the UNODC Global Report on Corruption in Sport, two general ways are identified in which organized crime groups
exploit sport for illicit gain:
• By direct affiliation to or infiltration of sport, often through internal actors such as senior officials of sport
organizations, coaches, referees, athletes and intermediaries
• By those with no direct affiliation to sport, such as external and established organized crime groups, including
mafia-type organizations, that require the collaboration of internal actors inside sport to enact their illicit activities
In addition, a growing trend identified in the report is for people engaged in competition manipulation to increasingly
target youth and women’s competitions,. Also highlighted is the fact that athletes, coaches, officials, players’ agents and
other actors are particularly vulnerable to approaches from individuals engaged in competition manipulation at sports
venues and places of residence, such as hotels where they stay for the course of events or matches.
There are many reasons why athletes and officials within sport may be vulnerable to approaches and motivated to engage
in competition manipulation.
5. INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES AND APPROACHES TO CASES OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION 51
VULNERABILITY MOTIVATIONS
Easy to manipulate/ impressionable Peer pressure, promise of success or reward, attracted to lifestyle, greed
Blackmail Fear, exposure of some previous wrongdoing
Threats Fear for self or others, career and reputation, loss of status
Duress Offer is hard to resist, exposure of some previous wrongdoing, groomed with
gifts, money or sexual favours
Gambling debts Fear of exposure of gambling on own sport, an infringement of rules, lifestyle
choices
Other debts, living beyond personal income Financial
Poor financial circumstances No contract, poorly or irregularly paid
Not paid well enough or viewed as unjust Financial, revenge, feels justified
Criminal associates or links through Loyalty, coercion, peer pressure
community, lifestyle, etc.
Unfulfilled ambition Desire for personal progression, grandiose self-perception, greed, naivety
Lack of knowledge/ information regarding Lack of awareness
rules, risks and consequences
The opportunities to gather information and to identify the sources of information will vary depending on whether
it is a sports investigation or a criminal investigation. Complex competition manipulation schemes usually involve a
conspiracy between those who have direct or indirect influence on the organization, execution and outcome of the
sporting event or the environment surrounding it, and others who stand to gain from it. Investigators should strive
to identify everyone involved in the conspiracy and create a profile for each person. In general, this should start upon
learning of a potential violation. An initial list should be created of persons who would be expected to have firsthand
knowledge of the events in question and potential sources of information (such as emails, text messages, etc.).
Investigations of corruption, including competition manipulation, often require the identification of individuals who
can assist by providing information about the wrongdoing. These individuals include informants and witnesses.
These may be individuals within the conspiracy -- “insiders” -- who can provide information about others involved.
When the main instigators or co-conspirators in the competition manipulation scheme are criminals, identifying
them often requires cooperation from someone inside a criminal organization. Such cooperative individuals may
become informants or cooperative witnesses. An informant may have an existing relationship with the target or may be
encouraged to forge a relationship in order to facilitate the collection of information for the investigation.
It is generally more appropriate to initially recruit people at the lowest rungs of the competition manipulation scheme
to provide information on the involvement of others. Care should be taken not to use people with more culpability to
52 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
gain information about those with less culpability. Such individuals often have an incentive to cooperate, with benefits
ranging from a favourable sanctioning regime to full immunity from prosecution and sanction.
Working with informants and witnesses requires special skills, and it is crucial that law enforcement agencies and sport
governing bodies have the adequate training infrastructure, systems and processes in place that allow them to protect
the identity of the cooperating individuals, and that all activity undertaken conforms with data protection and retention
legislation. Sport governing bodies can achieve this by following the relevant law enforcement guidelines. Witnesses
and victims who give testimony concerning corruption offences related to organized crime (and, as appropriate, their
relatives and other persons close to them) should be provided with effective protection from potential intimidation
and retaliation in line with article 32 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and national laws. When
identifying potential targets in an investigation, strategic decisions need to be made about the possibility for gathering
evidence needed for a successful prosecution or imposition of sanctions. There is a risk of reputational damage to the
target and the investigation if investigations are pursued based on flimsy evidence.
Both risks and opportunities are involved in prioritizing various targets. For example, pursuing a powerful target will
be complex and resource intensive. Within a competition manipulation scheme, there may be powerful individuals
who shield themselves from exposure beneath layers of co-conspirators and accomplices. Such individuals can distance
themselves from the actual execution of the wrongdoing. Their involvement is not immediately obvious and linking
them to evidence may prove difficult. Targeting such individuals requires a strategic intelligence-led approach. In
general, investigators should only approach such individuals after having gathered sufficient information and after first
having successfully interviewed individuals on lower levels of the hierarchy. However, failure to pursue a high-level target
leaves that target free to resume further competition manipulation schemes even when the targeted investigation is
disrupted. It also creates a perception of leniency and raises the impression of corruption or improper influence in the
investigation itself.
