An African Ethics of Personhood and

Bioethics: A Reflection on Abortion and

Euthanasia 1st ed. Edition Motsamai
Molefe
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An African Ethics of
Personhood and Bioethics
A Reflection on Abortion
and Euthanasia

Motsamai Molefe
An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics
 Motsamai Molefe

An African Ethics of
Personhood and
Bioethics
A Reflection on Abortion and Euthanasia
Motsamai Molefe
University of Fort Hare
East London, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-46518-6    ISBN 978-3-030-46519-3 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3

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 This book is my gift to my father Andrew Ndodana Manzana. Thank you
for all you have done for me. I am what I am because of your endless efforts
to make sure that all is well with me.
 Preface

This book emerges as a response to two considerations in the literature

concerned with the discourse on personhood in African philosophy. Firstly,
a number of scholars have raised serious objections against the moral idea
of personhood in the literature. Many of these criticisms pivot on whether
the idea of personhood can embody social or even global justice. Some
commentators point to its sexist or patriarchal nature; others point to its
ageist orientation, others to its homophobic tendency and others point to
its speciesism. Ifeanyi Menkiti’s, a pioneer in the discourse of personhood,
recent reflections on social and global justice do not even attempt to reveal
the robustness or even the plausibility of the idea of personhood by mar-
shalling some kind of defence or response. As a result, questions remain
over the plausibility of the idea of personhood.
Secondly, Kevin Behrens’ essay—‘Two Normative Conceptions of
Personhood’—and Anthony Oyowe’s—‘Personhood and the Strongly
Normative Constraint’—make discomforting observations about the idea
of personhood in African philosophy. Behrens notes that there are two
distinct moral concepts in moral philosophy, namely: (1) moral virtue and
(2) moral status. He observes that the first one, moral virtue, is prevalent
or even definitive of African moral thought. He also observes that the
second idea of moral status is prominent in the Western bioethical context.
These are two different moral concepts: the first one deals with evaluating
human conduct in terms of excellence and the second one prescribes the
duty of respect towards beings that have the relevant moral capacities like
rationality or sentience, depending on what theory of it is being proposed
or defended. I agree with much of Behrens’ analysis except that it creates

vii
viii PREFACE

a false impression regarding the African idea of personhood. A careful

reading of Behrens’ essay suggests that the African idea of personhood has
no resources to tackle bioethical issues or is not useful in such contexts.
This book aims to demonstrate that the idea of personhood does have
resources and is useful in bioethical contexts.
I make the same observation regarding Oyowe’s essay in relation to the
idea of personhood. The difference between these two essays lies in the
fact that Oyowe is not primarily concerned with bioethical issues per se,
but with moral-political ones like citizenship, distributive justice and
rights. He observes that the idea of personhood has no moral-theoretical
resources to offer a robust alternative model to reflect on the above politi-
cal issues. He concludes his essay by suggesting that it is the idea of dig-
nity, what he calls the weakly normative notion of personhood, which can
offer a robust political discourse. What is worth noting is that he does not
appear to contemplate the possibility that the idea of personhood might
embody its own conception of dignity that might do the political work
that he believes a robust moral concept ought to do.
This book speaks to the oversight on the part of Behrens and Oyowe,
and the literature in African philosophy in general, regarding the richness
of the idea of personhood. These scholars overlook the idea that the
African idea of personhood does embody its own conception of dignity,
which is relevant, suitable and useful in bioethical and political contexts.
To demonstrate the robustness of the idea of personhood and its own
conception of dignity, this book will focus, in the main, on two bioethical
questions of abortion and euthanasia, and it will tersely reflect on the
issues of animals and disabled individuals. The major insight of this book
is that the African idea of personhood embodies its own conception of
dignity, which makes it suitable to engage in bioethical, environmental
and political themes.

East London, South Africa Motsamai Molefe

 Acknowledgements

The success of this work was possible because of a number of people to

whom I am eternally grateful. Space will not permit to express my grati-
tude to everyone.
First and foremost, I am exceedingly grateful to God for all that He is
and has done for and through me.
I wish to express special gratitude to Asithandile Zibaya for all the sup-
port and love she has given me during the process of writing this book.
I wish to thank my friends that stand by me and support me through my
academic journey: Sthembiso Khumalo, Sizwe Koom, Tumi Mohotlane,
Xolani Msimango, Sihle Khanyile, Dumisani Mbanyele, Otto Matsapula,
Kgomotso Moshugi, Promise Aphana, Akhona Mafani, Siyabonga Makwetu
and Ps. Gcumeni.
I also wish to appreciate the academic brothers and friends that have
supported me in this journey: Prof. Metz, Prof. Matolino, Dr. Mutshidzi
and my brother Dr. Mpofu.
I cannot omit to mention my colleagues at the Centre for Leadership
Ethics in Africa [CLEA], Chris Allsobrook and Thina Mnonopi. I would
not have been able to write this book without your support and
encouragement.
This book would not be possible without the generous financial sup-
port from the Govan Mbeki Research and Development Centre (GMRDC)
special funding at University of Fort Hare. I truly appreciate Prof. Pumla
Gqola’s support of my efforts to produce books in the field of African
philosophy. I am truly grateful and honoured to have been granted fund-
ing by Prof. Gqola, the dean of research.

ix
 Contents

1 Introduction: Personhood, Dignity and (African) Bioethics  1

The Concepts of Personhood and Moral Status in African
Philosophy   4
The Literature Review   9
The Structure of the Book  16
Conclusion  16
References  20

2 Personhood, Morality and Dignity in African Philosophy 27

Introduction  27
Personhood as an Agent-Centred Theory of Value  29
Implications of the Agent-Centred Theory of Value  34
Personhood and Dignity: The Patient-Centred Notion of
Personhood  40
Relationship Between Moral Status and Dignity  40
Menkiti’s Personhood-Based View of Dignity  46
Gyekye on Personhood and Dignity  52
Making Sense of the Capacity for Virtue  54
Conclusion  58
References  62

3 Personhood and Abortion in African Philosophy 69

Introduction  69
Statement of Methodology  72

xi
xii Contents

Controversial Approaches to the Question of Abortion  75

Horsthemke on Personhood, Abortion and the Young  83
Objections  91
The Objection Against Potential  91
The Case of Rape and Abortion  93
Animals and Mentally Disabled Individuals  95
Conclusion  96
References  99

4 Personhood and Euthanasia in African Philosophy103

Introduction 103
Definition of Euthanasia 105
The Context of the Discussion of Euthanasia in Africa 107
Personhood and a Good Death 111
Elders, Children and the Possibility of a Good Death 111
Virtuous Life and Good Death 114
Refining the Account 115
Personhood and Euthanasia 120
Conclusion 125
References 126

Index131
 About the Author

Motsamai Molefe is a senior researcher at the Centre for Leadership

Ethics in Africa (CLEA), University of Fort Hare, South Africa. He spe-
cialises in African philosophy, applied ethics (bioethics and animal ethics),
moral philosophy and social and political philosophy. He is the author of
An African Philosophy of Personhood, Morality, and Politics (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2019) and African Personhood and Applied Ethics [NISC, 2020].

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Personhood, Dignity

and (African) Bioethics

This book is a contribution to African philosophy. Like any tradition of

philosophy, African philosophy covers a broad range of themes insofar as
it deals with questions in metaphysics, epistemology, logic and ethics. The
focus of this book will be in the domain of African moral philosophy.
Here, we will discuss the confluence of two central concepts in [African]
moral philosophy. The primary concept will be the moral category of per-
sonhood in African philosophy.1 The second important concept will be the
universal value of dignity.2 The idea of personhood embodies an African
value system for assessing human lives that are morally excellent or virtu-
ous (Gyekye 1992; Menkiti 1984; Wiredu 1996). To judge someone [to
be] a person, in the moral sense, amounts to appreciating the quality of
their moral deportment or character insofar as it exudes virtue or excel-
lence (Ikuenobe 2006a, b; Molefe 2018a; Oyowe 2014).
The concept of dignity refers to the intrinsic worth associated with
some entity in virtue of possessing certain ontological features (Donnelly
2015; Ilesanmi 2001; Waldrow 2012). Dignity marks something, in virtue
of possessing certain ontological features or capacities, as having a superla-
tive rank (Metz 2012a; Waldrow 2012). Different theories of dignity dif-
fer in terms of the ontological feature or features they specify to account
for it, be they spiritual (the soul, the image of God, vitality) or natural
(rationality, autonomy, basic capabilities, the capacity for love, empathy or
care) (Metz 2012a; Nussbaum 2008).

