History of Nature – Nature of History

Notions of Time and Space in Eighteenth-Century Historiography and

Natural History

MASTERARBEIT
Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades
Master of Arts (MA)

an der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz

vorgelegt von
Florian MEIXNER, BA

am Institut für Geschichte

Begutachter: Univ.-Prof. Dr. phil. Simone De Angelis

Graz, 2015
 EIDESSTATTLICHE ERKLÄRUNG

Ich versichere, dass ich die Masterarbeit selbstständig verfasst, andere als die angegebenen
Quellen und Hilfsmittel nicht benutzt und mich auch sonst keiner unerlaubten Hilfe bedient
habe.

Graz, am 17.07.2015
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1

1. The End of the Scale ....................................................................................................... 6

1.1. A Problem Arising ......................................................................................................... 6

1.2. The scala naturae in Eighteenth-Century Natural History ............................................ 7

1.2.1. Nature in One Dimension ...................................................................................... 7
1.2.2. The Problem of Species – Linnaeus, Buffon and Bonnet ...................................... 9
1.2.3. Nature without Change ........................................................................................ 12
1.2.4. Preformationism vs. Epigenesis ........................................................................... 14

1.3. “Cette chaine n’existe pas” – Emerging Criticism on the Chain ................................. 17
1.3.1. Missing Links....................................................................................................... 17
1.3.2. Leibniz, his Curve and the Problem of Infinity ................................................... 19

1.4. A Net to Save the Scale – ‘Multidimensionalizing’ the scala naturae ........................ 21
1.4.1. Johann Hermann and his Tabula Affinitatum Animalium (1783) ........................ 21
1.4.2. From the Scale to the Net – Entering the Second Dimension.............................. 25
1.4.3. Affinities as Ordering Principle ........................................................................... 31
1.4.4. Spatial Limits of the Two-Dimensional Network ................................................ 32

1.5. The Comparative Method in Natural History .............................................................. 35

2. A Matter of Time .......................................................................................................... 38

2.1. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck – A New Approach ................................................................. 38

2.1.1. Back to the Scale .................................................................................................. 38
2.1.2. A Theory of Natural Change................................................................................ 43

2.2. Ideas of Change in Eighteenth-Century Thought......................................................... 47

2.2.1. The Count and the New World – Buffon’s Concept of Degeneration ................. 47
2.2.2. Only Matter Matters – The Materialists and Change........................................... 50
2.2.3. Past and Future States – Charles Bonnet’s Palingénésie ..................................... 53
2.2.4. The ‘Other’ Leibniz ............................................................................................. 57
2.2.5. A Power of Change – Blumenbach and his Bildungstrieb .................................. 59

2.3. A Question of Time ...................................................................................................... 62

2.3.1. Back to Lamarck .................................................................................................. 62
2.3.2. Change without Time? ......................................................................................... 63
2.3.2.1. Buffon Again ............................................................................................... 63
 2.3.2.2. Bonnet and Time .......................................................................................... 66
2.3.3. Lamarck’s Escalator – A New Dimension........................................................... 66

2.4. Interim Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 68

3. Excursus: Earth in Time and Nature in Space – Eberhard August von

Zimmermann’s Geographische Geschichte der Menschheit ...................................... 69

4. Inventing History – Historical Thought in the Eighteenth Century ........................ 75

4.1. Comments on Eighteenth-Century Historiography...................................................... 75

4.2. Historia – Grasping an Early Modern Concept ........................................................... 76

4.3. Seperating Histories ..................................................................................................... 78

4.4. Dimensions of the Past – The ‘Multidimensionalization’ of History .......................... 81

4.4.1. Bossuet and the Linearity of History ................................................................... 81
4.4.2. Synchronicity and Geographical Space ............................................................... 83
4.4.2.1. Gatterer’s Nexus rerum universalis ............................................................. 83
4.4.2.2. History and Space ........................................................................................ 86
4.4.2.3. History Outside Europe................................................................................ 87
4.4.3. Expanding Time – Past, Future and Progress within ........................................... 89
4.4.4. Pushing Dimensional Boundaries – Cultures across Time and Space ................. 92

4.5. ‘Anthropology’ and the ‘History of Mankind’ – Reconnecting History and Nature ... 94
4.5.1. The Rise of Anthropological Thought ................................................................. 94
4.5.2. Man as the Link – the ‘History of Mankind’ ..................................................... 100
4.5.3. Remarks on Herder and Kant ............................................................................. 105

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 108

Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 112

Primary Sources ................................................................................................................ 112

Secondary Literature ......................................................................................................... 116

List of Figures ....................................................................................................................... 120

Introduction

Within the broader context of the history of the life sciences, the late eighteenth century is
perceived as a period of fundamental changes in the conceptualization of nature as a system.
Over the last decades, the transition from the static Early Modern notion of the natural world
towards nineteenth-century theories of natural change – and mutability in particular – has been
addressed by many historians of science. It is, above all, Arthur O. Lovejoy who has provided
the term ‘temporalization’ in order to describe the processes concerning the natural world and
the prevalent concept of the scale of beings in the second half of the eighteenth century. Within
a specific historiographical tradition – following Michel Foucault, Reinhard Koselleck and
others –, eminent historians like Wolf Lepenies1 used terms like ‘temporalization’,
‘processualization’ or ‘acceleration’ to describe rather than really explain the apparent changes
within the realm of natural history. By introducing or readopting these terms, historians of
science – or of ‘biology’, as we would call it today – tried to summarize the general shifts that
took place in the second half of the eighteenth century and which would ultimately lead towards
evolutionary thought, paving the way for Charles Darwin and his theory of natural selection.
The goal was, or so it seems, to discover the roots of Darwin’s epochal theory in the preceding
centuries and to describe the transitions that made the emergence of something like the Origins
of Species possible.

For quite a long time, the natural sciences of the eighteenth century were actually rather – even
if not explicitly –seen in the aftermath of the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century
and as the prelude to the rise of the sciences in the nineteenth century. In the examination of
the history of the life sciences, it becomes clear that the innovations and insights of the
eighteenth century were overshadowed by what came afterwards. Thus, it is not surprising
that, in many cases, the decades of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were
merely seen as the “time before Darwin” and, equally, scientific achievements and transitions
of that period simply classified as “pre-Darwinian”2. This approach towards eighteenth-century
natural history and its debates about classifications, mutability and progress inevitably led to
some kind of distorted perspective and created the impression of historical teleology. As a

1
Cf. LEPENIES, Wolf: Das Ende der Naturgeschichte. Wandel kultureller Selbstverständlichkeiten in den
Wissenschaften des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts. Munich 1976.
2
This can be seen by using the example of books like HODGE, Michael Jonathan Sessions: Before and After
Darwin. Origins, Species, Cosmogonies, and Ontologies. Aldershot 2008.

1
result, the transitions of late eighteenth-century natural history were often used to explain the
development of evolutionary thought without explaining these phenomena themselves. Only
recently have scientific discussion and the emergence of research that particularly focus on the
development of the (life) sciences in this period shed new light on these topics, raising new
issues.

Yet, Lovejoy’s concept of ‘temporalization’ – or variations like Wolfgang Proß’s similar, yet
likewise insufficient, term ‘auxesis’3 – still persists in the historiographical analysis of late
eighteenth-century concepts of nature, even though, as I intend to show, it is in no way
sufficient in order to adequately explain the processes and mechanisms that led to the
integration of time in a historical sense into the concept of nature as a system. Instead, and this
will be the main hypothesis of this investigation, processes of ‘multidimensionalization” which
laid the foundations for the historical perception of nature must be taken into consideration. It
shall be demonstrated that the integration of a historical notion of time into nature was the
result of a fundamental shift in the way nature – as a system – was perceived and conceptualized
with respect to both temporal and, even more important, spatial aspects. Furthermore, it will
be shown that the rise of historical thought and the consolidation of history as an academic
discipline over the course of the eighteenth century had a significant influence on the
understanding and perception of nature. In his magnum opus The Growth of Biological
Thought, Ernst Mayr has noted that “[…] the acceptance of the importance of history almost
inevitably led to a recognition of the process of development […]”, adding, however, that ”[…]
historicism never seems to have had close relations to evolutionary biology, except perhaps in
anthropology”.4 This statement is symptomatic of the historiographical analysis of this period.
Apart from the fact that Mayr reveals a distinct ahistorical approach towards late eighteenth-
century issues, anticipating developments of the following century, this assertion lacks
adequate explanations of the relation between history and natural thought and the underlying
mechanisms that led to the integration of historical thought into the understanding of the natural
world.

This paper seeks to explore these mechanisms and the mutual relationship between
historiography and natural history in the eighteenth century. The main focus will be laid on the

3
Cf. PROSS, Wolfgang: Herder und Vico: Wissenssoziologische Voraussetzungen des Historischen Denkens. In:
SAUDER, Gerhard (ed.): Johann Gottfried Herder 1744-1803. Hamburg 1987, p. 103.
4
MAYR, Ernst: The Growth of Biological Thought. Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance. Harvard 1982, pp.
129-130.

2
similar developments that can be observed both in the development of history and in the
changes concerning the conceptualizations of the natural world with respect to the notions of
time and space. In chapter 1, an analysis of the prevalent idea of the scala naturae that served
as fundamental model for eighteenth-century natural systematics will show the significant
changes this concept underwent in terms of its spatial understanding. The centre of this first
part will be the investigation of Johann Hermann’s Tabula Affinitatum Animalium, a rather
unknown treatise from 1783 which tried to depict the natural world as a network and serves as
an example of the spatial extension of the linear scale of beings. It will not only be demonstrated
that Hermann’s concept, even though having fallen into oblivion, was highly significant for the
developments in natural history of the time and was better received than previously assumed,
but it will also be proven that assertions like Igor J. Polianski’s idea of the concept of the
network as being the antithesis to the scala naturae5 are plain wrong. In order to interpret
Hermann’s Tabula and other similar manifestations of this spatial extension of the scale of
beings, a general survey of the scale’s development over the course of the second half of the
century will be necessary. It will be illustrated that the attempts to sustain the traditional
concept led to both its decline and to significant transformations, the latter providing the
foundation for a new understanding of nature at the turn of the century. In addition, a closer
look will be taken at the increasing influence of comparative anatomy in natural history and its
impact on the decline, or the transformation respectively, of the scale of beings.

As a next step, Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s influential theory of transformation, developed during

the first decade of the nineteenth century, will be the object of a critical scrutiny in chapter 2,
since it builds upon central aspects of the scala naturae as well as implies a distinct historical
notion of time. In particular, the role of time in Lamarck’s theory will be analysed and then
compared with the notions of time and change that can be found in eighteenth-century
reflections. It will be demonstrated that Lamarck’s conception of time with regard to the natural
world is significantly different from concepts set forth by naturalists like Buffon or the French
materialists in the previous century. In addition, it will be shown that the eighteenth-century
notions of time with regard to nature – which naturally laid the foundations for Lamarck’s
theory – were closely connected to notions of (geographical) space. This will be illustrated in
chapter 3 by using the example of Eberhard August Wilhelm von Zimmermann’s influential

5
Cf. POLIANSKI, Igor J.: Das Netzwerk als Natursystem und ästhetische »Pathosformel« der Moderne. In:
FANGERAU, Heiner/HALLING, Thorsten (eds.): Netzwerke: allgemeine Theorie oder Universalmetapher in den
Wissenschaften? Ein transdisziplinärer Überblick. Bielefeld 2009, p. 20.

3
work Geographische Geschichte des Menschen und der vierfüßigen Thiere. This analysis will
also not only reveal the complex interaction between notions of time and space in the context
of natural history but also be the transition to the last part of this paper.

This final section (chapter 4) will deal with the development of history as an academic
discipline and the formation of historiographical methods over the course of the eighteenth
century. However, this chapter will not provide a detailed survey of the general theoretical
foundations and developments of historiography of the time. Instead, particular attention will
be drawn to the changes concerning spatial and temporal notions within the changing field of
historiography. The central assumption will be that in eighteenth-century historiography,
transformations in terms of a ‘multidimensionalization’ can be detected which are analogous
to those observable in natural history. At the beginning of the chapter, an analysis of the Early
Modern term Historia will be provided in order to demonstrate the increasing separation of
natural history from (human) history at the beginning of the century. In addition, the issue of
the comparative method in historiography will be addressed and, in this context, linked with
the general extension of spatial and diachronical aspects. The last part of chapter 4 will focus
on the emergence of anthropological thought in the eighteenth century which played an equally
important role in the development of both natural history and history. Yet, even more
importantly, I intend to prove that the increasing influence of anthropological concepts can be
understood as a main cause for the reconnection of history and natural history in the second
half of the century and the eventual inclusion of historical thought into nature.

This study is primarily based on the analysis of primary sources. Especially in the first two
chapters which deal with issues concerning natural history, mainly original sources are used in
order to illustrate the main problems and developments of the time. For the sake of readability,
all non-English texts have been translated into English. When possible, contemporary
translations of relevant passages have been cited, or, in case no such translations exist, my
translations have been provided, with the original passages set in the footnotes. In the case of
Buffon’s Histoire naturelle, the translation by William Smellie is used when it comes to direct
citations, yet the French original has also been quoted. All other indirect references to Buffon’s
Histoire refer to the French original. The last part, which deals with issues of historiography
and anthropology, refers to recent research by Annette Mayr, Lucas Marco Gisi and Thomas
Nutz, who comprehensively investigated the correlations between historiography and
anthropology, as well as to original sources.

4
The aims of this study are manifold. On the one hand, I intend to relativize the still prevailing
concept of the ‘temporalization’ of natural history and, instead, assert a general process of
‘multidimensionalization’ which includes aspects of time as well as space and which can be
detected both within historiography and natural history. On the other hand, considering and
including largely unknown sources, I shall provide a more detailed picture of this period with
its complex interconnections. In particular, the various connections and relations on an
interpersonal level will be used to prove the interactions between different and, prima facie,
distinct areas of knowledge. By doing this, this paper contributes to closing the gap in the
historiographical evaluation of the relationship between natural history and history which – as
Gisi rightly comments – still remains a desideratum in the historiography of eighteenth-century
history of science.6

6
Cf. GISI, Lucas Marco: Einbildungskraft und Mythologie. Die Verschränkung von Anthropologie und
Geschichte im 18. Jahrhundert. Berlin 2007, p. 320.

5
1. The End of the Scale

1.1. A Problem Arising

In April 1795 Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, certainly one of the most eminent naturalists of
his time, published a 3rd edition of his dissertation De generis humani varietate nativa (On the
Natural Variety of Mankind) and added a dedicational letter to Sir Joseph Banks, the then
President of the Royal Society of London. Apart from the fact that this letter can be regarded
as a representative example of the intensive international and interdisciplinary network that
characterized scientific work in the late eighteenth century, it is its content that signifies the
changing zeitgeist in terms of how nature was perceived and understood in the last decades of
the century. After having thanked Banks for his support of his own anthropological studies,
Blumenbach commented on the issue of the integration of man into taxonomic classification.
Criticizing the Linnaean method of organizing mammals based on the structure of teeth as
unnatural, he continued by not only questioning but also rejecting the concept of a continuous
natural system:

For though I rather disagree with those, who, particularly in recent times, pleased
themselves so much with playing mind games with the continuity or gradation of
nature, as they called it, in that they sought the wisdom of the creator and the
perfection of Creation in the fact, that nature, or so they say, does not make leaps
but that the natural things of all three regna of nature, regarding their external
conformation, follow each other like steps on a ladder or rings and links on a
chain: yet since it is obvious for those who treat the issue free of prejudice and
seriously, that even within the animal kingdom there are entire classes, like birds
or genera, for example squids, which can hardly and not without affection be
connected with other adjacent things in such a gradual scheme; that on the other
hand, there are animals, for example scale insects, that show such a great
difference between the habits of both sexes that, if you want to fit them in such a
ladder, it would be necessary to put the males far away from their females and
the different sexes of one species in completely different places; that on the
contrary it is undeniable, that there are vast gaps in these schemes whereby the
kingdoms of nature most evidently differ from each other; and other things in this
vein; although, having considered all this properly, I can by no means approve of
this grandeur and dignity in the doctrine of the gradation of nature, which is
generally praised and embellished by physico-theologians, I nevertheless admit
that there is an undeniable benefit from these metaphorical and allegorical games

6
 in that they facilitate the method in the study of natural history. This is, because
they virtually constitute the foundation of every natural system, wherein the
things are ordered according to their universal habit and external qualities in
which they mutually most correspond, whereas the artificial ones just allow single
features as foundation for their distribution.7

These lines provide impressive evidence of a drastic change concerning the general
understanding of nature. By labelling the concept of the continuity of the natural world as a
mere mind game (Ger. Gedankenspiel, Lat. lusus), Blumenbach contributed to a widespread
debate in the second half of the eighteenth century. His text is a representative swan song for a
concept that had dominated the perception of the natural world since antiquity: the scala
naturae.

1.2. The scala naturae in Eighteenth-Century Natural History

1.2.1. Nature in One Dimension

In his influential work The Great Chain of Being, Arthur O. Lovejoy points out the important
role which the scala naturae played in terms of providing a theoretical framework for
eighteenth-century natural history, claiming that the concept of the chain of beings had offered
essential and constituting presumptions for most naturalists of that time. 8 Lovejoy primarily
concentrates on emphasizing the concept’s significance for the life sciences throughout the

7
“Quanquam enim longissime ab eorum opinione absum qui sibi, nuperis praesertim temporibus ingenii sui
lusibus de nescio qua continuitate aut gradatione naturae ut vocabant, ita placuerunt, ut creatoris sapientiam
et creationis perfectionem ine eo quaererent quod natura ut dicunt non faciat saltum, sed res naturales ternorum
naturae regnorum quoad conformationem suam externam se invicem ceu gradus in scala aut articuli et
juncturae in catena excipiant: cum contra iis, qui rem praejudicii expertes et serio agunt, facile pateat esse vel
in regno animali ab una parte ingras classes, ut avium, aut genera, v. c. sepiarum, quae male et non nisi
affectatione quadam in ejusmodi schematibus gradationis rerum naturalium aliis vicinis junguntur; ab altera
autem extare genera animalium v. c. coccos, in quibus tam ingens differentia utriusque sexus habitum intercedit,
ut si ad ejusmodi scalam ea revocare velis, masculos a suis femellis longissime removere et diversissimis locis
diversos ejusdem speciei sexus inserere necesse foret; contra vero in schematibus istis non infitiandos imo vero
insignes esse hiatus quibus nautrae regna luculentissime a se invicem discriminantur; et quae sunt id genus
alia; quandam ergo, hisce probe perpensis, eam in doctrina de gradatione naturae gravitatem et dignitatem,
qua vulgo a physico-theologis ornari et commendari solet, nullus plane agnoscere queo, hoc tamen ababus
concedo inesse hisce metaphoris et allegoricis lusibus, non infitiandam ad methodum studii historiae naturalis
faciliandam, utilitatem. Basin enim quasi constituunt omnis systematis naturalis, quo res secundum habitum
universum et longe plurimas quibus invicem conspirant qualitates externas ordinantur, cum artificialia contra
singularem tantum characterem pro fundamento distributionis agnsocant”. BLUMENBACH, Johann Friedrich:
De Generis Humani Variatate Nativa. Editio Tertia. Göttingen 1795, pp. XI-XIII. Author’s translation based on
the German translation: Id.: Über die natürlichen Verschiedenheiten im Menschengeschlechte. Nach der dritten
Ausgabe und den Erinnerungen des Verfassers. Translated and edited by Johann Gottfried Gruber. Leipzig 1798,
p. XVIII-XX.
8
Cf. LOVEJOY, Arthur O.: The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the Histories of Ideas. With a New Introduction
by Peter J. Stanlis. New Brunswick 2009, p. 227.

7
eighteenth century, yet basically ignores the fact that the decline of this idea, as will be shown
in this paper, had already started in the second half of the century. It seems undeniable,
however, that the history of life sciences throughout the eighteenth century and beyond must
involve the significance of this concept, which can easily be reconstructed.

The underlying principle of the scala naturae is mentioned in Blumenbach’s hostile verdict
quoted above, namely that “natura […] non faciat saltus”9, that nature does not make leaps.
This is a direct reference to the original assertion made by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in his
Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain of 1704, claiming that “la nature ne fait jamais des
sauts”10 and stating his “loi de la continuité”11, a universal principle of continuity. For Leibniz,
the universe was characterized and ruled by fundamental principles of continuity, plenitude
and linear gradation. According to these principles, the natural world was a continuous, perfect
and integral whole that consists of single, intergradient elements classified in a linear hierarchy.
Every single component in this ideal system was preceded and followed by another, creating a
series of infinite grades of forms.12 In this concept of nature there was no metaphorical room
for gaps, since, according to the principle of continuity, the whole system is completely filled.
Hence there is neither a need for nor the possibility of leaps, since there is nothing that needs
to be jumped over.

One of the most significant features of the scala naturae is its continuous linearity as described
by Leibniz, who tried to apply geometrical principles to physical nature. In a letter to the
mathematician and physicist Pierre the Varignon, Leibniz stated that his law of continuity –
originally established for geometrical matters – was also valid for the natural world, claiming
that “[t]he universality of this principle in geometry has soon revealed to me that it must have
validity in physics as well”13. Leibniz drew an analogy between the universe and – in
accordance with his development of calculus – a geometrical curve or graph. Consequently, he
postulated that “the different classes of beings […]” were “like ordinates of this single curve

9
BLUMENBACH, De Generis, p. X.
10
LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm: Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain. Neue Abhandlungen über den
Menschlichen Verstand. Vol 1. Edited and translated by Wolf von Engelhardt and Hans Heinz Holle.
Frankfurt/Main 1961, p. XXVIII.
11
Ibid.
12
Cf. LOVEJOY, Chain, pp. 144-145.
13
“L’universalité de ce Principe dans la Géométrie m’à bientôt fait connoitre, qu’il ne sauroit manquer d’avoir
lieu aussi dans la Physique”. Letter from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz to Pierre de Varignon. In: LEIBNIZ,
Gottfried Wilhelm: Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie. Edited by Ernst Cassirer. Translated by
Arthur Buchenau. Vol. 2. Hamburg 1966, p. 556. Author’s translation.

8
[…]”14. Referring to the Dutch mathematician Johannes Hudde, he then mentioned the
existence of so-called zoophytes, alleged intermediaries between plants and animals, as proof
of the validity of his assertions.15 This idea of the natural world as a curve and its resultant
linearity is highly significant for the following discussion. The fact that the natural system was
perceived and explained as a one-dimensional continuity gave, of course, rise to severe
inconsistencies and problems which significantly influenced the scientific discussions within
natural history throughout the eighteenth century.

1.2.2. The Problem of Species – Linnaeus, Buffon and Bonnet

From 1735 onwards, the influence of the scala naturae on the classification system devised by
Carl von Linné shows the importance of the scale for the development of eighteenth-century
life sciences. In his highly influential Philosophia Botanica, first published in 1751, Linnaeus
phrased the most famous Latinized form of the Leibnizian postulate, which was later cited by
Blumenbach: “Natura non facit saltus”16. Linné’s use of this phrase in the context of his
taxonomical work gives information about its general theoretical connotation. For instance, in
his Systema Naturae, originally published in 1735 and reprinted in twelve editions, Linnaeus –
polemically labelled as ‘second Adam’ by his contemporary Albrecht von Haller17 – clearly
stated his ideological and scientific stance, positioning himself within a strict physico-
theological tradition. For Linnaeus the natural world – which he wanted to name and order
according to its natural hierarchy – undoubtedly was the result of divine Creation (“Deo nempe,
cuius opus Creatio audit”18) and, therefore, immutable (“Hinc nullae species novae hodienum
producuntur”19).

This fundamental assumption is perfectly represented by the concept of the scala naturae: a
static, hierarchically ordered system of the natural world created by God, according to the Book
of Genesis. By stating in his Philosophia Botanica that nature did not make leaps, Linnaeus
explicitly located himself and his highly received system within this frame of ideas,
consolidating its significance even further. After Linné had compiled his classification system,

14
“Toutes les différentes classes des Etres […], que comme autant d’Ordonnées d’une même Courbe”. Ibid., p.
558. Author’s translation.
15
Cf. ibid.
16
LINNÉ, Carl von: Philosophia Botanica. Stockholm 1751, p. 27.
17
Cf. HARRISON, Peter: Linnaeus as a Second Adam? Taxonomy and the Religious Vocation. In: Zygos, Vol.
44/4 (2009), p. 873.
18
“Namely God, whose work is called Creation”. LINNÉ, Carl von: Systema Naturae. Sive Regna Tria Naturae
[…]. Translated by Johann Joachim Langen. Halle 1740, p. 2. Author’s translation.
19
“Therefore, no new species are produced to date”. Ibid. Author’s translation.

9
the concept of the scale of beings unsurprisingly became even more prevalent in the scientific
debates of the time. This fact can be regarded as the result of an arising problem which has
already been indicated in the initial quotation by Blumenbach. Even though Linné adopted the
principles of Leibniz’s idea, his system required the presumption of the concept of species as
clearly distinguishable entities. For the purpose of creating a consistent order, Linnaeus had to
draw clear distinctions between his species, orders and classes, thus implicitly relativizing the
continuity of nature. This – apart from other aspects – launched a debate within the scientific
community of the time, questioning the validity of such a system. Linné’s most famous
opponent in this discussion, the French naturalist George Leclerc Comte de Buffon, referred to
Linné’s classification as being unnatural and his divisions in species, classes and orders as
arbitrary.20

As a result, the scala naturae underwent a conceptual revival, even a renaissance, among
Linné’s opponents, since it was understood as the natural ordering principle of nature – contrary
to Linnaeus’ allegedly unnatural system. This becomes obvious in the work of the Genevese
naturalist Charles Bonnet. Following Leibniz, who had provided the theoretical philosophical
backing for the scala naturae, yet not a specific implementation of his concept, the Swiss
naturalist first presented the draft of his Echelle des Etres in 1745 as part of his Traité
d’Insectologie. Starting with Materie plus subtile at the bottom, Bonnet created a ladder-like
scale on which the natural world climbed up via the four elements, metals, stones and classes
of plants and animals, with the crowning Homo at the top.21 Every rung of this infinite ladder,
he stated, resembled a natural form, and every discovery of new forms would lead to the
completion of this perfect and continuous system. According to Bonnet, the complete and true
understanding of this order was, however, reserved for the heavenly forces.22 In 1764 Bonnet
published his Contemplations de la Nature, in which he not only extensively elucidated his
ideas of this chain of beings but also provided an elaborate and somehow metaphysical
cosmology based on the concept of the scale of beings. Whereas the original version solely
included the material world, Bonnet’s concept of the universal ladder from 1764 also
comprised the heavenly realms: “It is the same with the scale of every world, and everything
composes just one single series of which the first end is the atom, and of which the last end is

20
Cf. SLOAN, Phillip R.: The Buffon Linnaeus Controversy. In: Isis, Vol. 67/3 (Sep. 1976), p. 359.
21
Cf. BONNET, Charles: Traité d’Insectologie ou Observations sur les Pucerons. Vol. 1. Paris 1745. Copper plate
after the Preface.
22
Cf. ibid., pp. XXIX-XXXI.

10
the highest of the CHERUBIM “23. With this expansion Bonnet emphasized both the holistic
character of his philosophy and his close connection to theological beliefs.

It seems rather difficult to provide a generally valid interpretation of Bonnet and his systems
of thoughts, especially since Bonnet was by no means consistent in his presumptions and
beliefs, as will be shown chapter 2. Yet, a close scrutiny of his writings suggests that the early
Bonnet of 1764 largely applied the Leibnizian system. It seems that only in his later works did
he develop opinions of his own, which today are a regular cause for misconceptions and
confusions regarding his natural philosophy.

Apart from Bonnet’s elaborate adaption of the scala naturae, indications for its general
influence and prevalence in the eighteenth-century mindscape can also be found in an entirely
differnet context. Beyond the discussions within natural history, the scale of beings was a topic
in literature as well, most prominently in Alexander Pope’ s famous Essay on Man, published
in 1734. In this poem, treating “Nature and State of MAN, with Respect to the UNIVERSAL
SYSTEM” and “to his OWN SYSTEM, as an INDIVIDUAL and as a Member of Society24”, Pope
illustrated the scale of beings as the underlying concept of the universe, the “gen’ral ORDER”
which “is kept in Nature, and is kept in Man”25.

Vast Chain of Being! which from God began

Etherial Essence, Spirit, Substance, Man,
Beast, Bird, Fish, Insect! what no Eye can see,
No Glass can reach! from Infinite to Thee!
From Thee to Nothing! – On superior Pow’rs
Were we to press, inferior might on ours;
Or in the full Creation leave a Void,
Where one step broken, the great Scale destroy’d:
From Nature’s Chain whatever Link you strike,
Tenth, or ten Thousandth, breaks the chain alike.
And if each System in Gradation roll,
Alike essential to th’amazing Whole;26

23
“Il e nest de même de l’Echelle de chaque Monde, & toutes ne composent qu’une seule suite, qui a pour premier
terme l’Atôme, & pour dernier terme, le plus éléve des CHERUBINS”. BONNET, Charles: Contemplations de
la Nature. Vol. 1. Amsterdam 1764, p. 29. Author’s translation.
24
POPE, Alexander: Essay on Man. Dublin 1734, pp. 3-4. Emphasis in the original.
25
Ibid., p. 14.
26
Ibid., p. 16.

11
These lines clearly outline the general understanding of the scale of beings as a divine system
that provides order for the natural world created and sustained by God. Several parts of the
poem accentuate the general principles of the scala naturae stated by Leibniz in the century
before. For instance, by talking of a “System of Gradation”, Pope did not only refer to the law
of continuity but also to the principle of plenitude by mentioning a void and the destruction of
the whole system if one step of the ladder was broken. This part in particular reflects the
common view that the extinction of species seemed impossible, since this would contradict the
principle of plenitude and destroy the perfect order of the scale. In believing that nature did not
make leaps, the naturalists (and writers) of the time built upon a comprehensive system of
thought that claimed validity for the whole natural and non-natural world, including distinct
salvation-historical and exegetical implications. Thus, naturalists like Bonnet not only
borrowed principles postulated by Leibniz but also applied the implicit assumptions which
would later become highly relevant for the development of natural history: the immutability of
natural forms and the constancy of species.

1.2.3. Nature without Change

The notion of an unchangeable nature has its origin in the ancient idea of the chain of beings.
The concept of the scala naturae was closely connected to Aristotle’s theory of the soul,
devised in his De anima. The differentiation between a vegetative soul (anima vegetativa), a
sensitive soul (anima sensitiva) and a rational soul (anima rationalis) correlated with the
division of the natural world in plants, animals and man.27 Within this classification the single
parts of the chain were defined by their possession or non-possession of these different parts
of the soul and, since this was predetermined, change within the scala was impossible.28

That nature itself is not subject to change was one of the most fundamental conceptions of
Early Modern thought, expressed and reasoned in various ways, scientifically as well as
theologically. Both lines of argument – closely linked to each other anyway – can be found in
Linné’s thoughts preceding his Systema Naturae. On the one hand, according to the Swedish
naturalist, species had to be permanent, since all living forms reproduced through ova
(“viventia singula ex ovo propagari”29), the offspring always resembled their parents

27
Cf. NABILIEK, Rainer: Biologische Kenntnisse und Überlieferungen im Mittelalter (4.-15.Jhdt). In: JAHN,
Ilse (ed.): Geschichte der Biologie. Theorien, Methoden, Institutionen, Kurzbiografien. Heidelberg 2004, pp.
92-93.
28
Cf. HARIG, Georg/KOLLESCH, Jutta: Naturforschung und Naturphilosophie in der Antike. In: JAHN,
Geschichte, p. 63.
29
LINNÉ, Systema, p. 1.

12
(“omneque ovum producer sobolem parenti simillimam”30) and thus no new forms could come
into existence (Hinc nullae species novae hodienum producuntur”31). The stationary character
of nature is also expressed in Linnaeus’s Fundamenta botanica of 1736: “We count as many
species as different forms were created in the beginning”32. This notion is founded on the
assumptions of seventeenth-century physico-theology, for instance in the writings of the
influential botanist John Ray, whose main concern was botanical classification and,
consequently, the concept of species. For Ray, not only the conformity within a group of living
beings was essential for the definition of species but also the similarity between parents and
their progeny.33 Hence, change within species was not possible, as the offspring automatically
needed to resemble the parental generation, otherwise the term ‘species’ as fundamental
concept of classification would not be applicable.

