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Risks, Identity and
Conflict
Theoretical Perspectives and
Case Studies
Edited by Steven Ratuva · Hamdy A. Hassan
Radomir Compel
Risks, Identity and Conflict
 Steven Ratuva · Hamdy A. Hassan ·
Radomir Compel
Editors

Risks, Identity
and Conflict
Theoretical Perspectives and Case Studies
Editors
Steven Ratuva Hamdy A. Hassan
Faculty of Arts College of Humanities & Social
University of Canterbury Sciences
Christchurch, New Zealand Zayed University
Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Radomir Compel
School of Global Humanities and
Social Sciences
Nagasaki University
Nagasaki, Japan

ISBN 978-981-16-1485-9 ISBN 978-981-16-1486-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1486-6

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To Michael Blain, one of our authors and a wonderful philosopher, who
passed away much too early and suddenly in 2020 when the book was in
preparation.
 Foreword

If ever there has been a need to understand the politics, ideology and
impact of the relationship between risk, identity and conflict across the
world, it is in these days. This book has been put together by a group of
eminent international scholars, from the research committee on Security,
Conflict and Democratization (R44) of the International Political Science
Association (IPSA). The IPSA was founded under the auspices of the
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Council in 1949, as
an international scholarly association for the advancement political science
across the world.
Through its fifteen chapters, this book introduces the idea of risk into
the study of identity and conflict, and how through unlocking debates
and unique narratives, there is a potential that we might be able to address
such conflicts in ways that are people-centred, empowering and sustain-
able. Risk is part of our everyday lives and how we frame it does vary
in relation to different cultural, political, ideological, methodological and
philosophical contexts.
The book provides a comparative discussion of the complex relation-
ships between identity and conflict and manifestations, of risks and how
different societies have managed to deal with these given the resources
they have and limitations with which they are faced. The case studies are
from various parts of the world and what is clear is that while the process
of globalization has linked many international and regional developments,
there are still specific issues and conditions, which are unique and highly

vii
viii FOREWORD

relevant to local contexts. The 2020–2021 COVID-19 pandemic posed

one of the most devastating risk factors ever to beset humanity. Each
country dealt with it differently in accordance with their specific condi-
tions and capabilities. For many this added to the existing social and polit-
ical risks of inequality, ethnic conflict, territorial disputes, political power
struggle and economic exploitation. And for many there was a need for
recovery that included innovative solutions to conflict, and social trans-
formation beyond conventional security paradigms. Thank you to the
scholars contributing to this book, for expanding our understandings of
risk, identity and security, and illuminating future trends regionally and
globally. The quest for peace and international relations is foundational to
each chapter. This is unique, timely, vital scholarship.
While risk of identity conflict is often unfairly stereotyped as being
specific to Global South countries, the storming of Capitol Hill on 6
January 2021 by supporters of President Donald Trump was but one
example of how liberal democracy itself creates conditions for political
risks in the form of right-wing extremist groups, clamouring for a partic-
ular political and cultural identity. This book provides a series of examples
of how risks are associated with political mobilization, elections, refugees,
ethnic cleansing and even peace-making, regionally and globally. The posi-
tive aspect to these is that we humans have the creative capacity to respond
to and transform these risks into opportunities for peace and stability.
For students and researchers in the areas of identity, security, conflict,
peace-building and international relations, this book offers much that is
thought-leading, critically substantive and bold. The global context of the
book makes it appropriate for comparative studies as well as regional and
national analysis of risk, identity and conflict. As a scholar who has worked
in the areas of identity, power and education, I find the book timely, given
the dramatic changes in the world today, and that the potential we each
have to contribute to peace and stability.

January 2021 Prof. Airini

Provost and Vice-President Academic
University of Saskatchewan
Saskatoon, Canada
 Preface

The unprecedented impact of COVID-19 around the world and the

recent storming of Capitol Hill by supporters of former President Donald
Trump are two classic examples of how social risks have shaped events
both at the local and global levels. With globalization, risks associated
with specific places and historical moments can become universalized as
a result of cross-border interactions and global virtual communication,
amongst other means. Risks are part of human experiences and how we
construct and understand them may differ from society to society or from
context to context. This book is about understanding how risks are linked
to identity and conflict and how these manifest themselves in different
contexts.
In a conference on Risk, Identity and Conflict in August 2019 at the
Nagasaki University, jointly organized by several research committees of
the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and the Nagasaki
University, the notion of “risk” was seen as a missing link in the current
discussions on security and conflict. While the idea of risk is contextual, it
is also recognized that there are universal conditions, especially in situa-
tions of conflict, which are common. These include threats to human life,
identity and survival of social groups, amongst other things, although the
theoretical framing may differ. The idea of the book is part of the broader
plan to initiate discussions on re-theorizing the idea of risks in the context
of identity and conflict. Risk, identity and conflict and value-loaded terms,
which are subject to diverse theoretical framing and application.

ix
x PREFACE

The relationship between identity and risks in today’s world is multilay-

ered and complex and contribute in direct and indirect ways to increasing
conflict, insecurity and instability different regions. Almost every aspect of
economic policies, political decisions, military strategies, financial invest-
ment and other forms of human endeavours are associated with risks. In
the natural sciences, risks can be predictable and calculable, using proba-
bility functions and statistical analyses. In the social sciences, risks have to
be understood and interpreted in the context of behaviour, relationships,
events, perceptions and social transformation. They are intersubjective and
are based on assumptions and consequences of complex social interactions
and human intentionality. Such risks are far more complicated and difficult
to quantify. Social risk has been a concept common to political and secu-
rity studies with their focus on the potential of adversarial intentionality
and communal survival, beyond the conventional security paradigms. The
study of risk management as a way of responding to risk must inevitably
include human security, identity construction and social trust. It is impor-
tant to capture the complex, intersectional, multi-causal and co-relational
linkages between risks, security culture and identity.
This volume explores the complex interrelation between risk, identity
and conflict and focuses on ethnicity, religion and gender as modes of
identity, which are often associated with conflict and cooperation in the
contemporary world. The chapters provide various theoretical perspec-
tives and pay special attention to analysis of diverse case studies from
Africa, Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America, as well as
the Euro-American world. Using various conceptual and methodolog-
ical approaches, it provides narratives of unique local and regional social
risk factors and conflict contexts. The relationship between risk and secu-
rity is multidimensional and perpetually changing, and lends itself to
multiple interpretations. This publication provides some discussions for
future theoretical and policy debates on risk, and identity and conflict in
a dramatically changing world.

Christchurch, New Zealand Steven Ratuva

Dubai, United Arab Emirates Hamdy A. Hassan
Nagasaki, Japan Radomir Compel
 Acknowledgements

The chapters are based on papers presented at a conference on Risk, Iden-

tity and Security at the Nagasaki University in August 2019, a result of
mutual partnership and collaboration between a number of organizations
and networks. Firstly, we acknowledge the conference hosts, the Transdis-
ciplinary Research Platform on “Risk Society” in Humanities and Social
Sciences of Nagasaki University, which organized a very high standard
international conference under the coordination of Associate Professor
Radomir Compel.
Secondly, we acknowledge the role of the various research commit-
tees of the International Political Science Association for their mutual
partnership in making the conference a success. These Research Commit-
tees include Security, Conflict and Democratization (RC44), Women and
Politics in the Global South (RC07), Biology and Politics (RC12), Poli-
tics and Ethnicity (RC14), Technology and Development (RC35) and
Religion and Politics (RC43).
Thirdly, we acknowledge the grants provided by the São Paulo
Research Foundation (FAPESP), Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science (JSPS), Japan International Cooperation Agency Ogata Sadako
Research Institute for Peace and Development (JICA-RI), Univer-
sity of Kitakyushu Grants for Special Research, academic exchange
funding bodies, such as, Nagasaki International Tourism and Convention
Association.

xi
xii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Lastly, we acknowledge the hard work of the authors and others who
presented papers during the Nagasaki conference, as well as other insti-
tutions not named above, which have contributed to making this book
possible.
 Contents

1 Risk, Identity and Conflict: A Critical Overview 1

Steven Ratuva, Hamdy A. Hassan, and Radomir Compel

Part I Ethno-religious Approaches to Risk and Security

2 Risk, Security, and the War on Terror 25
Michael Blain and Angeline Kearns-Blain
3 Ethnicity, Insecurity and Geostrategic Transformation
in the Horn of Africa 61
Hamdy A. Hassan
4 Formation of Diaspora Network and Reconstruction
of Collective Memory: The Case of Indo-Fijians 85
Masaki Kataoka
5 Ethnicity and Geopolitics of Rohingya Crisis 109
Mohd Aminul Karim
6 Pious Predicaments and Pathways for Engagement:
Ulama and Risks in Post-Conflict Milieu 131
Jovanie Camacho Espesor

xiii
xiv CONTENTS

Part II Institutional and Policy Approaches to

Ethno-religious Risks
7 Ethnic Conflicts and Peacekeeping 157
Sergio Luiz Cruz Aguilar
8 Ethnofederal Elections and National Identities:
Cross-National Survey Research 185
Ryo Nakai
9 A Quantitative Text Analysis on Mobilization
of the Electorate by Islamist Parties During the 2018
Iraqi Parliamentary Election 207
Hiroko Kinoshita and Dai Yamao
10 Designing a Constitution: Bridging the Gap Between
Political Ideals and Political Practices in Afghanistan 231
M. Bashir Mobasher
11 COVID-19 and the Way to Authoritarian Rule
in Ethiopia 255
Hala Thabet

Part III Gender-Based Approaches to Risk and Security

12 Women Peace and Security: Sexual Gender-Based
Violence Survivor Support in Refugee Settlements
in Uganda 277
Miho Fukui
13 Why GBV Survivors Cannot Seek Help: The Case
of South Sudanese Refugees in Uganda 307
Chigumi Kawaguchi
14 Negotiating the Gender-Based Violence Referral
Pathway: Challenges and Opportunities in the Refugee
Hosting Areas of Uganda 339
Kalyango Ronald Sebba
 CONTENTS xv

Part IV Conclusion
15 Risk, Identity and Conflict: Some Concluding
Remarks 369
Steven Ratuva, Hamdy A. Hassan, and Radomir Compel