© The Author(s) 2020 1

M. Molefe, An African Ethics of Personhood and Bioethics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46519-3_1
2 M. MOLEFE

The aim of this book is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to contribute to the

discourse on personhood and dignity. It will do so by articulating a theory
of dignity inherent in the discourse on personhood in African philosophy.
In other words, it will articulate an African conception of dignity by draw-
ing on the axiological resource of personhood. The insight here is that
there is a moral-theoretical connection between the idea of personhood
and dignity in African philosophy. Secondly, the aim will be to apply the
novel personhood-based conception of dignity to the discourse of bioeth-
ics, thus contributing to the emerging field of African bioethics (Tangwa
1996; Murove 2005; Behrens 2013a). The idea here is: the salient idea of
personhood in African philosophy embodies its own conception of moral
status [dignity], which is useful to the discourse of African bioethics.
The above aim—to contribute to African bioethics through a
personhood-­based theory of dignity—is informed by the centrality of the
concept of dignity in the discourse of bioethics (see Behrens 2013a;
Christiano 2008; Formosa and Mackenzie 2014). In fact, Daniel Sulmasy
(2008: 484) informs us that the idea of “dignity has important implica-
tions for addressing a variety of issues in bioethics”. For another, Adam
Schulman (2008: 4) avers—“the concept of human dignity … has an
important role to play in bioethics, both now and especially in future”. I
believe that the idea of personhood as initially advocated by leading think-
ers such as Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984, 2004), Kwame Gyekye (1992, 1997,
2010) and Kwasi Wiredu (1992, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2009), among oth-
ers, embodies a robust and under-explored view of dignity, which I aim to
unfold in this book.3 I believe that this view of dignity will offer us an
interesting African perspective on bioethical themes such as abortion and
euthanasia. Put differently, this book is one attempt to realise the vision
that Kevin Behrens (2013a: 32), one of the leading scholars of African
environmental ethics and bioethics, expresses it in this fashion—

One way is for African bioethicists to begin to apply indigenous African

philosophy, thought and values to ethical issues. This project is important (i)
to restore dignity; (ii) because a bioethics grounded in indigenous ideas is
more likely to be accepted by Africans; and (iii) because such ideas can
enrich bioethical discourse.

In the light of Behrens’ call, the aim of this book is to single out the
indigenous axiological concept of personhood (or, more precisely, a con-
ception of dignity inherent in it) and apply it to the bioethical themes of
 1 INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 3

abortion and euthanasia, thus contributing to African bioethics. I think

that this project is important for the very reasons provided by Behrens,
above. Firstly, this project is important for restoring the dignity of African
people, so that their forms of life—their cultures—should be one of the
crucial considerations in how we handle pressing practical ethical issues
(see Murove 2005). Secondly, African people are most likely to embrace
ethical systems that are in tune with plausible interpretations of African
thought and values. Finally, reflecting on moral issues in terms of local
intellectual and moral resources will contribute to global bioethics dis-
course by adding to the diversity of bioethical thought (Chuwa 2014).
This is important for cross-cultural learning and dialogue, and it provides
a platform for the evaluation of our diverse philosophical views.
Another reason that informs why this project is important and relevant
in African philosophy is that it speaks to the blind-spot or lacuna regarding
the idea of personhood. The literature focusing on the discourse on per-
sonhood has tended to overlook the possibility that the idea of person-
hood can embody its own conception of moral status and dignity. This
blind-spot in the literature is best exemplified in the writings of Behrens
(2013b) and Oyowe (2018). The possibility that the idea of personhood
entails its own conception of dignity is implicit in the works of scholars like
Ifeanyi Menkiti (1984), Kwame Gyekye (1992), Mogobe Ramose (2009),
but it has not been given the philosophical exposition and justification it
deserves. As a result, the possible moral-theoretical contribution the idea
of personhood qua dignity can make to bioethical, environmental and
political philosophy has escaped the attention of the literature.4 This book
is important because it will speak to this deficiency in the literature, by
directing us to how the idea of personhood can contribute to bioethical
discourses.
In this chapter, I provide the reader with a bird’s eye view of this book.
I structure this chapter as follows. I begin by clarifying the concepts of
personhood that are crucial to this project and their relation to the idea of
moral status (dignity) in the literature in African philosophy. The ultimate
burden of this section is to suggest how the African idea of personhood
embodies its own conception of dignity. Secondly, I give the reader a sense
of the status of the aforementioned bioethical themes—abortion and
euthanasia—in the tradition of African philosophy. Finally, I discuss the
chapters that will constitute the remainder of the book. Immediately
below, I discuss the concepts of personhood central to this project.
4 M. MOLEFE

The Concepts of Personhood and Moral Status

in African Philosophy

It is common knowledge that the idea of personhood in African philoso-

phy is characterised by ambiguity. Scholars of African thought tend to
distinguish between the ontological and normative concepts of person-
hood (Gyekye 1992; Ikuenobe 2006a, b, 2015, 2016; Matolino 2014;
Molefe 2016, 2019a, b; Oyowe 2013, 2014, 2018; Wiredu 1996, 2004,
2009). The ontological idea of personhood deals with the fact of being
human, and in analysing it we seek to do a philosophical explication of the
descriptive features that constitute human nature (see Gyekye 1995;
Kaphagawani 2004; Wiredu 2009; Ikuenobe 2015). I will say something
about the normative idea of personhood below. Thaddeus Metz (2013:
13), in his analysis of the debate between Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame
Gyekye, identifies three distinct concepts of personhood, namely: the ideas
of (1) being human; (2) moral status; and (3) moral virtue. In my own
analysis of the debate between Menkiti and Gyekye, I come to the same
conclusion as Metz (except that I identify a fourth distinct concept of
personhood in the literature—personal identity). We concur that the
debate exhibits a lack of precision regarding which notion of personhood
is pivotal in proffering a plausible interpretation of Afro-communitarian
moral and political thought (Molefe 2016, 2018b, 2019a, ch. 1).
Recently, Kevin Behrens (2013b) and Anthony Oyowe (2018) have
further distinguished two distinct normative notions of personhood pres-
ent in the literature. Behrens talks of the patient-centred and agent-centred
notions of personhood. Oyowe, on the other hand, talks of the strongly
and weakly normative notions of personhood.5 I take these distinctions to
be equivalent in terms of capturing two distinct moral concepts. Going
forward, I will use the more common distinction of the patient-centred
and agent-centred notions of personhood. I do so because it is important
to emphasise that both concepts are moral in nature; however, they play
different roles in moral discourse (see Behrens 2013b; Molefe 2019a: ch. 1).
In his essay—‘Two Normative “Conceptions” of Personhood’—
Behrens (2013b) observes that the agent-centred notion is salient in
African philosophy and the patient-centred one in the Western tradition.
He points to us what these concepts share in common. The obvious simi-
larity between these two concepts of personhood is that they both draw a
distinction between being a member of a biological group, Homo sapiens,
and being a person. It is one thing to be human and quite another to be a
 1 INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 5

person. Being human is an ontological fact that one is distinct from other
kinds of things in the world like tables, stones, grains of sands and so on.
Being human is available to ontological elucidations and justifications.
One can account for it by appeal entirely to material or even a combina-
tion of the material and spiritual properties (see Kaphagawani 2004;
Ikuenobe 2016).
The above distinction regarding being human and being a person is
borne out by Behrens in this fashion:

Thus the claim that ‘… [b]eing a person and being a human being are not
the same thing’ (Masolo 2010: 154) ought not to sound that strange or
unfamiliar to philosophers. Even the idea that we are ‘… born humans but
become persons’ (Masolo 2010: 13) has a familiar ring. As far back as 1972,
Joseph Fletcher argued for a number of necessary criteria to establish per-
sonhood: criteria that excluded not just fetuses, but even infants—arguably
for the first few years of their lives—from personhood.

In this quotation, Masolo represents the African view of personhood

and Fletcher the Western one. The major difference between the African
and Western views of personhood is in terms of the criteria they specify to
determine or even account for their respective concepts of personhood.
The African view of personhood conceives of it as some kind of moral
achievement. To be called a person is to be morally recognised to be living
a genuine human life (Metz 2010). The moral agent achieves it relative to
the quality of her performance. Scholars of African thought associated the
relevant performance with moral “virtue” or “excellence” (Behrens 2013b:
111; Gyekye 1992: 110). Menkiti (1984: 176) explains moral excellence
or virtue that captures personhood in terms of “ethical maturity”.
African scholars generally understand the idea of personhood to
embody a particular moral system (Dzobo 1992; Gyekye 1997, 2010;
Wiredu 2004; Metz 2007; Molefe 2019a). Some scholars capture the
ethical system embodied by the idea of personhood in terms of a “self-­
realisation” or “moral perfectionism” (Behrens 2013b, p. 118; Metz
2007, p. 331). The essence of this moral system is the requirement that
the agent ought to perfect her own humanity. To be called a person is to
be morally judged to be living a morally virtuous life.
The Western view of personhood, on the other hand, conceives of it in
terms of the capacities or ontological properties some being or entity pos-
sesses. In fact, Behrens informs us that the Western idea of personhood is
6 M. MOLEFE

best understood in terms of the technical idea of moral status. To claim

that some being has moral status is the same as claiming that its presence
warrants moral recognition and attention in virtue of certain facts pertain-
ing to it (DeGrazia 2008, 2013). These facts could revolve around its
well-being, needs, rights or whatever is also thought to be morally signifi-
cant regarding the existence of an entity. The kind of moral attention and
appropriate response towards a being of moral status is one of moral
respect (Warren 1997). This moral respect could be understood in two
related ways. On the one hand, it means certain ways of treating such a
being are wrong insofar as they flout some moral principle. On the other,
it means that certain ways of treating such a being wrong it insofar as they
harm it or make it worse off (DeGrazia 2008; Metz 2012a; Molefe 2017a).
The Western idea of personhood is patient-centred insofar as it bases
moral value on some capacities of the entity in question. In other words,
merely because the entity in question possesses certain onto-moral capaci-
ties or qualities, it deserves moral respect. It is crucial to appreciate that it
is not the use of such properties, but the mere fact of possessing them that
is relevant for moral status, and the respect it engenders. Different theories
of moral status will posit different capacities or properties to account for
it. Some theories ground it on rationality [Kantianism], sentience [utili-
tarianism]; basic capabilities [capabilities approach] and so on. These the-
ories will differ in terms of what things count as persons in terms of moral
status. If rationality is the basis for moral status, for example, it would
imply that foetuses, animals and mentally disabled individuals have no
moral status since they lack the relevant ontological property.
To summarise this distinction, Behrens (2013b: 111, emphasis origi-
nal) makes the following point—

By now it ought to be clear that the Western bioethical normative concep-

tion of personhood and the African notion are completely distinct. Another
way of expressing this distinction is to consider the object of the focus of the
term ‘personhood’. In Western thought, personhood is concerned with the
status of moral patients, whereas the African approach focuses on the char-
acter of a person as a moral agent.