The theological foundation appears to be even more relevant to this basic assumption. For
Linné, as already shown, nature was God’s Creation, hence unchangeable. Again, the
underlying idea of this kind of reasoning is to be found in Leibniz’s natural philosophy,
especially in his principle of sufficient reason. Every entity in God’s Creation serves a purpose
and, due to God’s own perfection, everything he created must be as perfect as possible: “And
it follows also that created beings derive their perfections from the influence of God, but that
their imperfections come from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits. For
it is in this that they differ from God”34. This statement is in accordance with one of Leibniz’s
most famous claims, namely that God had created the best of all possible worlds:

Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, because there is no
perfect creature, and that it is always possible to produce one which would be
more perfect. I answer that what can be said of a creature or of a particular
substance, which can always be surpassed by another, is not to be applied to the
universe, which, since it must extend through all future eternity, is an infinity.
[…]. It is thus one must think of the Creation of the best of all possible universes,

30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
“Species […] tot numeramus, quot diversae formae in principio sunt creatae”. LINNÉ, Carl von: Fundamenta
Botanica. Amsterdam 1736. p. 18. Author’s translation.
33
Cf. MÄGDEFRAU, Karl: Geschichte der Botanik. Berlin 2013, p. 51.
34
LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm: The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings. Translated by Robert Latta.
Oxford 1898, p. 240.

13
 all the more since God not only decrees to create a universe, but decrees also to
create the best of all. For God decrees nothing without knowledge […].35

Even though it was made in a different context, this assertion illustrates Leibniz’s concept of
Creation. Supposing that the world and, therefore, nature was created in the best way possible,
every change would inevitably lead towards degeneration – something impossible when
assuming a benevolent and perfect God.36 Similar reflections can be found in Baruch Spinoza’s
natural philosophy. A perfect divine being would always create the same world and not a world
that would need to change, since this would mean that the Creation at one point would have
been imperfect.37

1.2.4. Preformationism vs. Epigenesis

Closely linked to this basic concept of Creation is the discussion about the principles of
reproduction, which was one of the main issues of eighteenth-century natural history and which
cumulated in the antagonism between epigenesis and preformationism. The advocates of
preformationistic concepts – which prevailed during the eighteenth century – challenged the
epigenetic view that the embryo, in the course of its ontogenesis, developed new structures not
predetermined in the germ itself. Many eminent naturalists like Albrecht von Haller or the
aforementioned Bonnet cherished the seventeenth-century idea of predetermination or
preformation of all structures of the organic body in the embryonic germ. Furthermore, they
assumed that all prospective generations were already pre-existent in the generations before
and thus had already been present in the first organisms created by God. This complex of
theories was in accordance with the mechanistic explanatory models of the seventeenth century
as well as with theological beliefs.38

35
LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm: Theodicy. Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin
of Evil. Edited with an Introduction by Austin Farrer. Translated by E.M. Huggard. La Salle 1985, p. 249.
36
See also BÄUMER, Änne: Geschichte der Biologie. 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. Vol. 3. Frankfurt/Main 1996, p.
208.
37
Cf. LOVEJOY, Chain, p.154.
38
Cf. TOEPFER, Georg: Historisches Wörterbuch der Biologie. Geschichte und Theorie der biologischen
Grundbegriffe. Vol. 1. Stuttgart 2011, pp. 407-409; BLUMENBACH, Johann Friedrich: Über den
Bildungstrieb. Göttingen 1789, pp. 17-20. In his treatise about a vitalistic power (nisus formatius), Blumenbach
commented on the debate of his contemporaries, juxtaposing the different positions of epigenesis and
preformation. His use of the word ‘evolution’ in this context must not be confused with the modern meaning of
the term as it concerned the development of the germ in the course of its ontogenesis. He, therefore, referred to
the ‘theories of preformation’ as ‘theories of evolution’.

14
Leaving aside the complex history of embryology,39 it nevertheless seems important to take the
main aspects of these theories into consideration. Preformationistic views went hand in hand
with the concept of a universal scale of beings and with the immutability of natural forms,
which becomes evident in the fact that it was Leibniz, amongst others, who offered a
philosophical backing of this theory. In his Principes de la nature et de la grâce (1714) he
stated the main principles of preformationism:

Modern research has taught us, that the living beings whose organs are known to
us, that is to say, plants and animals, do not come from putrefaction or from
chaos, as the ancients thought, but from preformed seeds, and consequently from
the transformation of pre-existing living beings. In the seed of large animals there
are animalcules which by means of conception obtain a new outward form […].40

As has been shown, the interacting ideas of continuity and preformation played an important
part in Leibniz’s understanding of nature, influencing the general conception of the natural
world throughout the eighteenth century. Both the assumption of a nature that did not make
leaps and the idea of preformationism reinforced the general notion of an immutable nature.
After all, the asserted pre-existence of all upcoming generations in the initial Creation left no
room for potential change, since everything had always been there, and therefore nothing new
could ever come into existence.41 It is not surprising that Bonnet not only adopted this theory
but also became one of its main advocates in the uprising debate towards the middle of the
eighteenth century, affirming the pre-existence of all organic forms and consequently the
impossibility of natural mutability.42 In his earlier works he had already assumed the
immutability of species, as a passage in his Considérations sur les Corps Organisés
demonstrates: “NATURE is truly admirable”, he stated, “in the conservation of Individuals;
but SHE is, particularly [admirable, F.M.] in the conservation of Species”. Furthermore, he

39
For detailed analyses of the eighteenth century debate see e.g. BOWLER, Peter J.: Bonnet and Buffon: Theory
of Generation and the Problem of Species. In: Journal of the History of Biology 6 (2), 1973, pp. 259-281;
PINTO-CORREIA, Clara: The Ovary of Eve. Egg and Sperm and Preformation. Chicago 1997.
40
LEIBNIZ, Monadology, pp. 412-413.
41
It seems important to mention that the concepts of preformation and pre-existence are part of both Haller’s and
Bonnet’s natural philosophy but cannot be used synonymously. For a detailed analysis of the topic see
BOWLER, Peter J.: Preformation and Pre-existence in the Seventeenth Century: A Brief Analysis. In: Journal
of the History of Biology, Vol. 4/2 (Autumn 1971), pp. 221-244.
42
For Bonnet’s arguments in favour of the idea of preformation see for instance: BONNET, Contemplation, pp.
151-161.

15
claimed that “[t]he various ways of plants and animals perpetuate […]. No change; no
alteration; perfect identity”.43

The notion that nature and, therefore, all natural entities (like species) were fixed formed the
general opinion within natural history of the 1700s and beyond, even though, as will be shown
later, significant changes can already be seen over the course of the eighteenth century. The
supremacy of this paradigm and its wide influence on the development of the life sciences can
be demonstrated by an extract of a letter written by Charles Darwin. In this letter to John Dalton
Hooker from 1844 – fifteen years before the publication of his Origin of Species – Darwin first
revealed his thoughts about the mutability of species, stating that he was “[…] almost
convinced (quite contrary to the opinion I started with) that species are not (it is like confessing
44
a murder) immutable” . The significance of this passage seems to be beyond question.
Especially the moral implications of this change of paradigm become clear: doubting this
concept had, at least for the founder of the theory of natural selection, almost the character of
a sacrilege.

The idea of the scale of beings found its way even into the belles-lettres of the time. For
instance, in his popular utopistic novel L'an deux mille quatre cent quarante from 1771, Louis-
Sébastien Mercier fictionally foresaw the triumph of this concept over all others. In this novel
Mercier finds himself in the year 2440 in a futuristic Paris. Chapter 31 of the book described
his fictitious visit to the Cabinet du Roi, the royal natural history collection, which displays the
whole of nature of the time:

That scale of beings, so contested in our day, and which many philosophers had
judiciously supposed, was here confirmed by the clearest evidence. We saw
distinctly that the several species touch; that they run, so to speak, into each other;
that by the delicate and sensible connections between the mere stone and the
plant, the plant and the animal, the animal and man, there remained no
interstices.45

43
“LA NATURE est assurément admirable dans la conservation des Individus, mais ELLE est, sur tout, dans la
conservation es Espéces” ; “Les diverses manières dont les différentes Plantes & les Animaux se perpétuent
[…]. Nul changement, nulle alteration, identité parfaite”. BONNET, Charles: Considérations Sur Les Corps
Organisés, Où l'on traite de leur Origine, de leur Développement, de leur Reproduction […]. Amsterdam 1762,
p. 123. Author’s translation.
44
DARWIN, Charles: Letter to John Dalton Hooker, January 11, 1844. Online: Darwin Correspondence Database,
[https://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/entry-729 accessed on Wed April 8 2015].
45
MERCIER, Louis-Sébastien: Memoirs of the Year Two Thousand Five Hundred. Translated by W[illiam]
Hooper. Vol. 2. London 1772, pp. 54-55.

16
Summing up we can state that towards the middle of the eighteenth century the scala naturae
was the leading concept in natural history, representing a continuous, linear and unchangeable
universe, comprising all animate and inanimate forms of nature as well as the heavenly realms.
It was not only in line with the leading concepts of generation of the time but also with general
philosophical and theological assumptions that claimed an immutable universe created by a
perfect God. The chain of beings provided a universal model of the natural world corresponding
with the divine plan of Creation. However, in this context it seems important to point out that
the success of this concept was more than merely the result of philosophical and theological
explanations. The scala naturae also mirrored the social structure of the time, fitting perfectly
into the general thought patterns of Early Modern feudal (and basically static) hierarchy and
turning it into a comprehensible metaphor for nature as well as for one’s own position in
society.

1.3. “Cette chaine n’existe pas” – Emerging Criticism on the Chain

1.3.1. Missing Links

Nevertheless, the concept of the scale of beings was increasingly challenged during the second
half of the century. One of the most famous and fundamental critics of the chain of beings was
the influential French philosopher Voltaire, who included an article about the Chaine des Êtres
Créés in his Questions sur l’Encyclopédie par des Amateurs in 1771. He raised a topic that
seemed to be contradictory to the principles of plenitude and continuity, namely the extinction
of species. According to Voltaire, the fact that animals and plants could vanish from the surface
of the earth could be seen as disproof of the scala naturae, because such an extinction would
mean – as already mentioned above – that a link of the alleged eternal chain was missing. In a
polemic passage he stated that the chain of beings pleased especially those who adhered to the
clerical hierarchy that stretched from the Pope and the cardinals down to the Capuchins, and
finally came to the conclusion that “[t]his chain, this alleged graduation does not exist anymore
in the plants and animals”46.This metaphorical comparison between a clerical and a natural
chain, together with his distinct verdict, leaves little room for misinterpretation of his opinion,
which is one of the earliest and clear disapprovals of the chain of beings.

46
“Cette chaîne, cette gradation prétendue n’existe pas plus dans les végétaux et dans les animaux”. VOLTAIRE,
Questions sur l’Encyclopédie par des Amateurs. Vol. 3. s.l. 1771, p. 285. Author’s translation.

17
Voltaire’s and later Blumenbach’s rejections of the idea of a scale of prove that this traditional
concept, which sustained a whole range of speculations and theories within natural history,
remained no longer unquestioned in the second half of the century. Although drawing different
kinds of conclusions and being differently motivated, both Voltaire and Blumenbach declined
a system that no longer seemed to be adequate enough to explain the structures and
interconnections within the natural world and its parts. Voltaire, as shown above, built his
arguments upon inconsistencies of this concept in relation to empirical observations and
opposed to – at least his remarks suggest this presumption – the implicit religious and political
aspects. Blumenbach’s arguments, on the other hand, result from his vitalistic ideas about the
so called Bildungstrieb (nisus formativus), an intrinsic quasi-Newtonian force, immanent in all
(and exclusively) living beings. From this clear distinction between inanimate and animate
nature Blumenbach concluded that the scale of being and the underlying principle of continuity
did not correspond with the way the natural world was organized:

One cannot be more profoundly convinced of anything than I am of the sweeping

gap which nature has made between the animate and the inanimate Creation,
between organic and inorganic creatures; and I don’t ignore, despite all my
deference for the ingenuity wherewith the advocates of the sequence of steps or
the continuity of nature have set up their ladders, how they, at the transition from
the organised kingdoms to the inorganic, want to succeed without a really quite
ambitious leap.47

This passage from Blumenbach’s famous treatise elucidates the argumentative foundation of
his disapproval. Yet Blumenbach was not the first to follow this line of reasoning: in 1779 the
Hungarian naturalist Ludwig Mitterpacher stated in his Elementa Rei Rusticae: “[…] I don’t
see how the transition from the sensible to the non-sensible can be made without a leap […]”48.

In this context it is striking that especially in Blumenbach’s thinking a distinct change of

opinion can be observed. Although – as shown above – he distinctly rejected the scale of beings
in his writings from 1789 and 1795, a quite different passage can be found in the first edition
of his Handbuch der Naturgeschichte (Handbook for Natural History) from 1779. In this

47
“Man kann nicht inniger von etwas überzeugt seyn, als ich es von der mächtigen Kluft bin, die die Natur
zwischen der belebten und unbelebten Schöpfung, zwischen den organisierten und unorganischen Geschöpfen
befestigt hat; und ich sehe bey aller meiner Hochachtung für den Scharfsinn, womit die Verfechter der
Stufenfolge oder Continuität der Natur ihre Leitern angelegt haben, nicht ab, wie sie beym Uebergange von den
organisierten Reichen zum unorganischen ohne einen wirklich etwas gewagten Sprung durchkommen wollen“.
BLUMENBACH, Bildungstrieb, pp. 71-72. Author’s translation.
48
“[…] non video, qua ratione transitus a sentiendo ad non sentiendum sine saltu fieri possit […]”.
MITTERPACHER, Ludwig: Elementa Rei Rusticae. Buda 1779, p. 4. Author’s translation.

18
widely read book he stressed the usefulness of the concept of the scala naturae for natural
history, claiming that every natural system should be represented in some kind of Bonnetian
scale. Nevertheless, he warned against taking this concept too literally and applying it too
strictly to the natural world.49 Gerhard Wagenitz regards this warning as a certain distancing
from the concept,50 yet the difference between Blumenbach’s assertions from 1779 and those
made in 1789 and 1795 is explicit, made even more obvious in the later editions of his
Handbuch. No later than 1799 (but maybe already earlier) Blumenbach had changed this
passage significantly, bringing his assertions about the chain of beings in line with those
expressed in the paragraphs quoted above. He declared the metaphorical image of a ladder or
chain as being deficient and particularly objected to the physico-theological claim that species
could not get extinct. Just like Voltaire, he alleged the example of the extinction of wolves in
Britain and, in addition to that, the case of the extinction of the Dodo, both of which did not
seem to have any impact on the order of the universe.51

1.3.2. Leibniz, his Curve and the Problem of Infinity

Due to its Leibnizian foundation, the concept of the scale of beings led to another severe
problem: the issue of infinity. Leibniz’s conception of nature, which was analogous to a
geometrical curve, implicated a problem that was quite difficult to solve. As mentioned above,
single natural beings directly corresponded with single points or ordinates on the metaphorical
graph, ergo the universe. According to the laws of geometry, between every two arbitrarily set
ordinates on the curve an infinite number of ordinates can be determined, and therefore,
analogously, between two natural beings an infinite number of intermediary forms could be
found. As a consequence of the principle of plenitude, which allowed no room whatsoever for
empty spaces within the universe, these forms were not only potentially thinkable but rather
had to actually exist. Yet, this conclusion was in absolute contradiction to empirical
observations. On the one hand, in many cases these intermediate forms could not be found in
nature, and on the other hand it was clear that the world, even though not entirely discovered,
was a limited, finite space. The combination of an asserted continuous, uninterrupted gradation
and the alleged infinite number of beings became again a kind of vantage point for the

49
Cf. BLUMENBACH, Johann Friedrich: Handbuch der Naturgeschichte. 1 st edition. Göttingen 1779,
pp. 11-13.
50
Cf. WAGENITZ, Gerhard: Die “Scala naturae“ in der Naturgeschichte des 18. Jahrhunderts und ihre Kritiker.
In: RHEINBERGER, Hans-Jörg/WEINGARTEN, Michael (eds.): Jahrbuch für Geschichte und Theorie der
Biologie. Vol. 4. Berlin 1997, p. 188.
51
Cf. BLUMENBACH, Johann Friedrich: Handbuch der Naturgeschichte. 6th edition. Göttingen 1799, p. 9.

19
opponents of the scala naturae. For example, the French clergyman and member of the
Académie Française François Arnaud criticized this discrepancy of the scale by challenging
the concept of intermediary forms:

We know the polyps, the zoophytes or animal-plants. If anything seems to

confirm the system of the continuity of the chain of beings, these are the
intermediary forms that seem to fill the gap between plants and animals and that
appear to be the middle part of the animals in the immense chain of nature. Is this
renewed idea of the Greek really that impressive? From vegetation to the simplest
sand, to clay, isn’t there an infinite distance? The polyps, the anemones, are they
really animals? Do they have sentiment and isn’t it the inexplicable gift of
sentiment that constitutes the animal? Do we really perceive a continuous and
uninterrupted gradation among the beings? We see animals on four legs and on
two, but there is none on three, despite all the admirable properties attributed to
the number three throughout antiquity. We find reptiles which have an
undetermined number of legs. How many species can’t we imagine between man,
monkey and the other genera?52

This passage is an adequate summary of the problem. Although – according to the principles
of continuity and plenitude – every imaginable form of being had to exist, many of these forms
(like three-legged animals) could not be found, which could be regarded as the empirical
disproof of the alleged chain. Furthermore, even between similar forms of beings infinite
numbers of gradual intermediaries could be imagined, let alone between forms that did not
show any similarities at all.

This chapter has shown that criticism of the scale of beings came from many sides and was
based on different aspects of argumentation. Even Blumenbach, who, at the end of the 1770s,
was at least to some extent an advocate of the concept, became one of its distinct opponents.
Although, due to these assertions, the scala naturae-concept lost some of its reputation, these

52
“On connoît les polypes, ces zoophytes ou animaux-plantes. Si quelque chose paroît confirmer le systême de la
continuité de la chaîne des êtres, ce sont ces formes intermédiaires qui paroissent remplir l’intervalle des
végétaux & des animaux, & qui semblent être des animaux mi-partis de la chaîne immense de la nature. Cette
idée, renouvelle des Grecs, est-elle aussi vraie qu’imposante ? De la végétation au simple sable, a l’argille, n’y
a-t’il pas une distance infinie ? Les polypes, les orties de mer, sont-ils bien réellement des animaux ? Ont-ils du
sentiment, & n’est-ce pas le don inexplicable du sentiment qui constitue l’animal ? Apperçoit-on réellement une
gradation continue & sans interruption entre les êtres ? Nous voyons des animaux à quatre pieds & à deux,
mais il n’y en a point à trois, malgré les admirables propriétés attribués au nombre de trois par toute l’antiquité.
On trouve des reptiles indéterminé. Combien d’espèces ne peut-on pas imaginer entre l’homme & et le singe,
entre le singe & d’autres genres?”. ARNAUD, François: Supplement a la Gazette Littéraire de L’Europe. In :
Gazette Littéraire de L’Europe. Vol. 1. Paris 1764, pp. 73-74. Author’s translation.

20
withering judgements did not suffice for a fundamental crisis, even though they give evidence
for a change in the general view of nature from the 1770s onwards. That such a dominating
and in many ways inconsistent system would sooner or later raise considerable doubt is not
surprising. Even more remarkable is the fact that outspoken proponents of its significance
demonstrated and admitted to the limits of the system, as will be shown in the following
chapter.

1.4. A Net to Save the Scale – ‘Multidimensionalizing’ the scala naturae

1.4.1. Johann Hermann and his Tabula Affinitatum Animalium (1783)

In 1783 the scholar Johann Hermann (or Jean Herman), professor at the University of
Strasbourg, published an extensive paper entitled Tabula Affinitatum Animalium, an attempt to
create a new system of order for the animal kingdom. Hermann, born in 1738, studied medicine
at the University of Strasbourg53 and became professor of medicine in 1768, professor of
philosophy in 1778 and finally, following his teacher Reinbold Spielmann, professor of botany,
chemistry and medicine in 1784.54 As head of the botanical gardens in Strasbourg, founder of
a natural history collection, member of many scientific communities and part of a vast
international correspondence network,55 Hermann can be regarded as a typical savant of
eighteenth-century natural history. Even though widely ignored in modern historiography,
Hermann’s work is crucial for the development of natural history in the second half of the
eighteenth century.

His main work is the aforementioned Tabula Affinitatis Animalium from 1783, the extended
edition of a similar but significantly shorter treatise from 1779. The centrepiece of this treatise
is the Tabula, a foldable table that tries to depict the natural relations of organisms within the
regnum animale, the animal kingdom. The main aim of his work was to show “[…] how the
continuous transition from one to the other and the mutual connected relationships can be
revealed”56. This initial ambition, namely talking about continuous transition, already shows
that Hermann had linked his work to the ideas of the scala naturae. The central terms he used

53
Cf. LAUTH, Thomas: Vitam Johannis Hermann. Strasbourg 1801, pp. 3-8.
54
Cf. QUERNER, Hans: “Hermann, Johannes“. In: Neue Deutsche Biographie. Vol. 8. Berlin 1969, p. 660.
55
Hermann corresponded with leading naturalists of his time such as Georges Cuvier, Georges-Luis Leclerc
Comte de Buffon, Johann Reinhold Forster, Alexander von Humboldt or Sir Joseph Banks. LAUTH, Vitam, pp.
40-42.
56
HERMANN, Johann: Tabula Affinitatum Animalium Olim Academico Specimine Edita Nunc Uberiore
Commentario Illustrata Cum Annotationibus Ad Historiam Naturalem Animalium Augendam Facientibus.
Strasbourg 1783, p. 2.

21
in his work, such as ‘affinity’, ‘nexus’, ‘series’ or ‘chain’, make his situatedness within this
tradition visible.

Prima facie Hermann’s Tabula shows little resemblance to the scale of beings devised and
depicted by Charles Bonnet. Contrary to the original linear ladder-like scala naturae in
Bonnet’s Traite d’Insectologie, Hermann compiled his system as a complex network of
species, classes, criss-cross connecting lines, dots and borders. Only on closer examination
does this table reveal the close relation between Hermann’s system and the traditional concepts
of eighteenth-century natural history. In the introduction of his 370 pages commentary we find
an outline of his thoughts concerning the principles of the natural world as well as elaborate
remarks on the works of ancient and contemporary naturalists and philosophers on whose
works he based his own reflections. Right at the beginning of this introduction Hermann
referred to the famous ‘natura non facit saltum’ motive, stating that

[…] nature kept a certain course of the things, and did not make a leap from one
type to another, but is, like an uninterrupted chain, through manifold species and
likewise varieties of perfection, an admirable and continuous connection and
series of things, so that it seems that one thing is connected to the other and
everything is mutually tied.57

This passage distinctly outlines Hermann’s view of nature as a universal series of connected
forms, and is thus fully in accordance with the prevalent concepts of his time. Moreover, he
decidedly mentioned and commented on authors who had already reflected upon the
connections and relations of natural forms following the concept of the scale of beings, for
example ancient authors such as Plato, Aristotle or Nemesius,58 or later writers like Leibniz,
Bonnet, Vitaliano Donati or Peter Simon Pallas. Accordingly, Hermann also included a Latin
version of Bonnet’s Chaîne des Êtres Créés, which he declared as being a guiding principle for
his own work.59

57
“[…] natura servasse tenorem quendam in rebus, nec subitum ab uno genere ad alterum fecisse saltum, sed
non interrupta fere trama, per multiplices specierum aeque ac perfectionum varietates, esse admirabilem
quandam & continuatam conjuncionem seriemque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa & omnes inter se aptae
colligataeque videantur”. Ibid., p. 1.
58
Cf. ibid., pp. 4-5.
59
Cf. ibid., pp. 9-11.

22
Fig. 1: The foldable Tabula Affinitatum Animalium, the
centrepiece of Hermann’s treatise from 1783.

23
This statement is interesting in so far as Hermann elsewhere criticized Bonnet’s ideas about
the universal connection of all natural beings. Although he, too, presumed general connections
and ties within the natural world, he rejected Bonnet’s often metaphysical assumptions
concerning a catholic harmony and a mutual dependency of all things in nature. For Bonnet
everything in the world had its particular role, place and purpose, virtually an inherent raison
d'être within this perfect, absolute and harmonious universe – an opinion Hermann did not
share.60 In contrast to Bonnet, Hermann did not take metaphysical correlations into account,
but concentrated on observable connections.

Bearing these underlying assumptions – set forth by Hermann in his commentary – in mind,
the Tabula appears in a new perspective. Examining the table’s internal structure the relations
to the scala naturae become apparent: following a hierarchical linearity, the vertical principles
of arrangement resemble the hierarchy of the scale of beings. Beginning with the Regnum
Minerale at the very bottom, the array continues with the Regnum Vegetabile. The main part
at the top is dedicated to the animal kingdom, connected to the preceding part via transitional
forms of beings. Within the Regnum Animale itself the hierarchical structure is even more
evident. Segmented into five subdivisions, the realm of animals ascends from the lowest
invertebrates (Vermes) via insects, fish, amphibians and birds to the class of mammals at the
top, crowned by mankind. This structure not only parallels the fundamental form of the scala
naturae but also accomplishes the task of depicting the transitional forms as basic prerequisites
for this concept.

Hermann, following the Leibnizian principle of continuity and Bonnet’s work, presumed
intermediate forms (“intermedia genera mediasque species”61) as necessary connections
between otherwise distinct natural forms or species. Just like Bonnet, who had declared the
polyp as a transitional form between plants and animals and the flying squirrel as standing
between birds and quadrupeds,62 Hermann tried to establish these intermediaries in his Tabula,
creating connections between species across the natural world and beyond borders of
classificational systems. A synopsis of Hermann’s philosophy can be found in a magazine for
popular science called Neues Magazin für Frauenzimmer (New Magazine for Women) from
1788, in which he published an article about corals and which was later republished by his son.

60
Cf. ibid., p. 14.
61
Ibid., p. 2.
62
Cf. BONNET, Contemplation, pp. 27-28.

24
Discussing the peculiar nature of corals as apparent intermediaries between plants and animals,
Hermann expressed his view of the natural system:

The whole Creation is a connected plan, a series of beings, which are linked
together like a chain, or rather interwoven like a net. From one shape to another,
from one ability, from one property, from one perfection to the other, grades and
more or less imperceptible transitions can be found everywhere.63

In his explanations Hermann also alluded to many of the concomitant topics described earlier.
As proponent of a physico-theological conception of the natural world he not only denied the
mutability of species64 but also commented on the problem of extinction. Being in line with
Leibniz, Hermann objected to the possibility of extinct species by pointing out that a wise and
benevolent God would not create something, just to destroy it again.65 It becomes evident that
Hermann thoroughly approved of the traditional view of the scala naturae, distinctly linking
his own thoughts to this philosophical system. Yet, his Tabula features remarkable, at first
appearance even contradictory differences to the classic chain of beings.

Hermann was, of course, familiar with the points of criticism mentioned above and responded
to them at length in his commentary, even quoting parts of Arnaud’s verdict. His
counterarguments are quite inconsistent at this point but show remarkable thoughts. He
basically relativized the Leibnizian principle of plenitude, stating that nature was a net and not
a densely woven cloth (“non […] densissime contexto panno”66) without room for emptiness.
Yet, soon after this assertion he declared to be willing to accept an infinite number of beings,
stating that these beings did not necessarily need to be found on earth but could also exist on
other planets.67

1.4.2. From the Scale to the Net – Entering the Second Dimension

As shown above, one of the distinct characteristics of the scala naturae was its linearity,
founded in Leibniz’s analogical conclusion of the world as a geometrical curve and represented

63
“Die ganze Schöpfung ist ein zusammenhängender Plan, eine Reihe von Wesen, die wie eine Kette an einander
hängen, oder vielmehr wie ein Nez in einander verflochten sind. Von einer Gestalt zur andern, von einem
Vermögen, von einer Eigenschaft, von einer Vollkommenheit zur andern, sind überall Grade und mehr oder
weniger unmerkliche Uebergänge anzutreffen“. HERMANN, Johann Friedrich: Etwas über die Korallen. Aus
dem Neuen Magazin für Frauenzimmer Jahrgang 1788, April. Strasbourg 1788, p. 9. Author’s translation.
64
Cf. HERMANN, Johann: Histoire naturelle des Oiseaux. Tome I. Paris 1770. In: BECKMANN, Johann (ed.):
Physikalisch-oekonomische Bibliothek […]. Vol. 6. Göttingen 1775, p. 33.
65
Cf. HERMANN, Tabula, p. 16.
66
HERMANN, Tabula, pp. 20-21.
67
Ibid., pp. 21-22.

25
in Bonnet’s scheme. However, Hermann left this strict linearity behind and – while keeping
the original linearity as hierarchical verticality – expanded his system into the second
dimension, thus creating a plane network. His arguments for this step towards a
multidimensional system can be found in the introduction to his commentary. Explaining his
rather complex table Hermann stated that the series of beings cannot be understood as a single
line, “[…] like the Bonnetian scala first tried to express in very simple schemes”68, but as a
system of mutual connections which run not only vertically but also horizontally, creating a
vast network rather than a single, linear ladder.

Even though Hermann’s Tabula certainly is (as far as we know) the most elaborate realization
of an attempt to create a reticular systematisation of nature, ideas concerning netlike relations
within nature can already be found earlier. One of the authors who had already extensively
expressed these ideas was Peter Benedikt Graumann, who can be regarded as a direct
forerunner of Hermann’s later work. In a treatise from 1777 Graumann – also following the
fundamental presumptions of a scale of beings and a harmonious, leap-less universal continuity
– assumed that there was not merely one chain of beings, but many. He understood nature as a
system of often parallel series of forms, mutually connected and intertwined lines and lateral
branches that separate from the main stem just to reconnect at another point. The underlying
presumption was that in many cases similarities to more than just two other beings (the ones
above and below in the linear scale) could be found, which meant that the metaphor of a single
chain could never suffice to represent the complexity of nature and its connections.
Graumann’s concept is interesting in so far as even though he shared the fundamental principles
of the scala naturae, he decidedly wanted to prove it wrong, yet just related to its linear
character.69 As proof he adduced his observation that it was possible to create at least two
different series of beings that ‘connected’ the mouse with man, which he arranged as an
example.70 This assembly can also be found in a shortened Latinized version in Hermann’s
explications, serving as an argumentative support for his own table.71 Hermann’s system can,

68
“[…] qualem Bonnetiana scala primo simplicissimi schematis tentamine expressa sistit”. Ibid., p. 25. Author’s
translation.
69
Cf. GRAUMANN, Peter Benedikt: Betrachtungen über die allgemeine Stuffenfolge der natürlichen Körper.
Rostock 1777, pp. 30-32.
70
Cf. ibid., p. 36.
71
Cf. HERMANN, Tabula, p. 26.

26
therefore, be seen as a continuation of Graumann’s ideas, thinking them one step further by
expanding the new two-dimensional concept into a plane network.

Fig. 2: Graumann’s two series of beings that Fig. 3: Hermann’s Latinized reproduction of
connected man and mouse Graumann’s series

Rudimentary approaches towards this idea of a network can be found in other places as well.
However, these approaches mostly appear as mere remarks within more extensive reflections
on nature, without ever being realized in any form of system or, if so, not to the extent of
Hermann’s Tabula. Yet it becomes obvious that the idea of nature as a network, even though
not widely spread, emerged over the course of the second half of the century. It is also clear
that Hermann was familiar with these ideas, mentioning them in his commentary and
incorporating them into his Tabula.

Giulio Barsanti has already shown the variety of two-dimensional ideas that appeared from the
1750s onwards, although he labelled these systems as ‘maps’ and also subsumed Hermann’s
Tabula under this category. However, this categorization does not seem to be suitable for these
different approaches, since the term ‘map’ only applies to some of these concepts which clearly
show geographical features, whereas others lack these geographical elements entirely. This
becomes evident when comparing the ideas set forth by Vitaliano Donati in 1750, Carl von
Linné in 1751 and Georges Luis-Leclerc de Buffon in 1755. In his Saggio della storia naturale
marina dell’ Adriatico, Donati had expressed his thoughts about the chain of beings, stating
that the series of beings resembled a net rather than a linear chain. Similar to that Linné –
according to Barsanti – stated in a short aphorism in his Philosophia Botanica that the natural

27
world was too complex to be expressed by a single line72, claiming that “[a]ll plants show a
relation on both sides, like a territory on a geographical map“73. Both approaches, Donati’s as
well as Linné’s, remained mere ideas without ever being realized by their originators. Only the
Linnaean concept of a geographical map for plants was actually implemented by Paul Dietrich
Giseke in 1789, showing several circles representing different groups of plants according to
their relations as well as their scope.74

Furthermore, Barsanti draws attention to Buffon’s concept of a Table de l’Ordre des Chiens
from 1755, on which he tried to represent the different varieties of dog breeds in a prima facie
network-like system.75 Yet here it becomes clear that Barsanti’s general labelling of these
concepts as maps is problematic. Contrary to the other two approaches, Buffon’s system,
realized by the naturalist himself, can actually be seen as a map due to its distinct geographical
features. At the right bottom corner a compass dial indicates the fact that Buffon displayed
these different varieties of dog breeds according to their geographical distribution; thus, these
system has little to do with an alteration of the scale of beings. This approach must rather be
understood in the context of Buffon’s reflections on the degeneration of species in relation to
exterior factors, which will be dealt with later. His table can, therefore, hardly be seen within
the same context as, for example, Donati’s ideas about a natural network, or Hermann’s
approach, even though Buffon later expressed thoughts about the natural connections which
are very similar to those underlying Hermann’s conception. Talking about the mutual relations
between animal species, Buffon also referred to the concept of the chain of beings, stating that
the universal chain is “[…] not a simple uniform series, it ramifies at intervals in all directions,
the branches from different parts bend, and run into each other […]”76.

