Agpala Statutory Construction

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Philippine Copyright, 2009
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/. L0nv--f!V.Fjfhlt- ~Plhc..RUBEN E. AGPALO

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2JfoJM..lS --fJ.;..t.~~ ISBN 978-971-23-5286-7
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7
vi
D. ISSUANCES, RULES AND ORDINANCES
1.20. Presidential issuances . 34

1.21. Administrative rules and regulations . 42
1.22. Illustrative cases on validity of executive orders,
rules and regulations . 46
1.23. Administrative.rule and interpretation
distinguished : .: .. ' : .. : . 61
1.24. Supreme Court rule-making power .. 62
1.25. Legislative power oflocal government units . 64
·i.26. Barangay ordinance : : ·.';~.~ .. 64
1.27. Municipal ordinance :·._.; .. 65
1.28. City ordinance . 65
1.29. Provincial ordinance; :·•··················· : . 66
E. VALIDITY OF STATUTE.
1.30. Presumption of constitutionality ; .: ~ .. L. 66
1.31. Requisites for exercise of'judicial power ;. 68
1.32. Appropriate case · ' ;; .. 68
1.33. Standing to sue ;.: ; : .. 69
1.34. When to raise 'constitutionality . 73
1.35. Necessity cifdeciding c6risfitutiori3.lity .. 74
1.36. Summary of Essential Requisites
for Judicial Review . 75
1.37. Test of constitutionality ; .•.. : .. 87
1.38. Effects of unconstitutionality . 88
1.39.. Invalidity due to change of conditions ; .. 91
1.40. Partial invalidity : . 92
F. EFFECT AND OPERATION

1.41. When laws take effect , .. 96
1.42. When Presidential issuances, rules
and regulations take effect : . 98
1.43. When local ordinance takes effect .. 100
1.44. Statutes continue in force until repealed .. 101
1.45. Territorial and personal effect of statutes .. 102
1.46. Manner of computing time : :..: : .. '.:.~ , .. 102
Chapterll
CON~~JlUCTION
.,. .'
AND... INTERPRETATION
.
A. NATURE AND PURPOSE

2.01. Construction defined . 104
viii
3.07. Punctuation marks . 163
3.08. illustrative examples . 163
3.09. Capitalization of letters . 165
3.10. Head.notes or epigraphs . 166
3.11. Lingual text .. 167
3.12. Intent or spirit of law , , .. 168
3.13. Policy of law , . 169
3.14. Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed . 170
3.15. Dictionaries ; . 171
3.16. Consequences of various constructions .. 172
3.17. Presumptions ~ ;·.; . 172
B. LEGISLATIVE'IDSTORY
3.18. Generally ; . 173
3.19. What constitutes legislative history . 173
3.20. President's message to legislature ;. 174
3.21. Explanatory note . 175
3.22. Legislative debates, views and deliberations . 176
3.23. Reports of commissions . 177
3.24. Prior laws from which statute is based , .. 178
3.25. Change in phraseology by amendments .. 181
3.26. Amendment by deletion . 182
3.27. Exceptions to. the rule , .. 185
3.28. Adopted statutes , · . 185
3.29. Limitations of rule . 186
3.30. Principles of common law . 188
3.31. Conditions at time of enactment .. , . 188
3.32. History of the times , .. 189
C. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
3.33. Generally . 190

3.34. Executive construction, generally; kinds of.. . 190
3.35. Weight accorded to contemporaneous
construction . 191
3.36. Weight accorded to usage and practice .. 194
3.37. Construction of rules and regulations . 194
3.38. Reasons why contemporaneous construction
is given much weight . 195
3.39. When contemporaneous construction disregarded .. 196
3.40. Erroneous contemporaneous construction does
not preclude correction nor create rights;
exceptions . 197
x
C. IMPLICATIONS
4.25. Doctrine of necessary implication . 254

4.26. Remedy implied from a right . 257
4.27. Grant of jurisdiction . ·259
4.28. What may be implied from grant of jurisdiction . 259
4.29. Grant of power includes incidental power , . 261
4.30. Grant of power excludes greater power ~: ~ . 263
4.31. What is implied should not be against the law . 264
4.32. Authority to charge against public funds
may not be implied·········••·································· 265
4.33. illegality of act implied from prohibition . 265
4.34. Exceptions to the rule ; . 266
4.35. What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly . 267
4.36. There should be no penalty for compliance . .
with law · : ~ . 268
ChapterV
INTERPRETATION OF WORDS
ANDPmiASES
A. IN GENERAL
5.01. Generally . 269

5.02. Statutory definition · . 270
5.03. Qualification of rule . 272
. 5.04. Words construed in their ordinary sense . 273
5.05. · General words construed generally . 276
5.06. Application of rule . 277
5.07. Generic term includes things that arise
thereafter ~ . 277
5.08. Words with commercial or trade meaning . 278
5.09. Words with technical or legal meaning ~ . 279
5.10. How identical terms in same statute construed . 281
5.11. Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute . 282
5.12. Word or phrase construed in relation to other
provisions : , . 283
5.13. Meaning of term dictated by context . 288
5.14. Where'the iaw does not distinguish . 289
5.15. Illustration of rule ··························· 292
5.16. Disjunctive and conjunctive words . 299
xii
6.06. Special and general provisions in same statute . 364
6.07. Construction as not to render provision nugatory . 364
6:08. Reason for the rule . 365
6.09. Qualification of rule . 365
6.10. Construction as. to give life to law ~ . 367
6,11. Construction to avoid surplusage . '369
6.12. Application of rule ..........•...•................. ; ~ ;.; . 370
6.13. Statute and its amendments construed
together ;.· . 372
B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO

CONSTITUTION AND-OTHERSTATUTES
6.14. Statute construed in harmony with

the Constitution ~ . 373
·6.15. Statutes inpari materia ; . 376
6.16. How statutes in_pari materia construed , .. 376
6.17. Reasons why laws on same subject are reconciled . 379
6.18. Where harmonization is impossible . 380
6.19. illustration of the rule .. 380
6.20. General and special statutes . 384
6.21. Reason for the rule. : ; . . 387
6.22. Qualifications of the rule '. .. ' ~ : . 388
~.23. Reference statutes . 388
6.24. Supplemental statutes : · ; . 38~
6.25. Reenacted statutes , . 390
6.26: Adoption of contemporaneous constrUctiOD..;.;.~ . 3,91
6.27. Qu8.Iification of the rule , : : . .•........ 392
6.28. Adopted statutes : .. 392
Chapter VII
STRICT OR LmERAL CONSTRUCTION
A. IN GEN,ERAL
7.01. Generally ~ . 393

7.02. Strict construction, generally ~ . 393
7.03. Liberal construction, defined . 394
7.04. Liberal _co~truction applied, generally . 394
7.05. Constructfon to. promote . social justice . 395
7.06. Construction taking into consideration general
welfare or growth of civilization .. 396
xiv
Chlij)tei."..VHI:" · .
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
S'l.'f.~S . . . :.:. . .
·A !Nd:ENJhiAL
8.01. Generally .' : ., . .'.: .. :.. · '. ,., ; ~··.'.;······,.-•,:·'.·'· · 453
8,02. Mandatory and directory statutes,,~ene:ra])y ........• : .... ;.453
B.03. When statute is m:an,~l!lt"r)\9r .~ec:t;ory .. '.···:'.•·;"1":•,-.·•··'. ,454
8.04. Test to determine nature .qfstatu,te , T.~·····,···'<'.• . 455
8,05. Language used ': ,·.:~··•········~~·····•••••.·'.·······'·i··••·'···• A5p
8;06. Use of"i;hal}" ()r ,C<D1ust'' ••• ~•·.·:•''··············.•·····.-~··~····''"·····' ,.457
8.07. Use of"may" ......•••• , .•.........• , .•.•..•.... , .•.......•. , ...... , •. "·'\'··•; .. ·460
8;08. When "shall," is construed as "may" ·
and vice versa ~·················· 1.461
8.09. Use of negative, prohib\wry or exclusive te:r;ms ~·'·'.·~'· ;473
B. MANDA'l'ORY STATUTES
8.10. Statutes conferring power , ..,, .. ; ......•....•............... 474

8,11. Statutes· granting benefits .. ;, .. '. ..••••• :: .....•...•.•..•........ ; .... 474
8.12. Statutes prescribing jurisdictional
requirements . 475
8.13. Statutes prescribing time' fo -tiike·it:tion ·
or to appeal ,. .. 475
8.14 .. Statutes prescribing procedural-requirements . ''477
8.15. Election laws on conduct of election ; . 478
8.16. Election laws on qualifieatitm .
and disqualification ...•. , :.::.:.; .......•..... :·.. ., .....•. 480
8.17. Statutes prescribing qualifieations'for office ;.:. 48.0
8.18. Statutes relating to assessment'of'taxea.. '.'. .. 481
8.19. Statutes coneerning :(>rtblic auction sale : :;: :~ .. 481
C. Dm.ECTORY STATUTES·.
8.20. Statutes prescribing guid.ance·fdt offkei's ... , .. :.''.;···;··· 482

8,.21. Statutes prescribing manner of.j.1.1;ti!'~alaction';;.~.'.1~. . 482
.8.22. Statutes requiring rendition of decision. · ·
Within,Ptescribedperiod ~ '.······'.······ 483
8.23. Constit\;itid'nal time provision directory . 485
xvi
ChapterX
AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION
AND REPEAL
. A. AMENDMENT
10.01. Power to amend........................................................... ·529
10.02. How amendment effected , .. ; .. ,.......... 529
10.03. Amendment by implication........................................ 530
10.04. When amendment takes effect ...•....•...... ;................... 531
l0.05. How airiendment is construed, g'eiierally ;;,.. 531
10.06. Mearung of law changed by amendment: ....• ; ;... 532
10.07. Ameridiiient operatee.prospectively .. .......•......... ,....... 533
10.08. Effect of amendment on vested rights :········· 533
10.09. Effect of airiendm..eiit onjllrisdi.ction :......... 534
io.io. Effect ofnulli:ty of prior or amendatory act............... 535
B. REVISION AND CODIFJCATION

.10.11. Generally , ,· , , ..............•. , ......• , ,.. 235
10.12. Construction tO harmonize different provisions.i.L.; 536
.io.is. What is omitted is deemed repealed ,....... 536
10.14. Change inphraseology ..............•.•.............. ,.................. 538
10.15. Continuation of existing Iaws. ,........... 538
C.REPEAL
j:0.16. Power to repeal , .: 539
10.17. The constitution prohibits passage of
irrepealable laws; all laws are repe8.lable......... 539
10.18. Repeal, generally......................................................... 542
10.19. Repeal by implication 542
10.20. Irreconcilable inconsistency 543
10.21. Implied repeal by revision or codification.................. 554
10.22. Repeal by reenactment............................................... 556
10.23. Other forms of implied repeal.................................... 558
10.24. "All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with this Act are hereby .repealed or
modified accordingly;" construed....................... 559
10.25. Repeal by implication not favored ..............•... ,........... 560
10.26. As between two laws, one passed later prevails........ 563
10.27. Genera))~~does not repeal law, generally............... 564
10.28. Application of rule....................................................... 565
10.29. When special or general law repeals the other......... 569
10.30. Effects of repeal, generally......................................... 572
xviii
f . . :·
2 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
orders issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power

during the revolutionary period under the Freedom Constitution.2 ·
Statutes may either be public or private. A public statute is one
which affects the public at large or the whole community. A private
statute is one which applies only to a specific person or subject. But
whether a statute is public or private depends on substance rather
than on form.
Public statutes may be classified into general, special and local
laws. A general law is one which applies to the whole state and
operates throughout the' state alike upon' all the people or all of a
class.s It is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does
not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class,- A
special law is one which relates to particular· persons or things of a
class or to a particular comm.unity, individual or thing.' A local law
is one whose operation is confined to a specific place or locality. A
municipal ordinanceis ail example of a local law.6 •
1.03~ Permanent and te~poraey statutes.

According to· its duration; a .. statu:te may be permanent or
temporary'. Apermanent statute is one whose operation is not limited
in duration but continues until repealed, It does not terminate by
the lapse of a fixed 'period or by the occurrence of an event. Neither
disuse nor custom or practice to' the contrary operates to render it
ineffective or inoperative. 7
A temporary statute is a statute whose duration is for a limited
period of time fixed in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the
happening of an event. Where a statute provides 'that'It shall be in
force for a definite period, it terminates at the end of such' period. 6
Where a statute is designed to meet an emergency, it ends upon
the cessation of such .emergency. Smee an emergency is by nature
temporary in character, so must the statuteintended to meet it,.be.
2 Sec. 1, Proclamation No; 3, March 25, 1986, known as Freedom C~nstitution

'People v. Palma, G.R. No. 44113, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 243.
Tuason:
'Valera v. 80 Phil. 823 (1948).
'Valera v, rfu.tison, ibid.
"People'v. Palma, supra.
7Art.
7, Civil Code.
8Espiritu
v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 32743, February 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 533
(1974).
1.07. Legislative power of Congress.

Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that ''the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate arid a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by .the provision on
initiative and referendum." Legislative power is the power to make,
alter and repeal laws.>
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution,
to make laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution,
as the will of the people· in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.
The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed ,to be. legislative
by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has.lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited
by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power
embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or
common interest.» '
Legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines,
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives, not in a
particular chamber, but in both chambers. While the Constitution
requires that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of Representatives, on
the theory that, elected as they are from thedistricts-the members
of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems, and Senators, who are elected at large, are expected
to approach the same problem from the national perspective, both
views on any of these subjects are made to bear on the enactment of
such laws.'2
The Constitution has explicitly provided .that legislative. power

is the power to enact laws; executive power, to execute the law:s; and
judicial, to interpret and apply the laws. By physical arrangement of
the articles on such powers, the legislative power is first and appears
to be more extensive
.. ·.·\
and broad than the executive and judicial
powers. For wfthoiit a law, the executive has nothing to execute,
I•Occeria v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 755 [1980].

110ple v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 [1998).
12Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 [1994].
However, a law may not be declared unconstitutional when

what has been violated in its passage are merely internal rules
of procedure of the House, in the absence of any violation of the
Constitution or of the rights of .an individual. Courts have no
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House
of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of a
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals. These rules are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
They are procedural, and with their observance, the courts have
no concern. They· may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. The mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action taken by the body when the requisite number
of members has agreed to a particular measure.18
1.09. Steps in the passage of bill into law.

A bill is a proposed legislative measure introduced by a member
or members of Congress for enactment into law. It is signed by its
author(s) and filed with the Secretary of the House. It may originate
from either the lower or upper House, except appropriation, revenue
or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills, which shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives.>
a) First and second readings of bills.

The Secretary reports the bill for first· reading. First Reading
consists of reading the number and title of the bill, followed by its
referral to the appropriate Committee for study and recommendation.
The Committee may holdpublic hearings on the proposed measure
and submit(s) its report and recommendation for Caiendar for
second reading. On Second Reading, the bill shall be read in full
with the amendments proposed by the Committee, if any, unless
copies thereof are distributed and such reading is dispensed with.
Thereafter, the bill will be subject to debates, pertinent motions,
and amendments. After the amendments shall have been acted
upon, the bill ;Yajl ..Jle voted on second reading. Abill approved on
second reading 'shall be included in the Calendar of bills for third
Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 CRA 268 [1997).

18
Art. VI, Sec. 24, 1987 Constitution.
19
differences will be settled by the Conference Committees of both

Chambers, whose report or recommendation thereon will have tobe
approved by both Houses in order that it will be considered passed
by Congress and thereafter sent to the President for action.
The respective Rules of the Senate and the House provide for
a conference committee. Generally, a conference committee is the
mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and
the House in the passage of a bill into law. However, its jurisdiction
is not limited to such question. It has broader functions. It may
deal generally with the subject matter. Occasionally, a conference
committee may produce unexpected results beyond its mandate.
There is nothing in the Rules which limits a. conference committee
to a consideration of conflicting provisions. It is within its power
to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found
either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 21 This is the reason why
other political scientists call the conference committee a third body
of the legislature.
The broader function of a conference committee is described as
follows:
"A conference committee. may deal generally with the
subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee· is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative
custom severely limits the _freedom with which new subject
matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally
a conference committee produces unexpected results, beyond
its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction.
This is symptomatic .of the authoritarian power of conference
committee.>
Thus, there may be three (3) versions of a bill or revenue bill
originating from the lower House. The first is that of the lower
House; the second is that of the Senate; and the third is that of
the conference committee. If both Houses approve the report of the
conference committee adopting a third version of the bill, then it
-r· .· ......
21Phil.
Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 [1993); Tolentino v. Secre-
tary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 [1994).
22Davis,
Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81; Phil.
Judges Assn. v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 709 [1993).
all such cases, the votes .of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall
be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto
to any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, It shall become a law as if he
had signed it."2•
In other words, a bill passed by Congress becomes a law in
either of three ways, namely: (1) .when the President signs it; (2)
when the President does not sign nor communicate his veto of the bill
within thirty days after his receipt thereof; and (3) when the vetoed
bill is repassed by Congress by two-thirds vote ofall its Members,
each House voting separately.
C. PARTS OF STATUTES·
1.10. Statutes generally contain the following parts:
1. Preamble.
A preamble is.a prefatory statement or explanation or a finding
of facts, reciting the purpose, reason; or occasion. for making· the
la~ to which it is prefixed." It is .usually found after the enacting
clause and before the body of the law .. The legislature. seldom puts a
preamble to a statute it enacts into law. The reason for this is that
the statement embodying the purpose, reason; or occasion for . the
enactment of the law is contained in its explanatory note. However,
Presidential decrees and executive orders generally have preambles
apparently because, unlike statutes enacted by the legislature in
which the members thereof expound on the purpose of the bill in its
explanatory note or in the course of deliberations, no
.better place
than in the preamble can the reason and purpose of the decree be
stated. Preambles thus play an important role in the construction of
Presidential Decrees. 28 ·
2. Title of statute.
The Constitution provides that "every bill passed by Congress
shall embrace 9ajy,1dne subject which shall be expressed ill the title
2 •sec. 27[1], Art. VI.

27 Continental Oil Co. v. Santa Fe, 177 P. 72, 3 ALR 394 [1918).
28 People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 [1978]; People v. Echavez, 95 SCRA 663
[1980).
thus precludes the insertionrof riders in legislation, a.rider being a

provision not germane to the· subject matter of the bill."35 ·
A fourth purpose rriay-he ~4d~d. Thetitle of.a ~~atute is, used as

a guide in ascerj:,i:1,i,r,ii11g )~~slative i in~ent W:heri the language - of the
act does not clearly e;pr.ess its purpose,v The title may clarify doubt
or ambiguity in the meaning ~d. scope, of statute, and limiting .a a
statute to only one subject and expressing Itiii its title will strengthen
its function as. an intrinsic aid to statutory construction.
The title of.the bill is, not required to be an: in,dex to the body
of the act, or to be comprehensive as to .cover every single detail.of
the measure. It hasbeen held;that if the title fajrly indicates the
general subject,,and reasonablycoversall the.provisiens.of theact,
and is not calculated to mialead.thelegislature Qr. the peeple, there
is sufficient compliance with. the constitutional i:equirement. 87
The "one title-one subject" rule does not reqilire the Congress
to employ in the title· of th~ eri.actinent, language bf s.uch p~cisio:n
or
as to mirror, fully i.Ildex catalogue' Ei1ftP-~ coriteht's arid the tii'.inute
details 'therein, '·'
The
rule is suffi.Cient1Y. corti.plied
-·. :! .··,.
._.·'.. •
~th irtKe titie is
·. j .·.;•;' ··-.i
''·''.I 1'· ... ,·: .: · _ · ·;··:· 1
copiprehen.~iv~e · ~~~ug~ as t<>, in~l11?~ }he.·.ge~~r~ ,8bj'eCt 'V.:hl.c~ the

statute see~,i;q effect, and where the petsonsp11;ei:~~ted are ¥1f?rmed
or the nature; 'scope aµ~ consequences of the proposed law arid,.its.
operation. ·The Court J:i,11s .µiva#ably ad,opted a liberal rather than,
technical construction of tlle rj.tle so as not tq _ cripple 01' impeded
legislation.88 Where a 'iaw amends a section or part of a statute, it
suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there
being no need to state the precise nature of the' amendment."
b) · Subjectofrepeal of statute.
The repealof a statµt~ on'~ given s~bject is properly connected
with .the subject, - matter of a new statute on . the same subject;
and therefore a'' repealing section in the new statute . is valid,
J.
notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would
be difficult t.o
conceive of a matter more germane to an ·aCt and to
-i ... : ,-~ '
35Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172, 179 [1968].
88Govermne:D.t v, Mtmicipality of Binangonan, 32 Phil .. 634 [1915].
37phil. Judges Association v; Prado;·227SCRA 703 [1993].
SSCawaling, Jr. v. Comelec, 368·SCRA453 [2001].
89Alalayan v. NFC, 24SCRA172, 179 [1968].
14 STATUTORY.CONSTRUCTION
into law, It does not apply to laws in force and existing at the time
the 1935 Constitution took effect.s
· e) · Effect of itt~ufftciency of title.

' '. .. ., .· .. ·, ·. __ :. .
A statute whose title . does not conform to theccnstitutional
requirement or. is .not rela:t~dJn any manner to. its subject. is null
and void.47 Where,h~weye:t~the subjectmatterof a statute isnot,
sufficiently expressed ill its,ti:tl~~ onlyso much of the subject matter
as is not expressed th«i;)reill .is 'v(>id, leaving the rest in force, 46 unless
the invalid provisions are inseparable from the others, in which case
the nullity of the former vitiates the latter.49
3. Enacting clause.
. The enactingclause is that part of'a statute written immediately
after the title thereof which stat~$ the authority by which the' act is
enacted. Laws passed by the Philippine Commission contain this
enactingclause: "By authority of the President of the United States,
be it enacted by the United States Philippine Commission." The
enacting clause of statutes enacted by the· Philippine Legislature
states: "By authority of the United ·States, be it enacted· by the
Philippine Legislature," wP.en. the Philippine Legislature became
bicameral,' laws enacted by:l:t have this enacting clause; it enacted "Be
by the Senate and House of ~epr!'!senfatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by ~1;1tho!1ty ofth~ same." During the
· Oommonwealth.fhe enacting clause of statutes is: "Be it enacted by
the National Assefubly of the Philippines," wliith later changedwas
to: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in Congress assembled," when the' assembly became ·bicameral.
The latter enacting clause is also the enacting clause used by the
Congress fromA946 to· 1972 and from 1987 up to the present.
The enacting clause adopted by the Batasang Pambansa is: "Be it
enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled." On the
other hand, the enacting clause of Presidential decrees is worded
substantially as follows: "NOW THEREFORE, I, ,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested
by the Constitution, do hereby decree·asfollows:".Exectitive.Order
.,.. ·.: ,.l
'4BPeople v. Valensoy, 101 Phil. 642 [1957].

47Phil. Constitution Assn., Inc. v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965); De la Cruz v.
Paras, 123 SCRA 569 [1983].

48Unity v. Burrage, 103 U.S. 44 7, 26 L. ed. 405 [1881].
49ln
re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534 [1954).
6. Repealing Clause
When the legislature repeals a law, the repeal is not a legislative
I
!
declaration finding the earlier law unconstitutional. The power to

declare a law unconstitutional does not lie with the legislature, but
with the courts.63
7. Effectivity clause.
The effectivity clause is the provision when the law takes effect. ·
Usually, the provision as to the effectivity of the law states that it
shall take effect .15 days from publication in the Official Gazette or
in a newspaper of general circulation.
1.11. Meaning of certain bills originating from lower House.

The procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills applies to
the enactment of appropriations and revenue measures. However,
they can only originate from the lower House, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.
"Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase Of the public debt, bills oflocal application, i
and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
l
amendments."
t
The above provision means that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public· debt, \-
private bills and bills oflocal application must come from the House
of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more 1
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby
made to bear on the enactment of such laws. A bill originating in the
I
I:
f
t;
hoµse may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate, with its i
i'
power to propose or concur with amendments, that the result may i
be a re-writing of.the whole. The constitutional provision does not i
prohibit the ,filing in the Senate of substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate l·
t
\r :
s•Mirasol v. CA, 351 SCRA 44 [2001]. f
l.
r
!
L ... .
The enactment of an appropriation bill follows the usual route

which any ordinary bill goes through in its enactment, as above
discussed.
1.13. Restrictions in passage of budget or revenue bills.

Revenue or appropriations bills are subject to the following
restrictions or qualifications, as provided in Section 25 of Article VI,
thus:
1. Budget preparation by the President and submission to
Congress. - "The Congress may not .increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government
as specified in the budget. The form, content; and manner of
preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law ."•s ·
Under the Constitution, the spending power known as the
"power of the purse" belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto
power of the President. The President may propose the budget, but
the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the
project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law.It can be
as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be. The Countrywide
Development Fund forms part of the power ofappropriation,»
The budget preparation is prescribed in Book VI, entitled
·National Government Budgeting, of the 1987 Administrative Code,
particularly Chapter 3,.on "Budget Preparation." ·
2. Each provision must relate specifically to particular
appropriation. - "No provision or enactment shall be embraced in
the general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates.t= . ·
This restriction precludes the Congress from including in the
appropriations bill what is known as "inappropriate provisions."
It has been held that Congress may include special provisions,
conditions to itema which cannot be vetoed separately from the
items to whicl(th~ relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the
68Sec. 25[1], Art. Art. VI.

69Phil. Constitution Assn. v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994].
60Sec.
25[2], ibid.
3. Procedure in approving appropriations. - The procedure

in approving appropriations for the.Congress shall strictly followthe
procedure for approving appropriations for the other departments
and agencies.?«
4. Speeial ~ppropriatio~ bill.to spe~ifYpuii)~se. - "A)peci~·
appropriations. bil~ shall specify the p~of!~ for whi9h it is iIJ,~ended;
and shall be supported . by funds a(!tufilly availeble: as cerlified. by
the National Treasurer, or, tobe raised by a cottesponqmg revenue
proposal therein.;•~. - · .- . ·
5. Restriction on transfer of appropriation; exception. - "No
law shall be passed authorizing any ·transfer of 'appro~Ji~tions;
however, the President, the President of the s.en~te· .
~~(~i>eak.er
of the House of Representatives, the Chief Jufltic~ Of th~'. Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions 'may, by law,
be authorized. to augment any item in the 'ge~eral appropriations
law for their ~espedi~e offices from savings in other iteriis of t:tleir
respective appropriatibns."""
; . ,.
· ·
The officials expressly enumerated in the constitutional
provision are authorized to realign savings .to augment any item in
the general appropriations law within their respective offices. The
appropriation law itself may contain provision authorizing them to
do so."
Pursuant to the foregoing constitutional provision, the Senate
President and the Speak.er are ·authorized to realign savings
as appropriated. While individual members may. determine . the
necessity of realignment of savings in the allocations of their
operating expenses, the final say on the matter is lodged in the Senate
President or -the Speak.er, as the case may be, who should give his .
approval when two requirements are met: (1) the funds to be realized
or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from
which the same are to be taken; and (2).the transfer or realignment
is for the purpose of augmenting the items-of expenditures to which
transfer or realignment is to be made. 68 -
'
t .: ; ;\
------
64Sec. 25[3], Art. VI.
Sec. 2S[ 4], ibid.
66
Sec. 25[5], ibid.
68
67!'hil. Association, Inc. v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994].

=tu«
22 STATUTORY'CONSTRUCTION
9. No public funds tobe spent except by law. ~No money shall

be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.» .
The provision that "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance: of an appropriation made by law" underscores
the fact that only. Congress can authorize the expenditure of public
funds by the passage of a law to that effect. However, the legislature
is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but
a 'public purpose: The test is whether the measure is designed to
promote public interests, as opposed to the furthe~ance of advantage
of individuals,' although itmight incidentally serve the public."
10. No public money or property for religious purposes. - No
public money or property shall be . appropriated; applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, 'denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of a:riy priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher,
or' dignitary as such, except when such priest; preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium, 1•
· The prohibition that no public funds or property be paid or
employed'; directly or indirectly; for the use, benefit or support of
any systeni,oftellgion does not apply to the temporary use of public
streets or places, which are open to the public, for some religious
purposes. 79 Where a religious order is given free use of water supply
by a public corporation in exchange for its' donation of a land in favor
of said corporation, the prohibition does not apply because the free
supply of water is not given on account ofreligious consideration but
as payment for the land donated. 80 Where money was appropriated for
the printing of commemorative stamps showing the words "XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress" held in Manila,it was held that
the same did not violate the constitutional restriction because the
Catholic Church did not receive money for the sale of the stamps
and the stamps were not issued for its benefit. •1
_____76
...;'...,. ,\.
Sec. 29(1], Art. VI.
77Pascual
v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960].
78Sec. 29[2], Art. VI.
79People
v. Fernandez, CA-G.R. No. 1128, May 29, 1948.
800rden
de Predicadores v. Metropolitan Water District, 44 Phil. 292.
81Aglipay
v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201.
Section 26. x x x
(2) x xx Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas. and nays entered in the
Journal. ·
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. xx x IT
he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same With his objections to the House where
it originated, which.shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and 'proceed to reconsider it; x x x In all such cases,
the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays,
and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his
veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise,it shall become
a law as if he had signed it. x x x,"
1.15. Power to issue its rules of proceedings.

Each House has the power to issue its own rules of proceedings.
The rules may not, however, ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and further that there should be .a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by
the rules and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only
within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the
determination of the Legislature. Unless the rules of proceedings
have violated any of these restrictions in the enactment of a law,
the law may not be declared unconstitutional for not having been
enacted in accordance with the internal rules,«
Conversely, if the internal rules violate the Constitution
or the fundamental rights of an individual and the same have no
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained,
such rules may be declared unconstitutional. Thus, in Francisco v.
House of Representatioee= in declaring certain rules of impeachment
of the House. o~,~presentatives as violative of the Constitution,
unconstitutional; the Court ruled:
MArroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 [1997].

86G.R.
No. 160161, November 10, 2003.
xxx
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that
each house may determine the rules of its proceedings."
It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House
had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the
suggestion of'.the.Speaker, the names of members
sufficient to makea quorum. in the hall of the House
who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and re-
corded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker _
with the names of the members voting, and be, count- ·
. ed and announced in determining the presence of a
quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Febru-
ary 14., 1890) -
'll · ..
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule.

The question, therefore, is as to the validity of. this rule, and
not what methods the Speaker may of his· own motion resort
-to for determining the presence ofa quorum, nor what matters
the Speaker or clerk may i:>f: their .own volition place - upon
the journal. Neither do :the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration; With the courtsthe question is only one of power.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules
of proceedings. It may not, by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental, rights, and there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
II
proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters
of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is
no impeachment of the: rule to say that some other way would j
be better, more 'accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed
and in force for a length oftime. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
r
power, always subject to· be exercised by the House, and within t
the limit~tiopsi suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any ~ther body or tribunal.
t
Ballin clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass
upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e., whether they
are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and
1.17. Enrolled sm,

The bill as. passed by Con.gress, authe:htic~U\ldby the Speak.er
and Senate President and approved by ~he. ~¢13jc;l~nf j13. known as
the enrolled bill.00 Under the ptjnd.pfo of the eiiro'Q.ed bill.jhe text of
the act as passed andapprovedls c:JeeDied'i#J.port~gal:>.~olU:~everity
and is binding on the courts.» Under the "enrolled bill doctrine,"
the signing of a bill. by the. Speak.er ,Qf th~ House and the Senate
President and the certification ofthe Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of, its due enactment. 92
The enrolled copy 'of a bill is conclusive not only of itsprovisions
but also of its due enactment, Not even Claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment \vas invalid because the requisite votes
for its approval had not been' obtained or that- certain provisions
of a statute had been "smuggled" in the, printing of the bill, have
moved or persuaded the court to look behind the proceedings of a
co-equal branch of the government, Attempts to have the. doctrine
re-examined or relaxed has so far failed. 9•
The reason why an enrolled bill Is accorded conclusive verity
lies in the fact that the enrolled' bill carries on its face a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments -. of the
government, charged respectiv,ely with the duty of enacting and
executing the laws, that it was passed by the assembly. The respect
due to co-equal and independent departments requires the.judicial
department to .aet upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed the assembly, all bills duly authenticated.v
Courts cannot go behind the enrolled:act to discover what really
happened. The respect due to the other branches of government
demands that courts .act upon the. faith and .credit of what the
officers of the said branches attest to as the . official acts of their
respective departments. Otherwise, courts would be cast, in the
unenviable and. unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what
actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with. consequent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. For if there
OOMoralef!'V:.Stl.bido, 27 SCRA 131 [1969].

91Mab,anag
v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 [1947]; Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v.
Gimenez, 7'SCRA 347 [1963]; Morales v. Subido, 27SCRA131 [1969].
92Farinas
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003.
93Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 [1994]; Arroyo v. De Vene-
cia, 277 SCRA 268 [1997].
94Morales
v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 [1969].
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is

alleged to have been violated in the enactment ofR.A. No. 8.240
are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for. the enactment of a law, i.e.,
Art. Vl Secs. 26-27 .. Petitioners <Jo not claim that-there was no
quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation
of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of a quorum.
xxx
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms
of expression, all. deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House. of Congress failed
to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a· violation of a constitutional provision or the rights
of private individuals: In Osmeiia v. Pendatun, it was held:
"At any rate; courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has
been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and
with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived .or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently,
'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was
stated thus:
"The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the. result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
acctii-at't\,or even more just. It is no objection to the validity
.of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in
force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not
one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
L ..
xxx
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of he law in the
House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still
making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep.
Albano's motion approved.
xxx
No rule of the House. of Representatives has been cited
which specifically reqwres.th.at in case such as this ~volving
approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must
restate the motion and conduct a viva voce o nominal voting.
xxx
. Fourth. Under the .enrolled bill doctrine, thesigning of
H.B. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996
are conclusive of its due enactment. Much.energy and learning
is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by
Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there
is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] . that the enrolled bill
embodies a conclusive. presumption. In one case we "went
behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by
the Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary,
this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers
of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this
rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-
fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Con-
stitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated
bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the
courts." x x x
xxx
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well
established, 'lt is cited with approval by text writers here and
abroad .. The enrolled bill rule rests on the following consider-
ations:
As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secre-
D. ISSUANCES, RULES AND ORDINANCES
1.20. Presidential issuances.

Presidential issuances are those which the President issues
in the exercise of his ordinance power. They;4nclude- executive
orders, administrative orders, 'proclamations, memorandum orders,
memoranduni circulars, and general or 'special orders. These
issuances have the force and effect of iaws.1.00
Executive Orders are "acts . of the President prqyi(ling for
rules of a general or permanent character in the Implementatron
or execution of constitutional. or statutory powers."101 These should
be differentiated from execution orders issued by the President in
the exercise of his legislative power during the revolutionary period
under the Freedom Constitution, for the latter are of the same
category and binding force as statutes enacted by the legislature
while the former do not have such status.
Administrative Orders ate "acts of the President which relate
to particular aspects of governmental 'operations- in pursuance of
his duties as administrative head."102 Proclamations are "acts of the
President fixing a date or declaring a statute or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend. "103 Me~orandum Orders
are "acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest W:hich only concern a particular
officer or office of the Government.">' Memorandum Circulars are
"acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration
which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some
of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices ofthe Government,
for information or compliance.t'= General or specific orders are "acts
and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.I= · ·
In David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006,the Court
held:
100Pesigan:v.$'geles, G.R. No. 64279, April 30, 1984.

101Sec. 2)Bo0k m, Title I; Chap. 2, 1987 Administrative Code.
102see:· a, ibid.
103Sec. 4, ibid.
104Sec. 5, ibid.
106Sec. 6, ibid.
106Sec. 7, ibid.
The case of Ople v. Torres; G;R. No. 127686, July 23, 1998,
which defines the scope of the ordinance power of the President; s~eks
to declare unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Referen~e
System" on two important constitutional grounds, namely; one, ~t
is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and ~wo, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone ofpnvacy.
Executive Order No. 308 dated July 12, 1996 reads:
"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDEN-
TIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens
and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service· and social security providers and
other government instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, this will require. a computerized system to
properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services
on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations;
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among
the various basic services and social security providing agencies
and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve
such a system;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of
the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
in me by law, do hereby direct the following:
SECTION.· 1. Establishment of a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification
Reference System among the key basic services and social
security providers is hereby established. •
SEC. 2 Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-
. Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) ·to draw-up the
·implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the
System is hereby created, chaired by .the Executive Secretary,
with the t:ollil-Mngas members: xx x
. ' •• r
SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center

(NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as
such shall provide administrative and technical support, to the
IACC.
branch of government of power belonging to another will be

given a stricter scrutiny bythisCourt,
Theline that delineates Legislative and E:xecutiv~power
is not indistinct, Legislative power is "the authority, under'
the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repealthem,"
The Constitution, as the will of the people in the4" original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power
in the Congress of thePhilippinee. The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The
legislative body possesses plenary power. for an purposes of
civil government, Any power, deemed to be Iegislative by usage
and tradition, is necessarily possessed •by Congress, unless the
Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except/asIimited
by the Constitution, 'either. expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general
concern or common interest.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws,
the President executes the laws. The executive power is vested
in the President, It is generally defined as the power to enforce
and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws
into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is
the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole
and sees to itthat all laws are enforced by the officials and
employees of his department. He has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive
department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion
of its officials; Corollary to the power of control, the President
also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for
the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power .over bureaus and offices under
his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
Administrative power is. concerned with the work of
applying"poli~ies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental. organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative
orders, rules and. regulations.
contending state policies - the primacy of national security,

the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of
Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves
the all-important freedom of thought. As. said administrative
order · redefines the parameters of. some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates
the administrative power of the President to make rules and
the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it
deals with· a subject that should be covered by law.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O.
No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no
duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O.
No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with ioveniment
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to
get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government, It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID,
a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying
his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No.
308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly
expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently
erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws; This is
contrary to the established approach defining the traditional
limits of administrative legislation. As .well stated by Fisher:
"x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on the public.
It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted
in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to
be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress
enacts in the form of a public law, Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe
rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to
make laws.
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the
subject o~JtJ~w, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right
to privacy. The essence of privacy isthe "right to be let alone."
In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States
Supreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy
when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It
basic distinctions .between absolute and limited government.

Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects
of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast,
a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the. individual, firmly distinguishing it from
the public .sector, which the state can control., Protection of
this private sector - Protection, in other words, of the dignity
and integrity of the individual - has become. increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of
a technological . age - industrialization, urbanization, and
organization - operate. to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate. intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support. this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian-society."
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that
the right of privacy . is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of bur Constitution. xx. x
1.21. Administrative rules and regulations.

Rules and regulations issued by administrative or executive
officers in accordance with, and as authorized by, law have the force
and effect of law or partake the nature of a statute.w' All that is
required for their validity is that the rules. should be germane to
the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulations be not
in contradiction with, but conform to, the standards that the law
. prescribesj= and that they be ;for the. sole purpose of carrying into
effect the general provisions of'the.law .109 By such regulations, the law
itself cannot be extended, 110 nor its terms. and provisions. restricted.w
Hence, in case. of discrepancy or conflict between the basic law and
the regulations issued to Implement it, the former prevails over the
107Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555
(1962). .
108Director
of Forestry v. Mufi.oz, G.R. No. 25459, June 28, 1968, 23SCRA1184;
People v. Exco'ndet 101. Phil. 1125 (1957); Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39
Phil. 660 (1919).~
..
100U.S
. "/
. / '1
.. v, Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 (1914); People v, Santos, 63 Phil. 300
(1938); Shelf Phils., lnc.,v. Central Bank, 162 SCRA 628 (1988).
11"Teoxon.v.
Board of Administrators, G.R. No. 256.19, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
585; Gobantes v. Civil Service Commission, 214 SCRA 495 (1992).
111People
v. Lim, 108 Phil. i091 (1960). ·
public interestt= public welfar.e;n9. interests. . of law and order.=

justice and equity and substantial merit of the casej= and adequate
and efficient instruction.; ...
In Cemco Holdings, Inc. v. National.Life Insurance Co., G.R.
No. 171815. [August 7, 2007); the Court held:
Rules and regulations ~hen Promulgated in pursuance of
the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the natiJre of a statute, and compliance
therewith may. be enforced, by a penal· sanction provided in
the law, This.Is so because statutes are usually couched in
general terms, after expressing the policy; purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The'details
and _the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to
the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement.
The Court in a case summarized the rule, as follows:
"(T)he power to promulgate rules in the implementation
of a statute is necessarily limited to what is 'provided for in
the legislative enactment. Its terms must be followed for an
administrative agency cannot amend an Act of Congress. The
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulation
of the mode or proceedirigs to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted, and it cannot be extended-to amend or expand
the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered
by the statute. If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law
and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails. The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use
either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the
Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as-well as with
respect to what :fields are subject to regulation by it. It ntay
.n\. ot make rules
.
and regulations which are inconsistent
. \ . with
mpeople v. R?se11thhl, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); Municipality of Cardona v. Binang-

onan, 36 Phil:(1917k "
n•Pelaez.-v~Auditor General, supra; Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940).
120Rubi
v. Provincial Board ofMindoro,-39 Phil. 669;·
121Intemational
Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labors, 70 Phil. 602 (1940).
1"Phil.
Assn. of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil.
806 (1955).
more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned
by the basic. "125 ·
In another case,126 the.law involved was Sec. 6 ofR.A. No. 6646,

which provides in part that -
"If for any reason, a , candidate is not declared by final
judgment before ari election to be disqualified and h~ is v~ted
for and receives the winning number of votes in suchelection,
the Court or Commission shall continue With the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof· order the suspension ·of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guiltis strong."
The. Commission on Elections issued Section 5, Rule 25 of its
Rules of Procedure, which provides in part that the "proclamation
shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the
winning number of votes in such election," changing the word "may"
in the law by the word "shail" in said Rule. The Court ruled that it
was improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used
instead the word "shall" in its rules, for the word "may" indicates that
the suspension of' a proclamation is only directory and permissive
in nature and operates to confer discretion= while the word "shall"
imports a command. and requires the suspension to be mandatory.
The Court added that "being merely an implementing rule, the same
must not override, but instead remain consistent and in. harmony
with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative· rules
and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to
modify, the law."w
1.22. illustrative cases on validity of executive orders, rules

and regulations.
Executive Secretary v. Southuiing Heavy Industries, Inc.
The issue in Executioe Secretary v. Southwing Heavy
Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 164i'71[February20, 2006] is whether or
not the executive order banning the importation of used vehicles
' . ',(
125/bid.;
Roniulo; Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles v. HDMF,
128 SCAD 101, 333 SCRA 777 (2000).
126Grego
v. COMELEC, 83 SCAD 923, 274 SCRA 481 (1997).
lZl[bid., citing R.E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, p. 239 (2nd ed., 1990).
=tu«, 274 SCRA, p. 498.
l
necessary; .... Provided, That upon periodic investigations by

the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA, the
President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels
granted in Section One hundred and four of this Code, includ-
ing those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.
' '
2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment
Code of the Philippines which was issued on July 16, 1987,
by then President Corazon C .. Aquino, in the exercise of
legislative power tinder the Provisional Freedom Constitution,
empowers the President to approve or reject the prohibition on
the importation of any equipment or raw materials or finished
products. Pertinent provisions thereof, read:
ART. 4. Composition of the board .. The Boardof Invest-
ments shall be composed of seven (7) governors: The Secretary
of Trade and Industry, three (3) Undersecretaries of Trade
and Industry to be chosen by the President; and three (3)
representatives-from the government agencies and the private
sector ....
ART. 7. Powers and duties of the Board.
xxx xxx
(12) Formulate and implement rationalization programs
for certain industries whose operation may result in disloca-
tion, overcrowding or inefficient use' of resources, thus imped-
ing economicgrowth. For this purpose, the Board may formu-
late guidelines for progressive manufacturing programs, local
content programs, mandatory sourcing requirements and dis-
persal of industries. In appropriate cases and upon approval
of the President, the Board may restrict, either totally or par-
tially, the importation of any equipnient or raw materials or
finished products involved in the rationalization program;
3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the
"Safeguard Measures Act" (SMA), and entitled "An Act Pro-
tecting Local Industries By Providing Safeguard Measures To
Be Undertaken In Response To Increased Imports And Provid-
ing Pen~tie's..iFor Violation Thereof," designated-the Secretar-
ies ofzheDepartment of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the De-
partment of Agriculture, in their capacity as filter egos of the
President, as the implementing authorities of the safeguard
measures, which include, inter alia, modification or imposition
In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule

as it seeks to implement or execute primary legislative enact-
ments intended to protect the domestic industry by imposing
a ban on the importation of'a specified product notpreviously
subject to such prohibition. The due process requirements in
the issuance thereof are embodied in Section 401 of the Tariff
and Customs - Code and Sectio~s 5 and 9 of the SMA which es-
sentially mandate the conduct of investigation and public hear-
ings before the regulatory measure or importation ban may be
issued.
In the present case, respondents neither questioned before
this Court nor with the courts below the procedure that paved
the way for the issuance of' EO 156. What they challenged
in their petitions; before the trial court was the. absence of
"substantive due process" inthe issuance of the EO. Their main
contention before the court a quo is that the importation ban is
illogical and unfair becauseit unreasonably drives them out of
business to the prejudice ofthe'national economy,
Considering the settled principle that in the absence of
strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches
of the government 'are presumed to be· valid, and' there being
no objection from the respondents -as to the procedure in the
promulgation ofEO 156,the--presumption is that said executive
issuance duly com.plied with the procedures and· limitations
imposed by law.'
To determine whether EO . 196 has - complied with the
third and fourth requisites of a :valid administrative issuance,
to wit, that it was issued within the scope of authority given
by the legislature and that ib.is reasonable, an examination
of the nature of a Freeport under RA 7227 and the primordial
purpose of the importation ban under the questioned EO is
necessary.
'•
RA 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things,
the sound and balanced conversion· of the Clark and Subic
1 • • I
military ~sel'Vations and their extensions into alternative

productive uses in the form of Special Economic and Freeport
Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to promote the
economic and social development of Central Luzon in particular
and the country in general.
The Freeport was designed. to ensure free flow o: ~o~e-

ment of goods and capital within a po~on of th~ Philippine
territory-in order to attract investors-to mvest th~rr capita~ m
a business climate with theleast governmental intervention.
The concept. of this zone was explained by Senator Guingona
in this wise: .
Senator Guingona: Mr; President, the special economic
zone is successful in many places, particularly Hong Kong,
which is a free port: The difference between' a special economic
zone and an industrial estate is simply expansive in the sense
that the commercial activities, including the establishment
of banks, services, :financial institutions, agro-industrial
activities;maybe agriculture to a certain extent.
This delineates the activities that would have the least of
government.intervention, and the running of the aff~rs of the
special economic zone would be run principally by the investors
themselves similar to a housing subdivision, where the
subdivision.' owners elect their representatives to run the affairs
of the subdivision, to set the policies, to set the guidelines.
We would like to see Subic area converted into a little
Hong Kong, Mr. President, where there is a hub of free port
and free entry, free duties and activities to a maximum spur
generation of investment and jobs.
While the investor is reluctantto come in the Philippines,
as a rule because ofred tape and perceived delays, we envision
this special economic zone to be an area where there will be
minimum government interference.
The initial outlay may not only come from the Government
or the Authority as envisioned here, but from them themselves,
because they would be encouraged to invest not only for the
land but also for the buildings and factories. As long as they
are con~ced that in such an area they can do business and
reap reasonable profits, then many from other parts, both local
and f~reign, would invest, Mr. President. (Emphasis, added)
W,ith, ~fninimum interference from the government,
. investors'can, in general, engage in any kind of business as well
as import and export any article into and out of the Freeport.
These are among. the rights. accorded to Subic Bay Freeport
Enterprises under Section 39 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7227, thus -
they can be exported, That will generate employment for us.

For as long as t!iat is done, we are saying, in effect, that we
have the least .contact with our ·:tariff .and . customs laws and
our .tax Jaws. Therefore, w~:conside:rthese goods .as outside of
the customs 'junsdic:tjon. of&he Republic of'.the Philippines as
yet, until .we draw th~w fnom this t~tqcy and bring them
inside our domestic oommeree, In which.case, tl;l,ey have.to pass
through our customs gate. :I thought we are carving out this
entire area and convert it into this 'kind of concept.
However, contrary to .the .olaim of .petitioners, .there is
nothing . in the foregoing ,excer.pts which :absolu,'t{lly limits
the incentive to Freeport investors only to exemption from
customs duties and taxes. Mindful of the legislative intent to
attract investors, enhanc~ investment and.boost the economy,
the legislature could not have limited the enticement only to
exemption from taxes. The minimum interference policy of the
government on the Freeport extends to the kind of business
that investors. in.ay "ein.bark on and the articles which they
may import or export into and out of the zone. A contrary
interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the Freeport
and drive away investors.
It does not mean, however, that the right of Freeport en-
terprises to import all types of goods and article is absolute.
Such right i~ of course .subject to the limitation that articles
absolutely prohibited by law cannot be imported into the Free-
port. Nevertheless, in detennining whether the prohibition
would apply to the Freeport, resort to the purpose of the prohi-
bition is necessary.
In issuing EO 156, particularly the prohibition on impor-
tation under Article 2, Section 3.1, the President envisioned
to rationalize the importation of used motor vehicles and to
enhance the capabilities of the Philippine motor manufactur-
ing firms to be globally competitive producers of completely
build-up units and their parts and components for the local
and export markets. In justifying the issuance of EO 156, pe-
titioners .al'l~ged that there has been a decline in the sales of
new,vehlcles and a remarkable growth ofrthe sales of imported
us~d. motor vehicles, To address the same; the President issued
· the questioned EO to prevent further erosion of the already
depressed.market base of the local motor vehicle industry and
void, not only for being ultra oires, but also for being unreason-
able.
This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is. an axiom in
administrative law that administrative authorities should not
act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules 'and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If
shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which
they were authorized to be issued; then they must be held to
be invalid.
There is no doubtthat the issuance of the ban to protect
the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power.
The deterioration of the local motor manufacturing' :firms due
to' the in.flux of imported used motor vehicles is an' urgent na-
. tional concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the Presi-
dent. In the· exercise· of delegated policepower, the executive
can therefore validly proscribe the importation of these vehi-
cles. Thus, in Taxicabppefators ofMetro Manila, Inc. v. Board
of Transportation., the Courtheld that a regulation phasing
· out taxi cabs more than 'six years old is 'a valid exercise of po-
lice power. The regulation was sustained as reasonable holding
that the purpose thereof was to promote the convenience and
comfort and protect the safety of the passengers.
The problem, however, lies with respect to the application
of the importation ban to the Freeport, The Court finds no logic
in the all encompassing application of the assailed provision
to the Freeport which is outside the customs territory. AB long
as the used motor vehicles do not enter the customs territory,
the injury or harm sought to be prevented or remedied will not
arise. The application of the law should be consistent' with the
purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione ceesa»'lex, et cessat
lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases. It is not
the letter alone but the. spirit of the law also that gives it life.
To apply the proscription to the Freeport would not serve the
purpose of the EO. Instead of improving the general economy
of the country, the application of the importation ban in the
Freeportrw9ufd subvert the avowed purpose of RA 7227. which
is to cyeate .a market that would draw investors and ultimately
boost the· national economy. · · ..
In similar cases, we also declared void the administrative
issuance or ordinances· concerned for being unreasonable. To
classes and preparing . their. mental and psyehological

make-upfor the.examination dayits~l;f.-,. Would; be like
uprooting the. tree: to.get r.i.d of.oB: rotten branch; What is
needed. to. be. done by the. respondent, js to find, OU;t the
source ofisuchleakages 'and; sWP it :cig}lt,t)lere. ;J:fo:orrupt
officials or personnel should . be . ,tf:l:n:¢Pated from, their
loss, then so be it. ]fixers or swindlers should 'be flushed
.c)oi. Stf:i~ gili'delliie$:to be.obserted by examiners should
be. ~et 'up ·andifViofatfoi::is··ilfe d>:nhnitte'd, then licenses
sh6hld'he suspendecFOr 'fev-bked. . . . ·,
15 . ., :.. ;.~;) '.'; .. · :·);··L .. - - : _ ·-. ·1·,, ·' •
In· Lucena, Grand ·Cen.tral . Terminal, Inc .. u•. JAC Liner,

Inc., the Coµrt lik~wi~~:st~kqqwn-as ~eason.able and over-
breadtha city qrdina:nce,gpa,n~4tg :an'J;~xcllliliV;~ .fyanchise for
25 years, renewable for· imoth.er .~5 years; to '911~ en,~ty for the
construction and opel'.!ition of 0ne;<:omm0n bus,aµd jeepney ter-
minal facility in Lucena City. While professedly aimed towards
alleviating ·the traffic -eengestion. alleged 'to have been caused
by the existence of various -bus and.jeepney'terminals within
the city, th'e ordmanc~ was held·to be ;beyond what is reason-
ably necessaryto'solve-thetraffic problem iri'the city.
'; ,. . ' ~,; · , . . ' -~ . ,• J _ ': : .· :·> ... : ; '.
;ey,parjty .of r;eai;Jo$g, the hµp(?~~~t\;l>an in this case
should also .be cJe(flru<ed"void, for ita too sweepil].g and unneces-
' ~ary applicatfo~ 1~0 th~',Fi'.eepoit; which hS:~ ii~ bearing on the
objectiy;~.ofth1:1,prohibit~on. .If the ain:l ofthe..EO is to prevent
the entry of used motor vehicles frcm the El;~_eport to the cus-
toms territory, the solution is not to forbid entry of these vehi-
cles into the; Fteeport, birt to.intensify goveriii:fiental campaign
and measures to tb:wart)iliegal ingress of us~d motor vehicles
into the'custom~ territory.
DAR, v. Sutton
In DAR, v. Sutton, [G;R· No. 16'2070, .Oct<!)b,er ·19; ~005], the
issue was whether DAR A.O. No. 9 fixing the::l;'.etentionJitnits of
1
lands devoted to livestock farming is constitutienak, In declaring

DAR A.O. No. 9 as unconstitutional, the Court.ruled:
'.· , - . .1i_._:.r:.:. 1:.
· Administtative agencies -are .endowed.: With powers

legislatiy~\ii't. nature, i.e., the power to 'make rules and
- regul~tihns •. They have been granteduby Congress with the
authority tOdssue rules to regulate the· implementation of a
law entrustedto ;:t;hemi Delegated rule-making-has become a
practical necessity in modern govemaacesdue-to-the increasing
60 STATUTORY CONS!l'RUCTION
The subsequent case of Natalia Realty.,. Inc" v.-_DAll

reiterated'ounruling in the Ll(,zrFarms case. In Natalia;Rea~ty,
the Court held tliat industrial, commercial and residential
lands are not covered by the :CARL. We stressed anew that
while Section 4 of RA. No. •6657 provides that .the CARL
shall cover all -public and ·private agricultural lands; .the term
"agricultural.land" does not include .lands clas1:3ified,.as mineral,
forest, residential, com,We~jal or industrial, .Tuus, 4t Natalia
Realty, even portions of tp:e Antipolo Hills Su:t)division,which
are arable yet still mideveloped,. could not be considered as
agricultural lands subject to 'agraqari reform 8E,i ~hes~iots were
already classified ~s residential lands. ·
A similar· logical deduction should be followed in the
case at bar. Landsdevoted.to.raising oflivestock, poultry and
swine have been classified· .as-' industrial, 'not agricultural,
lands and thus exempt from agrarian reform, Petitioner DAR
argues that, in issuing the impugned ,,A.O., it was seeking to
address the reports it has 'received that som;e' unscrupulous
landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to
livestock farms· to avoid their coverage by the,agrariaii reform.
Again, we find neither meritnor ·logfo -in t~~ .c,o~~i;iiion. The
undesirable scenario which petitioner, seeks 1;Q prevent with
the issuance of the AO. clearly does not apply.in tj:tj.s case.
Respondents' family acquired their landholdings as early as
1948. They have long been in the business q(bi;~edill.g, cattle
in Masbate wh;,ch}s popularly ~own as. the .,cattle,,~reeding
capital of the Philippines, Petitioner DAR does not dispute this
fact. Indeed, there is Il.O evidence on record ·tha~ respondents
have just recently engaged in or. converted to the business of
breeding cattle after the enactment.of the CARL.that may lead
one to suspect that respondents i~~nde(i,to evade itEJ coverage.
It must ,be stressed that what .the CARL proh,ibits,._is the
conversion of agricultura,l lands fqr ·ni;>.'i:i~~~H}bir~ pW;-poses
after the effectivity of the CARL.. There has been, no change of
. business interest in the case ofrespondents, ,
I -- •" -•·- ·•
·
Maxima R;,ea~ty Management

Maxim.a R~alty Management, and Dev. Corp. u. ·Parkway Real
Estate Dev: Corp., [G.R. No. 136492,.February 13, 20d4J'.raises the
issue as to whether an administrative rule prescribing a period
of 30 days to appeal a decision to the Office of President prevails
ment is entrusted to an administrative body. When. an administra-

tive agency promulgates rules arid regulations, it "makes" a new
law with the force and effectof a valid law, while when it renders
an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law. The rules promulgated pursuant to law are binding on
the courts, even jf they are not in agreement with' the policy stated
therein or with its· innate wisdom. On the other hand, administra-
tive interpretation ofthe law is at best merely advisory, for itis the
courts that finally determine-whatthelaw means.w ·
Administrative construction is not necessarily. binding' upon
the courts. Action of an . administrative. agency mai be. disturbed or
set aside PY tJ?:e
j~diciaJ.. department if there is an.
error of law, or
abuse of power or lack of juljs~ction or grave abuse of,.discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of a legislative
enactment.w
1.24. Supreme Courtrule-makingpower.

The 1987 Constitution grants the Supreme Court the power
to "promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and· procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice oflaw, the Integrated Bar, and
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial -bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.":»
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court as provided in
Sec. 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution is complemented by Sec.
30, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides that: "No law shall
be passedincreasingthe appellatejurisdiction of the Supreme Court
as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence." ·
It has been held that a .statute which provides that a decision of a
quasi-judicial body be appealable directly to the Supreme Court, if
enacted without. the advice and concurrence of the 'Supreme Court,
/'·:,.·\
129\Ticl:orias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555
(1962); Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 (1992).
"'0Per'alta v. Civil service Commission, 212 SCRA 425 (1992).
131Sec. 5(5), Art~ VIII, C~nstitutlon. ·
1.25. Legislative power of local government units.

. The legislative power of local government units refers to the
power of local legislative bodies to enact ordinances, consisting
of barangay ordinance, municipal ordinance, city ordinance, and
provincial ordinance, as the case may be. To be valid, such ordinances
require that their passage be in accordance with prescribed procedure
and that they meet the substantlverequisites for their validity.
In Lagcao v. Labra, G:R. No:
155746,October 13, 2004, the
Court outlined the requirements for a valid ordinance. - It held:
"For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within

the corporate - powers of the city or municipality to enact but
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic
. principles of a substantive nature. These principles require
that an ordinance (1) must not. contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable."
1.26. Barangay ordinance.

The smallest legislative body is the sangguniang barangay.
It may pass an ordinance affecting a barangay by majority vote of
all its members. A barangay ordinance is subject to review by the
sangguniang bayan or scingguniang panlungsod, as the case may
be, to determine whether it is consistent with law or with municipal
or city ordinance. The 'sangguniang panlungsod or - sangguniang
bayan shall take action on the ordinance within thirty days from
submission. If it does not take action within said period, - the
ordinance will be presumed consistent with law or municipal or
city ordinance and shall be· deemed approved. If it finds that the
ordinance is inconsistent with. law or city or municipal ordinance,
it shall return the same to the sangguniang barangay concerned
for adjustment, amendment, or modification, in which case the
effectivity of the ordinance is suspended.136
136Secs. 54 and 57, Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160).
1.29. Provincial ordinance.

The sangguniang panlalawigan, as the legislative body of a
province, may by a vote of a majority of the members present, there
being a quorum, enact ordinances. affectingfhe prevince.i= The
ordinance is then forwarded .to the governor who, within fifteen days
from receipt thereof, shall return it with his approval or veto. If he
does not return it within that time, itshall . be deemed approved. A
vetoed ordinance may be repassed by thesfl,ngguniang panlalawigan
by a two-thirds vote of all its members.w
E. VALIDITY OF STATUTE
1.30. ·Presumption of constitutionality.

Every statute is presumed valid.w The reason lies in the very
essence of how a law· is enacted. Before .the legislature passes a bill,
it is presumed that it has decidedthe measure tobe constitutional;
and when the President approves the bill, it is presumed that he
has been convinced of its validity. It is but a decent respect due
to the wisdom, integrity, and the patriotism of the .. legislature, by
which the law is passed, and the chief executive, by whom the law
is. approved, to presume of its constitutionality.w .A,n -~~ ~f the
legislature, approved by the President, is presumed to ,l:)ew1;t~ the
constitutional . limitations, For the responsibility of uphol~g. the
Constitution rests not on.the courts alonebut on the legislature and
executive as well."•
The function of the legislature to legislate law.is primary, its
exercise fortified by presumption of right and legality; and is.not to be
interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of its wisdom
or propriety.w To declare a law unconstitutional, the· repugnaney
of the law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal. To
strike down a law, there must be a clear showing that what the
144 Sec. 54,.ibid.

145 Secs. 54 and 55, ibid.
""Salas v. &enc'io, G.R. No. 29788, August 30, 1970, 46. SCRA 734; Morfe v.
Mutuc, G.R. No. 20,387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424; Peralta v. Commission on
Elections, G.R No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30.
147Alba v. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957).
146Peralta v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 82
SCRA30.
149Uy Cong Eng v. Trinidad, .4 7 Phil. 385 (1925).
can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was

indeed an infraction of the, Constitution, and only when such a
conclusion is reached by 'the required majority may the; Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the· duty it cannot escape, that
the challenged act must be struck down. "1"'
1.31. Requisites for exercise of judicial power.

The court does not pass upon tll.e ~onstitutionality of a statute
at any time it is requested by any person and.for any purpose.11111
.Before the court may resolve the question of constitutionality of a
statute, the following requisites should, as a rule, be present: (1)
the existence of an appropriate case; .(2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
plea that the function be exercised .at the earliest opportimity; ~d
( 4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case.1M
1.32. Appropriate case.

The case in which the question of constitutionality of a statute
is raised must be a bonafide case; one in which it raises ajusticiable
controversy, the resolution of which the court will have to ch?~se
between the Constitution and the challenged statute.157 JudiCial
a
power is limited only to actual controversies, as last resort ~d .
a necessity in the determination of real, actual, earnest, and vital
controversy between litigants.1ea
Generally, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter
which is appropriate for court review. It pertains to issues which
are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized
by law. The Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over
actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that
are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates
to rule on are "political questions." The reason is that political
1"'Drilon v. Lim,.54 SCAD 218, 235 SCRA 135, 140 (1994).

1M\7icente~ . .Sfuco; Philippine Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (19El0), p. 44.
tMI>umlao v, Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52245, January.22, 1980, 95
SCRA 392;.People v. Vera, 65 Phil.56 (1937); Phil. Const: Assn, v, .Enriquez, 54
SCAD 561, 235 SCRA 506 (1994).
117Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346, 55 L. ed. 246 (1911).
158pbfl. Assn. of Colleges imd Universities v. Secretary' of Education, 97 Phil.
806 (1955).
only when there is an exercise by Congress of its axing or spending

power.w
Not eve,ry person or taxpayer can question the constitutional-
ity of a law. The rule ii; that a person who questions the validity of a
statute must show that he has sustained, oris in immediate danger
of sustaining, some direct !njucy a~·. a result of its. enforcement.w :He
must have a personal and substantial interest u1fhe case such that
the enforcement of the law has caused him or will cause · him direct
injury.103 Concrete fu.Jui-Y;whet}ieracttial or thr.e8:~;ned, is the in-
dispensable element of a dispute which serves in .part to cast it in a
form traditionally ¢apable of judicial resolution. When the asserted
harm is a generalized grievance. shared in substantially equal meas-
ure by all or a large class of citizens, that h(lI111 alone normally does
not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.w Without such direct injury,
the petition challenging the validity of a law states no cause of ac-
tion and should be dismissed.w · ·
'In the determination of thedegree of interest essential to give
the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute,
the general rule is that not only persons individually affected but
also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal ex-
penditure of moneys rrusetby taxation and may therefore question
the validity. of laws requiring expenditure of public moneys.166 Tax-
payers may bring an action to, restrain officials from wasting pub-
lic funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.167 So-called taxpayer's suit is based on the theory that the ex-
penditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication
of such funds.w
161 Gonzales v. Narvasa, 131 SCAD 710, 337 SCRA 733 (2000).
162 Bautista v, Municipal Council ofMandsluyong, 98 Phil; 409 (1956); Sanidad
v. Commission on Elections, G:R. No. 43731, October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 330.
183People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937). . f
164Lozada
SCRA337. ·
v. Commission on Elections, G;R. No. 59068, January 27, 1983, 120
166Bautista,.vs.Milnicipsl
166Phil.
Council ofMandsluyong, 98 Phil. 409 (1956).
Constitution Assn., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 23326, December 18,
1965, 15 scRA 4 79.
I!
167Phil.
Constitution Assn., Inc. v. Mathay, G.R. No. 25554, October 4, 1966,
18 SCRA300.
168Pascual
v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Tan v. Macapa-
gal, G.R. No. 34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677.
of the Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as

precedents, such as the calling by the President for the deployment
of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police in
visibility patrols around the metropolis.w
The Supreme Court ruled in Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA
201,222-223 [2000]:
"This. is a rather novel theory.- that people should await
the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question
acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that
the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law
are contravened by Section 4 of EO 372, not whether they are
viol~ted by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en bane
case Taiiada v. Angara, this Court held.thatwhen an act of the
legislative department is seriously alleged to have Infringed
the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the quty of
this Court, By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/
or the law: is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court;
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thusposed is
judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)'remains
to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.'
Once a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation of
a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.'
xxx 'xxx xxx
AB this Conrt has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in
many cases, it~ not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred
duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that
172 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 131 SCAD 800, 338 SCRA 81
(2000).
when the complaint was 'filed or during thetrial. 115 The question of
validity may also be raised iii criminal cases: at' any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal, in civil cases where it appears cletfrly that
a determination of the question is necessary to adecision, and in
cases where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below.i=
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a ~q~~qua)._,of Congress, is 'seriously alleged
to have infringed the C~nstitU.tlOil and the 'laws, a!'! in the P,resent
case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts. .· · · . '
1.35. Necessity of de~i~g con~ti~utio~ality~,

It is well-settled that the court will not pass upon the validity of
a statute if it can decide the case 'on some other grounds; it will leave
the· constitutional question for· consideration until an -
appropriate
case arises inwhich a decision upon such questiohis unavoidable.r"
This does not mean that to avoid a constitutional question,the court
may decline to decide the case on the merits. If the only issue is
a constitutional question w}aj,ch is unavoidable, the court; should
confront the question and decide the case on the merits.118 _
Nor will the co~_pa~~- upon .the validity of~ .staiute where
the issue raised in the case has apparently become moot, Insuch an
event, the court- will <¥!3priss ~pecase on such gro:uD.,d/79
The court may.however; relax strict compliance.withthe proce-
dural requirements for the court to inquire intothe constitutionality
of a law. Where the constitutional question is ofparamountpublic
interest and time is of the essence in the resolution of such question,
adherence to the strict procedural standard may be relaxed.and the
court, in its discretion, may squarely decide the case.w And.where
the question of validity, though apparently has become moot, has
become of paramount public interest arid there is undeniable neces-
· mAlonso v. pbiJ.'. National B'iuik, 91 Phil. S45 (1952).

178San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, G.R. Na: 2i'879, September 29, 1967,
.
21 SCRA 292. . . , .. · -
177Sotto v. Q,)initdssion on Elections, 76 Phil. 516 (1946); Go Chiong v. Dingla-
san, 79 Phil.1~2(1947).
178KriveD.ko
v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
179Gori.zales
_ v, Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 27833, April 18, 1969, 27
SCRAB35. . .
1"°Dumlao
v. Commission on Elections/G.R. No. 52245,'Janliary 22, 1980, 95
SCRA 392; Tinio v. Mina, G.R. No. 29488, December 24, 1'968; 26 SCRA 512.
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative

enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but alsobecause the.judiciary in the
determination of.actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdomand justice of the people as expies~d through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of
the government.
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as ·a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained' or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the .governmental actthat.js being challenged. The gist
of the question of standing is ·:whether a: party alleges such
personal stake in the outcomeof.the controversyas to assure
that concrete adverseness which· sharpens the presentation of
issues uponwhich the. court.depends for illumination of difflcult
constitutional questions.
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, contends th:it petitioners do not have standing since
only the Chief Justice has sustained and 'Vfi.11 sustain· direct
personal injury. Amic'us curiae former Justice Minister and
Solicitor General Estelito Mendozasimilarly contends.
Upo~ the other hand, the- Solicitor General asserts that
petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the past,
accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
legislators in cases involving paramount public interest and
transcendental importance, and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other
branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them. Amie~ curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion,
citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched
rule exception that, when· the real party in interest is unable
to vindicate his rights by 'seeking the· same remedies, as in
the case-ofthe Chief Justice who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will
grant petitioners standing. ·
There is, however, a difference bet~een th,e rule.onreal-
party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former is a
In a long line of cases, however; 'concerned· citizens,

taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements 'have
been met have been given standing by thisCourt,
When suing as a. citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing th~ constitutionality of a· statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in
imminent danger of sustaining.some direct injury as.a result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffersthereby.in.some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person, complaining has
been or is about to be denied some right pr privilege to which he
is lawfully entitled or that .he is aboutto be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
qf: In . fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
'public . right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer,heis allowed to sue where there is
a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there
is a wastage of public funds through . the· enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power
of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of
a
money raised by taxation 'and that he would sustain direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute
or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to
whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This
Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given
theirallegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate
of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the
Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public
funds. ',
As' for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the
validity· o£ e'rly official action which· he claims 'infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator. 'Indeed; a inember of the House
of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in his office.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal

attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner
is able to craft an issue of transcendental signiflcanoe to the
people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public. Such liberality does not, however, mean that the
requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter
is totally eliminated. A party must, at· the very least, still .
plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which
courts can take judicial notice. IIl petitioner Vallejos' case, he
failed to allege any interest in the case. He ·does not thus have
standing. · ·
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success. of
· either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted
by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.
In .Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria,
et. al. in. G,R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue,
they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no
objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., has been
interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagma:malasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al., sought to join petitioner
Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking theirright as citizens to
intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme
of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention
had been complied with:
Alleging, that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 16~~61~160262, 160263; 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160a1-0 were of transcendental importance; World War II
Veterans Legionnaires ofthe Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-
in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional
issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint
Ripeness and Prematurity

.. ,
In Tan v. Macapagal, this Court, through Chief Justice
Fernando, held that· for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may: come into the picture." Only then tn.ay the courts
pass on the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is
challenged in an appropria~eJegal proceeding.
The instant petitionstaisein the main the issue of the va-
lidity of the filing of the second impeachmentcomplaintagainst
the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment
Rules adopted ·by the 12th Congress; the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts- having been carried
out, i.e., the second i.ni.peachment coinplaintha:d been filed with
the House of Representatives and the 2001Rules have already
been already:promulgated·and enforced, the prerequisite that
the· alleged unconstitutional 'act should be accomplished and
performed··befo're suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been
complied with: . ·
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether
the instant petitions are premature.' Amicus curiae former
Senate ·President· Jovito R. Salonga opines 'that there may
be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this
time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality
anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House
and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U .P. College of Law who· suggests to this Court to take judicial
notice of· on-going attempts to encourage- signatories to the
second i.ni.peachment compla.lnt to withdraw their signatures
and opines that the House impeachment Rules provide for
an opportUnity for members to raise constitutional questions
themselves when the Articles· of Impeachment are presented
on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean
maintains that even assuming that the Articles are transmitted
to the $.e~, the Chief Justice can· raise the issue of their
constituflonal infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the with-
drawal by the Representatives of their signatures would not,
by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their consti-
Executive·Secretary which raised the issue ofwhetherthe.1973

Constitution was· ratified, hence,' in force, this Court shunted
the political questton doctrine 'and toek cognizance. tb.~r?of.
Rati:ficatfon by the people ·of ·a Constitution is a'' ~olitic~
question, it being a question· decided ·by· the people· m .their
sovereign capacity.
The fr~uency with which this Court invoked the political
question doctrine to refuse totakejurisdiction over certain cases
during the Marcos regime•Iii.otivated ChiefJustice Concepcion,
when he became aConstitutionalCom.nllssiOrier;to clarify this
Court's power of judicial review and its application-on issues
involving political questions, viz: · ·
xxx
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also .a duty, a duty which
cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Jus~ce
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however; that Section
1 Article VIII was not intended to do.away with "truly
p~litic:~i'questioiis." From tlris clarification it is gathered
that there are two species ofpolitjcal que~tions: (1) "truly
political questions" and )(2) those' whic~ · "are not truly
.
polifical.questions." . ~
'
Truly. political. questions, are thus .beyond judi<:ial

review, the reason for respect of the doctrineof separation
of powers to be maintained On the other hand, by virtue
e.
of Section 1, Article Vlll of.the Constitution, courts can

review questions which are not truly political in nature.
.: As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico
Agabin ofthe lW, College of Law, this Court has in fact
in a number· of cases taken jurisdiction over questions
which
. . . . . are
,. not truly·.political following. the effectivity of
the present Constitution.
lit Marco's il Mbnglapus, thisCourt.epeaking thr01Jgh'Madame
Justice Irene Cortes,'held: · · r
The present· Constitution limits resort to the political

question doctrine a'nd broadens the scope of judicial inquiry
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first

three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lac~ of
judicially discoverable and :mru.iaJJe~~le s~andards ~o~ ~«:;~olvi?g
it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding with~ut .~ nn~al po~cy
determination -of a kind- clearly for non-Judicial discretion.
These standards are not .separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the
conclusion that the others Me also present.
The problem in app}yingthe foregoing standardsis that
the American concept . ofju.dicial review. is radically different
from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides our courts with far)ess discretion in
determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional
issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a. trul! p~litical
question from a non-justiciable political question ~es .m the
answer to the question . ofwhether there are constitutio~y
imposed llinits on powers or functions conferr:ed upon politi~al
bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or mstrllm.entality of the government
properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus now
apply this standard to the. present controversy.
xxx
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should
be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in'. the case of Sotto v.
Commission on Elections, this Court held:
xx x It is a well..,established rule that a court should
not pass upon a constitutional question and decide ~ la~
to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by th~ parties and that when it is raised, if the
reci>~cf 'iuso .presents some other ground upon which the
. court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted
and the constitutional -question will be left for consider-
ation until a case arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable.
for failure to accord the people fair notice of what conduct to avoid;
and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government
muscle.>'
The change of circumstances or conditions may affect the
validity of some. statutes, specially those so-called emergency
laws designed specifically to meet certain contingencies. They are
deemed constitutional at the time of their enactment as a valid
exercise of police 'power. When the court declares a statute of such
type unconstitutional because the emergency has passed or there
have been changes in circumstances and conditions, it does so, not
because it does not violate the Constitution but because the change
in circumstances and conditions makes the continued enforcement
of the statute violative of the Constitution or its basic principles.188
With respect to ordmances, the tests of validity are: (1) It must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) It must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) It must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) It must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) It must not be
unreasonable.t"
1.38. Effects of unconstitutionality.

