Pale Digest 8 Suspension Disbarment and Discipline of Lawyers

PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
ATTY. STEPHEN L. YU | AY 2022-2023 | M2

CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT, AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS
1. Anita Santos Murray vs. Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes (A.C. No. 5408, February 7, 2017)
FACTS: On February 2, 2001, complainant filed before this Court a Complaint charging respondent with violating
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant alleged that sometime in June 2000, she
sought the services of a lawyer to assist in the naturalization (that is, acquisition of Philippine citizenship) of her
son, Peter Murray, a British national. Respondent was later introduced to her. On June 14, 2000, she and
respondent agreed on the latter's services, with complainant handing respondent the sum of Php 80,000.00 as
acceptance fee. About three (3) months passed without respondent doing "anything substantial." On September
11, 2000, complainant wrote respondent to inform him that she was terminating his services and expected that
respondent return the said fees. As respondent failed to return the Php 80,000.00 acceptance fee, complainant
instituted the Complaint in this case and a criminal proceedings against respondent for violation of Article
315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
(in case iask unsa na pud sa letter)

I am not satisfied with the way things are going regarding my petition. I am expecting that you keep me abreast of
your activities but I am left in the dark as to what have you done so far. You do not show up on your scheduled
appointments nor do you call up to let me know why you cannot come. You stood me up twice already which
shows that you are not even interested in my case. Since I already paid the P80,000 acceptance fee in full, I
expect to get a refund of the same from you.
This case was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its investigation, report, and
recommendation. After the proceedings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Investigating Commissioner
Demaree J.B. Raval (Commissioner Raval) furnished a Report dated September 9, 2002 recommending that
respondent be reprimanded and required to return the sum of Php 80,000.00 to complainant. Respondent filed
before this Court a Motion for Leave to Admit Additional Evidence with Motion to Dismiss. This Motion was
forwarded to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and was treated as respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondent suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year, with an additional three (3)-month suspension
for every month (or fraction) that respondent fails to deliver to complainant the sum of P80,000.00.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines refers proposed actions to this Court. Recognizing the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines' limited competence in disciplinary cases impels a concomitant recognition that, pending favorable
action by this Court on its recommendations, its determinations and conclusions are only provisional.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent falls short of the standards imposed by Canon 18 of the CPR and entitled
for suspension.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that respondent acknowledged his duty to compensate complainant for the
amount of P80,000.00 and made his own commitment to make this compensation. He may not have been bound
ALICANDO, BATI-IT, BALITE, CANILLO, CLOSAS, ENOLPE, FALCONE, GENSON, LAMBAYAN, MALAZARTE, OLIVA, REMORERAS, TUDTUD, VALENZUELA, VILLA
by a juridical instruction, but he was certainly bound by his own honor. It is proper, in the course of these
disciplinary proceedings, that respondent be required to return the amount of P80,000. This amount was
delivered to respondent during complainant’s engagement of his professional services, or in the context of an
atty-client relationship. This is neither an extraneous nor purely civil matter.
By the same failure to timely and diligently deliver on his professional undertaking (despite having received fees
for his services), as well as by his failure to keep complainant abreast of relevant developments in the purposes
for which his services were engaged, respondent falls short of the standards imposed by Canon 18, which
provides:
A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified
to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 — A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client's request for information. (Emphasis supplied)
That he has failed to adhere to his own freely executed commitment after more than a decade speaks volumes of
how he has miserably failed to live up to the "high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing" that is
apropos to members of the legal profession. For this reason, Court exact upon respondent a penalty more severe
than that initially contemplated by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Moreover, to impress
upon respondent the urgency of finally returning to complainant the amount he received, the Court imposed on
him an additional penalty corresponding to the duration for which he fails to make restitution.
SANCTION/PENALTY:
Hence, the respondent Atty. Felicito J. Cervantes is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and
six (6) months.
He is ORDERED to restitute complainant Anita Santos Murray the sum of P80,000.00. For every month (or
fraction) the he fails to fully restitute complainant the sum of P80,000.00, respondent shall suffer an additional
suspension of one (1) month.
2. Re: Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes Alleging Illicit Activities of a Certain Atty. Cajayon Involving Cases in
the Court of Appeals Cagayan de Oro City (A.M. No. 16-12-03-CA, June 6, 2017)
FACTS: These consolidated matters arose from letter-complaints respectively filed by Sylvia Adante and Lucena
Ofendoreyes both charging a certain Atty. Dorothy Cajayon from Zamboanga City and Associate Justice Jane
Aurora C. Lantion of the CA in Cagayan De Oro City for illicitly selling favorable decisions involving cases filed in
the CA-CDO to the highest bidding clients.
On October 17, 2016, Adante filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a letter, alleging that it was "intimated to
her" that Atty. Cajayon, whom she met only once, was in cahoots with Justice Lantion in engaging in the
shameful business of "selling" decisions involving cases from the CA-CDO to the highest bidder.
Subsequently, on October 25, 2017, Ofendoreyes filed before the same agency a letter, requesting the latter to
investigate and stop the purported partnership of Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion from the business of selling
decisions in exchange for money.
Both letter-complaints were respectively referred by the Ombudsman to the SC. The Court then referred the
administrative matters to the OCA.
OCA’s Report and Recommendations
The OCA observed that the letter-complaints were insufficient in form and substance in that they:
1. Were not verified; and
2. Lacked affidavits of persons who may have personal knowledge of the facts to prove or substantiate the
letter-complaints' allegations against respondents, as well as supporting documents.
Moreover, it echoed the rule that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent
committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant, and that in the absence of evidence against a court
employee or magistrate to discipline for a grave offense, the presumption that the respondent has regularly
performed his duties will prevail.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Cajayon and Justice Lantion should be held administratively liable.
RULING: NO.
Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints both against lawyers and judges of regular and special
courts as well as Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan must be verified and supported by
affidavits of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations. For lawyers, this rule can be found in Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court:
“SECTION 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon
the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.”
On the other hand, the rule with regard to judges and justices can be found in Section 1, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court:
“SECTION 1. How instituted. — Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of regular and special courts
and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations,
or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint
shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of
standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Courts or the Code of Judicial Conduct.”
In this relation, Section 2 of Rule 140 states that:
“SECTION 2. Action on the complaint. — If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a
copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10)
days from the date of service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.”
In these cases, it is evident that the herein complaints lacked the foregoing requirements. Complainants'
respective single page letter-complaints are indisputably unverified, and bereft of any supporting affidavits or
documents that would support the charges made against herein respondents. Overall, they contain bare
allegations that, unfortunately, have no factual or legal anchorage.
Moreover, it appears that the complainants lacked personal knowledge. For one, Adante clearly stated in her
letter-complaint that the alleged offense was only "intimated to [her]," while Ofendoreyes simply asks the Court to
"investigate and stop" the said illicit activities without providing any further details on the information.
Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the
allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon
which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense. The same
goes with administrative cases disciplining for grave offense court employees or magistrates. The evidence
against the respondent should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge.
SANCTION/PENALTY: There was no sanction or penalty. The complaints were DISMISSED.
3. Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray vs. Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (A.C. No. 10868, January 26, 2016)
FACTS:
1. Lawyer pretended to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in a
pleading.
2. Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray filed a complaint before the IBP
a. She alleged that Atty. Daquis filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage without Vasco-Tamaray’s consent and forged Vasco-Tamaray’s
signature on the Petition
3. Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her husband.
a. That she was actually informed by the same lawyer that a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage was filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City
b. The same lawyer asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Muntinlupa
City
4. When Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor’s Office and met Atty. Daquis, she
asked that a copy of the Petition be given to her but Atty. Daquis refused.
5. Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was forged by Atty.
Daquis.
a. And that her purported community tax certificate appearing on the jurat was not hers
because she never resided in Muntinlupa City.
b. She further alleged that she had never received any court process.
i. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial court were received by
Encarnacion T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives ofLeomarte
Tamaray, the husband of Vasco-Tamaray.
6. Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant herself, and
not complainant's husband.
a. With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she
notarized the Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by
Vasco-Tamaray. Atty. Daquis' allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of her staff.
b. Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money from
Leomarte Tamaray but she refused to do so.
c. Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition.Atty. Daquis further
alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son with a certain Reuel Pablo
Aranda.
7. The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the Complaint because
Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Commission on Bar Discipline noted that
Vasco-Tamaray should have questioned the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she never filed
any petition, but she failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held administratively liable for making it
appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged
signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
RULING: Yes.
The SC found that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15 is dismissed.
By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her duty of doing no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any falsehood in court as stated in the Lawyer's Oath.
In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was Leomarte Tamaray's counsel but was unable to rebut the other
allegations against her.
Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006, but did not refute the statement in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that
Leomarte Tamaray introduced her as his lawyer.
Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for complainant. Yet, there is no explanation how she was referred to complainant or how
they were introduced. It appears, then, that respondent was contacted by Leomarte Tamaray to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting and the presence of
Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to annul his marriage with Cheryl[. ]"
Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, respondent made it appear that
complainant, not her client Leomarte Tamaray, was the petitioner. There is a probability that respondent did not want Leomarte Tamaray to be the
petitioner because he would have to admit that he entered into a bigamous marriage, the admission of which may subject him to criminal liability.
In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there appears to be no reason for respondent to advise her "not to oppose
Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled."
The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never received any court process because her purported address in the Petition
is the address of Leomarte Tamaray.
Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she allowed the use of a forged
signature on a petition she prepared and notarized.
While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the fact remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be
used on a petition she prepared and notarized.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude
on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a
foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared
and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part.
This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented complainant, who is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in
the same case.
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his
client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State-the
administration of justice-as an officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also
of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. "
On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015.
Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
....
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the
Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the
respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and
distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a
period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submission of the
Investigator's report.
(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.
(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.
Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was given the power to
"issue a decision" if the lawyer complained of was exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension
or disbarment." In addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless an interested party filed a petition
before this court.
The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the power to impose disciplinary
action on members of the bar. The factual findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline and the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are recommendatory, subject
to review by this court.
SANCTION/PENALTY:
The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis.
The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of
Attorneys.
4. Garrido vs. Garrido, et al. (A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010)
FACTS: In the complaint-affidavit filed by the complainant, it stated that Maelotisea Garrido is
the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and their marriage was blessed with 6 children. One of
their daughter, Madeleine, confided to her mother that an unknown caller talked with her
claiming that the former is a child Atty. Garrido. The same incident happened when another
one of her daughters, May Elizabeth said she saw Atty. Angel Garrido strolling at the
Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and child who was
later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angel Ramona Valencia Garrido,
respectively.
Atty. Angel’s wife did not stop investigating until she was able to secure the Certificate of Live
Birth of the child, stating among other things that the said child is the daughter of the
respondents and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were
married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
On June 1993, Atty. Garrido left their conjugal home and joined Atty. Romana Paguida
Valencia at their residence. That since the day he left, he failed and still failing to give the
needed financial support to the prejudice of their children who stopped schooling because of
financial constraints.
Thus, the complainant filed disbarment proceedings against her husband, Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and his mistress, Atty. Romana P. Valencia.
In his counter-affidavit, Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was
already married to Constancia David when he married Maelotisea. He further alleged that
Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his "bad boy" image before she married
him in 1962. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all
graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.
On the other hand, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between
them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia.
In the course of the hearings, after she had presented evidence, Maelotisea filed a motion for
the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to
maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. However,
the said motion was denied by the IBP CBD.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia should be disbarred.
RULING:
YES. The respondents should be disbarred.
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant – do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of
the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party
whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged
and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty.
Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to
be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, the possession of good moral character is both a

condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership in the legal profession.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others,
any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before
admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea's affidavit of desistance cannot have the
effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea
is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed
her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now
available for the Court's examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by
her desistance.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. In several cases, we applied
the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or
multiple marriages.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty.
Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second

marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his
bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
Thus, he did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer. Furthermore, not only
did he violate his lawyer’s oath and Sec. 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, he also
violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
As to Atty. Valencia, under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a
lawyer, she already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to
Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was
under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic
relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages.
These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral
character.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession.
She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.
SANCTION/PENALTY:
1. DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and
2. DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
5. Tan, et al. vs. IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (G.R. No. 173940, September 5, 2006)
FACTS:
Tomas G. Tan (petitioner Tan), stockholder and director of co-petitioner CST Enterprises, Inc. (CST), discovered
that two parcels of land owned by the corporation were used to obtain loans from Philippine Business Bank
(PBB). Tan learned that a certain John Dennis Chua, representing CST, mortgaged the properties. Chua was
purportedly authorized by the Board of Directors of the corporation as shown by the Corporate Secretary’s
Certificate dated 04 April 2001 signed by Atty. Jaime N. Soriano (respondent).
On 28 May 2002, petitioner Tan filed in his personal capacity and as minority stockholder of CST under a
derivative action, a letter-complaint with the IBP charging respondent of deceit, malpractice, falsification of public
documents, gross misconduct and violation of oath of office.1
Petitioners filed a civil case with the RTC of Makati. In the course of the proceedings in the said civil case,
petitioners claim to have gathered more information and seen the "extent of the plot or machinations" of
respondents.
Petitioners filed with the IBP, a Motion to Amend/Supplement the Complaint with Motion to Admit
Amended/Supplemental Complaint, claiming that respondent and Atty. Taala had facilitated and recommended
the approval of the allegedly spurious loans and mortgage entered into by John Dennis Chua.
The Commission, however, denied the motion on the ground that the amendments/supplements involve
proceedings pending before the trial courts and that the determination of the matters presented belong to said
courts which have already acquired jurisdiction over them. An MR was filed but was denied.
Because of the denial of the motion, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under R65 where they imputed grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission.
Petitioners claim the following as well:

- that respondent’s allegations in his Verified Answer are untruthful and perjurious as he knowingly cited
untruthful testimonies and affidavits from the records of the civil case with the RTC of Makati.
- petitioners aver that the proceeds of the spurious loans amounting to P91.1 Million Pesos covered by the
real estate mortgage on CST’s real estate properties were funneled to the Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc.,
a corporation where respondent is the incorporator, stockholder and President.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s
Amended/Supplemental Complaint.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated Rule 139-B of the RoC when they divulge, essentially,
confidential information.
RULING:
1. NO. The commission did not. The Court noted that petitioners are seeking similar, if not identical, reliefs
from the regular courts and the Commission. Thus, in addition to the prayer to disbar respondent and Atty.
Taala, petitioners implore the Commission to make a finding that respondent lawyers be found liable for
using untruthful statements under oath, conspiracy to commit estafa, employing deceit and other
manipulative acts as well as fraud, and falsification of public documents ─charges which are included in his
allegations in the civil and criminal cases.
Obviously, the Commission is not empowered to resolve matters which are pending resolution by the regular
courts to which jurisdiction properly pertains. The IBP, particularly the Commission on Bar Discipline, is
merely tasked to investigate and make recommendations on complaints for disbarment, suspension and
discipline of lawyers. It is not a regular court and thus is not endowed with the power to investigate and
resolve judicial matters pending before the regular courts.
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis, they belong to a class of their own, and are distinct from that of
civil or criminal actions.18 To be sure, a finding of liability in a civil case or a conviction in a criminal case is
not necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding. However, in the instant
case, the civil and criminal cases involving the acts referred to in the proposed amended/supplemental
complaint are still pending adjudication before the regular courts. Prudence dictates that the action of the
Commission related to the proposed amended/supplemental complaint in the administrative case be
sustained in order to avoid contradictory findings in that case and in the court cases.19
2. YES. A review of the records disclose that petitioners lifted and cited most of the amendatory averments in
respondent’s Verified Answer in the administrative case as the core of their Amended Complaint in the civil
case. In fact, petitioners even identified the Verified Answer and the disbarment proceedings itself as the
sources of the averments in the Amended Complaint before the trial court.
Disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer are private and confidential until its final determination.22 The
confidential nature of the proceedings has a three-fold purpose, to wit:
a. to enable the court and the investigator to make the investigation free from any extraneous influence
or interference;
b. to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless charges of disgruntled,
vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting the publication of such charges pending
their resolution; and
c. to deter the press from publishing the charges or proceedings based thereon
Petitioners had in effect announced to the world the pending disbarment case against respondent. Not only
did they disclose the ongoing proceedings, they also divulged most, if not all of the contents of respondent’s
Verified Answer. Clearly, petitioners’ acts impinged on the confidential nature of the disbarment proceedings
against Atty. Soriano.
Petition was dismissed
SANCTION/PENALTY: Petitioners were reminded to preserve the confidentiality of administrative proceedings.

6. Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun vs. Prima Jesusa Quinsayas, et al. (G.R. No. 194578, February 13,2013)
FACTS:
This case involves the Maguindanao massacre. Petitioner is the counsel for Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr.
(Ampatuan, Jr.), the principal accused in the murder cases. Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint
against petitioner. While the disbarment case was still pending, petitioner alleged that several media outlets
(GMA News Tv, Inquirer, Philstar, ANC) published articles related to the pending disbarment case. Petitioner
alleged that Atty. Quinsayas, et al. actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint against him in
violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. Petitioner
pointed out that the disbarment complaint was discussed by a media personality (Drilon) with Atty. Quinsayas in a
television program viewed nationwide.
In its Comment, GMA Network alleged that the publication had already been done and completed when Atty.
Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint and thus, the members of the media who reported the
news and the media groups that published it on their website, did not violate the confidentiality rule. Some of the
other media outlets alleged that they reported the disbarment complaint against petitioner as it involved public
interest and perceived it to be a newsworthy subject. They further alleged that assuming the news article is not a
privileged communication, it is covered by the protection of the freedom of expression, speech, and of the press
under the Constitution.
Atty. Quinsayas claimed that the alleged posting and publication of the articles were not established as a fact.
Respondent alleged that petitioner did not submit certified true copies of the articles and he only offered to submit
a digital video disk (DVD) copy of the televised program where Atty. Quinsayas was allegedly interviewed by
Drilon. Respondents alleged that, assuming the articles were published, petitioner failed to support his allegations
that they actively disseminated the details of the disbarment complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Atty. Quinsayas violated the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings, warranting a
finding of guilt for indirect contempt of court.
RULING:
Yes.
Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final
order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.
The purpose of the rule is not only to enable this Court to make its investigations free from any extraneous
influence or interference, but also to protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys and judges
from the baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive, and irresponsible clients and litigants; it is also to deter the
press from publishing administrative cases or portions thereto without authority.
However, If there is a legitimate public interest, media is not prohibited from making a fair, true, and accurate
news report of a disbarment complaint. In the absence of a legitimate public interest in a disbarment complaint,
members of the media must preserve the confidentiality of disbarment proceedings during its pendency.
In this case, the filing of a disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern considering
that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the public is not on petitioner himself but
primarily on his involvement and participation as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Since the
disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a right to publish such fact under
freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes that respondent media groups and personalities merely acted
on a news lead they received when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.
Still, Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant in the
disbarment case against petitioner and as a lawyer. As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is
familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality,
Atty. Quinsayas disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against petitioner to members of the media
which act constitutes contempt of court.
SANCTION/PENALTY:
WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Prima Jesusa B. Quinsayas GUILTY of indirect contempt for distributing copies of
the disbarment complaint against Atty. Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun to members of the media and we order her to pay a
FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000).
7. Crisanta Jimenez vs. Atty. Joel Jimenez (A.C. No. 6712, February 6, 2006)
FACTS:
Petitioner Crisanta Jimenez alleged that respondent Atty. Jimenez received in trust several documents for the
purpose of transferring the registration thereof in her name. Due to a misunderstanding between Crisanta’s
husband and respondent's father, she demanded the return of the documents but Atty. Jimenez failed and
refused to turn over the same. She also claimed that Atty. Jimenez surreptitiously took from her residence a black
bag containing important documents. She thus instituted cases for qualified theft and estafa against the
respondent and his father. In addition, she filed the instant administrative case for respondent's disbarment.
In his answer, Atty. Jimenez admitted that he received certain documents from Aurora Realon, an agent of
petitioner's husband, Antonio Jimenez, his uncle, the latter being a brother of his father, with instructions to
deliver the same to his father. He also disclaimed any responsibility to account or deliver property to petitioner
due to the absence of any lawyer-client relationship between them. He alleged that petitioner and her husband
are persecuting him to collaterally attack his father, with whom they have a serious misunderstanding regarding
their agency agreement.
He also averred that the Makati Prosecutor's Office dismissed the complaint for estafa for lack of merit and
insufficiency of evidence. In the report the Investigating Commissioner concluded that respondent could not be
held administratively liable for the charges against him and thus recommended the dismissal of the complaint,
which report and recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Joel Jimenez engaged in dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct, failed to account
property received from a client, and failed to deliver property upon demand of a client.
RULING: No. The SC agreed with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
The long-settled rule is that the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence against an
accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily foreclose the administrative
proceeding against him or carry with it the relief from administrative liability. The quantum of evidence needed in
a criminal case is different from that required in an administrative case.
In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was presented to prove that respondent engaged in dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct. There was no factual or legal basis, much less substantial ground to hold
respondent administratively liable.
The SC finds no merit in the allegations of petitioner that respondent failed to account and deliver property she
demanded from him
The documents received by respondent from Realon were not held by him in trust for the petitioner. What was
delivered to respondent was the material or physical possession of the documents and not the juridical
possession thereof. Juridical possession of said documents pertains to the receipt by respondent's father being
the attorney-in-fact of the petitioner and Antonio by virtue of a special power of attorney.
As correctly pointed out by respondent, he has no duty to account anything to the petitioner as there is no
attorney-client relationship between them. The only relationship between them is that of an estranged aunt and a
nephew-in-law; whereby the former once asked the latter to act as a courier between her and his father. Besides,
with or without any of these relations, the respondent has nothing to account or deliver to petitioner as the
documents in question were never within his juridical possession nor were they unlawfully taken by him.
SANCTION/PENALTY: PETITION DENIED.
8. Republic of the Philippines vs. Maria Lourdes Sereno (G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)
FACTS: CJ Sereno purportedly failed to file her SALNs while she was a member of the faculty of the U.P. College
of Law and that she filed her SALN only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006.Hence, the Republic seeks to oust
respondent from her position as Chief Justice on the ground that she failed to show that she is a person of
proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under the Constitution.
The Republic thus concludes that since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven
integrity, she has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.
Republic justifies its resort to the unconventional method of quo warranto by stating that it seeks respondent's
ouster, not on account of commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to assume the
position of Chief Justice.Respondent argues that, on the strength of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
the Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sereno is eligible as a candidate and nominee for the position of Chief Justice? (NO)
RULING: : No, compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person's integrity. Respondent
chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
A member of the Judiciary who commits such violations cannot be deemed to be a person of proven integrity.
Respondent's failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not
established at the time of her applicationThe qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are
enshrined in Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution:
x x x (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character and is a clear breach of
the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency as a
deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official who has failed to comply with the
requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her
disqualified from holding public office.
The requirement to file a SALN is not a trivial or a formal requirement. Neither is it something over which public
officials can exercise discretion. It is mandated by Our Constitution and laws. It is meant to forge transparency
and accountability in the government and as a measure meant to curb corruption.
TN: The SC clarified that the quo warranto only applies if it is the appointment that is being questioned, not the