72
Cf. BARSANTI, Giulio: Le Immagini della Natura: Scale, Mappe, Alberi 1700-1800. In: Nuncius, Vol. 3/1
(1988), pp. 83-84.
73
“Plantae omnes utrinque affinitatem monstrant, uti Territorium in Mappa geographica”. LINNÉ, Philosophia,
p. 27. Author’s translation. This quote seems to be quite contradictory and leaves room for interpretation, as
‘utrinque’ clearly refers to ‘both sides’, which would correspond to the original concept of the chain, whereas
the analogy to the geographical map suggests a two-dimensional aspect. This begs the question whether this
aphorism suggests a bio-geographical approach or refers to a two-dimensional system analogous to a
geographical map.
74
Cf. BARSANTI, Immagini, fig. 15.
75
Cf. ibid., p. 84-86.
76
BUFFON, Georges-Louis-Leclerc: The Natural History of Birds. From the French of the Count de Buffon.
Illustrated with engravings; and a Preface, Notes, and additions, by the Translator. In nine Volumes. Vol. 1.
London, 1793, p. 319. The French original is even more distinct: “[…] cette chaîne n’est pas un simple fil qui
ne s’étend qu’en longeur, c’est une large trame ou plutôt un faisceau, qui, d’intervalle à intervalle, jette des
branches de côté pour se réunir avec les faisceaux d’un autre ordre”. BUFFON, Georges-Louis Leclerc:
Histoire naturelle des Oiseaux. Volume 1. Paris 1770. p. 394.

28
Considering the 15 years that lie between Buffon’s Table de l’Ordre des Chiens and this
passage it seems appropriate to interpret both approaches differently. Even though the outer
appearance of Buffon’s table of dog breeds suggests the idea of a network as expressed in the
quoted passage, it seems clear that the table is based on (bio)geographical presumptions,
whereas these are completely missing in the latter passage. Therefore, the table of dog breeds
can undoubtedly be labelled as a ‘map’, being part of a complex of ideas, which would later –
as will be shown – result in the development of biogeography as a discipline. However, the
thoughts concerning a reticular natural system, as for instance expressed by Donati and the
later Buffon, are (primarily theoretical) modifications of the scale of beings. Undoubtedly, the
realization of these theories such as Hermann’s Tabula resemble maps due to their two-
dimensional appearance, which is Barsanti’s main criterion; yet it appears to be crucial to this
investigation to distinguish between these approaches since they differ greatly in terms of their
underlying principles.

In a treatise about the assumed class of zoophytes from 1766 the German naturalist Peter Simon
Pallas – directly following Vitaliano Donati – suggested a reticular system in order to replace
the traditional linear view of nature. He actually imagined a tree-like structure for the natural
world;77 nevertheless, this structure must not be confused with the concept of phylogenetic
trees set forth in the nineteenth century in order to depict evolutionary processes. Pallas’s idea
of a tree is more like a metaphorical extension of the idea of a natural network, with the uprising
trunk as representation of the hierarchical order in nature.

About 1770 we find two realizations of the idea of the network without any geographical
implications. In 1766 and again in 1774 the botanist Johann Philipp Rüling published his
Tabula Phytographica Universalis Affinitates Ordinum Naturalium Plantarum Exhibens as
part of two treatises dealing with the natural order of plants.78 Relying on the Linnaean
classification, Rüling compiled the table in such a way that the connections and affinities of
plant species could be immediately recognized “like geographical maps”79. Compared to
Giseke’s attempt from 1789, in contrast to Buffon, Rüling’s table incorporates the
‘geographical’ aspect as mere analogy to an overseeable, two-dimensional setting without
comprising any actual geographical features. Similar to this array the French author Jaques-

77
Cf. PALLAS, Peter Simon: Elenchus Zoophytorum. The Hague 1766, pp. 23-24.
78
Cf. BARSANTI, Immagini, p. 89.
79
“[…] mappae geographicae instar”. RÜLING, Johann Philipp: Ordines naturales plantarum commentatio
botanica. Göttingen 1774, p.5. Author’s translation.

29
Henri Bernardin de Saint-Pierre compiled a spherical system of seashells (Idée d’un Ordre
Spherique pour une des Parties de L’histoire Naturelle), published as part of his Voyage A
l’Ile-de-France in 1773.80 Starting from the simplest shape he set up a system based on outer
appearances, in which various series of forms spread radially from the centre according to their
external affinities. Even though depicted on a two-dimensional table, the radial system is
thought as a three-dimensional sphere, creating virtual connections between forms placed at
the edges of the table. Yet Bernardin de Saint-Pierre’s attempt at creating a spherical order
remains a virtual three-dimensionality, since a closer examination reveals that the
transformation of the table into a three-dimensional sphere would not be possible due to
discrepancies within the concept. However, both systems can be seen as direct paragons for
Hermann’s Tabula, because he was outspokenly familiar with them, as he stated in his
commentary.81

The underlying thought for all these concepts was that considering different criteria or features
beyond external appearances automatically revealed more than just one connection between
natural beings, resulting in a system that, as a consequence, required the extension to the second
dimension, that is to say a map-like network. The fact that the concept was not only regarded
as valid for the realm of animals and plants but also considered as – just like the scala naturae
– universally applicable can be seen by using the example of Louis Jean-Marie Daubenton’s
introduction to the volumes of the Encyclopédie méthodique from 1782 dealing with natural
history, wherein he claims that nature was not only connected through one direct line but
through many oblique lines. Unlike many others, he did not use examples of the animated
nature but adduced the metals gold, silver, iron and lead as an instance, which, according to
Daubenton, showed different connections depending on the considered features weight,
tenacity or ductility.82

So, by the time Hermann had created his Tabula the concept of the network as an extension of
the scala naturae was already part of the discussions within natural history. Blumenbach, for
instance, in his already mentioned Handbuch der Naturgeschichte from 1779, talked about

80
Cf. BERNARDIN DE SAINT-PIERRE, Jacques-Henri: Voyage à l'Isle de France, à l'Isle de Bourbon, au Cap
de Bonne-Espérance, etc. avec des observations nouvelles sur la nature et sur les hommes. Volume 1.
Amsterdam 1773, pp. 145-147.
81
Cf. HERMANN, Tabula, p. 13. Hermann inexplicably refers to Bernardin de Saint-Pierre as “ANONYMUS
scriptor”.
82
Cf. Encyclopédie méthodique par Ordre des Matières. Histoire naturelle des Animaux. Vol. 1. Paris 1782, p.
IV.

30
“well known images of chains, ladders and nets”83 when he referred to the concept of the scale
and the Leibnizian principles. Hermann’s two-dimensional network of affinities within the
animal kingdom can, therefore, definitely not be seen as an exceptional, unique approach, since
he relied heavily on ideas which had emerged from the 1750s onwards. This relation to already
existing concepts becomes obvious by considering the accordance of ideas and by Hermann’s
extensive commentary, wherein he made detailed remarks on authors he took into
consideration. However, compared with the concepts of his contemporaries, Hermann’s
system is by far the most extensively executed system of this kind, as the majority of these
theories were merely considered theoretically, and only in single cases were they implemented
as graphical depictions. In accordance with the developments of his time, Hermann tried to
bypass the fundamental problems the traditional concept of the scala naturae was confronted
with, mainly by extending the linear scale to the second dimension, thus creating his plane
network of affinities. However, despite this fundamental adaption, the limits of this kind of
system soon became apparent.

1.4.3. Affinities as Ordering Principle

The central principle for Hermann’s Tabula was – like for the traditional scale of beings – the
concept of affinities. Yet, as stated above, a fundamental difference can be found between these
two systems. The network of the Tabula was not only an extension of the scale in terms of its
dimensionality but also of the general notion of natural affinities. Hermann followed Pallas’s
assertion that, in order to create a natural system, it was not sufficient just to take exterior
characteristics and their affinities into account. In Hermann’s opinion it was crucial to consider
a whole range of various features in order to properly understand the immanent structure of
nature and its order. As a result, he tried to incorporate and represent as many criteria of
affinities as possible, claiming that

[…] others, in order to create a scale of nature, rather follow the similarity of
forms, others the structure, others rather value the multitude and perfection of
organs, others the elements which the animals inhabit or the way of reproduction,
and others consider the accordance of qualities, others like the number of parts,
others rather urge the faculties of animals.84

83
“[…] die bekannten Bilder von Ketten und Leitern und Netzen“. BLUMENBACH, Handbuch (1779), p. 10.
84
“[…] alios in instruenda naturae scala magis sectari formarum similitudinem, alios structuram, alios plus
tribuere organorum mustitudini & perfectioni, alios elementum quod Animalia inhabitant, motus propagationis,

31
Hermann tried to integrate all these different approaches of classification – based on criteria
like external form, habitat, reproduction, cognitive facilities or internal structure – into his
Tabula in order to create a system depicting the complexity of nature as accurately as possible.
Taking all or most of these categories into account, Hermann tried to place various species of
animals within his network: the more affinities could be found between different species the
closer they were (spatially seen) located on the Tabula.85

In addition, Hermann displayed different affinities by drawing connecting lines between

species further apart. For example, he connected the leeches (Hirudo) and earthworms
(Lumbricus) – located next to each other within the class of worms (Vermes) – with the larvae
of butterflies (Lepidoptera), located further up within the realm of insects, as well as with
morays (Muraena), which again are linked with snakes (Serpentes). Here, of course, criteria of
external form come into effect, since all of these different types of animals apparently resemble
each other in their vermicular shape. In a similar manner some mammals are connected with
amphibians due to their common hibernating behaviour. The two-dimensional character of
Hermann’s Tabula was, therefore, conditioned by his endeavour to consider a comprehensive
variety of affinities. Taking up Graumann’s approach, it soon became evident that the linearity
of the scala naturae could not suffice to depict the complexity of the natural world. However,
even with this two-dimensional approach, Hermann was soon confronted with new problems
and dimensional limitations.

1.4.4. Spatial Limits of the Two-Dimensional Network

As soon as Hermann wanted to include as many criteria of affinities as possible he had to

realize that even his two-dimensional setting was quite limited due to quite practical reasons.
As it was important to maintain the linear hierarchy of the scale of beings to some extent, there
was literally no way for Hermann – due to the spatial limitations of the plane system – to
display all affinities he wanted to illustrate. Adding further lines and connections to the array
was impossible without crossing out other lines or names.

In a first attempt to solve this problem Hermann tried to avoid this issue altogether by adding
a rather unique feature to his Tabula: following the instructions in his commentary, it was
necessary to bend the whole table lengthwise by bringing together its long sides, thus forming

alarumque qualitatum convenientiam respicere, alios sibi in numeris pertium placer, alios magis animae
facultates urgere”. HERMANN, Tabula, p. 31. Author’s translation.
85
Cf. ibid., p. 33.

32
a tube and thereby creating some kind of three-dimensional shape. As a result, it was possible
to display connections between species which were horizontally in line but on different sides
of the table. For instance, Hermann was able to place the beaver within the rodents on the far
right side as well as within aquatic mammals on the far left. But even this peculiar method did
not suffice to compensate for the limitations of Hermann’s array. Hence, he acknowledged that
such an attempt was foredoomed to failure, for it seemed “[…] impossible to express these
[affinities, F.M.] in a plane chart”86. This statement is crucial for understanding the
developments of the time. As a result of his own attempts to preserve the scala naturae as
universal principle for natural order, Hermann finally realized that it was impossible to depict
the natural system within two dimensions. This was not only problematic for his own work but
also rendered the general inadequacy of ways of representing nature within a two-dimensional
setting visible. Not only did the linearity of the scale prove to be insufficient to explain the
order of nature but also the two-dimensional approach.

As a further consequence, Hermann contemplated on three-dimensional concepts to fully

represent the order of nature. He roughly outlined his ideas about a system wherein every single
species would be written on little cards set up in a complex structure and connected by thin
chains or various kinds of threads to show the various relations and affinities. Hermann’s
conception of the possibility of such a three-dimensional setting is pointed out in an earlier
passage in his commentary. Discussing the problem of intermediary forms and the difficult
distinction of species, he referred to Hermann Samuel Reimarus, who, in 1760, had commented
on the zoophytes and the Linnaean classification in his book Angefangene Betrachtungen über
die besondern Arten der thierischen Kunsttriebe. In a metaphorical analogy with nature as a
rolling landscape (and thus a three-dimensional space) he tried to explain how the concept of
classification goes hand in hand with the notion of gradual intermediates. Comparing the
realms of nature with hills in this landscape, on which the single species are placed, he stated:

Genera, which we see as a whole, can be distinguished clearly enough. But if we

just have observed single species on different sides of the hill, we cannot decide
yet whether they belong to one genus or to different genera, and therefore we
often cannot be sure either in the bordering valley, if our knowledge is limited,
whether a species found there belongs to one hill or the other.87

86
“[…] in uno chartae plano eas [affinitates, F.M.] exprimere nobis impossibile videat“. HERMANN, Tabula, p.
33. Author’s translation.
87
“Gattungen, die wir im Ganzen übersehen, sind deutlich genug zu unterscheiden. Wenn wir aber nur an den
verschiedenen Seiten des Hügels einzelne Arten beobachtet haben, so können wir noch nicht entscheiden, ob sie

33
Faced with the difficulties of displaying all the various affinities by connecting lines, Hermann
also mentioned this passage, calling Reimarus’s approach a “[…] very beautiful […]
comparison”88. Furthermore, he briefly entertained the idea of an allegorical representation of
the natural world as a landscape with rivers, streams and pathways to depict the relations and
affinities.89 Even though Hermann left it at that, this consideration can be related to his thoughts
about a three-dimensional display of natural affinities.

In summary, it can be stated that these deliberations are quite remarkable in so far as they
distinctly reveal the shift in the prevailing notion of nature which took place not only in
Hermann’s thinking but can also be ascertained in other works during these decades of the
eighteenth century. The concept of the universal scale of beings underwent a substantial change
from the 1750s onwards. In order to address and solve the problems caused by the
inconsistencies of the scale and the contraries between the theoretical concept and the empirical
evidence, the advocates of the traditional idea of the scala naturae like Hermann tried to alter
the original conception.

The most evident of these alterations was the spatial expansion of the scale. Leaving the
linearity of the Leibnizian/Bonnetian scale behind, Hermann not only expanded the scale into
the second dimension by creating his Tabula as a network but also – understanding the limits
of this concept – thought one step further by speculating about three-dimensional systems to
represent the natural world. So it can be stated that by the early 1780s a new spatial notion of
nature as a system had found its way into the discussion about classification, systematics and
natural order. Nature was no longer perceived merely within the scope of a simple linear
hierarchy. In fact, for the first time naturalists of the time tried to consequently conceive the
natural order as a complex, spatial system that expanded not only into the second but also into
the third dimension.

Yet, as can be seen in the case of Hermann’s Tabula, steps towards a multidimensional notion
of nature as a system did not suffice to preserve the traditional Leibnizian concept of a
gradually continuous, unchangeable, timeless and infinite nature. Even though Hermann’s
approach clearly demonstrates the problems it was confronted with, the mere existence of an

zu einer oder zu verschiedenen Gattungen gehören, und so können wir auch im Gränzthale, wenn unser
Kenntniskreis umschränkt ist oft ungewiss seyn, ob eine daselbst angetroffene Art zu diesem oder jenem Hügel
gehöre”. REIMARUS, Hermann Samuel: Angefangene Betrachtungen über die besondern Arten der thierischen
Kunsttriebe. Hamburg 1773, p. 204. Author’s translation.
88
“[…] perpulchra […] comparatio”. HERMANN, Tabula, p. 28. Author’s translation.
89
Cf. ibid.

34
elaborate system such as the Tabula provides evidence of the fact that the fundamental concept
of the scale of beings was far from having been abandoned in the 1780s. However, and this
seems to be most remarkable in this context, almost simultaneously one of the most eminent
naturalists of his time, Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, in a rather significant change of mind,
rejected the classical concept of the scale as well as its modifications. His shift of opinion, as
shown above, occurred between the years 1779 and 1789. It seems unlikely that the fact that
Hermann published his Tabula in 1783 – which happened within this time frame – is a mere
historical coincidence. Even though there exists, at this point, no evidence that Blumenbach
was familiar with Hermann’s Tabula, it seems justifiable to assume that he was. Yet, what can
be proven is that Blumenbach not only knew Hermann but also met the naturalist in person in
the same year Hermann published his main work. In a letter from 1803 to Friedrich Ludwig
Hammer, Hermann’s son in law, Blumenbach wrote that he had admired Hermann’s
collections “[…] already 20 years ago […] when I, on my way back from Switzerland, came
through Strasbourg”90. Thus, it can be assumed that even Blumenbach was familiar with the
Tabula, Hermann’s main achievement, which provided another aspect for his criticism and the
collapse of the scala naturae.

1.5. The Comparative Method in Natural History

It has been demonstrated that the decline of the concept of the scala naturae as the prevalent
model for natural order came along with profound criticism of all kinds. However, one of the
main reasons for the collapse of the scale was the establishment of the comparative method as
leading instrument in natural history. The method of systematic comparison became central for
eighteenth-century epistemology. In his Treatise on Human Nature from 1738 David Hume,
for instance, claimed that “[a]ll kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but comparison, and a
discovery of those relations, either consistent or inconsistent, which two or more objects bear
to each other”91. Michael Eggers remarks that the method of comparison became an essential
criterion for scientificity in the eighteenth century due to its significance for the establishment

90
“[…] schon vor 20 Jahren […] da ich auf der Rückreise aus der Schweiz durch Strasburg kam“.
BLUMENBACH, Johann Friedrich: Letter to Johann Friedrich Hammer, August 5, 1803. Niedersächsische
Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen.
(2 Cod. Ms. philos. 182 : J. F. Blumenbach, 5.8.1803).
91
HUME, David: A Treatise on Human Nature And Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. London 1874, p.
375. Cf. also MEYER, Anette: Von der Wahrscheinlichkeit zur Wahrheit. Die Wissenschaft vom Menschen in
der Schottischen Aufklärung. Tübingen 2008, p. 140.

35
of order on an empirical level and to the possibility of extrapolating from parts to an entirety92.
For natural history, the comparative method became particularly relevant in the form of
comparative anatomy, yet – as will be shown later – also in other fields of knowledge
comparativism became a crucial catalyst for the emergence of new perspectives.

At the end of the seventeenth century the British physician Edward Tyson had already
published his influential work Orang-Outang, sive Homo Sylvestris: or, the Anatomy of a
Pygmie Compared with that of a Monkey, an Ape, and a Man (1699), and in the middle of the
eighteenth century the Scottish anatomist Alexander Monro, in his Essay on Comparative
Anatomy (1744), reflected upon the benefits of comparativism which mainly consisted of
conclusions about the human body the anatomist could draw from dissecting similar parts of
animals.93 Andrew Cunningham labels this approach as the “old form of comparative
anatomy”94, which was eventually replaced by the establishment of comparative anatomy as
an academic discipline by Georges Cuvier which he had developed from the 1770s onwards.95

Cuvier’s application of the comparative method was particularly essential for classificational
purposes since it perfected the methods established over the course of the century and used the
internal structures of organisms and their mutual relations rather than external appearances. By
1817 Cuvier had compiled a classification system based on his anatomical findings, which
divided the animal kingdom into four embranchements or types that were equally set side by
side. By doing this he radically broke with the traditional scala naturae and its hierarchical
linearity. Yet – in sharp contrast to Lamarck –, he outspokenly rejected the idea of
transmutation.96

However, the impact of comparative anatomy on the scale of beings and its eventual decline
cannot solely be demonstrated by using the example of Cuvier’s ultimate rejection of the
traditional concept. The Dutch anatomist Petrus Camper had already postulated his concept of
the linea facialis in his comparison of skulls of different mammals and various ethnic groups,

92
Cf. EGGERS, Michael: “Vergleichung ist ein gefährlicher Feind des Genusses.“ Zur Epistemologie des
Vergleichs in der deutschen Ästhetik um 1800. In: SCHNEIDER, Johannes Ulrich (ed.): Kulturen des Wissens
im 18. Jahrhundert. Berlin 2008, p. 629.
93
Cf. MONRO, Alexander: An Essay on Comparative Anatomy. London 1744, pp. 1-3.
94
CUNNINGHAM, Andrew: Quis custodiet ipsos custodies? Or, What Richard Owen did to John Hunter’s
Collection. In: KNOEFF, Rina/ZWIJNENBERG, Robert (eds.): The Fate of Anatomical Collections. Farnham
2015, p. 33.
95
Cf. ibid., pp. 30-31.
96
Cf. BOWLER, Evolution, pp. 109-110.

36
which was later used to constitute their position within the scala naturae.97 Even though this
approach was used to sustain the claim of a linearly ordered nature, it can be assumed that it
was the extensive application of the comparative method that prompted Hermann to deviate
from the original linearity of the scala naturae and move towards his multidimensional Tabula.
As already demonstrated before, Hermann’s approach involved the consideration of as many
characteristics as possible in order to determine the relations within the natural world, including
internal features. It was Cuvier himself who, in his Histoire des sciences naturelles from 1845,
underlined the merits of Hermann’s research and the congruities with his own comparative
anatomical findings.98 According to the German zoologist Julius Victor Carus, Hermann was
“[…] the first since Aristotle, who contemplated single features and their relations. He does
not yet enunciate the law of the correlation of parts, but he indicates how the form of one part
of the animal body influences the form of other parts”99. Hermann’s comparative approach,
which was central for his Tabula, can, therefore, not only be seen as the foundation for the law
of correlation – which was later formulated by Cuvier100 – but also as the main trigger for his
realization that it was impossible to maintain the principles of the scala.

It has been shown above that with Hermann’s Tabula the transformation of the scale of beings
towards a multidimensional system had reached a pinnacle, yet it could not suffice to sustain
the concept of the scala naturae whose inconsistencies had increasingly became problematic.
However, despite Hermann’s multidimensional approach, this natural system was still
understood without any notion of time, something that would radically change at the beginning
of the nineteenth century.

97
Cf. NUTZ, Thomas: “Varietäten des Menschengeschlechts”. Die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in der Zeit
der Aufklärung. Köln 2009, p. 131.
98
Cf. CUVIER, Georges: Histoire des Sciences naturelles depuis leur Origine jusqu'à nos Jours, chez tous les
Peuples connus. Compléteé par T. Magdeleine de Saint-Agy. Troisième Partie. Contenant la fin de la moitié du
18e siècle en une partie du 19e. Vol. 5. Paris 1845, pp. 144-148.
99
“[…] der erste nach Aristoteles, welcher die Beziehungen der einzelnen Merkmale zu einander ins Auge faßt.
Er spricht zwar noch nicht direct das Gesetz der Correlation der Theile aus, weist aber darauf hin, wie die Form
eines Theiles des Thierkörpers die Form anderer Theile beeinflußt“. CARUS, Julius Victor: Geschichte der
Zoologie bis auf Joh. Müller und Ch. Darwin. Munich 1872, p. 543.
100
Cf. QUERNER, Hermann, p. 660.

37
2. A Matter of Time

2.1. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck – A New Approach

2.1.1. Back to the Scale

Towards the nineteenth century a thoroughly different approach to the subject can be
ascertained. At the very beginning of the century the famous naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck
presented his ideas about the natural world, which are now often regarded as being the first
milestone towards a Darwinian theory of evolution. In a somehow teleological interpretation,
nineteenth-century evaluations in particular understood Lamarck as the true, yet in many ways
mistaken, predecessor of Charles Darwin and of evolutionary thought. The judgement made by
Darwin’s controversial advocate in Germany, Ernst Haeckel, is typical of this perception: “In
the vanguard of the French natural philosophy is Jean Lamarck […]. The immortal glory will
be his for having accomplished a theory of descent as an independent theory for the first time,
establishing it as the natural philosophical foundation for biology as a whole”101. The
difficulties with regards to this point of view are obvious. It goes without saying that this
passage can definitely not be seen as a historical analysis, since it was written by a naturalist
and outspoken advocate of Darwin’s theory. Yet, the underlying view had considerable
influence on the historiographic interpretation of Lamarck’s work and led to “one-sided
approaches”102 to the subject, as, for instance, Ernst Mayr states.

However, even these attempts to overcome this one-sidedness are faced with the difficulty of
Darwin’s omnipresence. It seems almost impossible to write about Lamarck without even
mentioning Darwin. As a consequence, most historiographical examinations still set Lamarck
in relation to Darwin or, as in Mayr’s case, show presentistic tendencies. For this investigation,
Lamarck’s concept will not be analysed in respect of its relation to Darwin’s theory of descent,
even though the relevance of Lamarck’s contribution to the development of evolutionary
thought seems to be indisputable. Instead, there are two major aspects that need to be taken
into consideration concerning the current subject: firstly, Lamarck’s concept of natural

101
“An der Spitze der französischen Naturphilosophie steht Jean Lamarck […]. Ihm wird der unsterbliche Ruf
bleiben, zum ersten Male die Descendenztheorie als wissenschaftliche Theorie ersten Ranges durchgeführt und
als die naturphilosophische Grundlage der ganzen Biologie gestellt zu haben”. HAECKEL, Ernst: Natürliche
Schöpfungsgeschichte. Gemeinverständliche wissenschaftliche Vorträge über die Entwickelungslehre im
Allgemeinen und diejenige von Darwin, Goethe und Lamarck im Besonderen, über die Anwendung derselben
auf den Ursprung des Menschen und andere damit zusammenhängende Grundfragen der Naturwissenschaft.
Berlin 1870, p. 98. Author’s translation.
102
MAYR, Ernst: Lamarck Revisited. In: Journal of the History of Biology, Vol. 5/1 (Spring 1972), p. 55.

38
development and mutability and, secondly, his situatedness in eighteenth-century theories and
concepts of nature.

Earlier examinations of Lamarck’s philosophy of nature found that the fundamental

presumptions for his concept of natural order were those of a continuous scale of beings and
those that emphasized the linear character of his notion of natural order.103 In his Système des
Animaux sans Vertèbres from 1801 Lamarck outlined his notion of nature as a linear series of
forms:

Indeed, first considering the simplest animal organization that gradually ascends
to one that is the most complex, like from the monad, which is, so to speak, just
an animated point, up to the mammals, and among them up to man, there is
obviously a nuanced gradation in the structure of the organization of all animals
[…].104

In the light of the aforesaid, these lines appear rather unambiguous. Following the basic
principles of the scala naturae, even Lamarck understood nature as a continuous graduation.
In his first major work, his three-volume Flore françoise, Lamarck had already talked about
species of plants as links in a chain,105 and the plant kingdom as a “chaîne admirablement
graduée”106. Considering the fact that Lamarck published his Flore in 1778, it is not surprising
that he followed the idea of the scale, being the leading concept of that time. However, it is
remarkable that he still held onto it more than 20 years later, even though many of his
contemporaries had already outspokenly dismissed its validity. Nevertheless, following his
deliberations, it soon becomes clear that Lamarck’s notion of a linear, gradually ordered nature
distinctly differs from that of the classic concept of the scale of beings.

Shortly after making this basic assumption quoted above, Lamarck outlined his ideas of a
graduated natural order, stating that he did not “ […] intend to speak about the existence of a
linear, regular series between the species and genera: such a series does not exist [sic!]”.

103
Cf. BURKHARDT, Richard W.: The Spirit of System. Lamarck and Evolutionary Biology. Cambridge 1977,
pp. 52-53.
104
“En effet, en considérant d’abord l’organisation animale la plus simple, pour s’élever ensuite graduellement
jusqu’à celle qui est la plus composée, comme depuis la monade qui, pour ainsi dire, n’est qu’un point animé,
jusqu’aux animaux à mamelles, et parmi eux jusqu’à l’homme, il y a évidemment une gradation nuancée dans
la composition de l’organisation de tous les animaux […]”. LAMARCK, Jean-Baptiste: Système des Animaux
sans Vertèbres: ou, Tableau général des classes, des ordres et des genres de ces animaux. Paris 1801, p. 16.
Author’s translation. Emphasis in the original.
105
Cf. LAMARCK, Jean-Baptiste de: Flore françoise ou description succincte de toutes les plantes qui croissent
naturellement en France. Vol. 1. Paris 1778, p. XC.
106
Ibid., p. LI.

39
Instead, he talked about an “almost regularly graduated series within the principal masses,
such as the large families” 107. Interestingly enough, an almost one-to-one version of this very
passage can be found in Lamarck’s Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivants108 from
1802, which reveals the relevance of the underlying assumptions for Lamarck himself. The
chapter heading of this later version of the paragraph already outlines his main presumptions:
“The series that constitutes the animal chain lies in the distribution of the masses and not in
that of individuals and species”109. Then he clarified the quite inconclusive term ‘masses’,
defining it as the “principal systems of recognized organisation that give rise to observed
classes and large families”110. The first major difference to the scala naturae can clearly be
determined in this assertion: The original eighteenth-century concept of the scale was – as
shown above – based on a continuous series of either individual organisms or species.
Lamarck’s approach, on the other hand, was an entirely new one. He rejected the idea of a
universal gradation of single organisms within species and genera and assumed a linear series
based on larger classificational groups. This kind of series not only differed from the
Leibnizian, respectively Bonnetian, concept but also from Lamarck’s own thoughts expressed
in his Flore Françoise – wherein he had referred to species as links in a chain –, thus revealing
a significant shift of opinion.

Another major deviation from the original chain of beings can be found in this paragraph.
Claiming that this “[…] series most assuredly exists […]”, Lamarck also stated that it was to
be found “either in animals or in plants”111. What is crucial in this assertion is Lamarck’s
wording which implies a significant novelty in comparison to the classic scale of beings. To
fully understand this particular aspect it is necessary to first have a look at his famous
Philosophie zoologique from 1809, in which he extensively expounded his ideas of mutability.
In distinct contrast to the idea of a single continuous linearity that comprised all natural forms,
Lamarck clearly set boundaries between the three kingdoms of minerals, plants and animals.

107
“[…] je n’entends point parler de l’existence d’une série linéaire, régulière dans les intervalles des espèces et
des genres : une pareille série n’existe pas ; mais je parle d’une série presque régulièrement graduée dans les
masses principales, telles que les grand familles”. LAMARCK, Système, p. 17. Author’s translation.
108
LAMARCK, Jean-Baptiste: Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivants. Paris 1802, p. 39.
109
“La série qui constitue l’échelle animale réside dans la distribution des masses, et non dans celle des individus
et des espèces”. Ibid. Author’s translation.
110
“[…] les principaux systêmes d’organisation reconnus, qui donnent lieu aux classes et aux grandes familles
observées”. Ibid. Author’s translation.
111
”[La] série très assurément existante, soit dans les animaux, soit dans les végétaux […] ”. Ibid. Author’s
translation.

40
Not only did he clearly divide nature into living and non-living beings, he also sharply
separated the realm of plants from the realm of animals.

Whereas it had been one of the main goals of eighteenth-century natural history to find
connecting intermediaries between the three kingdoms, Lamarck defined the kingdoms of
plants and animals as separate realms of the natural world. His clear distinction was mainly
based on aspects of irritability and motion. By defining animals as organized, partly or
completely irritable bodies, capable of performing sudden movements, he distinctly set them
apart from plants as organized bodies neither irritable nor capable of moving.112 Therefore, he
also outspokenly opposed to the concept of intermediary forms which were thought to connect
plants and animals, claiming that it was “[…] quite as absurd to call compound animals by the
name of plant-animals, as it would be to call compound plants by the name of animal-
plants”113. His rejection of these intermediaries came along with harsh and rather polemic
criticism of eighteenth-century natural history: “If the name of zoophyte were given a century
ago to compound animals of the class of polyps, the error was excusable; the low state of
knowledge then existing about animal nature made this term less obnoxious”114.

