CONTENTS

SL.NO PARTICULARS Pg.No

1 Background of the Case 2

2 Facts 2–3

3 Issue 3

4 Legal Principle 3–4

5 Analysis 4–6

6 Conclusion 7

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 JUMMA MASJID, MERCARA v. KODIMANIANDRA DEVIAH

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CASE No: AIR 1962 SC 847

DECIDED ON JANUARY 11TH , 1962

JUMMA MASJID, MERCARA Petitioner

VERSUS
KODIMANIANDRA DEVIAH Respondent

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

This is the landmark judgment which draws a comparison between the Rule of Feeding the
Grant by Estoppel under Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TOPA) and Spes
Successionis under Section 6 (a) of the Act.1

FACTS

 A joint family comprising three brothers, B1, B2, and B3, existed. B1 died unmarried, B2
died leaving behind a widow W1, and B3 passed away leaving his widow W2 as his heir.
 The brothers also had a deceased sister, S, survived by two children and three grandsons
(G1, G2, and G3), who were deemed heirs under the principle of spes successionis.
 The grandsons, representing themselves as owners, sold the family properties to Ganapathi
(T) on November 18, 1920.
 Subsequently, W1, still alive and the rightful owner of the properties, filed a case against the
grandsons, resulting in a decree in her favor.

1
https://www.barelaw.in/jumma-masjid-mercara-v-kodimaniandra-deviah-air-1962-sc-847-barelaw [last visited on
23rd March, 2024]

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  Despite the decree, the transfer to Ganapathi (T) remained valid under Section 43 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (TOPA), which includes the Rule of Estoppel.
 Before the second appeal, W1 passed away, and the property devolved to the grandsons.
 Jumma Masjid, Mercara intervened, asserting its entitlement to the properties based on a gift
alleged to have been made by W1 before her demise, and a deed of release executed by B1
relinquishing his half-share to the mosque for Rs. 300.
 The Revenue Authorities declined to accept the mosque's title, directing Ganapathi's name to
be entered as the owner, as he had purchased the properties in good faith.
 Ganapathi argued that since the grandsons had represented themselves as owners and were
now in possession after W1's death, he should be entitled to the property's title under Section
43 of TOPA.
 The mosque contended that the grandsons, being mere expectants of succession, had no title
to transfer the property under Section 6(a) of TOPA, rendering the sale void.

ISSUE INVOLVED

1. Whether a transfer of property, in return for some consideration, made by a person who
represents that he has a present and transferable interest in that property, while in reality he
possesses only a spec succession is within the protection of Section 43 of the TOPA, 1882?

LEGAL PRINCIPLE

The legal principle applied in the case of Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah
is around the interpretation and application of Sections 6(a) and 43 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (TOPA).

i. Section 6(a) of TOPA2 pertains to certain kinds of interests in property, specifically those of
spec successionis, and prohibits the transfer of these interests. This provision establishes a
substantive rule of law regarding the transferability of such interests, stating that they cannot
be transferred outright.

2
The Transfer of Property Act Section 6(a).

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ii. On the other hand, Section 43 of TOPA3 deals with representations made by a transferor
regarding their title to a property, even if they do not actually possess such title at the time of
transfer. This section operates as a rule of estoppel, providing protection to transferees who
rely on the representations made by the transferor and transfer property for consideration.

Section 6(a) and Section 43 relate to two different subjects, and there is no necessary
conflict between them.

Section 6(a) deals with certain kinds of interests in a property mentioned therein and
prohibits the transfer simply of those interests. Section 43 deals with representations as to
title made by a transferor who had no title at the time of transfer and provides that the
transfer shall fasten itself on the title which the transferor subsequently acquires.

Section 6(a) enacts a rule of substantive law, while Section 43 enacts a rule of estoppel
which is one of the rules of evidence law.

Both provisions cannot be combined.