The African idea of personhood depends, for its achievement, on the

actions and performances of the agent. The Western idea revolves around
the properties or capacities possessed by the patient. The respect associ-
ated with the agent-centred notion of personhood tracks performance and
 1 INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 7

the respect associated with the patient-centred notion tracks ontology.

One significant difference regarding these two notions is that the agent-­
centred notion admits of gradations or variations among agents in terms
of some individual having more or less or even no personhood at all. As
such, the respect imagined here would be proportionate to one’s quality
of character [personhood] or lack thereof. On the other hand, the patient-­
centred notion is a function of an “invariant” property one possesses in
virtue of which all those that have it are generally owed equal moral regard
since respect is a function of possession and not use (Metz 2013: 12).
The idea of moral status attributes respect to some entity merely because
it possesses relevant ontological features. Typically, in the literature in
moral philosophy ontological features such as sentience, rationality, the
soul, life, or basic capabilities have been invoked to generate different the-
ories of moral status (see Bujo 2001; Iroegbu 2005; Nussbaum 2011;
Singer 2009). These relevant ontological features are crucial because they
are the ones that are central to the entity under consideration being able
to lead a decent life, depending on the view under consideration. The
reader should here appreciate the distinction between a concept and a
conception of moral status.
Several comments are crucial to consider regarding the distinction
between the patient- and agent-centred notions of personhood. Firstly,
Behrens informs us that they both draw a distinction between being
human and being a person (2013b: 103–104; see also Metz 2013: 12).
The fact of being human, though necessary for the attainment of person-
hood, does not guarantee it in both senses of the term—being human is
necessary for both moral status and moral perfection, but it is not suffi-
cient (Oyowe 2018).6 Secondly, Behrens informs us that the patient-­
centred notion is more dominant in the Western moral tradition—specifically
in bioethics and environmental ethics—whilst the agent-centred notion is
more prevalent in the African tradition of philosophy (Behrens 2013b:
105; see Metz 2007: 331). Following the tendency in the literature of
using these concepts separately, Oyowe (2018) rejects the agent-centred
notion (what he calls the strongly normative idea of personhood) and
endorses the patient-centred notion of it (what he calls the weakly norma-
tive notion of personhood).
One implication that follows from Behrens’ distinction of the patient-
and agent-centred notions of personhood is that only the former is rele-
vant, suitable and useful in bioethics. The major intervention this book
seeks to make is to point out that the agent-centred notion of personhood
8 M. MOLEFE

is relevant and useful in bioethical contexts. This book clarifies that the
fact that scholars of African ethics tend to focus on the agent-centred
notion and Western scholars on the patient-centred notion is a contingent
fact of these traditions of philosophy. The suggestion here is that a more
robust approach to the ethics of personhood in African philosophy requires
us to appreciate that the two concepts are intrinsically connected. More
specifically, the agent-centred notion of personhood [moral virtue]
embodies its own conception of the patient-centred notion of personhood
[moral status]. That is, the tendency by scholars of African thought to
focus on the agent-centred notion of personhood reveals their social pro-
clivity, in their moral philosophising, to be fixated on the one side of the
moral coin, instead of appreciating both sides of the moral coin that
embodies a robust ethics of personhood in African moral philosophy.
I take it to be the case that Behrens is correct to observe that it is the
patient-centred notion of personhood [moral status] that is central in bio-
ethical discourses. The major contribution that this book will be making is
to rely on the agent-centred notion of personhood to construct African
bioethics. It will do so, by demonstrating or deriving a patient-centred
notion of personhood, an African theory of moral status, on the agent-­
centred notion of personhood [moral virtue]. The idea that is central in
this book is that the agent-centred notion of personhood is grounded on
a particular view of the patient-centred notion—one that is usually implicit
and not typically clarified or defended in the literature. The idea here is
that there is a certain ontological feature of being human—informing the
patient-centred notion (moral status)—that is decisive for the very possi-
bility of pursuing the agent-centred notion of personhood (moral perfec-
tion) (see Molefe 2019a: ch. 3). As such, the primary aim of this book is
to unfold and develop the patient-centred view of personhood—a theory
of moral status/dignity that informs the agent-centred view. We can then
proceed to employ this theory to reflect on the bioethical themes of abor-
tion and euthanasia.
Whereas Behrens and Oyowe, in different ways and for different rea-
sons, take these concepts to be distinct and diverging moral terms, in this
book, I will proceed on the assumption of their moral interconnectedness
and interdependence to articulate a more robust ethics of personhood in
African philosophy. It is because human beings possess particular kinds of
ontological features that we take them to be beings of value (to have moral
status) and it is because of these same features that we can rightly expect
them to pursue personhood (to lead morally virtuous lives).
 1 INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 9

The reader should keep in mind that reference to the patient-centred

notion of personhood is the same as talk of moral status. It is the concept
of moral status (dignity) that will be central to our approach to bioethics
in this book interpreted in the light of the salient idea of personhood in
African philosophy.7 In the next section, I will consider the literature
regarding the bioethical themes that are the focus of this book.

The Literature Review

In this section, I wish to consider the bioethical themes that will constitute
the focus of this book. Before I turn to these specific themes—abortion
and euthanasia—I begin by attending to two clarificatory points.
To begin, I clarify how I understand the ideas of ubuntu and person-
hood, and the relationship that I take to hold between them. I do so,
firstly, because I will draw extensively on the literature on ubuntu in the
course of this book, and I wouldn’t want to leave the reader confused.
Secondly, I do so because I take these two ideas to be continuous, if not
synonymous. At least in this book, I stipulate the relationship to be as fol-
lows: I take the idea of ubuntu to be tantamount to the idea of person-
hood. So, to say that someone has ubuntu is the same thing as to claim
that they are persons or have achieved personhood. I take this position
because the idea of ubuntu is essentially concerned with the idea of per-
sonhood—specifically, the agent-centred notion of it. This view is sus-
tained by considering the aphorism that grounds ubuntu ethics.
Ubuntu, as an embodiment of an African moral view, is usually explained
in terms of the following aphorism—‘A person is a person through other
persons’. This aphorism does admit of a metaphysical interpretation,
where it specifies an account of personal identity in terms of human social-
ity or interdependence (Ramose 1999; Louw 2004; Metz 2007). It is,
however, the moral connotations of this aphorism that are of interest here.
The reader will immediately realise that the idea of a person appears three
times in the aphorism, but it is not immediately obvious which concepts of
it are captured here (given that we have already specified at least three pos-
sible concepts of personhood in the literature).
The first reference to a person, in the aphorism above, is about the
mere fact of being human—the ontological notion of personhood. The
second instance of the word ‘person’ refers to the normative idea of per-
sonhood—the goal of morality prescribed by ubuntu ethics. The last
instance of it, as captured in the phrase “through other persons”, captures
10 M. MOLEFE

the importance of social relationships in the pursuit of personhood.8 Put

simply, the goal of morality, under ubuntu, is for a human being to pursue
a morally excellent character (the agent-centred notion of personhood)
and the only way to do so is through participating in particular kinds of
social relationships (Metz 2010; Molefe 2019a, b). It becomes less sur-
prising then that we are informed that “the concept of ubuntu … is a
statement about being, about fundamental things that qualify a person
[human being] to be a person [morally virtuous]” (Dandala 2009: 260).
In other words, those interpretations of ubuntu that construe it as
embodying a self-realisation moral view are continuous with, or even
equivalent to, the idea of personhood present in the works of leading
scholars of African thought such as Menkiti (1984, 2004); Gyekye (1992,
1997); Wiredu (1992, 2004); Ramose (1999); Masolo (2010); and
Ikuenobe (2006a, b, 2015, 2017).9 It is equally important to recognise
that those interpretations of ubuntu that do not take it as a self-realisation
view of morality will not necessarily be equivalent to the idea of person-
hood prevalent in African philosophy (see Etieyibo 2018; Matolino and
Kwindingwi 2013; Praeg 2014).
My second clarificatory point is to draw the attention of the reader to
the overall context within which the bioethical themes to be considered
will proceed. Bioethics is concerned with “moral issues in science, tech-
nology … medicine” and the natural environment (Andoh 2011: 67;
Frimpong-Mansoh and Ceasar 2019). In the context of African philoso-
phy and the post-colonial situation, the overall theme is the growing call
to contribute to the emerging field of African bioethics (see Barugahare
2018; Murove 2005; Tangwa 1996). This theme emerges at least moti-
vated by two crucial considerations. On the one hand, it is a direct response
to Western ethical imperialism, with the aim of decolonising the subject of
bioethics by looking at it from the vantage point of African cultures and
moral values (Fayemi and Macaulay-Adeyelure 2016; Murove 2005).
Secondly, it is an attempt to think of practical moral problems in the light
of traditional or indigenous views. Surely, there are many ways to approach
and contribute to African bioethical discourse (see Frimpong-Mansoh and
Ceasar 2019; Rakotsoane and Van Niekerk 2017).10 In this book, I will
make my contribution by following a suggestion made by Behrens (2013a:
33), who observes that “most bioethics publications related to Africa deal
with issues in research ethics, and focus less on applying African values to
ethical issues than on applying Western moral systems to the African con-
text”. In this book, my aim is to apply African ethical values qua the
 1 INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 11

personhood-based theory of dignity to the select bioethical themes of

abortion and euthanasia. I will say more below regarding why I have
selected these themes, after discussing the literature.
Let me now focus on the central idea of dignity in the literature in gen-
eral and in African philosophy. The idea of dignity is among those classi-
fied as essentially contested concepts (see Rodriguez 2015). The contested
nature of this moral term could be understood in two ways—one extreme
and another heuristic. The one view, which I classify as extreme, takes an
overly critical or repudiatory view of dignity. This view is summarised in
this fashion:

The notion of dignity … is frequently criticised for its lack of conceptual

clarity and openness to misinterpretation. Often dignity is seen as serving
merely as a rhetorical device in political debates, ‘something of a slogan in
bioethics’ … and as a camouflage for quite different values in legal docu-
ments. When perceived as a ‘mere rhetorical dressing’ … or ‘a simple slo-
gan’, the notion of dignity is disapproved for not being distinctive enough
to add much to policy debates and legal reasoning. (Misztal 2012: 107)

This shows that there are scholars that contest the usefulness or even
the plausibility of the concept of dignity. I must hasten, however, to add
that this is not a dominant view in the literature.
The second way of understanding the contested nature of the concept
is heuristic. It is a suggestion that the contestations are not so much about
the concept of dignity itself—at least not its validity—but about various
and conflicting conceptions of it (see Formosa and Mackenzie 2014; Metz
2012b). In other words, scholars tend to agree on the concept of dignity
and the value it embodies or represents. Where they differ is on the speci-
fication of the substance or details regarding what constitutes it. It is this
second approach to the idea of dignity qua personhood that will inform
how this book will proceed. I will take the idea of dignity to be valid and
generally recognised, but I will proffer what I take to be an African con-
ception of it by employing the idea of personhood (see Deng 2004;
Donnelly 1982).
The idea of dignity is usually deployed to refer to a property possessed
by some entity (usually a human being) in virtue of which we owe it the
utmost moral respect (Darwall 1977). Jack Donnelly (2015: 1–2), one of
the leading scholars of human rights, defines dignity as signifying “worth
that demands recognition and respect. Those with dignity are due
12 M. MOLEFE

recognition as a result of possessing a particular honorable quality or sta-

tus. They are also due the respect appropriate to that status or quality.”
Put simply, to accord dignity to some being is to recognise it as possessing
some ontological property in virtue of which we ought to respect the
being in question. Normal adult human beings are taken to be paradigm
examples of beings of dignity because they possess the morally relevant
ontological features that assign them the honourable quality or status
(DeGrazia 2008; Toscano 2011). If this definition of dignity is true, it has
the following implications.
Firstly, dignity is a property of an individual. In other words, the dis-
course of dignity (or, the dominant understanding of it) takes it to be
individualistic. So, here, dignity is a function of some property or charac-
teristic of the individual (Molefe 2017b). Hence, it is common to read in
the literature that dignity refers to “worth that is inherent” or “inalien-
able” or constituting an “inner, transcendental kernel” (Miller 2017: 113,
emphasis mine; Rosen 2012: 9). The upshot of this view is that since
dignity is a function of human nature, it is something that is not granted
and (in some sense) cannot be taken away, unless one’s nature is funda-
mentally changed or destroyed (Miller 2017). One has dignity by simply
being the kind of thing one is.
Secondly, the idea of dignity is best characterised in deontological terms
(see Rosen 2012; Toscano 2011). To elucidate the deontological nature
of the idea of dignity, we can remember that there are at least two ways to
relate to some value: one can either promote or honour it. Consequentialist
accounts tend to promote a value, where the agent is required to maximise
it insofar as possible (MacNaughton and Rawling 1992). If one takes the
value of love as an example of a value to be promoted, then the agent has
a duty to make sure that there is as much of it in the world as is possible,
even if that can only be achieved by a few unloving acts (ibid.). The deon-
tological attitude of respecting a value is captured in this fashion—“instead
the idea is that a thing that has dignity ought to be honored in attitude
and action” (Christiano 2008: 108). This means that moral agents have a
duty to respect such a being even if doing so does not maximise the good
or even when doing so causes there to be less respect for that being in the
future (ibid.). Put simply, the presence of beings of dignity demands and
deserves unconditional respect.
Another facet related to the idea of dignity is that it offers one way to
capture social egalitarianism. The idea of dignity accounted for in terms of
some “invariant” property of the individual is used to capture equality
 1 INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 13

(Metz 2013: 12). On this view, equality among individuals is a function of

recognising some fact of their nature—the property that grounds their
dignity (Darwall 1977). Individuals that possess the relevant property to a
minimum threshold are equal and are owed equal moral regard (Carter
2006). This is the case because dignity is not a function of achievement,
but rather of merely possessing the relevant property.
It is important for the reader to notice that the scepticism that is some-
times expressed towards the idea of dignity in the Western tradition is
generally absent in the literature on African philosophy (see Macklin 2003;
Pinker 2008). That is, African scholars are generally committed to the idea
and ideals associated with the concept of dignity. Some scholars offer spiri-
tual conceptions of dignity, where they ground it on the possession of life,
or life force, or being part of a spiritual community (see Bikopo and van
Bogaert 2009; Bujo 2001; Deng 2004; Gyekye 1992; Ilesanmi 2001;
Iroegbu 2005; Wiredu 1996). These scholars take some divine feature of
God, usually captured in terms of vitality, or Okra—spiritual energy—as
the basis for dignity (Deng 2004; Imafidon 2013; Molefe 2018b; Wiredu
1996). On the other hand, you find scholars that take a secular approach
to dignity, where they account for it by appeal to some natural property.
Some scholars ground it on the human capacity for autonomy, the rela-
tional capacity for care, or the capacity to enter into particular kinds of
social relationships (see Gyekye 1997; Metz 2012b; Ramose 2009).
Recently, and of particular interest in this book, is Polycarp Ikuenobe’s
(2017, 2018) account of dignity based on the idea of personhood, which
refuses to ground it, as it typically is grounded in moral philosophy, on the
mere possession of some ontological feature. Ikuenobe argues that a plau-
sible African view of dignity ought to account for it in terms of how the
agent uses her ontological features to attain personhood (moral excel-
lence). He considers the possession of some ontological property to be
merely instrumentally good, which means that dignity emerges as a result
of how the agent uses it.
In this book, I propose an alternative conception of dignity qua person-
hood that grounds it on the mere possession of the capacity for virtue. I
do this after raising serious objections against Ikuenobe’s performance-­
based view of dignity. This is motivated by two considerations. Firstly, I
believe that our pioneers on the idea personhood—Menkiti and Gyekye—
anticipated that the idea embodies a conception of dignity (a capacity-­
based conception of it) although they never went on to articulate it fully
and apply it to various practical moral problems (see Gyekye 1992:
14 M. MOLEFE

109–110; Menkiti 1984: 171). Secondly, I believe that this conception is

robust enough to offer under-explored insights and perspectives on vari-
ous practical moral problems. I will further employ the view of dignity qua
the capacity for virtue to consider the bioethical themes mentioned above.
Below, I consider the literature regarding the selected bioethical themes in
this book.
At this stage, I imagine that one might object to the way I go about
discussing the idea of dignity. The major complaint will be that I have not
yet invoked any of the African languages (mentioned in footnote 1) to
glean a concept or conception of dignity from them. I appreciate this
objection. The decision to omit these is deliberate on my part, however. I
have no philosophical reason to believe that African words used to capture
the idea of dignity embody anything significantly different from what has
been said above. I take the concept of dignity to be universal (Palk 2015).
In isiZulu, the word used to capture the concept of dignity is isi-thunzi, in
seSotho serithi and in isiXhosa isidima. These words are essentially charac-
terised by a vitalist metaphysics (Molefe 2013, 2018b; Shutte 2001). To
have dignity, on the metaphysics suggested by African languages, is to
possess the spiritual property of vitality (see Metz 2012b).11 In isiZulu, the
idea of isithunzi refers to a spiritual shadow (-thunzi) that inheres in and
surrounds the individual. The tree has umthunzi, literally translated as a
shadow; a human being has isithunzi, literally translated as dignity.
The reader will see in the conclusion of this chapter that in my own
analysis I stipulate a naturalist or secular interpretation of African moral
thought, be it on the idea of personhood or dignity. I believe this to be
consistent with the above given definition of dignity. I will not draw from
the vitalist (spiritual) interpretation of dignity. For interesting exposition
of the ethics of vitality and its conception of dignity, see Shutte (2001),
Metz (2012b), Imafidon (2013) and Molefe (2013, 2017c, 2018b). I will
leave it in the hands of the reader to assess whether the naturalist concep-
tion of dignity to be articulated here is plausible. Let me now turn to a
consideration of the bioethical themes germane to this book.
I will consider two bioethical themes. I will first discuss the theme of
abortion in African philosophy. Typically, African scholars tend to be
opposed to abortion for reasons that invoke a controversial metaphysical
system. African scholars tend to advocate a tri-logical conception of the
human community, where it consists of the (1) unborn; (2) living; and (3)
living dead (see Bujo 2001, 2005; Ramose 1999). On this view, the
unborn (entities such as zygotes and foetuses) are beings of value, which
 1 INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 15