acts done while he or she was already in that position. This means that it retroacts to the appointment of that
officer to that position.
SANCTION/PENALTY: Removed from Office/ Impeached.
9. Amalia R. Ceniza vs. Atty. Eliseo B. Ceniza Jr. (A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019)
FACTS: The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received the complainant's letter-complaint denouncing the
immoral conduct committed by her husband, a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She submitted
therewith her affidavit detailing the grounds for her denunciation. The complainant stated that she and the
respondent were married on November 12, 1989 at the Sacred Heart Parish in Cebu City; that in time they had
two children, Marie Agnes (Agnes) and Christopher Chuck; that on April 21, 2008, he told her that he would be
attending a seminar in Manila, but because she had some business to attend to in General Santos City, he
seemingly agreed to her request to forego with his trip to Manila; and that upon her return from General Santos
City, however, he had already moved out of their home, taking along with him his car and personal belongings.
The complainant went to the Mandaue City Hall where the respondent worked as a legal officer in order to inquire
about his situation. She learned from members of his staff that they had suspected him of carrying on an
extra-marital affair with one Anna Fe Flores Binoya (Anna). On the next day, the complainant, accompanied by
her daughter and a nephew, went to the address provided by the staff to verify the information. They were able to
meet Anna's sister who informed them that she had moved out of their address; that Anna and her second
husband, Atty. Eliseo Ceniza, Jr. the herein respondent, had been living together in Aldea Subdivision; and that in
the evening of said date the complainant and her daughter proceeded to the new address where they found and
confronted the respondent, who simply denied having committed any wrongdoing.
The respondent commenced a civil action seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the complainant,
alleging her psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. The respondent visited the complainant at
work and requested her to agree to the nullification of their marriage. She refused and instead pleaded with him
to avoid displaying his paramour in public Her pleas notwithstanding, he continued with the illicit relationship. The
complainant brought a complaint for immorality against the respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Complainant sent a letter to President Macapagal-Arroyo alleging therein that her husband had abandoned her
and their children in order to live with another woman. The Presidential Action Center of the Office of the
President forwarded the complainant's letter to President Macapagal-Arroyo to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC). In due course, the OBC directed the respondent to comment on the complaint against him. The
respondent denied having engaged in immoral conduct and maintained that Anna had only been a business
partner. He insisted that he had moved in with his parents after leaving their family home; and that he had left the
complainant because her behavior had become unbearable. The Office of the Ombudsman found the respondent
guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for having an extramarital affair with a woman in violation of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
IBP recommendation: WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that the
administrative suit be dismissed but with WARNING to the respondent to be more circumspect in his actuation to
avoid the impression of committing immorality.
ISSUE: Should the respondent be disciplined for the actions attributed to him by the complainant? (YES)
RULING: We disagree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors for the dismissal of the charge of
immorality. It appears to us that Commissioner Hababag utterly failed to conscientiously discharge his
responsibility as the factfinder; and that he also did not properly appreciate the facts in relation to the relevant
laws and the canons of ethics. All that he accomplished was to rehash the principles of law that he believed were
applicable, but without calibrating such principles to whatever facts were found by him to be established. He did
not even explain why the principles were relevant to the case of the respondent. Such nonchalant discharge of
the responsibility of fact-finding was almost perfunctory, certainly lackluster, and bereft of the requisite
enthusiasm. What makes it worse for the timid, if not lethargic, recommendation was the unquestioning
affirmance by the IBP Board of Governors, which seemingly failed to even notice the glaring inadequacy. For
sure, the finding of insufficient evidence against the respondent was unwarranted. He had not even put forward
anything of substance in his defense. He had been content with merely denying the imputed wrongdoing, but his
denial did not disprove the substantial evidence adduced against him. He had been sufficiently shown to have
abandoned his legitimate spouse and family in order to live with a married woman. The findings made by the
Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative case brought against the respondent more than sufficed to show
his immorality, thereby showing his failure to live up to the legal and ethical obligations of a lawyer. In this regard,
we adopt and reiterate the apt findings of the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent is adamant in his denial that
he has a relationship with Binoya. He insists that complainant's accusation that he was having an affair with
Binoya was purely speculative and unsupported by evidence. Complainant, for her part, presented affidavits not
only of their daughter, Marie Agnes ("Marie"), but also of two others, namely: Roberto Joseph Galvan ("Galvan")
and Gabriel Jadraque ("Jadraque").
Complainant likewise proffered photographs proving her claim that respondent frequents Binoya's house, as well
as, proofs that the place which her husband visits was indeed owned by Binoya. Complainant also adduced
evidence to the effect that facts of marriage appear in the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Cebu City, between
Binoya and a certain Ebrahaim Angeles Yap who were married on 18 October 2002 at Al Khariah Mosque, San
Nicolas, Mambaling, Cebu City. The corresponding Certificate of Marriage was likewise submitted. Vis-a-vis
complainant's overwhelming allegations, respondent offered only self-serving denials. It is elementary that
denials are weak especially if unsupported by evidence. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.
The members of the legal profession must conform to the highest standards of morality because the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandated them so, to wit:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
There is no question that a married person's abandonment of his or her spouse in order to live and cohabit with
another constitutes immorality. The offense may even be criminal - either as concubinage or as adultery. Immoral
conduct, or immorality, is that which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. As a basis of disciplinary action, such immoral conduct, or
immorality must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency. That the illicit partner is himself or herself married compounds the immorality. In disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. The Court will exercise its disciplining authority only
if the case against the respondent is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Given the
serious and far-reaching consequences of disbarment, only a clearly preponderant showing can warrant the
imposition of the harsh penalty of disbarment. Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by
one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other; it means evidence that is more
convincing as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Herein, the complainant presented clearly preponderant evidence showing that the respondent, while being
lawfully married to her, had maintained an illicit relationship with a married woman. It is of no moment that she
presented no direct evidence of the illicit relationship between him and his mistress; or that her proof of his
immorality was circumstantial. Direct evidence is that evidence which proves a fact in issue directly without any
reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
indirectly proves a fact in issue; the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence.
The lack of direct evidence should not obstruct the adjudication of a dispute, for circumstantial evidence may be
available for the purpose. The Rules of Court has really made no distinction between direct evidence of a fact
and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. Thus, for the respondent to
insist that the complainant did not discharge her burden of proof because she did not adduce direct evidence of
the immorality is utterly fallacious. As the records amply indicated, the circumstantial evidence adduced herein
compelled the conclusion that he had abandoned the complainant and their children in order to cohabit with his
married mistress.
Time and again, the Court has pointed out that when the integrity or morality of a member of the Bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he or she denies the charge, for he or she must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence presented on the charge. He or she must present proof that he or she still maintains the degree of
integrity and morality expected of him or her at all times. The respondent failed in this regard.
SANCTION/PENALTY: WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ELISEO B.
CENIZA, JR. guilty of gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; DISBARS him from the practice of law effective upon receipt of this decision; and ORDERS his
name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be attached to the respondent's personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
10. Trovela vs. Assistant Prosecutor Michael Robles, et al. (A.C. No. 11550, June 4, 2018)
FACTS: The complainant initiated this disbarment complaint against Pasig City Assistant Prosecutor Michael B.
Robles of Pasig City for issuing a resolution recommending the dismissal of his complaint for estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code against Katigbak, Salonga and Reyes for insufficiency of
evidence; and against Prosecutor II Emmanuel L. Obuñgen and City Prosecutor Jacinto G. Ang, both of Pasig
City, for approving the recommendation of dismissal.