To hold that transfers by persons who have only a spec successionis at the date of the
transfer are not within the protection awarded under Section 43 of the Act., as it would
destroy its utility to a great extent. Section 43 of the Act enables a special provision for the
protection of the right of the transferees for the consideration given to the party that made a
representation of a current title, when in reality they do not have one.4

ANALYSIS

This case hinges on the conflict between two seemingly opposing sections of the Transfer of
Property Act (TOPA), 1882:

Section 6(a):

 Restricts the transfer of mere expectancy of inheritance, also known as spes successionis.
 In this case, the grandsons (G1, G2, G3) only had a chance of inheriting after the widows'
deaths (spes successionis).

3
The Transfer of Property Act Section 43.
4
https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-4953-comparison-of-sections-6-a-and-section-43-jumma-masjid-
mercara-v-s-kodi-maniandra-deviah.html#google_vignette [last visited on 23rd March, 2024]

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 Section 43:

 Protects good faith transferees who rely on a false representation of ownership if the
transferor later acquires the title.
 The grandsons misrepresented themselves as the rightful owners and sold the property to
Ganapathi (T). When they inherited the property later, T could potentially claim ownership
under Section 43.

Problems:

 Jumma Masjid's Claim: The mosque argues that the sale by the grandsons is void under
Section 6(a) since they lacked transferable interest.
 Uncertainty for Buyer (T): Without a clear ruling, T faces uncertainty regarding his
ownership rights.

Potential Effects:

 Loss for Mosque: If Section 43 prevails, Jumma Masjid loses its claim to the property
despite the alleged gift and deed.
 Unfair Advantage for Grandsons: The grandsons might gain ownership after
misrepresenting themselves, potentially leading to a sense of injustice.

Argument Supporting Section 6(a):

 Strict Interpretation of Section 6(a): Section 6(a) clearly prohibits the transfer of spes
successionis. The grandsons' inheritance right was just an expectation, not a legally
transferable interest at the time of the sale.
 Protecting Public Policy: Upholding Section 6(a) discourages speculation and prevents
manipulation of inheritance rights. It ensures clarity and prevents future disputes like this
one.
 Alternative Claims: Jumma Masjid's claims based on the alleged gift from W1 and the deed
from B1 should be thoroughly investigated. If proven valid, these claims could provide the
mosque with a stronger legal basis for ownership.

Arguments Supporting Section 43:

 Protection of Bona Fide Transferee (T): T, the buyer, acted in good faith based on the
grandsons' representation of ownership. He entered into the transaction with the reasonable
belief he was purchasing the property.

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 Estoppel by Representation: The principle of estoppel by representation under Section 43.
The grandsons made a false representation, and T relied on it, fulfilling the core purpose of
the section - protecting innocent transferees.
 Eventual Acquisition of Title: Since the grandsons eventually inherited the property, their
initial misrepresentation "attached" to the acquired title, fulfilling the conditions of Section
43.
 Maintaining Certainty in Transactions: Upholding Section 43 in this case promotes stability
in property transactions. Buyers who rely on representations have greater assurance of
ownership rights.

Solution:

However, Section 43 operates in a different sphere (estoppel) and supersedes Section 6(a) in
this specific scenario where the transferor later acquires the title.

By effectively presenting these arguments, the court could potentially rule in favor of
Section 43. This would grant ownership of the property to Ganapathi (T), upholding the sale
deed based on the grandsons' misrepresentation and subsequent inheritance fulfilling the
representation.

CONCLUSION
In the case, the Supreme Court rejected the argument made by Jumma Masjid and held that
Section 6(a) and Section 43 address different subjects within the law and do not conflict
with each other. Section 6(a) establishes a substantive rule regarding the transferability of
certain interests, while Section 43 operates as a rule of estoppel, protecting the rights of
transferees who act in good faith based on representations made by the transferor.5The court
emphasized that Section 43 applies when a transferor makes a representation of having a
title to the property, even if they do not actually possess such title. If the conditions specified
in Section 43 are met, including the transferee acting in good faith and without notice of any
prior defects in the title, then the transfer will be upheld, and the transferee will acquire the
title to the property. The court ruled that the transferee in the case was entitled to the
property under Section 43 of TOPA because they had entered into the transaction based on
the representations made by the transferor. As such, the court rejected the contentions made
by Jumma Masjid and upheld the transfer of the property to the transferee.

5
https://www.drishtijudiciary.com/transfer-of-property-act [last visited on 23rd March, 2024]