As a consequence of this division, Lamarck abandoned one of the essential ideas of the original
scala naturae, that is to say its universal uniformity and unilinearity that comprised all nature.
By rejecting the intermediary class of zoophytes, the metaphorical chain lost some of its links:

All known living bodies are sharply divided into two special kingdoms, based in
the essential differences which distinguish animals from plants; and in spite of
what has been said I am convinced that these two kingdoms do not really merge
into one another at any point, and consequently that there are no animal-plants,
as implied by the word zoophyte, nor plant-animals.115

For Lamarck, nature did not constitute one single and infinite scale of beings but at least two
independent series of animals and plants that did not show any connections, as had been
assumed by the naturalists of the previous century. Suddenly the universal chain was virtually
cut in half.

112
Cf. LAMARCK, Jean-Baptiste: Zoological Philosophy. Translated, with an introduction, by Hugh Elliot.
London 1914. Vol. II, p. 195.
113
Ibid., p. 200.
114
Ibid.
115
LAMARCK, Jean-Baptiste: Zoological Philosophy. Vol. I. London 1914, p. 51.

41
Even though Lamarck had suggested the existence of two different series of beings, one for
plants and one for animals, which independently stood next to each other, he held on to the
strict linearity of the natural order as it was already originally assumed in the concept of the
scala naturae. In his Système des Animaux sans Vertèbres he emphasized the linear nature of
the natural world, rejecting those systems which had altered the original scale in the centuries
before. He disagreed with those naturalists who had depicted species “[…] like different points
of a geographical map or a map of the world” and regarded the natural forms as connected “in
the manner of a reticulation”116. He also included almost the same passage in his Philosophie
zoologique eight years later, stating that the idea of a network-like natural system “[…] is
clearly a mistake”117.

Interestingly enough, in his Recherches from 1802 Lamarck continued his criticism. Similar
to his remarks in his Système, he rejected the idea of a reticular natural system, “[…] which
seemed to be sublime to some moderns, and which Professor Hermann has tried to
accredit”118. It is not surprising that Lamarck was familiar with Hermann’s system, since the
latter, having died two years before, had been in correspondence with many eminent members
of the scientific community in Paris. This does not only prove that Hermann was better known
and more renowned in the scientific community than assumed but also demonstrates the
significance of his Tabula concerning the development of the life sciences in the early 1800s,
which will be shown later. Lamarck, dismissing Hermann’s approach of a two-dimensional
system, turned back to the original linearity of the scale, but altered it significantly in order to
establish his own theory as presented in the Philosophie zoologique.

Although claiming that “[…] the list of living bodies should form a series, at least as regards
the main groups; and not a branching net-work […]”119 and thus, constituting a linear order
of larger animal classes and families, Lamarck was fully aware of the fact that some parts of
nature – that is to say certain species or genera – showed specific and unique features, making
it impossible to arrange them in a fully linear manner. Consequently, he used to speak of these
deviations as “[…] side branches whose ends are truly isolated points”120. Prima facie this

116
“[…] sembable aux différens points d’une carte de Géographie ou d’une Mappe-monde […]” ; “[…] en
manière de réticulation […]”. LAMARCK, Systéme, p. 17. Author’s translation.
117
LAMARCK, Philosophy I, p. 58.
118
“[…] qui a paru sublime à quelques modernes, et que le professeur Herman avoit essayé d’accréditer”.
LAMARCK, Recherches, p. 40. Author’s translation.
119
LAMARCK, Philosophy I, p. 57.
120
“[…] ramifications latérales dont les extrémités sont des points véritablement isolés”. LAMARCK, Système,
p. 17; LAMARCK, Recherches, p. 39. Author’s translation.

42
approach appears to be rather illogical, since the supposition of lateral branches seems to
contradict the general assumption of a linear series of forms. In this regard the crucial factor is
the difference between the distinct levels of classification. Lamarck constituted the linearity –
derived from the scala naturae – only for the superordinate categories such as families or
classes, whereas the subordinate categories of genera and species showed these lateral
branches. This specific differentiation is directly linked to the certainly most significant aspect
of Lamarck’s theory: the assumption of change. The main features of Lamarck’s theory will
be outlined in the following.

2.1.2. A Theory of Natural Change

Lamarck’s basic assumption was, as shown above, the linear order of natural forms. Similar to
the ideas of the advocates of the traditional scala naturae, he understood this order as the
reflection of “nature’s plan”121. However, for Lamarck this order did not exclusively exist
because it followed the divine plan of Creation – even though he assumed a higher being122 –,
but was the result “[…] d’une loi constante de la nature”123, of a constant law of nature. The
fact that the idea of the natural chain was both the underlying principle of and the starting point
for Lamarck’s theory of change becomes evident in a passage at the beginning of chapter VI
of his Philosophie:

We must recognise that the general series of animals arranged according to their
natural affinities is a series of special groups which result from different systems
of organisation employed by nature; and that these groups are themselves
arranged according to the decreasing complexity of organisation, so as to form a
real chain.124

Two points in this passage are important: first, the ‘natural affinities’ as constitutive ordering
criteria for the natural series, and second, the use of the term ‘degradation’. The notion of
‘affinities’ refers directly to ordering principles of the scala naturae based on mutual
similarities, whereas the concept of ‘degradation’ reveals – as will be shown later – a
Buffonian tradition.

The crucial point in Lamarck’s theory, however, is not that nature forms a regular, linear chain,
but that it shows distinct irregularities in its degeneration from the most complex to the simplest

121
LAMARCK, Philosophy I, p. 68.
122
Cf. ibid., p. 36.
123
LAMARCK, Jean-Baptiste: Philosophie zoologique. Vol. 1. Paris 1809, p. 130.
124
LAMARCK, Philosophy I, p. 68.

43
organisms. For Lamarck the perfect gradation of the scale existed only in theory, as a superior
principle. The universal order of the scale was, so to speak, the blueprint of nature, whereas
nature itself with its observable divergences and irregularities could be seen as the realization
of this scheme:

It is obvious that, if nature had given existence to none but aquatic animals and if
all these animals had always lived in the same climate, the same kind of water,
the same depth etc.,etc., we should then no doubt have found a regular and even
continuous gradation in the organisation of these animals.125

To put it straight, Lamarck assumed an essential difference between how nature ‘should be’
and how the observable natural world actually ‘was’: Nature would be a regular chain if it was
not for reasons and mechanisms he sought to explain.

Another essential aspect of Lamarck’s approach that needs to be clarified is his use of the term
‘degradation’, which implied a certain direction of development, that is to say from perfection
to imperfection and from complexity to simplicity. This notion is closely related to Buffon’s
concept of degeneration, which he expressed in the section De la dégénération des Animaux
in the 14th volume of his Histoire naturelle from 1766.126 His basic assumption was that, due
to exterior influences, animals would degenerate to inferior forms. In his – in many respects
contradictory – approach Buffon exemplified his theory by mentioning animals found in
America which he assumed to be degenerated forms of species of the Old World. In his view,
the transformation of these species was always one to the worse and could never lead to
perfection; to him, domesticated animals as well as species of the Old World were inferior to
their original forms.127 As Buffon’s disciple, Lamarck was, naturally, familiar with his
mentor’s concepts and integrated them in his own theory. Lamarck’s usage of the concept of
degradation can be seen analogous to Buffon’s concept of degeneration in terms of the
direction of the development. Nevertheless, even though he used this idea as the starting point
for his deliberations, he did not hold onto Buffon’s original assumptions of degenerative
change. In a central passage of his Philosophie he stated that

[t]his degradation follows from the fixed plan of nature, and is at the same time a
result of our following her in the inverse direction; for if we followed her actual

125
Ibid., p. 69.
126
Cf. BUFFON, Georges-Louis Leclerc: Histoire Naturelle Générale et particulière […]. Vol. 14. Paris 1766, pp.
311-374.
127
Cf. ROGER, Jacques: Buffon: A Life in Natural History. Translated by Sarah Lucille Bonnefoi. Ithaka 1997,
pp. 300-301.

44
 order, if, that is to say, we passed along the general series of animals from the
most imperfect to the most perfect, […] we should find a growing complexity
and we should see animal faculties successively increasing in number and
perfection.128

Contrary to his teacher’s view, Lamarck assumed a development towards perfection, which
caused the anomalies in the gradual series of animals.

As for as the mechanisms of this change were concerned, Lamarck identified two general laws:
the first law said that the frequent use of an organ led to a strengthening and enlargement of
the said part, just like the disuse of any organ would, on the contrary, cause its deterioration
and, ultimately, its disappearance. The second law then said that each of these acquired changes
of organs was passed on to the following generation.129 Lamarck traced these changes back to
fundamental causes: the use or disuse of organs was determined by certain habits and by
lifestyle, which were again influenced by one central factor, namely environment.

The role of the environment in Lamarck’s theory is interpreted quite controversially. Ernst
Mayr remarks that the direct effect of the environment on natural transformation was wrongly
claimed to be a cornerstone of Lamarck’s theory.130 Even though Mayr might be right in the
sense that Lamarck did not claim that the environment actively modified organisms,131 the
importance of environmental factors within Lamarckian transformism is, nevertheless,
undeniable: “[…] great alterations in the environment of animals lead to great alterations in
their needs, and these alterations in their needs necessarily lead to others in their activities”132.
Although the environment is not the sufficient reason for change, it still is the initial cause for
any potential change. The hackneyed example of the giraffe and its neck that would grow
longer and longer due to its attempts to reach higher hanging leaves, which Lamarck provided
in his Philosophie,133 is just one model he used in order to illustrate these mechanisms and the
interaction between environment and habits. Another quite familiar example provided by
Lamarck is that of the different races of domesticated dogs. Assuming an original wolf-like
race, he explained the multitude of dog-varieties with the man-made distribution of dogs across
the world. Exposed to different climates and demands challenging their skills and behaviour,

128
LAMARCK, Philosophy I, p. 72.
129
Cf. ibid., p. 113.
130
Cf. MAYR, Lamarck, p. 57.
131
Cf. LAMARCK, Philosophy I, p. 107.
132
Ibid.
133
Cf. ibid., p. 122.

45
the original dogs became transformed into various races.134 It is no coincidence that these
deliberations are reminiscent of Buffon’s geographical Table de l’Ordre des Chiens (see
chapter 1).

Taking these factors into consideration, Lamarck developed a distinct concept of natural
change that had formed the observable world. It stood in marked contrast to the traditional
concept of nature conveyed through the original scala naturae. According to him, nature, as it
presented itself, was not the result of a single act of Creation which had brought forth
immutable species with unchanging faculties, set into a predetermined environment they were
created for. Instead, he understood nature as the result of a development subject to specific
laws:

Nature has produced all the species of animals in succession, beginning with the
most imperfect or simplest, and ending her work with the most perfect, so as to
create a gradually increasing complexity of organization; these animals have
spread at large throughout all the habitable regions of the globe, and every species
has derived from its environment the habits that we find in it and the structural
modifications which observation shows us.135

Lamarck not only presumed that nature was able to change but also considered this mutability
as the underlying mechanism for the whole of nature and its creatures. To him, all complex
organisms were not the result of one initial Creation but of a continuous development impelled
by a change of habits and needs caused by environmental influences. However, he was not the
first to assume some kind of natural change. Richard W. Burkhardt, quite legitimately, argues
that Lamarck’s theory of natural change “[…] provided a natural history of organic forms in a
special, eighteenth-century sense”136, as he believed development or change to be an
interaction between a natural course and outer circumstances affecting this natural course – just
like Rousseau, Smith, Hume or Malthus had treated the subject of change.137 In the following,
a short account of the ideas of change, which emerged over the course of the eighteenth century,
will be given.

134
Cf. ibid., pp. 110-111.
135
Ibid., p. 126.
136
Burkhardt, Spirit, p. 145.
137
Cf. ibid.

46
 2.2. Ideas of Change in Eighteenth-Century Thought

2.2.1. The Count and the New World – Buffon’s Concept of Degeneration

The fact that different notions, ideas and concepts concerning natural change and the mutability
of species emerged during the eighteenth century has already been discussed extensively,
especially in the context of the historical analysis of Darwin's theory of evolution and its
origins. For the purposes of this investigation the focus will be set on concepts of
transformation that are related to the idea of the prevalent scala naturae in particular.

It has repeatedly been stated that the scale of beings was basically a concept that did not leave
room for any kind of change, as it was constituted as an infinite gradual continuum.
Accordingly, even for Hermann any kind of change within the natural world was unimaginable.
In 1775, for instance, he published a review of Buffon’s Histoire naturelle des Oiseaux wherein
he outspokenly rejected Buffon’s concept of change under geographical influences, stating that
“[H]e [Buffon, F.M.] still has a wrong concept of the genera and thinks that all species of a
genus may originally come from one stem and have just accidentally changed through the
influence of climate”138. Buffon, as already mentioned above, had developed the idea of a
degenerative transformation of species. It is somehow difficult to grasp Buffon’s concept of
natural change as a whole since it is not formulated in one coherent treatise. Instead, his
deliberations concerning the mutability of natural forms are integrated in various parts in his
36-volume Histoire naturelle and are in many cases quite contradictory.

Buffon assumed four major influences causing natural change: geographical or climatic
changes, nutrition, human intervention in the form of domestication or breeding and
hybridization of individuals of different species.139 The possibilities for these alterations,
however, were thought to be very limited. According to Rheinberger, Buffon’s use of the term
dégénération implies not only the direction of the development – that is to say deterioration of
the original organism – but also its limits. In the course of this degeneration, any deviation
from the original type was only possible to some extent, namely as some sort of deflection.140

138
“Aber er hat noch immer einen unrichtigen Begriff von diesen Geschlechtern, und meynt, alle Gattungen eines
Geschlechts könnten wohl ursprünglich von einem Stamm herkommen, und nur zufälligerweise, durch den
Einfluß des Himmelsstrichs, sich so verändert haben“. HERMANN, Histoire. In: BECKMANN, Bibliothek, pp.
33-34. Author’s translation.
139
Cf. TOEPFER, Wörterbuch, p. 487.
140
Cf. RHEINBERGER, Hans-Jörg: Buffon: Zeit, Veränderung und Geschichte. In: History and Philosophy of
the Life Sciences, Vol. 12/2 (1990), p. 211.

47
This assumption is closely related to his concept of a moule intérieur, an internal mould that
he believed determined the internal and external forms of organisms. This mould, which was
passed on to the descendant generations in the course of reproduction served him as explanation
for his epigenetic ideas of generation: in combination with a constituted – somehow Newtonian
– force, matter arranged according to this mould and thus formed the organism. Yet it remained
unexplained what this internal mould actually was.141 Any alteration of an organism had to be
in line with the internal mould and was, therefore, limited.

But despite these limits, the idea of change played quite an important role in Buffon’s natural
philosophy. In his reflections on animal degeneration he expressed the idea that the two
hundred different species of quadrupeds he described in his Histoire naturelle originated from
merely thirteen species through degeneration. Besides, in a later supplement to his Histoire, he
raised the question whether all species had always been the same, and he admitted to the
possibility of extinction.142 Especially the latter seems surprising, since Buffon is regarded as
one of the advocates of the scale of beings in his campaign against the Linnaean
classification,143 and he clearly expressed his sympathies for this model. In the first chapter of
his Histoire des Animaux he claimed, for instance, that

[…] there is no absolute and essential difference between animal and vegetable
kindoms; but that nature proceeds by degrees and imperceptible nuances from the
most perfect to the most imperfect animal and from there to the vegetable: hence
the fresh water polypus may be regarded as the last of animals, and the first of
plants.144

This passage not only strikingly reveals the distinct characteristics of the scala naturae but also
shows Buffon’s perception of the direction of this alleged series. His use of the term
dégénération suggests that Buffon’s concept of nature was ruled by his notion of descent. In
Buffon’s perception nature did not rise from the simplest to the most complex or perfect

141
Cf. ROE, Shirley A.: Life, Matter, and Generation: Eighteenth-Century Embryology and the Haller-Wolff-
Debate. Cambridge 2003, pp. 16-18.
142
Cf. RHEINBERGER, Buffon,p p. 209-210.
143
Cf. JAHN, Ilse: Biologische Fragestellungen in der Epoche der Aufklärung (18. Jh.). In: Id. (ed.), Geschichte,
p. 248.
144
BUFFON, Georges-Louis Leclerc, Natural History, General and Particular. Translated by William Smellie.
Vol. 2. London 1791, p. 8 (= BUFFON, Histoire Naturelle, Vol 2. (1749), pp. 8-9). For the significant part which
the discovery of the polyp had on Buffon’s natural philosophy, also in terms of his materialistic approaches, see
DAWSON, Virginia P.: The Limits of Observation and the Hypotheses of Georges Louis Buffon and Charles
Bonnet. In: GARBER, Elizabeth (ed.): Beyond History of Science. Essays in Honor to Robert E. Schofield.
Cranbury 1990, pp. 107-126.

48
entities, as it did in Bonnet’s view, but took the opposite direction on this metaphorical ladder.
As already indicated above, this approach can also be found in Lamarck’s Philosophie as a
methodological move, again inverting the direction of the scale.

Concerning his ideas of natural change, Buffon’s case is quite specific. Even though the
influential French naturalist was already regarded as one of the first evolutionists in the second
half of the nineteenth century,145 his ideas can only to some extent be understood in this context.
His natural philosophy included a distinct notion of change that had formed the observable
natural world. However, as Peter J. Bowler points out, this notion was very limited. Despite
Buffon’s idea that degeneration had put forth various organisms, he nonetheless insisted on the
immutability of the classificational class of genera. Only within these genera modifications
were possible, but also only to some extent.146 So Buffon’s interpretation of the scale of beings
comprised elements of both mutability and immutability. This was doubtless quite
contradictory to the traditional view of the scala. In addition to this, Buffon also rejected
another substantial aspect of the scale: its theological foundation. Bowler, for instance,
underlines Buffon’s hostile position towards the Christian doctrine of Creation. Instead, Buffon
tried to provide a materialistic explanatory model of the natural world.147

As a result of his collaboration with the English naturalist John Turberville Needham, Buffon
developed his own view of spontaneous generation. Needham had conducted experiments to
allegedly prove that life or organic matter could develop from inorganic matter. In combination
with his notion of the moule intérieur, Buffon believed that over the course of the formation of
the earth – which he divided into several epochs – life (including higher organisms) had come
into existence due to spontaneous generation. Organic particles had assembled and organized
themselves – in accordance with the internal moulds – to the original forms of organisms.
Subsequently, by means of degeneration provoked by environmental factors, nutrition, climate
and hybridization, all present creatures had developed from these original types.148 This was,
of course, in absolute contrast to the preformistic concepts of the time.

145
See for instance BUTLER, Samuel: Evolution, Old & New; Or, the Theories of Buffon, Dr. Erasmus Darwin
and Lamarck, as compared with that of Charles Darwin. London 1879.
146
Cf. BOWLER, Peter J.: Evolution. The History of an Idea. Berkeley 2009, p. 80.
147
Cf. ibid., p. 75.
148
Cf. ibid., pp. 79-80.

49
2.2.2. Only Matter Matters – The Materialists and Change

Buffon’s ideas were highly influential, especially, of course, within the Parisian scientific
community and, above all, on the French materialists. Without wanting to go into further detail
concerning the various materialistic concepts of the French philosophes and encyclopédistes,
some of these ideas need to be considered for the purpose of this analysis. Whilst, for instance,
Voltaire – as mentioned at the beginning – actively rejected the scale of beings, other eminent
thinkers in his sphere held onto basic ideas of the concept. One of them was Denis Diderot,
which becomes obvious in a passage of his Rêve de D’Alembert from 1769. In his fictional
dialogue he revealed his thoughts about the natural world in the form of dreams of his friend
D’Alembert:

Every animal is more or less man, every mineral more or less plant, every plant
more or less animal. In nature there is nothing definite. […] Don’t you agree that
in nature everything holds together and that it is impossible that there is a gap in
the chain?149

Obviously, the image of the chain in this passage is used in a rather metaphorical sense without
many of the implications of the traditional concept, yet the notion of a chain-like, connected
universe is still prevalent here. At an earlier point in the text we find a passage wherein Diderot
expressed his opinion about natural change:

Who knows the races of animals that have preceded us? Who knows the races of
animals that will come after us? Everything changes, everything passes, there is
nothing that rests but the whole. The world begins and ends incessantly; it is in
every moment at its beginning and at its end.150

This part clearly indicates that not only the notion of a universal chain but also the idea of
natural mutability was already present in Diderot’s natural philosophy. Contrary to the view of
a fixed, immutable nature presumed in the physico-theological interpretation of the chain,
Diderot – inspired by Buffon’s assertions – saw nature as a dynamic system of matter.151 The

149
“Tout animal est plus ou moins homme; tout minéral est plus ou moins plante; toute plante est plus ou moins
animal. Il n'y a rien de précis en nature […]. Ne convenez-vous pas que tout tient en nature et qu'il est impossible
qu'il y ait un vide dans la chaîne?”. DIDEROT, Denis: Œuvres complètes: Comprenant ce qui a été publié à
diverses Époques et tous les Manuscrits inédits conservés à la Bibliothèque de l'Ermitage: revues sur les éditions
Originals. Edited by Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux. Vol. 2. Paris 1875, pp. 138-139. Author’s translation.
150
“Qui sait les races d'animaux qui nous ont précédés ? qui sait les races d'animaux qui succéderont aux
nôtres ? Tout change, tout passe, il n'y a que le tout qui reste. Le monde commence et finit sans cesse ; il est à
chaque instant à son commencement et à sa fin”. Ibid., p. 132. Author’s translation.
151
Cf. BOWLER, Evolution, p. 83.

50
influence of Buffon’s natural philosophy on Diderot can be clearly seen in another passage.
Deliriously pondering on the course of nature D’Alembert (or rather Diderot) ventures the guess
that, in a kind of circularity, all life could revert to a mass of unorganized matter. Consequently,
he asks:

Who knows which new races could again result from such a great mass of
sensible and living points? Why not one single animal? What was the elephant in
its origin? Maybe an enormous animal as it appears to us, maybe an atom, because
both are equally possible […]. The elephant, this enormous organized mass, a
sudden product of fermentation! Why not?152

This is a testimony of Diderot’s clear commitment to Buffon’s and Needham’s concept of

spontaneous generation; preliminary to this passage he referred to Needham’s experiments and
Voltaire’s ridiculing remarks on this matter. The example of the elephant that suddenly comes
into existence is a direct reference to Buffon’s assumption that even complex organisms could
emerge through processes of spontaneous generation or fermentation. Needham’s experiments
served Diderot as proof that nature was not subject to a pre-established stability and order but
was rather dynamic and changeable.153 As Bowler justly claims, the issue of spontaneous
generation was the materialists’ prime concern that only secondarily led to assumptions about
the mutability of organisms. Therefore, neither Diderot nor for instance Paul Henry Thiry
D’Holbach, who had also expressed similar ideas in his Système de la Nature, came forth with
specific elaborate theories of change. Their assumptions about the mutability of nature
remained highly speculative and of second rank. It was more the idea of life emerging from
inanimate matter that had caught their attention, as it replaced the prevalent Christian worldview
of a universe created by God.154

More specific, although not necessarily less speculative, are the ideas expressed by the
philosopher and naturalist Jean-Baptiste Robinet. He explicitly based his conjectures about
natural change on the concept of the scale of beings, interpreting it in quite a controversial
manner. In his De la nature from 1761 and his later Considérations philosophiques de la

152
“Qui sait quelle race nouvelle peut résulter derechef d'un amas aussi grand de points sensibles et vivants?
Pourquoi pas un seul animal? Qu'était l'éléphant dans son origine? Peut-être l'animal énorme tel qu'il nous
paraît, peut-être un atome, car tous les deux sont également possibles; […] L'éléphant, cette masse énorme,
organisée, le produit subit de la fermentation! Pourquoi non?”. DIDEROT, Œuvres, p.133. Author’s translation.
153
Cf. ROE, Shirley A.: The Life Sciences. In: PORTER, Roy (ed.): The Cambridge History of Science. Vol. 4.
Eighteenth-Century Science. Cambridge 2003, p. 415.
154
Cf. BOWLER, Evolution, p. 83-84.

51
gradation naturelle from 1768/9 he developed the idea of a progressive nature that climbs up
the chain of being through perfecting metamorphoses. In accordance with the traditional view
of the scala naturae, Robinet saw man on the uppermost step of the metaphorical ladder, and
thus he concluded that man was the ultimate purpose of nature due to his paramount position.
Assuming a universal prototype for all natural forms, he regarded every stage of the scale as
“[…] a study of the human form that Nature has meditated; and I think I can call the collection
of these studies the apprenticeship of Nature or the attempts of Nature that learns to make
man”155. Robinet based his assumptions on preformistic foundations. He presumed pre-existent
germs created by God that formed all existing beings in the world and were capable of
recombining in infinite varieties. These combinations, however, did not occur arbitrarily but
followed a certain teleological plan, with the ultimate goal of forming man. For Robinet, the
chain of beings was, therefore, the series of various manifestations of the prototype coming into
existence as the result of a recombination of the preformed germs.156

In his De la nature Robinet had already expressed his rather radical view of the scala naturae,
rigorously applying Leibniz’s laws of continuity, plenitude and gradation and creating a highly
speculative concept of natural progress along the scale. Yet, his strong belief in the plenitude
of nature induced him to assume the existence of creatures like fish-men, a supposition that
proved to be rather harmful for his reputation.157 In a manner quite evocative of alchemic
traditions, he also tried to demonstrate that mankind was the ultimate aim of nature as a whole,
depicting natural objects like stones or fossils that showed resemblances to human organs or
body parts.158 His ideas struck some of his contemporaries as extremely dubious. It is not
surprising that Johann Hermann, for instance, mocked at Robinet’s concept as being a mere
figment,159 remarking that “[i]t is hardly possible to invent something more childish”160.
Interestingly enough, he also mentioned Mercier, author of the fictional novel L'an deux mille

155
“[…] une étude de la forme humaine que la Nature méditoit, & je crois pouvoir appeler la collection de ces
études, l’apprentissage de la Nature, ou les essais de la Nature qui apprend à faire l’homme”. ROBINET, Jean-
Baptiste: Considérations philosophiques de la Gradation naturelle des Formes de l'Être, ou les Essais de la Nature
qui apprend à faire l'Homme. Paris 1768, p. 4. The same treatise was also published in Amsterdam as Vue
philosophique de la Gradation naturelle des Formes de l l'Être, ou les Essais de la Nature qui apprend à faire
l'Homme in the same year.
156
Cf. REILL, Hans Peter: Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment. Berkeley 2005, p. 182-183.
157
Cf. LOVEJOY, Chain, p. 269-272.
158
Cf. REILL, Vitalizing, p. 183.
159
Cf. HERMANN, Tabula, p. 16.
160
“Pueriliter fingi quid vix ultra potest”. Ibid., p. 18. Author’s translation.

52
quatre cent quarante who was not only an advocate of the concept of the scale but also a
supporter of Robinet’s ideas of progression. Hermann even cited a passage of Mercier’s book:

It was moreover remarked, that nature in all her operations, tended with energy
to the formation of man; and that labouring patiently, and even at a distance, that
important work, she endeavoured, by various essays, to arrive at the gradual term
of his perfection, which seemed to be the utmost effort of her power.161

The similarities to Robinet’s deliberations are strikingly obvious, and, above all, it is
particularly relevant that Mercier took up this kind of approach. The fact that the novel was
translated into German and English already a year after having originally been published
demonstrates that it was highly received by Mercier’s contemporaries. His remarks on natural
history are just a small part of the whole book, but the fact that Hermann commented on this
passage demonstrates that the novel was also read in this light. Robinet’s notion of change was,
as mentioned above, based on his preformistic views of generation. Another – yet quite
misleading – approach based on this concept can also be found in the late work of Charles
Bonnet.

2.2.3. Past and Future States – Charles Bonnet’s Palingénésie

As already indicated at the beginning of this study, Bonnet’s natural philosophy cannot be
described as homogeneous whatsoever. On the contrary – especially concerning the mutability
of species –, Bonnet’s opinion seems to be quite inconsistent. It was initially demonstrated that,
in his Considérations sur les Corps Organisés Bonnet declared species as absolutely
immutable. Yet, in one of his later works, namely in his Palingénésie philosophique from 1769,
he expressed intriguing thoughts which seem to be quite contradictory to the aforesaid. The
full title of this metaphysically orientated work – La palingénésie philosophique: ou Idées sur
l'état passé et sur l'état futur des êtres vivans: ouvrage destiné á servir de supplément aux
derniers écrits de l'auteur et qui contient principalement le précis de ses recherches sur le
christianisme (Philosophical palingenesis: or ideas about the past and future state of living
beings: a work meant to serve as a supplement to the latest writings of the author and that
mainly contains the summary of his research into Christianity) – already indicates Bonnet’s
main intentions. He wanted to unite his natural philosophy with Christian theology, trying to
reconcile insights and concepts of his scientific work which conflicted with principles of

161
MERCIER, Memoirs, p. 55; HERMANN, Tabula, p. 18.

53
Christian faith. Central issues of this treatise were the questions concerning the immortality of
the soul, the existence of the soul in the pre-existent germs and the doctrine of resurrection,
which was antithetic to Bonnet’s ideas of an uninterrupted gradual universe.162 In connection
with these issues Bonnet, as already implied in the title, expressed his thoughts about the ‘past
and future state’ of animals.

As a consequence of his preformistic beliefs and his notion of continuity, Bonnet assumed a
physical location of the soul in the body and “la prééxistence des Ames dans les Germes”163,
the pre-existence of the soul in the germ. He stated that not only all organs but also all faculties
of the senses potentially existed in the germs, and attributed an inherent urge of perfecting to
all living beings:

This little organic body can contain a multitude of organs, which are not destined
to develop in the present state of our globe, and which will be able to develop
when it [the globe, F.M.] will have undergone the new Revolution to which it
seems to be called to.164

This passage addresses several crucial points. The ‘little organic body’ (petit Corps organique)
represents the pre-existent germ wherein the soul is located and which contains all potential
organs. But Bonnet did not only assume the potentiality of these organs but also their capacity
to come into existence at one point, given that the world fundamentally changed in the course
of a révolution, since it was “[…] quite recognized by the most skilled Physicists that our Globe
has once been different to what it is today”165. One of these physicists who talked about
revolutions which had allegedly changed the surface of the world, was Buffon. In the initial
chapter of his Histoire naturelle, addressing the Histoire et théorie de la Terre, he remarked
that the changes the earth underwent in recent history were “[…] very minor indeed, when
compared with those important revolutions which must have taken place in those ages which

162
Cf. DÖRR, Hartmut: “Palingenesie”. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Vol. 7. Basel 1989, coll.
42.
163
BONNET, Charles: La Palingénésie philosophique: ou Idées sur l'État passé et sur l'État futur des Êtres vivans:
Ouvrage destiné á servir de supplément aux derniers Écrits de l'Auteur et qui contient principalement le précis de
ses Recherches sur le Christianisme. Vol 1. Geneva 1769, p. 103.
164
“Ce petit Corps organique peut contenir une multitude d’Organes, qui ne sont point destinés à se développer
dans l’état présent de notre Globe, & qui pourront se développer lorsqu’il aura subi cette nouvelle Révolution
à laquelle il paroît appellé“. Ibid., p. 171. Author’s translation.
165
“[…] assez reconnu par les plus habiles Physiciens, que notre Globe a été autrefois très-différemt de ce qu’il
est aujourd’hui“. Ibid., p. 173. Author’s translation.

54
immediately followed the Creation”166. Thus Bonnet seized on a notion already quite prevalent
in natural history.

Furthermore, Bonnet talked about a general perfectibility of living beings, claiming that an
animal was “[…] a perfectible Being, and perfectible to an unlimited degree”167. On the basis
of this notion, he assumed that animals in their ‘future state’ would not have “ […] the same
Form, the same Structure, the same Parts, the same consistency, the same size as we see them
in their present State. They will be as different from what they are now as the State of our Globe
will be different from its present State”168. Again, referring to the preformistic foundations of
his philosophy, he alleged the pre-existence of the “organic Principles”169 of this perfectibility
from the very beginning of the natural world. As a consequence, assuming a future state of
living beings, he concluded that animals must also have had a past state of being.