The general rule is that an unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as though
it had never been passed.iOO However, such broad statements as to
the effects of unconstitutionality of a· statute must not be taken
without qualifications. For as the court in a case explained: "The
actual existence of a .statute, prior to· such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling 'as to .invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects - with respect to particular
... \
187Estradav.'Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001.

188Ruther v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953); Dinglasan v. Araneta, 84 Phil. 368
(1949).
189 Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 53 SCAD 367, 234 SCRA 255
(1994).
190 Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores, 99 Phil. 738 (1956).
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those

which have engaged the attentj.9n of courts.>'
The rule on the effects of unconstitutionality of a law has been
restated as follows:
"Thereare two views on the effects ofa declaration of the
unconstitutionality of a statute.
The first is the orthodox view. Under this rule, as
announced in Norton v. Shelby•,,an unconstitutional act is not
a law; it =confers. no right; it imposes no. duties; it .affords no
protection; it: creates no. office;' it is; in legal contemplation,
inoperative,as=ifithad notbeen passed; It is therefore stricken
from the statute books: and eonsidered never to have existed
at all. Not only the parties but all persons are boundby the
declaration of unconstitutionality, which means that no.rone
may therefore . invoke it nor may the courts be .permitted to
apply it in subsequent cases. It. is, in other words, a total
nullity.
The second or modern View is less striilg~nt. Under this
view, th~ court in passirlg upoil.the question of constitµtiohality
does not ahD:iilor repea.l.'th(:l ~fatute ifit fi;ids it;in co~ct with
the Constitution. It simpl;yr~fuses to recognize it and determines
the rights oft}i~ vartiesJµst.as ~(s~cll, statute had ~o ~~~tence.
The court may give its reasons for ignoring or disreg~ding
the law, but the decision affects the parties only and there is
no judgment against the statute. The opinion' or .reasons of
. the court may operate .. as'. a precedent for the. determination
of other similar cases, but it does .not strike the statute,.from
the statute books; it does 'not repeal; 'supersede; revoke, or
annul the statute; The parties tothe.suit are concludedbythe
judgment, but no one else is bound:
The orthodox view is expressed· in Article 7 Of the Civil
Code, providing that 'when the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shallbe void
and the.latter shall govern. x x x.'
The/~trl:~ view considers. a legislative enactment which
is declared unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and
194Co v. Court of Appeals, 45 SCAD 538, 227 SCRA 444 (1993).

parties involved in the case and its effects applied prospectively.

Thus, in Rutter v. Esteban, 198· the Court declared the morato~~ law
suspending the period 'of prescription o~ actio~s .unconstitutional
on May 18, 1953 because of the change in conditions.' Before s_uch
date of declaration of nullity, it has been held that the moratorium
law was in full force and suspended the period of:prescription of
actions. 199
1.40. Partial invalidity.

The general rule is that where part of a s~atut~ is void ~s
repugnant to the Constitution, while another part rs valid, the valid
portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand .and be eprorced.200
The presence of . a saparability clause in a sta'Ft~ creates the
presumption that the legislature intended. separability. rather th~
complete nullity.. of the statute'. 201 . 'ro just~ this. i:esult~ the val1.d
portion must be so far independent of .the invalid portion. t~at it
is fair to presume that theJegislature would have enacted it by
itself if it had supposed thatjt could not constitutionally enact the
other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and
vilid statute: ..which carries: out the legislative intent ... The void
provisions must be eliminated withoµt causing resul_ts afl'.~cting the
main purpose of the act in a ma.Il1ler contrary to the. Intention of the
legislature. The language used' in the invalid part of a st.atute can
have no legal effect or efficacy for ~y purl)ose whatsoever, and wh~t
remains must express the legislative Will independently of the void
part, since the court has no power ~o.legislate.202.
The exception to the general.rule is that whenthe parts of a
statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations,inducements,or compensations for each other, as to
10993 Phil. 68 (1953). . . .

10•Republic v. Herida, G.R. No. ;344;8.6, December 27, 1982, 11~ SCRA 41l;Ma-
nila Motor ce., Inc. v. Flores, 99 Phil. 739 (1956); Areneta v. Hill, 93 Phil. 1002
(1953)· Montilla.v. Pacific Commercial Co., 95 Phil. 133 (1955).
~ooBarrameda'V'.. :~('l:Uir, 25 Phil. 44 (1913); Government v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259
(1927); Lindasen.f.Colnmission on Elections, G.R. No. 28089, October 25, 1967, 21
SCRA 496; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52243, January 22, 1980,
95 SCRA 392·. .
201Williamsv. Standard OilCo., 278 US 235, 73 L. ed. 287 (1929).
202Barrameda v. Moir, 25 Phil: 44(1913); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 759 (1918);
Government v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 (1927).
is fair to presume that the legislature could have enacted

it by itself if'it: had supposed that it could not constitu-
tionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible and valid statute, which carries out
the legislative intent. x x r'
"The exception to the general rule is that when the
parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and con-
nected, as conditions; .eonsiderations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that
the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of
one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the
statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one an-
other, the legislature intended the statute to be carried
,. out as a whole .and would not have enacted it if one ·part
is void in which case if some parts are unconstitutional,
all the' other ·provisions thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must fall with them."
"R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Sec-
tion 23 provides that 'if for any reason, any section or pro-
vision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid,
such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force
and effect.' This separability clause notwithstanding, we
hold that the offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so in-
firmed its essence that the entire law has to be struck
down. The· provisions on tariff differential, inventory and
predatory pricing are among the principal props of R.A.
No. 8180. Congress could not have regulated the down-
stream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortu-
nately, contrary to their intent, these provisions on tariff
differential, inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere
with the free interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180
needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition.
The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be over-
stated. Before deregulation;.PE'i'RON, SHELL and CAL-
TEX ba9:~l'lo real competitors but did not have a free run
ofth~··market because government controls both the pric-
ing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After de-
regulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain un-
threatened by real competition yet are no longer subject
to control by government with respect to their pricing and
In Lopez v. CA, G.R. No. 144573 [September 24, 2002], the

Court held:
While it is true that in. Fabian v. Desierto, the Court
declared unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic Act No.:
6770 and all other provisions of law implementing the
same the declaration should be interpreted to mean that
the said provisions are void only insofar as they provide that
administrative appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman
shall be taken to the Supreme Court. Under the 1997 Rtiles of
Civil Procedure, the proper forumfor administrative appeals
from the Office of the Ombudsman is the Court of Appeals. The
provisions of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and 1the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman with respect to
the finality and execution of decisions are not affected by the
ruling in Fabian v. Desierto, and therefore still stand. It is a
fundamental principle in statutory construction that a statute
may be constitutional in one part and unconstitutional in
another and that if the invalid part is severable from the rest,
the portion which is .eonstitutional may stand while that which
is unconstitutional is stricken out and rejected. Whenever a
statute contains unobjectionable provisions separable from
those found to be unconstitutional, it is the duty of the court
to so declare and to maintain the act insofar as it is Valid. The
separability clause found in Section 40 of Republic Act No.
6770 creates the presumption that the legislature -intended
separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.
F. EFFECT AND OPERATION
1.41. When laws take effect.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the-completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette unless it is otherwise provided x x x." Section 18,
Chapter 5, Book J.1of the 1987 Administrative Code provides t~at
"laws shall take-effect after fifteen ( 15) days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided."
It has been held, however, in the subsequent case of Phil.

Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Vega,21• that the phrase "unless
it is otherwise provided" provides an exception as to the date of
effectivity of a statute, in that Congress may providein the law that
it shall take effect immediately.upon.itsapproval. This case appears
to be in conflict with the Toiiada v. Tuvera case, isupra, in which
it was held that publication is a "must" before a statute becomes
effective even though it provides that it shall take effect upon its
approval. -
1.42. When Presidential issuances, 'rules and regulations

take_ effect.
The President's ordinance .power - includes the authority to
issue executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations,
memorandum orders, memorandum circulars, and general or
special orders. 214 The requirement of publication as a condition for
the effectivity. of statutes applies to Presidential issuances, which
means that they should be published in the Official Gazette or-in
a newspaper of general circulation before they become effective,
except those which are merely interpretative or internal in nature
not concerning the public.s=
Generally, rules and regulations issued by administrative or
executive officers are of two types, namely: those whose purpose
is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation or to fill in the details of a statute, and those which are
merely interpretative in nature or merely internal in character
not concerning the public. The first requires publication for its
effectivity, while the second does not. Interpretative regulations and
those internal in· nature, that is, concerning the personnel - of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinatesin the performance of their dutiee.=
________ ,
' ,:·'-·l .
213Phil. y.e~r~s Bank Employees Union v. Vega, G.R. No. 105364, June 28,
2001. ,
214Secs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, Chap. 2, Title I, Book ill, 1987 Administrative
Code.
215Taiiada v. Tuvera, supra.
216Jbid.
To illustrate the rule, DMB-CCC No. 10 may be cited. This

circular disallowed car. plans, which were previously . allowed
for officials of Philippine Ports officials. The. Court ruled that -to
be effective this circular should first be published in the: Official
Gazette because the same was not just an interpretation or internal
regulation, but one which deprived government officials o~. .th.eir
allowances and additional compensation. Its subsequent publication
did not cure the fatal defect of lack of publication, nor did it retroact
to the time that the.circular was first issued; it could not apply
prospectively. 222
1.43. When local ordinanee takes effect.

(a) , Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution
approving the . local development plan and public investment
program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date
a copy thereof is posted in a' bulletin board at the 'entrance of the
:18
provincial capitol or city, municipal, or ba;arigay hall, . the case
may be, and in at least two (2) other-conspicuous places in the local
government unit concerned. ·· ·
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause
the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at,the
entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or Qarangay
hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the. local government
unit concerned not later than five (5)days after approval thereof e.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated

and posted in Filipino or English and in the language or dialect
understood by· the majority of the people in the local .government
unit concerned arid the secretary to the sanggunian shall record
such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval
and posting.
. (c) The gi~t of all ordinances with penal sanction:s sh~ be
published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province
where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of
any newspaper of'general circulation within the province, posting. of
such ordinances"shah be made in all municipalities and· cities· of the
province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
222Phil. Internal Trading Corp. v. COA, 108 SCAD 103, 309 SCRA 177 (199~).
1.45. Territorial. and personal effect of statutes.

n
"Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being
independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over
its entire doniinion. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its
power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme; its commands
paramount. Its laws govern therein: and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to. its terms. Th11t is the extent of itsjurisdiction, both
territorial and personal.t'=
1.46. Manner of cc:>mpu~g tiine.

''When law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall
be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each;
months; of thirty days; days, of tWenty-four hours; and nights from
sunset to sunrise." "If months are designated by their name, they
shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively
have." "In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and
the last day included.t'= Where the word "week" is used as a measure
of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of
seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week from
which it begins.w
The Civil Code adopts the 365-day year and the 30-day month,
not the calendar yearnor the solar or civil month. Hence, a year is to
be considered to have 365 days even if that particular year is a leap
year with an' extra day in it.200 In computing years, the first year is
reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day,
the first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of
the second cycle, the person turns two years old. The cycle goes on
and on in a lifetime. A person turns 21 years. old on the 365th day of
his 21st 365~day cycle. This means that on his 21st birthday, he has
completed the entire span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, ~·
the 365-day cycle.for his 22nd year begins. The day after the 365th
day is the first day of the next 365-day cycle and he turns 22 years
old on the 365th day.231 I
I
227Reagan 11. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 26379, December

27, 1969, 30 SCRA 9M, 973; see also People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 36409, October 26,
1973, 53 SCRA47(y., ,;' '1
'
228Art.
13,,CiVU Code.
v.
""'PNB Cotrl of Appeals, 41 SCAD 349, 222 SCRA 134 (1993).
23"National
Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, G.R. No. 29131 August 27 1969 29
SCRA 70. ' ' '
23'Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 82 SCAD 188, 271 SCRA 767 (1997).
Cha.pter II
CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION
A. NATURE AND PURPOSE
2.01. Construction defined.

· Construction is the art or process of discovering and expound-
ing the meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where that
intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its lan-
guage or of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for
in the law.1 Construction is the drawing of warranted conclusions
respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text,
conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of
the text.2 It is not a mechanical endeavour. Nor can it be accom-
plished by modem "brain" machines. Because of infirmities of lan-
guage and the limited scope in legislative drafting, inevitably there
enters into the construction of statutes the play of judicial judgment
within the limits ofthe relevant legislative materials.3 Construction
involves the exercise of choice by the judiciary.s
2.02. Construction and interpretation distinguished.

Some authorities distinguish construction and interpretation.
It has been said that interpretation is the art of finding the true
'Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
24 7, citing Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1.
2U.S. v. Farenhalt, 206 US 226, 51 L. ed. 1036 (1907).
31..ocal
1976}V.~~(IC. & J. v. National Labor Relations Board, 357 US 93, 2 L.
ed. 2d 1186 (1958); ,,
'RepubJ.ic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 28463, May
31, 1971, 39 SCRA 268.
104
states that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of

the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of'labor." Section 5 of'Bepublic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known· B:s the Local Government Code of
1991 reads:
"In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the

following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit
shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, andin case of'doubt,
any question thereon shall.be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the dower focal government unit. Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the existence of the ·power shall be in-
terpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;
(b) In case of doubt, any ta:;c6rdinance or revenue mea-
sure shall be construed strictly against the local government
unit enacting'it, and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. Any tax
exemption, incentive or relief granted by a:ny local· government
unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed
strictlyagainst th~ person claiming it;
(c) The general welfare provisions.in this Code shall be
lib~r~ly interpreted to give more powers to iocal government
umts m accelerating economic development and upgrading the
quality of life for the people in the community;
(d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of effec-
tivity of this Code and arising out of contracts or any other
source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be
governed by.the. original terms and conditions of said contracts
or the law in force at the time such rights were vested; and
(e) , In the resolution of controversies arising under this
Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort
may be had to the customs and traditions in the place where
the controversies take place."
The legislat.µre. also defines, in certain complicated statutes,
the wo~ds and pIµia"§es used therein. Except as they may.have been
embodied aspart of a statute, rules of statutory construction have
no bin~g effect on the courts. Nor .are they controlling in the in-
terpretation of_laws. As instruments of construction, they may only
be used to clarify, not to defeat, legislative intent. Even those rules
2.05. Legislative intent, generally.

Legislative intent is the vital part, the essence of the law.17.The
intent of the legislature is the law, and the key to, and the control-
ling factor in, its construction or interpretation.18 Intent is the spirit
which gives life to legislative enactment. It must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter
of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when it
leads away from the true intent of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.19 Hence, where a
statute is.susceptible of more than one construction, that construc-
tion should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the legislature.>
What is legislative intent? What does it comprehend? The term
"intent" includes two concepts, that.of purpose and that of meaning.
It has been held.ihowever, that the ascertainment oflegislative in-
tent depends more on a determination of the purpose .and object of
the law,» Intent is sometimes equated with the word "spirit," While
the terms "purpose," "meaning," "intent," and "spirit" are oftentimes
interchangeably used by the.courts, they are not entirely.$,y:I;lony-
mous.
2.06. Legislative purpose.

The legislative purpose is the reason why a particular statute
was enacted by the legislature. What did the legislature intend to
achieve or accomplish by enacting a statute? What is its object? Is it
to prevent a mischief? Is it to create new rights? Is it to eliminate de-
fects in existing laws? Isit to implement specific provisions or man-
dates of the Constitution? The answer to these and similar questions
is the purpose of the law. A legislation "is an
active instrument of
government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws
''Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141 '1931).

18U.S.
v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321 (1915); Tamayo v. Gsell;·35 Phil. 953 (1916);
Senerillas v. Hermosisima, lOO·Phili 501 (1956); Hermani v.·Export Control Commit-
tee; 100 Phil. 973 \1.957;),;.. People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050, November 20, 1978, 86
SCRA 542. · i: . ; · · .
19Torres_v;
. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141 (1931); U.S.v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); Peo-
ple v. Concepcion, 44 Phil. 126 (1922); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 25326, May 29,
1970, 33 SCRA 105; Taiiada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957). .·
20U.S.
v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 (1911).
21Genera1
v. Barrameda, G.R. No. 29906, January 30; 1976, 69SCRA182.
between the planter and his plantation laborer in the proportion of

60% for thelatter and.40% for theformer? What is the legislative
intent which should be given effect?
An examination of Republic Act No. 809 and the sugar industry
as a whole shows that the planter's laborer or the so-called "sacada"
had always been at .the losing end in terms of wages and benefits
given him for his work and labor in the field. The planter would in-
variably blame the miller or. central for this sad plight of his laborer,
by claiming that the central had, not been giving' him his. rightful
share in the sugar produce milled by the central, and that as a result
he was not able to adequately compensate his laborer. In the 1950s,
when the long-term contracts between the millers and sugar plant-
ers had expired or were about.to expire and negotiations tor another
long-term contracts are in progress, the planters staged strikes and
threatened not to plant cane unless they were given bigger share in
the sugar industry as a whole, the sugar quota commitment to the
United States, and the thousands of'families dependent upon the in-
dustry. To solve the problem, the Congress enacted'Republic Act No.
809 which, in effect, forced the planters to plant, and the centrals to
mill, sugarcane by government taking over the planting and milling
in the event that the planters and millers refuse to do their respec-
tive roles in the production of sugar.
The. purpose or reason of the legislature is thus clearly shown:
to compel the continuous production of sugar and to grant the plant-
ers' laborers a share in.the increased participation of the planters
in the sugar produce. But what about the meaning of the Act? Do
the words of the Act reflect such purpose? What is the meaning of
the phrase "in the absence of written milling agreements" in Sec-
tion 1? Does it mean that the Act is not applicable where there is a
written milling agreement? What is the meaning of the phrase "any
increase in participation granted the planters under .this Act" in
Section 9? Does it exclude written agreement? A literal rendition of
these phrases will support the argument that the Act is inapplicable
when written milling agreement between the central and the plant-
ers exists, for suchis the literal import of the provisions in question.
Apparently, the literal import, if given effect, will defeat the purpose
of the Act, which)a• to grant· the planters' laborers a share in the
sugar produ~e!Considering this purpose, the legislative meaning,
which is not clearly disclosed in the language of the Act, is thus
indicated, which is to give the laborers a share for as long as sugar
is produced and the planters receive an increased participation. The
was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed.v The court
may also look to the purpose ofthe.statuteto be subserved, the.rea-
son or cause which induced the enactment of the law, the mischief
to be suppressed, and the policy which dictated its passage,» When
all these means. from which legislative intent may be ascertained
fail, the court may look into the effect of the law, but not otherwise
because then, interpretation becomes judicial legislation,"
Illustrative case
In Garcia v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 170735,
December 17, 2007, the issue is whether or not the only surviving
director of a corporation is liable for the. whole collected and unre-
mitted SSS constitution to the SSS, with penalties. The Court ruled
that the only surviving director of said corporation is liable, by ap-
plying the pertinent provisions of the SSS law and various rules of
statutory construction.
The Court ruled:
In sum, the core issue to be resolved in this case is
whether or not petitioner, as the only surviving director of
Impact Corporation, can be made solely liable for the corporate
obligations of Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted
SSS premium contributions and penalties therefor.
As a covered employer under the Social Security Law, it
is the obligation of Impact Corporation under the provisions
of Sections 18; 19 and 22 thereof, as amended, to deduct from
its duly covered employee's monthly salaries their shares
as premium contributions and remit the same to the SSS,
together with the employer's shares of the contributions to the
petitioner, for and in their behalf.
From all indications, the corporation has already been
dissolved; Respondents are now going after petitioner who is
the only surviving director of Impact Corporation.
xxx
'"Molina v. Rafre~. 38 Phil. 167 (1918).

29Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385 (1925); Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil.
368 (1949); Adong v. Cheng Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922); Philippine Central Agency
v. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131 (1927); Escribana v. Avila, G.R. No. 30375, Sep-
tember 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245.
80Lacson
v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1953).
tance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-annual-

ly in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be
advanced by their respective employers: Provided, That upon
separationofan employee, any-contribution so paid in advance
but not due shall be credited-or refunded to his employer.
.· UnderSection 22(a), every employer is required to deduct
and remit such contributions penalty refers to the 3% penalty
that automatically attaches to the delayed SSS premium
contributions, .The spirit, rather than the letter of a law
determines construction of a provision of law. It is a cardinal
rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning
and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the
whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law must
be made. Nowhere in the provision or ill the Decision can it be
, inferred that the persons liable are absolved from paying the
unremitted premium cori.tributfons. · ·
Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear
it is incumbent upon the judge to apply them regardless of
personalbelieforpredilections ~when thelawis unambiguous
and unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is
imperative. However, where the language of 'a statute is
vague and ambiguous, an. interpretation thereof is resorted
to. An interpretation thereof is necessary in instances where a
literal.interpretation wouldbe either impossible or absurd or
would lead to an injustice. A law is deemed ambiguous when
it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed
persons in either of two or more senses. The fact that a law
admits of different interpretations is the best evid~nce that
it is vague and ambiguous. In the instant case, petitioner
interprets Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law as applicable
only to penalties and not to the liability of the employer for
the unremitted premiuni contributions. Respondents present
a more logical interpretation that is consistent· with the
provisions as a whole and with the legislative intent behind
' the Social Security Law.'
This yoUft cannot be made to accept. ap interpretation
that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
Petitioner also challenges the finding of the ·Court of
Appeals ~hat under Section 28(£) of the Social Security Law,
a mere director or officer of an employer corporation, and not
116 STATUTciRY CONSTRUCTION
being a mere stockholder, she is liable only to the extent of her

subscription. ·. ·
Section 31. of the Corporation Code, stipulating on the
liability of directors, trustees, or officers, provides:
SEC. 31. Liability' of 'directors, trustees or officers.
- Directors or trustees'who willfully arid knowingly vote
for or assent-to patently unlawfulacts of the corporation
or who are guilty of gl'.OS~hegligenceOT bad faith in direct-
ing the affairsofthe corporationor acquire any personal
or pecuniary interest. in .,conflict with their duty as such
direct9rs!. ~r: irustee.~ ~hall,~~ . liable j9~~Jyajld severally
for.all, ,d.~ag~s resulting the,refro~ ~,1Mf
~~ed J:>:y.t4e corpo-
ration) its. s~QC~~lders ?~ members. and other1persons.
Basicistherulethat a corporation is invested by law with
a personality separate and distinct from that of thespersons
composing it ru.:i. well as from that of any other legal entity to
which it may he related. A c'oi-poration is a jll.ticfical entity with
legal persqnallty separate and' distinct froni'those ~ding for
and in its beh~lf'and; in general, from tile people eorhprising
it. Foiio:wiilg,this, the general ruleapplied is that obligations
incurred by the corporation, acting through its airecto'.rs, officers
and employees, are its sole liabilities. A•direct(>r, offlcer, and
employee; of a corporation !U-e generally not. held personally
· liable for obligations incurred by the corporation. · ·
Being a mere fiction, of law, however, there are peculiar
situations: or valid grounds that can exist. to ·Wa!T~t the
disregard of its independent being and the lift;ing of the
corporate veil. This situation might arise when a corporation
is used to evade a just and due 'obligation or to justify a
wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud, to carry out other similar
a
unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as subterfuge to commit
injustice and so circumvent the law. Thus, Section 31 of the
Corporation Law provides: ·
Taking 'a · oue from the above provision, a corporate
· director, a trustee or an officer, may be held solidarily liable
with the corpqration in the following instances:
.·. ·;-..t
· 1. t,When directors and trustees or, in appropriate cases,
the officers of a corporation ;,....
(a). vote for or assentto patentlfUnlawrul acts of
the corporation; ···
(h) Any employer who, after deducting the month-

ly contributions or loan amortizations from his employ-
ees' compensation, fails to remit the said deductions to
the SSS within thirty (30) days from the date they became
due shall be presumed to have misappropriated such con-
tributions or loan amortizations and shall suffer the pen-
alties provided in Article Three hundred fifteen of the Re-
vised Penal Code.
(i) Criminal action arising from a violation of the
provisions of this Act may be commenced by the SSS or
the employee concerned either under thisAct or in appro-
priate cases under the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
Respondents would like this Court to apply another
exception to the rule that the persons comprising a corporation
are not. personally. liable for acts . done in. the performance of
their duties.
The Court of Appeals in the appealed Decision stated:
Anent the unpaid SSS contributions of Impact Cor-
poration's employees, the officers of a corporation are li-
able in behalf of a corporation, which no longer exists or
has ceased operations. Although as a rule, the officers and
members of a corpora ti op. are not personally liable for acts
donein.performance of'their duties, this rule admits of ex-
. ception, one of which is when the employer corporation is
. no longer existing and is' unable to satisfy the judgment
in favor of the employee, the officers should be held liable
· for acting on behalf of the corporation. Following the fore-
going pronouncement; petitioner, as one of the directors
of Impact Corporation, together with the other directors
of the defunct corporation; are liable for the unpaid SSS
contributions of their employees.
On the other hand, the SSC, in its Resolution, presented
this discussion: ·
Although ~s .a rule, the officers and. members of a

co~Q:r~tiop..are not personally liable for acts done in the
performance of their duties; this rule admits of excep-
. tions, one of which is when the employer corporation is
no longer. existing and is. unable to satisfy the judgment
in favor of the employee, the officers should be held liable
for acting onbehalf of the corporation.x x x.
to a point beyond its reasons and policy, and when invoked in

support of an end subversive of this policy, will be disregarded
by the courts. ·
B. POWER TO CONSTRUE
. 2;11. Construction is a judicial function,

The duty and power to interpret or construe a statute or the
Constitution belong to the judiciary. "It is the duty of the legislature
to make the law; of the executive to execute the law; and of the ju-
diciary to construe the law."•1 "It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."•2 While the
legislative and the executive departments, by enacting and enforc-
ing a law, respectively, may construe or interpret the law; it is the
court that has the final word as to what the law means.33
The Supreme Court construes the applicable law in controver-
sies which are ripe for judicial resolution. It refrains from doing so
where the case has become moot and academic and it will instead
dismiss the case. A case or question is moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale or where no practical relief can be granted
or which can have no practical effect,« However, notwithstanding its
mootness, the Court may nonetheless resolve the case and construe
the applicable law "ifit is capable ofrepetition, yet evading review,"
specially where public interest requires its resolution= or where ren-
dering a decision on the merits would be of practical value,«
The court does not, however, interpret the law in a vacuum. It
construes or applies the law as it decides concrete and controverted
cases based on the facts and the law involved. It does not give legal
opinion on hypothetical cases or in cases which have become, as a
rule, moot and academic. It has been held that "laws are interpreted
31U.S.
v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. l, 6 (1922); L.S. Moon & Co. v. Hamson 43
Phil. 27 (1922). ' '
32Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); San Miguel Corp. v. Avelino, G.R.
No. ~~69~, March 14, :197:9, 89 SCRA 69; Chinese Flour Importers' Assn. v. Price
Stabilization Board,g}l··Pffil. 439 (1951).
33Endencilj>v.
David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953);
34Joya
v. PCGG, 45 SCAD 186, 225 SCRA 568 (1993); Castro v. Tan 100 Phil.
910 (1957). ' '
35Alunan
ill v. Mirasol, 85 SCAD 277, 276 SCRA 501 (1997).
"6Malaluan v. COMELEC, 69 SCAD 160, 254 SCRA 397 (1996).
nution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution;

Now comes the Legislature and in Section 13, Republic Act·No. 590;.
says that 'no salary whenever received by any public officer of the
Republic (naturally including a judicial officer). shall be 'considered
exempt from the income tax,' and proceeds to declare that payment
of said income tax is not a diminution- of his· compensation, Can the
Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature declare thecollec-
tion of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judi-
cial officer, not a decreaseof.hissalary, afterthe Supreme Court'has
found and decided otherwise?"
The Supreme· Court ruled that ·the legislature cannot over-
ride its interpretation of the constitutional.provision, Explains the
Court: "Under our system of constitutional government, th¢ legisla-
u
~ .·.·~
§ ·~?
tive department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The
-~.
executive department is charged with the execution or carrying' out
of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application
of said laws belong exclusively to the judicial department. A.n!i this
authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Cpllstitu-
tion. Before the court can determine whether a law is co~stitutio'D,8,1
or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only
of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the. Constitution iii
order to decide whether there is a, conflict betweenthe two, because
if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared
invalid and unconstitutional." "By iegislative fiat as enumerated in.
Section 13, Republic Act No. 590, Congress says that taxing the sal-
ary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation, This is
a clear example of interpretation ·or ascertainment of the meaning
of the phrase 'which shall not be diminished during their continu ..
ance in office,' found iii Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting
the Constitution or any part established province and jurisdiction
of the Judiciary." If the Legislature may declare what a law means,
or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially af-
ter the courts have in actual case ascertained its meaning by inter-
pretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause con-
fusion. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case
based on a judici,al ,,interpretation of the law or of the Constitution
may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different
interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative
department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides'being
clearly violative of the fundamental principles of our constitutional
ence and law. In the process,the unceasing effort is to say what is

meant and to mean what.is said."« Language is rarely so free from
ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more than one sense.
Thus, what the legislature had actually in mind is not sometimes ac-
curately reflected in the language of
the statute.« As a result doubt
is created as to what the statute means or as to whether it'~pplies
to a given situation. Construction is the means by which the court
clarifies the doubt to arrive at the true intent of the law ...
2.15. Condition sine ·qua non before courts can construe

statutes;ambigUity defined' ·
A condition sine qua non, before the court may construe or
interpret a statute, is that there be doubt or .ambiguity /in its lan-
guage.v The province -of construction lies wholly within the domain
of ambiguity ... For where there is no ambiguity in the words of a
statute, there is no room for construction.•• Only statutes with an
ambi~ous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory con-
struction. 60 Ambiguity means. a. condition of admitting two or more
meanings, of being understood in more than one.way, or of referring
to two or more things at the same time. 61 A statute is ambiguous if
it is susceptible of more than .one interpretation. In such a case, the
court should construe the statute and give it a meaning· that is in
accord with its intent.
Thus, the Court in a case= explained that "Only when the law
is ambiguous or doubtful of meaning may the court interpret or con-
strue its intent. Ambiguity is a· condition of admitting two or more
meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring
«Justice Castro's concurring opinion, Phn. Constitution Assn., Inc. v. Mathay,

G.R. No. 25554, October 4, 1966, 18 SCRA 300, 329 (1966).
45U.S.
v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
••caltex (Phils.), Inc, v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650 September 29 1966 18
SCRA 247. ... ' ' '
~7Banawa v. Mirano, G,R. No. 24750, May 16, 1980, 97 SCRA 517; Resins, Inc.
v, Auditor General, G.R. No. 17888, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 754; Guevara v. Ino-
centes, G.R. No. 2557, March 15, 1966, 16 SCRA 379.
:H~ton v:.~t]iiiione, 175 US 414, 44 L. ed. 219 (1899).
Aparn v. crollli of Appeals, G.R. No. 36057 January 31 1984· Ong v Parel
156 SCRA 76~ ~1987); Veroy v. Loyague, 210 SCRA 97'(1992). ' ' · '
60Daong
v. Municipal Judge, 159 SCRA 369 (1988).
::~ebster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 66 (1961).
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. IAC, 116 SCAD 999 320 SCRA 279 289
(1999). ' '
2.16. Court may not· construe where statute is clear.

The. first and fundamental. duty of the court. is to apply the
law.» Construction or interpretation comes only afterIt has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
it. It is the very last function which the court should exercise, for if
there is more application and less construction, there would be more
stability in the law. 55 · ·
It is well-settled thatthe court may not construe a statute that

is clear and free from doubt. "Time and time .again, it has been re-
peatedly declared by this court that where the Iaw speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There
is only room for application.w "For nothing is better settled than
that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law as
they find it, not as they like itto be. Fidelity to 'such a task precludes
construction or· interpretation; Unless application is impossible· or
inadequate without it."~7 Where the law is clear and unambiguous,
it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no
choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. 58
Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not intro-
duce exceptions or conditions where none is provided from consider-
ations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose;69
nor may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated, 60 nor
54People
v. Mapa, G.R. No. 220301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Resins,
Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No. 17888, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 754; PacificOxy-
gen & Acetylene v. Central Bank, G.R. No. 21881, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 917.
65Lizarraga
Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504 (1913); Yangco v. Court of First
Instance of Manila, 29 Phil .. 183 (1915); Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 53766,
October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 728; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Limpan In-
vestment Corp., G.R. No. 28571, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 148; People v. Mapa, G.R.
No. 22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.
66Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality ofNaga, G.R. No. 24116, August
22, 1968, 24 SCRA 708, 712.
5'Resins,
Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No. 17888, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA
754, 757.
58Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, G.R. No. 25659, October 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 111; Quijano y.' 1?4\V'elopmentBank of the Phils., G.R. No. 26419, October
19, 1970, 35 SCRA 170( Chartered Bank Employees Assn. v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273
(1985). ,' .
69University
of the Phils. Board of~gents v. Auditor General, G.R. No. 19617,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 5 (1969).
SORamos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43766, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA
728.
pay is immediately executory and is not stayed by a timely appeal

to the Court of Appeals. Relying on Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which
provides that "Any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty
of public censure or reprimand, suspension of .not more than one
month's salary shall be final and unappeable" and that "In all ad-
ministrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the
·Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the 'Supreme Court
(now Court of Appeals) by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt ofthe written notice of the order, directive
or decision or denial of the motionfor reconsideration with Rule 45
(now Rule 43) of the Rules of Court," the Supreme Court ruled that
since the decision imposed a suspension of one (1) year without pay,
the same is not immediately executory and the timely llppeal in-
terposed therefrom stayed its becoming executory. As to·the claim
of the Solicitor General that Sec. 12 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which reads:
"Section 12.. Effect of Appeal. - The appeal shall not
stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to
be reviewed Unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise
upon such terms as it may deem just,"
that Sec. 68 of the Local Government Code, which s~tes:
"Section 68. Excution Pending Appeal .. .l.; An appeal shall
not prevent the. decision from becoming final and executory,
The respondent shall ·be · considered as· having been placed
under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal
in the event· he wins such . appeal. In the event the appeal
results in an exoneration, he shall be paid· his salary and such
other emoluments during thependency of the appeal,"
and that Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 6, Section 47, par. (4)
.:
of the Administrative Code of 1987, which reads: ' i
I
"(4) An appeal shan not stop the decision from being
executory, and in one case the penalty is suspension or removal,
the respondent shall be considered as having been under
preventive '~~pension during the pendency of the appeal in
the ev~p.(he wins an appeal," should apply and authorize the
immediate execution of the one-year suspension of respondent,
the Court ruled that these provisions cannot be read in Sec. 27
of the Ombudsman Law.
deposit to be made as compensation for the rejecting landowners,

that is, in 'cash' or in 'LBP bonds," "foreclosing any doubt as to allow
an expanded construction that would include the opening of 'trust
accounts' within the coverage of the term 'deposit," For well-settled
is the rule that "when the Iaw speaks in clear and categorical lan-
guage, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only
for application." , ·
In Libanan u. HRET,69 the issue.is whether ballots not signed
at the back by the chairman ofthe board of election inspectors are
spurious, since it violated Sec. 24 ofR.A. No. 7166, which reads:
"Sec. 24. Signature of Chairman at the back of Every

Ballot. - In every case before delivering an official ballot to the
voter, the Chairman of the Boardof ElectionInspeetors shall,
. in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back
thereof. Failure to authenticate-shall be noted in the minutes
of the Board of Election Inspectors and · shall constitute an
election offense punishable under Sections 263 and 264 of the
Omnibus Election Code."
The Court ruled in the negative, thus: "There.is really nothing
in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is not so authen-
ticated shall thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely renders
the BEi Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts may not,
in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
embrace situations neither provided nor intended by the lawmak-
ers. Where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and
ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
determined from the language employed, and where there is no am-
biguity in the words, there should be no room for construction. "70
2.17. Verba legis or plain meaning rule.

Where the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and· applied without interpreta-
tion. This plain meaning rule or uerba legis derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech istheindex of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a
statute cotrec¥yefyress its intention or will and preclude the court
from constrning it differently.
89 SCAD 998, 283 SCRA 520 (1997).