Index 381
 Contributors

Sergio Luiz Cruz Aguilar Sao Paulo State University (UNESP), Sao
Paulo, Brazil
Michael Blain Boise State University, Boise, ID, USA
Radomir Compel School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences,
Nagasaki University, Nagasaki, Japan
Jovanie Camacho Espesor Mindanao State University, General Santos,
Philippines
Miho Fukui Programme Department, Peace Winds Japan, Tokyo, Japan
Hamdy A. Hassan College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zayed
University, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
Mohd Aminul Karim Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB),
Dhaka, Bangladesh
Masaki Kataoka University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
Chigumi Kawaguchi Toyo Gakuen University, Tokyo, Japan
Angeline Kearns-Blain Boise State University, Boise, ID, USA
Hiroko Kinoshita Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan

xvii
xviii CONTRIBUTORS

M. Bashir Mobasher American University of Afghanistan, Kabul,

Afghanistan;
Western Washington University, Washington, USA
Ryo Nakai Department of Policy Studies, The University of Kitakyushu,
Kitakyushu, Japan
Steven Ratuva Faculty of Arts, Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific
Studies, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
Kalyango Ronald Sebba School of Women and Gender Studies,
Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda
Hala Thabet Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
Dai Yamao Kyushu University, Fukuoka, Japan
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Empire, victimage ritual, and the biopolitics of ethnic

groups as terrorists (Source Author, adapted from ideas
developed in Blain [2019]) 29
Fig. 2.2 Structural analysis of melodramatic patterns of meanings
in political victimage ritual (Note […] = substitution
of signifiers. Source Authors, adapted from Blain [2019]) 41
Fig. 9.1 Trust of political parties by each ethno/sectarian group
(Source Yamao [2018b, 30]) 212
Fig. 9.2 Result of the 4th parliamentary election: number and %
of seats (Source Made by authors based on the Iraqi
Independent High Electoral Commission [https://www.
ihec-iraq.com/ar/]) 213
Fig. 9.3 Frequency and weight of each dictionary by parties
(Source Made by authors) 221
Fig. 9.4 Mobilization tone of each party (Source Created
by authors) 223
Fig. 9.5 Coefficient plot of the Model 1 (Source Created
by authors) 225
Fig. 9.6 Marginal effect of each party’s mobilization tone (Source
Created by authors) 226
Fig. 9.7 Coefficient plot of the Model 3 (Source Created
by authors) 227
Fig. 10.1 Ethnic distribution of survey respondents (Source Author) 234
Fig. 10.2 Opinion of different groups on the issue of power-sharing
in the government (Source Author) 235

xix
xx LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 10.3 Popularity of the emerging cross-ethnic coalitions against

ethnic parties or banning both political organizations
among different ethnic groups (Source Author) 236
Fig. 10.4 Popularity of a cross-ethnic party system over an ethnic
or a mixed party system based on the public opinion
(Source Author) 237
Fig. 10.5 Importance of different identities based on the public
opinion in Afghanistan (Source Author) 238
Fig. 10.6 Comparison of ethnic groups’ responses with regard
to the use of ‘Afghan’ for the people of Afghanistan
as their national identity (Source Author) 239
Fig. 11.1 Map of Ethiopia and the nine regional states (Source map
made by the author) 261
Fig. 12.1 Uganda refugee response coordination structure (Source
WFP and UNHCR 2018) 285
Fig. 12.2 Yumbe settlement referral mechanism (Source UNHCR
2016a, 7) 296
Fig. 13.1 Ecological framework for explaining GBV (Source Author,
adapted from Heise 1998; Ellsberg and Heise 2005, 26) 312
Fig. 14.1 The GBV referral pathway (Source Author, adapted
from data in Inter Agency Standing Committee [2008].
Gender Based Violence Resource tool: Establishing GBV
standard operating procedures (SOP) guide) 347
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Percent and number of US Presidential

State-of-the-Union addresses containing references
to empire and deploying terror/subjection by stages
of US Empire, 1790–2018 31
Table 2.2 Number of n Oxford English Dictionary concepts
of terror in relation to the French revolutionary period,
1789–1815 33
Table 2.3 Number of Trump tweets and retweets during campaign
(06-01-15) and after 2016 Presidential election
(11-04-2016) 44
Table 2.4 Percent articles linking subjects and discourses
to “terrorism” in influential articles indexed
in Sociology Abstracts pre-9/11 (1960–2001) and WoT
(2002–2012) 53
Table 6.1 Muslim population in the Bangsamoro 136
Table 8.1 Logistic regression analysis of people’s national identity
by three unitary-federal systems 197
Table 8.2 Logistic regression analysis of people’s national identity
with interaction terms 198
Table 8.3 The list of countries, elections, and surveys in our
analysis 203
Table 9.1 Social media platforms of the parties 215
Table 9.2 Result of OLS regression 224
Table 10.1 Ethnic composition of political parties
inside the parliament of Afghanistan 243

xxi
xxii LIST OF TABLES

Table 12.1 Organizations and type of service provided 294

Table 12.2 FGDs GBV help-seeking preferences 299
Table 12.3 Refugees’ suggestions for improving SGBV survivor
support access 301
Table 13.1 Promoters and inhibitors of GBV act and help-seeking
act from FGDs 328
 CHAPTER 1

Risk, Identity and Conflict: A Critical

Overview

Steven Ratuva , Hamdy A. Hassan ,

and Radomir Compel

Overview
The relationships between risk, identity and conflict take complex forms,
especially when the intersection between identity construction and poli-
tics has the potential to create conditions related to risks of conflict,

S. Ratuva (B)
Faculty of Arts, Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
e-mail: steven.ratuva@canterbury.ac.nz
H. A. Hassan
College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Zayed University, Dubai, United
Arab Emirates
e-mail: hamdy.hassan@zu.ac.ae
R. Compel
School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki University,
Nagasaki, Japan
e-mail: cmplrad@nagasaki-u.ac.jp

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
S. Ratuva et al. (eds.), Risks, Identity and Conflict,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1486-6_1
2 S. RATUVA ET AL.

instability, marginalization, human rights abuse and oppression. This is

because identity can be used as a means of mobilization to expand polit-
ical influence, resist hegemony and articulate demands for a group interest
or as a means of achieving particular political ends. The book attempts to
cover a number of these aspects by looking at specific case studies around
the world. While focusing on diverse historical and contextual differences,
it also provides some common strands in relation to how various forms of
identity such as ethnicity, religion, culture and gender are linked to social
and political mobilization, framing of the “Other”, electoral engineering,
group oppression and even genocide. At the outset, it is important to
note that understanding risk and security requires expanding our social
perspectives which capture the changing patterns of social life and global-
ization, rather than focusing narrowly on traditional notions of risks and
security. This is the approach which the book takes.
The notion of risk is ever present in our midst and has been so since
the beginning of humanity. Risks can be based on threats by the natural
environment such as earthquakes and the weather pattern, and at the
same time, it can be socially induced such as violence and other forms of
conflict. While the term risk itself is an abstract construction, in its usage,
it refers to phenomenon, whether “real” or perceived, that pose a threat
to people’s lives, livelihood, sense of comfort or perception of normality.
Increasingly, in the modern world of globalization, where things are inter-
connected in complex ways, different types of natural and social risks are
linked in different ways. Experience of risks in faraway lands has direct
or indirect implications on local realities. Global risks influence local risks
and vice versa, some forms of risk may be obvious and explicit while some
may be more subtle and implicit.
In a broad sense, the term risk is often associated with security and
threat and the book is more concerned with the intersection between
risk and identity, especially identity-based relations and tension. The book
takes an analytical eclecticism approach by consciously addressing and
selectively recombining conceptual and empirical discourses and appli-
cations of diverse theoretical narratives (Suh et al. 2004), as a way of
exploring the multi-layered contours of risks, identity and conflict in
various societies. The different chapters represent the different experi-
ences and approaches to risk, identity and conflict; these include the
biopolitical critique approach, political economy analysis, geo-strategic
framing, critical discourse analysis, human rights framing, phenomeno-
logical assessment and use of gender lenses. These different modes of
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 3

conceptualization are specific to different chapters and thus make them

unique in their own right but their strength lies in how they (chap-
ters) converse with each other in a mutual but discursive dialogue. The
different case studies from around the world provide a sense of diver-
sity about the different historical, political and cultural circumstances of
countries and communities, yet there are commonalities as well. They
provide a rich tapestry of experiences from around the world in the
way identity and risk interplay are experienced, perceived and responded
to in the unfolding dynamics of political conflict, social transformation,
peacebuilding and democratization.

Identity and Risk Nexus: A Critical Observation

Before examining the relationship between identity, risk and conflict, it
would be pertinent at this point to discuss what identity entails and some
of the inherent characteristics which may help induce risks of conflict.
Sociologists and anthropologists have attempted to define identity in
relation to the use of socio-cultural symbolisms to frame a sense of
commonality within a group (Ratuva 2019). There are diverse forms of
socio-cultural identifiers people use to determine their sense of belonging
to a group and some common ones are ethnicity, race, language, religion,
gender, common history, citizenship, common lineage, political affilia-
tion, regional loyalty and the list continues (Jenkins 1997; Cohen 1985).
Within the boundaries of broader identities are smaller sub-identities and
as we move closer to the local communities, identities become quite
complex as people take on multiple identities of their own. Today, as a
result of globalization and cyber-technology, groups and individuals tend
to take on multiple identities, including digital forms of virtual online
identities, in response to changing circumstances (Kang and Bodenhausen
2015).
In many Global South societies with post-colonial experience (as we
shall see in the book), an important mode of collective identification
is “community”, whether it be based on tribal, kinship, genealogical
relationships, religion, broader cultural systems, sub-cultural groupings,
common language, common ancestral line or common history. These
social variables define the boundaries, relationships and sense of shared
uniqueness as expressed by Cohen:
4 S. RATUVA ET AL.