The complainant also seeks the disbarment of former Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano and former Secretary
of Justice Leila M. De Lima for allegedly incurring inordinate delay in issuing their resolutions resolving his
petition for review and motion for reconsideration before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The complainant stated that he became the Employee Relations Director of Sky Cable. He later on received a
termination letter 2 years later signed by Salonga informing him of his relief from work and of his compensation
being paid until the effective date of his termination. That complainant’s payslips for the periods from July 16,
2006 to July 31, 2006 and from August 1, 2006 to August 15, 2006 still reflected deductions of his savings
contributions to the Meralco Employees Savings and Loan Association (MESALA) amounting to P2,520.00 per
payday period; that withholding taxes of P4,509.45 and P4,235.70, respectively, were also deducted from his
compensation; that he discovered that such deductions were not remitted to MESALA when he closed his
account on September 6, 2006; and that Sky Cable did not reimburse the amounts of his unremitted deductions
despite demand.
In his resolution Robles recommended the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Obuñgen and
Ang approved the recommendation of dismissal. The complainant filed his petition for review to appeal the
dismissal of his complaint. Arellano issued his resolution finding no reversible error in the resolution of Robles,
hence, affirming the dismissal of the complaint.
The complainant moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by Secretary De Lima.
ISSUE: Should the respondents be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of the complainant?
RULING: No, the respondents should not be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of the
complaint. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) has no jurisdiction to investigate government lawyers
charged with administrative offenses involving the performance of their official duties.
In his complaint-affidavit, the complainant has posited that Robles, Obuñgen and Ang committed grave errors of
facts and law that require an inquiry into their mental and moral fitness as members of the Bar; and that Arellano
and Secretary De Lima be declared guilty of dereliction of duty or gross inexcusable negligence for belatedly
resolving his petition for review and motion for reconsideration.
The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or discharge of official duties as
prosecutors of the Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang
and Arellano exclusively pertained to their superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima,
the authority to discipline pertained to the President. In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of
the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public officials pursuant to
Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).Indeed, the accountability of
respondents as officials performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always to
be differentiated from their accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to
investigate them as such lawyers.
SANCTION/PENALTY: No sanction/penalty. the Court DISMISSES the disbarment complaint filed against all
the respondents for lack of jurisdiction.
11. Guevarra-Castil vs. Atty. Emely Reyes Trinidad (A.C. No. 10294, July 12, 2022)
FACTS: Complainant Maryanne Merriam B. Guevarra-Castil (Maryanne), accused her husband, Orlando L.
Castil, Jr. (Orlando), and Atty. Trinidad, of maintaining an extra-marital affair.
Atty. Trinidad and Orlando are both officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP), and got to know each other
by reason of their work. Several years back, Maryanne started receiving reports from friends and Orlando's
co-workers of the pair's supposed fling which she shrugged off as rumors. However, unable to contain the doubts
and speculations any longer, Maryanne confronted Orlando which the latter confirmed his infidelity with Atty.
Trinidad. Maryanne contacted Atty. Trinidad to beg her to stop seeing Orlando, and end their romantic
entanglement but Atty. Trinidad allegedly insulted and demeaned Maryanne, instead of showing remorse and
bragged about her being a lawyer and a ranking PNP personnel. Atty. Trinidad allegedly said, "kayangkaya ko
maging business [person] tulad mo, pero ikaw hindi mo kaya maging abogado tulad ko!" Moreover, Atty. Trinidad
belittled Maryanne, saying that any complaint against her would be futile because of her legal knowledge and
position in the PNP. In one of their exchanges, Atty. Trinidad allegedly told Maryanne, "kahit na ipatanggal mo
ako sa trabaho ko, lawyer pa rin naman ako. Na hindi kamukha mo, pag nawala si Orlando wala nang
mangyayari sa buhay mo!"
In another incident, as she was cleaning their room, Maryanne stumbled upon a birth certificate, despite not
having any child, and was shocked to see the child's name — and the indicated parents — Atty. Trinidad and
Orlando. The birth certificate also contained an "Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity" executed by
Orlando.
In her defense, Atty. Trinidad contended that she does not personally know Maryanne, nor does she have any
knowledge of the latter's relationship with Orlando. Atty. Trinidad claimed that she only got to know of Maryanne
being the wife of Orlando, when she started receiving complaints from the former.
The Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Trinidad guilty of the acts complained of, declaring her actions to
amount to gross immorality and misconduct, and constitute a violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7, Rule
7.03 of the CPR and imposed the penalty of disbarment. The IBP Board adopted the resolution. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: (A) Whether the court has jurisdiction over Atty. Trinidad; (B) Whether Atty. Trinidad should be
disbarred for the acts complained of.
RULING:
(A) Yes. the Court notes that Atty. Trinidad, aside from being a lawyer, is also a member of the PNP. As
held in various cases, such as in Fuji v. Dela Cruz and as reaffirmed in Trovela v. Robles (Trovela),
this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in government
service. Instead, the complaint is referred to either the proper administrative body that has
disciplinary authority over the erring government lawyer, or the Ombudsman. This same ruling is
explained in depth in the case of Spouses Buffe v. Gonzalez (Spouses Buffe). The common element
in Fuji, Alicias, Trovela, and Spouses Buffe, which led to the dismissal of the disbarment cases in
these rulings, is the fact that the government lawyers concerned committed acts and omissions
primarily involving their official duties. In other words, they were charged in their capacity as public
servants, and not as members of the Bar.
Despite the foregoing, the Court has nevertheless refused to shirk away from its constitutional mandate
to regulate the admission to, and the practice of law, which necessarily includes the authority to
discipline, suspend, or even disbar misbehaving members of the legal profession, whenever proper and
called for. Indeed, "if the government official's misconduct is of such character as to affect his [or her]
qualification as a lawyer, or to show moral delinquency, he [or she] may be disciplined as a member of
the bar on such ground." This mandate is enjoined no less by the 1987 Constitution, specifically Article
VIII, Section 5, paragraph (5).
Pursuant to this mandate, the Court has codified conditions before one may be admitted to the practice of
law, as well as ethical conduct legal practitioners must always abide to. Foremost of these are Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to the Bar), and Rule 139-B (Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys) of the
Rules of Court, as well as the Lawyer's Oath, and the CPR.
NATURE of a DISBARMENT COMPLAINT – Unlike regular civil and criminal cases, disbarment
proceedings are sui generis in character, and are not meant to inflict criminal or civil sanctions. Instead,
the main question to be resolved is whether the lawyer involved is still fit to continue to be an officer of
the court in the dispensation of justice.
Thus, in order to guide disbarment cases concerning government lawyers, the Court lays the following
rules in the filing and handling of complaints against government lawyers, to serve as guidelines for both
the bench and the bar:
1. All complaints against and which seek to discipline government lawyers in their respective
capacities as members of the Bar must be filed directly before this Court. Conversely, complaints
which do not seek to discipline them as members of the Bar shall be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and referred to the Ombudsman or concerned government agency for appropriate
action.
2. In connection with paragraph 1, upon filing, the Court must determine whether the concerned
agency, the Ombudsman, or the Court, has jurisdiction over the complaint against the
government lawyer. In making such determination, the following must be considered: did the
allegations of malfeasance touch upon the errant lawyer's continuing obligations under the CPR
and/or the Lawyer's Oath? To put it more simply, the primordial question to be asked in making
this determination is this: do the allegations in the complaint, assuming them to be true,
make the lawyer unfit to practice the profession?
2a. If the question in paragraph 2 yields a positive answer, the case properly lies before the
Court, which shall retain jurisdiction. This is so because again, the power to regulate the
practice of law, and discipline members of the bar, belongs to Us. Necessarily, proceedings to
be had before this Court should concern these and only these matters. This rule shall hold,
even if the complaint also contains allegations of administrative and/or civil service rules
infractions. In such situation however; the Court shall limit its ruling only to the matter of the
respondent's fitness as a lawyer.
2b. On the other hand, if the question in paragraph 2 yields a negative answer, the Court, for lack
of jurisdiction, shall dismiss the case and refer the same to the appropriate government office
or the Ombudsman.
3. If multiple complaints have been filed, the process shall be the same.
In the event that paragraph 2b shall apply, and results in a situation where one or more complaint/s have
been dismissed and referred to the appropriate government office or the Ombudsman, and one or more
complaint/s have been retained by this Court, the cases shall proceed independently from one another.
In this case, Maryanne specifically alleged in her complaint the following:

