Psychology of climate change – T. L.

Milfont 1

Citation:
Milfont, T. L. (2010). Global warming, climate change and human psychology. In V. Corral-
Verdugo, C. H. García-Cadena, & M. Frías-Arment (Eds.). Psychological approaches to
sustainability: Current trends in theory, research and practice. New York: Nova Science
Publishers.

GLOBAL WARMING, CLIMATE CHANGE

AND HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
Taciano L. Milfont
Centre for Applied Cross-Cultural Research and
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
(www.milfont.com)

Abstract. This chapter considers psychological aspects of global warming and

climate change. It begins with a brief consideration of the public and political
recognition of global warming and climate change as significant environmental
issues. The chapter then turns to a review of the scientific evidence of the causes and
consequences of climate change, and some of the issues in psychology that attend its
investigation. The main section of the chapter reviews characteristics of global
warming and climate change that function as psychological barriers for the awareness
of their existence and for willingness to act. Using Construal Level Theory, a new
integrative approach is then outlined that links climate change barriers with
psychological distance, and implications of the high-level construals of climate
change are discussed. Thereafter some research agendas for further psychological
research addressing global warming and climate change is proposed and delineated.
This is followed by a section highlighting that the rate and consequences of global
warming and climate change can be downgraded by global and local reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions. The chapter finishes with some concluding remarks.

Keywords: global warming, climate change, psychology, barriers, climate change

construals
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 2

Introduction
Discussion of issues related to global warming and climate change are increasingly
frequent in public discourse. The last few years have seen the release of several
movies dealing with the topic, including An Inconvenient Truth, The 11th Hour, The
Great Global Warming Swindle, The Day After Tomorrow and The Age of Stupid.
Media coverage has also appeared in popular magazines, including a special report on
Time magazine (April 3, 2006) under the banner “Global warming: Be worried. Be
very worried.” An increasing number of scientific publications have also been dealing
with the topic. The large and increasing number of scientific studies have been
routinely assessed, and the main conclusions are summarised, in the reports by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; discussed below). There is also
an increasing number of psychological studies dealing with the topic (e.g., Gifford,
2008a; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Nilsson, von Borgstede, & Biel, 2004; Pawlik, 1991;
Sundblad, Biel, & Gärling, 2009). The majority of lay people also seem to be aware
of the problem. The results of a Gallup survey in the early 90s with representative
samples from six nations (Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Portugal, Russia and USA) shows
that the majority of lay persons in four of the six nations rated “global warming or the
‘greenhouse’ effect” as a very serious problem (Dunlap, 1998). Similarly, a more
recent public opinion survey from Yale University also showed that 71% of the
American public is convinced that global warming is happening (Leiserowitz, 2007).

Concern about climate change and the emission level of greenhouse gases is also
evident in political discourse. For example, in a 2007 speech UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon has warned that climate change poses as much of a danger to the world
as war, and in a 2004 speech the former Prime Minister Tony Blair called climate
change the world’s greatest environmental challenge in a foreword to a book
published in 2005 (“Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change”).1 As a result, global
warming and climate change are a concern in many nations (see also Brouwer, Akter,
Brander, & Haque, 2007; Harré & Atkinson, 2007), and they are seen as one of the
most significant environmental issues in recent years (Heath & Gifford, 2006), or
even the greatest challenge to our civilization (Triandis, 2008). However, despite the
increasing certainty about the evidence for anthropogenic climate change (i.e., climate
change caused by human activities), public opinion and political change has been very
slow (or even non existent). This raises the question of “why”? Why do we not seem
to be worried? This chapter tackles this question by specifically focusing on
characteristics of global warming and climate change that function as psychological
barriers for the awareness of their existence and for willingness to act.

In the first section, I will give a brief overview of the evidence for global warming
and climate change. It will be argued that global warming and climate change are
happening, that they are anthropogenic issues, and that their effects pose real threats
for human living conditions and ecosystems. In the second section, I will present
psychological barriers that allow us to understand human failure to become aware of
global environmental changes and to act properly to address these changes. These
barriers will be illustrated with data from my ongoing programme of research as well
as from other published data. The third section briefly outlines a new integrative
approach for understanding the climate change barriers based on Construal Level
1
Political discourse is an unfortunate measure of what people feel because politicians would not
address global warming and climate change if they did not think they would have the support of a
sufficiently large fraction of their voters.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 3

Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003). This approach holds that climate change is a
psychologically distant event, and for that reason people mentally construe climate
change in terms of high-level, abstract, and stable characteristics. In the fourth
section, I discuss research agendas through which the psychological barriers can be
reduced, eliminated or overcome. Four interrelated psychological research areas that
deserve special attention in dealing with global warming and climate change are
discussed. In the forth section, I will highlight the challenges of change. This section
briefly outlines the importance of both individual and community actions for tackling
global warming and climate change. Some conclusions are presented in the fifth and
last section of the chapter.

Facts about global warming and climate change: It is a happening thing!

The notion of global warming and climate change can be briefly summarised as
follows. Some gases present in the Earth’s atmosphere act like the covering of a
greenhouse, allowing the sun’s energy to enter but then keeping the heat from
escaping back into space, thus helping to make our planet a warm and habitable place.
Although greenhouses gases (e.g., carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide) are
emitted naturally from trees and animals, they are also emitted from human activities
like burning coal, driving cars, farming and deforestation. An increase in such human
activities leads to higher emissions of the greenhouse gases into the atmosphere and
increases their concentrations. Rising concentrations of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere means that even more heat is being trapped from the sun, causing the
planet to warm up and our natural weather patterns to change. Global warming refers
to this process. However, it is preferable to think of climate change because the
changes currently observed and predicted are not limited to temperature alone but also
embrace changes in climate patterns and related events (sea rise, floods, cyclones,
droughts and landslips) (Ministry for the Environment, 2007).

Although global warming and climate change are currently a hot topic (double
meaning intended), a historical overview clearly shows that these are not new issues
(see Table 1). It is true that evidence has increased since the late 1980s (Flavin &
Engelman, 2009), but scientists have long indicated that human activities could cause
large-scale changes in climate. Nowadays most of the widely disseminated scientific
evidence relating to global warming and climate change comes from the assessment
reports produced by the IPCC. The IPCC was established in 1988 by the World
Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme, and is
open to 192 countries that are members of these organizations. The IPCC regularly
assesses the scientific, technical and socio-economic information important to
comprehending the science of climate and climate change, potential impacts of
climate change and options for adaptation and mitigation. This assessment is provided
via Assessment Reports, Special Reports, Methodology Reports and Technical
Papers, and is used to inform the work of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC is the political multi-lateral process by
which countries agree on measures to counteract the negative consequences of climate
change through placing limits on greenhouse gas emissions, and through adapting to
the unavoidable consequences of a changing climate.

[Table 1 about here]

 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 4

The UNFCCC definition of climate only encompasses climate change attributed to

human activities. In contrast, the IPCC defines climate change as any “change in the
state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the
mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period,
typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, whether due
to natural variability or as a result of human activity” (IPCC, 2007a, p. 30). In other
words, in IPCC usage there is no pre-judgement whether a given change in climate
was caused by human activities or may be a natural phenomenon. Rather, scientific
research must be used to answer such questions. This chapter uses the broader climate
change definition of IPCC, but focuses on anthropogenic climate change.