would imply that abortion is impermissible (see Molefe 2015: ch. 6). The
difficulty associated with this view is that before we can take it seriously, we
must first establish the plausibility of the metaphysical view that there is a
‘community’ of the unborn. Metz (2012a) offers a promising analysis of
the abortion question in terms of his modal-relational view of moral sta-
tus. In his view, abortion is permissible any time before the third trimester
because the foetus has not yet developed the relational capacities that
would grant it some moral status. The foetus is not yet an object of the
morally relevant social relationships of love. In this book, I will consider
the status of a foetus in the light of the idea of personhood. Horsthemke
(2018; see also Etieyibo 2018) criticises the idea of personhood for failing
to grant foetuses a place in the moral community. I will evaluate whether
it is true that the idea of personhood denies foetuses any moral standing.
The idea of euthanasia is particularly neglected in the field of African
philosophy. I am aware that Tangwa (2000) mentions it in his discussion
of African bioethics. But no systematic method is proffered to reflect on
this serious moral problem in the light of African moral thought. The idea
of personhood that Tangwa invokes (an idea he associates with the Nso
people of Cameroon) is distinct from the one relevant to this book. It is,
furthermore, loaded with questionable and controversial metaphysical
considerations that do not clarify the practical issues under consideration,
at least in my view (see Tangwa 1996, 2000). In a sense, this chapter will
be one of the first in African philosophy to look into this issue in the light
of personhood.
As the reader is no doubt aware, bioethics is a broad subject and involves
many issues. One might wonder how I arrived on the themes of abortion
and euthanasia, specifically. I found the bioethical themes related to the
beginning of life—abortion—and those related to death—euthanasia—to
be largely under-explored in the African philosophic literature, and absent
in the light of the moral lens of personhood. These are by no means the
only under-explored bioethical themes, but I believe that they will provide
an important opportunity to reveal the robustness of the personhood-­
based view of dignity. I also believe that a volume focusing on abortion
and euthanasia will be an important addition to African philosophy, and
African bioethics in particular.12 Moreover, I am willing to admit that
there is an arbitrary element to how these themes were selected insofar as
they are included as a result of my interest in them. That, however, should
not detract us from keeping in mind that the true value of this book resides
in its promise to systematically showcase the robustness of the
16 M. MOLEFE

personhood-based view of dignity and its ability to contribute meaning-

fully to the discourse of African bioethics.

The Structure of the Book

I divide this book into four chapters. Chapter 2 will discuss personhood as
a moral theory. There, I will consider the two facets of personhood as a
moral theory, namely: the agent- and patient-centred theories of value. I
will observe that the agent-centred theory embodies a perfectionist moral
view and the patient-centred theory accounts for dignity in terms of our
capacity for virtue [sympathy]. Chapter 3 will apply the personhood-based
theory of dignity to the question of abortion. I will argue that this view of
dignity forbids abortion because it assigns moral status to foetuses. Foetuses
carry this status because they possess the relevant potential to pursue per-
sonhood in the future. The final chapter (Chap. 4) will reflect on euthana-
sia in the light of a personhood-based theory of dignity. I will argue that the
personhood-based view of dignity ought to permit euthanasia.

Conclusion
To conclude, I bring the following considerations to the attention of the
reader. Firstly, this book is a result of the status of African literature on the
idea of personhood. Very little philosophical work has been done in pursu-
ing the implications of personhood on a variety of bioethical issues. The
literature has tended, on the one hand, to be fixated on the question of
human rights (Gyekye 1992; Matolino 2014; Molefe 2016; Oyowe 2014).
On the other hand, even the one attempt to extend the literature on per-
sonhood to dignity and applied ethics is limited to the problem of human
rights (see Ikuenobe 2017, 2018). This book reflects on bioethical themes
of abortion and euthanasia analysed in terms of personhood as a system of
value. This approach, I believe, will provide clues regarding how we could
deal with other bioethical themes that are not discussed in this book (such
as biomedical enhancement, assisted reproduction, clinical care of the
elderly and disabled and so on).
I also wish to emphasise that the aim of this book is to consider the
(moral-theoretical) implications of the personhood-based theory of dig-
nity for the bioethical themes of abortion and euthanasia. At best, the
book aims to give a philosophical interpretation or exposition of dignity
and its consequences for bioethics in the light of personhood. That is, it
 1 INTRODUCTION: PERSONHOOD, DIGNITY AND (AFRICAN) BIOETHICS 17

seeks to discuss how certain moral issues stand in the light of a robust
conception of personhood in African philosophy. It should never, there-
fore, be construed to be promising that the idea of personhood entails the
most plausible conception of morality (dignity) in the African tradition or
any other tradition. The aim of this book is a moderate one: to familiarise
readers, both in African and other traditions of philosophy, with the idea
of personhood and its implications for bioethics. I leave it for another
occasion to compare personhood to other salient moral theories such as
the ‘capabilities’ approach and Confucian moral views.
The expository nature of this book should not come as a surprise. The
idea of personhood, just like the tradition of African philosophy itself, is
still in its developmental phase. The developmental status of the moral
idea personhood is suggested by Wiredu (2009: 15) when he opines that
“the philosophical implications of the normative conception of a person
are legion, and we will not pursue them here”. I am aware that a lot of
research has been produced since when Wiredu made this observation,
but this statement is still to a large extent true. Hence, the need to extend
this idea of personhood to the discourse on dignity and African bioethics.
Before one can argue that personhood entails a plausible moral view, it is
reasonable to start by explicating it as a moral theory and considering its
implications for a variety of practical problems. When the implications of
this moral theory are on the table, then one can pursue the philosophical
project of comparison, arguing that it is comparable to or better or worse
than other rival moral views in other traditions.
The reader would remember that above I said that I prefer (I stipulate)
a naturalist or secular interpretation of personhood as a moral theory. I am
aware that scholars such as Tempels (1959), Magesa (1997), Bujo (2001)
and Molefe (2018b) offer a supernaturalist vision of personhood. In this
book, I will stipulate ethical-naturalism as the best way to construe per-
sonhood. I do so largely because leading scholars of personhood such as
Menkiti (1984), Wiredu (1992) and Gyekye (2010), Ikuenobe (2015,
2018) among others, tend to take ethical-naturalism as their point of
departure. It is not within the scope of this book to resolve the compli-
cated meta-ethical question of whether personhood is best construed in
religious (ethical supernaturalism) or secular (ethical naturalism) terms. It
is safe, however, to appreciate the fact that ethical naturalism is a salient
view in African philosophy (Gyekye 2010; Okeja 2013). I therefore stipu-
late it in this book. Those that find ethical supernaturalism to be plausible
view, may pursue interpretations under that rubric, which would be a
18 M. MOLEFE

welcome contribution to the literature. For my part, I will be pursuing a

naturalist view of personhood, dignity and bioethics.
In the next chapter, I offer a philosophical exposition of personhood as
a moral theory.

Notes
1. Among the Nguni [Zulu, Xhosa and Ndebele people] of Southern Africa,
the word umu-ntu is used to capture the idea of a person. Among the
Sotho people that are found largely in Lesotho, South Africa and Botswana,
it is mo-tho. The Tsonga people of South Africa and Mozambique capture
it as mu-nhu. The Akans of Ghana use the word onipa. It is common
knowledge, among African philosophers, that this concept—umuntu,
motho, munhu and so on—has both a descriptive and normative dimen-
sion (see Gyekye 1992). It is the normative notion that tends to be salient
in African moral discourse (Menkiti 2004).
2. African languages use the following words to refer to dignity: isithunzi
(Zulu); Isidima (Xhosa); Serithi (Sotho); Hunhu (Shona). I am not aware
of a philosophical exposition of dignity from these languages. The word is
usually taken to have a relatively stable universal meaning aimed at picking
out beings of high value (see Donnelly 1982). For example, leading schol-
ars of African philosophy invoke the idea of dignity without relying on
local languages for their philosophical exposition (see Gyekye 1992;
Ikuenobe 2017; Ilesanmi 2001; Wiredu 1996). To a large extent I sub-
scribe to this universal approach. My approach differs from that of col-
leagues in that I insist on a secular view of dignity, whereas they tend to
invoke a religiously based view.
3. The view of dignity that has been pursued here was initially suggested by
Menkiti (1984) and Gyekye (1992). I will elucidate what I take to be their
conception of dignity in the next chapter, or a view of dignity we can asso-
ciate with their moral philosophy.
4. In my recent book—African Personhood and Applied Ethics—I address
questions of social justice in the light of the idea of personhood. In this
book, I was offering a defense of the idea of personhood from the criti-
cisms that have been levelled against in relation to the question of patriar-
chy, ageism, animals and social justice in general (see Molefe 2020).
5. Oyowe (2018) believes that the strongly normative view of personhood is
implausible for a variety of reasons, one of which is that it fails to embody
an egalitarian political theory. A more plausible understanding of person-
hood, as anticipated in this book, will demonstrate otherwise.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 the 26th April, at noon, accompanied by his aide-de-camp,
Captain del Pilar, and Mr. Leyba, his private secretary. …

"Throughout the whole stay of General Aguinaldo in Singapore

the editor was kept fully informed daily of the progress of
affairs. Naturally, however, all statement of what occurred
has been withheld by us until what has been deemed the fitting
moment has arrived. The substance of the whole incident in its
relations to the recent course of affairs in the Philippines
has been very fully telegraphed by the editor both to New York
and London."