“Community” thus seems to imply simultaneously both similarity and

difference. The word thus expressed a relational idea: the opposition of
one community to others or to other social entities…The use of the word
is only occasioned by the desire or need to express such a distinction. It
seems appropriate, therefore, to focus our examination of the nature of
community on the element which embodies this sense of discrimination,
namely, the boundary. (Cohen 1985, 12, original emphasis)

In recent years, community as a socially constructed mode of iden-

tity has gone through significant transformation as a result of internal
strife, externally generated conflict, cyber-technology, cultural interaction,
geostrategic dynamics, neoliberalism and commodification of identity,
beyond what the early pioneering identity theorists like Bath (1969),
Geetz (1973) and Cohen (1985) ever imagined. The old debate between
the primordialist and social constructionist theories as dichotomies has
now shifted to issues such as cultural genomics as a result of new advances
in genetics to determine how culture and genes shape each other (Chen
and Moyziz 2018). However, at the same time, this has raised concern
about the recent increase in research on biological determinism and impli-
cations on “scientific racism” and how this poses a great risk to ethnic
relations (Saini 2019).
In the broader scheme of things, Jenkins (1997, 40) argues that socio-
cultural identity has a number of fundamental characteristics including:
providing a means of differentiation; shared cultural meaning; repro-
duction of sense of self through interaction; changeability in different
situations; and manipulable to serve particular interests. The fact that
it is manipulable makes identity subjected to political mobilization and
thus makes it potentially explosive and subject to high risk. It is also
transactional in the sense that one’s identity is defined both internally
(by the group itself) and externally (by others) (Erikson 1993; Hughes
1994). The “us” and “them” or “in group” and “out group” definitions
provide a basis for identity differentiation and potential conditions for
risks, especially when they intersect with issues of inequality, contestation
for power and resources distribution. This has the potential to inflame
ethno-nationalism and conflict.
Identities can also be part of the process of mythmaking, especially
where certain claims are made to justify certain things like claim to
land or immemorial sovereignty. In modern states, the tension between
national identity and communal identity may shape the nature and level
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 5

of political tension and risks in positively transformative or destructive

ways (Stavenhagen 1996). Different communities with different claims
to unique identities constitute a state, and in some cases, state power
may rest with a particular community and this could be a precondition
for communal tension. Despite an appearance of solidarity and shared
common identities, people in a large community may still relate to each
other as strangers in an “imaginary community” (Anderson 1983).
Identity is at the centre of many modern-day conflicts. Amongst other
things, it can be used as a means of justification for political action,
basis for mobilization, leverage for social and political transformation
and lenses for stereotyping others (Spoonle 2019). But risk of conflict
is heightened when identity intersects with issues such as socio-economic
inequality, competition for power, resource disputes and human rights
abuse (Matory 2015). Identity is a fluid and often ambiguous term
which is associated with socially constructed symbolisms, characteristics
and modes of behaviour associated with a particular group. When external
threat increases, the risk of harm to the group may also increase and
the nature of the response would depend very much on the nature and
intensity of the threat.
Some forms of identity dealt with in the book are ethnicity, race, reli-
gion, gender, citizenship and nationality. Race and ethnicity are closely
associated with each other and are often used interchangeably. Although
the former refers to biological inheritance and the latter cultural charac-
teristics, over the years, a combination of physical and cultural differences
has been used to define ethnic or racial identity (Balibar and Wallerstein
1991). This fluidity and ambiguity of identity make it readily subjected
to various forms of politicization involving mobilization of people under
a unifying ideological narrative for a political cause. This creates its own
set of risks involving identity power struggle as in the case of Iraq and/or
identity cleansing, as in the case of the Rohingya in the book.
The interface between identity and risk of conflict is often explained
by scholars in different ways based on competing discursive, method-
ological and ideological imperatives in political science, sociology and
peace/conflict studies. Based on the pluralistic perspective, Samuel Hunt-
ington’s “clash of civilization” thesis proposes that differences in cultural
identity and incompatibility of civilizational values are at the centre of
global political risks and conflict (1993). Edward Said (2001) repudi-
ated this assumption in his “clash of ignorance” narrative by arguing that
6 S. RATUVA ET AL.

cultural identity and civilizations cannot be arbitrary demarcated as Hunt-

ington has done since they have been interacting and mixing for centuries,
and thus, conflict must be understood in terms of responses to condi-
tions of colonial and post-colonial exploitation and hegemony. A core
issue here is not so much cultural differences but competing economic,
strategic and ideological interests which intersect with issues of identity as
Tariq Ali (2003) argues in his book Clash of Fundamentalists. The point
here is that a political situation only poses a risk when the circumstances
which shape social and political relations are being leveraged, manipulated
and exploited either in deliberate or unconscious ways by groups to serve
their agenda.
For those subscribing to the game theory of conflict, risk is height-
ened or ameliorated when players of different identities engage in a
“rational” way to maximize benefits (Grzyl et al. 2019). While this may
make sense in some situation, often, human behaviour is unpredictable
and decisions can be made unconsciously, not so much in a rational
manner but in a way that is convenient to the situation at hand. The
greed and grievance theory is much more specific and self-explanatory
about the socio-psychological circumstances of risk—these are greed and
grievance (Bensted 2011). The idea that the propensity to fight over
resources or expression of anger over one’s negative experiences does
happen in many contexts around the world but this still does not explain
other forms of risks and conflicts which are institutionalized and passed
on through generations. The political economy thesis tries to address
this shortcoming by arguing that issues of inequality of resources distri-
bution, power and opportunities amongst people of different identities
create conditions for risks and conflict. When socio-economic inequality
and unequal distribution of power intersect with identity, whether it be
ethnicity or religion, the risk of conflict is considerably heightened.
The idea that differences in identity naturally create risks of conflict is
associated with the primordialist assumption about human nature being
predisposed to self-interest and competition, which is the standard justi-
ficatory narrative for individualism and capitalism (Seidman 2008). The
opposing view is that, rather than having roots in some primordial
or atavistic predisposition, social and political risks are constructed by
human agency in relation to prevailing circumstances that could poten-
tially threaten their lives and well-being. In everyday life, people can
also construct conditions and perceptions of risk in ways which either
provide them with means to respond to threats, provide them with a
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 7

sense of safety and assurance of security or provide them with the means
of keeping their communities safer in the future.
The post-colonial writers frame the relationship between identity and
socio-political risk in the context of the broader history of transforma-
tion from colonialism to modern-day forms of power relations, control,
exploitation and subjugation (Diagne 2020). Apart from framing risk
around issues of identity conflict, there are other complex political,
socio-cultural, economic and psychological factors which create subaltern
relations and risks. For instance, neoliberal capitalism has added to the
risk of tension through the privatization of education and knowledge,
public services, health, security and well-being. In the process, cultural
and ethnic minorities become most at risks because of the lack of access
to privatized user-pay systems in addition to the level of epistemic racism
and sexism which are historically embedded in the economic, educational
and political structures (Wilder 2013). Multiple identities can also invoke
multiple risks. For instance, those who are black, women, working class
and refugees, the risks to one’s well-being and life are multiplied many
times over.
Risk is contextual and transformative at the same time. It is contextual
in the sense that what may be defined as risk in one situation may not
be so in another. For instance, the term “terrorism” as a political identity
of sorts conjures images of destruction and other racialized stereotypes
while using the term “freedom fighters” on the same group lowers the
psychological impact of risk and even provides a positive and optimistic
outlook. Also, some countries like those in the Pacific may see the symbi-
otic relationship between the ocean and climate change as a risk while for
landlocked countries like Mongolia, this is hardly an issue. Risk is trans-
formative because the fear of something terrible such as war happening
can make people change behaviour and when something actually happens
(in this case, war), people’s lives can be transformed further in significant
ways.
The relationship between risk and identity is multi-layered in various
ways. Economic, political, cultural, health and psychological risks and
their impact on a group can be accumulative over time and even if you
peel off one layer, other layers may remain and still pose long-term threat
to communities. A classic example is COVID-19 which has become the
most widely pronounced risk in the world today which requires the most
urgent attention. There are different layers of risk associated with the
pandemic such as health and infection; then, there is the economic risk
8 S. RATUVA ET AL.

of loss of employment, on top of that is the risk of isolation due to lock-

down, then to top it off is the risk of political control and surveillance.
Those who are most at risk are groups from minority communities. Apart
from posing different types of challenges, these multiple risks have also
helped to build response mechanisms and people’s sense of resilience.
For many indigenous and minority communities, this involves falling
back on their social solidarity economies which have sustained them for
centuries (Tora 2020). Given COVID-19’s status as the most widespread
and profound source of risk in the world today, it would be timely at this
point to examine how this plays out.

COVID-19 Risk and Identity

It would be appropriate to briefly discuss COVID-19 here because it
has become the most dominant threat and risk globally, and in some
ways, it has also impacted on identity and conflict. The pandemic has,
in various peculiar ways, reshaped the way we define risk in that risk is
no longer defined as an external identifiable threat but also as invisible
but frighteningly deadly factor in the form of a minute virus which can
threaten individuals, families, communities, nations and the entire planet
simultaneously (ILO 2020). This is unprecedented in terms of its impact
on health, well-being, economies, border closure, lockdowns and greater
control of the population. The risks are global and seem to escalate and
become replicated all the time, and despite attempts by countries to put
in place measures, the threat does not seem to diminish. Some countries
have managed to control the virus to some degree, while in some cases
the successes have been temporary as shown by the “second wave” of
infection sweeping many countries around the world.
There are a number of significant connections between the pandemic,
risks and identity which we need to be cognizant of. The pandemic has
exacerbated the identity-based structural inequalities and thus heighten
the risk for minorities who do not have access to health care, educa-
tional opportunities, who work in low-skill and high-risk frontline jobs
and those caught up in war-torn environments (ILO 2020). In densely
populated communities, the risk of infection is very high and the fact
that access to testing is minimal does not allow for a full picture of
the extent of the problem. In some countries, COVID-19 has led to
conflict between those pushing for strict adherence to health guidelines
and those pushing for lifting of restrictions and open the economy. Others
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 9

argue that the lockdowns and other forms of restrictions undermine their
libertarian ideals.
The COVID-19 has exacerbated racial inequalities in many countries
where minorities at the lowest socio-economic stratification are the most
at risk. For instance, in the United States (US), the most affected commu-
nities are Blacks, Latinos and Pacific Islanders who do not have health
insurance and who tend to live in large families because of economic and
cultural reasons. The Pacific Islanders are almost 10 times the infection
rate of other racial groups (Jackson 2020). This is not surprising since
in California, where most Pacific Islanders reside, Native Hawaiians and
Pacific Islanders (NHPI) had the largest increase in the poverty rate from
2007 to 2012—at 97%, higher than any other racial group. The average
increase in rate of poverty amongst this group over the same period was
31% (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). At the same time, the number of unem-
ployed amongst NHPI increased 158%, again, higher than any other racial
group.
The pandemic has also laid bare the differences between countries in
terms of their risk-based responses. Perhaps two extremes are the US and
New Zealand. In the US, the health system is based on the neoliberal
market principle of user-pay which puts the poor and non-white minori-
ties at risk. This is worsened by a leadership which is indiscipline and
anti-science supported by significant section of the public which is guided
by conspiracy theories. New Zealand’s low-risk approach is very different
and consists of a very efficient free public health system, well-structured
response mechanism using different levels of risk and a science-driven and
disciplined leadership team. The different approaches ultimately deter-
mine the levels of risk as well as the impact of the pandemic on various
racial groups (Stiglitz 2020). While the infection rate amongst the Pacific
Islanders increased steadily in the “second wave” in New Zealand, this
was quickly under control, and when the government gave the all clear in
October for the lifting of restrictions, the national total had reached zero
over subsequent days.
Another source of tension is the securitization of the pandemic,
especially the use of the war narrative (“war against COVID-19”), inten-
sification of surveillance of citizens, deployment of military forces, use of
draconian laws and rules to control people, mobilization of the military
for public control duties, closure of borders and strict control by border
officials. These have, to some degree, militarized society in unprece-
dented ways. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 environment provided an
10 S. RATUVA ET AL.