Bonnet’s deliberations about the perfectibility of living beings regarding their physical bodies
as well as their souls – in combination with his florid and sometimes indistinct style of writing
– allow a wide range of interpretation. In the late nineteenth century Bonnet’s views were
already read as some kind of (in a modern sense) evolutionary theory.170 Nevertheless, the
situation is fairly complex. On the one hand, as shown above, Bonnet’s fundamental
assumptions were the concepts of preformation and pre-existence, which intrinsically excluded
the possibility of change since every organism was already pre-existent in the germ from the
beginning of Creation. On the other hand, he expressed thoughts about past and future states of
living beings as the result of revolutions of the earth. Naturally, this latter notion can easily lead
to the presumption of rudimentary evolutionistic concepts in Bonnet’s work. In fact, the concept
expressed in his Palingénésie is more of a theory of a transmigration of the soul. In his attempt
of a synthesis of his philosophy and Christian theology Bonnet interpreted the revolutions of
the earth entirely different in comparison to, for example, Buffon.

166
BARR, J.S.: Barr’s Buffon. Buffon's Natural history: Containing a Theory of the Earth, a General History of
Man, of the brute Creation, and of Vegetables, Minerals &c. &c. From the French with notes of the Translator.
Vol. 1. London 1797, p. 15 (= BUFFON, Histoire, Vol. 1 (1749), p. 77).
167
“[…] un Etre perfectible, & perfectible dans un degré illimité”. BONNET, Palingénésie, p. 282. Author’s
translation. Emphasis in the original.
168
“[…] la même Forme, la même Structure, les mêmes Parties, la même consistance, la même grandeur que
nous leur voyons dans leur Etat actuel. Ils seront alors aussi différens de ce qu’ils sont aujourd’hui, que l’Etat
de notre Globe différera de son Etat prèsent”. Ibid., p. 184. Author’s translation.
169
“Principes organiques”. Ibid., p. 199. Author’s translation. Emphasis in the original.
170
This, for instance, can be seen by the example of WHITMAN, Charles Otis: Bonnet’s Theory of Evolution. In:
The Monist, Vol. 5/3 (April 1895), pp. 412-426. Even though Whitman intended to disprove that Bonnet’s
theory was evolutionistic, it can be gathered from this article that Bonnet was interpreted in this manner.

55
In general, it appears to be problematic to compare Bonnet’s and Buffon’s approaches in this
matter, due to their contrary attitudes towards metaphysical and theological assumptions.
Nevertheless, in order to understand the difference in their notions concerning revolutions and
change, such a comparison seems to be useful. As already shown, Buffon talked about the
significance of the revolutions which he thought had taken place in the ages that followed
Creation. So, if Bonnet had understood his revolutions in a Buffonian manner, they would have
occurred after Creation, according to the Book of Genesis. However, the naturalist offered a
unique interpretation of the occurrence of these revolutions. He claimed that they did not occur
after God had created the world, but that the Mosaic account of Creation was rather a narration
of one of these revolutions that fundamentally changed the world:

Would we invalidate the sacred Text of the Genesis if we claimed that the
Creation described by MOSES is less a real Creation than the somewhat
circumstantial story of the successive Degrees of a great Revolution, which our
globe has been submitted to and which was followed by the Production of this
multitude of diverse Beings which populate it today?171

For Bonnet the biblical Creation ‘itself’ was the last revolution that had altered the appearance
of the world. The present world was, therefore, just the state between two revolutions, both of
which were described in the Bible: Creation and the Last Judgement.172 In terms of the notion
of change, Bonnet’s approach is, therefore, quite complex. Each revolution entailed that the
soul in the indestructible pre-existent germ could unfold to a higher state of being, which had
already been potentially preformed in the germ.173 For Bonnet, these new stages of unfolding
were in no sense new Creations but merely manifestations of something that had always existed:

All the pieces of the universe are simultaneous. The EFFECTIVE WILL has
realized everything that can exist in one single act. IT does not create anymore;
but IT conserves, and this conservation is, if you like, a continuous Creation.174

171
“Infirmeroit-on le Texte sarcé de la Genese, si l’on avançoit que la Création décrite par MOYSE, est moins
une véritable Création, que le récit assez peu circonstancié des Degrés successifs d’une grande Révolution que
notre Globe subissoit alors, & qui étoit suivie de la Production de cette multitude d’Êtres divers qui le peuplent
aujourd’hui ?“. BONNET, Palingénésie, p. 173. Author’s translation. Emphasis in the original.
172
Cf. DÖRR, Palingenesie, coll. 42.
173
Cf. LOVEJOY, Chain, 285-286.
174
“La VOLONTE EFFICACE a réalisé par un seul acte, tout ce qui pouvoit lêtre. ELLE ne crée plus ; mais ELLE
conserve, & cette conservation sera, si l’on veut, une Création continuée”. BONNET, Palingénésie, pp. 246-
247. Author’s translation. Emphasis in the original.

56
As “[e]arth […] never received anything at one certain point of time that it had not possessed
at another”175, this continuous Creation could be compared with the metamorphosis of a
butterfly: currently in the state of a pupa, the world had developed from a worm and would
eventually turn into a butterfly. According to Bonnet, the world was, therefore, undergoing
more or less an ontogenetic process without ever creating anything new.176

A distinct notion of change can certainly be grasped in Bonnet’s concept, yet it had a special
position within eighteenth-century natural history. Even though he tried to conciliate
theological beliefs and notions of a mutable and progressive universe, his natural philosophy
could not provide an adequate explanatory model. Not only was it highly speculative and
inconsistent, it also neither pleased the Christian-theological proponents nor his already
somehow secularist contemporaries. It has already been stated that Bonnet’s opinion changed
essentially over his lifetime, which makes it difficult to give a distinct interpretation of his
philosophy. It has also been mentioned above that Bonnet’s understanding of nature was widely
based on Leibniz and his natural philosophy. Interestingly enough, even Leibniz’s views appear
to have been more than inconsistent in his views.

2.2.4. The ‘Other’ Leibniz

Lovejoy has already pointed out that there basically existed “ […] two Leibnizian systems of
philosophy, quite irreconcilable with one another”177. On the one hand Leibniz, who, as
demonstrated at the beginning, presumed an immutable world as a consequence of his principle
of sufficient reason. Represented by the scala naturae, the gradual, continuous and full universe
existed, together with everything it contained, as it presented itself – unchangeable and perfect.
When presuming a perfect divine being, change, by whatever means, was inconceivable. On
the other hand, Leibniz also expressed thoughts about change and progress in the natural world.
His deliberations in his Protogaea from the early 1690s – which was designed as a part of a
planned genealogical history of the Duchy of Brunswick178 – are most famous and used to

175
“La Terre […] n’a donc pas reçu dans un temps, ce qu’elle ne possédoit pas dans un autre”. Ibid., p. 253.
Author’s translation. Emphasis in the original.
176
Cf. ibid., 262.
177
LOVEJOY, p. 261.
178
Cf. SCHMEISSER, Martin: Erdgeschichte und Paläontologie im 17. Jahrhundert. Bernard Palissy, Agostino
Scilla, Nicolaus Steno und Leibniz. In: JAUMANN, Herbert (ed.): Diskurse der Gelehrtenkultur in der Frühen
Neuzeit. Ein Handbuch. Berlin 2011, p. 844.

57
demonstrate his allegedly ambivalent opinion on natural mutability.179 In this treatise, which
remained an unknown manuscript until 1749 (when it was posthumously published) Leibniz
addressed issues that would now be labelled as geological or paleontological. For instance, in
the 26th paragraph of this work he claimed that it was “[…] credible that because of these great
conversions the species of most animals have been altered”180. But despite this statement,
fundamental changes in the world were still problematic, as he stated earlier in this treatise:

I certainly know that there are some who go so far in their bold conjectures that
they claim that, since the ocean covered everything, animals, which now inhabit
the earth have once been aquatic, and little by little, leaving the element, became
amphibious, and finally, in their offspring, forgot their first home.181

This statement is interesting in so far as it gives evidence in the fact that already towards the
end of the seventeenth century ideas about the development of animals in the water had existed
and that scholars of the time like Leibniz were familiar with them. But then Leibniz made a
statement that is even more relevant for the current investigation:

But apart from the fact that they contradict with the holy writers, from which it is
a sacrilege to deviate, this opinion, taken by itself, has immense difficulties.182

This seems to be somehow contradictory. On the one hand, Leibniz considered the possibility
that species could change due to drastic environmental changes; on the other hand, he absolutely
dismissed the idea of animals having developed from aquatic creatures, since it contradicted
the biblical report. Obviously, the latter is quite a radical opinion considering the time, and it
goes further than just assuming the possibility of alteration, as it was contrary to the belief that
“God created the great sea creatures and every living creature that moves, with which the
waters swarm, according to their kinds, and every winged bird”183 on the fifth day, and then
“[…] the beasts of the earth according to their kinds and the livestock according to their kinds,

179
See for example MAYR, Ernst: The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance.
Harvard 1982, p. 326. Mayr mainly concentrates on the ahistorical question whether Leibniz’s assumptions can
be labelled as evolutionistic or not.
180
“[…] credibile est per magnas illas conuersiones etiam animaliums species plurimum immutatatas”.
LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm: Protogaea. Sive De Prima Facie Telluris et Antiquissimae Historiae Vestigiis in
Ipsis Naturae Monumentis. Leipzig 1749, p. 41. Author’s translation.
181
“Equidem haud ignore, esse quosdam, qui eo vusque licentia coniectandi, vt tegente omnia oceano animalia,
quae nunc terram inhabitant, aliquando aquatica fuisse arbitrentur, paulatimque, destituente elemento,
amphibia, psotremo in posteritate sua primas sedes dedidicisse”. Ibid., pp. 9-10. Author’s translation. Emphasis
in the original.
182
“Sed praeterquam quod ista cum sacris Scriptoribus, a quibus discedere religio est, pugnent, hypothesis ipsa
in se spectata immensis difficultatibus laborat”. Ibid. Author’s translation.
183
Gen, 1:21, ESV.

58
and everything that creeps on the ground according to its kind”184 on the sixth day of Creation.
Both the notion of development and the fact that, according to the book of Genesis, God had
created aquatic and terrestrial animals on different days of Creation were problematic for
Leibniz. Yet he conceded that some kind of change was possible, even though to a very limited
extent. In addition, he developed ideas similar to those later taken up and expressed by Bonnet
that implied the progressive ascent of the soul. However, these notions are also intrinsically
contradictory.185

In Leibniz’s philosophy we are, therefore, apparently confronted with two divergent views, the
assumption of change versus a wholly created unchangeable universe. Yet it seems that the idea
of an immutable nature prevails in his notion of nature. Somehow similar to Buffon’s ideas –
expressed half a century later – natural change was the conclusion resulting from various
observations, but nature as a whole was ‘actually’ still immutable. In the same way as Buffon’s
concept of degeneration was very limited in its possibilities, Leibniz’s idea of alteration was to
be understood only within an unchangeable universe. There might, of course, be quite a
difference between what Leibniz intended to say and how he was understood. And even though
there is no evidence that, for instance, Bonnet had read his Protogaea, the fact that the book
was not published before 1749 – at a time when various ideas of change were already around
and widely discussed – seems relevant.

Whether and how Leibniz’s vague ideas – which were absolutely contradictory to many other
aspects of his philosophy – influenced scholars like Bonnet, Buffon or the French materialists
is difficult to determine. Yet, it seems that even Leibniz had difficulties with the absolute
inflexibility of his system.

By the second half of the eighteenth century a variety of notions concerning change in nature
entered the stage, each of them conceding to various degrees of natural mutability, and most of
them still in accordance with the ideas of the scala naturae.

2.2.5. A Power of Change – Blumenbach and his Bildungstrieb

Towards the end of the eighteenth century another interesting aspect emerged. It is not
surprising that even Johann Friedrich Blumenbach took part in this debate on the mutability or
immutability of nature. In his Beyträge zur Naturgeschichte (Contributions to Natural History)

184
Gen, 1:25, ESV.
185
Cf. LOVEJOY, Chain, pp. 258-261.

59
from 1790 he commented on the ongoing discussions, stating that they had somehow gotten out
of hand. Nature, he claimed,

[…] would not go to pieces even if one species of creatures dies out, or another
is newly created, – and it is more than merely probable, that both cases have
happened before now, – and all this without the slightest danger to order, either
in the physical or in the moral world, or for religion in general.186

He added:

For my own part it is exactly in these things that I find the guidance of a higher
hand most unmistakable; so that in spite of this recognized instability of nature,
the Creation continues to going on its quiet way; and on that very account it is
my opinion that it is well worth the trouble, after such an immense deal has been
written upon the pretended changeableness of the Creation, just once to recollect
on the other hand the proofs of the great alterations in it.187

Blumenbach, as we will see later, adopted an interesting position in this debate. He can almost
be regarded as Hermann’s direct counterpart at that time, keeping in mind, of course, that he
was 14 years younger than his colleague in Strasbourg. Originally holding on to the concept of
the scala naturae, Blumenbach soon completely abandoned this model and became convinced
of the mutability of the natural world, whereas Hermann strictly advocated the concept of the
scale and the constancy of nature. Blumenbach’s assumption of a dynamic natural world,
however, had little to do with the aforementioned notions of change in regard to the scale of
beings. Blumenbach’s belief in change came along with the concept of his already mentioned
nisus formativus or Bildungstrieb, which he postulated in order to support his epigenesis and
set it against preformationism.

Besides, Blumenbach assumed revolutions of the world which changed the surface of the earth
and impelled natural changes:

After therefore that organic Creation in the Preadamite primitive epoch of our
planet had fulfilled its purpose, it was destroyed by a general catastrophe of its
surface or shell, which probably lay in ruins some time, until it was put together
again, enlived with a fresh vegetation, and vivified with a new animal Creation.
In order that it might provide such harvest, the Creator took care to allow in

186
BLUMENBACH, Johann Friedrich: Contributions to Natural History. Part the First. In: BENDYSHE, Thomas
(ed.): The Anthropological Treatises of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. Translated and Edited. London 1865, p.
282.
187
Ibid.

60
 general powers of nature to bring forth the new organic kingdoms, similar to those
which had fulfilled that object in the primitive world. Only that the formative
force [Bildungstrieb, F.M.] having to deal with materials, which must of course
have been much changed by such a general revolution, was compelled to take a
direction differing more or less from the old one in the production of new
species.188

This, of course, reminds us not only of Buffon but also, seen retrospectively, on George
Cuvier’s catastrophism of the early 1800s.189 Great revolutions or catastrophes cause massive
extinctions and reCreations, which, due to the effectiveness of the nisus, lead to alterations and
modifications in the natural world in the course of the new Creation.

However, Blumenbach’s notion of change also included a concept of degeneration, for which
domesticated animals served as an example.190 In addition to that, he also mentioned
observations of extinction, the introduction of species into new environments and general man-
made changes of nature as evidence of the changeability of nature, which he ranked amongst
the “[…] most benevolent and wisest facilities of the Creator”191. For Blumenbach, nature was
thoroughly versatile due to the virtue of the Bildungstrieb. Obviously, and this needs to be kept
in mind, he had no reason whatsoever to consider the foundational principles of the scale of
beings. Naturally, Blumenbach’s concept was highly speculative as well. His nisus formativus
was no more than a conjecture.

It is clear that – and this applies to all the other concepts presented above – this notion has
nothing to do with evolution in a nineteenth-century Darwinian sense. But this is not the point.
The relevant observation is that by the end of the eighteenth century the notion of change in
nature had already gained ground. Yet it would be wrong to put the Lamarckian theory in a
direct line of development with these other concepts, even though there is, of course, a distinct

188
Ibid., p. 287. Due to the fact that this translation is based on a later version from 1806 it slightly differs from
the original version from 1790. Nevertheless, the fundamental assumptions remained the same. For the original
version see: BLUMENBACH, Johann Friedrich: Beyträge zur Naturgeschichte. Vol 1. Göttingen 1790, pp. 24-
25.
189
The various differences between the concepts are of course significant and distinct. Cuvier’s cataclysmic theory
was based on the foundation of neptunism, assuming water as the main agent of change, whereas for
Blumenbach fire was the primary factor. And most importantly Cuvier rejected the idea of new creations, that
is to say of new species, while at the same time presuming the possibility extinction. BOWLER, Evolution, pp.
113-114.
190
Cf. BLUMENBACH, Beyträge (1790), pp. 33-36
191
“[…] zu den wohlthätigsten weisesten Einrichtungen des Schöpfers“. Ibid., p. 32. Author’s translation.

61
relation between them. What is unique to Lamarck’s theory of transmutation is one certain
aspect: continuous natural change in direct relation to time.

2.3. A Question of Time

2.3.1. Back to Lamarck

As already demonstrated above, Lamarck’s concept of natural change was formed in the first
decade of the nineteenth century, and it described nature as a progression towards perfection
along the linearity of the scala naturae. Following his teacher Buffon, he assumed a significant
impact of environmental factors on the transformation of organisms. In the course of its
ontogenesis, an organism, according to Lamarck, would acquire certain alterations of its
physique – due to the interaction between environment and behaviour – and consequently pass
these alterations on to its offspring. He resumed:

It is not the organs, that is to say, the nature and shape of the parts of an animal’s
body, that have given rise to its special habits and faculties; but it is, on the
contrary, its habits, mode and environment that have in course of the time
controlled the shape of its body, the number of and state of its organs and, lastly,
the faculties which it possesses.192

The main part of this passage emphasizes the mechanisms of use or disuse of organs –
depending on environmentally shaped behaviour – that lead to a further development or
degeneration of said parts; its essential message, however, lies in the fact that the factor ‘time’
plays a decisive role. Immediately after this paragraph, Lamarck drew the significant conclusion
that “[t]ime and a favourable environment are […] nature’s two chief methods of bringing all
her productions into existence: For her, time has no limits and can be drawn upon any
extent”193.

This notion of nature as a continuous progression over the course of time can certainly be
regarded as the central aspect of Lamarck’s theory. Beginning with the simplest forms of life
formed by spontaneous generation, nature progressively developed over time towards
perfection. Time was, in this case, not only an essential medium wherein change happened, it
also followed a linear course parallel to this progressive change (and vice versa). In short,
nature, in Lamarck’s theory, was subject to history.

192
LAMARCK, Philosophy I, p. 114.
193
Ibid.

62
He countered the argument that these changes were not empirically observable by pointing out
that

[t]here is one strong reason that prevents us from recognising the successive changes
by which known animals have been diversified and been brought to the condition in
which we observe them; it is this, that we can never witness these changes. Since we
see only the finished work and never see it in course of execution, we are naturally
prone to believe that things have always been as we see them rather than that they
have gradually changed.194

Even though not immediately obvious, this inclusion of a directional notion of time significantly
distinguishes Lamarck’s system from other notions of change developed in the eighteenth
century.

2.3.2. Change without Time?

2.3.2.1. Buffon Again

The fact that the eighteenth-century understanding of nature was not as static and inflexible as
assumed by Hermann and others has already been demonstrated earlier. Yet, these particular
notions of change did not involve the aspect of time in the sense that it did not affect nature as
a whole. Naturally, change itself is always bound to the passage of time. As soon as A changes
to B, time must have passed from the moment when A was still A to the point when B was
already B, no matter whether A became B all of a sudden or gradually. Therefore, it seems
nonsensical to claim that there is a notion of change that does not involve time. And, to some
extent, it actually is. However, it will be shown that the different interrelations between nature
and time are relevant in this context.

One of the most frequently mentioned naturalists when it comes to the relationship between
nature and time is, again, Buffon. This is not surprising, as we find quite relevant statements in
his work concerning this issue. For instance, in the 6th volume of his Histoire, dealing with Les
Animaux sauvages, he wrote:

Time is the great workman of Nature. He moves with regular and uniform steps.
He performs no operation suddenly; but by decrees or successive impressions,
nothing can resist his power; and those changes which at first are imperceptible,

194
Ibid., p. 178.

63
 become gradually sensible, and at last are marked by results too conspicuous to
be misapprehended.195

This passage seems to unequivocally reveal a Buffonian perception of nature that gradually
changes over the course of time. It even appears to anticipate Lamarck’s arguments concerning
the observability of these changes. Understanding Buffon’s notion of the role of time in nature,
though, is as difficult as grasping his ideas about change, since they are not only scattered across
his Histoire but also prove to be rather inconsistent. Furthermore, considering the long period
of time during which the Histoire was written and published, we cannot possibly talk about
merely ‘one’ standpoint in Buffon’s philosophy.

Essential for the general notion of Buffon’s approach towards time is not only his concept of
degeneration as a mechanism for natural change but also, most importantly, his influential
theory of the earth, described in the 34th volume (the 5th supplemental volume respectively) of
his Histoire naturelle, better known as Epoches de la nature. Not only was it the most
controversial of his writings; it is also regarded as a significant contribution to the emergence
of geology due to his division of the history of the earth in seven epochs.196 Yet again it is
widely ignored that – especially concerning his assumptions about the formation of the world
– there are significant differences between the early Buffon of the 1740s-1760s and the late
Buffon of the late 1770s onwards. These differences can best be perceived when regarding his
two approaches towards a theory of the earth: in the first volume of his Histoire (1749) Buffon
presented his Histoire et théorie de la terre, thirty years later he published his Epoques de la
nature, dealing with the same subject.

As Hans-Jörg Rheinberger has plausibly demonstrated, Buffon’s two theories of the earth differ
distinctly with regard to the function and relevance of time in nature. In his Histoire et théorie
de la terre, the formation of the earth is described as a singular event. All the occurring changes
appear repetitively and are, therefore, cyclical. Hence, the world explained in this early part of
the Histoire is something that, according to Rheinberger, “[…] exists in time, thus lasts, but
does not change with time”, making it “decidedly non-historical”197. In 1765, Buffon again
relativized the role of time, claiming that “[nature’s] duration is not to be estimated by a day,
a year, an age, nor any given period of time; for time itself relates only to individuals, to beings

195
BUFFON, History, Vol. 4 (1785), pp. 70-71 (= BUFFON, Histoire, Vol. 6 (1756), p. 60).
196
Cf. BUFFON, George-Louis Leclerc Comte de: Supplément à l’Histoire Naturelle. Vol. 5. Paris 1778, p. III.
197
RHEINBERGER, Buffon, p. 204-205. Author’s translation. Emphasis in the original.

64
whose existence is limited.198 According to this view, time was only relevant on a certain level
of nature, that is to say on the level of individuals, since only on this level change was
observable. In this context Rheinberger also points out the complex relation of time to the
Buffonian concept of species as genealogical, continuous succession of reproductive
individuals.199 Since individuals are subject to time, species as systems are “time-
containing”200, but eventually elude the “order of time and retain their character as timeless
entities”201.

Thirty years after Buffon had described his cyclical theory of the earth he presented a
fundamentally different notion of the earth and its history in the Epoques de la nature. The most
remarkable novelty of this treatise was Buffon’s calculation concerning the age of the earth.
Having measured different cooling times of hot metal or stone globes, he concluded that the
earth was about 75000 years old.202 It is clear that this proposition absolutely deviated from the
prevalent belief that the earth had been created on October 22nd in 4004 BC, as Bishop James
Usher had calculated in 1650.203 This calculation by means of cooling processes resulted in a
distinctly different notion of nature compared to the ideas from 1749. The formation and the
developments of the earth were no longer cyclical but directional, continuous and irreversible.
Contrary to the system developed in the Histoire et théorie de la terre, this new theory was
based on a continuous and directed process connected to a directed and continuous notion of
time, and was therefore historical in a modern sense.204 In the Epoches, earth was subject to a
linear course of history. At the same time, however, this historical notion of time did not apply
to organic nature. Unlike earth itself, living nature had no history in Buffon’s concept but gave
evidence of the history of the globe. Rheinberger plausibly concludes that we can observe a
fundamental change in Buffon’s work between 1749 and 1779, leading from a non-historical
theory of a cyclical earth towards a linear history of the earth. Yet, this historicity did not
implicate a historicity of nature as a whole. Indeed, the organic world remained subject to time
but had no history itself.205

198
BARR, Buffon, Vol. 9 (1807), pp. 343-344 (= BUFFON, Histoire, Vol. 13 (1765), p. I).
199
Cf. RHEINBERGER, Buffon, pp. 206-207.
200
Ibid., p. 212.
201
Ibid.
202
Cf. ibid., p. 214. His experiments forced Buffon to scale down his original assumption of several millions of
years.
203
Cf. USSHER, James: Annales Veteris Testamentis, A Prima Mundi Origine Deducti […]. London 1650, p. 1.
204
Cf. RHEINBERGER, Buffon, p. 217.
205
Cf. ibid., pp. 219-221.

65
 2.3.2.2. Bonnet and Time

Analysing Bonnet’s ideas – expressed in his Palingénésie – in this light, we can come to similar
conclusions. In Bonnet’s view, time affected the living nature only within the scope of its
ontogenesis and the unfolding of the pre-existent germs. As already proved, there is a distinct
notion of change (and, therefore, of time) inherent in the naturalist’s writings. Yet, this notion
is not historical, either. The changes within the natural world were only initiated by the alleged
great revolutions and merely altered the unfolding of the eternal, preformed germs. As Bonnet
claimed, the present world was just the state between two revolutions, with the biblical Creation
having been the latest. Presuming that the earth was much older than originally thought, it was
obvious for Bonnet “[…] that MOSES has not described to us the first Creation of the globe,
and that his story is only one of a new Revolution that the Planet had undergone […]”206.
Therefore, since the great revolutions were only the causes for the changes, the world – as it
presented itself in its present state – was basically unchangeable in the sense of the immutable
scala naturae. Even though Bonnet’s system differs widely from Buffon’s assumptions, he –
like Buffon – postulated various notions of time and historicity on different levels of the natural
world. The earth as a whole was subject to a somehow historical change on a large scale and
had to be regarded as a sequence of different worlds.207 However, the individual states of these
worlds were cyclical (according to the laws of physics) and immutable (regarding the scale of
beings) and, therefore, only subject to time on an ontogenetic level. Considering this, the
notions of time and change in both Bonnet’s and Buffon’s conceptions distinctly differ from
Lamarck’s understanding.

2.3.3. Lamarck’s Escalator – A New Dimension

Lamarck’s approach was in so far revolutionary as it not only comprised various elements of
eighteenth-century natural history, compiling a comprehensive and consistent theory of nature,
but also included a new notion of the historicity of nature: not just the earth was subject to
historical change; the whole of nature was in a constant flow. It was demonstrated earlier that

206
“[…] que MOYSE ne nous a point décrit la premiere Création de notre Globe, & que son Histoire n’est que
celle d’une nouvelle Révolution que le Planete avoit subi […]”.BONNET, Palingénésie, p. 237. Author’s
translation.
207
Bonnet remarked that “[…] on the surface and the bowels of the world we find immense piles of ruins which
appear to be of an ancient world, whose condition was, without doubt, in many characteristics different to that
of the world we inhabit today”. (“[…] on trouve par-tout sur la surface & dans ses entrailles des amas immenses
de ruines, qui paroissent être celles d’un ancien Monde, dont l’état différoit, sans doute, par bien des caracteres
de celui Monde que nous habitons.”) Ibid. Author’s translation. Emphasis in the original.

66
the scala naturae remained the fundamental presumption for Lamarck’s system. Even though
the traditional concept was significantly altered, the linearity and continuity of the scale
continued to be the guiding principles for Lamarck’s natural system, yet underwent a new,
twofold interpretation concerning time. The linear scale not only marked the hierarchical order
of nature in its present state but also represented the historical change of nature and its
organisms in the course of time.

As is known, Charles Coulston Gillispie has claimed that Lamarck transformed the chain of
beings into the “escalator of being”208. Whether this metaphor is well chosen or not can be left
undecided; yet it clearly reveals the new dimensional aspect of the scala naturae in Lamarck’s
theory. Unlike Hermann, for example, who had unfolded the scale into the second and,
rudimentarily, even into the third dimension, Lamarck held onto its linearity and basically tilted
it into the fourth dimension of time. By doing this, Lamarck was– at least partly – able to solve
one of the fundamental problems of the scale resulting from the principle of plenitude. As has
been shown at the beginning, due to the fixedness of the traditional scale of beings all alleged
intermediary forms needed to exist simultaneously, something that was contradictory to the
limitedness of space. Lamarck understood the intermediate forms of beings as slight alterations
within the course of progress: “Hence it follows”, he claimed, “that if there are extremes in
these alterations, there are also finer differences: that is to say, intermediate stages which fill
up the interval. Consequently there are also fine distinctions between what we call species”209.
The plenitude of the universe – accomplished in the continuous gradations of living forms as
postulated by the Leibnizian system – was no longer required to be realized simultaneously.
Now the plenitude of the world was rather interpreted in a historical way and was detected in
all the variations that organisms had produced in the past and would bring forth in the future.
After all, the process of successive change was still effective.

Therefore, it can be stated that, at least since Lamarck, all nature was seen as subject to a
continuous change along a directed course of time. Contrary to most concepts of eighteenth-
century natural history, later concepts related nature as a whole to time in a historical sense.
Nature in its entirety was interpreted in a historical manner and, therefore, had its own history.

208
GILLISPIE, Charles Coulston: Lamarck and Darwin in the History of Science. In: American Scientist, Vol.
46/4 (December 1958), p. 393.
209
LAMARCK, Philosophy I, pp. 111-112.

67
2.4. Interim Conclusion

Between the middle of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century fundamental
changes concerning the perception of nature as a system can be observed. The Buffonian
concept of degeneration is one of several examples of notions of change, which emerged from
the 1750s onwards. Yet, within these concepts, change was meant to be possible only to a very
limited degree and was in no sense regarded historical. Simultaneously, the traditional idea of
the scala naturae, even though extremely challenged, remained prevalent in the conceptions of
many naturalists of the time. The intrinsic inconsistencies of the scale of beings led to two
different approaches: on the one hand, the influence of the prevalent position of this concept
increasingly abated, whilst on the other hand, various attempts were made to safe the traditional
theory together with its philosophical substructure by expanding the original linearity of the
scale to the second and third dimension. By the end of the century, however, the concept of the
chain of beings seemed to have lost most of its importance.

During the first years of the nineteenth century, Jean Baptiste Lamarck developed his theory of
progressive change: it combined the concept of a constantly changing earth with the notion of
a natural world that originated from spontaneous generation and continuously perfected itself.
Based on the fundamental principles of the scale of beings, his theory involved the concept of
a linearly directed course of time. It is, therefore, adequate to label Lamarck’s theory as the first
consistent explanatory model of natural change that involved the aspect of historicity. Yet this
historicity cannot be simply explained by an alleged process of ‘temporalization’ inherent in
the chain of beings, which took place between 1750 and 1800. Rather, it seems that other aspects
of eighteenth-century intellectual thought played an important role in this matter, transforming
the notions of nature in relation to time and space. First, it is important to have a closer look at
the German naturalist Eberhard August Wilhelm von Zimmermann, whose work was influential
for the development of natural history in the aftermath of Buffon’s revolutionary theories and
can be seen as significant for the changing notions of time and space in late eighteenth-century
natural history.

68
3. Excursus: Earth in Time and Nature in Space – Eberhard August von
Zimmermann’s Geographische Geschichte der Menschheit

Obviously, Buffon’s concept of degenerative change due to environmental changes and his
history of the earth essentially influenced natural history in the second half of the century.
Furthermore, as it has been shown above, Buffon’s theories laid the foundations for Lamarck’s
elaborations, although the latter significantly changed and reinterpreted Buffon’s original
assumptions. Yet, it would be wrong to assume that the notion of a changing earth
automatically implied the notion of a changing nature. On the contrary, even though Buffon’s
theory of the earth and his concept of degeneration were widely received and adapted, the
notion of natural change did not find its way into natural history but was challenged even by
naturalists who agreed on the general concept of global revolutions the world had undergone.
Nevertheless, the concepts and ideas that emerged in the aftermath of Buffon finally paved the
way for a historical understanding of the natural world.

One of the followers of Buffon’s theory of degeneration was, at least to some extent, Eberhard
August Wilhelm von Zimmermann, professor of physics, mathematics and natural history in
Brunswick. Between 1778 and 1783 he published his influential three-volume Geographische
Geschichte der Menschheit und der allgemein verbreiteten vierfüßigen Thiere (Geographical
History of Mankind and the generally distributed quadrupedal Animals). Its title already
indicates its significance for this study. With this work, Zimmermann – regarded as one of the
protagonists in the development of biogeography as a discipline210 – delivered a comprehensive
zoogeographical account.