09
=tu«, pp. 531-532.

former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner

to acquire the· finished project at no cost would undoubtedly
constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice
of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law.
Another illustration .of oerba legis rule is National Food Au-
thority v. Masada Security Agency. Inc. [G.R No, 163448, March
8, 2005]. The issue is whether or not the liability of principals in
service contracts under Section 6 of RA .6727 .and the wage orders
issued by the. Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board is
limited only to the increment in the minimum wage, The Court ruled
that the incrementrefers only to the minimum wage:
RA 6727 (Wage Rationalization ACt), which took effect

on -Iuly 1, 1989, declared it a policy of the State to r~tionalize
the 'fixing of minimum wages and to promote productivity-
improvement and gain-sharing measures to ·ensure a decent
standard · of living for the workers and ·.their families; to
guarantee the rights of labor' to its just share in the fruits
of production; to enhance employment generation in the
countryside through industrial dispersal; andto allow business
and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion and
growth. ·
In line with its declared policy; RA 6727, created the
National Wages and Productivity Commission (NWPC), vested,
inter alia, with· the power to prescribe rules and guidelines
for the determination of appropriate minimum wage and
productivity measures at the regional, provincial. or industry
levels; and the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity
Boards (RTWPB) which, among others, determine and fix the
minimum wage rates applicable in their respective region,
provinces, or industries therein and issue the corresponding
wage orders, subject to the guidelines issued by the NWPC.
Pursuant to its wage fixing authority, the RTWPB issue wage
orders which set the daily minimum wage' rates.
Payment.of th~ increases in the wagerate of workers is
ordinarily. shouldered by the employer, Section, 6 of RA 6727,
however, e~}J!,~$~ly lodged said, obligation to the' principals or
indirect employers in construction projects and establishments
providing security.janitorial.and similar services. Substantially
the same provision is incorporated in the wage orders issued by
the RTWPB. Section 6 of RA 6727, provides:
and rest day pay' premium pay and other benefits granted to
workers. While basis of said remuneration and benefits is the
statu~ory minimum wage, the law cannot be unduly expanded
as to include those not stated in the subject provision.
The settled rule in statutory construction is that if the
s~atu~ is .~lear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.
This plain meaning rule or uerba legi~ derived from the maxim
index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests
on . the valid presumption that' the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intention or will
and preclude the court from construing it differently. The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to
h~ve used words advisedly, and to have expressed itsintent by
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be
no departure.
The presumption therefore is that lawmakers are well
aware that the word "wage" as used in Section 6 means the
statutory minimum wage. If their intention was to extend the
obligat~on of prin~ipals in. service contracts to the payment
of the increment m the other benefits and remuneration of
workers, it would have so expressly specified. In not so doing,
the· only logical conclusion is that the legislature intended to
limit the additional obligation imposed on principals in service
co~t:acts to the payment of the increment in the statutory
mimmum wage.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. AmeriCan Express, G.R.
No. 152609, June 29, 2005, is another case which illustrates the rule
that when the law is clear, interpretation is not necessary.
The Court ruled:
AB mentioned at the outset, Section 102(b)(2) of the Tax
~ode is ve~ clear. Therefore, no statutory construction or i
j,
interpretation is needed. Neither can conditions or limitations
be introduc~d vyhere none is provided for. Rewriting the law is
a forbidd~ ground that only Congress may tread upon.
The Court may. not construe a statute that is free from
doubt. "[W]here the .law . speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only
zero-rating. The portion paid for in local currency shall be

subject to VAT at the rate of 10%.'"
RR 7-95, otherwise known as the "Consolidated VAT
Regulations," reiterates. the above-quoted provision and
further presents as examples only the services performed in
the Philippines by VAT-registered hotels and other service
establishments. Again, the condition remains that these
services must be paid in acceptable foreign currency inwardly
remitted and accounted for in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the BSP. The term "other service establishments"
is obviously broad enough to cover respondent's facilitation
service. Section 4.102-2 of RR 7-95 provides thus:
"SECTION 4 .. 102~2. Zero-Rating. - (a) 1In general.
- . A zero-rated sale by a VAT registered person, which is
a taxable transaction for VAT purposes, shall not result in
any output tax, Howev;er,the input tax on his purchases
of goods, properties or services related to such zero-rated
sale shall be available as tax credit or refund in accor-
dance with these regulations. ·
"(b) Transaction subject to zero-rate. - The follow-
ing services performed iii the Philippines by VAT-regis-
tered persons shall be subject to 0%:
'(1) Processing, manufacturing or repacking
goods for other persons doing business outside the
Philippines which goods are subsequently exported,
where the services are paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the
rules and regulationsofthe BSP;·
'(2) Services other than those mentioned in
the preceding subparagraph, e.g., those rendered
by hotels and other service establishments, the con-
sideration for which is paid for in acceptable foreign
currency and accounted for in accordance with the
rules and regulations ofthe BSP"';
xx; x
Sect}9n':·14.i~2~2(b)(2) of RR 7-95 was subsequently

amen~ed by RR 5-96 to read as follows:
"Section 4.102-2(b)(2) - 'Services other than

processing, manufacturing or repacking for other persons
for the. performance of the former's work, .the employees

of the contractor andofthe latter's sub(lontractor, if any,
shall be paid in accordance with the 'provisions of this
Code. ·. -.. .
In the event that the contractor or ~ubcontractor fails
to pay the wage of his employees hi. accordance with this
Code, the employer. shall be jointly and seve~ally liable
with his contractor or subcontractor tosuch employees to
the extent of the work-performed under the contract, in
the same manner arid' extent that :heis liable to employ-
ees directly employed by him. .· · · ·
.xxx xxx
ART. 107. Indirect Employer. -'- The provisions of
the immediately preceding Article shall likeWise apply
to any person, partnership, association or corporation
which, not being fill employer, contracts with an-indepen-
dent contractor for the 'performance of any work, task, job
or project. · ·· · ·
ART. 109. Solidary Liability. - The provisions

of existing 'laws to the· contrary notwithstanding, every
employer or indirect employer 'shall be held responsible
with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of
any provision of this Code. For· purposes of determining
the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they
shall be considered as' direct employers,
Based on the foregoing interpretation of-Section 6 of RA
~72?•. the partie~ ~ay enter into stipulations increasing the
liabili~ of theprincipal. So long as the minimum obligation of
the principal, z.e., payment of the increased statutory minimum
wage is complied with, the Wage Rationalization Act is not
violated.
In the instant case, Article IVA· of the, service contract

provides: -, ·.
. IV.4. In the event of alegislated increase in the mini-
m~ w,~ of security guards and/or in the PAD PAO rate,
the AGENCY may negotiate for an adjustme:nt in the con-
~I'act price. Any adjustment shall be applicab1e only to the
increment, based· on published and circulated rates and
not on mere certification.·
legis vim obtinet. This legal maxim means that the authoritative in-
terpretation of the Supreme Court of a statute acquires the force of
law by becoming a part-thereof= as of the date of its enactment, since
the court's interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the statute thus construed intends to effectu-
ate." The rulings of the Supreme Court are laws in their own right
because they interpret what the laws say or mean.»
Article 8 of the Civil Code.expresses the principle of stare deci-
sis et non quieta novere. It means that when the Supreme Court has
once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of
facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases
where the facts are substantially the same. This principle assures
'certainty and stability in ·the legal system. 76 In other words, the
interpretation by the Supreme Court placed upon the la:W has the
force oflaw and establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent
of law, which constitutes part of the law as of the date the statute is
enacted. The Interpretation continues until overruled and the new
doctrine is applied prospectively in favor of the parties who have re-
lieved on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewtth.v
As part of the legal system and until reversed by the Supreme
Court itself, rulings of the highest tribunal are binding upon infe-
rior courts. 78 They become, to the extent applicable, the criteria that
must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide
thereby but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience thereto. 79
2.19. Judicial rulings have no rerroaetfve effect.

While a judicial ruling of the high tribunal construing a law
forms part of the law as of the date of its enactment, it cannot be
given retroactive effect ifto do so will impair vested rights. Nor may
73People
v. Jabinal, G.R. No. 30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 601; Caltex
(Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 247.
7$enovila
v. Hermosisimo, 100 Phil. 501 (1956); People v. Jabinal, supra.
"Phil, Veterans Affairs Office V; Segundo, 164 SCRA 365 (1988).
76Tung
Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, 134 SCAD 252, 340 SCRA 765 (2000).
77Pesca
v. Pesea, ~Hi No.' 136921, April 17, 2001.
78National
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated Union,
G.R. No. 26894,·February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 227 (1969); Kabigting v. Director of
Prisons, 6 SCRA 281 (1962).
79Caltex
(Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, September 29, 1966, 18
SCRA247.
142. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
ernor as secret agent is a "peace officer" within the meaning of the Pe

law and is entitled to possess· and carry firearms even without the an
required license and· cannot therefore be prosecuted for the crime of
of illegal possession of firearms.v In People v. Mapa,89 the court li
abandoned the doctrine enunciated in the · Macarandang case and ap
held that a person appointed· secret agent by a provincial governor a
is not a "peace officer" entitled to possess and carry firearms with- nu
out the required license; In view of the express abandonment of the o
· Macarandang doctrine, the question raised in People v. Jabinal is o
whether a person appointed secret agent by a provincial governor in
and found in possession of a.ii unlicensed firearm at a time when the g
Macarandang doctrine was still in force can be prosecuted and con- b
victed of illegal possession of firearms. The trial court, relying on the d
Mapa·ruling, convicted him of such crime. On appeal, tpe Supreme o
Court.reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction, saying: "The
f
doctrine laid down in x x x Macarandang was part of the jurispru-
dence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was found
in possession of the firearms in question and when he was arraigned o
by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the lo
Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled a
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied h
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the d
old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in i
the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is neces- a
sary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the o
guidance of society. "00 c
In Co v. Court of Appeals,91 it appears that on December 15, u
1981, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular holding that "Where m
the check is issued as part. of an arrangement to guarantee or se- d
cure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the t
drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. w
Big. 22 xx x." The Supreme Court in Que v. People= September 21, a
1987, overruled said circular and held that a check issued merely to t
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered
by B.P. Big. 22. The issue raised in Co v. Court of Appeals, supra, is
whether Co could be held criminally liable under the ruling in Que v.
________
88
,,.
·1· "1.,-\
See People'v, Lucero, 103 Phil. 500 (1958).
89G.R.-No.
22301, August 30, 1967, 20SCRA1164.
""People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. 30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607, 612.
9'45
SCAD 538, 227 SCRA 444 (1993).
92154 SCRA 160.
In Benzonan v. Court of Appeals.» the issue raised is when to

count the 'five-year period to repurchase under Sec. 119 of Common-
wealth Act No. 141 granting applicant, his widow .or legal heirs the
right to repurchase the land "within the period of five years from
date of conveyance." In Monge v. Angeles» and Tupas v, Damaso»
decided in 1957 and 1984, respectively, the Supreme Court held that
the five-year period of'repurchase should be counted from the elate of
conveyance or foreclosure sale, However, in Belisario v. Intermedi-
ate Appellate Courtr: decided in 1988, the Supreme Court ruled that
the five-year period should be counted after the expiration of the
one-year period of repurchase in extrajudicial foreclosure sale. In
Benzonan, the Court held that the doctrine that should apply is that
which was enunciated in Monge and Tupas because the transactions
involved took place prior· to Belisario and not that whi¢h was laid
down in the latter case which should be applied prospectively.
In Cemco Holdings, Inc. v. National Life Insurance Co., G.R.
No. 171815 [August ·7, 2007], the Court explained the effect of the
doctrine enunciated in the specific case and the new doctrine which
reversed an old one, as follows:
While a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law
as of the date that law was originally passed, this is subject
to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when
there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the
old doctrine and acted in good faith. To hold otherwise would
be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then,
if there is no recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication. ·
It is apparent that private respondent misconceived the
import of the ruling. The decision in Columbia Pictures does
not mean that if a new rule is laid down in a case, it should
not be applied in that case but that said rule should apply
. prospectively to cases arising afterwards. Private respondent's
view of the principle of prospective application of new judicial
doctrines would turn the judicial function into a mere academic
i : ,·\
00205 SCRA 515 (1992).

97101 Phil. 563 (1957).
9s132
SCRA 593 (1984).
99165
SCRA 101 (1988).
tory pending appeal regardless of the penalty it has imposed on the t

erring official. t
w
However, the Court divisions in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 334
h
SCRA 738; Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 389 SCRA 570 [2002]; Om-
2
budsman v. Laja and Laxina v. Ombudsman, uniformly held that
only Ombudsman rulings in administrative cases imposing censure,
suspension of not more than one month, or fine of not - more than t
one month salary are final and executory, and not those of higher
penalties in accordance with Sec. 27ofRA6770, or the Ombudsman
Law.
It is submitted that the first division in Buencamino v. Court
of Appeals may not validly reverse or modify the doctrine or prin-
ciple of law in the four other cases on the issue, for the/following
reasons:
Firstly, the Article VIII, Sec. 4(3) of the Constitution provides
that only the Court en bane can modify or reverse any doctrine laid
down by the Court either en bane or in division.
Secondly, the First Division in Buencamino relied on the
amended rule of the Ombudsman, which made its decisions in dis-
ciplinary cases final and executory, pending appeal; regardless of
range of the penalty imposed. Such amended rule is of doubtful va- d
lidity because being an administrative rule, it cannot modify nor p
enlarge Sec. 27 of RA 6779 by providing that Ombudsman orders or c
rulings imposing penalties of suspension of more than one month,
fine of equivalent to more than one month salary, or dismissal from
2
the service final and executory, pending appeal, Sec, 27 of the law
having provided otherwise. It is axiomatic that an administrative
rule which violates the enabling law or modifies or enlarges its scope m
is null and void. -
j
A division of the Court cannot modify or reverse a doctrine or
principle oflaw enunciated by another division thereof. However, if
what the Court has stated in a. decision is not a principle of law or
doctrine, but is merely an obiter dictum, a division.of the Court may
validly reject er disregard such obiter dictum. Thus, in Tapiador v.
Ombudman, 4~ J,;>,hil. 47 (2002), a division of the Court stated by
way of obiterdictum. that the Ombudsman has no power to directly
dismiss erring officials under the Constitution and that its disciplin-
ary power is only recommendatory. A Court division in a subsequent
case rejected such obiter dictum and ruled that the pertinent consti-
In Republic v;. CA,106 the Court in construing Article 36 of the m

Family Code on· psychological incapacity as· ground -for annulment
of marriage, issued eight (8) guidelines on (1) the burden of proof.to
show the nullityof the marriage belongstothe plaintiff; (2) the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clini-
cally identified, (b). alleged in the complaint, (c) suffi.ciently proven
by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) '!'he incapac-
. ity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage; (4) such incapacitymust.also betshown te.be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) suchillness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party: to assume the es-
sential obligations of marriage; (6) the-essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of'the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 2201 221 and 225
of the same Code in regard to parents and their children; (7) inter-
pretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or de-
cisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8)the trial· court
must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor Gen-
eral to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the .ease may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within :fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.v'
In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may tread on
sensitive areas. of constitutional rights, the Court may issue guide-
lines in applying the statute, not to enlarge or restrictitbut to clear-
ly delineate what the law requires. This is not judicial legislation
but an act to define what the law is. Thus, in People v. Ferrer= the
Supreme Court said that "even as we uphold the validity of the Anti-
Subversion Act, we-cannot overemphasize the need for prudence and
circumspection in its enforcement, operating as it does in the sensi-
tive area of freedom of expression and belief. Accordingly, we issue
the following guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the
Act. The Govepu,µflht, in addition to proving such circumstances as
106 268 SCRA 198, 209-213 [1997].

107Jbid.
108 People v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 32613, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382 (1972).
familiar surrounding; and every person he meets he considers

hostile to him. Theinvestigators ate well ...trained and seasoned
in their work. They employ all the methods and means that
experience .and study has taught them- to extract the truth, or
what may pass for it; - out of the detainee. ·Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And
even if they were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the
officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them
into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy
this imbalance.
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty
of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain/ silent and
·to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be
used against him.. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his.lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient meanso-- by telephone if possible - or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be ID. the presence
of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
his behalf, or - appointed by the - court upon petition either of
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to
counsel may bewaived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the process herein laid down, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. "112
The question is whether or not the Court's issuance of guide-

lines constitutes judicial legislation, or
an encroachment on the leg-
islative prerogative to enact laws. While the Court has the final say
on what the law is as it interprets it, the interpretation should be
based not only on law but also on the facts obtaining in the specific
case' resolved by the courts and not on future facts or circumstanc-
es.
i . ; .·l
112121 SCRA 553-554.

be extended to other transactions by interpretation.w To do any of

such things· would be todo violence to the language of the law and to
invade the legislative sphere.w
Neither should courts construe statutes which are "perfectly
vague." As a rule, a statute may be vague wh~n iilackscompreh~n-
sible standards thatmen of'common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning' and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution because it violates due process for failure to ac-
cord persons fair notice oftlie conduct to avoid and leave law enforc-
ers unbridled diseretion.in carcymg out .its provisions. But the act
must be utterly vague on its face; that is to s,ay, it cannot be clarified
by either a saving clause or by construction. A "perfectly vague" act
should be distinguished from a legislation which is couched in im-
precise language or from one which is ambiguous, as the latter types
oflegislation are subject to proper construction.w
Canet v. Decena, [G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004] illus-
trates the limitations on the power of the courts to construe.
The core issue in this petition is whether or not respondent, in
her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to issue the nec-
essary business permit to petitioner absent a municipal ordinance
which would empower her to do so. In answering the issue in the
negative, the Court applied rules of statutory construction on the
courts' power to construe, as follows:
The pertinent provision of law in contention is Section
447(a)(3)(v) of the, Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic
Act No. 7160), which reads;
SEC. 447. Powers, Functions and Compensation. -
(a) The Sangguniang Bayan. as the legislative body of the
municipality shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality
and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality
as provided for under Section 22, and shall:
xxx xxx
.; ...-,-.\
120Palanca
v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 (1920); Hongkong & Shanghai Bank
v. Peters, 16 Phil. 284 (1910).
121Republic Flour M:illS, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 28463, May
31, 1971, 39 SCRA 268; Crisologo v. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862 (1954).
122People
v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186 (1988).
also be an undue encroachment on respondent's administrative

·prerogatives.
Along the same vein, to read into the ordinances relied
upon by petitioner objects which were neither specifically
mentioned nor enumerated would be to run afoul of the dictum
that where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
be extended to other matters. In other words, it is a basic
precept of statutory "construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others,
as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare
tacitum - what is expressed puts an end to what yi implied.
The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body
would not have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it
had the 'intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative
gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume
otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative
lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not,
in the guise· of interpretation; enlarge the scope of a statute
and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however
after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are
not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be
in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have
supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.
Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the
law to conform with what they think should be the law. Nor
may they interpret into the law a requirement which the law
does not prescribe. Where a statute contains no limitations in
its operation or scope, courts should not engraft any. And where
a provision .:of.\ law expressly limits its application to certain
transactions, it cannot be extended to other transactions
by interpretation. To do any of such things would be to do
violence to the language of the law and to invade the legislative
sphere.
think that a particular statute is unwise or harsh, a becoming sense

of decency and a recognition oftheirown limited sphere forbid them
from amending-or rewtiting the law.Jn the guise of interpretation,
to suit their own.predilections. or preiudicea.w Any shortcoming of a
statute is for thelegislature alone-to correct by appropriate enact-
ment.i= '
As well emphasized ~'. a case:' "In making choices, Congress
has consulted its own wisdom, which this' Court has no· authority
to review, much less reverse; Well has it been said that courts do
not sit to· resolve the merits cif\cb'nflictlhg theories; That is· the· pre-
rogative of the p,oli:t}~al departm~nt('l~ It is settled that questions re-
garding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary b~~; ~ax be resolved only by tIJ:e legisla-
tive and executive ..d~pfil11m~nts,to which the function J'>~)ongs in
our scheme of government. That -, function is exclusive. Whichever
way these branches decide, ,they. ~e answerable ~Dly to. their own
conscience and th~ constituents who will ultimately Judge 1;heir acts,
and not to the courts ofJu!'ltice."131 . · ·
_____ 129
___...;. --~
BakiD.1p·. 'Director
•
of Prisons, G.R. No; 30364, July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 850;
Inchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155. (1957): ·. · .
130Lacson
v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456 (1935); Cornejo v. Naval, 54 Phil. 809 (1930).
131Magtajas
. v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 53 SCAD 367, 234 SCRA 255, 268
(1994).
the title thereof."4 This constitutional injunction makes the title

an indispensable part of a statute; and what may inadequately be
omitted in the text maybe supplied or remedied by its title.5
The case of City of Baguio' J;.' Mtitcosii illustrates the rule. The
question raised in this case is when to count the forty-year period to
file a petition for reopening· of c:aP.astraj proceedings as authorized
by Republic Act No. 931 covering lands that "have been, or are
·about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted .withiiiitiie fortyyears next preceding the
approval of this Act." Should the period be counted from the date the
cadastral proceeding sought to be reopened was originally instituted
in court, which was April 12, 1912? Or should it be counted from
the date the decision therein rendered became final, wrch was
November 25, 19221 As the petition for reopening was fileCl on July
25, 1961, it was filed beyond the forty-year period if the period was to
be computed from the date. the 'petition was originally filed, and not
if it was to be counted from the date the decision became fin.al. The
title of the law is "An Act to authorize the filing in tli.e proper court
under certain conditions of certain claims of title to parcels of land
that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this
Act." The court noted that there was an apparent inconsistency
betweenthe title and the body of the law. Nevertheless, it ruled that
the starting date to count the forty-year period is the 'date the final
decision was rendered. The court explained:
"It recites that it authorizes court proceedings of claims
to parcels of land declared public 'by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act.' That title is written in capital letters - by Congress
itself such kind of title then 'is not to be classed with words
or titles used by compilers of statutes' because 'it is the
legislature speaking.' Accordingly, it is not hard to come to a
deduction that the phrase last quoted from R.A No. 931 - 'by
virtue of judicial decisions rendered' - was but inadvertently
omitted from the body. Parting from this premise, there is, at
bottom, no contradiction between title and body. In line with
views hereinr .,
..fl,,tated, the title belongs to that type of titles
4Article VI, Sec. 26(1), 1987 Constitution.

City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 342;
5
Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 (1920).

6 G.R. No. 26100, February 28, 1969; 27 SCRA 342.
3.03. When resort to title not authorized.

When the text of the statute is clear and free from doubt, ii is
improper to resort to its title to mhlte it obscure. The title may be
resorted to in order to remove, but not to create, doubt or uncer-
tainty."
3.04. Preamble.
A preamble is that - part. of the statute written immediately
after its title, which states the purpose, reason or justification for the
enactment of the law, Itis usually expressed in the.form of"Whereas"
clauses.12 It is generally omitted in statutes passed by the Philippine
Commission, the Philippine Legislature.fhe Nat~(mal Assepibly, the
Congress of the Philippines and the Batasang Pambansa .. In lieu
of the, preamble, these legislative. bodies· used the explanatory note
to explain the reasons for the enactment of statutes. The preamble
is, however, extensivelyused.in.Prestdential Decrees issued by the
President in the exercise of his legislative power,v ·
The preamble is not an essential part of a statute. Hence, where
the meaning of a statute is clear· and unambiguous.: the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over
its text. Nor can a preamble be used as'basis for giV:ing a statute a
meaning not apparent on its face.»
While a preamble is not, strictly speaking; a part of a statute,
it may, when the statute is .ambiguous, be resorted to clarify the
ambiguity.vIn this connection.lit has been heldthat a preamble
is the key of the statute; to open the minds of the lawmakers as to
the purpose to be achieved, the mischief to be remedied, and the
object to be accomplished, by the provisions of the statute.» In short,
the preamble sets out the intention of the legislature. Hence, when-
ever there is ambiguity in a statute or whenever the: words used
therein have more than one meaning, the preamble may decide the
proper construction to be given to the statute.17 Thus, a preamble
"People v: Rivera, 59 Phil. 232 (1933); Commissioner of Customs v. Relunia,

105 Phil. 875 (1959). , .~ •
1Teople v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542.
13See
Sec; 1.23, supra.
"People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 663 (1950).
16People
v. Purisima, supra; People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 663 (1950).
18People
v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542.
=tr.s. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
. In another case, 22 the issue raised is whether a person who

squatted on a pastural-land could be held criminally liable for Vio-
lation of Presidential Decree No. 772, which punishes: "any person
who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advan-
tage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in oc-
cupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other purposes." The decree was pro-
mulgated to solve the squatting problem which, according to its pre-
amble, "is still a major problem: in urban communities all over the
country" and because "many persons or entities found to have been
unlawfully occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent
class .." The court answered the issue in the negative and said that
the crime may only be committed in urban communities and not in
agricultural or pastural lands because the preamble of the decree
shows that it was. intended to apply to squatting ill urban lands,
moreparticularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by
well-to-do individuals.
3.06. Conte:Xtof whole text.

The best source from which to ascertain the legislative intent
is the statute itself - the words, phrases, sentences, sections,
clauses, provisions. - taken as a whole and in relation to one
another. Legislative intent should accordingly be ascertained from
a consideration of the whole context ofthe statute and not from an
isolated part or particular provision,» The context may circumscribe
the meaning of a statute; it may give to a word or· phrase a meaning
different from its usual or ordinary signification. In such a case, the
meaning dictated by the context prevails. 24
Every section, provision or clause of the .statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arriveat theeffect
contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislature
must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is taken into view.20
22I>eople v. Echavez, G.R. No. 47757, January 28, 1980, 95 SCRA663; see also
Bernardo v. People, ~.R.)l'o. 62114, July 5, 1983.
23Aboitiz
Shipping-Corp. v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 14526, March 31, 1965, 13
SCRA449; Aispotma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 39419, April 12, 1982, 113 SCRA
459. .
24 People v. Chavez, 120 Phil. 1019 (1964); Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79
Phil. 461 (1967). ·· · .
'lllCommissionerof Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA 184
(1992).
backpay certificate may apply the same for payment-of "obligations

subsisting at the time of the approval of this amendatp,ry act for
which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to
any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to corpora~.ions owned or
controlled by the goverillnent; or to any citizens of the Philippines
or to any association; or corporation organized under the 'laws of
the Philippines,' who may be willing to· accept the same for such
settlement," qualifies only its last antecedent, which is "any citizen
of the Philippines or any association'or corporation organizedunder
the laws of the Philippines." The court held that there is a comma
between the phrase "or any citizen, etc." separating said phrase
from the preceding ones; and this implies thatthe qualifying phrase
applies only to its immediate antecedent, pursuant to which backpay
certificate holders can compel government-owned banks/to accept
said certificate for payment of their obligations subsisting at the
time the amendatory act was approved.31 ·
Similarly, where a statute authorizes the preventive suspension

of an employee pending an investigation "if the charge against such
subordinate or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty," the phrase "in
the performance of duty'' qualifies only the words "gravemisconduct
or neglect" because, as the court explained, "there is a · comma
after the words dishonesty and oppression, . thereby warranting
the conclusion that only the, phrase 'grave misconduct or -neglect'
is qualified . by th,e words 'in .the performance of duty," .so . that
"dishonesty and oppression, to warrant . punishment or dismissal,
need. not be committed in the course ofthe performance of duty by
the person charged.f=
In another case, 03 the issue refers to the effect of a comma that
separates the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of in-
solvency'' from the preceding clause, "is hereby sentenced to three
months of arresto mayor with accessory penalties of the law, to pay a
fine of Five Hundred. (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the offended par-
ty, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of Ten Thousand (Pl0,000.00)
' \ . ' '
Supra.
31 ., · · ,;' ..4
Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031,. 1035 (1960). But see Cornejo v. Noval, 54
32
Phil. 809 (1930), where it has been held that the phrase ''neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or. other forms of .maladminiatration in office" as grounds-for removal of
public officers is limited to those relating to the office and not to.personal behavior,
since the phrase "in office" qualifies all antecedents.
33People v. Subido, G.R. No. 21735·, Septemberr 5, 1975, 66 SCRA 545.
th~ gr?up. No capitals are used in the similar provisions of theCode

to ~dica~e the system." ·There is :"no difference between the. use of
capitals m the formerand . of small .letters in the latter .. There is
no reason for excluding .persons in.the unclassified service from the
benefits extended to. those belonging to· the ·classified. service}'37
3.10. Headnotes ore1>igraphs.

Hea~otes,. headings or epigraphs of sections of a; statute
are convement . index to the . contents of its provisions. They are
pre~ed t? sections or chapters of a statutefor ready reference . or
classificati~n. 38 ~ case of doubt or ambiguity in the meaning of the
la':" or the intention of the legislature, they may be consulted in aid
of interpretation. •• / ·
. Headin~s or epigraphs are -not., however, entitled to much
weight, and inferences cI:awn therefrom are of little value and they
can never controltheplainterms of the enacting clauses, for they are
?ot part of the law.: It has been held that when a statute is divided
into .seve~al subjects or articles, having respective appropriate
headin~s, it must be presumed that the provisions of each article are
controlli~g upon the· s~bject thereof and operate -as a. general rule
for settling such questions as are embraced therein. But the rule
acce~ted by most ~f the authorities is that ifthe chapter or section
heading has been inserted merely for convenience or reference; and
?ot as integral part of the statute, it should not be allowed to control
interpretation, '°
~er~ the text ?f a statute is clear and unambiguous,
there. is neither neces~ity nor. propriety to resort to the ·headings
or epigraphs ~f a section for interpretation of the text, especially
W:her~ s~ch ~pigraphs or headings are mere catchwords or reference
:1d~ indicating the .general nature of the text that follows ... The
epigraphs, . or headings, of a section, being nothing more than a
convenient index to the contents of the provision, cannot have the
=iu«. at.pp. 255-256.

(l931)~•Inre EstaY' ~fc~hnson, 39 Phil. 156 (1918); Kare v. Platon, 56 Phil. 248
rio G ~C~mo m2_0is8sOio5nNer ofCusbetom29s v. Relunia, 105 Phil. 875 (1959); People v. Deside-
' · . , ovem r , 1965, 15 SCRA 402.
Phil. 8;~5~rlaton, 56 Phil. 248 (1931); Commissioner of Customs v. Relunia, 105
41 People v. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499 (1933).
The 1987 Constitution provides that the national language of

the Philippines is Filipino. Section 20, Book I, Chap. 4 of the 1987
Administrative Code provides; "In, the interpretation of a law or ad-
ministrative issuance promulgated inall the official languages, the
English text shall control, unless 'C>tlierwise specially provided, In
case of ambiguity, omission or other. mistake, the other texts may
be consultad.?e · '
3.12. Intent or spirit ofJaw. ·. . ·

The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself,« For this reason,
legislative intent or spirit Is the controlling factor; the leading star
and guiding light in the,application and interpretation of'a statute,«
If a statute needs construction, the influence most dominant in that
process is the intent or spirit of the act.60 The spirit, ra'ther than
the letter, of a statute determines its constructions- hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent .. 52 For what is within
the spirit is within the statute although it is not within the letter
thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit
is not within the statute. 53 Stated differently, a thing which is within
the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within
the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not
within the statute unless within the•intent of the Iawmakers,«
The intent or spirit of a statute is that which is expressed in
the words thereof, which should be discovered within its four comers
Art.
47
XIV, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution.
""U.S. v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321 (1915); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141 (1931);
Tamayo v; Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 0916); Senerillas v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501
(1956).
49\'ellow
Taxi Bio. Pasay Transp. Workers' Union v. Manila Yellow Taxi Cab Co.,
80 Phil. 833 (1948); Ledesma v. Pictain, 79 Phil. 95 (1947); Garcia v. Ambler, 4 Phil.
81 (1904); McMicking v. Lichauco, 27 Phil. 386 (1914).
50De
Jesus v. City of Manila, 29 Phil. 73 (1914).
51Manila
Race Horse Trainers As1;1n. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951); Go Chi
v. Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622 (1955); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 25326, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA105.
5"Roa
v. ColiectQrofCustoms, 23 Phil. 315 (1912).
53Manila
RacirHOfte Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De la Fuente, supra; Villanueva v.
City of Iloilo, G.~. No'. 26521, December 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 578; People v. Purisima,
G.R. No. 42050; November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542.
54Roa
v. Collector of Customs, supra; U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909);
Alonzo v. IAC, 150 SCRA 259 (1987), citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction,
1986 ed., pp. 64-65.
law may be avoided by the homestead by postponing the getting of

his patent,»
The general policy of the State is against double pensions for

the same services. Hence, ·in construing or. applying pension and
gratuity laws, they will be so.interpreted as to prevent any person
from receiving double compensation, in the absence of express pro-
vision allowing him to receive double compensation. Thus, a law
which grants retirable employees certain gratuity "in addition to
other benefits to which they are entitled under e:Xisting laws" can-
not be so construed as to authorize the grant of double gratuity the
phrase "other benefits" which-can.bs interpreted to embrace refund
of contributions and payment of the money value of accumulated
vac.ation. ~d sick'leaves Ii~t being so clear as to override t~e general
pohcy against double pensions. •a· ·
/
, . I
3.14. Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed.

In construing a st,a~µte, the purpose or object of the law or
the mischief intended to' be removed or suppressed and the causes
which induced the enactment. of the law are Important; factors to
be considered. in its constrµ,ction.•~. The court. must look to the
object to be accomplished, tb.e, evils to .'be remedied, or
the purpose
to be subserved, and should.give-thelaw areesonable pr liberal
construction which will .best ·effectuate ·its purposE)~~. The purpose
of a statute is more important than rules of grammar and Iogic in
ascertaining its meaning,« A statute must be .read in such a way as
to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute,« For a statute
derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is enacted and to
construe it in a manner ~a~ disregards' or defeats such purpose is to
nullify or destroy the law.v But courts cannot assume some purpose
Tiniov.
81
Francis, 98 Phil. 32 (1955).
Cajiuat
82
v. Mathay, 124 SCRA 7l0 (1983).
83Phil.
Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131 (1927); U.S.
v. De Guzman, 30 .Phil. 416 (1915); Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. 19650,
September 29, 1966, ~~ S¥RA 247. . ,
84Escribano
v~1\vlia; G.R. No. 30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245; Home
Ins. Co. v. Eastern Shipping Lines, G.R. No. 34382, July 20, 1983, 123 SCRA 424.
06Litex
Employees Assn. v, Eduvala, G.R. No. 41106, September 22 1977 79
SCRA8R ' '
88Lopez
v. Court of Appeals, 215 SCRA 512 (1992).
87Sarcos
v. Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 861 (1969).
3.16. Consequences of various constructions.

In construing a statute, the consequences of the various con-
structions offered will be inquired into as additional aid to interpre-
tation. 75 Will the· statute be given a, literal, strict, . or. liberal interpre-
tation? Will it be accorded a restrictive or expansive meaning? Will it
be construed retroactively or not? Has a later law impliedly repealed
a prior act on the same subject? What are the consequences of one
construction as compared to the other? In construing a statute, the
objective should always be to arrive at a reasonable and: sensible
interpretation that is in full accord with the legislative intent. AB a
general rule, a construction of a: statute should be rejected that will
cause injustice or hardship;" result in' absurdity;" defeat legislative
intent or spirit;78 preclude accomplishment of legislative rurpose or
objectr=.render certain words or phrases a surplusagej= nullify the
statute or make any of its provisions nugatory.81
3.17. Presumptions.
In construing a statute, the court may properly rely on
presumptions asto legislative-intentIn order to.resolve doubts as to
its correct interpretation. Presumptions.are based onlogic, experience
and common sense, and in the absence of compelling reasons to the
contrary, doubts as-tothe proper and correct construction of astatute
will be resolved in favor of that construction.whichis in accord with
the presumption on the matter. .These presumptions include the
presumptions in, favor of the. const~tutionality of a: statute,82 of its
completeness,» of its prospective operation,» of right.and.justice,«
of its effective, sensible, beneficial and reasonable operation as a
whole,« as well as those against inconsistency and implied repeal,87
75
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050,
November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542.
76See
Sec. 4.17, infra.
77See
Sec. 4:16, infra.
78See
Sec. 2.05; supra; Sec, 4~08;.J.nfra.
'9See Sec. 2.06,supra;·Sec. 3.14, supra; Sec. 4.10, infra.
80See
Sec. 6.09, infra.
81See
Sec. 6;07.~i'f~·
82See
Secs. 1,a.2;'1supra., 6.13, infra.
83See Sec,.6.10, infra.
84See
See. 9.03, infra.
85See
· Sec. 4.17, infra.
85See
Sec. 6.04, etc., infra.
••see Sec. 10.24, infra.
If the statute is based-on, or is a revision of;c:a prior statute, the

latter's practical application· andtjadicial construction, the various
amendments it underwent, and the contemporary events at the time
of its enactment form part of its Iegislative history. If the statute
is borrowed from, or modelled: :Upon,. Anglo-American precedents
or other foreign sources, its history includes the history of such
precedents, and for a proper construction of the .statute sought to
be construed, it is oftentimes essential to review such legislative
history and find authoritative glide for its interpretation from such
precedents, their. practical application, and the decisions of the
courts construing arid applying such. precedents in the country of
origin,"
In Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corp. v. ;Microasia
Corp., G.R.No. 169080[December19, 2007], the Courtheld:
It is a well-established principle that in the-interpretation

of an ambiguous provision oflaw, the history of the enactment
of the law may be used as an extrinsic aid to determine
the import of the legal provision pr the law. History of the
enactment of the statute . constitutes prior '1aws on the same
subject matter. Legislative history necessitates review of "the
origin, antecedents and derivation" of the law in. question to
discover the legislative purpose or intent. It cim be assumed
"that the new legislation hasbeen enacted as continuation of
the existing legislative policy or as a new effort to perpetuate it
or further advance it."
3.20. President's message to legislature.

The Constitution provides that the "President shall address the
Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear
before it at any other time."08 The President's address or message
usually contains proposed legislative measures. The President's
message indicates his thinking on the proposed legislation which,
when enacted into law, follows his line of thinking on the matter."
Courts may, thus, refer to the messages of the President to the leg-
970.S. v'.'De Guzman, 30 Phil. 416 (1915); Kepner v. U.S., 11 Phil. 669 (1904);
Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308 (1912).
98Art.
vrr, Sec. 23, 1987 Constitution.
99'J'opacio Nueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12 (1946).
176 STATUT0RYCONSTRUCTION ·
ambiguity in the law".106 Neither can it be used as justification to read

a meaning that does not appear; nor is reflected, in the language of
a statute.w' Being written only by the author or proponent of the
bill, the explanatory note is a mere expression of-the author's views
and reasons for the. proposed. legislation and may not accordingly
override the cleat legislativemeaning or intent as expressed in the
statute itself.v= · ·
3.22. Legislative debates, Views' and dellherations.