opportunity for states to fine-tune, intensify and maximize their repres-

sive capacities as a way of minimizing the risk of infection. Some states
succeeded and became role models to be emulated by others, while some
have not.
COVD-19 also fuelled the geopolitical tension between the two most
powerful states in the world, China and the United States (US). US Pres-
ident Donald Trump blamed China for the pandemic and even calling it
the “Kung Flu” (Lee 2020). This latest round of scapegoating merely
reinforces the existing Sinophobic scaremongering narrative which has
been part of the West’s geopolitical stance towards China in recent years.
Geo-strategic contestation and the use of racialized framing of the other
have fed into the COVID-19 risk discourse in a significant way. Beyond
geopolitics was the issue of race and culture as subconscious identifiers
which provided an implicit ideological driver for the tension.
COVID-19 has also unravelled some myths about ranking of coun-
tries in relation to high risk and low risk when it comes to preparedness
capacity for pandemic. In 2019, Johns Hopkins University released the
Global Health Security Index (GHSI) which ranked countries according
to their level of preparedness to tackle an epidemic. Out of 195 countries,
the United States was ranked 1st, Britain was ranked 2nd and Netherlands
was ranked 3rd (Johns Hopkins University 2019). However, this ranking
was thoroughly invalidated when a real epidemic, in fact a pandemic,
struck. The US, Britain and Netherlands were amongst the most at risk
with high numbers of infections, contrary to the index. This is an example
of how the assessment of risks can be seriously flawed because of the faulty
assumptions and methodological shortcomings. The ranking of countries
in the index is closely associated with the ranking of races in relation to
their capacity as a group. In many similar indexes (such as Fragile State
Index, Corruption Index and Governance Index), African and other post-
colonial states are often ranked at the bottom and thus considered high
risk while European countries are ranked at the top—the reason being
that the selective choice of assessment variables tends to be biased towards
the “West”. This is an example of how risk itself can be constructed
through identity-based framing.

Weaving Multiple Voices of Risk: The Chapters

The chapters in the book provide different case studies from around
the world but are linked together in various ways such as their framing
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 11

of different situations of risks and identity. While the chapters provide

unique voices, they are also in dialogue with each other over some
common themes such as identity and conflict and some broader processes
of globalization which have impacted on the world over. The chapters
cover a broad range of themes, methodological approaches, theoretical
frameworks and geopolitical case studies. They provide a rich tapestry
of experiences from around the world in the way risk and identity
interplay are experienced, perceived and responded to in the context
of the unfolding dynamics of political conflict, social transformation,
peacebuilding and democratization.
In Chapter 2, Michael Blain and Angeline Kearns Blain critically
examine the relationship between risk, security and the War on Terror
(WoT) by problematizing the conceptualization of political violence and
ethnicity in sociological research. They do so by looking at the genealogy
of power and knowledge dynamics in the War on Terror. Using the biopo-
litical lenses, the authors introduce the concept of “victimage ritual” to
frame the way the United States ethnicizes and vilifies others as “ter-
rorists”, while framing itself as victim, to justify its military occupation,
hegemonic designs and predatory strategic interests. The chapter demon-
strates that the process of framing the other based on their supposedly
opposing cultural and political identities poses a severe risk to global
stability and peace.
An area of the world where US strategic interest has been prominent
and has heightened political risk for years is the African/Middle East sub-
region, especially the Horn of Africa (HOA). This is elaborated more
by Hamdy Hassan in Chapter 3 where he examines in some detail the
issues of geostrategic transformation and its relationship to ethnicity and
risk of insecurity in the HOA, which is one of the most troubled areas,
constantly plagued by conflicts and security threats in the African conti-
nent. The region has undergone tumultuous geostrategic changes which
have resulted in heightened risks. It is noteworthy that every country in
the HOA has been involved in some form of conflict with one or more
other states in the region or within itself in the past and the potential
for risk of instability is ever present, especially because of the geostrategic
importance of the region, amongst other reasons.
The theme of ethno-politics resonates cross geopolitical boundaries.
While the HOA is intertwined with geostrategic dynamics, in the Pacific,
the situation is slightly different. For instance, the ethno-politics and
associated risk of tension in Fiji is driven more by internal rather than
12 S. RATUVA ET AL.

external factors. In Chapter 4, Masaki Kataoka examines the issue of

memory construction in Fiji amongst the diaspora Indo-Fijian community
and indigenous Fijians and how this shapes the country’s ethnic relations
and risks of tension. While most previous works on diaspora have mainly
focused on the diaspora’s economic and diplomatic influences and reac-
tions from state authorities, this chapter pays attention to the role of the
diaspora in reconstructing ethnic collective memory of history and how
this shapes political risks. The author uses the critical discourse analysis
framework to examine the variety of texts, books, and Internet posts and
how the two ethnic groups (Indo-Fijian and Indigenous Fijians) formed
transnational diaspora networks. The Indo-Fijian diaspora in particular
has developed the ability to reconstruct their traditional ethnic memory
in Fiji as a means of adaptation using western notions of human rights.
Some aspects of the ethnic memory relate to the series of coups in Fiji
and how these have shaped both the cultural consciousness and political
risks.
Risks of identity conflict may be exacerbated when ethnicity intersects
in relation to issues of resource distribution, claims to sovereignty and
religious mobilization, and in extreme cases, this can lead to genocide as
in the case of the Rohingya. Mohd Aminul Karim examines this in detail
in Chapter 5 as he looks at the political, ethnic and human rights issues
as well as some of the geopolitical implications of the Rohingya crisis. As
Karim notes, the Rohingya crisis is a long-standing festering issue where
human rights should have been the focus but this is being dwarfed by
geopolitics. The Rohingya situation is associated with multiple layers of
risks relating to displacement, loss of identity, break-up of families, loss of
land and genocide.
Despite cases of social risks, violence, displacement and protracted
conflicts in many parts of the world, there are also stories of hope as
Jovanie Espesor examines in Chapter 6 where he discusses the role of
religion in decreasing social and political risks through peacebuilding in
the case of Mindanao in Southern Philippines. Espesor explores the role
of the ulama (guardians of Islamic faith) on risks and insecurities in post-
conflict Mindanao. Since the onset of insurgency in the 1970s, different
religious denominations have been a source of civil society leaders who
are playing a key role in the peace operations in the region. The paper
argues that understanding the ontological and epistemic perspectives on
risk and violence of the ulama is an imperative to enhance strategies in
mitigating risk and governing insecurities in post-Mindanao conflict.
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 13

The theme of peace is elaborated further by Sergio Agular in Chapter 7

where he examines the role of peacekeeping in keeping risks of ethnic
conflicts in check and some of the associated challenges. The chapter
highlights the barriers to managing, resolving and/or putting an end
to ethnic conflict and violence in ethnically divided war-torn societies
through peacekeeping operations. It uses the examples of ethnic civil war
and United Nations peace operations to present some of the opportu-
nities and challenges faced by operations while dealing with these types
of political risks and armed conflict. It focuses on preventive and reac-
tive deployment, as well as the location and size of peacekeeping, local
conflict, and the coordination and commitment of troops.
Although, not often acknowledged, elections are not only a means of
providing democratic mandates, they are also meant to minimize risks of
conflict through the process of legitimation; however, this does not always
work. Chapters 8 and 9 examine the role of election in minimizing risks in
Iraq. Ryo Nakai examines the relationship between elections and ethnicity
in Chapter 8. The study investigates the effect of an ethno-federal system
election and its electoral proximities on a peoples’ sense of national iden-
tification. While many studies have examined the connection between
federalism and ethnic conflicts, fewer studies have inquired into peoples’
nationalistic sentiments with federalist elections. The chapter argues that
citizens of so-called ethno-federalist nations do demonstrate a reduced
sense of attachments to their countries when elections happen, while citi-
zens of unitary or federal systems do not. This study offers an additional
perspective with which to consider the triangular relationship between
elections, political risks, federalist system and ethnonational issues.
Still on elections and risks, Hiroko Kinoshita and Dai Yamao provide
a quantitative text analysis of mobilization of the electorate by Islamist
parties during the 2018 Iraqi parliamentary election in Chapter 9. The
main reason for holding this election was to help provide stability
and minimize risks of conflict as well as formulate policies to address
numerous problems that stemmed from the military operation against
the IS. It analyses the process of electoral mobilization by major political
parties and some of the implications in relation to political risks in Iraq.
While elections have the potential to minimize risks, it can also escalate
existing tension, especially in cases where the root causes of conflict are
deeply embedded in history and structure of society, as in the case of
Afghanistan.
14 S. RATUVA ET AL.

