Texto N°13

442333
Article
Journalism
Journalism, ideology and

14(1) 96–110
© The Author(s) 2013
Reprints and permission: sagepub.
linguistics: The paradox of co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1464884912442333
Chomsky’s linguistic legacy jou.sagepub.com
and his ‘propaganda model’
Annabelle Lukin
Macquarie University, Australia
Abstract
A central reason why news discourse is an object of academic research is its potential
and actual role in establishing and maintaining ideology. News can do this because it is
made of language and other semiotic modalities (Hasan, 1996a). This article considers
the media coverage of the 2003 „Coalition‟ invasion of Iraq, in light of the contradictions
between the assumptions about discourse in the „propaganda model‟ (Herman and
Chomksy, 2002[1988]), and the nature of language in the Chomskyan tradition. The
propaganda model is predicated on language being social and semiotic, two aspects of
language absent in Chomsky‟s linguistic theory. Paradoxically, linguistic description in
the Chomskyan tradition cannot be recruited to analysing the news discourse identified
by Chomsky and Herman, over 20 years ago, as the medium for the establishment and
reinforcement of deep and consequential ideologies, which are as powerful today as
they have ever been.
Keywords
Halliday, Hasan, ideology, propaganda model, Saussure, Whorf
Introduction
The effects on Iraqi people, society and culture of the decision by some western
powers to invade Iraq have been unequivocally devastating, and are still unfolding (see
e.g. Otterman et al., 2010). The consequences for the invading countries are not
commensurate, but are hardly insignificant (see e.g. Stiglitz and Bilmes, 2008). For
journalism studies, the invasion of Iraq provides yet one more case study for testing
theories of media–state relations. In an empirical sense, the question is: Was the
media‟s reporting of this monumental event determined or at least shaped by the
belligerent governments and/or by those who could profit financially from this
invasion?
Corresponding author:
Annabelle Lukin, Centre for Language in Social Life, Department of Linguistics, Faculty of Human Sciences,
Macquarie University, NSW 2109, Australia
Email: annabelle.lukin@mq.edu.au
Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com by guest on February 27, 2015

Lukin 97
A number of research studies have sought to consider these questions, or near

variants of them (e.g. Aday, 2010; Bennett et al., 2007; Boyd-Barrett, 2004, 2009;
Lewis et al., 2006; Miller, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009), and there is a general
consensus across this literature about the success of the Coalition‟s media strategies
for shaping media coverage to their own interests. Boyd-Barrett is particularly forceful
in putting this position, arguing that journalists have been complicit in supporting the
„agendas of corporate, political and plutocratic elites‟ (2009: 296). The media, he
argues „provide cover for war fought on false pretexts and at crippling expense‟
Not all scholars are as unequivocal in their criticism of the media coverage of the
invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. For instance, Robinson et al. (2009) report that
many of their ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of „the elite-driven model‟, a
term they use to encompass theories of media–state relations which position the
media as largely deferential to „elite perspectives‟ (for example, Bennett‟s „indexing
model‟, 1990, as well as Herman and Chomsky‟s 2002[1988] „propaganda model‟).
In any environment, language provides speakers with choice, which is the basis of it
being a bearer of ideology (Hasan, 1996a). This fact about language is a driving force in
studies of media discourse, which assume that linguistic choices in news discourse
have consequences for the ways news consumers come to view a certain set of
historical conditions. There is a shared recognition that media institutions or
corporations are producers of text, and that the consequences of the dissemination
and consumption of these texts are forms of consciousness (Bernstein, 1990; Boyd-
Barrett and Rantanen, 1998). This is not to suggest that news audiences are mindless
consumers. I would agree with Philo‟s argument that it is crucial to research the
„potential impact of text on public understanding‟ (2007: 184), a process which
requires studies of text reception. But the reason news discourse is consequential is
because, as Hasan argues (e.g. 2005, 2009, 2010), texts are purveyors of meanings,
and meaning moves the mind. The mind is a function of experience (e.g. Greenfield,
1997).
The propaganda model: ‘abuse’ but not ‘use’ of language

