Lexington County School District One Lawsuit

ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2021 Jun 30 10:04 AM - LEXINGTON - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2021CP3202194
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

) ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF LEXINGTON )
)
Mother Doe, Individually, and as next ) CASE NO. 2021-CP-32-________
friend for Jane Doe (a minor under the )
age of 14), )
) SUMMONS
Plaintiff, ) (Jury Trial Demand)
)
vs. )
Lexington County School District One

and Action Labor Management, LLC.
Defendants.
TO THE DEFENDANTS:
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to answer the Complaint in this
action of which a copy is hereby served upon you, and to serve a copy of your Answer to
the said Complaint on the subscriber at their offices, 1921 Henderson Street, Post Office
Box 532, Columbia, South Carolina 29202 within thirty (30) days after the service
thereof exclusive of the day of such service; and if you fail to answer the Complaint
within the time aforesaid, the Plaintiff in this action will apply to the Court for the relief
demanded in the Complaint and for a default judgment.
BAILEY LAW FIRM, L.L.C.
By: s/Tyler D. Bailey

Tyler D. Bailey
S.C. Bar No. 101915
1921 Henderson Street (29201)
P.O. Box 532
Columbia, SC (29202)
Telephone: 1-803-667-9716
Fax: 1-803-526-7642
Email: Tyler@baileylawfirmsc.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
Columbia, South Carolina
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
) ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
COUNTY OF LEXINGTON )
)
Mother Doe, Individually, and as next ) CASE NO. 2021-CP-32-________
friend for Jane Doe. (a minor under the )
age of 14), )
) COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, ) (Jury Trial Demand)
)
vs. )
Lexington County School District One