Zimmermann’s relation to Buffon’s theories is rather ambivalent. On the one hand, it is obvious
that Buffon’s considerations concerning the correlations between geographical distribution and
outward appearance – as, for instance, expressed in his already mentioned L’Ordre des Chiens
– can be seen as the basis for Zimmermann’s own approach.211 In addition to that, references
to Buffon can be found throughout his work. On the other hand, Zimmermann explicitly
criticized some of Buffon’s main claims, especially those regarding his concept of
degeneration. He stated that Buffon had overestimated the impact of climatic conditions on

210
Cf. FEUERSTEIN-HERZ, Petra: Eberhard August Wilhelm von Zimmermann (1743-1815) und die
Tiergeographie. Dissertation. Technische Universität Carolo-Wilhelmina. Brunswick 2003, pp. 3-4.
211
James Larson, for instance, calls Buffon the founder of modern biogeography. LARSON, James: Not without
a Plan: Geography and Natural History in the Late Eighteenth Century. In: Journal of the History of Biology,
Vol. 19/3 (Autumn 1986), p. 448.

69
organisms. In Zimmermann’s view, the different variations of dogs or other domesticated
animals were the result of subjugation and breeding and, therefore, not representative of the
natural order. Yet he conceded that geographical distribution and climate could indeed
influence the form of wild animals with regard to size or strength. Thus, the lions found in
northern Africa were stronger than those in the south, the elephants of Ceylon of extraordinary
strength, and wolves living in colder climates stronger than those inhabiting hot areas.212 The
main flaw in Buffon’s theory was, according to Zimmermann, that he inferred from the various
degenerations of animals as the result of domestication that these mechanisms had a similar
effect on animals in the wild: “Therefore, we can never claim that, because the mouflon has
degenerated to the weak sheep, yet both surely constitute one single species, the panther from
Africa could have been degraded to the fearful American jaguar”213. In general, he criticized
Buffon for often expressing himself unclearly, “[…] since one, at times, does not know whether
he talks about species or about genera, and, therefore, is often not capable of understanding
him precisely”214.

Zimmermann’s reservations about Buffon’s inferences can easily be understood within the
framework of his worldview that also included the acceptance of the universal chain of beings.
In his opinion it was

[…] unreasonable if I concluded from single cases that there was no chain or
series of steps in nature, just because I now and then miss a link, a connection, a
transition. One does not resent Voltaire for such a wretched conclusion, based on
ignorance or rather wilful blindness; however, every naturalist is absolutely
convinced that solely lack of human understanding, not nature itself, has left open
gaps.215

This adherence to the traditional, theologically grounded concept must, however, not be viewed
as an eventual physico-theological foundation of Zimmermann’s position, since he elsewhere

212
Cf. ZIMMERMANN, Eberhard August Wilhelm von: Geographische Geschichte des Menschen und der
allgemein verbreiteten vierfüßigen Thiere. Vol.1. Leipzig 1778, p. 24.
213
“Daher kann man nie behaupten, daß weil der Muflon bis zu dem schwachen Schafe herabgesunken ist, und
diese beiden gewiß einerley Thierart ausmachen, der Panther von Afrika bis zu dem furchtsamen
amerikanischen Jaguar durch Ausartung habe können herabgesetzt werden“. Ibid. Author’s translation.
214
“[…] da man zuweilen gar nicht weiß, ob er von Arten (Species) oder von Geschlechtern redet, und man also
oftmals kaum im Stande ist, ihn genau zu verstehen”. Ibid., p. 27. Author’s tanslation.
215
“[…] unvernünftig, wenn ich aus einzelnen Fällen schließe, als gäbe es keine Kette oder Stufenfolge in der
Natur, weil mir hie und da noch ein Glied, eine Verwindung ein Uebergang fehlt. Voltairen nimmt man einen
so elenden, auf Unwissenheit oder vielmehr vorsezlicher Blindheit beruhenden Schluss nicht übel, allein jeder
Naturkenner ist völlig überzeugt, daß nur der Mangel menschlicher Kenntnisse, und nicht die Natur selbst,
Lücken offen gelassen hat“. Ibid., p. 5. Author’s translation.

70
distinctly refrained from explanations which served to sustain the validity of the Bible. In his
enlightened times, Zimmermann thought, it was no longer necessary to bring theories in
accordance with the literal narrative of the Bible; he was of the opinion that matters of religion
and matters of natural history had to be treated separately. In his further elaborations he
demonstrated a distinctly deistic point of view: “None of my readers”, he stated, “can,
therefore, demand that I, for example, reckon the reindeer to be a degenerated stag or the tapir
to be a degenerated elephant, so that it would become easier to imagine these animal species
in Noah’s ark”216.

In addition, his approach towards Creation was diametrically opposed to the Genesis narrative.
Zimmermann – in his attempt to explain the geographical distribution of animals over the globe
– abandoned the idea of a Creation of all life in one single place as described in the Bible and
assumed several independent Creations in different parts of the world. Together with his
limited notion of superficial change, this theory provided sufficient explanation for the
observable irregularities of animal distribution.217 This did not only contradict theological
claims but also Buffon’s approach presented in the following year in his Époques de la Nature.
According to Buffon’s concept that supposed a continuously cooling earth, organisms initially
developed at the poles which were the first to reach temperatures suitable for life.
Subsequently, these organisms migrated – along with the further cooling of the earth – towards
the equator until the globe reached its present, inhabitable state.218 Together with the process
of degeneration, which then came into effect, these mechanisms formed life as it was
observable in its present and final state. Zimmermann actively opposed this view in the third
volume of his Geographische Geschichte from 1783. He disapproved of the notion of a single
area of origin (Vaterland) and presumed several distinct areas of Creation from which animals
would migrate, due to lack of food, change of climate, human influence or global revolutions.

216
“Keiner meiner Leser kann es daher verlangen, daß ich z. B. das Rennthier für einen ausgearteten Hirsch oder
den Tapir für einen ausgearteten Elephanten nur deswegen hielte, damit es begreiflicher würde, sich auch diese
Thierarten in dem Kasten Noah möglich zu denken“. Ibid., p. 28. Author’s translation. This statement can be
understood as a comment on Athanasius Kircher and his Arca Noë. Just a century before Zimmermann the
polymath had elaborately tried to reconstruct the story of the flood and the construction of the ark. In his
approach to this literal interpretation of the biblical report, he did not include animals of America since he, too,
regarded them as degenerated forms of animals of the Old World. For a detailed analysis of this topic see
BROWNE, Janet: Noah’s Flood, the Ark, and the Shaping of Early Modern Natural History. In: LINDBERG,
David C./NUMBERS, Ronald L. [eds.]: When Science and Christianity Meet. Chicago 2008, p. 115.
217
Cf. FEUERSTEIN-HERZ, Zimmermann, p. 276.
218
Cf. LARSON, Plan, p. 452.

71
These natural migrations were only possible within a certain range of flexibility of organisms,
yet were the reason for the present distribution of animals.219

With Zimmermann’s work we are once more confronted with a very specific notion of time
regarding (living) nature, a concept which appears to be characteristic of the late eighteenth
century: the living world was subject to change only as far as it concerned the space, which
nature was embedded in. The presupposition for his work was the distinct notion of a
historically changing world susceptible to revolutions and alterations – similar to Buffon’s
concept presented in his Époques de la nature. Yet, change did only affect nature in matters of
space: Zimmerman’s geographical history of animals was a history (in a modern sense) of the
distribution of animals all over the globe rather than a history of animals themselves. Living
nature was understood as being embedded within a continuously changing geological world,
yet was affected by these changes only secondarily. As Petra Feuerstein-Herz aptly states, the
late eighteenth-century history of nature and living beings is merely a history of space.
Historical change of living beings is just a change concerning their existence in a changing
space. It is not living nature itself that changes; it is the space that is subject to continuous or
revolutionary alterations in which nature exists.220 Neither Buffon’s nor Zimmermann’s
theories involved the notion of the historicity of nature, even though their approaches towards
Creation and degeneration diverge in many of their fundamental assumptions.

In this context, the notion of dimensionality is, once again, crucial. Over the course of the
century, geographical considerations had increasingly become an essential part of natural
history. Linnaeus had already expressed distinct thoughts about the geographical distribution
of species.221 As shown in this short excursus, these geographical aspects gained even more
importance in the second half of the century, adding another facet of dimensionality to the
general understanding of nature. The linear scala naturae was perceived as being embedded
and realized in a three-dimensional space and was depicted – just as Zimmermann had done in
his work – on two-dimensional geographical maps. It is a rather peculiar coincidence that both
Zimmermann’s zoogeographical map (as part of the third volume of his Geographische
Geschichte) and Hermann’s two-dimensional Tabula were published in the same year. Again,
it seems to be relevant to mention that Hermann not only knew about Zimmermann’s work but

219
Cf. ZIMMERMANN, Eberhard August Wilhelm von: Geographische Geschichte des Menschen und der
allgemein verbreiteten vierfüßigen Thiere. Vol. 3. Leipzig 1783, p. 204.
220
Cf. FEUERSTEIN-HERZ, Zimmermann, p. 276.
221
For a comprehensive account of this topic see LARSON, Plan, pp. 447-488.

72
also largely incorporated his zoological studies into his commentary. Vice versa, Zimmermann,
too, was familiar with Hermann’s two-dimensional modification of the scala naturae and
agreed with his colleague in Strasbourg on this approach. In his translation of William
Smellie’s The Philosophy of Natural History from 1791 – originally written by the Scottish
encyclopedist and first translator of Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle in 1790 – Zimmermann
commented on Smellie’s defence of the scale of beings and expressed his thoughts about a
network of affinities. In this context he referred to Hermann, affirming the notion of a reticular
natural system:

It was Prof. Herman in particular who has delivered a depiction of the natural
affinities of bodies, which certainly is much more exquisite than the idea of a
single progressive scale of beings, in his very appreciable opus Tabula affinitatum
animalium […], and it should have been properly familiar to Mr. Smellie in his
enterprise, as it is written in Latin.222

This reference to Hermann demonstrates again not only the intensive interconnectedness and
mutual influences among the naturalists of the time but also Hermann’s relevance in the
scientific communtiy due to his role as integral component of this communicating system and
his widely received conception. The reinterpretation of the scale of beings as a plane network
extended the natural system to the second (and, subsequently, to the third) dimension on a
superordinate and abstract conceptual level, whereas at the same time this natural system was
also perceived on an observable level within a distinct notion of geographical space, which
itself had its history.

A step towards the beginning of the nineteenth century and Lamarck’s theory reveals certain
congruent continuities. As discussed above, the notion of a continuously changing and,
therefore, historically interpreted world was crucial to Lamarck’s theory of a living nature
transforming and progressing in parallel. It has already been shown that the French naturalist
had reduced the natural system to its original – albeit significantly reinterpreted – linearity on
the conceptual level. Yet he understood this linearity within the realm of geographical space.

222
“Eine Darstellung der natürlichen Verwandtschaften der Körper, die allerdings viel vorzüglicher ist, als jene
Idee von einer einzigen progressiven Skale der Wesen, hatte besonders Hr. Prof. Herman [sic!] in seinem sehr
schätzbaren Werke Tabula affinitatum animalium […] geliefert, und Herrn Smellie sollte dieses Werk bei seinem
Unternehmen billig bekannt gewesen seyn, da es Lateinisch geschrieben ist“. SMELLIE, William: Philosophie
der Naturgeschichte. Translated and edited by Eberhard August Wilhelm von Zimmermann. Vol. 2. Berlin 1791,
pp. 294-295. Author’s translation.

73
The significant distinction between this and the Zimmermannian concept was the inclusion of
change and, therefore, of a historically interpreted notion of nature.

It is tempting to declare this inclusion of the dimension of time – which virtually constitutes a
four-dimensional concept of nature – as a kind of logical next step in this historical
development of natural thought. However, this would be an unhistorical, Whig interpretation,
regarding scientific progress as a targeted process. Instead, it is important to identify the
underlying mechanisms that led to this inclusion of time or rather historicity into the general
understanding of living nature. The general historicisation of the earth – as roughly indicated
above – was certainly a main factor in this process,223 yet it cannot sufficiently explain the
historicisation of nature in general. Even though these two aspects seem to go hand in hand, it
was shown above that the historical understanding of a changing world did not automatically
apply to the realm of living nature.

In the following, an aspect within the intellectual landscape of the eighteenth century will be
examined that does not only show remarkable parallels to the development of systems of
natural order but also seems to be significant for the developments described above: the history
of man and the position of man in nature.

223
A detailed account of the development of geology as well as of the historical interpretation of the earth and the
interplay between geology and history can be found in ROSSI, Paolo: The Dark Abyss of Time. The History of
the Earth & The History of Nations from Hooke to Vico. Translated by Lydia G. Cochrane. Chicago 1984.

74
4. Inventing History – Historical Thought in the Eighteenth Century

4.1. Comments on Eighteenth-Century Historiography

As already initially stated, this survey of eighteenth-century historical thought will neither be
an account of the consolidation and institutionalization of history over the course of the century
nor an analysis of the development of its theoretical and methodological foundation. Rather, it
is supposed to be an analysis of how history and the notion of historical time were perceived
in terms of its dimensionality and the concurrent ways of its representation. Offering a detailed
account of eighteenth-century historiography to point out its relevance for this period within
the development of history in a modern sense would go beyond the constraints of this
investigation and would be redundant.

During the Enlightenment, German historiography was of significant importance due to the
large number of German-speaking scholars who contributed to this topic: August Ludwig von
Schlözer and his Vorstellung einer Universal-Historie (Concept of a Universal History) from
1772/3, Friedrich Schiller and his inaugural speech in Jena from 1789, addressing the character
and purpose of history, or Immanuel Kant, Johann Martin Chladenius or Johann Christoph
Gatterer are only some of the intellectuals who proved to be important for the development of
history. Yet, not only in the German-speaking world but also in other parts of Europe did this
period prove to be essential for the foundation of historical thought in a modern sense: for
instance, Edward Gibbon and his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-
1789), Henry Home and his Sketches of the History of Man (1774) as well as philosophers like
Montesquieu or Voltaire and their deliberations reflect England’s and France’s role in this
matter. These selected examples are, of course, not representative of the complex situation of
this period but simply show the increasing significance of historical thought and refute the still
persisting notion of an ‘unhistorical’ Enlightenment.224

Another important aspect in the development of historical thought at that time is the increasing
scientification of history and its consolidation as an academic discipline. It was not until the
eighteenth century that historia was more and more treated and understood as scientia. From
the middle of the century onwards Göttingen, in particular turned out to be a centre for the
development of a historical ‘science’ that went beyond the mere collecting and ordering of

224
Cf. BOURGAULT, Sophie/SPARLING, Robert: Introduction. In: Id. (eds.): A Companion to Enlightenment
Historiography. Leiden 2013, p. 1.

75
historical data and events.225 In the following, it will be shown how the emergence of
historiography as an academic discipline and its underlying concepts shaped the understanding
of history and time and also its relation to natural history. In order to do this, a short outlining
approach to the Early Modern concept of history or historia seems to be essential.

4.2. Historia – Grasping an Early Modern Concept

The Latin term Historia – or its corresponding versions history, Historie/Geschichte (germ.),
histoire (fr.) etc. – is virtually omnipresent in the Early Modern Era and shows significant
differences to its modern usage. In addition, the concept of historia underwent a significant
semantic change over the course of the eighteenth century. Contemporary attempts at a
definition already show the difficulty in dealing with this concept. For instance, the definition
for Historie found in the Universal-Lexicon aller Wissenschafften und Künste, the famous
encyclopedia by Johann Heinrich Zedler, published between 1731 and 1754, based on an
epistemological approach and demonstrates the universal meaning of the concept. Assuming
that all sciences are built on experience, the term ‘history’ is regarded as the counterpart to self-
experience: “History is, therefore, nothing else than experiences, which we get from others,
and which, because of their testimony, we consider as having really occurred. Everything that
happens belongs to history”226. Since more or less everything that happened was regarded as
belonging to history, the usage of the term was quite excessive, something that was already
observed by contemporaries. The German scholar Johann Martin Chladenius, for instance,
noted in his treatise Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft (General Science of History, 1752)
that the term Historie was not only broadly defined but also the cause for great confusion.227

In addition, the corresponding entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica from 1771 gives a similar
definition of History as “[…] description or recital of things as they are, or have been, in a
continued orderly narration of the principal facts and circumstances thereof”228. It becomes
clear that the understanding of history in the Early Modern period is not congruent with our

225
Cf. STEINER, Benjamin: Die Ordnung der Geschichte. Historische Tabellenwerke in der Frühen Neuzeit.
Cologne 2008, pp. 82-83.
226
“Die Historie ist also nichts anderes als Erfahrungen, welche wir von anderen bekommen, und wegen ihres
Zeugnisses davor halten, daß sie würklich geschehen sind. Alles was geschiehet, gehört in die Historie”.
‘Historia‘. In: Zedler, Johann Heinrich: Großes vollständiges Universal-Lexikon aller Wissenschaften und
Künste. Vol. 13. Leipzig 1735, coll. 281. Author’s translation.
227
Cf. CHLADENIUS, Johann Martin: Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft. Reprint of the edition Leipzig 1752.
Vienna 1985, p. 10.
228
‘History’. In: Encyclopaedia Britannica, or a Dictionary of Arts and Sciences [...]. Vol. 2. Edinburgh 1771, p.
788.

76
modern apprehension, which developed into an academic discipline over the course of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.229 Thus, the Historia of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries in its universalistic interpretation equally comprised the areas of historical
occurrences in a modern sense and past and present matters perceived by experience.

The structure of this comprehensive conception of history can best be illustrated by taking the
example of the educational tables of the Habsburg family from the late eighteenth century,
which were used to instruct the Austrian archdukes Ferdinand Karl Anton and Maximilian
Franz, the youngest sons of archduchess Maria Theresia.230 In the manner of a genealogical
tree the table, entitled Historia, demonstrates the various parts of history and illustrates the
universal claim of the concept. Crowned by the allegorical images of the Historia Particularis
on the left and the Historia Universalis, the areas of history are represented by ornate
medallions: together with Historia Sacra and Historia Profana, the areas of Historia Litteraria,
Historia Naturalis, Historia Technica, Historia Mixta and Historia Mythologica set up the
entirety of this system. There below the six aetates mundi, the ages of the world of Christian-
theological history of salvation are depicted in the form of biblical scenes. The last row of the
table consists of medallions which can be interpreted as the methodical foundation of history:
chronology, geography, genealogy and heraldry. The whole elaborate arrangement can be seen
as the extension of the classical tripartition of history into Historia divina, Historia civilis and
Historia naturalis.231

So the Early Modern conception of Historia differs significantly from the modern notion of
history, due to its universality and, therefore, its inclusion of the sacred and the natural world
as well as mythological and literary matters. As a consequence – apparent in the contemporary
definitions quoted above –, ‘history’ did not automatically imply the notion of time: everything
that was and is belonged to the category of history, including timeless matters of facts. The
result of this notion was that history and, therefore, also natural history – as Reinhard Koselleck
notes – was solely descriptive.232 Everything that went beyond these descriptive accounts in
the form of classifications or inventories was not understood as part of natural history but was

229
See for instance GIERL, Martin: Geschichte als präzise Wissenschaft. Johann Christoph Gattterer und die
Historiographie des 18. Jahrhunderts im ganzen Umfang. Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 2012.
230
Cf. BECKER, Ulrich/RAFFLER, Marlies: Die Tafeln Geschichte und Mensch. In: MÜLLER,
Astrid/RAFFLER, Marlies (eds.): Der Schüler Ferdinand. Unterrichtstafeln für die „jüngeren“ Erzherzöge aus
den Sammlungen des Joanneums (= Joannea 04/2012). Graz 2012. S. 172.
231
Cf. KOSELLECK, Reinhard: Geschichte, Historie. In: BRUNNER, Otto et al. (eds.): Geschichtliche
Grundbegriffe. historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. Vol. 2. Stuttgart 1975, p.
678.
232
Cf. ibid., p. 679.

77
labelled as ‘philosophy’. The best example of this is, once more, Lamarck, who titled his
deliberations about natural transformation Philosophie zoologique, in contrast to his Histoire
naturelle des animaux sans vertêbres, his classification of invertebrate animals.233

The role of historia within the Early Modern system of knowledge was based on
epistemological considerations and is difficult to grasp due to its complexity and the variety of
coexistent interpretations and valuations. A short definition that seems to sum up the
epistemological grading of historia can be found in the Philosophia definitiva, a textbook from
1738 written by the German philosopher Friedrich Christian Baumeister, wherein he
propagated the philosophy of Christian Wolff. In the first chapter, entitled Definitiones
Logicae, he defined “historical cognition” as “cognition of facts”, whereas “philosophical
cognition” was “the cognition of the causes”234. Thus, until the eighteenth century history was
merely a servant of philosophy, and human history in particular was regarded as minor
concerning its epistemological value. In the sixteenth century, for instance, the eminent
political philosopher Jean Bodin labelled the Historia humana as ‘uncertain’ and ‘confused’,
in contrast to the Historia naturalis and divina, which he regarded as ‘certain’ and ‘most
certain’. Even influential thinkers like René Descartes, Nicolas Malebranche or John Locke
were sceptical about the epistemological value of history.235

Summing up we can say that for one thing, the Early Modern notion of history was understood
as an epistemological category based on cognition through the experience of others. For
another, it was seen as an entirety of facts supporting the biblical exegesis within the framework
of salvation history. The fact that the various components of this universalistic construct of
Historia were finally treated independently can be regarded as a development of the eighteenth
century.

4.3. Seperating Histories

Even though the notion of the entirety of Historia was still present in the 1760s – as the
Habsburg educational table demonstrates –, the notion of different ‘histories’ and their mutual
relations underwent significant transformations over the course of the seventeenth and

233
Cf. KAMBARTEL, Friedrich: “Naturgeschichte“. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Vol. 6. Basel
1984, coll. 526.
234
“Cognito historiae est cognitio factorum“; “Cognitio philosophica […] est cognition caussarum”.
BAUMEISTER, Friedrich Christian: Philosophia Definitiva: Hoc Est Definitiones Philosophicae Ex Systemate
Celeb. Wolfii […]. Wittenberg 1738, p. 1. Author’s translation.
235
Cf. SCHOLTZ, G.: “Geschichte, Historie“. In: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Vol. 3. Basel 1974,
coll. 355.

78
eighteenth centuries. The first observable fundamental change was the decline of the
supremacy of sacred history and the associated interpretation of human and natural history
within the scope of a salvation-historical notion. Ulrich Muhlack has lengthily demonstrated
this process, which he refers to as the “absolutization of profane history”236. The prevalence
of the Historia divina gave way to an independent interpretation of human history, a
development that eventually led to the subordination of sacred history during the eighteenth
century.237

With this interpretive framework vanishing, natural history, too, became subject to conceptual
transitions. The general breakup of the all-embracing historia led to an occurrence that
Koselleck describes as the “precipitation of natural history out of the historical cosmos”238.
Natural history was more and more separated from history as a whole not only on a contentual
level. Francis Bacon had already differentiated between Historia naturalis and Historia civilis
in his two-part classification of the term Historia.239 During the eighteenth century this
separation of matters of natural history from history in a modern understanding was undertaken
also on a conceptual level. Tthe Italian scholar Giambattista Vico in particular, often regarded
as one of the forerunners of modern philosophy of history and cultural history,240 impelled this
segregation. In his Scienzia nuova (New Science), first published in 1725, Vico argues in favour
of the prevalence of (cultural) historical cognition over knowledge of nature on an
epistemological foundation. In this treatise, wherein he expounded his ideas of a scientific
history, he stated that civil society was definitely the result of human action:

Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent
all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it,

236
MUHLAK, Ulrich: Geschichtswissenschaft und in Humanismus und Aufklärung. Die Vorgeschichte des
Historismus. Munich 1991, p. 151.
237
Cf. KOSELLECK, Geschichte, p. 683.
238
Ibid., p. 678. Author’s translation.
239
Cf. BACON, Francis: De Dignitate Et Augmentis Scientiarum. Vol. 1. Würzburg 1779, p. 118. Bacon’s own
conception of the term historia also underwent significant changes. In the extended Latin version of his treatise
from 1628, Bacon stated that history was either natural or civil (“Historia aut naturalis est, aut civilis”) and
ecclesiastic and literary history subordinate to civil history. However, in the original English version from 1605,
Bacon had stated a division of history in four parts: “HISTORY is NATURAL, CIVILE, ECCLESIASTICAL &
LITTERARY, wherof the three first I allow as extant, the fourth I note as deficiant”. BACON, Francis: Of the
Proficience and Advancement of Learning. London 1605, fol. 7v.
240
Cf. BURKE, Peter: Vico. Philosoph, Historiker, Denker einer neuen Wissenschaft. Translated by Wolfgang
Heuss. Berlin 1987, p. 7.

79
 He alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of
nations or civil world, which, since men had made it, men could hope to know.241

Vico’s assertion is unmistakeable and alludes to the arising differentiation and dichotomy
between human history and natural sciences based on epistemological considerations. The
human mind was merely able to really understand what was made by humans. And, since
history was concerned with human society – something Vico regarded as man-made –, only
history could lead to true knowledge. Any attempt to comprehend nature was more or less futile,
as nature was created by God and, therefore, not truly understandable. With this argument Vico
subdivided the universalistic corpus of Historia into distinct and independent areas of concern.
The natural world was now excluded from historical matters due to the different quality of
cognition. Nature and (human) history were perceived as different affairs.

The fact that this notion was not limited to Vico’s view can easily be verified by using the
example of Voltaire’s article Histoire in the Encyclopédie. Voltaire begins by listing the
different areas of history, namely the history of opinion, of arts – which he declared to be the
most useful – and the history of events, separated into profane and sacred history. Natural
history was, of course, also part of this recital, yet – as the author remarked – wrongly: “[…]
Natural History, improperly called history, & which is an essential part of Physics”242. It
becomes obvious that by 1765 this distinction had already been completed and natural history
was perceived as a separate entity. In addition, in the important German dictionary by Johann
Christian Adelung from 1775 we find the remark that the term Geschichte (history) was
improperly used within the word Naturgeschichte (natural history) “[…] to name the register
and descriptions of the bodies belonging to the realm of nature”243. In summary, it can be stated
that one of the most significant developments within the scope of historia was the exclusion of
natural history and the Creation of a dichotomy between natural and historical knowledge.
History was increasingly understood in its ‘modern’ conception by including the distinct
notions of historical time and change, whereas natural history was still linked to the Early
Modern historia concept as an accumulation of facts without containing any notion of history

241
VICO, Giambattista: New Science. Translated by Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch. Ithaka 1948,
p. 85.
242
“[…] l'Histoire naturelle improprement dite histoire, & qui est une partie essentielle de la Physique”.
VOLTAIRE: “Histoire”. In: Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers. Vol. 8.
Paris 1765, pp. 220-221. Author’s translation.
243
“In sehr uneigentlichem Verstande wird es in dem Worte Naturgeschichte gebraucht, das Verzeichniß und die
Beschreibung der zu dem Naturreiche gehörigen Körper zu bezeichnen”. ADELUNG, Johann Christoph:
Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der hochdeutschen Mundart. Vol. 2. Leipzig 1775, coll. 601. Author’s
translation.

80
in the sense of time and change. It was demonstrated above that this unhistorical understanding
of natural history persisted until the early 1800s. However, this division was not the only
fundamental change within history during this period. Also the way history was perceived and
conceptualized in terms of dimensional aspects altered significantly, as will be demonstrated in
the following chapter.

4.4. Dimensions of the Past – The ‘Multidimensionalization’ of History

4.4.1. Bossuet and the Linearity of History

Earlier in this paper it has already been ascertained that the notion of nature underwent a
significant change in terms of its dimensionalization. However, this cannot only be said of the
realm of the natural world but also of history, which was submitted to similar processes. Yet
these latter changes manifested themselves quite differently from those concerning nature, due
to the different character of history. Unlike nature, history has always been connected to the
notion of time. But regardless of this fact a similar process of multidimensionalization can, in
many aspects, be stated for history as well and can be reconstructed with the help of influential
historiographical works and the various ways of depicting and representing history.

One of the last and at the same time most important examples of historiography that was still
dedicated to an explicit salvation-historical tradition is the Discourse sur l’histoire universelle
by the French bishop Jacques Béninge Bossuet from 1681. In this work, reprinted and translated
until well into the nineteenth century, Bossuet gave a comprehensive account of the history of
the Old World “[f]rom the Beginning of the World to the Empire of Charlemagne”244.

This universal history can be seen as a typical example of Early Modern exegetical
historiography that understood human history within the realm of divine history as recorded by
the Holy Scripture. In his Discours the bishop followed the traditional and Judaeo-Christian
chronology and presented the world as a succession of epochs from Creation up to the Frankish
Empire. Thus, the beginning of history is equated with the beginning of the world and –
following the Ussherian calculation – dated to the year 4004 BC.245 In general, Bossuet’s
account shows significant parallels to Ussher’s Annales Veteris Testamenti which had been
published some 30 years before. Similar to Ussher’s chronology, Bossuet designed his Discours

244
“Depuis le Commencement du Monde a jusqu’à l’Empire de Charlemagne”. BOSSUET, Jacques Bénigne:
Discours sur l'Histoire Universelle […]. Vol.1. Paris 1681. Front page. Author’s translation.
245
Cf. ibid, p. 7.

81
as a tripartite table: the main part contains the textual description of events, whereas the parallel
columns function as timelines, numbering the Ans du Monde, the years of the world, and the
Ans devans J. C; the years before Christ.246

A consequence of this exegetical interpretation of history and its embedding in Judaeo-Christian

chronology is its strict linearity. It followed the linear timeline, with historical events as a
chronological series of events, epochs and empires, beginning with the Creation of the world
and ending with the Last Judgement. Besides, this concept of history was highly limited in its
spatiality. This history of the world, read as a history of salvation, was more or less restricted
to the slightly extended realm of the ancient Greek and Roman sphere: the history of the ancient
Near East, followed by Greek, Roman and, eventually, European history.247 Within this
conception the biblical narration was regarded as a historical and factual report and Moses as
the “[…] oldest of the historians”248.

On a conceptual level, this Early Modern historiography can well be described as one-
dimensional. Despite being located within a spatial or geographical area (namely the extended
Mediterranean sphere) and containing a distinct notion of time, this conception was strictly
linear. It was the chronological succession of events along the linear and unidirectional course
of time. Two board games from the early eighteenth century also provide evidence of the linear
character of Early Modern universal history: Johann Balthasar Springer’s Neu-erfundene
Historisch-Chronologische Spiel-Tafel zur Erlernung der Teutschen Reichs-Historie249 (Newly
invented historical-chronological game board in order to learn the history of the German
Empire, 1720) and its French model, the Tableau chronologique de l'histoire universelle gravé
en forme de jeu250 (Chronological table of Universal History engraved in the form of a Game,
1717) by Claude Buffier. These two elaborate and ornate examples of Early Modern educational

246
Cf. ibid.
247
Cf. MUHLACK, Ulrich: Geschichtswissenschaft im Humanismus und in der Aufklärung. Die Vorgeschichte
des Historismus. Munich 1991, p. 150.
248
“[…] le plus ancien des Historiens“. BOSSUET, Discours, p. 7.
249
The board is part of SPRINGER, Johann Balthasar: Kurze Einleitung zur Reichs-Historie Von Teutschland,
Worinnen Alle Haupt-Veränderungen des T. Reichs und die führnehmsten Denckwürdigkeiten, so sich unter
eines jeden Kaysers Regierung Von CAROLO M. biß auf jetzt regierende Kayserl. Mäjestät CAROLUM VI.
zugetragen, Zur Erläuterung der also betitulten Historisch-Chronologischen Spiel-Tafel, Darauf sich sothane
Begebenheiten und Geschichte zum Begriff der edlen Jugend In Medaillen oder Schau-Müntzen praesentiren
[…]. Regensburg 1720. For a detailed analysis of this game see SCHMIDELER, Sebastian: „Hier sind die
Abbildungen und Modelle von allem, was dazugehört“. Schaustücke zum Mittelalter in der Kinder- und
Jugendliteratur des 18. Jahrhunderts. In: BERNDT, Frauke/FULDA, Daniel (eds.): Die Sachen der Aufklärung.
Beiträge zur DGEJ-Jahrestagung 2010 in Halle a. d. Saale. Hamburg 2012, pp. 490-497.
250
BUFFIER, Claude: Tableau chronologique de l'histoire universelle gravé en forme de jeu, avec l'exposition
des règles de ce jeu et des faits historiques dont il est composé. Paris 1717.

82
games illustrate the linear and chronological notion of universal history which was prevalent in
the early eighteenth century. The course of history was represented by a sequence of medallions
depicting either monarchs (in the case of the German Spiel-Tafel) or historical, mythological or
biblical events (in the case of the French Tableau chronologique). These two depictions not
only demonstrate the linearity of the historical past but also reveal the interlacement of political
and exegetical elements within this notion of history.