{594}

Mr. Pratt, the U. S. Consul-General at Singapore, had already,

under date of April 28, given his own official report of the
interview with General Aguinaldo, to the Department at
Washington, as follows:

"I have the honor to report that I sent you on the 27th
instant, and confirmed in my dispatch Number 211 of that date,
a telegram which deciphered read as follows. … 'General
Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey
co-operation insurgents Manila.
PRATT.'

"The facts are these: On the evening of Saturday the 23d

instant, I was confidentially informed of the arrival here,
incognito, of the supreme leader of the Philippine insurgents,
General Emilio Aguinaldo, by Mr. H. W. Bray, an English gentleman
of high standing, who, after fifteen years' residence as a
merchant and planter in the Philippines, had been compelled by
the disturbed condition of things resulting from Spanish
misrule to abandon his property and leave there, and from whom
I had previously obtained much valuable information for
Commodore Dewey regarding fortifications, coal deposits, etc.,
at different points in the islands. Being aware of the great
prestige of General Aguinaldo with the insurgents, and that no
one, either at home or abroad, could exert over them the same
influence and control that he could, I determined at once to
see him, and, at my request, a secret interview was
accordingly arranged for the following morning, Sunday, the
24th, in which, besides General Aguinaldo, were only present
the General's trusted advisers and Mr. Bray, who acted as
interpreter.

"At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the

state of and object sought to be obtained by the present
insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the
Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself,
whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the
Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent
action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the
expediency of co-operating with our fleet, then at Hongkong,
and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed
thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should
the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day
as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:
'Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange
with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if
desired. Telegraph.
PRATT.'

"The Commodore's reply reading thus:

'Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.
DEWEY.'

"I received it late that night, and at once communicated to

General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private
secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off
by the British steamer 'Malacca,' which left here on Tuesday,
the 26th. Just previous to his departure, I had a second and
last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of
which I shall give you by next mail. The general impressed me
as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the
confidence that had been placed in him.

"I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with

the commander of our forces, I have prevented possible
conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and
administering the Philippines. If this course of mine meets
with the Government's approval, as I trust it may, I shall be
fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due
some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.
How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to
decide."

Two days later (April 30), Mr. Pratt reported further, as

follows: "Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th
instant, I have the honor to report that in the second and
last interview I had with General Emilio Aguinaldo, on the eve
of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the
necessity, under Commodore Dewey's direction, of exerting
absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no
excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American
Government, the President having declared that the present
hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord
with modern principles of civilized warfare. To this General
Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was
perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the
insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should
direct. The general further stated that he hoped the United
States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least
long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government
of their own, in the organization of which he would desire
American advise and assistance. These questions I told him I
had no authority to discuss."

Of the arrival of Aguinaldo at Hongkong and his conveyance

thence to Manila, the following account was given by Mr.
Wildman, the U. S. Consul at Hongkong, in a communication to
 the State Department at Washington, which bears date July 18:
"On May 2 Aguinaldo arrived in Hongkong and immediately called
on me. It was May 16 before I could obtain permission from
Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the United States
ship 'McCulloch,' and I put him aboard in the night so as to
save any complications with the local Government. Immediately
on the arrival of Aguinaldo at Cavite he issued a
proclamation, which I had outlined for him before he left,
forbidding pillage, and making it a criminal offense to
maltreat neutrals. He, of course, organized a government of
which he was dictator, an absolutely necessary step if he
hoped to maintain control over the natives, and from that date
until the present time he has been uninterruptedly successful
in the field and dignified and just as the head of his
government. According to his own statements to me by letter,
he has been approached by both the Spaniards and the Germans,
and has had tempting offers made him by the Catholic Church.
He has been watched very closely by Admiral Dewey, Consul
Williams, and his own junta here in Hongkong, and nothing of
moment has occurred which would lead anyone to believe that he
was not carrying out to the letter the promises made to me in
this consulate. The insurgents are fighting for freedom from
the Spanish rule, and rely upon the well-known sense of
justice that controls all the actions of our Government as to
their future."

{595}

In reply to Consul Pratt's report of his interviews with

General Aguinaldo, and of his proceedings in connection with
the departure of that personage from Singapore to Hongkong,
the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Day, wrote, June 16,
as follows: "The Department observes that you informed General
Aguinaldo that you had no authority to speak for the United
States; and, in the absence of the fuller report which you
promise, it is assumed that you did not attempt to commit this
Government to any alliance with the Philippine insurgents. To
 obtain the unconditional personal assistance of General
Aguinaldo in the expedition to Manila was proper, if in so
doing he was not induced to form hopes which it might not be
practicable to gratify. This Government has known the
Philippine insurgents only as discontented and rebellious
subjects of Spain, and is not acquainted with their purposes.
While their contest with that power has been a matter of
public notoriety, they have neither asked nor received from
this Government any recognition. The United States, in
entering upon the occupation of the islands, as the result of
its military operations in that quarter, will do so in the
exercise of the rights which the state of war confers, and
will expect from the inhabitants, without regard to their
former attitude toward the Spanish Government, that obedience
which will be lawfully due from them. If, in the course of
your conferences with General Aguinaldo, you acted upon the
assumption that this government would cooperate with him for
the furtherance of any plan of his own, or that, in accepting
his cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize
any political claims which he may put forward, your action was
unauthorized and cannot be approved."

Treaty of Peace, and Accompanying Papers

(55th Congress, 3d Session, Senate Document Number 62,
part 2, pages 337-354).

See, also (in this volume),

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS: A. D. 1806-1808.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-June).

The War with Spain.
Movements or the Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera,
and the blockading of it in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.
Lieutenant Hobson's exploit.
The sinking of the collier "Merrimac" in the channel.

The opening of hostilities found a Spanish squadron of four

armored cruisers (the "Cristobal Colon," the "Almirante
Oquendo," the "Vizcaya," and the "Infanta Maria Teresa,") with
three torpedo-boat destroyers (the "Pluton," "Furor" and
"Terror") and some lighter craft, assembled at the Cape Verde
islands, under Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera. They were in
Portuguese waters, and Portugal, though friendly to Spain, was
forced to issue a proclamation of neutrality, on the 20th of
April, which required the Spanish fleet to depart. Some of the
vessels then returned to Spain; but the seven named above
sailed westward, and their destination became a mystery, very
exciting for some time to the American mind. They might
attempt to surprise some American coast city; they might
intercept the battle-ship "Oregon," then making her way from
the Pacific coast, by the long circuit around Cape Horn; they
might have some plan for breaking the Cuban blockade. Acting
on the latter conjecture, and surmising that Porto Rico would
be chosen for the Spanish naval base, Admiral Sampson moved in
that direction to seek them. He attacked the forts at San Juan
(May 12), and satisfied himself that no fleet was in the bay.

The truth was that Cervera was then just entering the
Caribbean Sea, considerably to the south of Sampson's search.
He touched at the French island of Martinique, and at the
Dutch island of Curaçoa, and then slipped across to Santiago
de Cuba, where he was to be overtaken by his fate. In the long
hill-sheltered bay, with a narrow entrance, which forms this
excellent Cuban harbor, the Spanish fleet was so hidden that
nearly a fortnight passed before its whereabouts could be
fully ascertained. It was not until May 20 that a blockade of
Santiago was established by a flying squadron of the American
fleet, under Commodore Schley, with certainty that the
squadron of Cervera was harbored there. On the 1st of June,
Admiral Sampson arrived on the scene, with a stronger naval
force, and took command. To attempt to force the narrow
entrance of the harbor, strongly fortified and thickly mined
as it was, and attack the Spanish fleet in the bay, was not
deemed practicable. The course resolved upon was to hold the
enemy fast in the shelter he had sought, until Santiago could
be taken, by a land attack. In pursuance of this plan, an
exploit of splendid daring was performed, in the early morning
of June 3, by a young officer, Lieutenant Richmond Pearson
Hobson, with a crew of seven volunteers, who placed and sank a
huge coaling ship, the "Merrimac," in the channel that leads
into Santiago Bay. The following is Admiral Sampson's report
of the undertaking and its achievement:

"Before coming here, I decided to make the harbor entrance

secure against the possibility of egress of the Spanish ships
by obstructing the narrow part of the entrance by sinking a
collier at that point. Upon calling upon Mr. Hobson for his
professional opinion as to a sure method of sinking the ship,
he manifested a most lively interest in the problem. After
several days' consideration he presented a solution which he
considered would insure the immediate sinking of the ship when
she had reached the desired point in the channel. This plan we
prepared for before we reached Santiago. This plan included
ten electric torpedoes on the outside of the ship, each of 78
pounds of gunpowder, sinking the ship partially before going
in, cutting the sea valves, and opening the cargo ports. The
plan contemplated a crew of only seven men and Mr. Hobson, who
begged that it might be intrusted to him. The anchor chains
were ranged upon deck for both the anchors, forward and aft,
the plan including the anchoring of the ship almost
automatically. As soon as I reached Santiago and had the
collier to work upon the details were commenced and diligently
prosecuted, hoping to complete them in one day, as the moon
and tide served best the first night after our arrival.
Notwithstanding every effort, the hour of 4 o'clock in the
morning arrived and the preparations were scarcely completed.
After a careful inspection of the final preparations I was
forced to relinquish the plan for that morning, as dawn was
breaking. Mr. Hobson begged to try it at all hazards.