and Action Labor Management, LLC.
Defendants.
PARTIES
The Plaintiffs, complaining of the Defendants, Lexington County School District
One and Action Labor Management, LLC, (“Defendants”), would respectfully show unto
this Honorable Court:
Plaintiffs Mother Doe and Jane Doe
1. That Plaintiff Mother Doe (hereinafter “Mother Doe”), is and was a citizen
and resident of the County of Lexington, State of South Carolina at all times relevant
herein.
2. That Plaintiff Jane Doe (hereinafter “Plaintiff Jane Doe”) is the minor
daughter of Plaintiff Jane Doe and is and was a citizen and resident of the County of
Lexington, State of South Carolina at all times relevant herein. That Plaintiff Mother
Doe brings this action individually, and as next friend for Jane Doe, her minor daughter
(hereinafter Plaintiffs Mother Doe and Jane Doe are collectively referred to as
“Plaintiffs”) who was sexually assault at Pelion Middle School.
2
3. That at all times relevant herein, Plaintiff Jane Doe was a minor student at
Pelion Middle School in Lexington County School District One and Defendant Lexington
County School District One owed a common law duty to protect the minor child from
harm, including sexual assault, while she was under their care.
Defendant Lexington School District One
4. That upon information and belief, the Defendant Lexington County School
District One is a school district operated as a subdivision of Lexington County
Government and is a governmental agency with its principal place of business located in
the County of Lexington, State of South Carolina and is responsible for the actions or
inactions of its agents, servants, contractors, and employees.
5. That upon information and belief the majority, if not all, of the events to
this claim took place at Pelion Middle School.
6. That Defendant Lexington County School District One is being sued in its
representative capacity pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act that makes the
employing entity liable for the torts of its employees and agents (S.C. Code §15-78-70).
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Lexington County School District One is liable for the
acts and omissions of its employees, agents, servants, and contractors for the negligence,
gross negligence, recklessness, and other liability forming conduct, actions, and inactions
that caused the harm to Plaintiffs.
7. The negligent and grossly negligent acts, omissions, and liability forming
conduct, actions, and inactions of Defendant Lexington County School District One
include their agents, principals, employees and/or servants, both directly and vicariously,
pursuant to principles of non-delegable duty, apparent authority, agency, ostensible
3
agency and/or respondeat superior and the acts and/or omissions of the abovenamed
Defendant was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries, damages, and losses to
Plaintiffs.
Defendant Action Labor Management, LLC
8. That upon information and belief Defendant Action Labor Management,
LLC (“Action Labor”) is a Florida company doing business in South Carolina, including
Lexington County.
9. The negligent and grossly negligent acts, omissions, and liability forming
conduct, actions, and inactions of Defendant Action Labor includes their agents,
principals, employees and/or servants, both directly and vicariously, pursuant to
principles of non-delegable duty, apparent authority, agency, ostensible agency and/or
respondeat superior and the acts and/or omissions of Action Labor was the direct and
proximate cause of the injuries, damages, and losses to Plaintiffs.
JURISDICTION & VENUE
10. That this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this litigation
and the parties heretofore named pursuant to Article V, Section 11 of the Constitution of
the State of South Carolina and venue is proper on the grounds that the actions giving rise
to the causes of action herein occurred in the County of Lexington.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS
11. That Plaintiffs incorporate herein by reference all the allegations contained
in the above paragraphs and throughout this entire Complaint as though the same were fully
set forth herein at length.
4
12. That on or about May 21, 2021, during the 2020 – 2021 school year,
Defendant Lexington County School District One hired Juston Deon Smith, a twenty-one
(21) year old male, to perform janitorial services through Defendant Action Labor
Management, LLC.
13. That Juston Deon Smith was an employee, servant and/or agent of
Defendants Lexington County School District One and Action Labor Management, LLC
as to render him under the direct control and supervision of Defendants Lexington
County School District One and Action Labor Management, LLC.
14. That upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein, Juston
Deon Smith was on duty and on the premises of Pelion Middle School acting within the
course and scope of his employment.
15. That upon information and belief, and at all times relevant herein,
Defendants Lexington County School District One and Action Labor Management, LLC
had the ability to control or should have known they had the ability to control Juston
Deon Smith, making them liable for his acts and conduct.
16. That upon information and belief, and at all times herein, Defendants
Lexington County School District One and Action Labor Management, LLC, knew or
should have known of the necessity and opportunity to exercise control of Juston Deon
Smith.
17. That at all times relevant herein, Plaintiff Jane Doe was a minor female
middle school student at Pelion Middle School, which the highest level of care was owed.
18. That on or about May 21, 2021, Juston Deon Smith started working at
Pelion Middle School in Lexington County School District One and immediately began
5
to prey on young and vulnerable middle school girls, including Plaintiff Jane Doe.
19. That on or about May 24, 2021, Juston Deon Smith continued to prey on
young and vulnerable middle school girls at Pelion Middle School, including Plaintiff.
That Juston Deon Smith lured Plaintiff into a stall in a bathroom designated for females
only. That upon information and belief, while in the stall Juston Deon Smith sexually
assaulted minor Plaintiff Jane Doe in numerous ways, including but not limited to
inserting his finger into her vagina and placing his penis inside of the minor victim’s
mouth. Subsequently, a female staff member of Defendant Lexington County School
District One entered the restroom and retrieved minor Plaintiff Jane Doe from the
restroom. That Juston Deon Smith remained in the female restroom and attempted to
hide. That Juston Deon Smith was ultimately questioned and arrested by law
enforcement for Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor.
20. That Defendants Lexington County School District One and Action Labor
were under a duty to prevent their agents, principals, employees and/or servants from
harming minor female middle school students, and/or conducting himself in a manner
that created an unreasonable risk of harm to others, including Plaintiff Jane Doe.
21. Notwithstanding information that Defendants knew or should have known,
Defendants took no reasonable measures to ensure that Juston Deon Smith was not
allowed to enter the restroom designated for minor female middle school students and
afforded him the opportunity to prey on minor female middle school students, including
Plaintiff Jane Doe.
22. That Defendants failed to properly ensure the safety and security of minor
female middle school students from sexual predators like Juston Deon Smith and failed to
6
properly monitor and supervise Juston Deon Smith.
23. That Plaintiffs suffered severe and permanent physical and emotional
injuries as a result of the Defendants’ inactions.
24. That as a proximate and actual result of Defendants’ negligent,
outrageous, carelessness, recklessness, wantonness, and gross negligent conduct,
Plaintiffs, suffered and will in the future suffer severe pain, permanent emotional distress,
humiliation, mental anguish, indignity, loss of pleasures and enjoyment of life which will
in the future require psychological and psychiatric medical care and treatment, and has
caused and will in the future cause Plaintiffs to incur medical costs.
25. That as a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned incident,
Plaintiff Jane Doe suffered emotional injuries from which she has suffered and will
continue to suffer great physical pain, mental anguish and has caused her to lose the
enjoyment of her life.
FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENCE/GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND/OR RECKLESSNESS
As to Defendant Lexington County School District One
27. That Defendants owed/owe a clear duty to Plaintiff Jane Doe and other
students while on school property.
28. That Defendant acting through its agents and servants were negligent,
careless, reckless, and grossly negligent at the time and place aforementioned in the
following particulars:
7
a) In failing to properly train, supervise, and monitor its staff;
b) In failing to provide a female bathroom for minor female students, including