Bashir Mobasher provides an assessment of the Afghanistan political

risks and ethnic-based conflict focusing on the issues of centrifugal prac-
tices and centripetal ideas in Chapter 10. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic
state with a recent history of civil war, which resulted in trust deficiency
amongst ethnic groups who now demand that their representatives and
interests are accounted for in any government formation. In order to
ensure their representation in power, they tend to vote in blocs in pres-
idential and parliamentary elections, and as a result, most elections have
led to ethnic divide and tension in Afghanistan. Given these centrifugal
politics, one may wonder if Afghanistan needs an ethnic-based system
of power distribution. The chapter provides a critical assessment of the
dynamics of institutional configurations and provides possible alternative
strategies to minimize risks through de-ethnicization of parties and poli-
tics. The argument put forward by the author is that in divided societies,
one must look not just at political practices but also at political ideals
which shape the normative and institutional dynamics of a country.
COVID-19 has become major global security threat which has for a
few months overshadowed other forms of risks and threats. In Chapter 11
on COVID-19 and authoritarian rule in Ethiopia, Hala Thabet analyses
the relationship between the spread of the pandemic and the setback on
democracy. She discusses how the fight against the virus is used as pretext
to extend the control of the State over the society, and impose authori-
tarian rule in an implicit and subtle and even accepted way. She draws on
the ethnic, economic and religious environment in Ethiopia to explore the
menace of social cohesion on the stability of the country. She discussed
how the government has seized the opportunity to concentrate and
expand its powers by tightening its grip on political freedoms, targeting
the opposition, controlling the access to information and censoring the
internet and social media as pretext to fight “fake news”.
She questions the relation between political stability and security from
one side and the precautionary measures taken to fight the virus and
discusses how political violence witnessed in several African states came
as a result of the excessive use of force from the security forces against
political opposition groups. Thabet also discussed how the spread of the
virus presents a serious challenge to the electoral processes, resulting in
the postponement of elections in more than 40 countries of the world.
In various ways, the pandemic has significantly intensified political and
social tensions and has encouraged delay or postponement of elections
under the pretext of social distancing, and seriously affected the economic
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 15

sphere and increased rates of unemployment, poverty and inequality. As

a result, the virus increased the tendency for instability and violence in
many transitioning democracies of the world.
The last three chapters focus largely on risks, conflict and gender,
focusing specifically on gender-based violence amongst South Sudanese
in Uganda refugee camps. Understanding the significance of political
risks using gender lenses is of critical importance as it unveils an aspect
of security and power relations which is often ignored. In Chapter 12,
Fukui Miho examines the issues of norm diffusion and sexual gender-
based violence and survivor support using the refugees’ settlements in
Uganda as case study. The chapter attempts to identify the extent to which
international gender norms—Women, Peace and Security (WPS), United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and the succeeding
resolutions—have been articulated and implemented. The author explores
the process of WPS norm diffusion in Uganda in three different perspec-
tives, the state system at the leadership level, the humanitarian refugee
response structure at the middle level and refugee settlements at the
grass-roots level. The chapter argues for the need for further gender main-
streaming in both humanitarian aid and governmental policies and the
role of humanitarian aid in the process.
In Chapter 13, Chigumi Kawaguchi expands on Miho’s analysis by
focusing on gender-based violence in the South Sudanese refugee camps
in Uganda. Gender-Based Violence (GBV) has been recognized as a
significant problem amongst forcibly displaced communities, like those
in refugee camps. Since the adaptation of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1325, significant progress has been made by the inter-
national community and the UN member countries to respond to GBV.
The chapter explores how South Sudanese refugees in those settlements
recognized GBV including their help-seeking pathways, and identifies the
reasons for their decision to seek help/not seek help for themselves and
even for others. Kawaguchi recommends support for social transformation
on the existing gender norms within refugee communities and provi-
sion of material resources and capacity building for service providers in
host communities. Kalyango Ronald Sebba continues with the discussions
in Chapter 14 by looking at some of the challenges and opportunities
in negotiating the GBV referral pathway, the refugee hosting areas of
Uganda. The chapter explores the nature of negotiations at the inter-
face, and how social norms and values as well as the survivor’s agency
inform access to the referral framework. It argues that whereas the referral
16 S. RATUVA ET AL.

pathway presupposes some degree of common interest amongst the actors

to respond to GBV, unequal power relations, resource endowments and
contradictory interest may increase rather than decrease risks.

Critical Issues and Concluding Remarks

There are a number of critical issues to be drawn from the book chap-
ters. To start with, while there are separate forms of identity such as
ethnicity, religion, regional loyalty, gender and national citizenship, they
can be interrelated in particular contexts. This interrelationship can also
account for the level of risks associated with them. The risk here is in
terms of how these connections are translated into racialized stereotypes
which feed into political and strategic policies. Edward Said’s notion of
Orientalism (Said 1978) provides a critical view of how the “West” views
the “Orient” using generalized imageries of association between race, reli-
gion and culture. This association can also influence geostrategic interests
as we have seen in the Middle East, Horn of Africa and other parts of the
world.
Another point to note is that citizenship, a fundamental form of iden-
tity in a modern state, is associated with risk when it becomes politically
contested and subject to the whims of an authoritarian ethnic elite trying
to create a mono-ethnic state as in the case of the Rohingya. What makes
refugees vulnerable is the fact that their basic right to citizenship, a legally-
based identifier, is either being removed by force or lost as a result of
forced removal, genocidal policies and oppression. Some refugees escape
violence and other forms of risk in their own country, only to face other
forms of risks such as hunger, diseases and inhumane living conditions in
refugee camps. As we will see in the case of Ugandan refugee camps for
Sudanese, women are the most at risk because gender-based violence in
“normal” patriarchal-based communities is simply transferred to refugee
camps and this exacerbates the vulnerability of women.
Defining risk and identity is contextual in the sense that it needs to be
defined in relation to different political, cultural and historical contexts.
For instance, what may be issues of political risk in the Middle East may
be different from the Pacific or Americas. For example, while elections
may be seen as a means of lowering risk of tension in some polities, it can
also be seen as a high-risk political activity in relation to its potential to
generate violence in others. Some factors such as ethno-political tension,
socio-economic inequality, power disparity, fluidity of state power, human
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 17

rights abuse and other factors may be associated with deeply embedded
risks. Understanding the specificities of local dynamics is important in
making claims about what the risk factors are and their potential impact
and consequences, direct or indirect, long term or short term. The risks
associated with these identities are due to the way in which identities are
defined and used to serve political, economic and cultural ends or when
identities intersect with inequality and political oppression.
Another important aspect to remember is the centrality of human
agency in not only defining identity, but also in framing risks. Individ-
uals and groups are socialized into particular ways of framing the world
and forms of consciousness about our own identity in relation to others
and often these evolve over time as people go through diverse experi-
ences. People may do things intentionally or unintentionally to put others
at risk. In fact, creating a situation of risk can be consciously used as a
means of “othering” some groups or even deliberately outmanoeuvring
or marginalizing them. While the means of power and control may be
structurally institutionalized through laws, policies and formal practices,
understanding the power of human agency and intentionality is also crit-
ical in having insights into how identity and risk intersect as part of what
Bourdieu (1977) refers to as “habitus”.
The synergies between the human agency and structural factors and
how they can create conditions for risk have been discussed extensively
by various sociological discourses such as Giddens’ theory of structuration
(Giddens 1984) which examines the dynamic and symbiotic relationships
between structures and human agencies. This constant dynamic shapes
the intention, norms and behaviour of the other in diverse and often inter-
dependent ways. Structures which are racist, violent and oppressive may
create conditions which breed behaviours which elevate the political risks
on people who are often subaltern and do not fit into the “normal” social
and political paradigm (Matory 2015).
This interplay between agency and structure in increasing the risk
of conflict is further complicated by the nature of group relationships
between each other. What feeds into conflict is reproduction of sentiments
of hatred, xenophobia or racism towards other groups facing exploitation.
There are many sources of such sentiments, but the most fundamental
one is the result of repugnance felt for the unknown in the psyche of
the other (Levinas 1989, 279). Often, it is the anxiety and doubts within
the subordinate groups towards a hegemonic group, which may generate
repulsion in the subjected ones. But at the same time, within the mindset
18 S. RATUVA ET AL.

of the hegemonic power, a very similar set of doubts may grow about the
loyalty and submissiveness of those subjected to control, including subal-
tern minorities. It was this kind of distrust and doubts which shaped the
Nazi mentality of anti-Semitism (Campbell 1998, 172).
Another important factor is the interaction between internal and
external risks. As the case studies suggest that, while some of the risks
can be categorized as internal or external, the relationships between
them can be complex to the extent that it is no longer easy to identify
their “origin”. Over time and through various processes, external factors
become internalized and internal factors become externalized. The threat
of “terrorism”, for instance, may have “local origin” while having an
international character and influence and vice versa. The line between the
internal and the external becomes vague or in some cases, non-existent.
The place of origin of risk no longer matters as risk becomes part of
the global network and spheres of operation. Thus, the externalization of
risks is prerequisite for its globalization which means that it now becomes
part of a transnational phenomenon with multiple local and internal focal
points and modes of organization. In the Horn of Africa, for instance,
the internal risks of individual countries become part of the collective
geostrategic risk of the region and vice versa. For COVID-19, the distinc-
tion between internal and external risks is no longer easily demarcated as
risks of individual countries are all connected to each other and one of
the ways in which risk is being mitigated is through border closure. Risks
of climate change also have the same local and global nexus beyond the
limitations of geographical and political boundaries.
One of the ways in which risks are globalized is through global
power expansionism, hegemony and contestation. For instance, the
United States’ global geostrategic interests, military industrial complex
and partisan support in regional conflicts help to amplify risks of conflict
and instability, as Bain and Bain argue in Chapter 2. One of the
techniques used as a means of justification is framing and vilification
of particular groups through “victimage ritual”. Sometimes, mitigation
measures against what is perceived as terrorism could breed more risks
and the process could escalate into a broader and deeper vicious cycle.
Response and counter-response have been hallmarks of contemporary
global geo-politics and tension and this has increasingly heightened risks
of conflict.
Because countries in a region tend to share some common geopolitical
interests, certain types of political risks can be shared and experienced at
 1 RISK, IDENTITY AND CONFLICT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW 19

the regional level without much direct impact on other parts of the world.
For instance, some of the conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Asia
may be visually transmitted across the world through cyber-technology
and media; the risks are often limited to immediate geographical neigh-
bourhoods. The political conflict in Sudan, for instance, does have direct
impact on neighbouring countries but have little influence on what the
political risks in other countries in Asia, Pacific or Americas. The region-
alization of risks is often addressed at the regional level by regional
organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN or European Union
but situations can also escalate where they become globalized with the
United Nations directly involved.
Finally, the issue of risk management is complex and needs to be under-
stood in multidimensional ways. Some approaches are localized within
countries while some are more national while beyond these are regional
and international approaches. Different strategies are used at different
levels, depending on the nature of risks and conflict, the types of players
involved, the nature of identity politics, the historical roots of the risks and
tension and the aims, principles and philosophies of the risk management
approaches. In the book, the strategies used in different countries include
mediation, peacekeeping, international cooperation, external intervention
and elections. Some are elite and state driven while some are people-based
and controlled; some are internally initiated while some are externally
driven. Many have their own successes and failures; some are meant
for immediate results while some are meant to provide a long-term
mechanism for risk mitigation.