21. Upon consultation with a counsel, I learned that Atty. Trinidad's actions are clearly against the
Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01, which states, "A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Assuming that these allegations are true, do they make Atty. Trinidad unfit to be a member of the legal
profession? We answer in the positive. Thus, the SC hold that it has jurisdiction to resolve the present
disbarment complaint.
(B) Yes, the Court adopted the findings of the Commission, as affirmed by the Board, and sustains the
imposition of the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Trinidad.
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the CPR state:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Meanwhile, Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds . — A member of the bar may
n be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for
a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied).
In the present case, there is no denying that Atty. Trinidad's actions of maintaining an adulterous affair with
Orlando, which even produced a child, falls under the definition of grossly immoral conduct. As correctly found by
the Commission, these acts are not only grossly immoral and unlawful, but more importantly, "adversely reflects
on [Atty. Trinidad's] fitness to practice law."
SANCTION/PENALTY: Disbarred
12. Roger Asuncion vs. Atty. Ronaldo Salvado (A.C. No. 13242, July 5, 2022)
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
SANCTION/PENALTY:
13. Crisanta Hosoya vs. Atty. Allan Contado (A.C. No. 10731, October 5, 2021)
FACTS:
The parties here were lovers and they bore a child. Petitioner maintained her relationship with respondent despite
having knowledge that he is married. Their relationship turned sour, which led respondent to leave their home.
Subsequently, respondent gave little to no support to petitioner. Aside from this, respondent also took petitioner’s
vehicle.
This prompted the disbarment proceedings against respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent be disbarred.
RULING:
Yes, respondent should be disbarred for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR.
For the imposition of the penalty of disbarment on the ground of immortality, the conduct complained of must not
only be immoral, but must be grossly immoral. It is well-settled that married person's abandonment of his or her
spouse to live with and cohabit with another constitutes gross immorality as it amounts to either adultery or
concubinage.
Here, Atty. Contados statements, therefore, made it clear to the Court that he abandoned his legal wife and family
to cohabit with Crisanta that resulted in two children.
Further, the fact that Atty. Contado has not yet returned the subject vehicle to Crisanta despite demand bolsters
this disciplinary case against him.
Refusal to return property despite lawful demand is akin to deliberate failure to pay debt. Jurisprudence is clear
that a lawyer's failure to pay debts despite repeated demands constitutes dishonest and deceitful conduct77 also
a violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer; this
is in accord with a lawyer's mandate to "faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients." The Court may impose the penalty of disbarment or suspension from the practice of law
against the erring lawyer for failure to pay debts.
SANCTION/PENALTY: Atty. Allan C. Contado is GUILTY of gross immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law effective upon receipt
of this Decision. His name is ORDERED stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
14. Soledad Nuñez vs. Atty. Romulo Ricafort (A.C. No. 5054 & A.C. No. 6484, March 2, 2021)
FACTS:
Records show that a total of three (3) administrative disciplinary complaints were filed and resolved against
petitioner, all involving serious breaches of his fiduciary duties as an attorney to his clients.
To recount, the records of A.C. No. 5054 show that in 1982, petitioner was engaged by a client to sell the latter's lots. After
successfully selling the same, petitioner, however, failed to remit the proceeds of the sale despite numerous demands,
resulting in his client filing a civil suit against him. Even after his client won in the civil case, petitioner engaged in various
machinations to avoid said remittance, and in so doing, defied the final and executory judgment in the civil case. In light of the
foregoing, the Court indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law, and ordered him to return to the complainant the
amount of P13,800.00.
Meanwhile, in A.C. No. 8253, petitioner was engaged by a client in 1992 to assist him in a dispute involving the latter's
foreclosed property. Instead of consigning the money given to him by his client, petitioner deposited the amount into his
personal account. Furthermore, when the court required the filing of a memorandum, petitioner, despite having been paid
additional expenses by his client, did not file the same. Petitioner was found administratively liable, and considering his
previous similar infraction in A.C. No. 5054, the Court imposed on him the supreme penalty of disbarment, and ordered him to
return to the complainant the amount of P80,000.00.
Finally, in A.C. No. 6484, petitioner was once more, engaged by a client in September 2000 regarding a potential case for
recovery of land. In connection therewith, the latter gave petitioner the money that was supposed to answer for the
redemption price of the land, the filing fees, and his legal fees. Three (3) years later, the client discovered that petitioner did
not institute the necessary action, as agreed upon. Further, the client found out that petitioner was indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law since May 29, 2002, which was probably the reason why the latter pawned off the case to another counsel.
The Court found him administratively liable.
On March 25, 2019, petitioner filed the subject petition, attaching numerous certifications and testimonials in
support of his plea for clemency. He laments that it has been 17 years since he was ordered indefinitely
suspended in A.C. No. 5054 and has since atoned for his indiscretions. At the age of 70, petitioner earnestly
hopes to be accorded judicial clemency "before he embarks on his final journey into the unknown," and that his
absolution would be the only legacy he would leave to his children and grandchildren.
ISSUE:
Whether or not judicial clemency should be granted in favor of petitioner.
RULING:
As case law states, "[m]embership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute
or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued
only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character." "The same
reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its inherent power to grant
reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness and
knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar.
At its core, "[t]he basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar.
Nevertheless, granting judicial clemency lies in the sound discretion of the Court pursuant to its constitutional
mandate to regulate the legal profession. In the exercise of such discretion, the Court is essentially called to
perform an act of mercy. However, the compassion of the Court in clemency cases must always be tempered by
the greater interest of the legal profession and the society in general.
It was in the 2007 case of Re: Diaz that the Court first framed the operative guidelines for judicial clemency, albeit
under the context of a clemency petition filed by a disrobed judge. In the said case, the Court, "[i]n the exercise of
its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof, [laid] down the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:"
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges
or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a
strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
At the outset, it is observed that the testimonials/certifications attached to the subject petitions were all
one-pagers that are similarly patterned and worded. The uncanny similarities between the
testimonials/certifications create an impression that they were not actual and personal accounts of the
signatories, but rather — more likely than not — all pre-made, pro-forma documents conveniently made for their
signing.
Complementarily, it is further observed that none of these testimonials/certifications were executed under oath
and hence, render doubtful, on their face, the genuineness of the statements or at the very least, the sincerity of
those who signed the same. Even more, neither was there any corroborative evidence included in the petition to
show that the alleged socio-civic activities mentioned in the petition were indeed conducted and if so, how many
times were they conducted, including their details and scope.
At any rate, it is discerned that petitioner committed multiple serious breaches of his fiduciary duties to different
clients, demonstrating his great propensity in this respect. This resulted into the imposition of the most drastic
penalties of indefinite suspension in A.C. No. 5054, disbarment in A.C. No. 8253, and another disbarment in A.C.
No. 6484. In fact, despite having been indefinitely suspended in A.C. No. 5054 on May 29, 2002, he continued
practicing law from the years 2002 to 2003. Worse, aside from his unauthorized practice of law, he concealed the
fact of his indefinite suspension from his client in A.C. 6484 and furthermore, failed to file the action for recovery
as agreed upon resulting into the said client's prejudice. To note, as found in the Decision of A.C. No. 6484, it was
only three (3) years later from the time of petitioner's engagement that the complainant in said case learned that
no such action was ever filed by him. Thus, in view of petitioner's numerous infractions, the Court does not
believe that "[s]ufficient time [has] lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation,
SANCTION/PENALTY: The Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is DENIED.
(Just in case i-ask)