The IPCC has established three working groups that prepare reports on specific
thematic areas. The IPCC Working Group I assesses available scientific information
on the climate system and climate change. The IPCC Working Group II assesses the
impacts of climate change and the vulnerability of natural and socio-economic
systems to climate change, and options and ability to adapt to such changes. The
IPCC Working Group III assesses the technical and economic feasibility of strategies
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and hence reducing the rate and magnitude of
future changes in climate. Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are usually
referred to as “mitigation”, while efforts to adapt to changes in climate are referred to
as “adaptation”. Each working group is co-chaired by one scientist from a developing
country and another from a developed country. IPCC reports are prepared by teams of
scientific authors, and undergo a two-stage peer-reviewed process (first by experts
and then by both experts and governments). This peer-review process is followed by
an adoption and approval process in which a plenary with IPCC members accept the
final reports and agree on the wording of the report’s executive summary (know as
“Summary for Policymakers”). None of the authors who prepare the assessments are
paid by the IPCC for their work, and authors are drawn from the current global and
active scientific community (IPCC, 2004). These features of the IPCC work provide
robust support for the scientific integrity, transparency and reliability of its
assessments. Figure 1 shows the worldwide web search volume for “climate change
vs. global warming” on Google Trends, and serves as a crude indicator of the impact
of IPCC work on people’s awareness of these issues. As can be seen, the spikes in the
graph in 2007 coincide with the release of the IPCC reports and the announcement of
the Nobel Peace Prize award for the IPCC and Al Gore for their efforts to build up
and disseminate greater knowledge about anthropogenic climate change.

[Figure 1 about here]

The IPCC (IPCC, 2007a; 2007b) has provided international peer-reviewed scientific
evidence for (amongst other findings) the following:2

2
Interestingly enough, some commentators argue that because not all scientists agree or fully endorse
these evidences they should be ignored. Would they give the same advice for say a cancer patient who
is testing a new treatment for her/his disease? Should the patient wait until a full scientific consensus is
reached about the new treatment before undertaking it? Likewise, should we wait for a similar
consensus before acting to solve the environmental problems we face? As the reader will soon see, the
scientific evidence for climate change is more compiling and consensual than the evidences for most of
the medical treatments we readily accept and employ.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 5

• There is unequivocal evidence of the warming of the climate system, including

increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, pervasive melting of snow
and ice, and rising global average sea level
• Global mean temperature has risen approximately 0.76º Celsius since 1850 and
continues to rise from decade to decade
• Changes in arctic temperatures and sea ice, widespread changes in precipitation
amounts, ocean salinity and wind patterns are long-term changes already observed
due to climate change; recent warming has already affected many natural systems
on every continent and most oceans
• Concentrations of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide)
have increased strikingly since 1750 as a result of human activities (i.e., from
deforestation, land use change, burning fossil fuels)
• Human activities that increase the concentration of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere are largely responsible for the observed increase in temperature over
the past 50 years
• Increasing emissions will further enhance the greenhouse effect and result in an
additional warming of the Earth’s surface over the 21st century that will very
likely be greater than the warming observed over the 20th century
• Climate models predict a increase of the global mean temperature between 1.1 to
6.4ºC over the next 100 years, depending on future greenhouse gas emissions
• Extreme weather events including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and
the intensity of tropical cyclones have also been observed and in many places are
expected to become more frequent and/or intense as the climate warms
• Sea level is projected to rise by about 0.5m by 2100, and would continue to rise
inexorably for many centuries in a warmer world (more recent studies suggest that
this rise could occur even faster)
• The projected changes in climate will result in many negative impacts on
ecological systems and socio-economic sectors, including e.g. food supply, water
resources, and human health
• The impacts of climate change will be felt in all countries, but developing
countries and some key ecosystems are generally most vulnerable

This evidence is very serious. They show that the planet is warming up, that our
natural weather patterns are changing, that human activities are largely responsible for
these changes, and that projected future changes are likely to have significant impacts
on the most vulnerable people. Scientists are now very confident that the observed
changes in climate are not just a natural weather cycle (Collins, Colman, Haywood,
Manning, & Mote, 2007). Indeed, IPCC revised its conclusion that most of the
warming observed since the mid-20th century is attributable to humans from likely
(more than 66 percent probable) in the 2001 report to very likely (more than 90
percent probable) in the 2007 report (Collins et al., 2007). More worrying still is the
fact that although very accurate, the 2007 IPCC report has been seen as too cautious
as new scientific data is reported on unexpectedly rapid changes, such as the dramatic
further reduction in Artic sea ice during 2007 and 2008 (Kintisch, 2009).

Evidence thus supports the claim that global warming and climate change are
anthropogenic. Ecological systems in many regions of the world are now more
controlled by anthropogenic rather than by natural forces. The Italian geologist
Stoppani created the term “anthropozoic era” in 1873 to refer to humans as a new
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 6

factor (a new geological force) in nature (as cited in Clark, 1988, Footnote 1). More
recently, Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) coined the term “anthropocene” to refer to this
same idea of humans as a major geological force, and to characterise the current
geological epoch of a global-level impact of human activities on geology and ecology.

Given the key role of human behaviour in the current environmental issues,
psychology and in particular environmental psychology can boldly lead initiatives that
address these issues, as several publications in the area have already made clear (see,
e.g., Gifford, 2008a; Oskamp, 2000; Schmuck & Schultz, 2002; Schmuck & Vlek,
2003; Vlek & Steg, 2007). In the next section, I will explore the psychological
barriers or constraints that affect the ability of people to think and act about global
warming and climate change.

Environmental numbness and psychological characteristics of climate change

Gifford (2008a) has recently expanded his concept of “environmental numbness.” He
argues that “most people, most of the time, simply are not thinking at all about
climate change. Instead, they are (understandably) thinking about their work, their
friends and family, or the big game.” (p. 277). Environmental numbness thus implies
that people can be intentionally thinking about climate change but choose not too.
However, there are also unintentional psychological mechanisms that work as barriers
or constraints preventing people from becoming aware of climate change and from
acting on this awareness. These psychological characteristics were addressed in one of
the first psychological papers dealing with global environmental changes published by
Pawlik (1991). In a concise but important work, Pawlik proposed five
“psychologically inadvertent characteristics” related to climate change. These
characteristics influence people’s evaluations of climate change, and can help us to
understand the human failure to become aware of global environmental changes.
These inadvertent characteristics of climate change are reviewed and expanded next.

1. Psychophysiological barriers
The first psychologically inadvertent characteristic of climate change is humans’
psychophysiological barrier to perceiving the physical signs of these climate changes.
Pawlik (1991) referred to this as the ‘low signal-to-noise ratio of global change’. As
presented above, evidence shows that the global mean temperature has risen
approximately 0.76ºC and is going to increase between 1.1 to 6.4ºC over the next 100
years. However, the variation in temperatures that humans normally experience from
summer to winter, or even variations in temperatures during a single day, are typically
higher than the evident warming due to climate change. The physical ‘signals’ of
changes in temperature due to climate change are thus weak in value if compared to
the strong ‘noise’ of changes in temperature due to daily, seasonal and regional
variations (Pawlik, 1991). Because of the weak physical signals of climate change,
sensory and memory mechanisms are unable to discern them as they are below the
common thresholds of discernability. Its weak physical signals make climate change
harder to notice than other environmental problems. It is easier to notice deforestation,
air and water pollution than small variations in temperature.