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 PART I

Ethno-religious Approaches to Risk

and Security
 CHAPTER 2

Risk, Security, and the War on Terror

Michael Blain and Angeline Kearns-Blain

Introduction
The spectacular September 11, 2001, attack on the US by Al Qaeda
provoked a global War on Terror (WoT), multiple new power struggles,
and an intensification of political surveillance and wars fought world-
wide. We can say without fear of exaggeration, the practices of terror,
terrorism, and counter-terrorism are fundamental features of the history
of the present. One can also add that US imperial activities around the
world and the US power elite’s political decision to mount a WoT in
response to 9/11 have heightened global risk and insecurity. Millions of
people in the war zones of the WoT around the world have had their ways
of life destroyed by the massive high-tech political violence perpetrated
by the US power elite. The Costs of War project documents the horrific
details such as the contamination of battlefields with toxic chemicals
causing long-term health effects in the populations affected (see Crawford

M. Blain · A. Kearns-Blain (B)

Boise State University, Boise, ID, USA
e-mail: ablain2@icloud.com
M. Blain
e-mail: mblain@boisestate.edu

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 25

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021
S. Ratuva et al. (eds.), Risks, Identity and Conflict,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1486-6_2
26 M. BLAIN AND A. KEARNS-BLAIN

2019). Crawford’s report makes a strong case that the massive amount
of resources used by the Pentagon preparing for and fighting these wars
has been a major contributor to climate change. Dunbar-Ortiz (2017)
makes a persuasive argument that the constant military violence associ-
ated with the history of US imperialism—the savage wars and massacres
of indigenous people that secured the settlement of the Western fron-
tier in the nineteenth century and generated and regenerated American
nationalism, and the frequency and intensity of US-initiated wars in the
twentieth century (Slotkin 1973, 1992)—has had some influence on the
increasing intensity and frequency of mass shootings in the US since the
1960s. The WoT, she argues, has amped up this phenomenon. As we
write, US special forces are engaged in massacres of so-called terrorists,
their families, and communities. US military violence around the world
is an everyday phenomenon, disseminated in pop culture through the
news, films, books, and TV programs. At the same time, these perpetra-
tors are glorified as heroes fighting and dying to protect and defend the
US homeland and “Western civilization.”
There are two ways to interpret the massive expenditures of the WoT.
Critics emphasize the “opportunity costs” or “lost opportunities” of
the WoT (i.e., to health, education, etc.). This chapter argues that the
“costs” are interpreted as “benefits” by the powerful who orchestrate
and prosecute these wars, the social upper class, corporate community
and policy planners, the federal agencies particularly the National Security
Agency (NSA) and Department of Defense (DOD), and their millions of
employees and thousands of private contractors in communities around
the US and the world. These, together with the federal state system,
constitute the globally hegemonic military-industrial complex. The US
federal government agencies (security and defense, NSA and DOD and
many other WoT-related activities) have directly benefited in terms of
billions of dollars of new expenditures on counter-terrorism. According
to Priest and Arkin’s (2011) investigation, 33 large office complexes had
been built in the Washington D.C. area since 9/11 to accommodate
the new top secret intelligence work. “After two years of investigat-
ing…[the author’s found that]…1,074 federal government organizations
and nearly two thousand private companies involved with programs
related to counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence in at least
17,000 locations across the United States—all of them working at the
top secret classification level…268 of them” (Location 1377). They also
found that the involvement of the private sector in intelligence activity had
 2 RISK, SECURITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 27

expanded. “Of the 854,000 people with top secret clearances, roughly
265,000 are not government employees; they are contractors working
at for-profit companies whose bottom line is to make money” (Loca-
tion 2849). Corporate firms were poaching intelligence analysts from the
public sector by offering them higher salaries for doing the same work.
Crawford’s (2016) report updates the costs of the WoT through
2016 at $4,792b. Crawford describes these expenditures as “opportunity
costs.” The perspective advanced in this chapter is that these costs have
been major benefits to those interest groups represented by the US power
elite, the social upper class and the corporate community in particular,
and the federal agencies involved in implementing these defense policies.
The trickle-down effects have been enormous, directly benefiting middle-
class professionals (e.g., “terrorism experts”) employed by the high-tech
industries, private think tanks, and university research centers.
The WoT has also produced multiple effects in the order of knowledge,
power, and ethics, reconstituting terrorism as a serious field of knowl-
edge, and terrorists and “terrorism experts” as new subjects of power.
These practices have diffused globally by means of the US WoT (ongoing
in over 70 countries worldwide) and have been taken up by allies and
adversaries alike. In Blain and Kearns-Blain (2018), we problematize the
absence of “political violence” from sociological theory, propose a correc-
tive, and present the results of historical genealogies of power, knowledge,
and ethics in relation to empire and the genesis of a global WoT. This
chapter highlights and amplifies points made in the book directly relevant
to emerging problems of global risk and security, and the WoT.
The concept of a victimage ritual (VR) is proposed as a corrective
approach. Political violence generates intense forms of in-group soli-
darity and out-group hostility, VR, and reinforces ethnic framing. Ethnic
profiling is forged through the calculated and well-orchestrated VRs that
target ethnically defined enemies that heighten the sense of risk and inse-
curity, arrogance and triumphalism involved in violent political power
struggles. Many sociologists have been slow to recognize this reality
by down-playing the role of terror and sadism under a façade of over-
idealized, altruistic conceptions of society (examples are detailed below;
see Saint-Amand’s 1996 survey of the Enlightenment social theorist’s
problem with violence, e.g., Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau; for a
good contemporary example, see Collins 2008). They continue to ignore
the evidence that political violence can generate intense forms of in-group
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Varieties.

Pun.—While the repairs were going on in State street, Boston,

two gentlemen of the bar happening to meet, one said, “I think this
looks like putting new cloth upon an old garment.” “I think so too,”
replied the other; “but it will make the rent greater.”

Humor.—A number of years ago, an eccentric old gentleman,

residing in a cottage in England, was greatly annoyed by noctural
depredators, who broke the fences in his garden, in order to get at
the good things contained therein. As he did not care so much for
the loss of the fruit as the damage done to the enclosures, and as he
was rather fond of witticisms, he had the following notice put up: “All
thieves are in future to enter by the gate, which will be left open for
the purpose.”

Has a Dog Wings?—“Father, has a dog got wings?”

“No, my son.”
“Well, I thought so—but mother told me, the other day, that as she
was going along the road, a dog flew at her.”

Irish Wit.—An honest Hibernian, upon reading his physician’s

bill, replied, that he had no objections to pay him for his medicines,
but his visits he would return.
 Death of the President.

William Henry Harrison, who became President of the United

States on the 4th of March last, died on the night of the 4th of April,
just thirty days after he had entered upon the duties of his high
office.
This event is calculated to cast a gloom over the whole nation, for
Gen. Harrison was generally esteemed a good man, and most
persons believed that he would govern the country in a manner to
promote the happiness of the people. He had lived to be almost
seventy years of age; and now, being elevated to the highest office
in the gift of the people, he is suddenly cut down, and laid in the
same dust that must cover ordinary men. This dispensation of
Providence seems almost like quenching a great beacon-light upon
the sea-shore at night, just at the moment when its illumination had
begun to scatter the darkness around.
A solemn thought is suggested by this event. Gen. Harrison has
lived a long life, and has often been in the midst of seeming peril. He
has often been in battle with savages and with the British soldiery.
He has often trodden the forest amid all the dangers and vicissitudes
that beset the traveller there. He has spent many days of toil in the
field, laboring as a farmer. In all these situations and conditions—
from youth to age—he has enjoyed the protecting care of
Providence. But at last he was elevated to a great office; he became
the occupant of a palace; he was the hope of a great nation; he was
surrounded with friends, with mighty men, with skilful physicians,
with tender nurses—with the great, the good, the prayerful—but all in
vain. His time had come—the arrow was sped from the bow, and no
human arm could stay its flight. And this should warn us all to
consider well the lesson conveyed by this event—which is, that life
and death are in the hands of God. He can protect us everywhere—
in the cottage or the log-cabin, in the forest or the field; or he can
take us away in the midst of power and pomp and riches. Let us
therefore be ever prepared for the decisions of his wisdom.
 THE APRIL SHOWER, A SONG.
the words and music composed for
merry’s museum.

Patter, patter, let it pour,

Patter, Patter, let it roar,
Down the steep roof let it rush,
Down the hill side let it gush,
’Tis the wlecome April shower
Which will wake the sweet May flower.

Patter, patter, let it pour!

Patter, patter, let it roar!
Let the gaudy lightning flash—
Let the headlong thunder dash—
’Tis the welcome April shower,
Which will wake the sweet May flower.

Patter, patter, let it pour!

Patter, patter, let it roar!
Soon the clouds will burst away—
Soon will shine the bright spring day,
Soon the welcome April shower
Will awake the sweet May flower!
ROBERT MERRY’S MUSEUM.
 My own Life and Adventures.

(Continued from page 71.)

CHAPTER VII.
My uncle’s influence.—​The influence of the tavern.—​State of society
forty years ago.—​Liquor opposed to education.—​The church
and the tavern.—​The country schoolhouse.—​Books used in
the school.—​A few words about myself.