The new clemency guidelines for reinstatement to the Bar:
1. A lawyer who has been disbarred cannot file a petition for judicial clemency within a period of five (5) years from
the effective date of his or her disbarment, unless for the most compelling reasons based on extraordinary
circumstances, a shorter period is warranted.
For petitions already filed at the time of this Resolution , the Court may dispense with the five (5)-year minimum
requirement and instead, in the interest of fairness, proceed with a preliminary evaluation of the petition in order to
determine its prima facie merit.
2. Upon the lapse of the said five (5)-year period, or earlier if so permitted by the Court, a disbarred lawyer becomes
eligible to file a verified petition for judicial clemency. The petition, together with its supporting evidence appended
thereto, must show on its face that the following criteria have been met:
a. The petitioner has fully complied with the terms and conditions of all prior disciplinary orders, including
orders for restitution, as well as the five (5)-year period to file, unless he or she seeks an earlier filing for the
most compelling reasons based on extraordinary circumstances;
b. The petitioner recognizes the wrongfulness and seriousness of the misconduct for which he or she was
disbarred. For petitions already filed at the time of this Resolution, it is required that the petitioner show that
he or she genuinely attempted in good faith to reconcile with the wronged private offended party in the case
for which he or she was disbarred (if any), or if such is not possible, the petitioner must explain with
sufficient reasons as to why such attempt at reconciliation could not be made; and
c. Notwithstanding the conduct for which the disbarred lawyer was disciplined, the disbarred lawyer has the
requisite integrity and competence to practice law.
3. Upon the filing of the verified petition for clemency, together with its attachments, the Court shall first conduct a
preliminary evaluation and determine if the same has prima facie merit based on the criteria abovestated.
4. If the petition has prima facie merit based on the above-criteria, the Court shall refer the petition to the OBC (or any
other fact-finding body the Court so designates) in order to verify the details and the authenticity of the statements
made and the evidence attached to the clemency petition. If the petition fails to show any prima facie merit, it should
be denied.
5. After its investigation, the OBC (or such other fact-finding body designated by the Court) shall submit its fact-finding
report to the Court, which shall ultimately resolve the clemency petition based on the facts established in the said
report. The threshold of evidence to be applied is clear and convincing evidence since it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to hurdle the seriousness of his or her established past administrative liability/ies, the gravity of which had
warranted the supreme penalty of disbarment.
6. Unless otherwise resolved by the Court sitting En Banc, these guidelines and procedure shall apply to pending
petitions for judicial clemency, as well as to those filed after the promulgation of this Resolution.

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PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS

ATTY. STEPHEN L. YU | AY 2022-2023 | M2

(in case iask unsa na pud sa letter)

OCA’s Report and Recommendations

1. Were not verified; and

In this relation, Section 2 of Rule 140 states that:

SANCTION/PENALTY: There was no sanction or penalty. The complaints were DISMISSED.

Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

4. Garrido vs. Garrido, et al. (A.C. No. 6593, February 4, 2010)

YES. The respondents should be disbarred.

As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, the possession of good moral character is both a

In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second

Petitioners claim the following as well:

Petition was dismissed

SANCTION/PENALTY: Petitioners were reminded to preserve the confidentiality of administrative proceedings.

Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SANCTION/PENALTY: PETITION DENIED.

SANCTION/PENALTY: Removed from Office/ Impeached.

In this case, Maryanne specifically alleged in her complaint the following:

This prompted the disbarment proceedings against respondent.

SANCTION/PENALTY: The Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is DENIED.

(Just in case i-ask)

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