'• -, ;• ..
Courts may avail tli.e.lils,elves of the actual proceedings of the

legislative body to-assist _ip.. deterniliifug the: construction of statutea
of doubtful ln,eaning>09 Th~y may ·resc:>rt to the legislative delibera-
tions in, the legislat_ID.e on abill whic¥:·eventually was enacted into
law to ascertain the· meaning of its provisions. Thus, where there
a
is doubt as to what a provision. of statute means, th~t meaning
which was put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or
discussion on the bill maybe adopted.w .
However, the views . expressed by the legislators during
deliberations of a bill as to the bill's purpose; meaning, or effect are
not controlling in the interpretation· of the law.w For statements
made by assemblymen during floor. deliberations do not necessarily
reflect the views ofthe assembly.Tt is impossible to determine with
authority what construction was put upon an act by the members of
the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches
of the members thereof. Those who did not speak may not have
agreed with those who did; and those who spoke might differ with
each other.w And even if the statements of those who spoke reflect I
the views of the assembly, if the act as passed is plain and clear, then I
106people v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 657 (1950~.
107Chong Yung Fa v. Gianzon, 97 SCRA 913 (1955).
108Guzman
v. Municipality ofTaytay, 65 Phil 340 (1938).
"'"Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 (1920); Steel Mill, Inc. v. Central
Bank, 162 SCRA 628 (1988).
110Arenas
v. City of San Carlos, 1}.R. No. 34024, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA 318;
People v. Olarte, 108 Phil. 750 (1960); De Villa v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 722
(1991); National ;E'olice Commission v. De Guzman, 48 SCAD 205, 229 SCRA 80
(1994). .· e.
mphil, Assn,;qf.GBvernment Retirees, Inc. v. Government Service In:surance

System, 121PJ:tjL1402 (1965); Mayon Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 111 Phil.'524 (1961); Espino v. Cleofe, G.R. No. 33410, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA
92.
112Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. v. Games and Amusement Board 107 Phil 151
(1960). ' .
properly refer to the reports, of the commissien.that drafted the code

in aid of clarifyingambiguities therein.w · -
3.24. Prior laws from whlehstatute iS based.

~f
. In ascertaining the intention _ the. la~aker _ courts are
permitted to lookto prior laweonthe same subjec;t ~d fu
investigate
the antecedents - of the : statute . involved.i= This rule is specially
applicable ·in the _interpretation _of codes, revised, or compiled
statutes, for the prior laws whfch have been: codified, compiled, or
revised will show the legislative history that Will 'clarify the - intent
of the law or shed light on the meaning and scope of the codified or
revised statute.r= - - .
. Cases. may be cited to Illustrate the principle. In /People v.
Manantani» the .issue raised is whether a justice of the
peace is
included in the prohibition contained in Section 54 of the old Revised
Election· Codew . which provides · that "no justice, judge; - fiscal,
treasurer, or assessor of any province x x x shall aid any candidate
or exert any influence in any election ortake p'arttherein except to
vote xx x." Ajusticeof'the peace was prosecuted fof Violation·of said
provision, He claims that Section 54 of the Code' was taken from
Se~on 449 of the - Revised Administrative Code, which provided:
"No Judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace,· or treasurer,
fiscal or assessor of any province x x x shall aid any candidate x
x x" and that when Section 54 omitted "justice of the· peace," the
omission revealed t4~ intention of the legislature to exclude justice
of the peace from its operation. In rejecting such argument and
4olduw .that the "wo~q "judge;• ipcludes "justice of.the peace," the
court said that a _ review of the history of the Revised Election Code
will help justify and clarify the above conclusion," . -
The court noted that under the first election law, Act No. 1582,
those prohibited from engaging in partisan political activities were
the "judge of the first instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal x
xx." ActNo.1707, tb.eAdministrativeCodeof1917,andActNo. 3387
were substantially of the same tenor. However, Commonwealth Act
119
.· . .
Escalante v; $it'n.ios, 56 Phil. 483 (1932).
120Director;.ofLands
v. Abaya, 63 Phil. 559 (1936).
121People·
v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657 (1962)· Go Chico v. Martinez 45 Phil
256 (1923). • • .
122115
Phil. 657 (1962).
128Rep.
Act No. 180.
is from the date of the institution of the judicial proceeding and not
from the date thejudgment therein is rendered.t=
Salaysa:x v7 Castrov« involvea, the interpretation of the phrase
"actually holding" in a provision which states that "any elective pro-
vincial, municipal, or city official running for'an'.office, other than
the one which he. is actually holding; shall be considered resigned
from his office from the moment of filing his certificate of candidacy."
The issue is whether a vice-mayor who. temporarily took .over the
functions of the mayor following the latter's suspension from office
be deemed automatically resigned as' acting mayor upon filing his
certificate of candidacy for mayor. To resolve thefssue, the court
examined the legislative history of said provision to ascertain leg-
islative intent. It noted that the provision was originally Section 2
of Commonwealth Act No. 666 which provided that "any elective
provincial, municipah or city official running for an: office other than
the one for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered re-
signed from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.'' Thiswas the situation in 1947 whenthen President
Roxas took office. The national elections for provincial and munici-
pal officials were held in 1940 for a· term ending December, 1943.
Since the rule of hold-over was not then in force, President Roxas
appointed many local officials to these elective positions. And to en-
able manylocal officials to continue in office even after .they had
filed their certificates of candidacy for said positions, the legislature
amended Section ·2 of Commonwealth Act No. 666 by substitnting
. the phrase "which he is actually holding'' for the phrase "for which
he has been lastly elected," the purpose being "to.give the benefit-or
privilege of retainingoffice 'not only to those'who have been elected
~ereto but also tothese-who have been appointed" or "toregular
mcumbents havingthe·right and title to the office either by election
or by appointment." "Bearing this intention ofthelegislature in this
regard in mind,l'it cannot be said that a "vice-mayor" merely.acting
as mayor because of'the temporary disability of the regular ineum-
bentcomas under the provision and exception because he-facts as
mayor only in a temporary, provisional capacity.t'=
128Ibid.
12798 Phil. 364 (1956).
128Ibid.,
at pp. 370-371.
182 STATUTORYCONSTRUCTiON
word 'port' is a clear indication of the legislative ·intent to change

the meaning of Section 2901 from what it originally meant, and not
a mere surplusage as contended by petitioner, in the sense that the
change 'merely affirms what customs authorities had been observing
long before the law was amended";. that .it.is "the. duty of the Court
to give meaning to the amendment" and "that under Section· 290.l
of the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended by Presidential De-
cree No. 34, only vessels berthing at .nat,:l'.onal ports(as distinguished
from private or municipal po:rts}.are)iable for berthing fees." ·
3.26. Amendment by deletion.

AP, a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or
phrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended to
change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption /s that the
legislature would not have made the deletion had theintention been
not to effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should
accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to
its amendment.1 ..
Where, for instance, a statute containing a provision prohibiting
the doing of certain things is amended by deleting such provision,
the legislative intent is clear that the doing of said things is no longer
proscribed in the amended statute.w Where a statutecontaining a
hold-over provision entitling an officer to hold on to his office after
the expiration of his termuntilhis successor shall have been chosen
and qualified, is amended by deleting such hold-over provision
and providing for the filling up of all vacancies which might occur
during and after the expiration of a term of office of public officers,
such amendment shows the manifest intention of the legislature to
suppress the hold-over principle.136 Where a statute which contains a
provision authorizing the Commissioner of Customs to compromise
the criminal liability of offenders in cases of unlawful importation,
is amended by deleting said provision, the elimination or deletion
of said provision shows the intent of the legislature henceforth not
to allow compromises of the ?ffender's criminal· liability in such
cases.w
'"'TopacioNueno v. Angeles, 76 Phil. 12 (1946); Niere v. Court of First Instance

ofNegros Occ.; G.R. No. 30324, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 165.
130Go
Chico v. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256 (1923).
1Wfopacio Nueno v. Angeles, supra.
13"People
v. Desiderio, G.R. No. 20805, November 29, 1965, 15' SCRA 402.
of the Ombudsman extends to other public officers or employees as

well, the Court traced the legislative history of the statute and gave
much weight to the deletion of words from the final version. of the
law. The Court ruled:
"The origin of the phrase can be traced to. Section 694 of

the Revised Administrative Code, which dealt with preventive
suspension andwhich authorized the chief of a bureau or office
to 'suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under
his authority pending an investigation x x x.'
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266),
which superseded Section 694 of the Revised Administrative
Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to 'suspend
any subordinate officer or employee, in his bureau 01( under his
authority.'
However, when. the power to discipline government
officials and employees was extended to the Civil Service
Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805),
concurrently with the President, the Department Secretaries
and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase 'subordinate
officer and employee in his bureau' was deleted, appropriately
leaving the phrase 'under his authority.' Therefore, Section 41
of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining authority
may preventively suspend 'any subordinate officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation xx x.' (Sec. 41)
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the
proper disciplining authority to 'preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending
an investigation.' (Sec. 51)
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words
'subordinate' and 'in his bureau,' leaving the phrase to read
'suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending
an investigation xx x.' The conclusion that can be deduced from
the deletion of the word 'subordinate' before and the words
'in his bureau' after 'officer or employee' is that the Congress
intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend
all officials · ahd employees under investigation by his office,
irrespective of whether they are ·employed 'in his office' or in
other offices of the government. "142
Ibid., pp. 653-654.

142
was taken.w The reason is that the legislature, in adopting from

another country a statute which has previously received judicial
construction in that com:,it!Y,. is deem:e.d to have adopted the statute
with such construction and practical application in the country of
origin.w
A good number of Philippine laws are adopted from, or
patterned after, the laws ofthe UnitedStates or of the individual
states of the American union, such· asthe corporation law,1110 the tax
code.i= labor laws,152 naturaliaationIaw.w and the-Rules of Court.w
For this reason, courts have always felt themselves "bound by the
rulings of the Supreni~ Cofu.t of'the United States in construing
and applying s~acii~oey ~Il.a'ctnients. modelled . ll:POn or borrowed
from English or. Ani.e:!'ican
orlginals."15• The adopted statutes are
thus generally conshiqeci in accord~ce with the construction given
similar statutes in, the United States, unless special reasons, local
customs and practice . require.otherwise.w
') :
·, ..;
For instance, the rules on evidence having been drawn mainly

from American sources, decisions of American courts, have persua-
sive effect. The general rule.is that where a local rule is patterned or
copied from that of another country, then the decisions of the courts
in such country construing the rule are entitled to great weight in
interpreting the focal rule.w
3.29. Limitations of rule.

The general rule that a statute.which has been adopted from
that of a foreign country should be construed in accordance with
""Ibanez de Aldecoa v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228 (1915); Cas-
tle Bros. v, Go Juno; 7. Phil. 144 (1906).
149'.l'amayo
v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916); Castle Bros. v, Go Juno, 7 Phil. 144
(1906); Cu v. Republic, 89 Phil. 473 (l951); Cerezo y. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 33
Phil. 425 (1916); Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, IJi.c.,G.R. No.
46908, May 17, 1980; 97 SCRA743; Wise & Co. v. ¥eer, 178 Phil. 665(1947).
16"'.l'an
Tiong Bio v. Commissioner-ofInternal Revenue, 114 Phil. 916 (1962).
161Wise
& Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655 (1947).
162Flores
v. San Pedro, 102 Phil. 44 (1957).
163Cu
v, Republic, 89.Phil. 473 (1951).
1MPhil. NationalBank v. Bondoc, G.R. No. 20236, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA
770.
166Cuyugan
v.Santos, 34 Phil. 100, 107 (1916).
'""Phil. Education Co., Inc, v, Soriano, G.R. No. 22405, June 30, 1971, '39 SCRA 6
587.
167People
v. Pagpaguitan, 113 SCAD 36, 315 SCRA 226 (1999). G
3.30. Principles of common law.

While common law as known in Anglo-Americarrjurisprudence
is not in forcein'thl~ c6tihtry, save_oDly ins~fa,r asit is founded on
sound principles applicable to .local conditions and' is not in conflict
with existing laws, neverthe.Jes~ m~y. ~fthe principles of the com-
mon law have been imported'into this jiuisdiction as a result of the
enactment of laws and establi~blneht ()finstitutio:rls similar to those
of the United States: Courts. may
thii~ prdperly resort to cominon
law principles in 'oonstrtiiD.g.dciubt.fufprovisio11s of a statute, 'par"
ticularly where such statUte is' mddell~d upon Anglo-American prec-.
edents.w However, where there is a conflict between a common law
principle and a statutory provision.fhelatter prevails.i=
I
,I
3.31. Conditions at time of enactment.
Statutes do. not operate in a vacuum, In enacting a statute,
the legislature is presumed to have. talt"'n into account the existing
conditions. of things nt the tirne of ·its. enactment. For this reason, it
is proper, in-the interpretation of a statute, to consider the physical
conditions of -the country and. the. circumstances then obtaining
which must of necessity affeetrts operation in, order to reach an
understanding as to the.intent of the legislature, or as to the meaning
of the statute .. '!"' The.courtshouldthen placeitselfin the situation of
the. legislature and so construe the statute as to give effect to such
intent or meaning.s-
Thus ' where
: '
the issueraised
. .-
is whether
' . ~ .. :
a petroleum
- . - ' .'
conces-
- - -
sionaire is entitled to tax exemption even 'ifthe crude petroleum it

refines is imported, the court, a.lls\veruigthe question in the affirma-
tive, ruled: "When·tiie Petroleum Act was passed and the concession
was granted to r~'sponderi.t under
its. provisions, ff was. we]l known
that there was then no Philippine crude petroleum available for the
use of any refinery in 'the Ph'.ilippinJs which makes it: obvious that
Congress could not have intended that'before the exemption may be
extended to a concessionaire the iattet should only refine crude pe-
161Alzua v. Jiih.n,!!.(>fl, 21 Phil. 308 (1912); Kepner v. U.S., 11 Phil. 669 (1904);
U.S. v. Guzman, 30.Phil. 416 (1915). . .

162Aznap.v. Yapcliangco, G.R. No. 18936, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 486; Garcia
v. Court-of Appeals, G.R. No. 20264, Januaty 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 129.
183Garcia v. Hipolito, 2 Phil. 732 (1903).
1MU.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil.128 (1909};Commissioner of Customs v. Superior
Gas & Equipment Co., 108 Phil. 225 (1960).
· c. CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
3.33. Generally.
Contemporary or practical constructions ·are the construc-
tions placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment
by the executive, legislature, or judicial authorities, as well as by
those who, because of their involvement in the process of legisla-
tion, are knowledgeable of-the ihteii.t and purpose of the law, such
as draftsmen and bill sponsors. Contemporary or contemporaneous
construction is an invaluable aid in the construction, by the courts,
of ambiguous or doubtful provisions oflaw. Contemporanea expositio
est optima et fortissima in lege - the contemporary construction is
strongest in law. /
3.34. Executive construction, generally; kinds of.

What is commonly understood, and usually referred to, as
contemporaneous construction is the construction placed upon the
statute by an executive or administrative officer called upon to
execute or administer such statute. The duty of enforcing the law,
which devolves uponthe executive branch of government, necessarily
calls for the interpretation of its ambiguous provisions. Accordingly,
executive and administrative officers are generally the very first
officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its enforcement, These
interpretations are in the form of rules and regulations, circulars,
directives, opinions and rulings.w
There are three types of executive interpretations of the law.
The first is the construction by an executive or administrative officer
directly called to implement the law. It may be expressed or implied.
An interpretation embodied in a circular, directive or regulation is
an expressed interpretation.v= A practice or mode of enforcement of
not applying the statute to certain situations or of applying it in a
particular manner is an implied interpretation; it is. interpretation
by usage or practice. m
170Phil.
Sugar Central Agency v. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131 (1927); In
re Allen, 2 Phil. 63909ruf>; Government v. Municipality ofBinangonan, 34 Phil. 518
(1916). . "
171See
San Miguel Corp. v. Inciong, G.R. No. 49774, February 24, 1981, 103
SCRA 139.
1'72Molina
v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 (1918); Madrigal v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 414
(1918); Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674
(1952). C
for a considerable period of time.177 It is thus entitled to great

weight and respect by th~ courts in the interpretation of ambiguous
provisions of law,11• and unless it is shown to be clearly erroneous;
contemporaneous construction will control the interpretation of
statute by the courts.w In the absence of error or abuse 'of' power or
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting
with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment creating in
or charging a governmental agency, the action of the agency.would le
not be disturbed by the courts.w As. aptly said in a case: "The principle P
that the contemporaneous. construction of a statute by the executive ra
officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled d
to great respect, and should ordinarily· control the construction of a
the statute by the courts; is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction fo
that no authorities need be cited to support it."181 ' c
n
The reason behind the rule that the interpretation of an
''
administrative government agency is generally accorded great
tw
respect is explained in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals182
it
in this wise:
p
"The rationale for the rule relates not only to the emer- x
gence of the multifarious needs of'a modern or modernizing so- u
ciety and the establishment of diverse administrative agencies a
for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the o
accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabili- h
ties by the administrative agency charged with implementing a w
particular statute. In Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. vs. Commis- 'a
sioner of Customs,183 the Court stressed that executive officials a
are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the con- fo
siderations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, u
and to have formed an independent, conscientious and compe- re
tent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to th
th
'"Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 (1918); Madrigal v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 414
1
fa
(1918). v
\78Vera v. Cueva, G.R. No. 33693;· May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 379; Asturias Sugar la
Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 19337, September 30, 1967, 29 b
SCRA 617 (1967);·Tan v. Municipality of Pagbilao, G.R. No. 14264, April 30, 1963, 7
SCRA B87; Nestle P)iili:ppihes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 203 SCRA 504 (1991). h
1'19Tamayo v.Mairlla Hotel Co., 101 Phil. 810 (1957). o
1eosagun.:V; People's Homesite & Housing Corp., 162 SCRA 441 (1988).
181Jn re Allen, 2 Phil. 630, 640 (1903); Phil. Global Communications v. Relova,
145 SCRA385 (1986).

182203 SCRA 504 (1991).
1es29 SCRA 617 (1969).
194 STATUTORYGONSTRUCTION
the money in question, even though the sugar was shipped from a
private wharf."!" ·
The rule that contemporaneous construction lf3 entitled to great
weight and respect in the i.Iiterpretation of a statute is especially
true under the 1973 Constitution, where some ministers !)r,heads of
executive ministries or departments are also members of the Bata-
sang Pam.bansa. In this situation, it is presumed that the sxecutive
official, being a member of theiegislatnre, knew the legislative in-
tent and reflected that intent inhis construction of the law.188
3.36. Weight accorded to usage and practice.

The principle of contemporaneous exposition, common usage
and practice under the statute, or· a course of conduct' iridicating
a particular undertaking of 'it, is 'frequently of great value in
determining its real ni.eaning, especially where the usage has been
acquiesced in by all theparties concerned and has extended over a
long period of time.189 For it has been said that the best interpreter
of the law is usage. Optimus interpres rerum usus; Thus, where a
statute granted the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Officeadditional
regular racing days, at the time of which enactment the long,
continuous and uniform practice was that all sweepstakes draws
and races were held on: Sundays and during the whole day; it is, safe
to conclude that when the legislature chose-not to specify in express
terms how the additional. sweepstakes draws and races would be
held, it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing practice and the
statute should thus be so construed as not to change the practice.v"
. 3.37. Construction of rules and regulations.

Rules and regulations issued ·by executive or administrative
officers pursuant to, and as authorized by, law have the force and
effect of laws.181 Recognizing this rule-making power, authorities
1 87Ibid., at pp. 143-148.

1 escr. Go;vernm.ent v. Municipality
of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915).
1 89M~a J()l!jt~!"Club, Inc. v. Games an~ Amusements Board, 107 P~. 151
(1960); Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674
(1952). .
190Ma.Dila Jockey Club, Inc. v, Games and Amusements Board, 107 Phil. 151
(1960).
191Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555
(1962); Warren Manufacturing Workers Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159
SCRA 387 (1988).
In Cemco HoldingsvInc- v National Life Insurance Co., .G.R.

No. 171815 (August 7, 2007], the Court held:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that the. constrUction given
to a statute by an administrative. agency charg~4.,¥tJ:i. the
interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to great
weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown
to be in sharp contrast with the governing law or statute. The
rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
multifarious needs of a modern. or moderriizing43ociety and the
establishment of diverse administrative agencies for adqressi:Q.g
and satisfying those. needs; it also relates to accumulation
of experience and growth . of sp;e~~zed capabilities .· b~ the
ad;ministrative agency charged with implementing i:ypJirl1cular
. statute.
3.39. When,contemporaneous construction disregarded.

The contemporaneous construction of a stlltute . is neither
controlling nor binding upon the court, the duty and power to
interpret the law being. primarily a judicial function.197 The 'court
may disregard contemporaneous construction, where there i~ no
ambiguity in the law, 198 where the construction is clearly erroneous.r"
where strong reason to the contrary exists,200 and where the court
has previously given ·the statute a different. interpretation.v' If
the contemporaneous construction is erroneous, the same .must be
declared null and void. It. is the role of the judiciary to define. and
when necessary, to correct constitutional or statutory interpretation
in the context of the interaction of the three . branches .of the
. government, almost always in situations where some agency of
the state has engaged in action that stems ultimately from some
legitimate area of government power. Thus, the policy instructions
of the Secretary of Labor adding another group of employees as
excluded from those entitled to holiday pay when the law itself did
not so exclude them is void. Ap. administrative interpretation which
1s7Koppel <FlrlTh'.~: Inc. 'v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 (1946); Ortua v. Encarnacion, 59
Phil. 440 (1934).

1s8Regitlado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 (1935).
199Molina v: Rafferty, 37 Phil. 545 (1918).
200Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674
(1952).
201Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, supra.
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is rendered necessary

because the tax statute to be enforced is not too plain and simple
to understand and where, in reliance on such circular, a taxpayer
faithfully complied with the obligation of paying the tax required by
it. In such case, the taxpayer. may not be required to pay additional
tax during the period that said circular had not'beeri: rescinded by
a subsequent circular correcting. the. erroneous wterpretation, for
while as a rule the government is never· estopped from collecting
taxes because of mistake or error on the parf of its agents, the
principles of justice and good faith dictate and operate to create
exceptions thereto.s= ·
3.41. Legislative interpretation.

Tue fact that the interpretation of a statute is ~rimarily a
judicial function does not preclude the legislature from indicating its
construction of a statute it enacts into law. It may thus provide in the
statute itself an interpretative or declaratory clause prescribing rules
of construction or indicating how its provisions should be construed. 209
It may also define the terms used in a statute, ehact a: declaratory act
construing a previous law, or pass a resolution indicating its sense
or intention as to a given statute.w Legislative interpretation may
likewise take the form of ail implied acquiescence to, or approval of,
ail executive or judicial construction· of a statute. 211
The legislature, in indicating itsconstruction ofa law, cannot

limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution,
For instance; it may not, by defining a term, make the definition
conclusive not only as regards .the statute which defines the term
but also as regards other statutes or as used elsewhere.s= Nor can
it validate a law which violates a constitutional provision so as to
prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall
be construed as not to contravene the constitutional limitation. To
do so would be to usurp judicial prerogatives=
208ABS-CBN '
Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No .. 52306, Oc-
tober 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142.
2091.e.,
Sec. 4"Bat~s Pambansa Blg. 337.
210People v/Ye'D.Viaje, .47 Phil. 536 (1925); De Ponce v. Sagario, 85 Phil. 79
(1949). .·· ,,
211See
Secs. 3.42, et seq., infra.
212City of Manila v. Manila Remnants Co., Inc., 100 Phil. 796 (1957); Endencia
v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953).
213Endencia v. David, supra.
only confirms the administrative construction but also constitutes a

ratification of.the act of the administrative officer as an agent of the
legislature in the implementation of the law.21•
Where the legislature has notice or knowledge of a construction
placed upon a 'statute by an executive officer charged With its
implementation, without repudiating it, its silence is acquiescence
equivalent to consent to. continue the practice.s= There is implied
legislative approval by the legislature's failure to change· a long-
standing administrative constructioii-.220- It is an axiom of law that
legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate, which is expressed
in the maxim, ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur=
3.43. Reenactmen:t.
The most common act of legislative approval of a contempora-
neous construction of a statute is by re-enactment, The principle of
legislative approval by re-enactment states that the reenactment
of a statute, previously given a contemporaneous construction is a
persuasive indication of the adoption bythe Iegislature of the prior
construction. Stated differently, the construction of a statute by an
executive officer called upon to implement the statute is deemed to
have been adopted by the legislature when it reenacted it in substan-
tially the same language, the presumption being that the legislature
knew of such construction when it made the reenactment.= Thus,
where the legislature resorts to language similar in its import to the
language of an earlier act which had received a practical construc-
tion, it is fair to presume that the language was used in the later
act with a view to the contemporaneous construction so given the
earlier law.s= To make the principle of reenactment applicable, the
earlier law must have been reenacted and not merely amended and
the contemporaneous construction thereof must be in the form of
218American
Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, G.R. No. 26803, October 14,
1975, 67 SCRA 287.
219ln
re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918).
22\IAsturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. 'Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 19337,
September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617.
'J.'J.1Governmeiit v._ StliJldard Oil Co., 20 Phil. 30 (1911); Mitsui Bussan Kaisha v.
Manila Electric Railrea<t&! Light Co., 39 Phil. 624 (1919).
=ABS-CB!i Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 52306, Oc-
tober 12, 1981, 108SCRA142; Alexander Howden & Co., Ltd. v, Collector of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 19392, April 14, 1965, 13 SCRA 601; Interprovincial Autobus Co.,
Inc. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290 (1956).
=i» re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918); Montelibano v. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228 (1955).
· ' The legislature is -presumed to have reenacted the law

with f'.till
knowledge of the contents ofthe revenue regulations
then m force regarding the VAT, and to have approved or
confirmed .thell?- .b~cause th~~ ~ould carz-r out the. legislative
purpos~, The PElt,t;Icular provisioiisofthe regulations we have
mentioned earlierare, therefore, re-enforced, "When a statute
is susceptible of the rl:ie,apin~ placed upon it by a ruling of the
go~e~ent 'a~ency ~h~g~d': ;With its enforcement and the
[l]egisfatyre thereajt~r [r.e~Iiacts] · the provisions [without]
substantial51.iange,; 8tich ~ct~oh is to some e?ct~mt confirmatory
that the ruling c~es outthe legislative purpose.
3.44. Stare deeisie, .

,
~e decisio~ of ~e f3u~reme Court applying or in~rpreting a
sta~te IS controlling With respect to the interpretatfon of that statute
. ttnd IS ~f great~r Wei~ht.~haft that ()f'an executiveor administrative
officer I_n the cops~niction of .other statutes of similar import. The
reason Is that tlie mterpret~tion of.. a statute by the Supreme Court
forms part of the statute. itself arid of the legal system= and comes
fro~,i}hat branch of govenrin:ent entrustsd with the duty to construe
?rmterpre~ t~e law.=It is an inv~1;1able aidin the construction or
mterpretation of statutes ofdoubtful meaning,
.. The leg~ maxim which requires that past decisions of the court
be followed m the adjudication of cases is known as stare· decisis
et non quieta in~vere. It means one should follow ~ast precedents
an~ sh~n!d not dis_turb what has been settled. The rule rests on the
desirability ofhavmg stability in thelaw~23o Accordingly, a ruling of
~he Supreme Court. asto the construction of a Iaw should be followed
in subsequent: cases involving similar questions, In other. words,
once a case has· been _decided one ~ay, then another case, involving
exactly the same point at issue, should be decided in the same
manner_.231 For t~e "Supreme ~<:>urt .has the constitutional duty not
only?fmterpretmg and applymg the.law in accordance with prior
doctrines but also of protecting society from the improvidence and
mArt. 4, Civil Coda; People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. 30061 February 27 1974 55
SCRA607. ,. ,,.•' ' ' '
:Enden<?-a v, David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953).
Koppel (Phils.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 (1946).
23'Associated
Sugar, Inc.'_.v. Commissioner ofCustoms, G.R. No. 30391, Novem-
ber 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 567; Pines City Educational Center v NLRC 46 SCAD 179
227 SCRA 655 (1993). . ' '
else is ~at the courts should be.righti=tHowever, only the-Supreme

?ourt itself can change or abandon a precedent enunciated by it;
it cannot be done by· an .inferior court; 'noreven by the, legislature
except when the hitter amends.orrepeals .the law itself.240 Hence
until ~he high tribunal .shal;l p.aV;e ,oyeP1J.leda p:rihd.pl~ or doc:trin~
enunciated in a case, inf~rio:r courta.#e bound to-follow it. There is
only one Supreme Court.from whose deci,sions all oth~~·courl~-sh6uld
take their bearings, Ifin,fez;iorc9urtSffl~l.tha#hedoctrli_:ie laiddown
by the S~preme Court ii;i, against; ·th.~ir way of reasoning, they may
state their personal OP,ini?11 ~n the matter but must .decide the case
in ac:cordance with the doctrine and not with their personal View.241
For inferior courts to deviate from this rule will have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy=e' i
· The Court in TungChin lrfui,v! Rodriguez, No. 137571 G.R.

[September 21, 2000], further explained when stare decis;,; is
applicable, as follows: .
Petitioner insists, however, that the "application of

Section 18, Rufo 41 under the 'Revised Rules of Court must be
maintained under the doctrine of stare decisis." Thus, he urges
the Court t? apply ;precedents that held that the 48-hour period
for perfecting an appeal was mandatory and jurisdictional.
He specifically cites Saulo' VO Cruz, Garcia v. Echioerri, and
Elepante v. Madayag.
The principle cited by petitioner is an abbreviated form of
the maxim "Stare decisis, et ti.on quieta mouere:" That is ''When
the court .has once laid _down aprinciple of law as ap~licable
to a ce:tam state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it t~ all. ~~e. cases where .the facts are substantially
the same. . This principle assures certainty, and stability in our
legal s~stem.
It should be stressed that stare decisis presupposes that
the facts of ~e precedent _ and the case to which it is applied
~e substantially the same. In this case, there is one crucial
difference. All
t~e incidents of the present controversy occurred
.;' ,,(
:Koppelcr'hil.), Inc. v. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 (l946).

See Secs. 2.12 and 2.13, supra. ; · . .
241Albert :v.'Coilit of First Instance •of Manila, GR No 26364 May· 29 1968
23 SCRA 948. . . . ' ' '
242Canon
18, Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Chapter IV
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE

FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE
A. LITERAL INTERPRETATION
4.01. Literal meaning or platn-meaning rule.

As a general rule, the intent of the legislature to be ascertained
and thereafter given effect is the intent expressed in the language
of the statute.1 If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as plain-meaning rule or verba
legis.. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech
is the index of intention.• The rule rests on the valid presumption
that the words· employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing
it differently.' The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of
the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its
intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.' Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should
be no departure.
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Hence, what is
1Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 (1935).

2Bustamante v. NLRC, 76 SCAD 652, 265 SCRA 61 (1996), citing Ruben E.
Agpalo, Statutory Construction. (1990 ed.), p. 94.
3Espiritu v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 32742, February 15, 1974, 55 SCRA 533; Globe-
Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 701 (1992), citing Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 19gc) ed., p. 94.
'Aparri v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 30057, January 31, 1984.
206
in nature and generally permissive only.9 The 'plain-meaning

rule' or verba legis in statutory construction is thus applicable
in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and.
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation.
In other words, Article 283 of the Labor Code does not
contemplate a situation where the closure of the business
establishment is forced upon the-employer and ultimately for
the benefit of the employees.t= .
The fundamental rule that the legislative intent must be

determined from the language of the statute itself must be adhered
to even though the court is convinced by extraneous circumstances
that the legislature intended to enact something very/ different
from that which it did enact. An absurdity cannot be created to
be cleared up by construction, and hidden meanings at variance
with the language used cannot be sought out. The court may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature different from
that expressed in the words of the statute. To attempt .to do so is a
perilous undertaking and is apt to lead to an amendment of a law
by judicial constrtlction. To depart from the meaning expressed by
the words is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to Interpret.»
Maledicta est expositio quae corrumpit textum, or it is dangerous
construction which is against the text.»
4.02. Dura lex sed lex.

. A statute, being the will of the legislature, should be applied
m exactly the way the legislature has expressed itself clearly in the
law. The clear; unambiguous and unequivocal language of a statute
precludes the court from construing it and gives it no discretion
but to apply the law,> The statute in such a case must be taken to
,9 Ibid., citing Agpalo, Ruben,E., Statutory Construction, 1995 ed. p. 263.