I pass over a space of several years in my history, and come to

the period when I was about fifteen. Up to this time, I had made little
progress in education, compared with what is done at the present
day. I could indeed read and write, and I knew something of
arithmetic, but my advance beyond this was inconsiderable. A brief
detail of certain circumstances will show the reason of this.
In the first place, my uncle had no very high estimation of what he
called larnin; he was himself a man of action, and believed that
books render people dull and stupid, rather than efficient in the
business of life. He was therefore opposed to education in general,
and particularly so in my case; and not only was his opinion
equivalent to law with respect to me, but it was of great force in the
village, on account of his character and position.
He kept the village tavern, which in those days of rum and punch
was an institution of great power and authority. It was common, at
the period of which I speak, for the church or meeting-house and
tavern to stand side by side; but if one day in the week, sobriety and
temperance were preached in the former, hard drinking and
licentiousness were deeply practised in the latter during the other
six. The tavern, therefore, not only counteracted the good effect of
the preacher, but it went farther, and in many cases corrupted the
whole mass of society. The members of the church thought it no
scandal to make regular visits to the bar-room at eleven o’clock in
the forenoon, and at four P. M.; the deacon always kept his jugs well
filled, and the minister took his toddy or his tansy bitters, in open day,
and without reproach.
In such a state of society as this, the tavern-keeper was usually
the most influential man in the village, and if he kept good liquors, he
was irresistible. Now my uncle was a prince of a tavern-keeper for
these jolly days. He was, in fact, what we call a whole-souled fellow:
generous, honest, and frank-hearted. His full, ruddy countenance
bespoke all this; and his cheerful, hearty voice carried conviction of it
to every listener. Beside, his tavern was freely and generously kept:
it was liberally supplied with good beds, and every other luxury or
comfort common to those days. As I have said before, it was situated
upon the great road, then travelled by the mail stages between
Boston and New York. The establishment was of ample extent,
consisting of a pile of wooden buildings of various and irregular
architecture—all painted a deep red. There was near it a large barn
with extensive cow-houses, a corn-crib, a smoke-house, and a pig-
sty, arranged solely with a view to ease of communication with the
house, and consequently all drawn closely around it. The general
effect, when viewed at a distance, was that of two large jugs
surrounded with several smaller ones.
Before this heap of edifices swung the tavern sign, with a picture
of a barn-yard cock on one side, and a bull upon the other, as I have
told you before: and though the artist that painted it was only a
common house-dauber, and though the pictures were of humble
pretensions when compared with the productions of Raphael, still,
few specimens of the fine arts have ever had more admirers than the
cock and bull of my uncle’s sign. How many a toper has looked upon
it when approaching the tavern with his feverish lip, as the emblem
and assurance of the rum that was soon to feed the fire kindled in his
throat; how many a jolly fellow, staggering from the inn, has seen
that sign reeling against the sky, and mixing grotesquely with the
dreamy images of his fancy!
If we add to this description, that in the street, and nearly in front
of the tavern, was a wood-pile about ten feet high, and covering
three or four square rods of ground; that on one side was a litter of
harrows, carts and ploughs, and on the other a general assortment
of wagons, old sleighs, broken stages, and a rickety vehicle
resembling a modern chaise without a top; and if we sprinkle
between all these articles a good supply of geese and pigs, we shall
have a pretty fair account of the famous Cock and Bull tavern that
flourished in Salem nearly forty years ago.
The proprietor of such an establishment could not, in those days,
but be a man of influence; and the free manners and habits of my
uncle tended to increase the power that his position gave him. He
drank liberally himself, and vindicated his practice by saying that
good liquor was one of the gifts of providence, and it was no sin—
indeed it was rather a duty—to indulge in providential gifts freely. All
this made him a favorite, particularly with a set of hard drinkers who
thronged the bar-room, especially of a wet day and on winter
evenings.
As I have said, my uncle was opposed to education, and as he
grew older and drank deeper, his prejudice against it seemed to
increase; and though I cannot easily account for the fact, still every
drunkard in the place was an enemy to all improvements in the
school. When a town-meeting took place, these persons were
invaribly in opposition to every scheme, the design of which was to
promote the cause of education, and this party was usually headed
by my uncle. And it is not a little curious that the tavern party also
had its influence in the church, for my uncle was a member of it, and
many of his bar-room cronies also. They were so numerous as to
cast a heavy vote, and therefore they exercised a good deal of
power here. As in respect to the school, so in the house of worship,
they were for spending as little money as possible, and for reducing
its power and influence in society to the lowest possible scale. They
even held the minister in check, and though he saw the evil tendency
of intemperance in the village, he had not nerve enough to attack it,
except in a very soft and mild way, which probably served to
increase the vice at which he aimed; for vice always thrives when
holy men condemn it gently.
Now I have said that my uncle was a kind-hearted, generous
man, by nature; how then could he be so narrow-minded in respect
to education and religion? The answer to this question is easy. He
was addicted to the free use of liquors, which not only tends to
destroy the body, but to ruin all the nobler parts of the mind. As he
came more and more under the influence of ardent spirits, he grew
narrow-minded, sottish and selfish. And this is one of the great evils
of taking ardent spirits. The use of them always tends to break down
the mind; to take away from us those noble feelings and lofty
thoughts, which are the glory of man; in short, to sink us lower and
lower toward the brute creation. A determined drunkard is usually a
great part of the time but little elevated above a beast.
Now I have been particular about this part of my story, for I wished
to show you the natural influence of the habits of my uncle, and their
operation upon my own fortunes. I have yet a sadder story to tell, as
to the effect of the village tavern, not only upon myself, but upon my
uncle, and several others. That must be reserved for some of the
sad pages through which my tale will lead you. For the present, I
only point out the fact, that a man who encourages the sale of liquors
is usually unfriendly to the education and improvement of mankind;
that his position tends to make him fear the effect of light and wish
for darkness; that hard drinking will ruin even a generous and noble
mind and heart; and that the habit of dealing in liquor is one to be
feared, as it induces a man to take narrow, selfish, and low views of
human nature and human society. It appears to me that a trade
which thrives when men turn drunkards, and which fails when men
grow temperate, is a trade which is apt to injure the mind and soul of
one who follows it. Even my noble-hearted and generous uncle fell
under such sinister influences.
But to return to the school. I have already described the situation
of the house. The building itself was of wood, about fifteen feet
square, plastered within, and covered with benches without backs,
which were constructed by thrusting sticks, for legs, through auger
holes in a plank. On one side, against the wall, was a long table,
serving as a desk for the writers.
The chimney was of rough stone, and the fire-place was of the
same material. But what it lacked in grace of finish, was made up in
size. I believe that it was at least ten feet wide, and five in depth, and
the flue was so perpendicular and ample, that the rain and snow fell
down to the bottom, without the risk of striking the sides. In summer,
the school was kept by a woman, who charged the town a dollar a
week, boarding herself; in winter it was kept by a man, who was paid
five dollars a month and found. Here about seventy children, of all
sizes, were assembled during this latter portion of the year; the place
and manner of treatment being arranged as much as possible on the
principle that a schoolhouse is a penitentiary, where the more
suffering, the more improvement.
I have read of despots and seen prisons, but there are few of the
former more tyrannical than the birch-despot of former days, or of
the latter, more gloomy than the old-fashioned schoolhouse, under
the tyrant to which it was usually committed.
I must enter into a few details. The fuel for the school consisted of
wood, and was brought in winter, load by load, as it was wanted;
though it occasionally happened that we got entirely out, and the
school was kept without fire if the master could endure the cold, or
dismissed if the weather chanced to be too severe to be borne. The
wood was green oak, hickory, or maple, and when the fire could be
induced to blaze between the sticks, there was a most notable
hissing and frying, and a plentiful exudation of sap at each end of
them.
The wood was cut into lengths of about five feet, by the scholars,
each of the larger boys taking his turn at this, and at making the fire
in the morning. This latter was a task that demanded great strength
and patience; for, in the first place, there must be a back-log, five
feet in length, and at least fifteen inches in diameter; then a top-stick
about two-thirds as big; and then a forestick of similar dimensions. It
required some strength to move these logs to their places; and after
the frame of the work was built, the gathering of chips, and the
blowing, the wooing, the courting that were necessary to make the
revolting flame take hold of the wet fuel, demanded a degree of
exertion, and an endurance of patience, well calculated to ripen and
harden youth for the stern endurances of manhood.
The school began at nine in the morning, and it was rare that the
fire gave out any heat so early as this; nor could it have been of
much consequence had it done so, for the school-room was almost
as open as a sieve, letting in the bitter blast at every window and
door, and through a thousand cracks in the thin plastering of the
walls. Never have I seen such a miserable set of blue-nosed,
chattering, suffering creatures as were these children, for the first
hour after the opening of school, on a cold winter morning. Under
such circumstances, what could they do? Nothing, and they were
expected to do nothing.
The books in use were Webster’s Spelling Book, Dilworth’s
Arithmetic, Webster’s Second and Third Part, the New Testament,
and Dwight’s Geography. These were all, and the best scholars of
the seminary never penetrated more than half through this mass of
science. There was no such thing as a history, a grammar, or a map
in the school. These are mysteries reserved for more modern days.
Such was the state of things—such the condition of the school,
where I received my education, the only education that I ever
enjoyed, except such as I have since found in study by myself, and
amid the active pursuits of life. But let me not blame the schoolhouse
alone; I was myself in fault, for even the poor advantages afforded
me there, I wilfully neglected; partly because I was fond of amusing
myself and impatient of application; partly because I thought myself
worth ten thousand dollars, and fancied that I was above the
necessity of instruction; and partly because my uncle and his bar-
room friends were always sneering at men of education, and praising
men of spirit and action—those who could drive a stage skilfully, or
beat in pitching cents, or bear off the palm in a wrestling-match, or
perchance carry the largest quantity of liquor under the waistcoat.
Such being the course of circumstances that surrounded me at
the age of fifteen, it will not be surprising if my story should at last
lead to some painful facts; but my succeeding chapters will show.
(To be continued.)
 The Artists’ Cruise.