Pawlik does not assume that global changes in temperature are not important, just that
people tend not to notice them. Indeed, it would be incorrect to assume that because
the magnitude of climate change appears small compared with day-to-day variability,
it is irrelevant. Global annual average temperatures normally only vary by a few
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 7

tenths of a degree from one year to the next. Hence an increase in several degrees in
global average temperature is a significant change on geological proportions. In
addition, small changes in average temperature can lead to a disproportionate increase
in extremes, for example heat waves. Apart from temperature, changes in average
rainfall of several tens of percent are projected in many already dry regions of the
globe, with attendant increase in drought risk. Combining all these changes, the
physical signals will therefore soon become very noticeable as the consequences of
changes in the climate increase in ecosystems and for human activities such as
agriculture, coastal storms and public health. If we were to wait for rapid and
catastrophic changes before taking global action the situation would get worse than
already is now.

2. Temporal barriers
Another psychologically inadvertent characteristic refers to temporal barriers related
to awareness of climate change. There is a great time lapse between human actions
and their influence on environmental change. As pointed by Reisinger (2003) for the
example of ozone depletion, “there is a lag of about 30 years from the first discovery
of a global environmental risk to the period of maximum environmental damage, and
a lag of more than 60 years from the beginning of concerted international action until
the environmental perturbation will have been reduced to levels prior to
anthropogenic interference” (p. 111). This means that in the case of ozone depletion
there is a time lapse of about one hundred years from discovery of the potential
environmental problem to its eventual resolution.

This temporal barrier was referred to by Pawlik (1991) as the ‘extreme masking and
delay of cause-effect gradients’. The great temporal delay between human actions and
their perceptible influence on environmental systems (i.e., cause-effect gradient)
means that the consequences of human actions go beyond a single generation. The
environmental problems we are facing now are a result of maladaptive human
behaviour of previous generations, and our current maladaptive behaviours will have
consequences for our generation as well as for several generations to come. Indeed,
climate scientists agree that the consequences of climate change will be felt by plants,
animals and humans for at least the next thousand years (Collins et al., 2007). Our
current actions will thus influence how the world will develop over centuries to come.
Conversely, it means that actions to reduce risks from climate change will present
costs to the current generation but the main benefits of such actions would be accrued
only by future generations.

This second characteristic of climate change can be expanded to include another

temporal barrier that is more related to individuals’ temporal orientations rather than
to the phenomenon of climate change per se. This second temporal barrier of climate
change is related to people’s capacity and interest in thinking long-term. Research has
shown that environmental issues entail not only a social conflict (discussed below) but
also a temporal conflict (a conflict between short- and long-term interests) (Joireman,
Van Lange, & Van Vugt, 2004). More specifically, research has shown that future-
oriented individuals (those who are aware of and concerned about the future
consequences of their actions) tend to care and act more to address environmental
issues than present-oriented individuals (for a review, see Pinheiro & Corral-Verdugo,
this volume). This means that individuals who care about environmental issues focus
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 8

more on public and long-term interests, rather than on their immediate needs and
concerns (Milfont & Gouveia, 2006).

Extending this line of research on the impact of individuals’ time orientation on

environmental awareness, we recently showed that attitudes toward climate change
responsibility predict differential support for political parties only for people who
have children (Milfont, Harré, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2008). Attitudes toward climate
change responsibility predicted increased support for a center-left party in New
Zealand (The Labour Party) and decreased support for a center-right party (The
Labour Party) but only for people with children. For people without children, such
attitudes did not predict support for either of these political parties. We proposed an
‘environmental generativity’ account to theoretically ground this finding, based upon
Erickson’s (1950) theory of life-span psychological development. Erickson sees
generativity as the challenge underlying the seventh stage of human development, and
is manifest as a desire to leave a social legacy and provide positive guidance for
others. Following this idea, we argued that parenting may help prompt an
‘environmental generativity’ so that parents (compared to non-parents) feel more
inclined to preserve the environment for their children. This indicates that the desire
to leave a social legacy and the future orientation underlying generativity tendencies
are characteristics related to climate change. This seems self-evident given that
parents have a clear stake in the welfare of future generations and thus have an
obvious motivation to care about the future of the planet. As a result, political parties
perceived as more pro-environmentally oriented may be more likely to attract the
votes of people who are concerned about climate change when they have a vested
interest in preserving the environment for future generations, and particularly one’s
children.

There is therefore robust evidence for the role of temporal barriers as psychologically
inadvertent characteristic of climate change. This is expressed in respect of the delay
between current actions and their future consequences on environmental systems, as
well as the impact of people’s time orientation on their awareness of such issues. It
has even been argued that it is difficult for humans to adopt a future-centered
conceptualization of problem-solving, which is needed for addressing environmental
issues, because of evolutionary characteristics of human personality (Shackelford,
2006).

3. Judgemental barriers
The third psychologically inadvertent characteristic of climate change refers to human
tendency to underestimate the occurrence of low-frequency events. Pawlik refers to
this as the ‘psychophysics of low-probability events’. People tend to underestimate
the increasing frequency of natural disasters produced by global warming and climate
change, such as hurricanes and major flooding, because of their low absolute rate of
occurrence (Pawlik, 1991). This tendency to minimize events with a small probability
of occurrence is a cognitive bias that originates from judgmental heuristics (mental
strategies or cognitive short-cuts). When making judgements under uncertainty we
tend to use such heuristics for reaching subjective probabilities (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Judgement by availability is one of the heuristic postulated by
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), and is used when “people assess the frequency of a
class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences
can be brought to mind” (p. 1127). Because instances or occurrences of global
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 9

warming and climate change (or natural disasters produced by those) cannot be easily
brought to mind, its probability of occurrence is underestimated due to a cognitive
bias. Uncertainty related to environmental problems not only influences risk
perception but also behaviour. For example, research has shown that increasing the
level of certainty (or probability of occurrence) that negative effects of resource
depletion would occur increased participants’ willingness to limit resource
consumption (Kortenkamp & Moore, 2006).

Another related cognitive bias that functions as a psychologically inadvertent

characteristic of climate change refers to more specific analyses of risk perception.
Research has shown that we tend to evaluate hazards as more threatening when such
hazards are perceived as unknown (Slovic, 1987). Slovic (1987) reports a study that
asked participants to rate 81 hazards (e.g., DNA technology, pesticides, pollution
from coal burning) on 18 risk characteristics (e.g., common, immediate, fatal,
controllable). Using a factor-analytic approach to provide a spatial representation of
the relationships among the hazards and the risk characteristics, two risk factors were
identified: a Dread Risk factor and an Unknown Risk factor. These two risk factors
have been confirmed in several other cross-cultural studies (Boholm, 1998). The
Dread Risk factor (uncontrollable, global catastrophic, consequences fatal, not easily
reduced) included hazards such as nuclear technology and radioactive waste. The
Unknown Risk factor (not observable, unknown to those exposed and to science,
effect delayed) included chemical technology hazards. While people were more afraid
of hazards that are both dreaded and unknown, people wanted to reduce the current
risks and wanted stricter regulation especially for hazards scoring high on the Dread
Risk factor.

These two cognitive biases are related to climate change. Natural disasters caused by
changes in global climate are underestimated because of their low frequency of
occurrence as well as because of their familiarity. Risks from climate change (e.g.,
floods, sea rise) are by and large known and thus underestimated (Weber, 2006).
Hence, risks from say nuclear reactor accidents (low-frequency event but unknown)
are perceived as more threatening than increasing hurricanes due to climate change
(low-frequency event but known).

4. Geographical and social barriers

Another psychologically inadvertent characteristic of climate change signed by
Pawlik (1991) refers to the ‘social distance between actors and victims of global
change.’ As discussed above, the environmental consequences of global warming and
climate change have impacts across temporal social distances, so that future
generations will have to deal with the environmental problems caused by the
behaviour of our generation. But these consequences not only operate across temporal
social distances; environmental impacts due to global warming and climate change
are also carried across spatial social distances. Our maladaptive behaviours will have
negative consequences for generations living away apart in both place and time.