Plaintiff Jane Doe;
c) In hiring and retaining employees, agents, servants, and contractors that were
not fit to work in the same setting with children, including Plaintiff Jane
Doe;
d) In failing to take reasonable precautions and safety measures for its students;
e) In failing to properly hire, train, and/or supervise its employees;
f) In failing to have adequate policies and procedures in place to protect minor

female students on their property, including Plaintiff Jane Doe;
g) In failing to act as a reasonably prudent entity would act under the same or
similar circumstances;
h) In failing to protect the minor female Plaintiff;
i) In failing to enforce their own internal rules, policies, procedures, and

standards;
j) In any other such manner that Plaintiffs may become aware of through
discovery and/or at trial.
29. All of which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages suffered by
the Plaintiffs herein, said acts being in violation of the statutes and laws of the State of South
Carolina.
30. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, gross

negligence, carelessness and/or recklessness, Plaintiffs were harmed and sustained serve
and permanent physical injuries, emotional distress, humiliation, mental anguish,
indignity, loss of pleasures, and enjoyment of life which required and will in the future
require psychological and psychiatric medical care and treatment.
31. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and/or

recklessness, Plaintiffs have and will likely, in the future, be caused to incur medical
expenses.
8
32. That Plaintiffs are informed and believe that they are entitled to actual
damages in an amount that would adequately compensate them for their injuries and
damages.
FOR A SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
NEGLIGENCE/GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND/OR RECKLESSNESS
As to Defendant Action Labor
34. That Defendant owed/owe a clear duty to Plaintiff Jane Doe and other
students their agents, servants, and employees would interact with.
35. That Defendant acting through its agents and servants were negligent,
careless, reckless, and grossly negligent at the time and place aforementioned in the
a) In failing to properly train, supervise, and monitor its staff;
b) In hiring and retaining employees, agents, servants, and contractors that were
not fit to work in the same setting with children, including Plaintiff Jane
Doe;
c) In failing to properly hire, train, and/or supervise its employees;
d) In failing to have adequate policies and procedures in place to protect minor

female students their employees, agents, servants, and contractors would
interact with, including Plaintiff Jane Doe;
e) In failing to act as a reasonably prudent entity would act under the same or
similar circumstances;
f) In failing to protect the minor female Plaintiff;
g) In failing to enforce their own internal rules, policies, procedures, and

standards;
9
h) In any other such manner that Plaintiffs may become aware of through
36. All of which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages suffered by
the Plaintiffs herein, said acts being in violation of the statutes and laws of the State of South
Carolina.
37. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, gross

negligence, carelessness and/or recklessness, Plaintiffs were harmed and sustained serve
and permanent physical injuries, emotional distress, humiliation, mental anguish,
indignity, loss of pleasures, and enjoyment of life which required and will in the future
require psychological and psychiatric medical care and treatment.

recklessness, Plaintiffs have and will likely, in the future, be caused to incur medical
expenses.
damages in an amount that would adequately compensate them for their injuries and
damages.
FOR A THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
OUTRAGE
40. That Plaintiffs incorporates herein by reference all the allegations contained
41. That the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized the actionability of the
tort of reckless infliction of emotional distress which is commonly known as Outrage.
42. That Defendant was negligent, grossly negligent, wanton and/or reckless
for the reasons outlined more fully herein.
10
43. That the negligence, gross negligence, wantonness and/or recklessness of
Defendants as further described herein, inflicted severe emotional distress on Plaintiffs.
44. That Defendant knew or should have known that their negligent, wanton
and/or reckless conduct would inflict severe emotional distress on Plaintiffs.
45. That Defendant’s negligence, gross negligence, wantonness and/or

recklessness was so extreme and outrageous that it exceeded all possible bounds of decency
and must be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
46. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligent and/or

reckless acts; Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages as further described herein.
47. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendants negligent and/or reckless
acts; Plaintiffs suffered severe emotional distress that no reasonable person should expect to
endure.
48. That Plaintiffs’ emotional distress was of such nature so as to require them to
expend monies, to receive additional medical attention, and to require medical necessities.
49. That Plaintiffs have suffered and will continue to suffer physical pain,
humiliation, mental anguish, emotional distress, medical expenses, wage loss, and loss of
enjoyment of life.
50. That Plaintiffs are informed and believes that they are entitled to actual
damages in an amount which would adequately compensate them for their severe emotional
distress, injuries, and damages.
FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