Less powerful individuals at the lower levels of the conspiracy will be easier to identify and will be essential to the
evidence-gathering endeavours of the investigation. However, the kind of information they can provide about the
involvement of others may be limited because of the methods which the more powerful actors have used to shield and
distance themselves from the wrongdoing.
In addition, potential informants and witnesses may be more reluctant to cooperate with the investigation of powerful
targets because of the risk of retaliation, exclusion or other consequences.
Integrity testing takes two main forms: intelligence-led testing, which targets specific groups or individuals suspected of
being involved in or planning wrongdoing, and random-virtue testing, where random individuals are tested regardless
of whether they are subject to any allegations.
In the law enforcement context, certain jurisdictions do not permit integrity testing. Others allow it with adequate legal
basis, proper authorization and careful design. Governing factors include: 51
• The test is necessary to obtain the evidence needed; it is controlled and only runs as long as necessary
• Collateral risk and third-party intrusion are minimized
• The test is properly recorded and documented
Reporting an alleged or actual act of competition manipulation is also a requirement of some sports organization. Article
2.5 of the Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of Manipulation of Competitions defines “failing to report to
the Sports Organisation concerned or a relevant disclosure/reporting mechanism or authority, at the first available
opportunity” as a violation of the Code.
Many sports federations also require adherence to a duty to report wrongdoing and provide sanctions for the failure
to report, without proper justification, wrongdoing or suspected wrongdoing in their codes of conduct. Respecting
the principles of ethical investigations and providing appropriate protection and safeguards to reporting persons are
essential prerequisites for people to speak out and report.
as the Sportradar Universal Fraud Detection System. In addition, many sports organizations have entered into voluntary
54
memoranda of understanding with betting entities or betting industry bodies and/or have commercial agreements with
monitoring companies to keep themselves informed about irregular betting activities relating to their events. For example,
IOC has many cooperation agreements with sports betting entities worldwide, all linked through the IBIS platform.
Real-time betting monitoring and analysis, in conjunction with other investigative strategies, can aid in identifying early
intervention techniques and effective investigative decision-making. Betting-related sources, including commercial sports
betting monitoring organizations, are often used by sports regulators to monitor betting markets. This betting monitoring
tracks changes in betting odds and liquidity across a wide range of betting markets. This supports the detection of irregular
betting patterns, which may indicate an attempt at competition manipulation, in real time, both pre-competition and during
play. Betting behaviour can be detected before the sports competition takes place and trigger an alert.
All national federations of Olympic sports and some non-Olympic sports are affiliated, through their international
federations, with the IOC IBIS. National federations may subsequently receive betting alerts from their international sports
federation or national Olympic committee.
If the initial notification of competition manipulation activity was not triggered by a betting report, it is still possible to
establish if there are indications of related activity in any betting markets globally. For sports investigations, this will be done
by the single point of contact to IBIS. Criminal justice authorities should also consider accessing the INTERPOL Match-
Fixing Task Force and the UNODC GlobE Network for this purpose.
Transactions such as placing bets and collecting subsequent winnings will leave a trail of evidence (telephone calls,
emails, financial transactions and betting account information). Those placing bets will use their real identity or those
of surrogates recruited for that specific purpose. Bets placed online will be associated with an Internet protocol address.
This can make it possible to track down computers or mobile devices that have been used as well as the geographical
origin of the message. However, due consideration must also be made to the use of methods to mask the identity of a
user, such as through the use of a Virtual Private Network (VPN).
Endeavouring to establish the identity of the person or persons who placed the bets and collected the winnings will
require the cooperation of the betting entity. This cooperation includes sharing the account details, including the
personal details (e.g. name, address, and date of birth), of the person or persons placing bets and any other evidence
connecting them to the bets, such as voice recordings or computer intelligence, as well as their past betting history.
Some sports betting entities may be reluctant to provide customer details to sports bodies because of customer privacy
or data protection considerations. However, there are centralized mechanisms of information collection and exchange,
including national gambling regulators and IBIS.
If betting transactions are secured, the following should be considered:
• Time of creation of the betting account (it is possible to recall dormant accounts, here or in another part)
• Who placed the bets: a player, an official, a family member, or a friend?