Research looking at the way people evaluate environmental problems in distinct

geographical places helps us to understand the social distance underlying climate
change. Uzzel (2000) observed people’s tendency to perceive environmental problems
as more worrying when they take place at greater distances, which he calls
‘environmental hyperopia.’ As a result of environmental hyperopia, people are
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 10

typically more concerned about environmental problems at the global and

international level than they are at the local and regional level. Several empirical
studies have supported this phenomenon (see, e.g., Freury-Bahi, 2008; García-Mira,
Real, & Romay, 2005). As an illustration, I re-analysed cross-cultural data of 468
participants from 59 countries (Milfont, Sibley, & Duckitt, in press). As can be seen
in Figure 2, while showing significantly higher (p < .001, d = .21) feelings of
responsibility for environmental problems in their community than for environmental
problems worldwide, participants rated the seriousness of global warming worldwide
as significantly higher (p < .001, d = 1.04) than the seriousness of global warming in
their community. This supports the environmental hyperopia and shows that we tend
to perceive global warming and climate change as more threatening to others than to
ourselves.

[Figure 2 about here]

A similar phenomenon that has been related to environmental issues is optimistic bias
(Hatfield & Job, 2001; Pahl, Harris, Todd, & Rutter, 2005; Uzzell, 2000). Weinstein
(1980) was the first to demonstrate optimistic bias by showing that people tend to
believe their chances of experiencing positive events to be higher than that of other
people, and their chances of experiencing negative events to be lower. Some studies
have investigated environment-related optimistic bias. Hatfield and Job (2001)
investigated optimistic bias regarding environmental hazards. Contrary to their
expectations, they found only low levels of optimistic bias regarding general
environmental hazards. However, higher levels of optimistic bias were found
regarding both the likelihood of hazards affecting the participant’s local area, and the
participant’s perception of their own knowledge of suitable ecological behaviours to
reduce environmental problems produced by the hazards. More recently, Pahl et al.
(2005) conducted two studies investigating whether optimistic bias exists in relation
to environmental risks and also whether this bias can be used to predict self-reported
ecological behaviour. Although Pahl et al.’s (2005) findings indicate that optimistic
bias is relevant to environmental issues, no direct association was found between
optimistic bias for environmental risks and ecological behaviour.

Conceptually integrating environmental hyperopia with optimistic biases, Freury-Bahi

(2008) investigated environmental risk perception for four distinct targets (i.e., risk to
oneself, inhabitants of the town, inhabitants of the country, and humanity) and three
categories of hazards (including climate change). In line with environmental
hyperopia and optimistic biases, he observed that participants’ perceived risk of
climate change increased as both the size of local area and the number of people
under consideration also increased. Climate change was thus rated as a greater risk for
humanity than for inhabitants of the country, inhabitants of the town, and for oneself
(i.e., humanity > country > town > oneself). These findings support the notion of a
psychologically inadvertent characteristic of climate change related to the actors-
victims social distance: even if people are convinced climate change is a major issue
facing the planet, they do not feel climate change will affect them much.

5. Social dilemma barriers

The final psychologically inadvertent characteristic of climate change signed by
Pawlik (1991) refers to the ‘low subjective cost-effectiveness of environment-
conserving behaviour.’ This characteristic stands for the practical understanding that
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 11

many (if not most) of one’s detrimental acts to the environment are more cost-
effective for oneself than acts that are less detrimental. Put in other words, from an
individualistic point of view pro-environmental behaviours (e.g., walking, biking or
taking public transport to work) are often more costly in terms of personal comfort
and convenience than anti-environmental behaviours (e.g., driving to work).

This low subjective cost-effectiveness of pro-environmental behaviours can be

understood through the conceptualisation of social dilemmas. When in a social
dilemma situation we are caught between two competing alternatives: to act serving
our own interests or to act serving the needs of the group we belong to or wider
society. Hardin (1968) was the first to describe the notion of social dilemma in his
paper The Tragedy of the Commons dealing with the risks of overexploitation of
natural resources as a result of the conflict between individual interests and the
common good. A prototypical example of the tragedy of commons is the situation in
which fishermen have little incentive to act alone to preserve the shared fish stocks
and as a result suffer collectively from overfishing. Environmental issues are
understood as social dilemmas because they represent a conflict between the
collective interest of society and the individual interests of its members (Milfont &
Gouveia, 2006; Osbaldiston & Sheldon, 2002; Van Vugt, 2001; Van Vugt &
Samuelson, 1999). This conflict between private and public interests comprises the
social dimension of the dilemmas. But a temporal dimension (see discussion above)
has also been acknowledged as another conflict underlying social dilemmas
(Joireman, 2005; Joireman et al., 2004; Messick & Brewer, 1983). Hence,
environmental issues are social dilemmas with a conflict between short-term
individual interests and long-term collective interests (Milfont & Gouveia, 2006).

There is also a distinction in the literature of two types of social dilemmas: The
resource dilemma and the public goods dilemma (Van Vugt, 1998). The resource
dilemmas are situations that require individuals’ cooperation to preserve a valuable
resource (e.g., rain forest), while public good dilemmas are situations that require
individuals’ cooperation to create a valuable good (e.g., creation of a community
centre for edible gardening). Although specific environmental issues might
encompass mainly a resource dilemma, broader environmental problems such climate
change clearly involves both resource dilemmas and public good dilemmas. In fact,
Gifford (2008b) have developed a theoretical model that can be applied to both types
of social dilemmas. The model integrates influences on and outcomes of social
dilemmas with relevance to environmental issues, including climate change (Gifford,
2008a). According to the model, five categories of influence (i.e., geophysical,
governance, interpersonal, decision-maker and dilemma-awareness influences) have
important consequences for the outcomes of social dilemmas. The influenced
outcomes are: outcomes for the decision-maker (e.g., emotional, financial and social
satisfaction) and outcomes for the environment (e.g., public good is completed or not;
resource depleted or sustained).

Overall, the imbalance between private good and public good comes from the fact that
environmental issues are usually the result of a large number of individual destructive
acts. Hence, one individual chosing not to commit such an act has a very small
influence on the overall outcome, but for the specific individual concerned, the choice
between committing or not committing such an act can be significant. Individuals will
benefit more in a social dilemma if he or she defects, but the group as a whole is
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 12

worse off if everyone defects than if everyone cooperates. As a result, individualistic

orientations tend to produce negative outcomes in social dilemmas. As research has
shown, individuals who place higher priorities in individualistic, self-centred value
orientations tend to be less concern about environmental issues and to act accordingly
(Coelho, Gouveia, & Milfont, 2006; Milfont, Sibley et al., in press; Schultz et al.,
2005). For example, we found that self-enhancement values were negative predictors
of ecological behaviour (while altruistic values were positive predictors) in samples
from Brazil, New Zealand and South Africa (Milfont, Duckitt, & Wagner, in press).