"This morning proved more propitious, as a prompt start could

 be made. Nothing could have been more gallantly executed. We
waited impatiently after the firing by the Spaniards had
ceased. When they did not reappear from the harbor at 6
o'clock I feared they had all perished. A steam launch, which
had been sent in charge of Naval Cadet Powell to rescue the
men, appeared at this time, coming out under a persistent fire
from the batteries, but brought none of the crew. A careful
inspection of the harbor from this ship showed that the
'Merrimac' had been sunk in the channel somewhat farther in
than had been intended.
{596}
This afternoon the chief of staff of Admiral Cervera came out
under a flag of truce with a letter from the Admiral extolling
the bravery of the crew in an unusual manner. I can not myself
too earnestly express my appreciation of the conduct of Mr.
Hobson and his gallant crew. I venture to say that a more
brave and daring thing has not been done since Cushing blew up
the 'Albemarle.'" The sunken ship did not actually block the
channel; but that fact takes nothing from the gallantry of the
exploit. Why the intended spot in the channel was missed was
explained by Lieutenant Hobson in a statement which he
afterwards made: "When the 'Merrimac' poked her nose into the
channel," says the Lieutenant, "our troubles commenced. The
deadly silence was broken by the swash of a small boat
approaching us from the shore. I made her out to be a picket
boat. She ran close up under the stern of the 'Merrimac' and
fired several shots from what seemed to be 3 pounder guns. The
'Merrimac's' rudder was carried away by this fire. That is why
the collier was not sunk across the channel. We did not discover
the loss of the rudder until Murphy [the volunteer assigned to
that duty] had cast anchor. We then found that the 'Merrimac'
would not answer to the helm and were compelled to make the
best of the situation. … Submarine mines and torpedoes were
exploded all around us, adding to the excitement. The mines
did no damage, although we could hear the rumbling and feel
the ship tremble. We were running without lights, and only the
darkness saved us from utter destruction. When the ship was in
the desired position and we found that the rudder was gone, I
called the men on deck. While they were launching the
catamaran I touched off the explosives. At the same time two
torpedoes, fired by the 'Reina Mercedes,' struck the
'Merrimac' amidships. I can not say whether our own explosives
or the Spanish torpedoes did the work, but the 'Merrimac' was
lifted out of the water, and almost rent asunder."

What followed, in the experience of the crew, when their

vessel went down, is described as follows by Lieutenant
Hobson, in a narrative of "The Sinking of the Merrimac," which
he published at a later day: "The stricken vessel now reeled
to port. Some one said: 'She is going to turn over on us,
sir,' to which I replied: 'No; she will right herself in
sinking, and we shall be the last spot to go under.' The
firing suddenly ceased. The vessel lowered her head like a
faithful animal, proudly aware of its sacrifice, bowed below
the surface, and plunged forward. The stern rose and heeled
heavily; it stood for a moment, shuddering, then started
downward, righting as it went. A great rush of water came up
the gangway, seething and gurgling out of the deck. The mass
was whirling from right to left 'against the sun'; it seized
us and threw us against the bulwarks, then over the rail. Two
were swept forward as if by a momentary recession, and one was
carried down into a coal-bunker—luckless Kelly. In a moment,
however, with increased force, the water shot him up out of
the same hole and swept him among us. The bulwarks
disappeared. A sweeping vortex whirled above. We charged about
with casks, cans, and spars, the incomplete stripping having
left quantities on the deck. The life-preservers stood us in
good stead, preventing chests from being crushed, as well as
buoying us on the surface; for spars came end on like
battering-rams, and the sharp corners of tin cans struck us
heavily. … When we looked for the life-boat we found that it
had been carried away. The catamaran was the largest piece of
floating debris; we assembled about it. The line suspending it
from the cargo-boom held and anchored us to the ship, though
barely long enough to reach the surface, causing the raft to
turn over and set us scrambling as the line came taut.

"The firing had ceased. It was evident the enemy had not seen
us in the general mass of moving objects; but soon the tide
began to drift these away, and we were being left alone with
the catamaran. The men were directed to cling close in, bodies
below and only heads out, close under the edges, and were
directed not to speak above a whisper, for the destroyer was
near at hand, and boats were passing near. We mustered; all
were present, and direction was given to remain as we were
till further orders, for I was sure that in due time after
daylight a responsible officer would come out to reconnoiter.
It was evident that we could not swim against the tide to
reach the entrance. Moreover, the shores were lined with
troops, and the small boats were looking for victims that
might escape from the vessel. The only chance lay in remaining
undiscovered until the coming of the reconnoitering boat, to
which, perhaps, we might surrender without being fired on. …
The air was chilly and the water positively cold. In less than
five minutes our teeth were chattering; so loud, indeed, did
they chatter that it seemed the destroyer or the boats would
hear. … We remained there probably an hour."

At daylight a steam launch approached, and was hailed by

Lieutenant Hobson, who judged that there must be officers on
board to whom it would be safe to surrender. He was more than
right. The commander of the launch was Admiral Cervera, in
person, who took the nearly exhausted men from the water and
treated them with great kindness, admiring the bravery of
their exploit, and sending a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson
to announce their safety. They were taken aboard the 'Reina
Mercedes,' and, as prisoners of war, were confined at first in
Morro Castle, and afterwards in the city. It so happened that
they were locked in the Morro during a bombardment of the
Spanish coast defences and fleet by ten of our vessels on June
6th, when about 1,500 projectiles were fired; and much anxiety
 and indignation were expressed in this country in view of that
circumstance; but Mr. Ramsden, British consul at Santiago,
explained in a despatch that they were removed as soon as
lodgings could be prepared in the barracks—actually on June
7th. They were released on July 6th in exchange for prisoners
captured by our forces.

{597}

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (April-July).

War with Spain,
Destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay.
Despatches of Admiral Dewey.
His relations with Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief.
Arrival of American troops for the occupation of the city.

Commodore George Dewey, commanding the Asiatic Squadron, then

awaiting orders at Hongkong, received on the 25th of April the
following despatch by cable from the Secretary of the Navy: "War
has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at
once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once,
particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture
vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." On the sixth day
after receiving these orders (namely on May 1st), he was able
to report from Manila, by a telegram sent from Hongkong on the
7th: "The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning.
Immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish
vessels: 'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de
Biloa,' 'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de
Cuba,' 'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Curreo,'
'Velasco,' one transport, 'Isla de Mandano,' water battery at
Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dispensatory. The
squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I
request the Department will send immediately from San
Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of
telegraphing is to the American consul at Hongkong."
In due time the post brought particulars of the action, in the
following report from Commodore Dewey, dated May 4: "The
squadron left Mirs Bay, [China] on April 27, immediately on
the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at
Manila, who brought important information and who accompanies
the squadron. Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30
and, finding no vessels there, proceeded down the coast and
arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon.
The 'Boston' and 'Concord' were sent to reconnoiter Port
Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take
position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the
'Boston' and 'Concord,' but the Spanish fleet was not found,
although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal (
inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their
intention to go there. Entered the Boca Grande, or south
channel, at 11.30 p. m., steaming in column at distance at 8
knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the
south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots
taking effect. The 'Boston' and 'McCulloch' returned the fire.
The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and
arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5.15 a.
m. by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the
Spanish fleet anchored in an approximately east and west line
across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water
in Canacao Bay. The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the
flagship 'Olympia,' under my personal direction, leading,
followed at distance by the 'Baltimore,' 'Raleigh,' 'Petrel,'
'Concord,' and 'Boston,' in the order named, which formation
was maintained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire
at 5.41 a. m. While advancing to the attack, two mines were
exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective. The
squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges
varying from 5,000 to 2,000 yards, countermarching in a line
approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The
enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective.

"Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the

'Olympia' with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One
was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before
an opportunity occurred to fire torpedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish
flagship 'Reina Christina' made a desperate attempt to leave
the line and come out to engage at short range, but was
received with such galling fire, the entire battery of the
'Olympia' being concentrated upon her, that she was barely
able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started
in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished until
she sank. At 7.35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported
to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5-inch
rapid-fire battery, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron
for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if
necessary. The three batteries at Manila had kept up a
continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which
fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these
batteries was situated on the south mole head at the entrance
to the Pasig River, the second on the south bastion of the
walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one-ha]f
mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the
Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not
cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of
silencing them.

"At 11.16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of

ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the
attack. By this time the flagship and almost the entire
Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12.30 p. m. the squadron
ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships
sunk, burnt, and deserted. At 12.40 p. m. the squadron
returned and anchored off Manila, the 'Petrel' being left
behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats,
which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed
by Commander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete
manner possible. The Spanish lost the following vessels:
Sunk—'Reina Christina,' 'Castillia,' 'Don Antonio de Ulloa.'
Burnt—'Don Juan de Austria,' 'Isla de Luzon,' 'Isla de Cuba,'
 'General Lezo,' 'Marques del Duaro,' 'El Correo,' 'Velasco,'
and 'Isla Mindanao,' (transport). Captured—'Rapido,' and
'Hercules' (tugs), and several small launches. I am unable to
obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded,
but believe their loss to be very heavy. The 'Reina Christina'
alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded.