107 SCAD 713, 327 SCRA, p. 165.
'0 '
"Taiiada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515 (1935).
'2Regalado ~Yul. ,q,"61Phil.173 (1935); Victoria v. COMELEC 47 SCAD 224
229 SCRA 269 (19i14)." ' '
"1RepubJic Flour Mills, In~. v. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 28464, May
31, 1971, 39 SCRA .269; Commissioner of Internal Revenue. v. Limpan Investment
Corp., G.R. No: 28571, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 148 (1970); Quijano v. Development
Bank of the Phil., G.R. No. 26419, October 16; 1970, 35 SCRA 270; Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 53766, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 728.
Once the .intent.or meaning of the law is ascertained by the

application of the rules of statutory construction, the law must be
enforced and obeyed. It has been held that there "may be discretion
as to what a particular P:r;<>vision .requires; . there can be none
whatsoever as to the enforcementan41.{lpplication-thereofonce its
meaning has been ascertained. What it decrees must be followed;
what it commands must be obeyed."21 ··
Where the law is clear, appeals tojustice and equity as

justification to construe it differently are unavailing. For equity is
available only in the
absence of law' and not its replacement. Equity
is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it
cannot supplant although it may supplement the law. All abstract
arguments based on equity should yield to positive rules. Appeals
for justice and equity cannot justify disregard of the mandate of
the law so long as it remains in force: 'Phe applicable maxim, which
goes back to the ancient daysof theRoman jurists and which is still
observed is "aequitas nunquam. eontraoenit legis."22 Equity never
acts in contravention of the law.
B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL

INTERPRETATION
4.03. Statute must cbe capable of interpretation, otherwise

inoperative.
A statute must be. capable. of construction or interpretation.
The court must use every authorized means. to ascertain the Intent
of the statute and give it an intelligible meaning. The court may
even depart from the language of the statute if to do so will enable
it to effectuate legislative intent and purpose. However, after such
effort is found impossible to solve the doubt and dispel the obscurity
ofa statute, if no judicial certaintycanbehad as to its meaning, the
court is not at liberty to supply nor to make one. If the legislative
intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the court may
not by interpretation speculate as to its intent and supply a meaning
not found in the Po/as.eology of the law. The court may not assume
some purpose in no,:way expressed and then construe the statute to
Phil.
21
National Bank v. Bitulok Sawmill, Inc., 23 SCRA 1366, 1377 (1968).
Aguila
22
v. Court of First Instance ofBatangas, 160 SCRA 352 (1988).
amendments on the Constitution· and the word "Constitution"

.is neither germane nor relevant to said section.
. . }· while Se~. 3 ~irludes in the tl4:!"ti systems of initia-
tive amendments to the'Constitution,"'tlie law unlike 6D. the
initiatives-on statutes and.local legislation, did ~ot provide for
the contents of a petition.forinitiative on the Constitution.
3. While the Actprovides sub-titles fornational laws
and local legislation, it did notprovide sub-titles for initiative
on the Constitution. · , .
4. While the Act empowered ·the Commission · on
Elections to issue rules and regulations, which it J did to
implement the initiatives on the Constitution, the delegation
of authority is invalid because the Act is incomplete abd·it did
not fix a sufficient standard. · . ·
. . The other members of the Court dissented .. The dissenting
opimon ?f Justice Reynato S .. Puno makes the followmg·argrifuents
to· sustam that Rep. Act No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right
of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution· thru
initiative:
. a. The majorlty opinion concedes that Rep. Act No .. 6735
was intended to, c.over not only initiatives to enact statutes and
local legislation but also initiatives to amend the Constitution.
Such legislative. intent is shown not only by the proV.isions
of the Act itself biif also by the deliberations on the bill that
became Rep. Act No. 6735. The intent of the law· bein.g 'cl~ar
and ~oncede~ byallt."it must be enforced-evenifit may not be
consistent with the strictlettar of the law and this ruling is as
old as the m,_o11!l:tain..".Mo:reover, where a law is susceptible of
more than one interpretation, that interpretation which will
m.ost tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature
will be adopted. . ·· ·
b; Republic Act No. 6735 defines "initiative as the power

of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for
the. P~~se: a~~ •"plebisc~te ~s t?e electoral process by which
an rmtiati':e on tne Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people." . -· ·
. ~·. . The law in Section 5(b) states what the petition for
an initiative on the Constitution should contain.
the mischief contemplated by the. framers.•• The maxim expressive

of the principle is ratio legis, or interpretation according to the spirit
or reason of the law. ·
The principle has been variously formulated~ "As a gElrtE!ral, rule
of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails
over the letter thereof, and what is Within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute although it is not within the le ' .thereof, while
that which is within the letter but not Within the . . , ,. '()f the statute
is not within the statute."00 The spirit, rather tli >"the letter, of a
statute determines the construction thereof, and the .eourt looks. less
to its words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence
and effect,» A statute must be read according to its spirit and mwnt,
and where legislative intent apparently conflicts with t1J.'e letter of
the law; the former prevails over the latter.» ·
It has been held that "if a statute is valid, it is to have effect
according to the. purpose and intent of the lawmakers. The intent
is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The
intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent
with the strict letter of a statute when it leads away from the true
intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusion inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives ·
life to a legislative enactment In construing statutes, the proper
course is to start and follow the true intent of the legislature and
to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and
promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and object of the
legislature.?=
Alaw should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance
with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the law,»
29U.S.
v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909); Taftada v. Cuenca, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957);
Villanueva v. City oflloilo, G,R. No. 26521, December 28, 1968, 26 SCRA 578; Mat-
abuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 28771~Match 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 284. .
30Taftada
v, Cueneo, 103 Phil. 1051, 1086 (1957), citing 82 C.J.S. 613.
31Manila
Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951); Go
Chiv. Go Cho, 96,.Ph,u.~622 (1955).
""Taftada v. Cuenca, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, G.R. No. 25326,
May 29, 1970;'33SCRA105; Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315 (1912).
""Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141, 145, 146 (1931), quoting II Sutherland, Statu-
tory Construction; pp. 693-695.
34Galuba
v, Laureta, 157 SCRA 627 (1988); Phil. National Bank v. Office of the
President, 67 SCAD 4, 252 SCRA 6 (1996). .
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
216
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the le~er _of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended, to case~ n~t _wit~. the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.39
4.06. Intent of a statute is the law

The Court in PNB v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528
[January 18, 1996], citing an old case, ruled:
"The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid
it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the
lawmaker. The inte:O:t is the vital part, the essence of the law,
and the primary rule of construction is to ascertaip and ~ve
effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in ena~mg
a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained;
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of t~e
statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute ~hen it
leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature
and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose .of
the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legisl~tive
enactment. In construing statutes; the proper course is to
start out and follow the true intent of the, legislature . and to
adopt that sense which harmonizes best with ~e context. and
promotesinthe fullest manner the apparent policy and objects
of the legislature."
In Solid Homes v. Tan, 465 SCRA 137 [2005], the issue is
whether or not Article 1385 of the Civil Code should be literally
applied. Said article reads in part:
Article 1385. Rescission creates the obligation to return
the things w}ric~were the' object of the contract, tOgether wi~
their fruits and' the price with its interests; consequently, it
can be carried out only when he who demands rescission can
return whatever he may be._.obliged to restore.
When.tliEi co~tract is.res,~ded,:~;th1;i lot b~!er be entit~ed
to the return'ofwhat he had paid or will he be entitled to receive
from the Iot seRerthe prevailing market value of-the property? The
ordinaryrule is thathe will be entitled only to the return of what he
SSRufino Lopez & Sons, Inc; v. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 (1957):
Were. we to follow the. letter of Article 1385; w:e will in

effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby
subdivision developers who have reneged on their contractual
and legal obligation to provide utility systems and facilities for
the use of subdivision lot owners may themselves profit from
their very own wrongs and shortcomings. In the curt language
of the Court of Appeals, to which we are in full accord:
Indeed, there would be unjust enrichment if respondents
Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita Soliven are made to pay only the
purchase price plus interest. It is definite that the value of the
subject property already escalated. after almost two decades
from the time the petitioner paid for it. Equity and justice
dictate that.the injured party should be paid the Ili9fket value
ofthe lot, otherwise, respondents Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita
Soliven would enrich themselves at the expense of herein lot
owners when they sell the same lot at the present market value.
Surely, such a ,situation should ·not be countenanced for to do
so would be contrary to reason and therefore, unconscionable.
Over time, courts have recognized with . almost . pedantic
adherence that what is inconvenient or contrary to reason is
not allowed in law.
The foregoing scenario becomes . even more intolerable
when it is considered that P.D. 959 was issued precisely as
a measure against subdivision owners, developers, operators
and/or sellers who reneged on their obligation to provide the
needed utility systems and facilities in their subdivisions. As
expressed in one of the decree's whereas clauses:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators and/or sellers
have reneged on their representations and obligations to
provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar
basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of
home and lot buyers.
·.'
. .1/.·
.
4.07. Limitation
,.
of rule.
The principle that what is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute itself although it is not within its letter applies
only when there is ambiguity in the language employed in the law.
such ends and purposes,« As betweentwo statutory interpretations,

that which better serv~s the purpose of'thelaw should prevail."
The reason why legislative purpose looms high in the
determination of legislative intent and in the construction of a
statute is explained in a case:
"All statutes must be construed in the light of their

purpose. The. same th<>~gh:t has been j>hlased differently, thus:
The purpose of Congress is a dori:tlnajl.t' factor In determining
meaning. For, to · paraphrase Frankfurter; legislative words
are not inert but derive vit3litjr from the obv1ous'purposes at
which they are aimed. The s'am~ jurist likewise. had occasion
to state: Regard for its purposes s~ould infus_~ ~e c?nstructioii
of the legislation if it is to be treated as a w9rking instrument
'of government arid not merely as a. collection of English
words.In the sixth aritiual Benjamin Natham Cardozo lecture
delivered by him,' entitled 'Some Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes,' he developed' the theme further: The generating
consideration is that legislation is more than composition. It
is an active instrument of government which, for purposes
of interpretation, means that laws have ends.to be achieved.
It is ill this - connection that Holmes said 'words are flexible.'
Again it was Holmes, the last judge to giv,~. po quarter to loose
thinking or vague yearning, who.said that ~h,e general PUfPOSe
is a more important rod to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may _lay ~own.' And it was Holmes
who chided courts for being 'apt to err by sticking too closely to
the words of law where those words import a policy that goes
beyond them."'48
In another case, the Court ruled that "It is axioinatic that laws
should be given· a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats
the very purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in
many cases involving the ;<::onstructionof statutes always cautioned
against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the 'purpose of
the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to
construe stat~te~ ,so as to avoid such a deplorable result (ofinjustice
'"Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 59 SCAD 506, 242 SCRA 211 (1995).

47Salenillas
v. Court ofAppeals, 169 SCRA 829 (1989).
48Sarcos
v. Castillo, G.R. No. 29755, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853, 861.
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its power under

Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the Constitution. This
constitutional grant to promulgate rules carries with it the
power, inter alia, to detennine whether to give the said rules
prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, under Rule 144 of
the Rules of Court, the Court may not apply the .rules to actions
pending before it if in its opinion their application would not
be feasible or would work injustice, in which event, the former
procedure shall apply. The· absence of a provision in Section
8 giving it prospective application only does not proscribe the
prospective application thereof; nor does it imply that the Court
intended the new rule to be given retroactive and prospective
effect. If the statutory· purpose is clear, the provisions of the
law should be construed asis conducive to fairness apd justice,
and in harmony with the general spirit and policy of the rule.
It should be construed so as not to defeat but to. carry out .such
~nd or purp~se~ A' statute derives its vitality from the purpose
for which it is approved. To construe it in a manner that disre-
gards or defeats such purpose is to nullify or destroy the law.
In this case, when the Court approved Section 8, it intended
the new rule to be applied prospectively and not retroactively,
for if the intention of the Court were otherwise, it would defeat
the very purpose for which it was intended, namely, to give
the State a period of two years from notice of the provisional
dismissal of criminal cases with the express consent of the ac-
cused. It would be a denial of the State's right to due process
and a travesty of justice for the Court to apply the new rule ret-
roactively in.the present case as the respondent insists, consid-
ering that the criminal cases were provisionally_ dismissed by
Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new rule took ef-
fect on December 1, 2000. A retroactive application of the time-
bar will result in absurd, unjust and oppressive consequenc-
es to the State and to the victims of crimes and their heirs.
(Peoplev. Kacsib, G.R. No. 149453, October 7, 2003)
' In Norkis: Free and Independent Workers Union v. Norkis
Trading Co., (G.R. No.157098, Jline 30, 2005], the issue is whether
respondent viQlated•the CBA ill its refusal to grant its employees an
across-the-Qoatd increase as a result of the passage of Wage Order
No. ROVIr:o6. .
Petitioner insists that respondent should have granted to the
employees the increase stated in Wage Order No. ROVII-06. In
224
wage adjustment was to be applied to employees receiving a

rtain denominated salary ceiling. In other· words, workers
already being paid more than the existing minimum. wage (up
to a certain amount stated in the Wage Order) are also to be
given a wage increase.
A cursory reading of the subject Wage Orde_r convinces us
that the intention of the Regional Board of Region VII ..was to
· um.
prescnib e a minim . · or · "floor
· · wage"·' not to determme a salary
uld
iling " Had the latter been its intention, the Board wo
~ave e~pressly provided accordingly. The text of Sections2 and
3 of the Order states:
. "Section 2. AMOUNT AND MANNE~ OF !~-
CREASE. - Upon the effectivity of this ()rder, the daily
minimum wage rates for all the workers and employees m
the private sector shall be increa~ed by Ten Pesos (Pl0.00)
per day to be given in the following manner:
i. Five Pesos (P5.00) per day effective April l, 1998,
and
ii. Additional Five Pesos (P5.00) per day effective
October 1, 1998.
"Section 3. UNIFORM WAGE ·RATE PER AREA
CLASSIFICATION. - To effect a uniform.wage rate pur-
suant to Section 1 hereof, the prescribed minimum wage .
after full implementation of this Order for each area clas-
sification shall be as follows:
Area Classification Non-Agriculture Sector

Agriculture Sector
Class A 165.00 150.00
Class B 155.00 140.00
Class C 145.00 130.00

135.00 120.00"
.Qlass D
~
·'These provisions show that the p~escribe~ minimum
wage after full implementation of the PlO m~rease in the Wage
Order is P165 for Class A private non-agnculture sectors. It
would be reasonable and logical, therefore, to infer that those
226 STATUTORY·CONSTRUCTION
deductions or qualifications butlilliited to not more than thr~e y~ars;

and (3) -full' backwages or without ded1:'-c~ons fro1ll t.he time the
laborer's compensation was withheld until his actual remstateme~t.
On November 1, 1974, the Labor Code took effect, Art. 279 of which
reads:
"Art. 279~ Security of .tenure. - In cases of regular em-
ployment,'. the employer shall not terminate·the. services ?f ~
employee except for-a just cause or when authonzed by this Ti-
tle. An employee who is unjustly:dismissed~o~ w?rk;shall be
entitled to reinstatenientwithout loss ofseroonty rightsand to
his backwages computed from the time his compensati~n was
withheld from him up-to the.time ofhis·reinstatem~nt."
. . i
.. The method of co~putation of backwages prior to the
ena~tment of the above pr,ovision is as stated in N~. 1 above. Under
the abovequoted provision, the. cQmp~tation autl;io~zed by the Court
is as stated in No. 2 above, even }Yhen Art. 279 has fixe~ the amount
of backwages from; the time his compensation was. wit~eld from
him up to the time ofhis reinstate.ment. Then came Republic Act No.
6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989 and wl)ich.amended Art.
279 of the Labor Code, as follows:
"Art .. 279. Security of tenure. :-- An eip.pl~yee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled t~ r~mstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other pnvileges. and to
his full backwages inclusive of allowances, and to his ot~er
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed fro~ the tm1;e
his compensation is ~thheld from him up. to the· time of his
actual reinstatement."
The above amendment prompted the Court to reconsider earlier
rulings on the computation ofbackwages. It held:
"The Court deems it appropriate, however, to reconsider
such earlier ruling on the compufation of back.wages as
enunciated in said Pines City Educational Center case, by now
holding that conform.ably with the evident legislative intent as
expressedjn 'Rep. Act No. 6715, above-quoted, backwages to be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not; as a
general rule, be diminished or reduced ~y.the e~~s derived
by him elsewhere during the period of his illegal dis1ll1ssal. ~e
underlying reason for this ruling is that the employee! while
litigating the legality (illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn
228
registry and record of brands and·marks of identification: of large

cattle, since thieves in possession of such cattle could evade 'the
provisions of the law by slaughtering them outside the municipal
slaughter house and thus.enjoy the fruits oftheir.wrongdoi'D;g. Such
construction should be avoided which would bring such result and
defeat the object of the legislature sought to be attained by the
enactment ofthelaw. ·
In another case ~6 the.issuera.lsedis.whether the Court of First
Instance and a municipal court in the capital of a' province have
concurrent jurisdiction· over 'the crfrne of libel. Article 360 .' of the
Revised Penal Code comers jurisdiction upon Courts ofFirst Instance
of the province or city where libel was first published or where the
offended parties actually reside, over the crime of libel, t,he purpose
being to prevent inconvenience or even harassmentto those accused
oflibel so as to avoid impairment of the constitutional right to freedom
of speech and press. On the other hand, the Judici~ Act grants
municipal courts in capitals of provinces concurrent jurisdiction in
offenses where the penalty is not more jhan prision: cor:re9cional or
fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both, of which lib;eUs one of such
offenses. The court said that to construe· Article. 360 of the Revised
Penal Code. and the Judiciary. A.ct to mean that. municipal courts
have concerned jurisdiction in libel cases is to defeat the purpose
of the law. The court explained that it is funqan:iental that. qnce the
purpose or policy of the statute has been ascertained or de~ermined,
the courts should give effect to it by givingthe statute a construction
that best accords with the purpose of the law, and rejecting such
interpretation.· that would . .tend to defeat its purpose and object. A
decent respect for the policy of the legislature must save the court
from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous.purpose.6'.'
The Patent Law grants the patentee the exclusive' right to
make, use and sell his patented machine, article or product, and ·
constitutes the making, using or selling by any person without
authorization from the patentee as infringement entitling him to
damages and injunction. To.achieve this purpose, the courts have
evolved the doctrine of equivalents pursuant to which infringement
occurs when adevipe appropriates a prior inventionbyfacorporating
its innovativ&con't:ept and, albeit with some moclification and change,
performs.substantially the same function in substantially the same
65Bocobo v, Estanislao, G.R. No. 30458, August 31, 1978, 72 SCRA 520.
66See Sec. 3.14, infra.
construed to reduce any benefit, interest, right or participation

enjoyed by the workers at the time of the enactment of this
Act, and no amount recovered by any beneficiary under this
Act shall be subject to anyform of taxation."
. Construing the above provisions together, the Court ruled that

the word "substituted" ill Sec.12 cannot be interpreted literally, as
it wlll reduce Instead of increasing the workers; b~n~ftts,· contrary to
the purpose of th~ law. It rllledth.8.t all benefits under R.A. No. 6982
shall be in addition to the benefits wider R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No.
621 because the Jaw illtencled to benefit the· sugar workers fili.d as
between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the
purpose of the law should prevail."
I
. . . . I
4.10. When reason oflaw ceases, law itself ceases.
The reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the
heart of the law. For this reason, the reason of the law plays a decisive
role in its construction. Consequently, its cessation or nullification
renders the law inoperative. It is a fundamental principle of statutory
construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. This principle is expressed in the maxim, cessante ratione
legis, cessat et ipsa lex.61 Another maxim expressive of the principle
is ratio legis est anima or the reason of the law is its soul. It is a
consecrated legal axiom that the reason of the law is the life of the
law. A lifeless law is a dead law.02
A subsequent statute may render aprior law devoid of reason.
In such a case, the later law will operate to repeal the prior law, even
though the two laws contain no conflicting provisions. Thus, where
a later law has a purpose in conflict with that of a prior statute on
the same subject, the latter has lost all meaning and function and
has ceased to exist. 63 For instance, the question raised in a case is
whether a tenant who prereapedor prethreshedpalay without the
60J>lanter8Association of Southern Negros, Inc. v. Ponferrada, 114 SCAD 886,

317 SCRA 463 (1999).
~1People ~ Apnuete, G.R. No. 26551, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 410; Lanaria
v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 20840, September 29, 1967, 21SCRA349; Comendadorv. De
Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991).
62Justice Perfecto concurring, Gomez v. Government Insurance Board, 78 Phil.
221, 224 (1947), quoting Olland, The Elements of Jurisprudence as cited in Bocobo,
Cult of Legalism.
63Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 23587, June 10, 1967, 71SCRA231.
statute has already been removed in a given situation, the statute

may no longer apply in such situation,w
4.11. Supplying legislative omission.

Where a literal import of the language of a statute shows that
words have been omitted that should have been in the statute in
order to carry out its intent and spirit, clearly ascertainable from
the context, the court may supply the omission to make the statute
conform to the obvious intent of the legislature or to prevent the
act from being absurd,« This rule is a corollary of the principle that
what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part ofit as what is
written pursuant to which an apparent omission in an interpretation
purely literal of the language used may be remedied by ~dhering to
its avowed objective and intent,»The court cannot, however, supply
what it thinks the legislature would have supplied had its attention
been called to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation. 70
4.12. Correcting clerical errors.

The court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the
legislature, may correct . clerical errors, mistakes or misprints
which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless, empty
or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, so
long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole
enactment» and no specific provision is abrogated. 12 To correct the
error or mistake is to prevent the nullification of the statute and
give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court to give
a statute a sensible construction, one that will effectuate legislative
intent and avoid injustice or absurdity.73 It is its duty "to arrive at the
legislative intent" and "in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary
rule under which it must be held without variance or shadow of
turning that the legislature intended to make a typographical error,
67Velascov. Blas, G.R. No. 30456, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 540.
. 68Harrett v. Union Bridge Co., 243 P 93, 45 ALR 521 (1926); Moruzzi v. Federal
Life & Casualty Co., 75 P.2d 320, 115 ALR 407 (1938). •
69MatabuenQ..v
.. ,<;:.etvantes, G.R. No. 28771, March 31 1971 38 SCRA 284
70People
v. GaiCia, 85 Phil. 657 (1950); Morales v. Subido, G.R. No. 29658: No-
vember 29, 1~68, 26 SCRA 150.
71La.mp
v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 (1912); Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 (1957).
72State
73Lamp
Ex Rel. Griffin v. Greene, 67 P 2d 995, 111 ALR 770 (1937).
v. Phipps, supra.
meant to be 'commissioner' of customs because under the Customs

Code, the commissioner of customs has supervision and control 'over
collectors of customs and th,e decisions of the latter are reviewable
by the commissioner of customs, all of which would be destroyed if
the literal meaning and wording in Section 11 are given effect, The
legislature could ~ot have intended this result." "It is more reasonable
and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the_ Act, the legislature
meant and intended ~ say, commissioner of customs, instead of
collector of customs ill the firstparagraph of said Section. _fa thus
holding, the courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation.
They are merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clerical error
in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course and carry out
the evident intention of the legislature. This, the courts should and
can validly do. Under the rules of statutory construction/it is not the
letter but rather the spirit of the law and intention of the legislature
that is important and which matters. When the interpretation of the
statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would
lead to absurd or mischievous results, or would contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the
law. Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal
meaning of the terms, for that which is clearly within the intention
of the legislature in enacting the law is as much within the statute
as ifit were within the letter.Here the error (clerical and misprint)
is plain and obvious. It is not to correct the act of thelegislature, but
rather to carry out and give due course to the true intention of said
legislature. ''n
In a statute which provides that the remedy of mandamus may
be availed of "if there is no other plain, speedy 'or adequate remedy
in the ordinary courts of law," the word "courts" is obviously an
error or mistake, for what the law intended, which the court should
effectuate, is that it should read "course," so that the phrase should
read "ordinary course oflaw.''78'Wherea reference in one section of
a statute to another by number is manifestly a typographical error,
the courts in construing the 'statute should correct the error, to
prevent its nullification and give its meaning,» Aword in a statute
inadvertently >e;futtlged by compilers to a meaningless word, which
77Ibid., at p. 855.
78Lamp v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 (1912).
79Lamons
v. Yardbrough, 55 SE2d 551, 11 ALR2d 717 (1949).
in such a way as to avoid such consequenees.« For Congress could

not have intended absurd interpretation of the law. 86 If the words of
a statute are susceptible of more than one.meaning, the absurdity
of the result of one construction }s. a strong argument against its
adoption= and in favor of such sensible interpretation as will avoid
such result.87 Hence, general terins,ofa statute should be so limited
in .their application as not to' lead to, absurdities, It will always be
presumed that the. legislature ,i11t~nded exceptions to its language
which would avoid consequences of this .character.» Similarly,
statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the literal
meaning of the terms if their exact and literal import woUld lead
to absurd or ~~chievous· results= Interpretatio talis in ambiguis
~emper_fie~daest ut euitetur ineonuenienset absurdum, Vfhere there
is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted= · , . -
Where a literal adherence to the language of a statute would
produce absurd result unless the appropriate word or words are
written or omitted therein, the court has the power to supply or omit
the words from a statute in order to prevent an absurd result. •1
It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its
language which would avoid absurd consequences,w
Courts test the law by its results. Where a law appears
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances, the courts are not bound to apply it in slavish
obedience to its language,»
MAutomotive Parts & Equipment Co. v. Lingad, G.R. No. 26406, October 30,
1969, 30 ~CRA 247; In re Allen, 2 Phil. 630 (1903); Ledesma v. Pictain, 79 Phil. 95
(19.47); Pritchard v: Republic, 81 Phil. 244 (1948); Chartered Bank v. Imperial, 48
Phil. 931 (1921); Director of Lands'v. Abaya, 63 Phil. 559 (1936); People v. De Guz-
man, 90 Phil. 132 (1951).
86Dargani
v. Republic, 106 Phil: 735 (1959).
:chartered B~ oflndia.v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921); In re Allen, supra.
7People v. Revilla, 59 Phil. 236 (1933); Lamp v. Phipps, supra; Bank of the
Phil. Islands v. Herrid~e1 47 Phil. 57 (1924).
881n
re Allen, ·2 J'lill. 630 (1903).
:Rufino ..~pez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855 (1957).
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. TMX Sales Inc 205 SCRA 184
(1992). ' .,
=us. v. Paguirigan, 14 Phil. 450 [1909].
92Belo
v. PNB, G,R. No. 134330, March 1 2001.
BaJbid. '
time, surrenders its sovereign power to prosecute the criminal act.

A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the 'part
of the State in favor of the offender." To effectuate this· legislative
intent and to avoid the absurd result, the Court ruled that the
phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be
deemed preceded by the word "until."98 ·
The principle may be better appreciated by way of illustration.
In Oliveros v. Villaluz~99· the issue raised is whether or not the
suspension order against an elective official following an information
for violation of the Anti-Graft Law filed against him, applies not
only to the current term of office but also to another term if the
accused run for reelection and won. Section 13 of the/Anti-Graft
Law.. under which the official was suspended, provides that "any
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the· Revised
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by fu:ial judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but ifhe is acquitted,
he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him." The court
said that the "state's argument that the suspension order was
not perforce limited to petitioner's term of office (1968-1971) and
should be deemed to attach automatically to his new term (1972-
1975) although .not originally covered nor contemplated thereby is
anchored on the provision of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019
that the suspended officer shall be entitled to 'reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension' in the event of acquittal from the charge. This provision
reinforces petitioner's position, that it refers to the current term of
the suspended officer (and not to a future unknown and uncertain
new term unless supplemented by a new suspension order in the
event of reelection) for if his term shall have expired at the time of
acquittal, he would obviously be no longer entitled to reinstatement;
otherwise, it would [ead to the absurd result that a suspended officer,
notwithstand$tjg;the fact that his term of office has long lapsed and
he has been succeeded in office by others, would also invoke the
»iua; pp. 614-615.

99G.R. No. 34636, May 30, 1974, 57 SCRA 163.
In People v. Reyes,10• the Court noted that "the penalty of

reclusion perpetua was imposed by R.A. No. 7659 as the maximum
penalty when the quantity of shabu involved in the offense is less
than 200 grams and at the same time as the minimum penalty
when the quantity of shabu involved is 200 grams or more. To avoid
incongruity in the application of the law as written, Section 17 of
R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to provide a penalty ranging
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal only when the
quantity involved is less than20Cfgrams. It is the duty of the Court
to harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole law
(Rufino Lopez and Sons v.
Court of Appeals, 100 Phil. 850(19571).
Furthermore, this Court has the duty to give a· statute its logical
construction as to effectuate the intention of the legislature. The
Court should. harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to the
wholelaw. This isto avoid anabsurd conclusion with regard to the
meaning of the _st'atute(Lanip v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]).
xxx
"In order to determine the penalty to be imposed on appellant,
we divide the amount of 199 grams into three 'correapondent to the
three applicable penalties, namely, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal." "If the shabu seized weighs from 134 !
to 199 grams, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion temporal. If the i
!
shabu seized weighs from 66 to 133 grams, the penaltyto be imposed
is prision mayor and if the.weight of the shabu involved is below 66
grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision correccionalPv-
In Malonzo v. Zamora,rn• one of the contentions raised was
that the City Counsel of Caloocan cannot validlypass an ordinance
appropriating a supplemental budget for the purpose of expropriating
a certain parcel ofland, without first adopting or updating its house
rules of procedure within the first 90 days following the election of
its members, as requited by Secs. 50 and 52 of the Local Government
Code. In rejecting sucli contention, the Supreme Court ruled:
"Moreover, adoption or updating of house rules would
necessarily entail work beyond the day of the first regular
session. In fact, it took the members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod·i:>l°CaloocanCity until July 23, 1998 to complete the
10355 SCAD 163, 236 SCRA 264 (1994).

10455SCAD163, 236 SCRA, pp. 271-272.
105Malonzo
v. Zamora, 109 SCAD 773, 311 SCRA 224 (1999).
242 STATUTORY,CONSTRUCTION
(b) · No recall shall take place within one (1) year from
the date of the official's assumption· to office or one {1) year
immediately preceding a regular local· election.":
It is a rule in statutory coristruction that every part of the
statute must be futerpre~d. with refere'nce to the context, i.e.,
that every Part of the statute must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment, The eVidenf intent of Section 74 is to subject
an elective local official to recall election once during his term
of office. Paragraph (b) construed together With paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, ·that is, during the second
year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's
interpretation of the phrase regular local election/to include
the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision
of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his
term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to
be held every three years froni May 1996 were to be deemed
within the purview of the phrase "regular local election," as
erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can
be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start
with the assumption that thelegislature intended to enact an
effective law; and the legislature is not presumed to have done
.w
a vain thing •the enactment of a statute. An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction
that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local
Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should
not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section
3 of Artic]e' ~f the Constitution to "enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local 'government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum ... "
A classic example of the application of the principle is Amatan

v. Aujeror» In this case, a person-was charged With homicide. Upon
arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended party and the public
prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, With the approval
of the judge, the information was amended to attempted homicide and
the accused pleaded guiltythereto.The plea bargaining agreement
was entered into and approved 'by the judge pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule
116 of the 1985 Revised' Rules of Criminal Procedure, as-amended,
which allows an accused, withthe consent of the offended party, to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such
offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable
by a court of lesser jurisdiction. Charged administratively for gross
ignorance of the law for approving the plea bargaining agreement
and. sentencing. the accused for t~e crim~ of attempted/~omicide,
the Judge explamed that what he did was m accordance With Sec. 2,
Rule-116 of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure.Jn holding the
judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of law, the Court
ruled:
"Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal

a
Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case
to plead guilty 'to a lesser offense regardless of whether or
not it is necessarily included in the crime charged.' The fact
of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad
was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common
sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lesser offense
of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide as defined in
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily produces
death; attempted homicide does not. Concededly, hiatus in
the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead
to a misapprehension of Section 2 of Rule 116 or to outright
confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy
Court Administrator when he recommended an amendment to
the provision in his Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such
-, cases. In instances where a literal application of a provision of
law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition
with the ditj;~tes of logic and everyday common sense as to
be uncon;cionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take
principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the
10864 SCAD 563; 248 SCRA 511 (1995),

"It is to be presuined that when P .D. No. 9 was promulgated

by the President of the Republic there was no intention to work
a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority
or an act of oppression, anitlng one person with a weapon
to impose hardship on another." To illustrate such result or
consequence, the court cited thetrial court'sobservation that
"it is not difficult tc believe the murmurings of detained persons
brought to court UP~ll. a charge (lf possession of bladed weapons
under P.D. No. 9 that more than ever before, policemen ...:.. of
course, not all can be heartless - now have in their hands P,D.
No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the
terrifying risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten
years for a ~sted ~tchen .knife or a pair of scissors.which only
God knows where it came from." ·
Moreover, the court continued, "there exists a valid presumption
that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure, and that a construction of which a statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences." Thus; "if
the contention of the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens
to be caught while on his way home by the law enforcement officers
carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a
store that the same may be used by one's cook for preparing the
meals in one's home, such person will be liable for punishment with
such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years ·under
the decree." There is also "a situation where a law-abiding citizen;
a lawyer by profession, after gardening in his house remembers
to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30
meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman.
The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places
him under arrest and books him for violation of P.b. No. 9(3). Could
the presidential decree have been conceived to produce such absurd,
unreasonable and insensible results?"111
In Ursua v. Court of Appealsv» the issue was whether the
isolated use, at one instance, of a name other than a person's true
name to secure }:l,1Copy of a document from a government agency,
constitute~ a violation of Com. Act No. 142, as amended, the Anti-
=tu«. at pp. 558-562.

112 70 SCAD 123, 256 SCRA 147 (1996).
escape punishment· for evidence· against them might have already

disappeared.!"
4.18. Construction m favor of right an:djustice.

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application .of law,
it is presumed that th~ lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail,"!" The Code Commission which reco~ende_d the
inclusion of the provision in the Civil Code says that while this rule
is unquestionable, .~t is necessary that it be embodied in the Code
"so that it may tip the scales in favor of right. and justice when the
law is doubtful.or obscure. 11; will strengthen the determination of
the court to ~void an :injustice which may apparently be authorized
by some way of interpreting, the.law,"!" Accordingly, ~y ~oubt in
the construction of a statute should be resolved in favor of right and
justice. m
The fact that a statute is silent, obscure or insufficient with
respect to a question before the court will not justify the latter
from declining to render judgment thereon.w The· ancient· maxim
of the Roman Law states: Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum
alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which was restated
by the Partidas in these terms: Ninguno non deue enriquecerse ·
tortizeramente con dafl,o de otro. Courts invoke these fundamental
principles when the. statutes are silent or obscure in order to arrive at
a solution that would respond to the vehement urge of conseience.w
"In balancing. conflicting solutions, that one is. perceived to tip the .,.
scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare 1
in its probable operation as a general rule or principle,'?"
A good illustration of the above principle is Salvacion v. Central
Bank.v" The issue raised in this case is whether the dollar bank
deposit in a Philippine bank of a foreign tourist can be attached to
satisfy the moral damages awarded in favor of the latter's 12-year-
old rape victim. The Philippine bank and the Central Bank refused
mco Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Teh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945).

116Art. 10, Ci.Vijp,de.
n7Report Jr.tlie Code Commission, p, 78.
116Tee,h8nkee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 (1946).
"9Art. 9, Civil Code.

120De Padilla v. De Padilla, 74 Phil. 377 (1943).
121Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 718-719 (1919).
12286 SCAD 142, 278 SCRA 27 (1997).

order or process of any court, legislative body, government

agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to
a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Barte11i. This
would negate Article 10 of the Civil Code which. provides· that
'in case of'doubt in the interpretation or application oflaws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice
to prevail.' Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente
con daiio de otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that
would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. "12•
4.19. Surplusage and superfluicy disregarded.

Where a word.phrase or Clause in a statute is devoid!of meaning
in relation to the context or intent of the statute, or where it suggests
a meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it without sense, the
word, phrase or clause may be rejected as surplusage and entirely
ignored.> The statute should be constnied in accordance with the
evident intent of the legislature without regard to the rejected word,
phrase or clause. w The rule is settled that surplusage does not
vitiate a statute, expressed in the maxim, surplusagium non noceat.
Nor is the useful vitiated by the hon-useful, expressed in the maxim,
utile per inutile non uitiatur. .·
. .
Demafiles v. Commission . on Elections128 illustrates the rule.
One of the issues raisedin this case is whethera pre-proclamation
election case has become moot because the proclaimed winner had
immediately taken. his oath pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 4870 which provides that. the "first mayor, vice-mayor and coun-
cilors of the municipality ofSebaste shall be elected in the next gen-
eral elections for local officials and shall have qualified." It is argued
that the phrase "shall have qualified" makes the term ofoffice of the
first municipal officials begin immediately after their proclamation.
The court, rejecting the argument, ruled:
"In our view, the last portion of the provision .:.... 'and shall
have qualified' - is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated
., ·' ".r·l •
-----..,.-
lbid,,.pp. 40-45.
123
Demafiles v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 28396, December 29, 1967,
124
21 SCRA 1462. See Sec. 6.11, infra.

120Company
"Bighani" v. Pablo, 53 Phil. 886 (1928).
12s21
SCRA 1462 (1967).
disregard loose or obscure words in order to arrive at the real

1
meaning and spirit of'the statute.w Lingual .imperfection in. the

drafting of a statute should never be permitted <t<lhamstring judicial
search for legislative intent, which.can otherwise be discovered.v"
Moreover, the fact that a sensible reading of the text of the law may
show that some words are missing therein due to .clerical error or
oversight does not preclude.giving the-statute a construction that
will carry out the intent of the law.131 Neither does false description
preclude construction nor vitiatethe meaning of the statute which
is otherwise clear .. Falsa demonstraiio non nocet, cum de corpore
constat.
4.22. Exemption from rigid application oflaw. ,

1
Every rule .is not with~ut an. exception. {Q,i .quid generaliter
conceditur; inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contras jus basque,
which means that where. anything is granted . generally, this
exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right.
Equity as well as the exceptional situations in a case may require
a departure from the established rule.i= Compelling reasons may
justify reading an exception to a rule even where the latter does not
provide any,1ss Wherethe rigorous application ofthe law would result
in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of a
case, the exigencies ofjustice demand that the general rule should
yield to occasional exceptions whenever there are weighty reasons
therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law wouldbecome the highest
injustice - summum jus, summa injuriav»
Where strict and rigid application ofiaw would workinjustice,
an exemption therefrom to prevent such result on humanitarian
and equitable grounds is warranted, even though the literal import
of the law suggests no such l:)Xemppon.1:15 For it is always presumed
that the legislature intended exemption to its language which would
129 Salaysay v. Castro, 98 Phil .. ,364 (1956). . · .

130City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 342.
l31Pritchard v. Republic, 81 Phil. 244 (1948); Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No.
28771, March 31, i97\,.S8,SCRA 284.. .
1s2Province' of Cebu v. IntermediateAppellate Court, 14 7 SCRA 44 7.
1ssr)e ~illa v. c~lJt ofApp~e:J.~, 195SCRA122 (1991). ·
1MPeople v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (1970).
1:15Sinclair v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52435, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA 318;
Ongchengco v. City ofZamboanga, G.R. No. 44657, January 22, 1980, 95. SCRA 313;
Melchor v. Moya, G.R. No. 35256, March 17, 1983, 121. SCRA 11. ·
refusing to do so, for.the law does not require the impossible to

be done; there is. n? obligation to do the impossible thing.140 •
4.24. Number and gender of words.

It is a maxim of statutory construction that when the context
of a statute so indicates, words in plural include the singular, and
vice versa. A plural word in a statute may thus ~PJ?lY to a singular
person or thing, just as ~ . singular word may e~~race two . or
more persons or things. Thus, ~icle 99_6 of the Civil.Code which,
provides that "if a. widow: or widower and legitimate childr~n . and
descendants are left, the surviviJlg spouse has in the succession the
same share as that of each of the children". applies W. a .situation
where there is onlf o:r~e child ·because."clrildren" jncb,1desj"child,"1•1
The term any "candidate" used in the Election · Code comprehends
"some candidates"· or "all. candidates"; "any person" is not limited
to "any person" in the singular' but. is applicable as. well .to two or
more persons .. A word may be .construed to mean, ~d indeed it has.
been frequently used in its enlarged arid plural or singular sense, as.
meaning "all," "all or every," "each," "each or all," "every," without
limitation; indefinite number or quantity, an indeterminate unit or
number of units out of many or all, one or more as the case may be,
several, some.w
It is also a rule of statutory construction that in construing a
statute the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders,
unless the context in which the word is used in the statute indicates
otherwise=
C. IMPLICATIONS
4.25. Doctrine of necessary implication.

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details
involved in its application. There is always an omission that may
not meet a particular situation. What is thought, at the time of
enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate
. . •.I
1•0Akbayan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001.

141santillon v. Miranda, G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 568.
142Gatchalian v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 32560, October 22, 1970,
35 SCRA435.
143Snyder's Estate v. Denit, 72 A2d 757, 18 ALR2d 663 (1950).
to support an interpretation destructive of the object or purpose ~f

the law. What may be necessarily implied from a statute should.fn
any event, be consistent with, and not contrary to, the Constitution
or to existing laws. An implication· which is violative of the law is
unjustified or unwarranted.w
illustrative of the doctrine of necessary implication is Chua v.
Civil Seroice Com',,,,ission.161 TheIssue raised in this case is whether
a co-terminous employee, .or one whose appointment is co-existent
with the duration of a government project, who has been employed
as such for more than two years, is entitled to early retirement
benefits under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6683, which provides
in part that the "benefits authorized under this Act sh~ apply to
all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, 11egardless
of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years of government service as of the date of separation." Answering
the issue in the affirmative, the Court ruled that a coterminous
employee is no different from a casual or temporary employee, and
by necessary implication, the inclusion of the latter in the. class of
government employees entitled to the benefits of the law necessarily
implies that the former should also be entitled to such benefits. The
Court added that the "maxim of expresio unius est exclusio alterius
sh~Uld not be the applicable maxim in this case but the doctrine of
necessary implication."
One of the issues in Com~sion on Audit v. Province of Cebu,
G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001, is whether the law· which
authorizes the opening· of extension classes includes . payment of
salaries and other benefits of extension teachers. The Court ruled:
Even under the doctrine of necessary implication, the

allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance
of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who
should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services.
Every statute is understood, by. implication, to . contain all
· such provisions as may ·be necessary to effectuate its object
and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction wJrich it grants, including all such collateral and
subsicifarY consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
Cameta v. Andanar, 95 Phil. 604 (1954) ..