Construal levels and psychological distance: Towards an integrative approach to

understand climate change as a psychologically distant situation
Climate change is an environmental risk characterized by weak physical signals, high
uncertainty, time-delayed consequences, low subjective cost-effectiveness, and great
geographical and social distance. These characteristics were outlined in Pawlik (1991)
and expanded upon above. These climate change characteristics are implicitly
discussed by other scholars (e.g., Dunlap & Jones, 2002; Gattig & Hendrickx, 2007),
and there are also other individual and social perceived barriers to engaging with
climate change that are not discussed here (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh,
2007). However, no previous attempt has been made to integrate the several barriers
related to climate change. I use the Construal Level Theory (Liberman & Trope,
1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003) to briefly outline a novel integrative approach for
understanding climate change (and other environmental risks) as a psychologically
distant situation.

According to Construal Level Theory (CLT), temporal distance influences people’s

responses to future events: events in the distant future are viewed in more abstract and
superordinate terms (high-level construals), while events in the near future are viewed
in more concrete and detailed terms (low-level construals). The theory has later been
expanded to include not only temporal distance but also other dimensions of
psychological distance (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). An event is more
psychologically distant as it takes place farther into the future (temporal distance), as
it occurs in more remote locations (spatial distance), as it is less likely to occur
(hypotheticality), and as it happens to people less like oneself (social distance). The
basic premise of CLT is that the more psychologically distant an event is (i.e., the
greater the temporal, spatial, hypothetical, or social distance from an event), the more
distant it appears and the more it will be represented at higher levels of abstraction.
Therefore, CLT posits that similar mental construal processes underlie psychological
distance dimensions, and that these construal processes guide the way people predict,
evaluate, and plan psychologically near and distant situations (Liberman & Trope,
2008). Indeed, several studies testing CLT hypotheses have shown that dimensions of
psychological distance are (i) interrelated, (ii) affect and are affected by the level of
construal (i.e., people think more abstractly about distant than about near situations,
and more abstract construals also lead people to think of more distant situations), and
(iii) have similar effects on prediction, evaluation, and action (for reviews, see
Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope et al., 2007).

All climate change barriers discussed above involve some form of psychological
distance. Climate change has weak physical signals and uncertain outcomes so is
perceived to be less likely to occur (hypotheticality), takes place farther into the future
(temporal distance), and is perceived to be more likely to occur in more remote
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 13

locations (spatial distance) and to people less like oneself (social distance). Thus,
psychophysiological and judgemental barriers are related to hypotheticality, and
temporal, geographical and social dilemma barriers are linked to temporal, spatial and
social distances, respectively. The links between barriers and psychological distance
indicates that climate change can be regarded as a psychologically distant situation.
And because climate change is a psychologically distant situation, CLT would predict
that the way people mentally represent it is by abstract representations, or high-level
construals. High-level construals consists of general, structured, parsimonious,
superordinate, and essential features of a situation (Trope & Liberman, 2003). This
means that climate change is likely to be represented in terms of a few abstract
features that convey its perceived essence rather than in terms of more concrete and
incidental details.

A CLT account of climate change has important implications for understanding the
way people evaluate environmental risks in general and also on action plans related to
these risks. Take the role of feasibility and desirability considerations of climate
change, for example. Whilst desirability refers to the value of an action’s end state
(superordinate, why aspects of an action), feasibility refers to the ease or difficulty of
reaching the end state (subordinate, how aspects of an action) (Liberman & Trope,
1998). So, desirability concerns the value (why) of overcoming climate change,
whereas feasibility concerns the amount of effort we have to invest (how) to tackle
climate change. Although climate change involves both desirability (moral principals
and ideals) and feasibility (difficulty, cost, and situational pressures) considerations,
moral principles are more likely to guide decisions involving high-level construals
and psychologically distant situations. Therefore, moral principals and ideals should
be key variables guiding people’s decisions to tackle climate change. This prediction
might explain the known role of values in predicting environmental attitudes and
behaviours (see discussion below). Using CLT as a framework for understanding the
construal of climate change and other environmental risks seems a fertile endeavour
for theoretical and empirical development in the area.

Psychological research for tackling climate change

As it is clear from the discussion and research examples discussed earlier,
psychological research is important for understanding and overcoming barriers related
to climate change. This section focuses on research agendas to help this process.
Important actions for addressing climate change have been proposed and discussed by
other commentators (Crompton, 2008; Gifford, 2008a). Here I will concentrate my
analyses on four interrelated areas for further psychological research that deserve
special attention. An effort is made to highlight the importance of the integrative
approach discussed above in the research agendas.

Risk perception. Climate change is an example of “hidden hazards,” or risks that are
unnoticed or unattended until they reach disaster proportions, despite their serious
consequences for society (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1991). In line with this, public
opinion polls and academic studies examining the relative importance of several
environmental problems have shown that global warming and climate change are not
salient issues in people’s minds (e.g., Bord, Fisher, & O'Connor, 1998; Leiserowitz,
2004). This hidden feature of climate change is further exacerbated by the
psychophysiological barriers of climate change discussed above. Future studies
should investigate the specific mechanisms by which people perceive climate change
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 14

as a risk or not. Considering the fact that climate change is a psychologically distant
situation, research should focus on the interrelationship of all dimensions of
psychological distance in affecting people’s perception of climate change as a risk (cf.
Gattig & Hendrickx, 2007). An inclusive approach that takes into account all these
factors will provide a way to understand how individuals consider the potential
climate outcomes of their past and current behaviours for themselves and others
(away in place and time), and also the extent to which they are influenced by these
potential future outcomes.

Risk communication. Communication seems the ideal tool for making climate change
an “unhidden” risk. Pawlik (1991) argues that communication can address many of
the barriers outlined above. Likewise, Gifford (2008a) argues that to challenge
environmental numbness we need, among other things, “to get as many people around
the world as possible actively thinking about climate change” (p. 277). These
positions seem to support the knowledge-deficit model (cf. Kellstedt, Zahran, &
Vedlitz, 2008), according to which providing information about global warming and
climate change would increase public concern about these issues. Communication is
thus expected to create awareness and willingness to act even considering the
uncertain, gradual, long-term signals of climate change. However, the effect of
communication and information on increased concern is not that simple. For example,
some researchers were unable to find a clear effect of perceived information about
global warming and climate change on concerns and intention to act (Heath &
Gifford, 2006; Kellstedt et al., 2008). Further psychological research is therefore
needed to examine whether increased information about climate change can indeed
lead to higher concern and proper actions. Three general areas of research could be
explored.
(1) It has been recently suggested that climate communication should use a
combination of top-down (regulatory approaches that forces green behaviour)
and bottom-up (fostering voluntary action to reduce emissions) approaches to
both facilitate public acceptance of regulations related to climate change and
to stimulate grass-roots action (Ockwell, Whitmarsh, & O'Neill, 2009). This
combination of approaches for climate communication seems reasonable. It
seems that we cannot rely only on individuals to take collective action; we
have to make collective action normative and subject to social sanctions
through policies and laws. However, the psychological reasons for combining
top-down and bottom-up approaches have not been spelled out nor tested.
(2) Environmental risks are more likely to be accepted when they are presented as
gains rather than as losses (Gattig & Hendrickx, 2007). This suggests that
framing climate communications in a way that it is perceived as an increase of
an existing risk may prove more effective. Another possibility is to tailor
climate change messages to the specific processes underlying behaviour
change, and to frame these messages as a function of the intrinsic versus the
extrinsic costs or benefits of the behaviour (Pelletier & Sharp, 2008). It is a
question for future research whether these tailoring and framing strategies are
more effective in climate communication.
(3) Besides addressing broad climate communication approaches and framings,
future research should also explore specific issues related to communicating
uncertainty. A recent study has shown that the way the IPCC reports
communicate uncertainty (using a set of probability terms accompanied by
global interpretational guidelines) leads to imprecision and errors in
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 15

communication related to climate change information (Budescu, Broomell, &

Por, 2009). Future studies could address whether changes in the way IPCC
reports communicate uncertainty can lead to higher risk awareness and
actions.
(4) Future research should also explore the implications of the high-level
construals of climate change in risk communication. As discussed above,
climate change is likely to be represented in terms of a few abstract features
that convey its perceived essence. Climate change communication should thus
take these features into account.