• The amount placed and if the amount is economically viable for competition manipulation (i.e. was it enough to
pay the player and for the fixers to make a profit? – it should be kept in mind that bets may have been spread or
placed using several accounts and operators)
• The amount placed relative to the market and the staking history of the person placing the bet
• The market on which the bet was placed (choice of an obscure market may be cause for more suspicion about the bet)
In the context of investigations conducted by sports authorities, investigators are somewhat more restricted in gaining
access to private financial transactions. However, some sports regulations confer specific powers on investigators to
obtain or demand material including financial records. The Olympic Movement Code on the Prevention of the
Manipulation of Competitions places certain obligations on sports organizations and their members to cooperate
with any investigation carried out by a sports organization. This includes producing details of their bank accounts and
explaining transactions where relevant.
Betting accounts generally have bank accounts linked to them and can be a starting point for tracing money flows.
It may be possible for some sports federations, depending on national law, to apply to the courts for an Anton Piller
Order to search a named premise and seize evidence without prior warning.
55
6. CONCLUSION
OF THE
INVESTIGATION
The conclusion of an investigation is just as critical as the investigation itself. The investigating team must finalize the
investigation steps, review the implications of the investigation’s findings and check that all records and documents are
in order.
Once a case has been concluded, it is important to conduct a thorough debrief. Some investigations reveal larger
problems that should be addressed. Questions to be asked include:
• Did the investigation identify any weaknesses in policy?
• Do any regulations or procedures need to be reviewed or refined?
• Did the investigation uncover other wrongdoing outside the remit of the investigation that should be addressed
or referred?
• Does the investigation team need further training, guidance or support?
The debrief is an opportunity to make changes to aspects of the process that presented problems. The investigation
process and its success or otherwise is a good indication of the strength of an organization’s powers, policies and
60 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
procedures in the fight against competition manipulation. The investigator or the investigation team will have had first-
hand experience of any shortcomings and may have found solutions. This feedback is not about criticism or complaints,
it is about benefiting from lessons learned. These lessons should be fed back into the system so that future investigations
do not have to experience similar challenges.
In sports investigations, it is important to refer to the terms of reference and examine if the investigation process and its
outcome were consistent with the terms set out at the beginning. If it was not, it is important to ask and answer why not.
Investigators should give careful consideration to how restraining mechanisms, such as freezing or seizure
orders, can be used to protect assets from competition manipulation schemes that may be subject to a
confiscation judgment.
Reports and information produced by Europol, INTERPOL and UNODC indicate that organized crime groups
56 57
operating at transnational level can make substantial criminal profits from competition manipulation activities and the
laundering of such profits. This may be detected during financial investigations and also through analysis of the money
58
transactions of members of organized crime groups (e.g. banking transactions and money exchanged through electronic
money business/transfer services and cryptocurrencies). Freezing and confiscating assets allows law enforcement
authorities to prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes and the proceeds of criminal activity from being
laundered. It also sends the message that “crime does not pay”. This is equally true for the proceeds of crimes related to
competition manipulation. 59
The International Criminal Police Organization coordinated Operation SOGA (short for soccer
gambling) I–VII between 2007 and 2018. In addition, SOGA VIII was carried out in 2021. These
operations resulted in thousands of arrests and the seizure of tens of millions of dollars.
Freezing assets is a temporary measure to prevent them from being disposed of before a final
judgement in a case. Freezing assets generally requires judicial authorization.
Confiscation is a final measure in which criminal proceeds (including money or property) are
permanently seized by the authorities. The investigative process to identify financial transactions
leading to tracing assets generated by criminal activity is complex.
56 https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/the_involvement_of_organised_crime_groups_in_sports_corruption.pdf
57 https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Corruption/Corruption-in-sport
58 UNODC, Global Report on Corruption in Sport (2021), chapter 6.
59 See also the UNODC paper entitled “Confiscated asset returns and the United Nations Convention against Corruption: A Net for All Fish” (Vienna, 2023) relating to asset
return obligations.
61
7. ANNEXES
@istock / vchal
62 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
Fixed-odds betting: The bettors know in advance how much they can win if their bet is correct. Fixed odds betting is
calculated as follows: winning = stake × odds.
Parimutuel betting: The stakes are distributed equally among the winners.
Betting exchanges: Two people bet against each other on the Internet with one playing the role of bookmaker and
proposing a bet with fixed odds, and the other player playing the role of bettor and placing a bet. The online betting
operator that facilitates the exchange is paid according to the winner’s earnings.
Asian handicap: This gives one of the teams (by default the underdog) a virtual head start in terms of the number of
60
goals in order to make the contest theoretically equal. The bet is settled by adding the handicap to the outcome of the
match. This type of betting removes the option of a draw.
Live betting: This provides the possibility of betting in real time during the course of a competition (also known as in-
play betting or in-the-run betting).