160
206 SCRA 65 (1992), quoting Agpalo, Statutory Construction, pp. 118-119
161
(1986 ed.).
potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. For where there is a right, there is remedy.t"
The principle is that where there is a wrong, there is a remedy
which courts of general jurisdiction can grant. The word "wrong"
means deprivation or violation of a right, and is not· equivalent to
"error." The principle assumesthe existence ofa right. Hence, wh~re
there is no right on the part of one who prays for a remedy or relief
for alleged violation thereof, the principle does not apply and no
relief may be granted.!"
Batungbakal v. National DeoelopmentCo'" is a case in point.
It appears that "a civil service employee was stispen~e~·lill? la~r
dismissed without cause as shown by the fact that ~r investigation
he was exonerated and found guiltless of the chargeof grosdnegligence
filed' against him and was even recommended for !eiiista~ID.ent by
the government committee that investigated him. In other words,
his suspension and removal were illegal and in violation not only of
the Administrative Code but of the Constitution itself." The court
ruled that to "remedy the evil and wrong committed, the least that
could be done is to restore him to the office and post of which he had
been illegally deprived, and to' include in that remedy or redress
payment of the salary which he would have received during this
period of illegal suspension and dismissal." However, there was
a legal problem in the way to his reinstatement, for w~en he w~s
suspended and eventually dismissed, somebody was appointed to his
position, and it was argued that to reinstate him would be to ~emove
the incumbent without cause in violation of law, In resolving the
problem, the court resorted to a legal fiction, so as not to make the
illegally dismissed employee without a remedy. The court ruled ~hat
inasmuch as the employee was illegally dismissed, legally speaking,
his position never became vacant. Hence, there was no vacancy to
which the present incumbent could be permanently appointed,. ~d
his occupancy of said position is temporary and does not come within
the constitutional prohibition against dismissal without cause. In
any event, the court added that the incumbent's being made to
leave the post to give way to the employee's superior right may be
considered as removal for cause .
.;' ·.,)i I.,
1MManila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 78 SCAD 764, 267 SCRA. 408 (1997).
1••Felipe v. Leuterio, 91 Phil. 482 (1952).
15893 Phil. 182 (1953).
cognizable by them, for the same is merely ~cident~ to the princ~pal

aetion.w And a sta~~ which_;provides that .aD._Y public ~fficer agam~t
whom any criminal pro~ecution under a valid information under this
Act (Anti-Graft Law) or' under the provisions of ,the _Revised Penal
Code on bribery is peD.mng in court, shall be suspended from office"
necessarily implies that it i/ithe'couit, and. not the executi~e official
concerned, that can suspend.the official pending deten:hinatio11 of the
criminal case, :t:he rea~o:n being tlt,~t the d~tenllin~tion as to whether
a
the information is valid is' judicial function and suspension being
a sequel to that findings, is an incident to the criminal prosecution
before the court.w ·
Statutes conferring jurisdiction to an administrative agency
must be liberally construed to enable the agency to dificharge its
assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose, Thus, the
power granted by P;D. No. '1344 to the·NationalHousing Authority
to hear and decide· "claims involving. refund and any other claims
filed by subdivision lot -or eondominium unit buyers against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman" include the
power to hear and decide "any and all claims which are incidental to
or a necessary consequence of the -claims/casee ·specifically included
in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority," such
as attorney's fees and other damages.>'
In GSIS v. Civil Service Commissionr" the Supreme Court
ruled that the Civil Service Commission, in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, has· the power to order execution of its decision
which has become final; It said that the grant to the tribunal or
agency of adjudicatory power; or the authority to hear and adjudge
cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the grant
of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders,
unless the law otherwise provides, for the authority to decide cases
is inutile unless accompanied bf the authority to see that what has
been decided is carried.
_____ ..;..1..,...·· ,.) ,,
Phil.Air Lines Employees' Assn. v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., 120 Phil. 383 (1964);
l62
Gomez v. North Camarines Lumber co., 104 Phil. 294 (1958).
163Luciano v. Provincial Governor, G.R. No. 30306, June 20, 1969, 28 SCRA
517.
164Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72 (1989).
166GSIS v. Civil Service Commission, 202 SCRA799 [1991].
··11
.
deport.113 The power to deport includes the power to order the arrest
of the undesirable alien after investigation in order to carry out
the deportation. m And. pending arrangements for his deportation,
an undesirable alien may also be, detained. for a reasonable period
of time, such being a necessary step in . the process 'of expulsion of
undesirable allens.w Where a statute confers uponthe President the
authority to "regulate, cµrtail, control and prohibit the exportation"
of scrap materials, deemed Included in said authority is th~ power
to exact royalties for the pe-rmissfve exportation of said materials
as the consideration for the exercise of the privilege.w Generally,
the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to
make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically
prohibited by law, or the . temporary or acting appointment is
repugnant to the nature of the office filled. This is based upon the
theorythat the whole includes andis greater than the part.v'
Where the Minister of Justice . appointeda lawyer "to assist
a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties" ~s
authorized by law, the attorney so appointed has the power to
sign criminal informations, make investigations, and conduct;
prosecutions, such power being necessarily implied from the
authority conferred. For the duties of a public office include . all
those which truly lie within its scope, those which are essential to I,
the accomplishment of the main purposes for which the office was !
created, and those which, although incidental and collateral, are I r·
germane to the accomplishment of the principal purposes.w
The express statutory grant of power to local. governments
to appropriate money for the general welfare of their inhabitants
includes the implied authority to withdraw unexpended money
already appropriated.v= Their statutory power to regulate telephone
service includes the power to establish and operate by themselves a
telephone service.w Where a statute authorizes a city to reclaim part
of the sea as an extension of its park, the reclaimed area acquires
113ln re Dick, 38 Phil. 41 (1918).

114Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, G.R. No. 10280, September so, 1963,
9SCRA27.
11"'.l'an
Sin ;Yi ·:gep0rtation Board, 104 Phil. 868 (1958).
1'6Marc
Donnelly & Associates, Inc, v. Agrega!lo, 95 Phil. 142 (1954).
111Cabiling
v. Pabualan, 121 Phil.1068 (1965). ·
118Lo
Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635(1946).
119Llanto
v. Ali Dimaporo, G.R. No. 21905, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 599.
180Phil.
Long Distance Tel. Co. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 23080, October 30,
1965, 15 SCRA 244.
the · constitutional grant of power . of supervision in favor of the

President over local governments= does not, in the absence of law
to that effect; include the power to suspend or remove· local elective
officials, nor to direct the form and manner in which local elective
officials shall perform their duties,188 they being actsof control which
are greater· than those of supervision.w Similarly, the President's
power to reorganize the executive 'department, bureaus and offices,
as c~nferred upon him by law, does not embrace the authority to
?e~~ve th~ courts of certajnjurisdictioil and to transfer itto a quasi-
judicial tribunal, the same not being germane or incidental to the
power conferrsd.w And the power to regulate business does not
incl~de the power to proh!bit, the reason being that by prohibiting,
nothing would be left to regulate, thereby rendering the authority to
regulate nugatory.w /
4.31. What is implied should not be against the law.

The statutory grant of power does not include such incidental
power which cannot be exercised without violating the Constitution,
the statu~ conferring the power, ()r other laws on the same subject.
Thus, while the power to appoint ordinarily carries with it the
power ~ suspend or remove, the constitutional restriction against
suspens~on or· removal of civil service emplOyees except for cause
as provided for by law precludes such implication unless the
appointment is made outside thecivilservice law.1eoWhere a statute
empowers the President to appoint a public officer for a fixed term
unless sooner removed, the· implication is that the President cannot
remove him without just cause as provided for by law. An inferential
authority to remove at pleasure cannot be deduced since the
existence of a defined term, ipso facto, negates such inference and
implies a contrary presumption, i.e., that the public officer shall hold
office to the end of his term, subject to removal for cause.w However,
where the statute fixes the term of office to be at the pleasure of
. _ 186~· VII, Sec. 10{1), 1935 Constitution in relation to Art. VII Sec. 16 New
Constitution. ' '
(l954/88!lebron v. ~yes: 104 Phil. 175 (1958); Rodriguez v. Montinola, 94 Phil. 964
7La~son ~!Roqu~, 92 Phil. 456 (1953); Jover v. Borra, 93 Phil. 506 (1953).
:8
of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376 (1953).
:;r~v~rs1ty
1
Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. City of Davao, G.R. No. 23080, October 30
1965, 15 SCRA 244; People v. Esguerra, 81 Phil. 33 (1948). '
190De
los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950).
191Jover v. Borra, 93 Phil. 506 (1953); Cuneta v. Andanar, 95 Phil. 604 (1954).
popularly known by the maxim, in pari delicto potior est conditio

defendentis .197 • . ·
Public policy requires that parties to an act prohibited by

statute be left where they are, to make the statute effective and to
accomplish its object. Hence, a party to an illegal contract cannot
come to a court of law and ask thathis illegal object be carried· out.
The law will not aid· either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves
the parties where it finds them.w Thus, a citizen who sold his land
to an alien in violation of the constitutional restriction cannot annul
the same and recover the land, for both seller and buyer are guilty
of having violated the Constitution.w
4.34. Exceptions to the rule. I

··The principle of pari delicta recognizes certain exceptions, one
of which is that it will not apply when its enforcement or application
will violate an avowedfundamental policy or public interest. Thus,
although the parties are in 'pari delicto, the court may interfere and
grant relief at the suit of one of them, where public policy requires
its intervention, even though the result may be that a benefit will
be derived by plaintiff who. is in equal guilt with defendant.s= For
in~tance, the policy of the homestead law is to give and preserve in
the homesteader and his family a piece ofland for his house and for
cultivation. To carry out such policy, the law prohibits the alienation
of a home.stead within five years following the issuance of the patent
and provides that any contract of a conveyance in contravention
thereof shall be null and void, In .a ·sale of a homestead in violation
of this restriction, the fact that the seller and buyer are at fault or
in pari delicto, will not preclude recovery of the land by the seller or
his heirs, ~or it _is not within the seller's competence to barter away
what public policy seeks to preserve. For this reason, the purchaser,
as agams~ the seller or his heirs, is no more entitled to keep the land
than any intrudsr.s»
'97J3ough v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil'. 210 (1919); Cabuatan v. Uy Hoo, 88 Phil. 103

(1951); Dinglasan v. Lee Hun, 99 Phil. 427 (1956).
198Dinglasan
v. Lee Hun, supra.
'99Cabuata.IJ,;v.. Uy.Hoo, 88 Phil. 103 (1951); Krivenko v. Register of Deeds 79
Phil. 461 (1947). · · . '
200Enriq(ie
T. Yuchengco, Inc. v. Velayo, G.R. No. 50439, July 20, 1982, 115
SCRA 307; Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 28774 Sep-
tember 21, 1982, 116 SCRA636. '
201De
los Santos v. Roman Catholic Church, 94 Phil. 405 (1954); Acierto v. De
los Santos, 95 Phil. 887 (1954).
4.36. There should be no penhltyfor compliance with law.

A person_who compfi.es with what a statute requires cannot,
by implication, be penalized thereby. For "simple logic, fairness
and reason cannot countenance an exaction or a penalty for an act
faithfully done in compliance with thelaw.t'=t
207Quimpo
v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 33092, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 73, 82.
no positive constitutional or statutory duty to define each and

every word in an enactment, as long as the legislative will is
clear, or at least, can.be gathered from the whole act, which
is distinctly expressed iii B~P. Big. 33, as amended. Thus,
respondent's reliance on the "void for vagueness" doctrine is
misplaced. '
Demonstrably, the :speeific ~cts and omissions cited in
the Circular are within the contemplation of the B.P. Big. 33,
as amended. The DOE, in issuing the Circular, merely filled
up the details and the manner through which B.P. Big. 33, as
amended may be carried out. Nothing extraneous was provided
in the Circular that could result in its invalidity.
On the fourth, fifth and sixth grounds, respondent avers
that the penalties imposed in the Circular exceeded the ceiling
prescribed by B.P. Big. 33; as amended. Respondent contends
that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis,
is no longer regulatory, but already confiscatory in nature.
Respondent's position is untenable. The Circular is not
confiscatory in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis.
Those penalties do not-exceed the ceiling prescribed in Section
4 of B.P. Big. 33, as amended, which penalizes "any person
who commits any act [t)herein prohibited." Thus, violation
on a per cylinder basis falls within the phrase "any act" as
mandated in Section 4. To provide the same penalty for one
who violates a prohibited act in B.P. Big, 33, as amended,
regardless of the number of cylinders involved would result in
an indiscriminate, oppressive and impractical operation ofB.P.
Big. 33, as amended. The equal protection clause demands that
"all persons subject to such legislation shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges
conferred and in the liabilities imposed." -
5.02. Statutory definition.

A statute sometimes defines particular words and phrases used
therein. In such case, the legislative definition controls the meaning
of the statutory ~ord, irrespective of any other meaning the word
or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense,s Otherwise put,
\ -
3Peoplev.
Buenviaje, 47 Phil. 536(1925); De Ponce v. Sagario, 85 Phil. 79 (1949);
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555 (1962).
alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for
the Philippines, other thana non-immigrant," The term thus includes
every alien coming into the' country either to reside permanently-or
for temporary stay, unless he can bring himself within one of the
exceptions.v
While definitions of terms in a .statute must be given all the
weight due them in the construction of the provision in which they
are used, the terms or phrases being part and parcel of the whole
statute must be given effect- iii their entirety as a harmonious,
coordinated and integrated unit; not as a mass of heterogeneous
and unrelated if-not incongruous terms; clauses and sentences. The
words and phrases ·should be construed in the light of thecontext of
the whole statute. n
5.03. Qualification. of rule,

The statutory· definition. of aword or term "as used in this Act" .
is controlling only insofar as said act is concerned. The definition. is
not conclusive as to the meaning of the. same word or term as used
in other statutes, particularly with.respect to transactions that took
place prior to the enactment of the act.»
The general rule that the statutory definitions control the
meaning .·of statutory words· does not' apply' where its application
creates · obvious incongruities in the language of the . statute,
destroys one of its major purposes," or becomes illogical as a result
of a change in its factual basis." In any such case, the statutory
definition will be disregarded and the word given a meaning that
will avoid any of such results or consequences.v For instance, under
Republic Act No. 4166 and Executive Orders 900' and 901, the term
"sugarcane planter" is defined as a planter-owner of sugarcane
plantation within the particular sugar mill district who has been
1 °Chang Yung Fa v. Gianzon, 97 Phil. 913 (1955).

11 Collector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Lodge No. 761, 105 Phil. 893 (1959).
12City of Manila v. Manila Remnant Co., Inc., 100 Phil. 795 (1957); Endencia
v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953); Misamis Lumber Co., Inc. v. Collector oflntemal Rev-
enue, 102 Phil. 116 (1~!§7). ·
13Lawson
v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 U.S. 198, 93 L. ed. 611
(1949).
14Ernesto
v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 52178, September 28, 1982, 116 SCRA
755.
15Lawson
v. Suwannee Fruit & Steamship Co., 336 US 198, 93 L. ed. 61 (1949);
Ernesto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52178, September 28, 1982, 116 SCRA 755.
preparation oflocal products, forming part thereof, that are actually

exported, the - phrase "forming' part thereof' 'does not mean that
the imported articles should be merged into the local product by
mechanical· process or-physically or materiallymised; or chemically
combined, so as to lose its identity; it means, in its 6rdinary sense,
thatthe imported articleis needed to accomplish the export abroad
of the product locally manufactured,» Where the word "business"
used in a tax statute is ndf qualified, it Should be understood in its
plain and ordinary meaning' to .embrace activities or affairs where
profit is the purpose or livelihood ·is the motive; and ili this sense, a
fraternal social club selling liquor at'!ts clubhouse in a limited scale
only to its members and their guests, without intention to obtain
profit, is not engaged in "business.?» The' term "present value" in
the provision which states that "for those who are at le1'st sixty-five
years of age, lump sum payment of present value of annuity- for the
first- five years and future annuity to be paid monthly: Provided,
however, That.there shall be nodiscount from annuity for-the first
five years ofthosewho are sixty-five or over on the date" the law took
effect, is used in its.ordinary and not in itstechnicaland restricted
sense because said law .grants to the retired employee substantial
sum for his . , sustenance considering his age .and any doubt in said
law, being for. his benefit, should be-resolved in his favor. In that
ordinary sense, there should be no discount from, the present value
of his annuity,». When a statute provides. that "persons who were
retired and paid gratuity''may at their option elect to receive in lieu
of such gratuity the annual retirement pay as provided in the act,
the court may pot construe the words as including those military
personnel who are, yet to retire after the said law took effect, for a
grammatical
. -
and' ordinary .sense
- ; ' .
~f the
'.- . . words. . excludes
" ' .
the
: ~ latter.>
In Matuguina Integrated _Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,26 one of the issues raised was whether a transferee of a
forest concession is liable for obligations arising from the transferor's
illegal encroachment into another forest concessionaire committed
prior to the transfer. Section 61 of P.D. No. 105 provides that "the
·
Central :Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 598 (1954).
22
Collector,of"J~rnal Revenue v. Manila Lodge No. 761, 105 Phil. 983 .(1957);
28
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Club Filipino, Inc. of Cebu; 115 Phil. 310 (1962).
24Phil.-'Assn.
'of Government Retirees, Inc. v. Government •Service Insurance
System, G.R. No. 20503, June 30, 1965, 14'8CRA 610;
26Espino
v. Cleofe, G.R. No. 33410, July 13, 1973, 53 SCRA 92.
2675
SCAD 526, 263 SCRA 490 (1996).
defined, inter alia, as 'timber or logs after being prepared for

the market.' Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber."
"It is settled.that in the absence oflegislative intent to the
contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given
their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar
as possession of timber Without the required legal documents
is concerned, Section 68 ofP.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw cir processed. timber. Neither should
we. Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere debemus. "29
5.05. General words construed generally.

A word of general· significance in a statute is to be taken in its
. ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown thlj(t the word
is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning.v The rule is
expressed.inthe maxlm.,generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda,
or what is generally spoken shall be generally understood or general
words shall be understood in a general sense. Generale dictum
generaliter est interpretandum, A general statement is understood
in a general sense.
Where a word used in a statute has both a restricted and general
meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the
nature of the subject matter or the context in which it is. employed
clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended.31 Thus, where
a general word is used in a statute, its generic meaning may not
be restricted by other words; unless the intention to do so is clear
and manifest,» In other words, a general word should not be given
a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated,» For if the
legislature has· intended to limit the meaning of a word, it would
have been easy for it to have done so. That it did not, gives. rise to
the presumption that it has not limited nor intended to limit the
meaning of the word. 34
»iua; pp; 448-449.

3 °Calder & Co. v. U.S. 334 (1907); Malicsi v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 99
Phil. 696 (1956); People v. Chavez, 120 Phil. 1019 (1964); Phil. Acetylene Co. v. Cen-
tral Bank, 120 Phil -. 829 ,1964).
31Marcos
v. ..Chi'ef of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 239 (1951); Belo v. PNB, G.R. No.
134330, March 1, 2001.
32Tolentfuo
v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948).
33Lo
Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635 (1946); Getz Corp. of the Phils., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59823, August 21, 1982, 116 SCRA 86.
34Pbil.
Acetylene Co. v. Central Bank, 120·Phli. 829 (1964).
comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at the time of its

enactment but those that may normally arise after its approval as
well. =This rule ofconsfructionis kllown as progressive interpretation,
which extends by construction the application of a statute to all
subjects or conditions wthin
its general purpose or scope that come
into existence subsequent 4) its. passage and thus keeps legislation
from becoming ephemeral and transitory. It has been said that a
general rule may, and frequently does, originate in some particular
case or class of cases whl.c;h'is in the mind· of the legislature at the
time; but so long as· it is expressed in general language the courts
cannot, in the absence of express restrictions, limit its. application
to these cases, hut· must apply it to all cases that come within the
terms and its general purpose and policy. Hence, statutes framed in
general terms apply to new c~ses that arise, all.d to new spbjects that
are created, from time to time, and which come within their general
scope and policy. It is a rule of statutory construction that legislative
enactments in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in
operation, apply alike to all persons, subjects and business within
their general purview and scope coming into existence subsequent
to their passage."
Conformably with the rule.bhe phrase "articles of prohibited
importation" used in the Tariffand Customs Code embrace not only
those already declared prohibited atthe time of its adoption but also
goods and articles that may be the subject of activities-undertaken in
violation of subsequent Iaws,» Similarly, where a statute speaks of
"any election," it means not only election provided by law at the time
but any election which may thereafter be held as well, including the
election of delegates to the constitutional convention.s
5.08. Words with commercial or trade meaning.

Words and phrases, which are in common use among merchants
and traders, acquire trade or commercial meanings which are
generally accepted in the community in which they have been in
common use. When any of such words or phrases is used in a statute,
it should not be given a new' or strange interpretation, but should
----.--Geotina
40
........ ;;~-"
v,.Cburt of Appeals, G.R. No. 33500, August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362.
•1Jus~oe Bocobo dissenting, Dioquino v. Araneta, 74 Phil. 705 (1944), citing 26
R.C.L., pp. 778-779. .
•2Geotina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 33500, August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362.
<SQat.chalian v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No, 32560, October 22, 1970,
35 SCRA435.
from the strict or literal meaning of the words,« The presumption is

that the language used in a statute, which has a technical or 'Yell-
known legal meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature,"
· The technical orIegal, not the ordinary or general, meaning
of a word used in a statute should be adopted ui"the construction
of the statute, in the. absence of any qualification or intention to
the contrary. Thus, Section 14 of Rule 59 o_f the Rules of Com::, ;~
which prescribes the steps to be taken· when property attached .is
claimed by a person other than the defendant or his agent, contains
a proviso. that "nothing herein contained shall prevent such third
person from vindicating his claim to ·the property by any proper
action." To the argument that the phrase "proper action" limits the
third party's remedy to. intervening in the actionin which the writ .;
of attachment was issued, the court said that the word ~liction" has
acquired a well-defined, technical meaning as an "ordinary suit
in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes_another for the
. enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong," while Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court under
the heading "Commencement of Action" states that a "civil action
may be commenced by filing a coin plaint with the proper court.'' "In
employing the word 'commencement,' the rule clearly indicates an
action which originates an entire proceeding and puts in motion the
instruments of the court calling for summons, answer, etc., and not .rl'i;'
..
any intermediary step taken in the course of the proceeding w~ether
by the parties themselves or by a stranger. It would be strange indeed
if the framers of the Rules of Court should have employed the term
"proper action" instead of 'intervention' or equivalent expression if
the intention had beenjust that. It was all the easier, simpler and the
more natural thing to say intervention if that had been the purpose,
since the asserted right of the third-party claimant necessarily flows
out of the pending suit."•1
Where a criminal case is dismissed, it is not equivalent to
the accused being "acquitted,'' for the latter has a technical or .j,.
legal meaning. For this reason, a public officer who was accused i
.·:i
in a criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law, which was {
dismissed, will not be entitled to the benefits of Section 13 thereof

•
which provides that if a public officer is "acquitted, he shall be
I ,.:;·/ . .
"'Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (194 7).

WKeepner v. U.S., 11 Phil. 669 (1904). ·
"'Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. v. Ramos, 88 Phil. 94,. 99 (1951).
282 . STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
appear .so near each other physically, and particularly where the
word has a technical meaning.and thatmeaning hasbeen defined
in the statute,e ·
Where, for instance; a statut~ ~iassifies riceland in share tenancy
according to average produce per hectare for the· three agricultural
years next preceding the current harvest, and in another provision
of the same statute, it classifies riceland in leasehold according to
the normal average harvest of the three preceding years, the word
"year" should also be. understood, as agricultural year and hot
calendar year; and an agricultural year represents one crop, so .that
if in one calendar' ye~- two crops are.
raised, then that represents
two agricultural year.s~69 Followingthe same pQp_ciple, the term
~agricultural land"
. . . . . i, Articl{l.XIII
in Section _.· , ., of. the. l935
·. . Constitution
I . - ... . ·
which states that "public agricultural ·1and shall not be alienated"
except in favor of Filipino citizens, and the term "agricultural land"
in Section 5 thereof which ~rpyides that "n,q private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned" except to' Filipino citizens, should
be construed as having the same meaning; both-sections being based
on the same policy of nationalization' and having-the Saine subject,
namely, thenon-transferability of agriculturallands to aliens.s
5.ll. MeaD.ingof word qualified by purpose of statute.

The meaning of a word· or phrase used in a statute may be
qualified by the purpose which induced the legislature to enact the
statute. The purpose may indicate whether to give a word or phrase
an ordinary, popular, technical, legal, commercial, restricted, or
expansive meaning. 61 In construing 'a word or phrase, the court
should adopt that interpretation that accords best with the manifest
purpose of the statute or pt~mote~ or realizes its object. 112 Where the
language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two ormore constructions,
that construction should be adopted which will most tend to give
effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object
MFroehlich & Kuttner v. Collector of Customs, 18 Phil. 461 (1911).

69De
la Paz v, Coq.rt: of Agrarian Relations, G.R. No. 21488, October. 14, 1968,
25 SCRA 479. .- · .,'-'
60Krivenko
v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947). .
61Muiioz
& Co. v. Hord, 12 Phil. 624 (1909); Gelano v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 39050, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA 90. ·
112Luzon
Stevedoring Co. v. Natividad, 43 Phil. 803 (1922); Molina v, Rafferty,
38 Phil. 167 (I918).
that "since the power vested on the electorate is not the. power to
initiate recall proceedings" but the power .to.elect an official into
office, the limitationsin Sec. 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the
entire recall proceedings.
A word or provision should nbt 'be· construe& fu isolation from,
but should be fute:rpreted'lli reUiti'O'D. fo, the other provisions of a
statute or other statutes dealln:g d:ri the'same. subject. The word
or provision should. not be ·given' 'mealing that will restrict ora
defeat, but should instead' bii conl!ittUe'd to effectuate, what has
been intended in. an enacting law. :_This 'principle finds illustration
in Garcia v. CO"MELEC,a1 where the issue raisedis whether a local
resolution of a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative
-and referendum. The Constitution; requires that the7legislature
shall provide a system of initiative and refsrendum.. whereby the
people cap_dir,ectlY approve or rejEf~t 8,IlY act ~rll1-~ or.part,thereof
passed by the Congress, orlocal legislative body.};:()n~ess thereafter
enacted Rep. Act No. 6735, 'Yltl~~
in~l{J.d~~ resoluti?,~ as amori~ the
subjects ofiniti'.1;1:tiv.e. Howev(;!r~·th~Lcical Goveni:plent Code, :1; later
law defines local ihitiativi:l'lis "th~ process wher(!}jy the registered
. ' - ·.. . ···-·_: '"'f. -. ' . . ....• ' ,_ !
voters of a local government uhltriiay directly.propose,. enact, or

amend any ordinahce," Itis claimed that 'sinci:i'1 a resolution is not
included in this definition, then .the' same cann:ot be the subject of an
initiative. In rejeCting this daifu., the S~p:r~m~ 9,ourt ruled:
"f . .! : '.
"We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of

the above provision for it 'will collide with the Constitution
and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the
provisions of.the Local Government Code of1991 on initiative
and referendum.
The 'Constitution clearly includes not ocly ordinances but
resolutions as appropriate sqbjects of a local initlative. Section
32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: 'The Congress
sball,' as early as possible, provide. for a'system of initiative
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the
. people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject
any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local
legislative body x x x.' An act includes a resolution. x x x It is
basic t1fat"i/1aw should be construed in: harmony with and not
in violation of the Constitution, In line with this postulate, we
6755 SCAD 789, 237 SCRA 279 (1994).

approved through the system of initiative and referendum as

herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by
the sanggunian concerned within six (6) months from the date
of approval thereof x x x.' Certainly, the inclusion of the word
proposition is inconsistent with respondents' thesis that only
ordinances can be the subject of local initiatives. xx x. "68
To further illustrate, the Corporation Law authorizes a
dissolved corporation to continue as a body corporate for three years
for the purpose of defending and prosecuting suits by or against
it, and during said period to convey all its properties to a "trustee"
for the benefit of its members, stockholders, 'creditors and other
interested persons, the transfer of the properties to -the ·trustee
being for the protection of its creditors and stoCkholders/ The word
"trustee" should be understood not in its legal or technical sense of
one so appointed for the purpose, but in its general concept which
would include a· lawyer to whom was. entrusted the prosecution of
the cases for recovery of sums. of money against the corporation's
debtors, for to construe the word in its narrow sense is to allow such
debtors to 'enrich themselves at the expense of another and thus
defeat the purpose of the law.69
To resolve the question asto whether the Sandiganbayan is a
regular court within the meaning of Rep. Act No. 6975. which makes
criminal actions involving members of the Philippine National Police
come "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts," the
Court considered the primary purpose of the law, which is to remove
from courts-martial the jurisdiction over Criminal cases involving·
members of the PNP and to vest it. in the courts within the judicial
system. It ruled that the terms civil and regular courts are used
interchangeably by the legislators; and the term "regular courts" in
Rep. Act No. 6975 means civil courts. "There could have been no other
meaning intended since the primary purpose of the lawis to remove
from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving
members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within our judicial
system, i.e., the civil courts which, as contradistinguished from
courts-martial, are the regular courts. Courts-martial are not courts
within the Philippine judicial system, they pertain to the executive
department o(.,th,,~government and are simply instrumentalities of
=iu«, pp. 290-294.

69Gelano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 39050, February 24, 1981, 103 SCRA
90.
raised only by motion in the main case," refers to the Court of Appeals
or the trial court. The {!ourt held that the word "court" refers tothe
trial court and not to the Court of Appeals. It ruled that "the law
unequivocally stated its declared objective that appeal shall not stay
the appealed decision, award, order, etc. The exception given is where
the officer or body rendering the same, or the. court on motion, after
hearing should provide otherwise. In line with the above objective,
the law provides further that t);le propriety of a stay granted by the
officer or body rendering the award, order, decision or ruling may be
raised only by motion in the main case. Hence, the Court of Appeals
correctly interpreted that if the adverse party intends to appeal
from a decision of the SEC and pending appeal desires to stay the
execution of the decision, then the motion must be filed ~th and be
heard by the SEC before the adverse party perfects its appeal to the
Court of Appeals." "By and large, such interpretation gives meaning
and substance to· the 'avowed purpose of the law where the need
for immediacy of execution of decisions arrived at by said bodies,
was recognized and considered imperative." "On the other hand, the
contrary view would negate the express mandate of the law that
appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or judgment
appealed from, should the appellate court and not the lower court or
administrative body which tried the facts, be authorized to enjoin
execution thereof."
5.13. Meaning of term dictated by context.

While ordinarily a word or term used in a statute will be given
its usual and commonly understood meaning, the context in which the
word or term is employed may dictate a different sense. The context
in which the word is used oftentimes determines its meaning.74
Differently stated, a word is to be understood in the context in which
it is used. Verba aceipienda sunt secundum materiam. Thus, in a
statute which provides that the "family home extrajudicially formed
shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except"
"for nonpayment of debts," the word "debts" in the context in which
it is used should be taken in its generic sense, i.e., obligations in
general.75 Where A law classified all lands into timber, mineral and
agricultur~, it
i~ apparent that the word "agricultural" is used in a
74U.S. v. Estapia, 37 Phil. 17 (1917); Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City of Cebu,
121 Phil. 426 (1965).

"People v. Chavez, 120 Phil. 1019 (1964).
nos distinguere debemuss" The rule.founded on logic, is a corollary

of the principle that generalwords and phrases in.a s.tatute s~oilld
ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The
rule requires that a general term or phrase _sho~d not be n:duc~d
into parts and one Part distin~shed from the. o~er so as to Justify
its exclusion from the operation pf.the law.84 In_pt}ier words, there
should be no distinction in theapplication of a statute where 11one
is indicated." For courts are ;rl(>t_authorize,d to distinguish where_
the law mak~s no distinction~ ';['hey_ should instead administer the
law not as they trunk it ought to be but as they find it and without
regard to consequences,"
, A corollary of the principle is the rule that wher? the law does
not make any exception, courts may not except something:therefrom,
87
unless there is compelU,n~ reason apparent in the}aw to justify it.
The axiom, ubilex.nondistingiiit,nec non distinguere deben:us,
applies not only in the construction of general words and exp~ess1ons
used in a statute but also in .the.interpretation of a rule laid down
therein. Thus, where the legislature has clearly laid down a rule for
one class of cases it is riot readily to be supposed that, in the same
act, a different rule has been prescribed for another class of cases
within the same as the first. And it has been held that courts should
strive to avoid imputation of a design to distinguish between cases
upon a course of reasoning too unsubstantial and to finely draw for
the regulation of the-human actiori•88-- ·
The principle that where the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts do so, assumes that the legislature made no
qualification-in the use of a general wor~ or expression. Th? courts
may distinguish when there are facts or circumstances showing that
B2Colgate-Palmolive Phils., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 14787,January 28'.1961,

1 SCRA 267; Libudan v. Gil, G.R. No. ~1163, May 17, 1972, 46 SCRA 17; Dommador
v. Derayunan, 49 Phil. 452 (1926); Guevarra v. Inocentes, G.R. No. 26677, March 15,
1966, 16 SCRA 379; Director of Lands v: Gonzales, G.R. No. 32622, January 28, 1863;
Olfato v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741;
Commissioner oflntemal Revenue v. COA, 218 SCRA 203 (1993), citing R.E. Agpalo,
Statutory Construction-(il.986), pp •. 143•144.
SSLo Cham ~. o~kpo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946).
MSocial_Security System v. City ofBacolod, G.R. No. 36726, July 21, 1982, 115
SCRA 412; Director of Lands v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, January 28, 1983.
Sl;Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 (1946).
86Velascov. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720 (1903). _
87Tolentino v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948).
88Chartered Bank oflndia v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921).
Petitioner further argues. that the, HRET . assumes r ,
jurisdiction onlyif.there is a valid.proclamation of the winning.

candidate. He contends that if a candidate 'fails to Satisfy
the statutory .requirements to qualify him as a candidate,
his subsequent proclamation is void ab initio. Where the
proclamation is null and void, there is no proclamation at all
and the mere assumptic>ti'hfo:fficebythe proclaimed candidate
does not deprive the.COMELEC at allof Its power to declare
such nullity, according .to peti.tioner. But as we already held,
in an electoral' contest' where
the ~8.lidity 'of the proclamation
of a· winning candidate· who· has taken his oath of''offlce and
assumed his· post as .(.longiiessnian .ia raised, that issue is best
addressed to. the· HRET .. ·The reason for this ruling is self-
evident, f~r it avoids duplicity of-proceedings and/a. clash of
jurlsdiction.be~een constitutional bodies, vvith due regard to
the peol>l~'s.'m~date. ··· · · · · ·
.·'"' ..... _ :.·. \' .
Whethel' respondent; Fariiias was v~dly substituted

in Cheoylle: v. Farinas arid whether respondent became a
legitim:a,te candidate; in our view; must-likewise be addressed
to the sound.judgment oflthe Electoral Tribunal. Only thus
can wee demonstrate fealtyto the Constitutional provision that
the Electoral Tribunal: of each .House' .of Congress shall be the
"sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and l
qualifications of theirrespective members." -·

. .: : .' .= ·':)• .• :-·. ·••
5.15. llim~tration of rule. j
A few cases· may be cited to illustrate the rule. Where a

statute grants a'petsoir against whom: the possession of''any land"
is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for' unlawful b
detainer, the phrase "any land"indudes all kinds of land,' whether r
agricultural, residential' or DiineraJ.,s0'The'pnrase cannotbe said to f
relate exclusively to public land anyriioite than it could be said to relate ,,.
exclusively to private land, thelawnothaving made any distinction. 91
Where the law 'authorizes the director of''lands to file petitions for
r'·
cancellation: 'df patents coverihg'1ptiblic Hinds on the 'ground therein
provided, without Q,istingillsmng whether the lands belong to the S
national or to ~y'lbcal'governni:ent, he can do so even if theland has
1
90Robles v. Zambales Chromite Co., 104·Phil. 688 (1958).