Intertemporal and interpersonal issues. Climate change comprises a conflict between

short-term individual interests and long-term collective interests. Current destructive
behaviours will have negative consequences for generations living away apart in both
place and time. Moreover, while actions to reduce risks from climate change represent
costs to the current generation, their resulting benefits would be accrued only by
future generations. Climate change therefore encompasses intertemporal and
interpersonal issues. Future research should further examined the link between
temporal and social distances in the climate change dilemma (cf. Joireman, 2005;
Milfont & Gouveia, 2006; Milfont et al., 2008). One possibility would be to link the
social dilemma framework with the CLT account of climate change. CLT predicts
that more abstract construals should be applied to other people and out-group while
more concrete construals should be applied to self and in-group (Liberman & Trope,
2008). In line with this, CLT may be expanded into the social dilemma framework by
considering the influence of both temporal and social distance on climate change
construals. One might postulated that events in the distant future are viewed in more
abstract and selfless terms (i.e., “a tax on gas will reduce fuel consumption and
pollution”), while events in the near future are viewed in more concrete and selfish
terms (i.e., “a tax on gas will cost me more money when I fill up my gas tank”). Given
that climate change is a distant future event, the information and evaluative
implications of high-level construals and cooperative orientations, compared to low-
level construals and competitive orientations, should have more impact on the way
people mentally represent climate issues. Empirical studies could address this
possibility. The link between intertemporal and interpersonal issues is also important
because social influence can be enhanced by future thinking. Research has shown that
reflecting on the future, or thinking about future consequences, increases persuasive
attempts by influencing choices in the present (Sherman, Crawford, & McConnell,
2004).

Dominant values. The areas of research discussed above are important for addressing
climate change. Enhancing risk perception and communication could increase
awareness, and understanding the link between intertemporal and interpersonal issues
can facilitate the promotion of personal and collective actions for overcoming
environmental issues. However, these research areas do not question nor address the
implicit causes of climate change or other environmental issues. Most (if not all)
current environmental problems are a result of the assumption that the ever-increasing
economic growth should be the main drive for development. This growth paradigm
and its underlying values, such as individualistic, materialistic and consumeristic
values, influence the way we relate to nature.3 Commentators and researchers have

3
Annie Leonard’s movie The Story of Stuff provides an interesting portrait of these underlying values.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 16

argued that these values have to be challenged if we are to successfully address

environmental issues (Brown & Cameron, 2000; Crompton, 2008; Flavin &
Engelman, 2009). No action will be completely effective if the dominant values that
lead to the current environmental problems are not challenged. This is because any
agreement or action built on the assumptions of ever-increasing economic growth is
doomed to failure (Flavin & Engelman, 2009). A core role of psychological research
should thus be to identify ways and means by which the underlying growth paradigm,
and its underlying values, can be challenged without leading to an immediate
blockage by the people whose growth would be halted. Furthermore, values constitute
moral principals and ideals that, according to CLT and the approach described above,
are more likely to guide decisions for situations with high psychological distance, like
climate change, because they represent desirability concerns (cf. Liberman & Trope,
1998). Values are thus crucial psychological variables for challenging the state of
affairs for the way we relate to nature. Indeed, research has shown the predictive
power of values in explaining people’s environmental attitudes and behaviours (e.g.,
Milfont, Duckitt et al., in press; Milfont & Gouveia, 2006; Milfont, Sibley et al., in
press)

The challenge of change

The focus of this chapter has so far been on evidence, facts and research agendas. The
evidence reviewed is worrying and can be overwhelming. There is the possibility that
we might end up in a state of inertia due to what the New Zealand journalist Margie
Thompson calls eco-anxiety: feelings of guilt with overtones of fear followed by
feelings of being overwhelmed by all the changes you know you should make to your
lifestyle. However, it is important to highlight that apart from the mounting scientific
evidence about the impact of human behaviour on the global climate, there is also
rapidly increasing evidence about options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and
thus reduce the rate and magnitude of climate change (see, e.g., IPCC, 2007a). This
means that hope, awareness and action should overcome despair, denial and inertia,
and the focus should be on ways we can ameliorate the impact of climate change in
our lives.

Although climate change cannot be prevented entirely, its rate and consequences can
be downgraded by global and local reductions of greenhouse gas emissions (Hare,
2009). In virtually every sector of human activities (energy, industry, buildings,
agriculture, forestry, and waste management) there exists a significant potential to
reduce emissions through new technologies, use of existing more efficient
technologies, and changes in behaviour. The overall economic costs of such changes
are estimated to be small, reducing the global average growth rate of GDP by less
than about 0.1 percentage points (Stern & Taylor, 2007), but they would require
significant policy changes including placing a cost on the emission of greenhouse
gases.

Because climate change is caused by human behaviour, its solution lies in changing
human behaviour. Actions to reduce emissions, including use of clean-energy
technologies, policy changes, domestic regulations and international treaties, will be a
result of community and individual decisions. Individual actions have thus a
meaningful impact in addressing climate change. Research supports this by showing
that individuals must believe that even small personal actions can make a meaningful
difference before they decide to act against climate change (Heath & Gifford, 2006).
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 17

Governmental and non-governmental agencies have also indicated the need to

enhance the power of small individual actions (Crompton, 2008; Ministry for the
Environment, 2007). For instance, the Ministry for the Environment (2007) in New
Zealand recognises that the difference in addressing climate change will be made by
the small steps taken by individuals (supported by the bigger steps of governments
and businesses).

However, such changes generate significant debate and opposition from vested
interests, since they would inevitably make some activities less profitable and others
more so. As a result, community action is also necessary for achieving widespread
changes. Communities should be encouraged to share their experiences and learn
from each other. For example, the movie The Power of Community: How Cuba
Survived Peak Oil shows how Cubans developed community initiatives and creative
strategies to overcome the collapse of their formal economy. We have much to learn
from their experiences and resilience strategies. Specific resilience strategies for
climate change have also been discussed (Brouwer et al., 2007; Dodman, Ayers, &
Huq, 2009). Therefore, psychological research should also contribute for enhancing
community and individual actions.

Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the issues of global warming and climate change. The
evidence and research summarized in this chapter indicate a number of important
conclusions about the role of psychological research aimed to address these major
environmental problems we are facing. First, evidence was shown demonstrating that
these issues are happening and that they will have negative impacts on our lives.
Second, five psychologically inadvertent barriers were presented that can help to
understand why most people are not acting to solve these issues. Third, construal level
theory was used to provide an integrative approach for understanding climate change
as a psychologically distant situation. Fourth, research agendas were outlined to guide
future psychological studies aiming to tackle climate change. Finally, considerations
of positive actions for tackling climate change were briefly discussed.

Before concluding, I would like to point out that we tend to use broader and (at some
degree) contestable concepts, such as ‘climate change’, ‘global warming’ and even
‘sustainability’, that are regrettably often used for political rhetoric rather than for
political and social action. However, what is really at stake is environmental
degradation. Even if the reader does not agree with such terminologies, remember that
the underlying concern encompassing these concepts is the degradation of the
environment. And now there is compelling evidence that human behaviour has been
producing unprecedented environmental problems (e.g., Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, 2005).