A concern with the effects of news discourse motivates the „propaganda model‟
of news production, elaborated by Herman and Chomsky (hereafter „HC‟) in their 1988
co- authored book. HC argued that „money and power are able to filter out the news fit
to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to
get their messages across to the public‟ (2002[1988]: 2). They proposed five kinds of
filters at work: 1) media ownership and profit orientation of major media firms; 2)
advertising as the primary source of income; 3) reliance by media on government,
business and „expert‟ sources provided by „agents of power‟; 4) „flak‟ as a means of
bringing media into line; and 5) the ideology of anti-communism as a „national religion
and control mechanism‟1 (2002[1988]: 2). Their title, Manufacturing Consent, is an echo
of the claims by some sociologists about the function of news. Boyd-Barrett and
Rantanen argue, in relation to studies of the rise of global news agencies, that the
business of these institutions was the production and distribution of forms of
consciousness, in ways which significantly impacted „our understanding of time and of
space‟ (1998: 1).

Lukin 98
News, they argue, contributed to processes of „the construction of national identity; to

imperialism and the control of colonies‟ as well as being „an essential lubricant in day-to-
day financial affairs, both within and between domestic markets‟ (1998: 1–2). In a similar
vein, although as part of a larger theory of cultural reproduction, Bernstein (1990) has
called media institutions part of the „field of symbolic control‟. The term denotes
agencies and agents „that specialize in discursive codes‟. These „discursive codes, ways of
relating, thinking, and feeling specialize and distribute forms of consciousness, social
relations, and dispositions‟ (1990: 134–135).
In HC‟s account, the media „manufacture consent‟ because they „serve, and
propagandize on behalf of, the powerful societal interests that control and finance them‟;
these powerful interests, thus, „play a key role in fixing basic principles and the dominant
ideologies‟ (Herman and Chomsky, 2002[1988]: xi); „the powerful‟ are able to „fix the
premises of discourse‟, and in so doing they „“manage” public opinion‟ (p. lix). Such
forces rule out the possibility of „mass deliberation and expression‟ (p. xli); the media
„internalize‟ „industry‟s self-legitimizing usage‟ (p. xlviii). The result, they propose, is a
dichotomization, „as if a commissar had instructed the media‟ to „[c]oncentrate on the
victims of enemy powers and forget about the victims of friends‟ (p. 31). This
dichotomization is „massive and systematic‟ (p. 35).
I am not alone in wondering what the implications of the propaganda model are
for understanding the power of language, and its relationship to notions such as ideology.
In an interview titled „Language and Politics‟, and reproduced in an extensive collection of
interviews with Chomsky by the same name (Otero, 2004), the first question turned to
this matter: „Could you discuss the relationship between language and politics?‟ (2004:
471). Chomsky‟s answer was that the relation was „tenuous‟ (see also the first interview
in Chomsky, 1979). The interviewer persisted, with a more specific question: „Could you
address the notion that words, language, have inherent power, concepts convey meaning
beyond their words? What is happening mechanically when certain phrases are used,
such as “the free world” or “strategic interests” or “national interests?” (2004: 472).
From the „father of modern linguistics‟, these were not matters pertaining to
language. He acknowledged that it was typical when people were discussing language and
politics to raise these kinds of questions, but dismissed the „banality‟ of such terms,
calling them „vulgar propaganda exercises‟, with which „we are inundated‟ and which
many of us „internalize‟. Chomsky argued that to defend oneself against this propaganda
was „not very hard to do‟. He gave the example of America‟s involvement in Vietnam
being described as the „defense‟ of South Vietnam, when America was attacking the
South: „Here the use of language – really the use of propaganda is what we should call it
– … frames the discussion.‟ By such choices, „our capacity for thought is destroyed‟ and
„our possibility for meaningful political action is undermined by very effective systems of
indoctrination and thought control that involve, as all such systems do, abuse of language‟
(2004: 472–473). Propaganda, for Chomsky, was not the „use of language‟ but the „abuse
of language‟.

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442333

Journalism, ideology and

and his ‘propaganda model’

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com by guest on February 27, 2015

A number of research studies have sought to consider these questions, or near

The propaganda model: ‘abuse’ but not ‘use’ of language

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com by guest on February 27, 2015

News, they argue, contributed to processes of „the construction of national identity; to

Downloaded from jou.sagepub.com by guest on February 27, 2015

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