PREMISE LIABILITY
11
52. That Defendant owed a duty to reasonably protect Plaintiff Jane Doe, a
minor female student at Pelion Middle School, from harm.
53. That Defendant knew and/or could have discovered through the exercise of
reasonable care that Juston Deon Smith posed a risk of harm to minor female students,
including Plaintiff Jane Doe.
54. That Defendant should have expected that Plaintiff Jane Doe, a minor female
middle school student, would not discover or realize the dangers Juston Deon Smith posed
to her on their property, or protect herself against his actions described herein.
55. That Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to Plaintiff Jane Doe while
on their property and therefore breaching the duties Defendant owed to Plaintiffs.
56. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligent and/or

reckless acts; Plaintiffs suffered injuries and damages as further described herein.
FOR A FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION/ NEGLIGENT HIRING/NEGLIGENT
TRAINING/NEGLIGENT RETENTION
58. That Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendant through the
negligent, reckless, wanton, outrageous, and grossly negligent conduct of its employees is
further negligent, willful, careless, reckless, and grossly negligent in one or more of the
(a) In failing to exercise the degree of care that a reasonably prudent school
district would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances;
12
(b) In failing to conduct a proper and adequate background search or review of
its employees, agents, servants, and contractors before and after hiring;
(c) In failing to monitor the conduct of its employees, agents, servants, and
contractors and to take appropriate steps to discipline and/or terminate
them subsequent to the commissions of negligent, outrageous, willful,
wanton, reckless, grossly negligent and/or unlawful acts;
(d) In failing to properly supervise its employees, servants, agents, and/or

contractors;
(e) In failing to have in place adequate policies and procedures, and if such
policies and procedures were in place, in failing to enforce them;
(f) In failing to have in place adequate policies and procedures to mandate

compliance by its employees, agents, servants, and/or contractors with state
guidelines, statutes, laws, and regulations, and if such policies and
procedures were in place, in failing to enforce them;
(g) In any other such manner that Plaintiffs may become aware of through
59. That all of which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages
suffered by the Plaintiffs herein, said acts being in violation of the laws of the State of South
Carolina.
enjoyment of life.
damages in an amount which would adequately compensate them for their injuries and
damages.
FOR A SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION/ NEGLIGENT HIRING/NEGLIGENT
TRAINING/NEGLIGENT RETENTION
13
63. That Plaintiffs are informed and believe that Defendant through the
negligent, reckless, wanton, outrageous, and grossly negligent conduct of its employees is
further negligent, willful, careless, reckless, and grossly negligent in one or more of the
(a) In failing to exercise the degree of care that a reasonably prudent entity
would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances;
(b) In failing to conduct a proper and adequate background search or review of

its employees, agents, servants, and contractors before and after hiring;
(c) In failing to monitor the conduct of its employees, agents, servants, and
contractors and to take appropriate steps to discipline and/or terminate
them subsequent to the commissions of negligent, outrageous, willful,
wanton, reckless, grossly negligent and/or unlawful acts;
(d) In failing to properly supervise its employees, servants, agents, and/or

contractors;
(e) In failing to have in place adequate policies and procedures, and if such
policies and procedures were in place, in failing to enforce them;
(f) In failing to have in place adequate policies and procedures to mandate

compliance by its employees, agents, servants, and/or contractors with state
guidelines, statutes, laws, and regulations, and if such policies and
procedures were in place, in failing to enforce them;
(g) In any other such manner that Plaintiffs may become aware of through
64. That all of which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages
suffered by the Plaintiffs herein, said acts being in violation of the laws of the State of South
Carolina.
enjoyment of life.
14
damages.
FOR A SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
LOSS OF PERSONAL SERVICES
68. That Plaintiff Mother Doe is the natural guardian and mother of Jane Doe.
69. That as a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned actions and
inactions of Defendant, Plaintiff Mother Doe has been injured and damaged in Actual and
Consequential Damages as follows:
i. Pre-trial medical expenses; and
ii. Post-trial and future medical expenses until Jane Doe’s age of
majority.
recklessness, Plaintiff Mother Doe lost the services of her minor child which damaged,
Mother Doe. That Mother Doe’s child is not exposed to an increased risk of future harms
for which Mother Doe must remain vigilant as to protect her minor daughter.
damages.
FOR AN EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