I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss psychological aspects of environmental

issues alongside distinguished colleagues in the field. I hope that this chapter, along
with the others, will contribute to enhancing psychological theory and research for
ameliorating the environmental challenges we face. We need to be aware (and make
other people aware) of the negative impacts of our behaviours in the environment.
And we need to lead by example. Our actions to reduce the effects of global warming
and climate change will certainly encourage others to do the same. I hope the reader
can join us in tackling these issues.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 18

Acknowledgements
I thank Víctor Corral-Verdugo for the invitation to contribute with this volume. I am
also grateful to John McClure (Victoria University of Wellington), Andy Reisinger
(New Zealand Climate Change Research Institute), Quentin Atkinson (University of
Oxford) and Niki Harré (University of Auckland) for their helpful comments and
criticisms. Whilst their comments and encouragement is in no small measure
responsible for this chapter, this is not meant to imply that they agree with all my
views, and I am, of course, solely responsible for any remaining shortcomings.

Reference
Boholm, A. (1998). Comparative studies of risk perception: A review of twenty years
of research. Journal of Risk Research, 1, 135-163.
Bord, R. J., Fisher, A., & O'Connor, R. E. (1998). Public perceptions of global
warming: United States and international perspectives. Climate Research, 11,
75-84.
Brouwer, R., Akter, S., Brander, L., & Haque, E. (2007). Socioeconomic vulnerability
and adaptation to environmental risk: A case study of climate change and
flooding in Bangladesh. Risk Analysis, 27, 313-326.
Brown, P. M., & Cameron, L. D. (2000). What can be done to reduce
overconsumption? Ecological Economics, 32, 27-41.
Budescu, D. V., Broomell, S., & Por, H.-H. (2009). Improving communication of
uncertainty in the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Psychological Science, 20, 299-308.
Clark, W. C. (1988). The human dimensions of global environmental change. In
Committee on Global Change (Ed.), Toward an understanding of global
change: Initial priorities for U.S. contributions to the International
Geosphere-Bisphere Program. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Coelho, J. A. P. M., Gouveia, V. V., & Milfont, T. L. (2006). Valores humanos como
explicadores de atitudes ambientais e intenção de comportamento pró-
ambiental [Human values as predictors of environmental attitudes and pro-
environmental behavior]. Psicologia em Estudo, 11, 199-207.
Collins, W., Colman, R., Haywood, J., Manning, M. R., & Mote, P. (2007). The
physical science behind climate change. Scientific American 297, 64-71
Crompton, T. (2008). Weathercocks & signposts: The environment movement at a
crossroads. London: WWF-UK. Retrieved May 17, 2008, from
http://wwf.org.uk/strategiesforchange.
Crutzen, P. J., & Stoermer, E. F. (2000). The "Anthropocene". Global Change
Newsletter, 41, 12-13.
Dodman, D., Ayers, J., & Huq, S. (2009). Bulding resilience. In T. W. Institute (Ed.),
State of the world 2009: Into a warming world. Washington, DC: The
Worldwatch Institute.
Dunlap, R. E. (1998). Lay perceptions of global risk: Public views of global warming
in crossnational context. International Sociology, 13, 473-498.
Dunlap, R. E., & Jones, R. E. (2002). Environmental concern: Conceptual and
measurement issues. In R. E. Dunlap & W. Michelson (Eds.), Handbook of
environmental sociology (pp. 482-524). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Erikson, E. H. (1950). The life cycle completed. New York: Norton.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 19

Flavin, C., & Engelman, R. (2009). The perfect storm. In The Worldwatch Institute
(Ed.), State of the world 2009: Into a warming world. Washington, DC: The
Worldwatch Institute.
Freury-Bahi, G. (2008). Environmental risk: Perception and target with local versus
global evaluations. Psychological Reports, 102, 185-193.
García-Mira, R., Real, J. E., & Romay, J. (2005). Temporal and spatial dimensions in
the perception of environmental problems: An investigation of the concept of
environmental hyperopia. International Journal of Psychology, 40, 5-10.
Gattig, A., & Hendrickx, L. (2007). Judgmental discounting and environmental risk
perception: Dimensional similarities, domain differences, and implications for
sustainability. Journal of Social Issues, 63, 21–39.
Gifford, R. (2008a). Psychology's essential role in alleviating the impacts of climate
change. Canadian Psychology, 49, 273-280.
Gifford, R. (2008b). Toward a comprehensive model of social dilemmas. In A. Biel,
D. Eek, T. Gärling & M. Gustaffson (Eds.), New issues and paradigms in
research on social dilemmas (pp. 265–280). New York: Springer.
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248.
Hare, W. L. (2009). A safe landing for the climate. In T. W. Institute (Ed.), State of
the world 2009: Into a warming world. Washington, DC: The Worldwatch
Institute.
Harré, N., & Atkinson, Q. D. (Eds.). (2007). Carbon neutral by 2020. How New
Zealanders can tackle climate change. Nelson, New Zealand: Craig Potton.
Hatfield, J., & Job, R. F. S. (2001). Optimism bias about environmental degradation:
The role of the range of impact of precautions. Journal of Environmental
Psychology, 21, 17-30.
Heath, Y., & Gifford, R. (2006). Free-market ideology and environmental
degradation: The case of beliefs in global climate change. Environment and
Behavior, 38, 48-71.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). (2004). 16 years of scientific
assessment in support of the climate convention (Anniversary Brochure).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved February 25, 2009, from
http://www.ipcc.ch.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). (2007a). Climate change 2007:
Synthesis report. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved February
25, 2009, from http://www.ipcc.ch.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). (2007b). Summary for policy
makers. A report of Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved February
25, 2005, from http://www.ipcc.ch.
Joireman, J. A. (2005). Environmental problems as social dilemmas: The temporal
dimension. In A. Strathman & J. A. Joireman (Eds.), Understanding behavior
in the context of time: Theory, research, and apllication (pp. 289-304).
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Joireman, J. A., Van Lange, P. A. M., & Van Vugt, M. (2004). Who cares about the
environmental impact of cars? Those with an eye toward the future.
Environment and Behavior, 36, 187-206.
Kasperson, R. E., & Kasperson, J. X. (1991). Hidden hazards. In D. G. Mayo & R. D.
Hollander (Eds.), Acceptable evidence: Science and values in risk
management (pp. 9-28). New York: Oxford University Press.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 20