About the first of August, 1840, an excursion was set on foot, by

five young men of Boston, for recreation and amusement—one full of
interest and excitement, conducive equally to health and pleasure.
The plan was this—to embark in a small pleasure-boat called the
Phantom, built and owned by one of the company, who was also well
skilled in nautical affairs, and proceed by easy distances along the
coast as far “down East” as time or inclination would admit—letting
the events and adventures of the day determine the movements of
the next.
The company consisted of young artists—lovers of nature—ready
to appreciate all the new and beautiful points that might meet the
eye. The boat was hauled up at Phillip’s beach, Lynn, to which place
the party proceeded, and fitted her out with all the conveniences and
comforts proper for the cruise. Everything being ready, they sailed on
the first of the week, with a fair southwest wind, passed Marblehead
and Salem gaily, and stretched onward for Cape Ann. As night came
on they were becalmed, but it was very clear, and the moon shone
gloriously, as they moved, creeping lazily along, catching a slight puff
at intervals. The musical portion of the company contrived to make
the time pass pleasantly away in singing certain old airs which
chimed in with the feeling and situation of the company. At last the
breeze came again, and about ten at night they found themselves in
the little cove before the quiet town of Gloucester. Here they cast
anchor; and so much pleased were they, that they stayed the next
day and enjoyed the pleasure of a ramble along the rocky shores,
fishing for perch, &c. They found an excellent host at the Gloucester
hotel, where they passed the next night. I cannot do better than to
tell the rest of the story in the words of these adventurers.
 “With a bright sun, a fresh breeze, and a calm sea, we left
Gloucester and shaped our course around Cape Ann for the Isles of
Shoals, a group which lie at the farther extremity of Ipswich bay,
across which we merrily steered, embracing the opportunity of
initiating the inexperienced in the duties of amateur seamanship. In a
few hours we ran in between the rocky isles, which, as we gradually
neared them, seemed to rise from out the waves. Anchoring in the
midst of a fleet of fishing boats, we prepared our supper, which was
soon despatched with much mirth, owing to the primitive simplicity of
our arrangements. We passed the night at our anchorage, after
witnessing the effect of a magnificent thunder-storm, and spent the
morning in strolling among the rocks along the shore, and amusing
ourselves with the characteristic traits of the islanders whom we met;
their isolated position, and constant devotion to the single occupation
of catching and curing fish, appearing to interpose a bar to their
advancement in any other qualification. From the Isles of Shoals we
had the next day a fair run to Wood Island, and anchored in Winter
harbor, near the mouth of Saco river—a place of considerable
importance at the time of the last war, owing to the exertions of an
enterprising merchant by the name of Cutts. During the war the
British entered the harbor and wantonly sawed through the keel of
three of the largest class of merchant vessels, then in progress of
building, and whose remains are still to be seen. We had plenty of
fowling, fishing, and sporting apparatus, and we here had ample
opportunity for exercising our skill as sportsmen—plover, curlew,
sand-birds, &c. being abundant. In this manner we passed the time
until the afternoon of the next day, when we left for Portland.
“Favored with a fine breeze, we dashed merrily over the waves,
which had now begun to be tipped with foam, and, under the
influence of the freshening wind, had assumed a size that, in
comparison with our miniature bark, might have been termed
mountain-high; but there was no danger, for our craft was as buoyant
on the sea as one of its own bubbles. The weather had gradually
been growing “dirty,” as seamen call it, and we raced into the harbor
of Portland with a small squadron of coasting vessels, all crowding
for shelter. The wind during the night blew a gale from the southeast,
which however did not prevent us from sleeping soundly. Our
appetites having assumed a remarkable punctuality since leaving
Boston, reminded us early of breakfast, and, in spite of wind and
rain, we resolved upon cooking a quantity of birds shot the day
previous. Having formed an imperfect shelter by means of a spare
sail, a fire was kindled, coffee made, birds broiled, and our meal
concluded amid a rain so drenching as to be quite a curiosity in its
way. Each person bent over his dish to prevent the food being fairly
washed away, and covered his mug of coffee to avoid excessive
dilution, and used many other notable expedients suited to the
occasion, which will certainly not be forgotten if never again
practised. It was most emphatically a washing-day with us, though
not accompanied with the ill-humor generally reputed to exist upon
those occasions.
“The storm and its effects being over, we received a visit from the
proprietors of the elegant pleasure-boat, Water Lily, who very kindly
invited us to accompany them to Diamond cove, a romantic spot in
one of the many beautiful islands that so thickly stud Casco bay—a
place much frequented by parties of pleasure from the city of
Portland. We left the harbor with a fine breeze, our pennants
streaming gallantly. We were soon upon the fishing-grounds,
anchored, and for a moment all was bustle and excitement, each
hoping to be the first to pull a ‘mammoth’ from the deep. Success
crowned our efforts, and a boat was despatched with the treasure to
the cove, to be there converted into a savory chowder; while we
again anchored near the rocks of one of the smaller islands, where
fortune favored us, and we soon had a goodly store of perch for the
fry.
“The sun was just sinking as we entered the cove, and the gray
shadows of twilight were fast gathering under the grove of fine old
oaks that crowned the shore. Soon the woods resounded with the
shouts and merry laughter of the party. Misty twilight yielded to the
brilliant rays of the full moon, which, streaming through the openings
of the forest, touched here and there, lighting up the picturesque and
moss-grown trunks with almost magical effect. The word was given,
and each one searched for his armful of brush to light us at our feast,
and soon it crackled and blazed away, lighting up a scene almost
beyond description. The party numbered about fifteen or twenty,
including the Phantom’s crew, and were scattered about in all the
various groups and postures that inclination or fancy might suggest,
each with his plate and spoon, or for the want of them a clam-shell
and box-cover, doing such justice to the feast as an appetite
sharpened by fasting, salubrious sea-breeze and wholesome
exercise would induce. Not the least important feature of the scene
was the picturesque costume assumed by our “Phantoms;” it
consisting of white pants, Guernsey frocks, belts, knives, and small
Greek caps tight to the head. Above us hung the blest canopy of
glowing foliage thrown out from those old oaks; each mass, each
leaf was touched and pencilled with a vivid line of light, whose
brightness might compare with that of sparkling gems. The more
distant groups were relieved from the dim and shadowy background
by a subdued and broad half-light. Fainter and fainter grew the light,
till all was lost in the deep and gloomy shadows of the forest.
“Amid this fairy-like scenery all was mirth, jollity, fun, and frolic; not
a moment passed unenjoyed. At ten o’clock our party broke up, and
we returned to our boats. We here parted with our kind friends, who
were soon on their way to Portland. We seized our flutes, and
breathed forth a farewell with all the pathos we were masters of. This
was soon answered by a smart salute from a cannon, which awoke
the echoes of the cove. Three cheers were given and returned, and
all was still.
“The next was a beautiful day, and it being Sunday, we remained
at anchor in the cove, enjoying the silence and repose of nature in
that lovely and sequestered spot. The succeeding morning being
fine, we started with a light southerly wind, which carried us slowly
along among the islands of Casco, and gave us a fine opportunity to
observe all their beauties. The scene was continually changing—
new islands opening upon us almost every moment. Before evening
we had made the little harbor called Small Point, where we remained
that night. The succeeding day we doubled cape Small Point and
made the mouth of the Kennebec, which we entered with a fine
breeze, that carried us briskly up to Bath, where we spent the
remainder of the day. Having taken a pilot, we continued up the river
with a fair wind and tide, which took us as far as Hallowell.
Considerable curiosity was here excited, in consequence of our
having come so far in so small a boat, it being thought a rather
hazardous enterprise. In the morning a council was held, and we
determined to return; accordingly this and the succeeding day were
spent in getting back to Bath. We did but little more than float with
the tide, in consequence of its being so calm. The scenery of the
Kennebec has been so often and minutely described, that it is best
to pass over it without comment.
At Bath we were treated with all the attention and kindness we
could wish for. The succeeding day we beat down the river, and
doubled the point, encountering a head sea, which tossed us about,
to the great detriment of our culinary apparatus. We again anchored
and passed the night at Small Point. We proceeded the next day, by
a difficult and somewhat dangerous channel, between ledges and
islands as far as Haskell’s Island, and anchored in the cove.
Continuing our course the next day, we stopped at Portland, saw our
friends of the Water Lily, and proceeded as far as Winter harbor,
where we arrived at twelve o’clock at night. We continued here a day
to take advantage of the fine shooting, and had very good luck. We
went as far the next day as York, where we anchored, cooked our
birds, and, with the help of good appetites, made a glorious supper.
“Leaving the town of Old York, we rowed slowly out of the small
river which forms its harbor, accompanied by numerous fishing-
boats, which came in the evening previous. It was a dead calm, and
continued so about two hours. The time passed however without the
usual tedium attendant upon the want of wind, it being employed in
the preparation and discussion of a hearty breakfast. The wind came
at last, a light breeze and ahead, and we soon exchanged the
swinging and rolling motion of the glassy ground-swell for the regular
rise and fall and cheerful dash of the ripple against the bow, and the
music of the breaking bubbles as they whirled away in the wake.
With all our canvass set, we stretched slowly along the narrow coast
of New Hampshire.
“Passing the harbor of Portsmouth, with its lighthouse built upon a
ledge so low that the tide sweeps over its foundation, as is the case
with the famous Eddystone, at nightfall we were off the mouth of
Merrimac river, yet some fifteen or twenty miles from our destined
port. A few clouds that had collected about dark now dispersed, and
the stars shone clear and beautiful from the heavens, while the
beacon lights blazed in rival brightness from the shore. About two in
the morning we approached the entrance of our port, which is
situated near the mouth of a small river which intersects Cape Ann,
and which, like most rivers, has a bar at its mouth. After passing the
lighthouse, being within half a mile of our anchorage, the wind fell
suddenly, and the rapid current swept us aground upon the highest
part of the bar, where the receding tide soon left us high and dry
upon the sand. Being stopped thus abruptly, we gazed about in
search of some means to ‘define our position,’ which measure was
presently vetoed by the rolling in of so thick a fog that in ten minutes
everything in sight could have been touched with a boat-hook.
Finding sight unavailing at this juncture, we resorted to sound, and
commenced firing signal guns, which were heard and answered from
the shore, and in a short time assistance arrived in the person of the
keeper of the lighthouse, who informed us that we should not float
again for six hours. Day broke upon us in this position, and having
plenty of time, we despatched two ashore for provisions in the pilot’s
skiff, and in a short time the sand-bar presented a singular
appearance, our baggage of all kinds being strewed about upon the
sand, and in close fellowship with cooking utensils, loose sails, spare
baskets, boxes, rigging, &c. &c.; for we had entirely unladed the
boat, for the purpose of washing and cleansing the inside from the
effects of an unlucky basket of charcoal, which had been upset in the
confusion consequent upon our endeavors to get into deeper water.
Upon the return of our purveyors all hands displayed great activity in
providing and eating breakfast. The fog still encompassed us, so that
we enjoyed all the uproar and fun of the meal in our own way, as our
apparent horizon was hardly more extensive than a common room. It
was a memorable breakfast, that seemed much like a day’s eating
condensed into a single meal, the whole being much enlivened by
the cheerfulness and local anecdotes of our old friend from the
lighthouse, to whom we were indebted for sundry excellent hints
touching the best method of extricating vessels in difficult and