LOSS OF PERSONAL SERVICES
15
73. That Plaintiff Mother Doe is the natural guardian and mother of Jane Doe.
74. That as a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned actions and
inactions of Defendant, Plaintiff Mother Doe has been injured and damaged in Actual and
Consequential Damages as follows:
i. Pre-trial medical expenses; and
ii. Post-trial and future medical expenses until Jane Doe’s age of
majority.
recklessness, Plaintiff Mother Doe lost the services of her minor child which damaged,
Mother Doe. That Mother Doe’s child is now exposed to an increased risk of future
harms for which Mother Doe must remain vigilant as to protect her minor daughter.
damages.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs prays that they will be granted a judgment against the
Defendant as follows:
a. Actual damages on all causes of action;
b. Incidental damages on all causes of action;
c. Consequential damages on all causes of action;
d. Punitive damages on the SECOND, THIRD, SIXTH, EIGHTH causes of action

asserted against Defendant Action Labor;
16
e. For the costs and expenses of this action; and
f. For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.
BAILEY LAW FIRM, L.L.C.
By: s/Tyler D. Bailey

Tyler D. Bailey
S.C. Bar No. 101915
1921 Henderson Street (29201)
P.O. Box 532
Columbia, SC (29202)
Telephone: 1-803-667-9716
Fax: 1-803-526-7642
Email: Tyler@baileylawfirmsc.com
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
Columbia, South Carolina
17

Lexington County School District One Lawsuit

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ELECTRONICALLY FILED - 2021 Jun 30 10:04 AM - LEXINGTON - COMMON PLEAS - CASE#2021CP3202194

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Lexington County School District One

demanded in the Complaint and for a default judgment.

BAILEY LAW FIRM, L.L.C.

By: s/Tyler D. Bailey

Lexington County School District One

The Plaintiffs, complaining of the Defendants, Lexington County School District

this Honorable Court:

Plaintiffs Mother Doe and Jane Doe

“Plaintiffs”) who was sexually assault at Pelion Middle School.

Defendant Lexington School District One

District One is a school district operated as a subdivision of Lexington County

inactions of its agents, servants, contractors, and employees.

this claim took place at Pelion Middle School.

that caused the harm to Plaintiffs.

pursuant to principles of non-delegable duty, apparent authority, agency, ostensible

Defendant Action Labor Management, LLC

8. That upon information and belief Defendant Action Labor Management,

principals, employees and/or servants, both directly and vicariously, pursuant to

principles of non-delegable duty, apparent authority, agency, ostensible agency and/or

proximate cause of the injuries, damages, and losses to Plaintiffs.

JURISDICTION & VENUE

to the causes of action herein occurred in the County of Lexington.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL CLAIMS

set forth herein at length.

County School District One and Action Labor Management, LLC.

course and scope of his employment.

mouth. Subsequently, a female staff member of Defendant Lexington County School

enforcement for Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor.

21. Notwithstanding information that Defendants knew or should have known,

Plaintiff Jane Doe.

injuries as a result of the Defendants’ inactions.

24. That as a proximate and actual result of Defendants’ negligent,

outrageous, carelessness, recklessness, wantonness, and gross negligent conduct,

25. That as a direct and proximate cause of the aforementioned incident,

enjoyment of her life.

FOR A FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

set forth herein at length.

students while on school property.

b) In failing to provide a female bathroom for minor female students, including

e) In failing to properly hire, train, and/or supervise its employees;

f) In failing to have adequate policies and procedures in place to protect minor

h) In failing to protect the minor female Plaintiff;

i) In failing to enforce their own internal rules, policies, procedures, and

30. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, gross

31. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and/or

set forth herein at length.

students their agents, servants, and employees would interact with.

a) In failing to properly train, supervise, and monitor its staff;

c) In failing to properly hire, train, and/or supervise its employees;

d) In failing to have adequate policies and procedures in place to protect minor

f) In failing to protect the minor female Plaintiff;

g) In failing to enforce their own internal rules, policies, procedures, and

37. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence, gross

38. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligence and/or

45. That Defendant’s negligence, gross negligence, wantonness and/or

46. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligent and/or

FOR A FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

56. That as a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s negligent and/or