Kellstedt, P. M., Zahran, S., & Vedlitz, A. (2008). Personal efficacy, the information
environment, and attitudes toward global warming and climate change in the
United States. Risk Analysis, 28, 113-126.
Kintisch, E. (2009). Global warming: Projections of climate ghange go from bad to
worse, scientists report. Science, 323, 1546-1547.
Kortenkamp, K. V., & Moore, C. F. (2006). Time, uncertainty, and individual
differences in decisions to cooperate in resource dilemmas. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 603-615.
Leiserowitz, A. A. (2004). Surveyung the impact of "The Day After Tomorrow".
Environment, 46, 23-44.
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (1998). The role of feasibility and desirability
considerations in near and distant future decisions: A test of temporal
construal theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 5-18.
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). The psychology of transcending the here and now.
Science, 322, 1201-1205.
Lorenzoni, I., Nicholson-Cole, S., & Whitmarsh, L. (2007). Barriers perceived to
engaging with climate change among the UK public and their policy
implications. Global Environmental Change, 17, 445-459.
Messick, D. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas: A review. In L.
Wheeler & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Review of personality and social psychology
(Vol. 4, pp. 11-44). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Milfont, T. L., Duckitt, J., & Wagner, C. (in press). A cross-cultural test of the value-
attitude-behaviour hierarchy Journal of Applied Social Psychology.
Milfont, T. L., & Gouveia, V. V. (2006). Time perspective and values: An exploratory
study of their relations to environmental attitudes. Journal of Environmental
Psychology, 26, 72-82.
Milfont, T. L., Harré, N., Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2008). Environmental
generativity and the climate change dilemma: Examining the effects of
parental status on political party support.Unpublished manuscript, Centre for
Applied Cross-Cultural Research, Victoria University of Wellington, New
Zealand.
Milfont, T. L., Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (in press). Testing the moderating role of
the components of norm activation on the relationship between values and
environmental behaviour. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. (2005). Ecosystem and well-being: Synthesis
report. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Ministry for the Environment. (2007). Understanding climate change. Get a grasp of
the facts. Wellington, New Zealand: Ministry for the Environment. Retrieved
February 25, 2009, from www.mfe.govt.nz.
Nilsson, A., von Borgstede, C., & Biel, A. (2004). Willingness to accept climate
change strategies: The effect of values and norms. Journal of Environmental
Psychology, 24, 267–277.
Ockwell, D., Whitmarsh, L., & O'Neill, S. (2009). Reorienting climate change
communication for effective mitigation: Forcing people to be green or
fostering grass-roots engagement? Science Communication, 30, 305-327.
Osbaldiston, R., & Sheldon, K. M. (2002). Social dilemmas and sustainability:
Promoting peoples' motivation to "cooperate with the future". In P. Schmuck
& P. W. Schultz (Eds.), Psychology of sustainable development (pp. 37-58).
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 21

Oskamp, S. (2000). A sustainable future for humanity? How can psychology help?
American Psychologist, 55, 496-508.
Pahl, S., Harris, P. R., Todd, H. A., & Rutter, D. R. (2005). Comparative optimism for
environmental risks. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 25, 1-11.
Pawlik, K. (1991). The psychology of global environmental change: Some basic data
and an agenda for cooperative international research. International Journal of
Psychology, 26, 547-563.
Pelletier, L. G., & Sharp, E. (2008). Persuasive communication and proenvironmental
behaviours: How message tailoring and message framing can improve the
integration of behaviours through self-determined motivation. Canadian
Psychology, 49, 210-217.
Reisinger, A. (2003). Science for global environmental problems – lessons learned
from Montreal for Kyoto? New Zealand Science Review, 60, 111-114.
Schmuck, P., & Schultz, W. P. (2002). Sustainable development as a challenge for
psychology. In P. Schmuck & W. P. Schultz (Eds.), Psychology of sustainable
development (pp. 3-18). Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Schmuck, P., & Vlek, C. (2003). Psychologists can do much to support sustainable
development. European Psychologist, 8, 66-76.
Schultz, P. W., Gouveia, V. V., Cameron, L. D., Tankha, G., Schmuck, P., & Franek,
M. (2005). Values and their relationship to environmental concern and
conservation behavior. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36, 457-475.
Shackelford, T. K. (2006). Recycling, evolution and the structure of human
personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 41, 1551-1556.
Sherman, S. J., Crawford, M. T., & McConnell, A. R. (2004). Looking ahead as a
technique to reduce resistance to persuasive attempts. In E. S. Knowles & J. A.
Linn (Eds.), Resistance and persuasion (pp. 149-174). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Slovic, P. (1987). The perception of risk. Science, 236(4799), 280-285.
Stern, N., & Taylor, C. (2007). Climate change: risks, ethics and the Stern review.
Science 317, 203-204.
Sundblad, E.-L., Biel, A., & Gärling, T. (2009). Knowledge and confidence in
knowledge about climate change among experts, journalists, politicians, and
laypersons. Environment and Behavior, 41, 281-302.
Triandis, H. C. (2008). Towards the realistic perception of a culture. Social and
Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 1812-1823.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110,
403–421.
Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Wakslak, C. (2007). Construal levels and psychological
distance: Effects on representation, prediction, evaluation, and behavior.
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17, 83-95.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Science, 185, 1124-1131.
Uzzell, D. (2000). The psycho-spatial dimension of global environmental problems.
Journal of Environmental Psychology, 20, 307-318.
Van Vugt, M. (1998). The conflicts of modern society. The Psychologist, 5, 289-292.
Van Vugt, M. (2001). Community identification moderating the impact of financial
incentives in a natural social dilemma: Water conservation. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1440-1449.
Van Vugt, M., & Samuelson, C. D. (1999). The impact of personal metering in the
management of a natural resource crisis: A social dilemma analysis.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 735-750.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 22

Vlek, C., & Steg, L. (2007). Human behavior and environmental sustainability:
Problems, driving forces, and research topics. Journal of Social Issues, 63, 1-
19.
Weber, E. U. (2006). Experience-based and description-based perceptions of long-
term risk: Why global warming does not scare us (yet). Climatic Change, 77,
103-120.
Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future life events. . Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 806-820.
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 23

Table 1. Brief summary of important historical events and initiatives related to

climate change and global warming

Year Event/Initiative
1859 John Tyndall, a UK scientist, discovers that greenhouse gases keep the
Earth warmer than it would be otherwise
1896 Svante Arrhenius, a Swedish chemist, was the first to postulate that
increasing carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere could raise
global temperatures
1979 First World Climate Conference organized by the World Meteorological
Organization
1985 The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was signed
1987 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was
signed
1987 The International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme was established
1988 The establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC)
1988 James Hansen, an American scientist, alerted a U.S. Senate Committee
that rise in temperature was a result of the greenhouse effect
1990 The IPCC First Assessment Report was released
1992 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was signed by 154 nations during the Earth Summit in Rio de
Janeiro.
1995 The IPCC Second Assessment Report was released
1996 The International Human Dimension Programme on Global
Environmental Change was established
1997 The Kyoto Protocol was agreed under the UNFCCC
2001 The IPCC Third Assessment Report was released
2005 The Kyoto Protocol came into effect
2007 The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report was released
2008 Kyoto Protocol First Commitment Period started (from 1/1/2008 to
31/12/2009)
2009 University of Copenhagen Congress on Climate Change
2009 Discussions for further climate change actions are being negotiated under
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 24

Figure 1. Worldwide web search volume for climate change vs. global warming
Note. This Google Trends data is scaled based on the average search traffic of the terms from January
2004 to April 2009. The label letters in the graph refer to automatically selected Google News stories
(not shown) written about the search terms. The numbers next to the search terms correspond to their
total average traffic in the time frame. The first term has a fixed value of 1.0; the number for the second
term (3.10) means that global warming has about 3 times more traffic in the time frame than climate
change. There is an interesting preference trend in the use of the search terms by the top 10 regions.
Although the list of regions is similar, we can see the prevalence of commonwealth/English-speaking
regions using the more neutrally-charged term “climate change” (i.e., Australia, New Zealand, South
Africa, United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, Singapore, India, United States, Switzerland), whereas the
more emotionally-charged term “global warming” tend to be the preferred term in Asian regions (i.e.,
Indonesia, Philippines, India, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, United States, Canada,
United Kingdom).
 Psychology of climate change – T. L. Milfont 25

own community worldwide

3.5

2.5
Mean rating

1.5

0.5

0
seriousness of global warming feelings of responsibility

Figure 2. Environmental hyperopia in a cross-cultural sample (source Milfont, Sibley

& Duckitt, in press)