4.4.2. Synchronicity and Geographical Space

4.4.2.1. Gatterer’s Nexus rerum universalis

An analysis of the dimensional aspects of eighteenth-century historiography proves to be

difficult due to its various different manifestations. However, with the help of assertions made
by writers of the second half of the century, it is possible to demonstrate how the notion of
history changed over the course of the eighteenth century in terms of its dimensionalization.

In the German speaking world, one of the most influential scholars concerned with history was
certainly Johann Christoph Gatterer, who became professor of history at the University of
Göttingen in 1759 and who is regarded as one of the main promoters of a scientifically
conducted history. Seeking for a methodological specification of the entire historiographical
enterprise he authored fundamental principles and textbooks in areas now regarded as ancillary
disciplines, such as statistics, numismatics, heraldry, diplomatics or geography. In this context
it is important to mention an essential difference between eighteenth-century historiography as
intended by Gatterer and its modern conception. As Martin Gierl points out, late eighteenth-
century historiography did not imply source-based, textual narration but perceived history as a
serial, compiling construction of ‘exact’ data and thus aimed at a reconstruction of the historical
past.251 For the first time, as Volker Rödel remarks, history was conducted purely without
political, theological or juridical purposes.252

In terms of the dimensional aspects of history, Gatterer and his work played an important role.
In his attempt to reform history within the academic sphere he disapproved of its traditional
conception. In his essay Vom historischen Plan (About the Plan of History) he criticized the
way universal history had been conducted until then, pinpointing two categories of universal-
historiographic literature either based on a subdivision into epochs or on the history of nations.

251
Cf. GIERL, Geschichte, pp. 1-3.
252
Cf. RÖDEL, Volker: Johann Christoph Gatterers ‚Linnaeismus Graphicus‘: Klassifikation und Universalismus
im 18. Jahrhundert. In: Medizinhistorisches Journal, Vol. 17/3 (1982), p. 216.

83
Even though he did not entirely dismiss these approaches, he outspokenly found fault with these
‘histories’ which he thought were either fragmented and incoherent or, in the case of histories
of single nations, detached as well as isolated. Either way, Gatterer’s main point of criticism
was the one-dimensionality of these approaches which did not correspond with his
understanding of universal history. To him, history was a polydimensional system of interlacing
structures and mutual dependencies of historical events and developments. Therefore, the
traditional approaches did not do justice to the complexity of history, as they lacked a central
principle which Gatterer regarded as essential: synchronicity.253

One of Gatterer’s main claims was the compilation of synchronistic tables which should display
the histories of single nations as parallel chronologies. This analysis would go too far afield if
it went into more detail about the general historical development and usage of historical tables
as historiographic devices. An extensive study on this topic has already been presented by
Benjamin Steiner, who has analysed the role of these tabular histories in Early Modern
historiography and also considered their dimensional aspects.254 With his synchronistic
approach Gatterer expanded the dimensional aspect of the historiographic evaluation of the
past. The synchronistic table, whose y-axis represented the course of time, was widely extended
to the x-axis in the sense of an expansion of space. The different chronologies of various
(geographical) spaces were placed side by side to form a universal entirety that included time
and space and allowed synchronistic comparison.

The underlying principle for this conception was Gatterer’s assumption of a “Nexus rerum
universalis”255, a universal connection of things. This notion is not accidentally reminiscent of
the all-encompassing interconnections of the universe represented by the scala naturae. In
accordance with the universal nexuses assumed for the natural world, Gatterer claimed that:

[…] no event in the world is, so to say, insular. Everything is linked together,
causes each other, begets each other, is caused, is begotten, and causes and begets
again. The events of the noble and the humble, of single humans and of all
together, of private life and of the big world, and even of the senseless and
inanimate creatures and of men, all are intertwined and connected.256

253
Cf. GATTERER, Johann Christoph: Vom historischen Plan, und der darauf sich gründenden Zusammenfügung
der Erzählungen. In: Id. (ed.): Allgemeine historische Bibliothek des königlichen Instituts der historischen
Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Vol. 1. Halle/Saale 1767, pp. 16-17.
254
See footnote 225.
255
Cf. GATTERER, Plan, p. 85.
256
“[…] keine Begebenheit in der Welt ist, so zu sagen, insularisch. Alles hängt an einander, veranlasst einander,
zeugt einander, wird veranlasst, wird gezeugt, und veranlasst und zeugt wieder. Die Begebenheiten der

84
The parallel to eighteenth-century cosmology is obvious. The idea of a nexus rerum universalis
was not only the principle for the natural world, represented by the scale of beings, but also the
main principle and claim for a universal history as Gatterer understood it. Yet it is not only this
notion that can be seen as a parallel between the comprehension of nature and the understanding
of history. Furthermore, after having exemplified the mutual connections within the historical
world, it became clear to him that – considering the whole “[…] system of such [historical,
F.M.] events” – “[…] there exists a whole chain [sic!] of causes of which the narrated [event,
F.M.] is only a link”257. The fact that the metaphor of the chain was used in this context can
certainly be explained by the perception of cause and effect; yet considering Gatterer’s
assumption of the nexus rerum universalis, the accordance with the omnipresent concept of the
scala naturae appears to be beyond doubt.

In addition it is crucial to mention that Gatterer was well familiar with the natural philosophy,
or rather natural history, of his time. This can best be shown by taking the example of his
methodological approach of a paleographic ordering system on the basis of the Linnaean
classification. With his adaption of a system of natural classification Gatterer wanted to forward
his endeavour to scientify history and its associated auxiliary disciplines. His Linnaeismus
graphicus was the attempt to provide diplomatics and palaeography with a scientific ordering
method,258 thus reconnecting history and natural history on a methodological level. It goes
without saying that this effort must be understood within the general ordering attempts of the
eighteenth century. It is particularly interesting that this Linnaean classification of scripts,
serving the purpose of historical studies, contained a notion of historical change, something the
original Linnaean classification of nature evidently did not. In an explanation of his system,
delivered in 1798, Gatterer remarked that – contrary to its counterpart in natural history – his
Linnaeismus graphicus was not only useful in terms of order but also in terms of determining
the age of different scriptures.259 Thus, the Linnaeismus graphicus was used to display
developments within the system of writing systems.260 Gatterer’s application of natural history
methodology to his systematic classification in order to reshape history as a discipline can be

Vornehmen und der Geringen, der einzelnen Menschen und aller zusammen, des Privatlebens und der grossen
Welt, ja selbst der unvernünftigen und leblosen Geschöpfe und der Menschen, alle sind in einander verschlungen
und verbunden“. Ibid. Author’s translation.
257
“Allein man betrachte nur das ganze System solcher Begebenheiten, so wird man bald finden, daß hier eine
ganze Kette von Ursachen vorhanden ist, an welcher die erzählte nur ein Glied ausmacht”. Ibid., pp. 86-87.
Author’s translation.
258
Cf. RÖDEL, Linnaeismus, pp. 215-218.
259
Cf. GATTERER, Johann Christoph: Abrißder Diplomatik. Göttingen 1798, pp. 37-38.
260
Cf. GIERL, Geschichte, p. 198.

85
understood – even though on a methodological level - as a reapproach of the separated areas of
history and natural history. This was, however, not the only intersection between natural history
and history in the second half of the eighteenth century. Another connecting factor was the new
notion of geographical space which became not only relevant for nature but also for history.

4.4.2.2. History and Space

Gatterer’s attempt at comprehensive synchronistic historical tables reveals the increasing

significance of geographical space in history. Universal history was perceived as the
accumulation of different, juxtaposed histories of distinct geographical areas or nations. This
extension to spatial aspects had great influence on the general concept of history and the way
history was depicted and displayed. Considering this, it is not surprising that geography gained
more and more importance as an auxiliary discipline within late eighteenth-century
historiography. Especially in Göttingen, geography and its historical interpretation became of
particular interest.261

For Gatterer, history was inseparably connected to nature, and his understanding of human
history included a distinct notion of environmental influences. Thus, it was his utmost aim to
understand “[e]arth and its inhabitant, man: both, not only how they are by nature, but also
how nature, times, customs and political institutions have altered them […]”262. Two aspects
of this statement are significant: First, its accordance with the contemporary notions of a
changing earth due to natural or environmental impacts, and second, the role of nature within
this interacting system. Nature itself – according to this concept – was understood as an agent
of the change which earth and mankind were subject to; yet it was not changing itself. This,
again, corresponds with the aforesaid: earth was part of the natural world, but the notion of a
changing earth did not imply a notion of a changing nature. Nevertheless, the geographical
aspect of history was central to Gatterer’s approach, since for him – as Gierl remarks – history
took place within geography.263

As a consequence, Gatterer devoted himself to the study of geography and cartography and
compiled comprehensive physiographical and historical maps, depicting historical
developments under spatial aspects. It has to be mentioned that Gatterer was not the inventor

261
Cf. FEUERSTEIN-HERZ, Zimmermann, p.38.
262
„Den Erdboden, und seinen Bewohner, den Menschen: beede, nicht nur wie sie von Natur aus sind, sondern
wie Natur, Zeiten, Sitten und politische Anstalten sie umgeändert haben […]“. GATTERER, Johann Christoph:
Abriß der Geographie. Göttingen 1775, p. 3. Author’s translation.
263
GIERL, Geschichte, p. 250.

86
of historical cartography. Already at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Atlas
historique had been published by Zacharias Châtelain, and several other historical maps were
compiled over the course of the following decades.264 Gatterer’s efforts can therefore be seen
as the result of a development that is distinctive of eighteenth-century historical thought. The
relevance of his geographical approach towards historiography becomes obvious with the fact
that his workplace was the University of Göttingen, where Zimmermann had spent part of his
student days.265

Similar developments can be observed also outside the German speaking world. As far as
England is concerned, the most impressive examples of the spatial extension of history on the
level of representation and depiction are certainly Thomas Jefferys’ Chart of Universal History
from 1753 as well as Joseph Priestley’s Chart of Biography (1765) and Chart of History (1769).
However, these arrays – created as charts to depict universal history as detailed and clearly as
possible – were not compiled as maps but distinctly built upon spatial considerations.266 Other
similar, yet misleading, attempts can be found in Italy. For instance, during the 1720s the Italian
scholar Girolamo Andria Martignoni created several historical ‘maps’ to depict the history of
Italy. Prima facie these compilations can easily be mistaken as historical cartographies, as they,
indeed, resemble geographical maps. Yet Martignioni’s carte used geographical topics and
elements only as analogies to depict history as interplay between chronographic and
geographical data.267 Even though this approach is also representative of the changing concept
of historical space in the eighteenth century, it should be understood in relation to the role of
maps as knowledge store in the context of the Early Modern ars memoriae.268 Nevertheless, the
emergence of historical cartography in the eighteenth century is one of the main indicators of
the increasing significance of spatial aspects in history.

4.4.2.3. History Outside Europe

Another important aspect of the spatial extension of historical thought is the fact that now even
areas outside the traditional realm of salvation history came to the fore. Since earlier
historiographies had largely been committed to issues of the historia sacra, the ‘historical

264
Cf. ibid., pp. 248-249.
265
Cf. FEUERSTEIN-HERZ, Zimmermann, p. 38.
266
Cf. ROSENBERG, Daniel/GRAFTON, Anthony: Cartographies of time. A History of the Timeline. Princeton
2010, pp. 112-121.
267
Cf. ibid., pp. 108-111.
268
Cf. LESTRINGANT, Frank: Die Erfindung des Raumes. Kartographie, Fiktion und Alterität in der Literatur
der Renaissance. Bielefeld 2012, pp.12-13.

87
space’ was – as mentioned above – limited to the realm of the ancient world for quite a long
time. Only with the breakup of the traditional historia concept and the declining prevalence of
sacred history to the benefit of profane history were the borders of this ‘historical space’
expanded.269

The most famous example of this spatially extended understanding of history in the eighteenth
century is certainly Voltaire’s Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations from 1756. His
approach towards history is symptomatic of the expansion of the perceptual horizon of
eighteenth-century historiography and the successive disengagement from linearity. By starting
his Essai with an account of the history of China, Voltaire abandoned the prevalent
Eurocentricity of the time and directed attention towards a culture which “[…] had a connected
history in a language already fixed, before we knew how to write”270. Not only did Voltaire
address an area that had been – as he outspokenly criticised – completely ignored by Bossuet;271
but he also regarded Chinese culture as having originally been superior to European culture:
“[w]hen you consider this globe as a philosopher, you first direct your attention to the east, the
nursery of all arts, and from whence they have been communicated to the west”272.

This new perspective inevitably led to a new way of writing history. The beginning of the
preface to the English translation of Voltaire’s work, delivered by Thomas Nugent, provides
evidence of this different approach:

The reader will easily perceive that the following work is not a chronological
compilement, or a dry series of genealogies and facts; the public is overstocked
with pieces of that sort: it is the picture of mankind in different ages; or a
philosophical history of the world.273

Voltaire’s history is not merely a collection of data in order to be able to trace the linear series
of events and the succession of regencies. Instead, it is an attempt to provide a synoptic history
that comprises the entirety of humanity in a global sense. Although it must still be seen in the
tradition of universal history, it can also be understood as a first step towards a kind of
historiography that would emerge in the further course of the second half of the century, and
which will be dealt with at the end of this paper: the history of mankind.

269
Cf. MUHLACK, Geschichtswissenschaft, pp. 150-151.
270
VOLTAIRE: An Essay on Universal History, the Manners, and Spirit of Nations […]. Translated by Thomas
Nugent. Vol. 1. London 1759, p. 10.
271
Cf. ibid., p. 3.
272
Ibid.
273
Ibid., p. V. Emphasis in the original.

88
4.4.3. Expanding Time – Past, Future and Progress within

It has been demonstrated that one of the main characteristics and developments of eighteenth-
century historiography was its extension towards space. History was increasingly understood
within a geographical framework, dependent on its spatial situatedness. Yet, other significant
developments can be observed concerning the dimensional notion of history, not only in terms
of space but also of time.

Even though the biblical chronology remained valid until well into the eighteenth and even
nineteenth centuries– exemplified by Bossuet’s universal history –, this traditional view in
correspondence with salvation history had already been challenged over the course of the
seventeenth century. Definitely, the most famous of these opponents to the traditional view was
the French theologian Issac La Peyrère, who launched an influential debate on the validity of
the chronology of the Bible. In 1655 he published his controversial and soon to be forbidden
Praeadamitae, wherein he postulated – as the title suggests – the existence of men before Adam.
His arguments for this audacious claim were, on the one hand, based on theological and
exegetical considerations and, on the other hand, the result of reflections concerning foreign
chronologies which came into the European focus. Since the comparison between Egyptian,
Chinese and European chronological calculations disclosed severe contradictions, the
traditional calculation of the age of the world was doubted on this level as well.274

With this extension of the timescale into the past, the traditional chronological framework of
history – both of the earth and of man – started to collapse. Naturally, La Peyrère’s reflections
were still situated within the tradition of the Bible and the history of salvation. Yet, along with
the inversion of the relation between sacred and profane history, the notion of historical time
was questioned, too, and underwent massive alterations. In the 1770s at the latest and with
Buffon’s extensive expansion of the history of the world, the notion of a world that was older
than 5000 years had gained ground also within natural history. The fact that towards the end of
the eighteenth century even the notion of future had already been seperated from theological-
eschatological beliefs that anticipated an apocalyptical end of the world can easily be shown by
the example of Mercier’s already mentioned utopistic novel.275 Moreover, Mercier’s fictional
vision of the year 2440 is a manifestation of a notion of historical time that is also significant
of this period, namely the notion of progress.

274
Cf. ROSSI, Abyss, pp. 132-137.
275
Cf. KOSELLECK, Reinhard: Zeitschichten. Studien zur Historik. Frankfurt/Main 2000, pp. 131-141.

89
The presumption of a progressive (cultural) development – and thus of a perfectibility of man
– can be regarded as one of the central and most characteristic topics of eighteenth-century
philosophy and, consequentially, of history. Especially the concepts of philosophers like
Voltaire, Rousseau or Condorcet must to be mentioned in this context. Since the history of the
idea of progress has already been lengthily elaborated – for instance by Robert A. Nisbet and
Ernst Breisach, the latter of whom has already shown the different manifestations of notions of
progress and perfectibility in the historiography of this period – it seems to suffice here to
simply refer to these works.276 Nevertheless, it is relevant to point out certain aspects of the
general notion of progressive development and change.

Distinct notions of progress in a historical sense – which proved to be decisive for the historical
thought in the following century – can already be found towards the end of the seventeenth
century. In particular, the French author Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle, one of the
protagonists of early Enlightenment, expressed his notion of historical progress of man in his
Digression sur les Anciens et les Modernes in 1688. This paper was Fontenelle’s contribution
to the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, a significant intellectual debate, which originally
took place in France between 1687 and 1700 and later gained importance for the rest of Europe.
The main topic of the debate was the relation between ancient and ‘modern’ times and the
question whether the ancient world could validly serve as a role model. The Querelle can be
seen as fundamental, especially with regard to the replacement of the cyclical concept of history
with linear notions.277

One of the main features of Fontenelle’s conception of history was his notion of the historical
progress of man, which was the result of an analogization or parallelization of phylogenesis and
ontogenesis: by comparing the historical development of humanity with the ontological
development of man as an individual and the human mind in the course of a lifetime, Fontenelle
– according to Lucas Marco Gisi – laid the foundation for an anthropocentric notion of history
in the eighteenth century.278 Fontenelle elaborated his ideas in his essay Sur l’histoire which
was not published until 1758.279 The fact that Fontenelle’s Digression was translated into
German in 1751 by Johann Christoph Gottsched and, consequentially, extensively received,

276
See NISBET, Robert A.: The History of the Idea of Progress. New York 1980, pp. 118-237; BREISACH,
Ernst: Historiography. Ancient, Medieval & Modern. Chicago 1994, pp. 205-210.
277
Cf. GISI, Einbildungskraft, pp. 13-16.
278
Cf. ibid., pp. 18-19.
279
Cf. ibid., pp. 321-323.

90
gives proof of its significance even outside France.280 It is important to mention that by the time
both Gottsched’s translation and Fontenelle’s Sur l’histoire were published, the discussion
between epigenesists and the advocates of preformation about generation and ontogenesis had
already reached its climax. Thus, Fontenelle’s parallelization of ontogenesis and history was
discussed at a time when the debate on the development of organisms was highly relevant.
Likewise, this parallelization of onto- and phylogenesis is a fundamental assumption in Vico’s
concept of history.281

This can again be seen as a link between natural history and historiography in the middle of the
eighteenth century. The history of man was increasingly perceived as a process of cultural
unfolding and perfection and – as Annette Meyer points out – contrasted sharply with the still
present presumption of the constancy of human nature.282 Nevertheless, the notion of the
perfectibility of man became a central aspect in the scientific discussions of the period and can
easily be linked with the contemporary reflections about the natural world, which have been
outlined in chapter 2. Not only were the concepts of history subject to significant changes in
terms of temporal and spatial expansion but also the extended notion of time was accompanied
by the notion of progressive change. As Benjamin Steiner writes, a notion of historical progress
can, of course, already be found in the writings of ancient authorities like St. Augustine and
was also part of the salvation-historical doctrine. Yet, during the Enlightenment, the
theologically founded temporal framework of this notion was successively abolished and
replaced by the idea of an open future.283

However, for a more complete understanding of the dimensional conception of eighteenth-

century history, another aspect is central as well. Apart from the extension of dimensional
aspects in history, which have been described above, one further facet must to be taken into
consideration: the collapse of the linear dimensional framework as a result of a comparative
method and diachronic comparison.

280
Cf. FONTENELLE, Bernard Le Bovier de: Auserlesene Schriften, nämlich von mehr als einer Welt, Gespräche
der Todten, und die Historie der Heidnischen Orakel; […]. Translated by Johann Christoph Gottsched. Leipzig
1751, pp. 558-589.
281
Cf. GISI, Einbildungskraft, p. 215.
282
Cf. MEYER, Wahrscheinlichkeit, p. 113.
283
Cf. STEINER, Ordnung, pp. 290-295.

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4.4.4. Pushing Dimensional Boundaries – Cultures across Time and Space

The seventeenth-century Querelle, as Steiner states, can already be seen as an example of the
comparison between two cultural systems across time. With the direct comparison between the
ancients and the moderns, a diachronic juxtaposition was established in order to identify and
evaluate any alleged progress in history.284 Yet, this diachrony was set along a classical, linear
notion of history and did not reach the dimensional extent it finally had in the eighteenth
century.
Doubtlessly, the most significant example of the establishment of a comparative historical
method that included both temporal and spatial aspects is the treatise Moeurs des sauvages
américains comparées aux moeurs des premiers temps (Customs of the American savages
compared with the customs of the first times) by the French Jesuit missionary Joseph François
Lafitau, published in 1724. Lafitau, having spent five years as a missionary in Canada,285 had
studied the culture of indigenous people of Northern America and – being a member of the
learned Jesuit Order – was, of course, also familiar with the historiographic writings of
European antiquity. Thus, Lafitau set out to compare the customs of the American Natives he
had been able to observe with the customs of people of ancient times, recorded by authors like
Herodotus. His aim, however, was not merely to achieve a better understanding of Native
American cultures:

I have not limited myself to learning the characteristics of the Indian and
informing myself about their customs and practices, I have sought in these
practices and customs vestiges of the most remote antiquity. I have read carefully
[the works, F.M.] of the earliest writers who treated the customs, laws and usages
of the people of whom they had some knowledge. I have made a comparison of
these customs with each other. I confess that, if the ancient authors have given
me information on which to base happy conjectures about the Indians, the
customs of the Indians have given me information on the basis of which I can
understand more easily and explain more readily many things in the ancient
authors.286

With this approach, Lafitau advocated the comparability between different cultures or people
not only across time but at the same time also across different geographical spaces.

284
Cf. ibid., p. 297.
285
LAFITAU, Joseph François: Customs of the American Indians Compared with the Customs of Primitive
Times. Edited and translated by William N. Fenton and Elizabeth L. Moore. Vol.1. Toronto 1974, p. 26.
286
Ibid., p. 27.

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Lafitau’s account stands in the tradition of reports and travelogues that reached Europe, telling
Europeans about the ‘savages’ and ‘barbarians’ of the New World who were ‘discovered’ in
the wake of the systematic exploration of the globe in the Early Modern period. Even though
Lafitau’s comparison of the native people of the New World with ancient cultures and people
is often considered as being mainly an ethnological or anthropological work,287 it nevertheless
opened up a new perspective and offered a new methodology within the historiography of the
time. By comparing not only different stages within one linear timeline – i.e. within a temporal
frame – but also different geographical areas, namely ancient cultures of the classical world
and people of America, Lafitau laid the foundation for an intertemporal and transspatial notion
of history: matters of the present and the historical past and of different times of the historical
past, respectively were comparable not only within a distinct linearity of continuity or
development but also across geographical areas.

An interesting aspect in this context is the history of the reception of Lafitau in the eighteenth
century. Interestingly enough, one of the Jesuit’s main critics was Voltaire, who ridiculed
Lafitau’s reflections, although he himself was dedicated to the historical evaluation of different
customs. Both Voltaire’s anti-clericalism288 and his assumption of a polygenetic origin of
mankind289 can be regarded as reasons for his rejection. Nonetheless, as Fenton and Moore
state, it can be assumed that Lafitau’s approach had influenced Voltaire with regard to his notion
of history.290 It is difficult to trace back Lafitau’s direct influence on French historiography of
the time – except for Antoine-Yves Goguet’s adoption of some of Lafitau’s ideas291 – , yet his
impact on German speaking scholars is even more evident. A German translation was first
published in 1753,292 and at the same time Johann Friedrich Schröter included large parts of
Lafitau’s work in his Allgemeine Geschichte der Länder und Völker von Amerika (General
history of the Nations and People of America).293 In addition to that, the treatise Kort Fortælling
af de vilde Folks (Short Story of the wild People) by the Danish philosopher Jens Kraft – who
was highly influenced by Rousseau and had taken up Lafitau’s approach – was translated into
German in 1766.294

287
Cf. FENTON, William N./MOORE, Elizabeth L.: Introduction. In: LAFITAU, Customs, p. XXIX.
288
Cf. ibid., p. XCVI.
289
Cf. GISI, Mythologie, p. 130.
290
Cf. FENTON/MOORE, Introduction, p. XCVIII.
291
Cf. ibid., p. C.
292
Cf. ZEDELMAIER, Helmut: Der Anfang der Geschichte. Studien zur Ursprungsdebatte im 18. Jahrhundert.
Hamburg 2003, p. 188.
293
Cf. FENTON/MOORE, Introduction, p. CVII.
294
Cf. ZEDELMAIER, Anfang, p. 190.

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Apart from the dimensional implication of this comparative historiographic approach, another
central development needs to be pointed out which can be regarded as being fundamental to the
new notion of history that became prevalent over the course of the eighteenth-century: the
anthropologization of history, i.e. the incorporation of anthropological notions of man, the
emergence of cultural history and the subsequent reconnection of history and nature.

4.5. ‘Anthropology’ and the ‘History of Mankind’ – Reconnecting History and

Nature

4.5.1. The Rise of Anthropological Thought

The rise of anthropology in the eighteenth century was, as Thomas Nutz recapitulates, the result
of a broadening of the perceptual horizon and an increase in information and data in the wake
of the successive discovery of the world. Although the fundamental question concerning human
nature was as old as humanity, the new perspectives opened up by cultures and people – in
combination with the departure from the Cartesian mind-body-dualism and from solely
metaphysical-theological explanatory models – paved the way for new ways of perceiving,
thinking and conceptualizing human nature holistically.295 Particularly due to the influence of
the Baconian system of science in the eighteenth century, the ‘study of man’ was acknowledged
as a distinct scientific discipline.296 Bacon regarded the study of man as being equal to the
studies of nature and the divine: “Thus it is convenient to divide philosophy into three doctrines:
the doctrine of divinity, the doctrine of nature, the doctrine of man”297. According to this
systematisation man was to be understood and treated as an independent scientific object, a
view which paved the way for the emancipation of anthropological thought in this period.

It has to be pointed out that this increasing importance of certain anthropologic issues over the
course of the eighteenth century – which, in recent historiographies, is often interpreted as an
‘anthropologic turn’ – needs to be treated within a larger scope. The investigations of Simone
de Angelis in particular have shown that the foundations for a ‘science of man’ were already
laid in the early stages of the Early Modern period. According to him, the anthropology of the
eighteenth century can only be understood in the context of the debates on the nature of the

295
Cf. NUTZ, Varietäten, pp. 7-8.
296
Cf. MEYER, Wahrheit, pp. 106-107.
297
“Convenit igitur partiri philosophiam in doctrinas tres: doctrinam de numine, doctrinam de natura, doctrinam
de homine”. BACON, De dignitate, p. 199. Author’s translation. Emphasis in the original.

94
soul, the rise of medical anatomy and the interpretations of natural law in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.298

Besides, talking about anthropology in the Age of Enlightenment is also connected with certain
definitional and terminological difficulties. This is the case not only because of the plurality
and diversity of anthropological notions in different areas of interest in eighteenth-century
thought but also because of the still existing ambiguity of the term in the present. For the
purpose of this investigation, a concise eighteenth-century definition will be used, found in the
1771 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica that defines anthropology as “a discourse about
human nature”299. This contemporary definition seems to be the most suitable for the current
discussion in this last chapter, which tries to give a brief account of the history of
anthropological thought within the realm of historiography – rather than of a history of
anthropology as a discipline. The question concerning human nature – as will be demonstrated
in the following – was a central issue of eighteenth-century scholarly studies and thus played a
highly influential role in the development of historical thought as well as in natural history.

Robert Wokler rightfully states that “[n]o age of European intellectual history was more
fascinated by the ideas of human nature – by its biological and moral dimension, and its
physical and spiritual attributes – than the Enlightenment”300 and indicates the wide scope of
notions and implications this interest entailed. This general tendency was also a central element
of eighteenth-century classification. Obvioulsy, it was Carl von Linné who was most concerned
with the question of the (biological) nature of human beings in his attempt to order the natural
world. Using the phrase “nosce Te ipsum”301 – know thyself – Linnaeus, in the 10th edition of
his Systema naturae, explicitly classified man as a primate, which shows that he regarded
Homo sapiens as part of the animal kingdom. As Hans Werner Ingensiep states, this serves as
an indicator of the incorporation of man in the general understanding of nature beyond the
mechanistic explanations of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Cartesianism. Over the

298
Cf. DE ANGELIS, Simone: Anthropologien. Genese und Konfiguration einer ‚Wissenschaft vom Menschen‘
in der Frühen Neuzeit. Berlin 2010, pp. 1-21.
299
‘Anthropology’. In: Encyclopaedia Britannica, p. 327.
300
WOKLER, Robert: Anthropology and Conjectural History in the Enlightenment. In: FOX, Christopher et al.
(eds.): Inventing Human Science. Eighteenth-Century Domains. Berkeley 1995, p. 32.
301
LINNÉ, Systema (1758), p. 20.

95
course of the eighteenth century, man was increasingly perceived as being part of the entirety
of nature and treated with regard to his relation to and his place within the natural world.302

Representative of this changing notion of man is the way Buffon dealt with this issue in his
extensive Histoire naturelle, providing a Histoire naturelle d’homme. With regard to the nature
of man, Buffon commented on man’s position within the natural world:

Man, it is true, resembles the other animals in the material part of his being; and,
in the enumeration of natural existences, we are obliged to rank him in the class
of animals. But, in nature, there are neither classes nor genera; all are mere
independent individuals. Classes and genera are only the arbitrary operations of
our own fancy: And, though we place man in one of these classes, we change not
his nature; we derogate not from his dignity; we alter not his real condition; we
only assign him the first rank among beings which resemble him solely in the
material part of his existence.303

This passage not only illustrates Buffon’s own approach towards this subject but also reveals
the general struggle that came along with the inclusion of man into nature. Linné’s
classification of man as an animal implied a relativization of man’s supremacy, something that
was not only in contradiction to theological doctrines but also to human self-perception in
general. Buffon’s solution was fairly simple: regarding the material aspects of the human body,
man was part of the natural world, yet regarding his mental faculties, man took on a special
role. Thus, it was the soul that distinguished man from other animals.

For Buffon – who tried to counteract the degradation of man made by his opponent Linné – the
universal scala naturae did not keep its infinite continuity when it came to the transition from
animal to man. According to him, there was no intermediate state between the possession and
non-possession of a soul which was the distinctive feature distinguishing animals from humans.
In contrast to this, Bonnet, the most dedicated proponent of the scale of beings, regarded the
mental faculties of apes as being similar to those of man and, therefore, he also placed man
within the continuity of the scale.304 It goes without saying that the discussion about man’s
position in nature and his relation to other primates in particular is closely connected to Tyson’s
comparative treatise from 1699.

302
Cf. INGENSIEP, Hans Werner: Der Mensch im Spiegel der Tier- und Pflanzenseele. Zur Anthropo-
morphologie der Naturwahrnehmung im 18. Jahrhundert. In: SCHINGS, Hans-Jürgen (ed.): Der ganze Mensch.
Anthropologie und Literatur im 18. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart 1994, p. 55.
303
BUFFON, History, Vol. 2 (1791), pp. 360-361 (= BUFFON, Histoire, Vol. 2 (1749), p. 437).
304
Cf. INGENSIEP, Mensch, pp. 60-61.

96
However, not only man’s position within the system of nature was of eminent interest in the
discussion about human nature. In addition, the various manifestations of man not only struck
the naturalists’ eye but also raised certain questions concerning the classification as well as the
origin of these different varieties. In his Systema naturae of 1758 Linnaeus already set up a
classification of man, stating six subdivisions of the species Homo sapiens: apart from the
subcategories that divided man with regard to geographical aspects – Americanus, Europaeus,
Asiaticus, Afer –, Linné also posited the two varieties Homo ferus (the ‘wild man’) and Homo
monstrosus (the ‘monstrous man’) and attributed specific features to each category.305

As a matter of course, the classification of man was a central issue for the famous naturalist
Buffon, too. His investigation of the various manifestations of man proved to be an important
step in the development of anthropology as a scientific discipline.306 Buffon’s approach
towards the topic is closely connected to his general theories about the natural world in which
geographical aspects played a central, influential role. In addition, this assumption provided
the basis for his discussion of the issues of the Variétés dans l’espéce humaine (Varieties of the
human species) in the third volume of his Histoire. After having dealt with the different
varieties by means of three criteria – namely “colour”, “figure and stature” and “dispositions
of different people”307 – the naturalist hypothesized the monophyly of man:

Upon the whole, every circumstance concurs in proving, that mankind are not
composed of species essentially different from each other; that, on the contrary,
there was originally but one species, who, after multiplying and spreading over
the whole surface of the earth, have undergone various changes the influence of
climate, mode of living, epidemic diseases, and the mixture of dissimilar
individuals.308

Buffon argued that the various observable manifestations of man should not be regarded as
different species but as varieties of one homogenous (human) species which were caused by
the influences responsible for all change in nature.