Spot or side betting: This involves betting on a specific aspect of a game, unrelated to the final result (which player will
score first, how many yellow cards a team will receive, etc.).
Spread betting: The bet is placed on whether the outcome will be above or below the spread (e.g. the number of goals
in a competition) with the payout based on the accuracy of the bet rather than a simple win or lose outcome. As the
competition progresses and the goals increase, the prices change.
60 See Asser Institute, Centre for European and International Law, January 2015, The Odds Of Match Fixing: Facts & Figures On The Integrity Risk Of Certain Sports Bets, p.
30, available here.
64 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
Annex III – Investigation log and tips for completing the investigation log
INVESTIGATION LOG
Context
Investigator/s
Commencement date: Expected completion date: Media strategy: Yes/no
Summary of allegation/information:
Legal/disciplinary breaches:
Parties involved:
Risk management
Date/time: Threat 61
Rating MANU62 Existing measures to
control risk
Sources of information/evidence
Date: Source: Summary: Evaluation:
Investigation steps
Date: Who is responsible: Summary of outcome: Risk of step MANU:
Interview schedule
Date Interviewee: Summary of outcome:
61 Risk to competitions, individuals, delay, loss of documents, destruction of evidence, lack of cooperation, coaching of witnesses, collusion between witnesses, threat to
witnesses, reprisal, inadequate resources.
62 Rating: M = minor; A = adequately controlled by existing measures; N = not adequately controlled – action required; U = unknown risk.
7. ANNEXES 65
Legal instruments and breaches: The first step in any investigation is to identify the legal framework authorizing and
surrounding the investigation. It is useful to enter the legislation relevant to the investigation, including the key elements
that need to be proven (the elements around which information and evidence needs to be gathered). This helps to
ensure that the investigation remains within its scope.
Parties involved: This refers to potential suspects, subjects or persons of interest.
Sources: These are sources of evidence or information. The evaluation column in the investigation log refers to the
information evaluation matrix presented below:
MANU mnemonic: This refers to risk analysis associated with the information and/or the source of the information. As
the investigative steps are actioned, consideration needs to be given to the risk management section.
Investigative steps: The next steps required to develop the investigation and secure information and evidence. The
evaluation and MANU columns of the investigation log have the same function as in previous sections. They require
the investigator to consider the risks of any actions and to evaluate any information that comes into their possession as
a result of these steps. As the investigation progresses, continued consideration will need to be given to the risk column
and the risk analysis section.
Interview schedule: The function of this section is to plan and schedule interviews with named witnesses, or suspects.
This planning will include consideration of any risks associated with contacting the witness or suspect to schedule the
interview. The summary column refers to a summary of the information gleaned from the interview. The evaluation
facilitates evaluation of information gleaned from an interview, particularly if it does not result in a signed statement.
Inquiries: This refers to inquiries to be carried out with other agencies or other departments within the agency carrying
out the investigation.
Internal notifications (including updates): This refers to notifying and updating any internal stakeholders.
External notifications: This refers to partners or agencies outside of the investigation agency that may need to be
informed about the investigation or about specific details of the investigation.
Risk management: This section relates to risks identified in the MANU column. These include risks relating to evidence,
witnesses, coaching of witnesses, collusion between witnesses, threat to witnesses, inadequate resources, delays, loss of
documents, destruction of evidence and lack of cooperation. It requires the investigator to detail the risks identified and
describe the measures planned or employed to eliminate, reduce or transfer the risk.
66 GUIDE TO THE EFFECTIVE INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION MANIPULATION
Risks to the investigation: Considering the potential risks to the investigation before any steps are taken will help
to minimize them and mitigate or manage acceptable risks. Risks may include delays, publicity, loss or destruction of
evidence, lack of cooperation, fear of retaliation, intimidation of witnesses and collusion between witnesses.
When anticipating the factors that may contribute to risk during an investigation the following questions should be
considered:
• What are you trying to establish?
• Who do you inform and when?
• Are there any risks in informing certain individuals at this time?
• What is the strategy to manage, minimize or mitigate risk?
• Resources
• Confidentiality issues
• Indicative timeline
Given the range of potential avenues an investigation can take and the sensitivity of many investigations, an element
of risk will inevitably exist. This should not mean that the avenues should not be explored or sensitivities should be
avoided. What is important is to have a robust risk management process.
Maintaining the investigation plan will aid in the risk management process. Having a risk-rating system in place is useful
for dynamic risk assessment. The mnemonic MANU may be helpful in this regard.
7. ANNEXES 67
The reader may also wish to be made aware that examples of mapping
of financial transactions and indicative contents of a court order can be
found in the UNODC Practical Guide for the Investigation of Corruption