"I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron

under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed,
and only 7 men in the squadron very slightly wounded. As will
be seen by the reports of the commanding officers which are
herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even
penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the
squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle. I
beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander
in chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more
loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the
squadron now under my command. … On May 2, the day following
the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it
remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns and
magazines of the batteries there. … On the 3d the military
forces evacuated the Cavite Arsenal, which was taken
possession of by a landing party."

{598}

Promptly in response to this report of his victory, a joint

resolution of thanks to Commodore Dewey and his officers and
men, by the two Houses of Congress, was despatched to them,
with announcement to the former of his promotion to the rank
of rear-admiral. The admiral replied, on the 13th, from
Cavite, making due acknowledgments, and adding: "I am
maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe
rebels are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and
making no demonstrations. Great scarcity of provisions in the
city. I believe the Spanish Governor-General will be obliged
to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain
possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require,
in my best judgment, a well equipped force of 5,000 men."

On the 20th he reported, further: "Aguinaldo, the rebel

commander in chief, was brought down by the 'McCulloch' [from
Hongkong]. Organizing forces near Cavite and may render
assistance that will be valuable." On the 27th of June, in
reply to inquiries from the Navy Department, he explained his
relations with Aguinaldo, as follows: "Aguinaldo, insurgent
leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by
permission, on 'Nanshan.' Established self Cavite, outside
arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his
army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a
personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting
him in any way with the force under my command, and on several
occasions I have declined requests that I should do so,
telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of
the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to
understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being
opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of
insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil
government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the squadron,
but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been
wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water recruits, arms, and
ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from
the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct
the war humanely, which he has done invariably. My relations
with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The
United States has not been bound in any way to assist
insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my
knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to
capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they
not yet having many guns. In my opinion these people are far
superior in their intelligence and more capable of
self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar
with both races."
 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898,
volume 2, pages 67-72 and 103.

On the 30th of June, troops sent from San Francisco, to the

number of 2,500 officers and men, commanded by General T. M.
Anderson, arrived in Manila Bay, to co-operate with the navy
in taking Manila and occupying the city, when taken. They were
followed by a second expeditionary force, under General F. V.
Greene, which arrived July 17, and by a third, July 25 and 31,
with which came General Merritt, commanding the corps and the
Department of the Pacific. General Merritt's army then
numbered nearly 11,000 men, and it was increased during the
next few weeks to more than 15,000.

Reports of the War Department, 1898,

volume 1, part 2, page 499.

An English officer, Major Younghusband, who visited Manila at

this time, remarked: "It may, perhaps, with some confidence be
prophesied that when the cold fit, which will in due course
follow the warmth of the present enthusiasm, falls on the
nation, America will discover that the true parting of the
ways was … in having allowed Admiral Dewey to do more than
defeat the Spanish fleet and exact a heavy indemnity from the
city of Manila before sailing away." It would seem to be more
true, however, to say that the parting of the ways was when a
military expedition was sent from San Francisco to Manila, to
be landed, for the capture of the city and for the occupation
of the islands. It is claimed with reason that Admiral Dewey
could not "sail away," after the destruction of the Spanish
ships, because he needed the harbor he had seized, his fleet
having lost most of the privileges it had formerly been using
in neutral ports, when it became the fleet of a belligerent
power. To retain possession of Manila Bay while it was needed
by the American fleet was clearly a measure connected
legitimately with the general conduct of the war against
Spain. But it is difficult to see that the landing of soldiers
 on the island of Luzon and the capture of the city of Manila
added anything to the security with which the Bay was held for
the purposes of Admiral Dewey's fleet, or that it contributed
at all to the weakening of Spain in the war, and to the rescue
of Cuba from Spanish misrule. For two months, from the first
day of May until the last day of June, before a soldier
arrived, and for six weeks longer, before Manila surrendered,
Admiral Dewey appears to have been as fully and as
conveniently in possession of all the advantages that
harborage there could give him, as he was after the Spanish
flag had been lowered in the city and on the island.
Therefore, the American conquest of the Philippines does not
readily connect itself with the war for the liberation of
Cuba, as a necessary part of it, but presents itself to the
mind as a somewhat supplementary enterprise, undertaken with
objects of its own.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (May-August).

Conduct of English and German naval officers at Manila.

While Admiral Dewey was holding Manila Bay, before the taking
of the city, there were many rumors and exciting stories
afloat, of offensive behavior towards the American fleet by
commanders of German war ships that were sent to the scene. As
far as possible, the facts were officially suppressed, in
order to avoid a quarrel between the two countries, and no
authoritative account of what occurred can be found. But some
incidents obtained publicity which are probably true in the
main. The first unpleasant happening appears to have been the
arrival in Manila Bay of a German naval vessel, which steamed
in with entire disregard of the blockading fleet, as though
the port was its own. Thereupon Admiral Dewey sent a forcible
reminder to the captain that he was intruding upon a blockade,
by firing a shot across his bow, and ordering him to heave to.
The German captain, in a rage, is said to have called on the
commanding officer of a British squadron that was in the Bay,
for advice as to what he should do, and was told that he owed
 the American Admiral an apology for his violation of naval
etiquette, well settled for such circumstances as those
existing in Manila Bay. According to the story, the British
commander, Captain Sir Edward Chichester, himself on the best
of terms with Admiral Dewey, visited the latter, on behalf of
the German officer, and made the matter smooth.
{599}
But, either through indiscretion of his own, or because he had
instructions to interfere as much as possible with the
proceedings of the Americans, the German commander continued
to pursue an offensive course. According to report, be went so
far as to stop a movement which Aguinaldo (then a recognized
ally of the United States) was making, to take possession of a
certain island, and to capture some Spaniards who were on it.
This provoked Admiral Dewey to a demonstration against him so
threatening that he drew back in haste, and the island was
occupied.

According to all accounts, Admiral Dewey showed unsurpassed

wisdom and dignity in meeting and checking these offensive
proceedings without allowing them to become a cause of
international quarrel; and he was happily aided in doing so by
the hearty support of the British naval commander. According
to still another report of the time, a German admiral, who had
come upon the scene, meditated an interference to forbid the
bombarding of Manila, when the city was about to be attacked,
and, calling upon Sir Edward Chichester to ascertain what
action the latter would take, was significantly told, "That is
only known to Admiral Dewey and myself,"—which convinced him
that his project was not wise. An English writer has related,
with much satisfaction, that when Sir Edward's ship, the
"Immortalité," finally steamed out of Manila Bay, returning to
Hong Kong, "every ship in the American fleet manned her yards
and gave the British man-of-war three cheers as she passed
along; and she with the answering signal, 'thank you,' flying
at her mast-head, went on her way."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1898 (June).
Act creating the United States Industrial Commission.

An Act "authorizing the appointment of a non-partisan

Commission to collate information and to consider and
recommend legislation to meet the problems presented by labor,
agriculture, and capital," was passed by Congress and approved
by the President June 18, 1898. It provided:

"That a commission is hereby created, to be called the

'Industrial Commission,' to be composed as follows. Five
members of the Senate, to be appointed by the presiding
officer thereof; five members of the House of Representatives,
to be appointed by the Speaker, and nine other persons, who shall
fairly represent the different industries and employments, to
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. … That it shall be the duty of this
commission to investigate questions pertaining to immigration,
to labor, to agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business,
and to report to Congress and to suggest such legislation as
it may deem best upon these subjects. … That it shall furnish
such information and suggest such laws as may be made a basis
for uniform legislation by the various States of the Union, in
order to harmonize conflicting interests and to be equitable
to the laborer, the employer, the producer, and the consumer.
… That the commission shall give reasonable time for hearings,
if deemed necessary, and if necessary it may appoint a
subcommission or subcommissions of its own members to make
investigation in any part of the United States, and it shall
be allowed actual necessary expenses for the same. It shall
have the authority to send for persons and papers and to
administer oaths and affirmations. … That it may report from
time to time to the Congress of the United States, and shall
at the conclusion of its labors submit a final report."

The Commission thus contemplated was duly appointed by the

President, and organized by the election of Senator Kyle for
its chairman. For the scope and plan of its investigations a
committee on procedure made the following recommendations,
which were adopted by the Commission and which have been
followed in what it has done:

"The main work of the Commission may … be said to be to study

and compare existing laws bearing upon industrial conditions,
here and elsewhere, to ascertain by competent testimony
wherein they are deficient, defective, inoperative, or
oppressive, and to recommend such remedial statutes as will
tend not only to make the conditions of industry more uniform
as between the several States, but to remove such existing
sources or causes of discontent, inequality, and injustice as
can be reached and regulated through legislation. … In order
to secure satisfactory results, it appears to your committee
imperatively necessary that the work shall be confined
strictly to the main purpose, viz, of ascertaining the nature
and effects of existing legislation, and the nature of
remedial legislation which may be necessary or desirable to
equalize conditions in industry and to remove any just grounds
of complaint on the part of either labor or capital or of the
people at large.

"To facilitate the progress of the work we recommend the

division of the Commission into four subcommissions of five
members each, to be severally charged with the investigation
of present conditions and the formulation of remedial
suggestions in the following branches of industry:

1. On agriculture and agricultural labor.

2. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in

manufacturing and general business.

3. On the conditions of labor and capital employed in mining.

4. On transportation.