As a consequence of this newly emerged interest, the classification of human varieties

flourished in the following years. Naturalists like the Göttingen professor Johann Christian
Polycarp Erxleben (1777), Johann Christian von Schreber (1775) or the Irish author Oliver

305
LINNÉ, Systema (1758), pp. 20-21.
306
Cf. ROGER, Buffon, p. 170.
307
BUFFON, History, Vol. 3 (1785), p. 57 (= BUFFON, Histoire, Vol. 3. (1749), p. 371)
308
Ibid., pp. 206-207 (= BUFFON, Histoire, Vol. 3. (1749), pp. 529-530)

97
Goldsmith (1774) tried to order the varieties of the human species within their zoological
works.309 One of the most influential contributions to this topic was, doubtlessly, Blumenbach’s
initially mentioned De generis humani varietate nativa (On the Natural Variety of Mankind)
from 1777, which was translated into German in 1795. Blumenbach’s approach was
groundbreaking in so far as he established a classificational method based not on outward
criteria but on anatomical features. Thus, with Blumenbach, the method of comparative
anatomy found its way into anthropology.310

Originally adhering to Linné’s division of the Homo sapiens into four geographical varieties,311
Blumenbach – as a result of his anatomical research – added the Malayan variety to his system.
Yet, since he was convinced of the monophyletic origin of mankind, he pointed out that this
categorization could only be considered as a rough guideline. The distinctions between
different varieties was not as strict as it appeared, but was rather meant to depict continuous
transitions.312 Another naturalist who promoted the method of comparative anatomy for
anthropological studies was Blumenbach’s student Samuel Thomas Soemmerring. Following
Camper – and in contrast to Blumenbach –, Soemmerring used his anatomical studies to
determine the position of different ethnicities within the scala naturae. Thus, since a distinct
notion of hierarchy was inherent in the scale of beings, he concluded a hierarchy for the
varieties of man, placing the African closer to apes than the European whom he regarded as
being at the top of the linear order.313 In his important treatise Ueber die körperliche
Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europäer314 (About the physical difference between the Negro
and the European) from 1785 Soemmerring expounded his observations concerning
anatomical differences between the bodies of European and African origin, which were based
on his comparative anatomical studies.

This central issue of anthropological comparative anatomy was, naturally, linked with the
question of man’s position in nature and his relation to the animal world. In his influential
treatise from 1699, which dealt with the anatomical comparison of man and apes, Tyson had

309
Cf. NUTZ, Varietäten, p. 128.
310
Cf. ibid., p. 130.
311
Blumenbach outspokenly rejected Linné’s inclusion of the Homo ferus into his classification. Cf. MARINO,
Mario: Einleitung. In: BLUMENBACH, Johann Friedrich: Beyträge zur Naturgeschichte. Published with an
Introduction by Mario Marino. Hildesheim 2014, p. XL.
312
Cf. Nutz, Varietäten, pp. 130-131.
313
Cf. ibid., pp. 135-137.
314
SOEMMERRING, Thomas Samuel von: Ueber die körperliche Verschiedenheit des Negers vom Europäer.
Frankfurt 1785. This is the extended version of a treatise published in the previous year as Id.: Ueber die
körperliche Verschiedenheit des Mohren vom Europäer. Mainz 1784.

98
concluded that – based on the observation that no considerable physical differences could be
found – apes could be regarded as the link between animals and man in the chain of beings.
This opinion, which was also shared by Linné, remained prevalent until well into the second
half of the century. Consequentially, the allegation of the supremacy of man over nature was
substantiated mainly by the argument that man possessed reason.315 However, from the 1770s
onwards – due to the advances in comparative anatomy –, anatomical differences between ape
and men were determined. In the ensuing debates, a special role was attributed to the os
intermaxillare, or incisive bone. Camper had stated (and was supported in his opinion) that this
little bone was missing in the human skull, whereas it could be found in the skulls of most
animals as well as in the skull of the orang-utan.316 It was not before the early 1780s that this
bone was independently discovered and described by Felix Vicq d’Azyr and Johann Wolfgang
von Goethe in 1784,317 thus putting man closer to animals again. It must not be ignored that,
apart from these discussions, the concept of the continuous chain of beings still influenced the
scientific debates. In a treatise from 1787 Christoph Ludwig Pfeiffer, for instance, regarded the
orang-utan as an intermediate creature between man and animals.318

In addition, Zimmermann’s Geographische Geschichte des Menschen must be interpreted

within the framework of is this heyday of anthropological classification. Since the study of the
varieties of mankind implied a priori a geographical aspect of distribution, Zimmermann’s
approach was not only consistent with the classificational ambitions of his time but also
combined the classification of man with a – still limited – aspect of historicity. In this context
it is not surprising that Soemmerring, for instance, quoted Zimmermann on the title page of his
comparative anatomical treatise from 1785. As demonstrated in chapter 3, nature itself was not
understood historically, yet man was – albeit not in terms of his nature but in terms of culture.
Man – in his special role – was both part of history and integral part of nature. As an object of
study, man became part of the general endeavour of natural classification – and, therefore, of
natural history – and, moreover, natural history became increasingly anthropocentric. Again,
Hermann’s depiction of nature on his Tabula can be regarded as representative of the notion of
the position of man in nature. Embedded in the network of the natural world, man (Homo) was

315
Cf. NUTZ, Varietäten, pp. 101-102.
316
Cf. BRÄUNING-OCTAVIO, Hermann: Vom Zwischenkieferknochen zur Idee des Typus. Goethe als
Naturforscher in den Jahren 1780-1786. In: Nova Acta Lopoldina. Vol.8, No. 126. Leipzig 1956, pp. 7-12.
317
BÄUMER, Geschichte, p. 362.
318
Cf. PFEIFFER, Christoph Ludwig: Der Orang Outan oder Wald-Mensch, samt den übrigen doppelartigen
Naturgeschöpfen als Verbindungsgliedern der grossen Naturkette in den Verschiedenen Naturreichen.
Mannheim 1787.

99
set right in the middle at the top of the table, thus demonstrating his prevalent role within the
system without setting him above the entirety of nature.

The rise of anthropological thought, however, did not only have an impact on natural history.
It has already been pointed out that in the concepts of history of Fontenelle and Vico distinct
anthropocentric notions can be found. Since Vico had declared man as the creator of his own
history, and both Vico and Fontenelle had juxtaposed history with the ontological development
of human life, the anthropological aspect increasingly became an integral part of history.
Taking the examples of Lafitau’s and Voltaire’s comparative approaches, it becomes obvious
that special emphasis was placed on the cultural aspects of human history. The focus of interest
of these historiographies was not on historical events or the succession of regencies, but on
diachronic comparisons of customs and manners of different peoples in different times. It was
Gisi who has analysed these interconnections between history and anthropology in the
eighteenth century, stating the emergence of an ‘anthropological history’ (anthropologische
Historie) for this period.319 Moreover, the relevance of anthropological knowledge for the
historiography of the time becomes evident by taking the example of the German translation
of Blumenbach’s De varietate. In his introduction Johann Gottfried Gruber, the translator of
Blumenbach’s dissertation, pointed out the significance of Blumenbach’s findings “[…] for the
philosophical historian of mankind and, in a way, even for the mere universal historian
[…]”320. Gruber addressed his translation primarily to scholars outside the field of natural
history – since professional naturalists would draw on the Latin original anyway –, and was
convinced of the benefit of this anthropological treatise for the study of human history.

As a result of this rising interest in anthropological thought, in the second half of the century a
certain type of anthropological history started to develop which can be regarded as a link
between natural history on the one hand and human history on the other hand: the ‘history of
mankind’.

4.5.2. Man as the Link – the ‘History of Mankind’

Nutz notes that, from the 1770s onwards, man – as an object of study – started to become
detached from the framework of zoological treatises and was treated as a literary subject of its

319
Cf. GISI, Einbildungskraft, p. 4.
320
“[…] für den philosophischen Geschichtsforscher der Menschheit, ja gewissermaßen selbst für den bloßen
Universalhistoriker[…]”. GRUBER, Johann Gottfried: Introduction. In: BLUMENBACH, Verschiedenheiten,
p. V. Author’s translation.

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own. Still methodologically related to zoology, the ‘natural history of man’ developed as an
independent genre within scientific literature. The best example of this development is,
definitely, Blumenbach’s dissertation which not only drew on Buffon’s deliberations but also
disengaged the topic from the greater task of writing a comprehensive Histoire naturelle.321
However, a parallel development can be observed within the field of historiography, which
brought forth a genre that focused on an anthropological concept of man as a genus, and which
intended to write histories considering the entirety of the human race with regard to its nature
rather than primarily concentrating on the historical or cultural developments of, for instance,
nations.

A signal example of this genre – and particularly relevant for the purposes of this investigation
– is Christoph Meiners’s Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit (Outline of the History of
Mankind), published in 1785. Meiners, professor of Weltweisheit at the University of Göttingen
and thus a colleague of Blumenbach, pursued the idea of establishing a new comprehensive
‘science’ that went beyond the histories of his time and that considered the history of man with
regard to his physical body, his mind and “[…] his disposition, character and customs, along
with the causes, whereby they get formed or depraved”322. Meiners’s general claim was that,
so far, history had been practised insufficiently and was not able to cope with the complexity
of human nature. In his view, it was especially the first of these three aspects that had been
widely ignored:

Insofar as man becomes an object of history through his body, he has, so far,
almost been completely neglected by historians and historiographers.
Admittedly, many scholars have written about the influences of the climate etc.
on the colour and the development of the body and its single parts as well as on
the development of the mind and the heart, yet, merely judging from my
collections which surely are far from complete, these topics have more been
alluded to than actually covered exhaustively.323

321
Cf. NUTZ, Vatietäten, p. 55.
322
“[…] seine Gemüthsart oder Charakter und Sitten, samt den Ursachen, wodurch diese gebildet oder verdorben
werden“. MEINERS, Christoph: Grundriß der Geschichte der Menschheit. Lemgo 1785, Introduction. Author’s
translation.
323
“In so ferne als der Mensch durch seinen Cörper ein Gegenstand der Geschichte wird, ist er bisher von
Geschichtsforschern und Geschichtsschreibern fast ganz vernachlässigt worden. Zwar haben viele Gelehrte
über die Einflüsse des Klima u.s.w. auf die Farbe und Bildung des Cörpers und seiner einzelnen Theile wie auf
die Bildung des Geistes und Herzens geschrieben, allein bloß nach meinen gewiß noch lange nicht vollständigen
Sammlungen zu urtheilen hat man diese Untersuchungen mehr berühret, als erschöpft“. Ibid. Author’s
translation.

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The physical aspects of human nature – since they had become a central issue of anthropology
due to the efforts of classification – were crucial for Meiners’s notion of history. Thus, it was
the natural history of man that had to be included into the task of writing human history.
Naturally, this focus on the physical aspect of the human nature was the result of an
anthropological orientation towards the method of comparative anatomy, which was
predominantly taught at the University of Göttingen. Although Meiners – or so it seems –did
not occupy himself with anatomical studies, he relied heavily on the findings of his
contemporaries Blumenbach and Soemmerring. Meiners was particularly interested with
Soemmerring’s Ueber die Verschiedenheit des Mohren vom Europäer, calling it “[a] sublime
treatise!” 324 in the bibliographical index of his Grundriß. This does not come as a surprise in
the light of his questionable reputation as one of the founders of ‘scientific racism’.325

Meiners’s concept of a history of mankind can be understood both as a comprehensive

manifestation of and as a conceptual highlight in the developments within historiography. He
saw his new ‘science’ in contentual and conceptual contrast to the universal history of his time:

Thus, universal history has entirely different intentions than the history of
mankind and also an entirely different method. […] So, universal history presents
a long series of real actions and events, which all had a more or less important,
yet always considerable, influence on the fortune or misfortune of a large part of
the human race, and at the same time specifies the reasons why it found itself in
exactly these conditions in various periods of time […]. The history of mankind,
however, does not teach us what man, in different epochs, did or experienced, but
what he was, or still is.326

To sum this up, universal history was, according to Meiners, associated merely with what
people in different times achieved in terms of politics and culture, but not withthe very nature
of man and his existence. Moreover, Meiners claimed that so far history given its attention
merely to the great civilizations and ignored those peoples that did not have an obvious impact
on the course of (political or cultural) history.327 As far as the methods for his history of

324
Ibid., p. T4v.
325
Cf. GISI, Einbildungskraft, p. 331.
326
“Die Universalhistorie also hat ganz andere Absichten als die Geschichte der Menschheit, und auch eine
andere Methode. […] Die Universalgeschichte stellt daher eine lange Reihe wirklicher Begebenheiten und
Handlungen auf, die alle einen mehr oder weniger wichtigen aber immer beträchtlichen Einfluss auf das Glück
oder Unglück eines großen Teils des menschlichen Geschlechts hatten, und gibt zugleich die Ursachen an,
warum es sich in verschiedenen Perioden gerade in solchen Zuständen fand […]. Die Geschichte der
Menschheit hingegen lehrt uns nicht so wohl was der Mensch in verschiedenen Zeitaltern tat oder litt, sondern
was er war, oder jetzo ist“. MEINERS, Grundriß, Introduction. Author’s translation.
327
Cf. ibid.

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mankind are concerened, Meiners – in a way following the trend of his time – considered the
comparative method to be the most fundamental. With regard to the physical aspects of his
history, Meiners wanted to investigate “the similarities and differences of entire peoples rather
than of single humans, and to compare man in large heaps with himself [= large groups of
people among themselves, F.M.], rather than man with the other animals”328. The latter, he
stated, was more likely to fall within the scope of natural history and anatomy. Yet, even for
the other two aspects of human history – those of the human mind (such as language or science)
as well as of customs and temperaments – the comparative method was essential:

This comparison of customs and habits, of rules and notions of wealth, decorum
and decency, of pleasures, religions, regimes and laws of all peoples will thus
become a unique and one of the most important affairs of the history of
mankind.329

However, Meiners was not the first to formulate ideas about a comprehensive history of
mankind. More than a decade before, the Scottish philosopher Henry Home Lord Kames had
already published his first edition of the Sketches of a History of Man in 1774. Right at the
beginning of his influential book, Kames stated that

[t]he Human Species is an interesting subject, and has been in every age the chief
enquiry of philosophers. The faculties of the mind have been explored, and the
affections of the heart; but there is still wanting a History of the Species, in his
progress from the savage state to its highest civilization and improvement.330

This passage is significant in many respects and reveals the underlying notions of Home’s
approach. It is not only the anthropological orientation of his Sketches that becomes evident
here, but also the new (eighteenth-century) approach inherent in this anthropological focus:
whereas the anthropologies of earlier times were mainly interested in aspects of the human mind
and soul, this new approach regarded man as a species within the scope of natural history and
classification. In addition, the distinct notion of progress of the human species was an essential
part of Home’s understanding of history. The fact that the Sketches had a certain influence on
Meiners becomes obvious in his comment on Home’s deliberations in his Grundriß, even

328
“mehr […] die Aehnlichkeiten und Verschiedenheiten ganzer Völker, als einzelner Menschen, und vergleiche
mehr den Menschen in grossen Haufen mit sich selbst, als den Menschen mit den Übrigen Thieren“. Ibid.,
Introduction. Author’s translation.
329
“Diese Vergleichung der Sitten und Gewohnheiten, der Regeln und Begriffe von Wohlstand Decorum und
Anstand, der Vergnüglichkeiten, Religionen, Regierungsformen und Gesetze aller Völker wird daher ein
eigenthümliches und eins der wichtigsten Geschäffte der Geschichte der Menschheit“. Ibid. Author’s translation.
330
HOME, Henry (Lord Kames): Sketches of a History of Man. Vol. 1. Dublin 1779, p. 1.

103
though he rejected fundamental assumptions of the Scottish philosopher. Apart from Home, he
also mentioned other authors, whom he regarded as essential with respect to their contributions
to the history of mankind such as Isaak Iselin, William Falconer, Montesquieu, Kraft or Goguet,
the latter of whom he considered as playing an eminent in the historiography of peoples.331
Even though Meiners did not mention Lafitau, an indirect influence via Kraft and Goguet can
easily be assumed.

One aspect which is most relevant for this investigation is the notion of historical dimensionality
in Meiners’s concept of history. It can be seen not only as characteristic of the time but also as
the expression of the changes of notions concerning the dimensional aspects of history over the
course of the eighteenth century. In his juxtaposition of universal history and history of
mankind, his idea about the dimensions of history becomes apparent:

Eventually, universal history follows the order of time as exactly as possible,

because otherwise the chain of events, which developed out of each other and
were caused by each other, would be completely interrupted. The history of
mankind does not know this chronological order at all. Instead, in all its stages it
combines nations, actions and events which had infinitely been separated from
each other by time and space.332

More than anything else, this passage provides evidence of the dimensional implications of
eighteenth-century historiography. The history of mankind was most affected by the breakup
of the dimensional framework, which had already been induced by the rise of comparative
methods in history – as can be shown by using the example of Lafitau or Voltaire. The ordering
structure of the linearity of time lost its influence on historiography and made way for a
multidimensional approach towards the historical past. This was predominantly caused by
including an anthropological concept of man as it was implementated within natural history.
Annette Meyer rightly points out the hybridity of the history of mankind that connected
fundamental elements of both history and natural history.333 In the interplay between
anthropology and history, the two areas of history and nature, or natural history respectively,

331
Meiners, Grundriß, Introduction.
332
“Die Universalhistorie endlich folgt der Zeitordnung so genau, als möglich, weil sonst die Kette der aus
einander entstandenen und in einander gegründeten Begebenheiten gänzlich würde unterbrochen werden. Diese
chronologische Ordnung kennt die Geschichte der Menschheit gar nicht. Sie stellt vielmehr in all ihren
Abschnitten Nationen, Handlungen und Begebenheiten zusammen, die durch Zeit und Raum unendlich von
einender getrennt waren“. Ibid., Introduction. Author’s translation.
333
Cf. MEYER, Wahrheit, p. 287.

104
which had been separated at the beginning of the century, were conceptually and contentually
reconnected.

4.5.3. Remarks on Herder and Kant

It seems insufficient to write about of the relation between nature and history in the late
eighteenth century without including Johann Gottfried Herder and his Ideen zur Philosophie
der Geschichte der Menschheit (Outlines of a Philosophy and History of Man, 1784-1791).
Although it is impossible to offer a detailed and adequate account on this philosopher and his
influential thoughts, it is nevertheless necessary to at least comment on Herder in order to round
out this portrayal of late eighteenth-century natural and historical thought. His Ideen are not
only the elaborate and comprehensive attempt to bring nature and history together in a
philosophy of history but also the expression and result of the developments both in
historiography and natural history. Talking about the “immeasurable chain” that “descends
from the Creator down to the germe of a grain of sand”334, Herder took up the great metaphor
of the scala naturae, while at the same time he emphasized the necessity of comparative
anatomy for the understanding of nature.335 Furthermore, he regarded Zimmermann and his
Geographische Geschichte as fundamental for his own reflections336 and was significantly
influenced by the ideas of Lafitau.337 And it was Herder – in the year of the publication of the
first part of the Ideen – to whom Goethe enthusiastically wrote to proclaim his discovery of the
os intermaxillare.338 The contemporary debates about the relationship between man and
animals were an essential part of Herder’s philosophical deliberations, which can be shown by
his references to Blumenbach’s De varietate.339 Moreover – in order to draw a final connection
to the first part of this paper –, it must be mentioned that Herder, like Goethe, was also well
familiar with Hermann and his ideas.340

Especially when it comes to the connection between nature and history – which was a central
part of this investigation – Herder’s Ideen play a central role. The structure of this work already
reveals his notion of man as the connecting part between nature on the one hand and history on
the other hand. In the first part of his Ideen, Herder addressed issues concerning natural history,

334
HERDER, Johann Gottfried: Outlines of a Philosophy and History of Man. Translated by T. Churchill. London
1803, p. 46.
335
Cf. ibid., p. 71.
336
Cf. ibid., p. 63.
337
Cf. FENTON/MOORE, Introduction, pp. CVII-CVIII.
338
Cf. BRÄUNIG-OKTAVIO, Zwischenkieferknochen, p. 15.
339
Cf. HERDER, Outlines, pp. 125-151.
340
Cf. BRÄUNIG-OKTAVIO, Zwischenkieferknochen, p. 14.

105
whereas the last part was dedicated to human history. In the middle part, Herder discussed those
topics which can be labelled as anthropological, dealing with man as a species and – referring
to Buffon – advocating a monophyletic position of the unity of man.341 At the end of the first
part, Herder remarked on man’s unique position in nature as the link between two worlds, being
both animal and man. Thus, for Herder – like for many of his contemporaries – it was man that
linked nature with history.342

Besides Herder, Immanuel Kant is also one of those scholars, who cannot remain unmentioned
in this analysis. Interestingly enough, despite his eminent role within the intellectual landscape
of the eighteenth century, Kant was, compared to other scholars like Blumenbach or Buffon,
hardly ever mentioned in the treatises used as sources for this paper. However, also Kant
extensively participated in the debates described here. Finally, it seems to be reasonable to quote
a passage from Kant’s writings about physical geography from 1802, wherein he claimed a new
understanding of natural history:

History […] and geography broaden our knowledge concerning time and space.
History pertains to the events which, with respect to time, have happened
successively. Geography pertains to phenomena which, with respect to space,
happen synchronically. […] History […] is nothing but a continuous geography.
[…] History is, therefore, only different from Geography with respect to time and
space. […] The history of nature contains the diversity of geography, namely how
it was in different times, but not how it is now at the same time, since this would
be the description of nature. If you, however, propound the occurrences of the
entire nature how it has been through all times, then – and only then – do you
deliver an actual so-called history of nature. Considering, for instance, how the
various races of dogs have originated form one strain and which alterations have
happened to them due to the diversity of land, climate, reproduction etc. through
all times: then this would be a history of nature of dogs, and such [a history of
nature, F.M.] could be delivered about every part of nature […].343

341
Cf. ibid., pp. 292-298.
342
Cf. ibid., pp. 225-226.
343
„Geschichte also und Geographie erweitern unsere Erkenntnisse in Ansehung der Zeit und des Raumes. Die
Geschichte betrifft die Begebenheiten, die, in Ansehung der Zeit, sich nacheinander zugetragen haben. Die
Geographie betrifft Erscheinungen, die sich, in Ansehung des Raums, zu gleicher Zeit ereignen. […] Die
Geschichte […] ist nichts anders als eine continuirliche Geographie […].Die Historie ist also von der Geographie
nur in Ansehung des Raumes und der Zeit verschieden. […] Die Geschichte der Natur enthält die Mannigfaltigkeit
der Geographie wie es nämlich in verschiedenen Zeiten damit gewesen ist, nicht aber, wie es jetzt zu gleicher Zeit
ist, denn dies wäre ja eben Naturbeschreibung. Trägt man dagegen die Begebenheiten der gesammten Natur so
vor, wie sie durch alle Zeiten beschaffen gewesen, so liefert man, und nur erst dann, eine richtig sogenannte

106
Naturgeschichte. Erwägt man z. B., wie die verschiedenen Racen der Hunde aus einem Stamme entsprungen sind,
und welche Veränderungen sich mit ihnen vermittelst der Verschiedenheit des Landes, des Klima, der
Fortpflanzung etc. durch alle Zeiten zugetragen haben: so wäre das eine Naturgeschichte der Hunde, und eine
solche könnte man über jeden einzelnen Theil der Natur liefern […]“. KANT, Immanuel: Schriften zur
Physischen Geographie. Edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Schubert. Leipzig 1839, pp. 427-428. Author’s translation.

107
Conclusion

In the second half of the eighteenth century, natural history was to a large extent shaped by the
ongoing debates concerning the validity of the scala naturae. This paper has clearly
demonstrated that the traditional model of the continuous and gradual chain of beings – based
on principles of Leibnizian philosophy – was prevalent until well into the second half of the
century but was increasingly challenged by many scholars of the time, due to various
inconsistencies of the concept. As a consequence, the original one-dimensional conception
underwent significant alterations towards a multidimensional system of nature. The most
impressive example of this development is Johann Hermann’s Tabula Affinitatum animalium
from 1783 which depicts nature as a two-dimensional network. Apart from that table, even
basic approaches towards three-dimensional systems to order the natural world can be found
during that time. Yet, even though these concepts expanded into the second and third dimension
they still heavily built upon the traditional concept of the scala naturae and did, therefore, in
no sense include the notion of time and change. In this context it must be stated that these late
eighteenth-century concepts of reticular natural systems can certainly not be regarded as an
antithesis to the linear scale of beings but rather as the attempt to sustain its fundamental
principles of continuity, plenitude and immutability. However, even these attempts to bypass
the severe – and in many cases contradictory – inconsistencies of the scale and to save it from
collapsing proved to be doomed to failure. Even Hermann, one of the chain’s main advocates,
had to acknowledge that it was impossible to illustrate the complexity of nature within the
limited possibilities of two-dimensional depictions. By the end of the century, the scale of
beings had lost most of its ground, a fact which, for example, becomes apparent in Johann
Friedrich Blumenbach’s devastating criticism. The transformation of the linearity of the scale
towards a multidimensional system during this period can be regarded as a proof of the general
tendency towards the ‘multidimensionalization’ of the natural world in terms of spatial aspects.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century another aspect of this ‘multi-dimensionalization’

comes into effect. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s theory of transformation can be regarded not only
as the first consistent theory that included the notion of natural change but also as the first
manifestation of an understanding of historical time within the living natural world. This paper
has demonstrated that already in the eighteenth century various notions of time and change
with respect to nature had emerged. Yet, these concepts were either highly speculative or –
even more important – did not involve a historical understanding of time. Even Buffon’s
reflections on the age of the earth – which went far beyond the traditional seventeenth-century

108
calculation by James Ussher – and his assumption of a linear history of the globe did not, as
Rheinberger suggests, automatically imply a historical understanding of living nature. Neither
did the eighteenth-century notions of change go so far as Lamarck’s presumption of a
continuous and linear change in a historical sense. Interestingly enough, Lamarck actively
rejected the concepts of reticular natural systems created by Hermann and others and reverted
to the original, albeit significantly reinterpreted, linearity of the scala naturae. By expanding
the scale of beings into the dimension of time, Lamarck was able to bypass one of the biggest
problems of the scale, namely the principle of plenitude. Since it was no longer necessary that
all assumed stages of the scale had to exist synchronically, the problem of the great discrepancy
between an alleged infinity of beings and the limitedness of space was solved.

This inclusion of a historical notion of time, however, was not, as one might expect, the logical
consequence of the general tendency towards understanding the earth historically. This has
been demonstrated by using the example of Eberhard August Wilhelm von Zimmermann,
whose Geographische Geschichte der Menschheit und der vierfüßigen Thiere (1778-1783) can
be regarded as symptomatic ofthe last decades of the century. Writing a natural history of
quadrupeds and man, Zimmermann’s understanding of historical time and change was solely
determined by spatial aspects with respect to distribution. As Petra Feuerstein-Herz rightly
notes, Zimmermann’s history was merely a history of organisms in space, rather than a history
of organisms themselves. Nevertheless, Zimmermann’s work needs to be understood as a
central link between natural history and history, two fields of knowledge which had been
separated in both conceptual and contentual terms at the beginning of the century. In addition,
Zimmermann’s geographical approach is another proof of the extension of nature with respect
to dimensional aspects of space. At the end of the eighteenth century, nature was both perceived
within space on an observable level and thought spatially on the conceptual level of
systematization.

Parallel to this ‘multidimensionalization’ of the natural world, historiography also underwent

similar developments. In the wake of the discovery of the globe, the issue of foreign peoples
and cultures increasingly came to the fore, undermining the prevalent concepts of chronology
and the dominant framework of the history of salvation. As a result, also within eighteenth-
century historiography the linear conception of history as a succession of epochs and empires
– analogous to the universal chain of beings – was slowly replaced by a multidimensional, in
this case diachronical and interspatial, understanding of the past and the present, as can be seen
by taking the example of Joseph-François Lafitau. This process went hand in hand with a

109
general expansion of the spatial framework of history that went beyond the classical, salvation-
historical framework, promoted by eminent scholars like Voltaire or Johann Christoph
Gatterer. Zimmermann’s Geographische Geschichte was, therefore, equally paradigmatic for
the spatial expansion of both natural and human history. Yet, despite these remarkable
parallels, the inclusion of a historical understanding of time into nature cannot be sufficiently
explained merely by the increasing importance of history: there is another key development in
the eighteenth century which can be regarded as the link between these two distinct areas of
knowledge, namely the rise of anthropological thought.

This paper has been able to show that both history and natural history increasingly adopted
anthropological aspects over the course of the century. For the realm of history, Giambattista
Vico’s reflections on the epistemological value of historical knowledge can be regarded as
particularly fundamental. The growing interest in the nature of man opened up a new
perspective in the historiography of the time and led to the development of the ‘history of
mankind’ as a distinct form of historical writings. Regarding man as being part of both natural
and human history, this new historiographical genre placed man in the middle between nature
and history. This approach was closely related to the emergence of issues concerning the nature
of man within natural history in the second half of the century. From the 1770s onwards, man
became an independent object of natural studies and anatomical observations. Eminent
naturalists, especially Blumenbach or his colleague Thomas Samuel von Soemmerring devoted
themselves to the question of the nature of man, trying to explain and classify the different
varieties of man, something that had already been of main interest to scholars like Linné or
Buffon. As a consequence of comparative anatomical insights, man’s position in nature was
extensively discussed within natural history in these last decades of the century. Since the
issues concerning the different varieties of man were closely linked to a distinct aspects of
(geographical) space, the overlapping between anthropology, natural history and human history
became obvious. Naturally, this preoccupation with man as a scientific object of study had
great influence on the historiographical writings of the time. The best example of this influence
is, certainly, Christoph Meiners, who sought to write his Geschichte der Menschheit as a
comprehensive account of the history of mankind, regarding man as being both historical and
genus. It is, therefore, the anthropological understanding of man of the late eighteenth century
that constitutes the link between nature – or natural history respectively – on the one hand and
human history on the other hand. In addition, it has clearly been demonstrated that the rise of
the comparative method in particular was crucial for these developments, both for history and

110
natural history as well as for anthropology. It was the incorporation of comparative anatomical
findings that can be regarded as one of the main reasons for the ‘multidimensionalization’ of
the scale of beings and its eventual decline. And within the realm of historiography, too, the
application of comparative methods led to the expansion of dimensional aspects.

Apart from disclosing these parallels and interconnections between history and natural history
on methodological, conceptual and contentual levels, another important connecting aspect has
been revealed, namely the extensive personal connections among the scientific community,
particularly in the last decades of the century. Most of the scholars, who were dealt with in this
paper, either knew each other personally or were at least familiar with each other’s scientific
works. Knowing this, it can be stated that Hermann and his Tabula were not as insignificant as
his underrepresentation in modern historiography suggests. On the contrary, it could be shown
not only that he was rather well known by his contemporaries but also that his Tabula had a
significant influence on the development of natural history. Hence, it became clear that the
transformation from a static view of the natural world towards a dynamic system with a
historical notion of time cannot be merely labelled as a process of ‘temporalization’ but needs
to be understood within a general tendency towards a ‘multidimensionalization’ of both the
natural world and the realm of history. Moreover, it has been shown that the consolidation of
history and natural history at the turn of the century was the result of complex and multilayered
interconnections on personal, conceptual, contentual and methodological levels. It was the
interactions between history, anthropology and natural history as well as the notion of man as
link between two distinct fields of knowledge that paved the way for an understanding of nature
as a changing and dynamic system with a history of its own.

Obviously, this study cannot claim to be exhaustive. For an even more accurate and
comprehensive picture of this time it would be necessary to consider, for instance, the
developments of geology and paleontology – and, as a matter of course, also the role of such
influential figures like Herder and Kant, a topic which could merely be insufficiently touched
upon. However, this study might serve as a starting point for further investigation in this
complex field within the history of science.

111
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 List of Figures

Fig. 1: HERMANN, Johann: Tabula Affinitatum Animalium Olim Academico Specimine

Edita Nunc Uberiore Commentario Illustrata Cum Annotationibus Ad Historiam
Naturalem Animalium Augendam Facientibus. Strasbourg 1783. Foldable Table.

Fig. 2: GRAUMANN, Peter Benedikt: Betrachtungen über die allgemeine Stuffenfolge der
natürlichen Körper. Rostock 1777, p. 36.

Fig. 3: HERMANN, Tabula, p. 26.

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