91Government v. Municipality of Binalonan, 32 Phil. 634 (1915).
S
294 STATUTORY ~ONSTRUCTION
whose execution as ordered is returned unsatisfied, the Rules not

having made any distinction, 99
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200, entitled "An Act to Prohibit
and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communications and Other Purposes," provides: -n
shall be unlawful
for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word,to tap any wife or cable, or byusing
any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record. such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone
or walkie-talkie or, tape recorder, or however 6therwise described."
The question raised in· connection with this · provision is .
whether
violation thereof refers to the taping ofa ~qillllluni~atjop, by a person
other than a participant.to the communication or even to the taping
by a participant who did not secure the consent of the other party
to the conversations. The court ruled that> the provision clearly
and unequivocally makes it.illegal for any person, not authorized
by law, the parties to any private conversation to secretly record
such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to bea party other than or different from those involved
in the private communication. ·The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is. underscored by the
use of the qualifier "any." Asthe.law did not distinguish, the court
should not.100
In Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co. v .. · Collector of Internal
Reuenue= involving the interpretation of a provision of the Tax
Code which imposes a specific tax "on cigarettes containing Virginia
tobacco and/or flue-cured' tobacco of seventy-one niillimeters ·or less
in length weighing one and one-fourth kilos or less per thousand,
wrapped in tinfoil or cellophane or packed in cartoons covered with
paraffin or wax paper or in tin cans, on each thousand, ten pesos;
Provided, That if the length exceeds seventy-one millimeters or
the weightper thousand exceeds one and one-fourth kilos,.the tax
shall be increased by one hundred per centum." the question raised
is whether in n;i.~asuring the length or weight of cigarettes, filters
., .,; .
99Phll.
British Assurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA
520 (1987).
'°"Ramirez v. Court.of Appeals, 64 SCAD 636, 248 SCRA 590 (1995).
101G.R.
No. 9415, April 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 106.
and expenditures in connection with the election." As the law did

not distinguish. between a candidate who pushed through with his w
candidacy and one who withdrew it, the term "every candidate" el
must be deemed to refer not onlyto a candidate who pursued his p
campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy; 11111 b
a
On the other hand, where the intent to make distinction th
appears from the statute, the courts should make the distinction. th
Illustrative of this rule is Sectjon ~3-~f B.P. Blg. 697, which provides C
that "1) any person holding' apublic appointive office or position x x o
x shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy," and that "2) governors, mayors, members of
the various sanggunians orbarangay officials shall, upon the filing of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office," An
elective. barangay captain. was elected President of the Msociation
of Bar.angay Councils and pursuant thereto was appointed by the
President as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. He thereafter
ran for Congress but lost. He then wanted to resume his duties as
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, saying that since Section
(2) of the law did not distinguish between appointive and. elective
member of the sanggunians, he was merely on forced leave when
he ran for Congress. The Secretary of Local Government denied
his request because being an appointive sanggunian member, he
was deemed automatically resigned when he filed his certificate
of candidacy. In sustaining the· Secretary of Local Government,
the Supreme Court ruled: "Although it may be that Section 13(2)
of B.P. Blg. 697 admits of more than one construction, taking
into consideration the nature of the positions of the officials
enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the
various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to
distinguish between elective positions in Section 13(2) as contrasted
to appointive positions in Section 13(1) under the all-embracing
clause reading 'any person holding public appointive office or
position' is clear. It is a rule in statutory construction that when the
language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than
one construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident
purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the
statute as a whole, must be followed.t'=
.,··, ., {.•
Pilar v. COMELEC, 62 SCAD 469, 245 SCRA 759 (1995).

11111
108 Sanciagco v. Rono, 137 SCRA 671, 675, 676 (1985).
merely to guarantee the said obligation, In accordance with the

. pertinent rule· of statutory construction, inasmuch as the law
has not made any distinction in 'this regard, no such distinction
can be made by means ofinterpretation or'application. Further,
it is the legislative intent to make the prohibition an-embracing,
without making 'a'.iiy exception from the operation thereof in
favor of a guar~tee. Consequently, what are important are
the facts that theaccused had d¢liberately issued the checks in
question to cover .accountaand that the checks were dishonored
upon presentment regardless of whether or not the accused
merely issued the cheeks as a guarantee.
In United BF Homeowners v. Barangay Chairman, G.R. No.

140092, September 8, 2006. The issue raised is whether/the follow-
ing provision· of the Local Government Code applies 'only to multi-
purpose halls in open space of subdivision open to the public, and
not to the other ·m.ultipurse-btiildings therein. Said provision reads:
' -
SECTION 391. Powers, Duties, and Functions. -

(a) The sangguriiang barangay, as the legislative body
of the barangay, shall: ·
xxx xx.x xxx
(7) regulate. the use of the· multi-purpose halls, multi-
purpose pavements, .grain' or copra . dryers, patios· arid other
post harvest facµiti,es,,. barangay waterworks, .barangay
markets, J>arking area or other similar facilities constructed
with government funds .wit_hin the jurisdfotion of the barangay
and charge reasonable fees for the use thereof.
The Court ruled that since the law did not make any distinction,
the courts should not. It held:
We likewise cannot sustain petitioner's stand that RA

7160, ~ection 391 (a)(7} applies only to multi-purpose halls
accessible to the public in general and not to those which cater
to an exclusive segment such as the homeowners or residents
of a sub~vis~on. Well-recognized is the rule in statutory
construcu?n that where the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts· distinguish - ubi lex non distinguit nee nos
distiriguire debemus. '
A close reading of Section 391(a)(7) shows that the
legislature did not intend to make such a distinction. Therefore,
The word "or'' may also be used as the equivalent of "that

is to say," giving that which precedes it the same significance as
that which follows it It-is not always disjunctive and is sometimes
interpretative or expository ofthe'',preceding word; For example, the
word "or" in an ordinance which imposes graduated quarterly fixed
tax "based on the gross value in money or actual market value" of
articles, should be construed to mean "that is.to say," so.that the
phrase "or actual market value" was intended to explain "gross
value in money."''" · _. · ..
The word "or" may also 1lleanr,l'!\1CC~s~i~ely. This is the, sense
in which the word "or" is used,in;Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code which states in part that ~the; offenses of seduction, abduction,
<rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be, prosecuted except upon
a complaint by the offended .party or her parents, grandparents,
or guardian, nor in any case; if t}ie offender has been expressly
pardoned by the· above-named persons, as the case may be." It has
been held that although these persons; are mentioned disjunctively,
~; .
the provision must be construed. as .meaning that the right to
institute criminal proceedings .in said, cases is· exclusively and
successively reposed in said persons in the order in.which they are
named, so that no one. of them has authority, to, proceed 'u there is
any other person previously mentioned therein with legal capacity
to appear and institute the action. F;or the right to institute criminal
proceedings in these cases would not be . reposed in the offended
party, her parents, grandparents and guardian, at one and the same
time, without occasioning grave difficulties in the administration
of justice, resulting. from the attempt -of some of these persons to
institute criminal proceedings contrary to the wish. and desire of
others; and thatthis was.notths Intention of the lawmaker becomes
manifest in the lightof'the :l"eculiirrprovision whereby the offended
party is. given the right to pardon the offender and this extinguishes
the cause of the criminal action.w ·
On the other hand, the word "and" is a conjunction pertinently
defined as meaning "together with," "joined with," "along or together
~th," "added to or linked to," used to conjoin word withword, phrase
with phrase, clause with clause. The word "and" does not mean
"or"; it is a coiv~ion used to denote a joinder or union, "binding
""San Miguel Corp. v. Municipality ofMandaue, G.R. No. 30761. July 11 1973
53 SCRA 43. . · ' ' '
116U.S.
v. De la Sabta, 9 Phil~ 22 (1907).
B. ASSOCIATED WORDS
5.17. Nosciturasociis.
The maxim! noscitur a sociis, states that where a particular
wo~d or phra~e is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of
van~us me~gs, its .correet construction may he made. clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or
with ~hich it is associated.120-f3tated differently, where a particular
word is obscure or of'doubtful meaning, taken by itself, the obscurity
or doubt m.ay be. removed by reference to the meaning of associated
or compamon words.w And where the law does notdeflne.a word
used therein, it will be construed as· having a meaning similar to
that of :vords associated with or accompanied by it.122 For .a word or
phrase m a statute is always used in association with oth~r words or
phrases, and its meaning may thus be modified or restricted. by the
la~ter.12• ~d taken by itself and in the abstract, a word or phrase
might easily con~ey a meaning quite different from the one actually
mtende~ and evident when the word or phrase is considered with
those with which it is associated. Thus; an. apparently ·general
word or. phrase may have a limited application if viewed with other
compamo~ words or pl_lrases.1~ Stated differently.ia word or phrase
should be mterpreted in relation to; or given the same meaning of
words with which it is associated.w · '
In acco~dance with the principle ofnoscitur a sociis, where most
of the .words man enumeration of words in a statute are used in their
generic and ordin~ sense,. th.e rest of the wordsshould similarly be
construed; Words m association should all be given their generic
12°00
Appeals, G.R. No. 39419, April 12, 1982, 113 SCRA 459· Soriano v S di
v~·c :t :r
Kim Chan v. Vald,ez Tan Keh, 75 Phit 371 (1945)· Caltex (Phil ) I
Palomar, G.R. No. 19650, Se~tember 29; 1966, 30 SCRA 24i; Aisporma 0
b
G.R. No. 65952, July 31, 19/W. . · · ·· ' · an gan ayan,
121Luzo~
di ', Stevedoring Co. v. Trinidad; 43 Phil. 803 (1922)· Chartered Bank of
In ra v. Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921). . '
122Schmid
& .Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez Fishing Corp., 166 SCRA 493 (1988)·
Buena~;;da v. FlaVIer, 1f"SCAD 1026, 226 SCRA (1993). '
124Lu1:>~
& L~¥:m Corp. v. Central Bank,.108 Phil. 566 (1960).
SCRA 44~01~ Shipping Corp: v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 14526, March 31, 1965, 13
SCRA 548'. Santulan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 28021, December 15, 1977, 80
(1994).=Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 53 SCAD 367; 234 SCRA 255
unit has no power to prevent or suppress - gambling which is

authorized by specific law.130
In Carandang v. Santiago,131 the issue raised is whether an
offended party can''file a separate and independent civil action
for damages arising from physical injuries during the pendency
of the criminal action for frustrated homicide. The offended party
predicated his action on Article 33 of the Civil Code whichprovides
that "[i]n cases. of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." Respondent, on the other
hand, claimed that the term "physical injuries" . does not include
frustrated homicide because the term refers to the specific crime of
physical injuries as defined in the Revised Penal Code and should
be understood in its technical or legal sense, and not in its ordinary
or generic sense of bodily injury. ·The court ruled that the term
"physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily harm or
injury, such as physical injuries, frustrated homicide, or even death.
Said the court: "The article in question uses the words 'defamation,'
'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in
their ordinary sense because .there are .no specific provisions in the
Revised Penal Code using these terms as means ofoffenses defined
therein, so that these two terms 'defamation' and 'fraud' must have
been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws
of the Philippines, but in their generic .sense. 'With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term 'physical injuries'
could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in
the Revised Penal Code for it is difficult to believe that the Code
Commission would have used terms in the same article· - some in
their generic and another in its technical sense. In other words, the
term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury,
not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the
latter are genericterms.v=
In Co Kim Chan v. Vald'!z Tan Keh,133 the question involved is
whether proceedings in civil cases pending in court under the so-
13<1Ma_gtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 53 SCAD 367, 234 SCRA 255
(1994). .
13197 Phil. 94 (1955).
132Ibid.,
at pp. 96-97.
13375
Phil. 371 (1945).
306 ·STATUTORY.CONSTRUCTION
"industries" used in its ordinary and. generic sense which means

enterprises employing.relatively large amounts of capital and/or la-
bor? The court held that since the term "industries" as used inthe
law for the second time "is·classifi:edtogether with the terms 'min-
~rs, mi~g industries, planters and farmers,' the obvious legislative
intent is to confine the meaning of the term
to activitie's that tend to
produce or create or manufacture such as those of miners mining
enterprises, planters and farmers;" The court added that-to'.give the
~ord an ~rdinary ~d general meaning would lead to patent· incon-
s~stency, m that while the first part of the law confines the exemp-
tion to new and necessaryindustry, another part would extend the
exemption to all industries, regardless of their nature which would
then be illogical.w '
.. In another case; involving a prosecution for libel, thl question
is whether defamatory , statements through the.· medium of an
amplifier systei;n, constitutes slander or libel. Libel is committed
by means of ;~~~g,_ printing, .·lithography, engraving, radio,
pho~~~aph, .P~tm.g, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic ·
~xhib1t10n, o~ ~Y similar.mean»," an.4 it is argued ~hat an ":µnplifier
lS a means 's1il;ril~ to 'radio."'Jri rejecting this argurllent, the court
rules that the W()rd.~ra~o",,s.ho.uldJ>e considered in relation to the
terms_ with which it.ls.~sso9ated - . "{Iitillg, ·printing, etc. - all
of which have a c?mmon characteristic; .. namely, their permanent
nature as a means.of publication, which is not present in utterances
throu~h an ~plifi:ei;.136 Followip~,pie. same principle~ where the
word 'lottery' .lSJl_efinedas a game of chance, one of the elements
?f which is. c.orisideration, the ten;D. "gift. enterprise" and "scheme"
1z:i. the provi~1on of the Postal Law making unmailabls "any lottery,
gift, enterpnse, or scheme for the distribution of money or any real
or personal ~roperty.by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind" means
such enterpnse as will require consideration as an element.w
I~ ~an Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Co~missz?n,1•• the issue raised is whether the claim of an employee
a~~st his employer for; cash reward for submitting a process to
eliminate defects m quality and, taste of San Miguel product falls
1"~Coriunissiol}er
1971, 39 SCRA 70. ''

v.
.o~Custom.s Phil Acetylene Co GR No 22443 May 29
., . . . ' •
138p 1 .·
eop e v, Santiago, G.R. No. 17663, May 30 1962 5 SCRA 231
137Calte
x (Phil s.), Inc. v. Palomar, G.R. No. '19650' September .29 1966 30
SCRA247. · ' ' '
138161
SCRA 719, 124, 127 (1988).
308 STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION .
otherwise disciplined and 'the innocent, exonerated or vindicated

in like manner, and to the end also 'that other remedies; including
court action, may be. pursued 'forthwith by the. interested parties,
after administrative remedies' shall have been exhausted, "The court
held that the executive order does not apply to criminal actions.
"To be· sure, there is mention herein ofcourt action (being pursued
forthwith byinterested parties but· that does not; so we hold, cover
proceedings such as criminal actions; which do not require a prior
administrative' course of action. It.will-indeed be noted that the
term is closely shadowedby the qualification, 'after administrative
remedies shall have been exhausted,' which suggests civil suits
subject to previous administrative actions." .
I,?}1ot~o_mul v. peza
Paz,140.th~ ~uei;;ticitt,rai~ed is ',Y':t~th~r the
:ord court. in Section 5 of Republic Act No, 5434, 'Yhich reads: 1.
'~ I
Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision orjudginent
unless. the o:tpcer, or body rendering the same or the court, on
motion, afte; hearing, and on such terms as it µi,~yAee,mjust; should
provide otherwise. The proprie:ty of a. stay gracted by the officer or
body ~endetjng the aw:ard'. .orqe1\ ~ing, decision pr ,jtidgnient may
be raised only by motipn,pi the main case,'' refers.to the Court.of
Appeals or to the trial courj;: Appl:Yillg the maXhn noscitur.·a s'ocifs
the Court ruled that the "correct co~struction oft]:i~.:word 'court' ma;
be made clear by reference to Section 1 of RA. No. 5434, where the
court, offic,ers!.or:bodies whose.decision, award,~tc., are appealable
to the Court of Appeals,. are enµmerated as .follows: Court of
Agrarian Relations, the, Secretary of
Labor, the Land Registration
Commission; the, Securities .and Exchange Commission . the Social
Security Oommission, the Cfvii Aeronautics Board the Patent Office
and the Agricultural Inventio~,s.Board.'' "Frofu s~d grqµping, the
enumeration in Section 5 is obviously derived and from which it is
easy to see the word 'court' means Court of Agrarian Relations and
not the Court of Appeals which by no stretch of the imagination can
be deemed to belong to the same group."
5.19. EJusdem generis.

While ~eneral words or expressions in a statute are, as a rule,
accorded their full, natural and generic sense, they will not be given
such meaning if tliey are used in association with specific words or
phrases. The general rule is that where a general word or phrase
140187 SCRA 743, 753 (1990).

the general words to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense,

it would not have enumerated the specific words.w The presumption
is that usually the minds of the legislators ate addressed specifically
to the particularization, and accordingly the general words, though
broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, should
be understood in contemplation with ·that which the mind of the
legislators are centered.w ·
5.20. illustration.. of rule,;. .
Where . an act makes. unlawful the -distribution of electoral

propaganda gadgets; pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods
or materials "and the like," the term "and .the like" does not embrace
. taped jingles for campaign. purposes, said term ;being restricted only
to things of the same kind or class as those specifically enumerated.w
Similarly, where a statute makes the classification "dynamos,
generators; exciters, and other machinery.for the generation of
electricity for lightning or for power," the phrase "other machinery"
would not include steam turbines,. pumps arid condensers because
these are not of the same Class or kind of machinery as dynamos,
generators and exciters which are forthe generation of electricity.i«
The term "skimmed milk" in a statute which requires that "all
condensed skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form" "shall be
clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers" "with the
words: 'This milk is hot suitable for nourishment for infants less
than one year of age,'" restricts the phrase "all milk in whatever
form" and excludes within. its scope; filled ·milk.1ro Under a statute
which provides 'that the vice-mayor shall be entitled to assume
the office of the mayor during the "absence, susp,ension or other
temporary disabilityof the mayor,".the word "absence" should be
construed on the same 'sense as "suspension" and' "other forms of
disability'' to mean one which disabies. the mayor from· exercising
the power and prerogatives of his office, since the phrase "other
temporary disability" follows the words "absence" and "suspension"
146Go
Tiaco y Hermanos v. Union Insurance Society of Canton, 40 Phil. 40
(1919); Murphy, Mol;ris & Co. v. Collector of Customs, 11Phil.456 (1908).
147Em~ire
IHSlltabce Co. v. Rufino, G.R. No. 38268, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRJ\.
437.
148Mutuc
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 32717, November 26, 1970, 36
SCRA288.
149Murphy,
Morris & Co. v. Collector of Customs, 11 Phil. 456 (1908).
16"Vera
v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 33693,M~y 31, 1979, 90 SCRA379.
enumeration of particulars, is commonly interpreted in a restricted

sense, as referring to such other matters· as are kindred to the class-
es before mentioned, receiving an ejusdem generis interpretation xx
x." In other words, the vocable 'otherwise' in the clause 'compensat-
ed for by insurance or otherwise' x x x should be construed to refer
to compensation due under a title analogous or similar to insurance.
Inasmuch as the latter is a contract establishing a legal obligation,
x x x it follows that in order to be deemed "compensated for x x
x 'otherwise,' the losses sustained by a taxpayer must be covered
by a judicially enforceable right; springing from any of the juridical
sources of obligations, namely, law, contract, quasi-contract, torts or
crimes," and not mere pronouncement of public offieials.w
In Cebu· Institute of Technology v. Ople,m one of/ the issues
raised ·is whether teachers hired on contract basis 'are · entitled
to service incentive leave benefits as against the claim that they
are not so entitled because Rule V of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code provides that "This rule (on
service incentive leaves) shall apply to all employees, except" "field
personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised
by the employer ID.eluding those who arE! engaged on task or contract
basis." The Court ruled that the phrase "those who were employed
on task or contract basis" should be related with "field personnel;"
applying the rule on ejusdem generis that the general and unlimited
terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms that they
follow, and that teachers are clearly not field· personnel and are
therefore entitled to service incentive leave benefits.
In Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.v« one
of the issues raised is whether the phrase "other lawful beverages"
in the provision which gives protection to a manufacturer who has
registered with the Philippine Patent Office its duly stamped or
marked bottles used for "soda water, mineral or aerated waters,
cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages" includes hard liquor.
In holding that the phrase includes hard liquor, the Court stated
that the "title of the law Itself, which reads 'An Act to regulate the
use of duly stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks; kegs; barrels
and other sin)il¥~containers,"' clearly shows the legislative intent
Cu Unjieng & Sons, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 1, 1618 (1956).
108
156 SCRA 629 (1987).
157
u;s179 SCRA 218 (1989).

kind; (3} the: enumeration of the particular and specific words is

not exhaustive or is n9t merely by examples; and (4) there is· no
indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases
a broader meaning.w
The general rule that a
general term may be restrained by
specific words associated with it is applicable only to cases where,
except for one general term, all theitems in an enumeration belong
to or fall under one specific class or are of the same nature. Where
the enumeration includes cfass'~s and general terms as well,1•2 or
where the specificthings•iil: tlie Efnu.meration }lave no distinguishable
common characteristics and greatly differ from one another, the
rule of ejusdem generis does not apply.w Thus, where the term
'"stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles classified
as food 'or food products as well asother items thf!,t do not belong
to such classification, the term is not restricted to articles used in
the preparation of food but should be construed in its generic sense
to include those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental
cream.w Conversely, if the enumerated words are all general words,
the meaning of'each word will be unrestricted by the other words;
Unless the context in which they are used indicates otherwise.
Nor does the rule of ejusdem generis apply where the enumera-
tion of the particular and specific words is exhaustive, If the specific
words embrace all persons or objects of the class designated by the
enumeration, the general words should include-those comprehended
in the general classification arid beyond.the specified class. Thus, in
the enumeration of the words "action or suit or other proceeding,"
the words "action" and "suit". exhaust. proceedings of judicial char-
acter, ·and the phrase: "other proceeding" should therefore include
proceedings other than judicial m nature; such as advertisement of
sale of property. For to apply the rule of ejusdem generis is to render
the phrase "other proceedingf-a.surplusage, in violation of the well-
16'Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 3.3471, January
31, 1972, 43 SCRA 192; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v, Commissioner of Customs,
G.R. No. 19337,Se,J>telJlb~r 30, i969, 29 SCR'.A 617; People v. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352
(1923). . ·~ ,, . . \.
162Colgl!-te-PalmolivePhil., Inc. v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 14787,January 28, 1961,
1Phil.267.
163Commissioner of Customs v. CourtofTaxAppeals,G.R. No. 33471, January
31, 1972, 43 SCRA192~

164Colgate-Palmolive
Phils., Inc. v. Jimenez, supra.
316 STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION
In Commissioner of]TJ;ternal..Revenue u, American Express,

G.R. No. 152609, June 29, 2005; the.Court explained when ejusdem.
generis rule is not applicable. The Court ruled: .
The canori of statutory' construction known as. ejusdem
generis or "of the same kind or speeie'[does not apply to Section
4.102-2(b)(2) ofRR7-95 as amended by RR 5~96. -
First, ai~ou.gh ,the .•-. re~~t9ry pro'1st~n contains an
enumeration ofpaxtjcular-,or:specific words, fellowed by the
general phrase "~d other si.ntilar services," such.words do.not
constitute-a readily discernible class and arepatently not of the
same kind. Project studies involve investments or mark,eting;
information Services focus on - data technology; engineering
and architectural designs require ·creatiVity. Aside from
calling for the exercise or· use of :n;ierital faculties or perhaps
producing written technical output's, no common denominator
to the exclusion-of all others characterizes these three services.
Nothing sets them apart from other and similar general services
that may Involve advertising;' computers, - consultancy, health
care, management, msssengerial work·- to name only a few.
Second, there is the regulatory intent to give the general
phrase "and other similar services" a broader meaning. Clearly,
the preceding phrase "as well as" is not meant to limitthe effect
of "and other similar services."
Third, and most important, the statutory provision upon
which this- regulation is based is 'by itself not. restrictive. The
scope of the word "services"inSection 102(b )(2) of the Tax Code
- is broad; it is not susceptible of narrow interpretation.
·: The rule does not apply, where the law is clear and free-from
.ambiguity. Thus, in Garcia v. Soc~al Security Com,m~sion, G.R.No.
170735, December 17, 2000, the Court ruled:
Petitioner jp.vokes J'he. rule in statu,toty construction
called ejusdem. generis; .that is, where general _words follow
an enumeration of persons or things; by words of a: particular
and sp~c :pieamng, such general words are not to be
construed.in th,eir widest extent, but are to be held as, applying
only to' per$0nS''o~ things- of: the same kind, or class as those
specifically mentioned; Accordiilg to petitioner, to be held
liable under Section 28(f}-Of the Social· SeCuricy Law, one must
be the "managing head," "managing' 'diredbr," or "managing
give protection to all registered marked bottles and containers of

all lawful beverages .regardless of the nature of their contents, and
for this reason, the words "other lawful beverages" in the provision
which grants such protection to "persons engaged or licensed to
engage in the manufacture, bottling, or selling of soda water, mineral
or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream or other lawful beverages"
may not be limited. to the same kind or class as those specifically
. mentioned butshould be taken intheir general sense to include not
only soft drinks but also hard liquor.
In Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security
Commission, 11• a religious Institution iJivoking the rule of ejusdem
generis claimed, that it is not included in: .the term "employer" as
statutorily.defined as ~anY person, natural.orjuridical, d9mestic or
foreign,who carried in the.Philippines any trade,J,l.usin~ss; industry,
undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another
person· who is· under his orders, as 'regard the .employment, ~xcept
the Government and any of its.political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities, including, corporations owned.or controlled bythe
government." It is contended that the term "employer" should be,
limited to those who carry an
"undertaking or activity which has
the element of profit or gain" because the; phrase "activity of any
kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business,
industry, undertaking." The court rejected such contention. It
said that the "rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there. is
uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent
of the legislature. would thereby be . hindered. and defeated." The
definition is "sufficiently comprehensive to include religious and
charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit," and "this
i~ made more evident by the fact that it contains exceptions in which
said institutions or entities are not included."
5.22. Expressio unius est exelusio alterius.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express
mention of one person, thing, qr consequence implies the exclusion
of all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio
.
unius est exclusio alterius .11•
G.R. NO. 15045, January 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10 (1961).

175
Canlas v. Republic,· 103 Phil. 712 (1958); Lao Oh Kim v. Reyes, 103 Phil.
176
1139 (1958); People v. Aquino, 83 Phil. 614 (1949); Escribano v. Avila, G.R. No. 30375,
September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245; People v. Lantin, G.R. No. 24735, Oct. 31, 1969, 30
SCRA 81; Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41001, September 30,
that of others. m They proceed from the premise that the legislature
would not have made specified. enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its' meaning and .confine. its' terms
to those expressly mentioned.w They are opposite the doctrine of
necessary implication.w ·
In Parayno v. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006, the
Court held that since the ordinance made a distinction between
"gasoline service station" and "gasoline filling station," the maxim,
ejusdem generis does not apply and what is applicable is the maxim
is expresio unius exclusio alterius. The Court ruled:
"We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent
municipality made a clear distinction between "gasoline service
station" and "gasoline filling station." The pertinent.provisions
read:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2L Filling Station. A retail station servicing
automobiles. and other motor vehicles with gasoline and
oil only.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 42. Service Station. A building and its prem-
ises where gasoline oil, grease, ·batteries, tires. and car
accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and
where, in addition, the following services may be rendered
and sales and no other.
a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries,
and distributor parts; ' '
b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or
re grooving;
c, Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water
hose, fan belts, brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats,
seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease
retainers, wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like;
, ' ,! ,I.
1 q'abQril. v. Gavino, 79 Phil. 421 (1947); see also concurring opinion of Justice
Feria, Brodett v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 758 (1946).
183Commissioner
of Customs v. CTA, 43 SCAD 486, 224 SCRA 665 (1993), cit-
ing Agpalo, Statutory Construction,2nd Ed., 1990, pp. 160-161.
1iusee Sec. 4.24, supra.
amount of P8,182,182.85 representing deficiency miller's tax and

manufacturer's sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable
year 1987. The deficiency miller's tax was imposed on SPMC's sal.es
of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while
the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil
as manufactured products.
The Court answered the issue in the negative, as follows:
"The language of the exempting, clause of Section 168 of
the 1987 Tu Code was clear. The tax exemption applied only to
the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil,:copra by-products
and desiccated· coconuts, whether in their original state or as
an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or
prod'-1:cts,
by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller
himself. ·
The l~gu~e of the e~emption proviso did not warrant
the interpretation advanced by SPMC. Nowhere did it pro~de
that the exportation made by the purchaser of the. matenals
enumerated in the exempting clause or the manufacturer
of products utilizing the said materials was. covered by t~e
exemption. Since SPMC's situation was not within the ambit
ofthe exemption, it was subject to the' 3% miller's tax imposed
under Section 1'68 of the 1987 Tax Code. · ·
SPMC's proposed interpretation unduly enlarged the
scope of the exemption clause. The rule is that the exemption
must not· be so enlarged by construction since the reasonable
presumption is.that the State has granted in express terms all
it intended· to grant and· that.. unless the ·privilege is limited
to the very terms of the statute, the favor would be intended
beyond what was meant.
Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon
which it appli~s,itis to be construed as
excluding from its ~ffects
all those not expressly mentioned. Expreseio unius est exclusio
alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is
excluded -~~.refroµi and a meaning that does not appear nor is
intendec!o:freflected in the very language of the statute cannot
be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would .not have made specific. enumerations in a
statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
a contagious disease, the court resorted to the negative-opposite

doctrine by stating thst the' statute: plainly relates only to the wife
of a naturalized citizen and. that it cannot interpolate the words
"native-bem citizen" Without,µsurping the. legislative function.
The <Jhung ilook case')i~s '-~~en c~tici¥ed: for apJ:>lyiilg the
negative-opposite doctrine ortheexpressio unius rule as aniechanieel-
technical tool that works _injusti~e to native-born citizens in favor of
naturalized citizens. The cflticisrii. is not without justificlition. The
court should have disr~gar.ded-\the .doctrine, as its application is
productive of injustice no:t ~tended J;iy, the. lsgtslafure, and should
have used instead the doctrine. of necessary implication, so as to
justify th~ extension of the benefits of the law in favor .of the wife of
a native-born citizen, for naturalized and native-born citizens are
both citizens and the legislature is not supposed to discriminate
against native-born citizens.
5.24. Application ot eX]Jre~sio unius rule.

The rule.of expressio unius est,exclusio alterius andits corollary
canons are generally used in the construction of statutes granting
powers, creating. .rights and . remedies, restricting common rights,
and imposiag penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes
which are strictly construed ...
Pursuant to the expreesio untus rule, where a statute directs
the performance • of rcettain · aets, ,by . a particular. person or class
or persons, .it implies that.it shall not be done otherwise or b~ a
different person or .class of pel(~ons.1~ Accordingly, a law which
specifically designates the persons who may. bring .actions for quo
warranto excludes others from bringing such actions.187 In actions
for libel, the statute whic~ provid~sJ~~t "~re~ary investigations
of criminal actions for wntten defamation xx x shall be conducted by
the provincial or eity.fiseal' ofthe province orcity or by themuriicipal
court of the city or capital oftqe·pro:vince where·such actions· may
be. instituted" precludes all other municipal courts from conducting
such preliminary investigations.188 And the statutory enumeration of
the crimes which cannot be' prosecuted de oficio, namely; adultery,
concubinagej.S-~~11tCtion, rape, er.acts of
lasciviousness, implies that
all other ~~s, such as a slanderous imputation that-a-person is a
186Escribano v, Avila, G.R. No. 30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245.
1s•Acosta v. Flor, 5 Phil. 18 (1905). ·
188Escribano v. Avila, supra.
are not presented as claims against the estate within the prescribed
period in the notice, s.o long as they have not prescribed ~derthe
Tax Code.194 Where a statute .which changedthe fonn. ()f ~v.e;qime11t
of a . muriicipallty .into a city. proyi.dE)s that t"ll:e. incumbent D1ayor,
vice-mayor and members of t~e wupicipal board ;EJ}lajl; C?Iltin¥e}1,1
office until the expiration oftbe~, te~s r . all othel' mmncip~ ()ffi.ces
were. deemed abolished. ie5 A:i:i(f wh~re the legislat~e}ms deliberately
select~d ~ p~i6",~ met~odof giyll.lg 11otic"e, as wP.~n
a c()~()~er ~s
given the right of legal red.epipt;ionjvith,in tb,irty days fry~ notice ~
writing by the vendor in case t}le .Otb!;!f CO-(?~ei:~ sells lrl~
.share lil
the co-owned. property, 'that method of giving notice :m~t be deemed.
exclusive and notice sent by the vendee is thus ll!:e~ective. '~ _ ·
Under the Local AutonomyAct, local governments are giv¢n
broad-powers .to tax 'everything; except .thosewhich ate sp.ec~cally
mentioned therein. If a subject· matter does not come within the
exceptions, an ·ordinance imposing a tax on such subject matter
is deemed to come· within the broad taxing power, in· accordance
with the maxim, exceptio firmat regulam in casibus rum exceptis :1•1
Accordingly, amunicipal ordinance imposing a tax on silica excavated ·
within the municipality, it being conceded not falling within the
exceptions, is a valid exercise ofits taxing power ;11'" Similarly, where
the Probation Law expressly enumerates the persons disqualified
to avail of its benefits, the clear intent is to allow the benefits of
probation to those not included in the enumeration.w And where a
statute enumerates the subject or things on which it is to operate,
it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not
expressly mentioned .. Thus, where the law provides· that positioI1~
in the government belong to the competitive service, except those
declared by law to be in the noncompetitive service andthosewhich
are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in
nature and enumerates those in the non-competitive as including
secretaries of governors and mayors, the clear intent is that assistant
secretaries of ,governors and mayors fall under the competitive
'"'Vera v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 31364, March 30, 1979, 86 SCRA 199.
195Mendenilla v. Omandia, G.R. No. 17893, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 536. .
1961Jutte
v,. ·M,anuel Uy & Sons, Inc., G.R. No, 15499,:February28, 1962, 4 SCRA
526.
197Vi.Jl'anuevav. City of nono, G.R. No. 26521; December 28, 1968, 26 SCRA
578.
19"Nin
Bay Mining Co. v. Roxas, Palawan, G.R. No. 20125, July 20, 1965, 14
SCRA660.
199Santos v. Pano, 120 SCRA 8 (1983).
In Centeno v. Yillalon-Pornilloes» the issue is whether the

solicitation for religious. purposes, i.e., renovation_ of a: church,
without first securing a permit from the Regional Office concerned
of the Department of Social Services, constitutes a violation of P .D.
No. 1564, making it a criminal offense for any person "to solicit
or receive contributions for Charitable or public welfare purposes"
without securing such permit. The resolution of the issue depends on
whether the phrase "charitable x x x purposes" includes a religious
purpose. The Court ruled in ~!i:e negative, by applying the maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, thus:
"It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well
as several other statutes, treat the words 'charitable' and
'religious' separately and independently of each other .. Thus,
the word 'charitable' is only one of three descriptive' words used
in Section 28(3), Article Vlof the Constitution which provides
that 'charitable institutidns, churches and parsonagesx xx
and all lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly,
and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.' x x x
That these. legislative _enactments specifically spelled
out 'charitable' and 'religious' in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated 'charitable or
public welfare purposes,' only goes to show: that the framers of
the law in question never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no
reason why it would not have so stated expressly."-
The issue in Lopez v'. CA, G.R. No. 144573, September 24,
2~02, is: Are decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of
six (6) months and one (1) day suspension without pay immediately
executory pending appeal?
Applying rules of exressio unius est exclusio alterius in statutory
construction, the Court answered the issue in the negative. The
Court ruled: -
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 15 provides:
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.
- ~1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombuds-
man are immediately effective and executory.
20855 SCAD 100, 236 SCRA 197.

=iua.. pp. 203-204.
final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal
if no appeal is perfected; or after the denial of the appeal
from the said order, directive or decision. It is only then that
execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact
that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from
its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these
decisions pending 'appeal, Otherwise, the essential nature
of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered
nugatory; As explained by the Court -
Section 27 states that all provisionary orders of the
Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory; and- that 'any order, directive or decision of the
said Office imposfng the penalty ofeensurs or reprimand
or suspension of not more than one [month, br a :fine not
. equivalent to one month salary], is final and unappealable.
. As such the legal maxim "[expressio] unius est exclusio
[alterius]" fuids'application. The express mention of the
things included excludes those that are not included. The
clear import of these statements taken together is that
all other decisions of the Offi.ce_ofthe Ombudsman which
impose penalties that . are not enumerated in the said
section 27 ·are not final, unappealable and immediately
executory. An appeal timelyfiled, such as the one filed in
the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation
of the decision. This finds support iii. the Rules of
Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states
that "(I)n all other cases, the decision shall become final
after :the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof
by the respondent, unless a motion.for reconsideration or
petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review
under Rule 43) shall have been filed by him as prescribed
in Section 27 of R.A. 6770."
·. . Petitioners' claim that the applicable provision is Rule 43,
Secti~n 12 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure, which provides
that [t)he app~al shall not stay the award, judgment, final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless. the Court of
Appeals shall pirect otheiwise upon such terms as it may deem
just," laokS/r:herit. While it is true that in Fabian v. Desierto,
the Court declared unconstitutional Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770, and all other provisions of law implementing
the same, the declaration should be interpreted to mean that
the said provisions are void only insofar as they provide that
332 STATliTOitY CON$~UCTION
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, the stay of execution

of the penalty of suspension should therefore issue as a matter
of right.' ., ·
. . Fin~y, the.Coyrt of'Appeals did not~buse its discretion

m ~rrecting peti~~one!s to explain within ten,(10) days from
notice why. t~ey sh~oulQ, .not be.cited f()r µ;ulir1'!ct contempt of
court for f~g to implamsnt the reso~utjon;.,4"8.ted March 16,
2000 restr~g the execution pending appeal of the i}"anuary
6, 2000 decision and February 4, 2000 order of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It .is within the inherent powers of the Court of
Appeals to ensure compliance with its lawful orders. · ,
5.25. Limitati()ns of rule.

. The rule of expressia unius est. exclueio alterius is not a rule
of law. It is a mere tool 'of statutory construction 'or a means of
a~certaining·t~e legisl~tiv~ ffi,~e11t. Itisnot ofuhlversal application.
Like ot~er i:ue.s of statutory' construction, it cannot be used to defeat
~he pl~1inly indicated p~ose of the l~gislature.200The rule, not being
inflexible nor a mechanical or-technical tool, must yield to what is
clearly a legislative intent. 200
The maxim, expreseio unius est exclusio aiterius, is no more
t?an an auxili~. rule of ajteryreiation to. be ignored where other
crrc~stances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be
exclus1v~.201 Thus, where the rul~.enumerates the provisions which
are. applicable to proceedings in murucipal trial courts hi cases
falling within t?~irjurisdi~dns_, .the fact thi;tt the p:roV:i.sioil making
the ?ate of maiJing a pl~aF,n? a,s s~own by the post offi~e registry
receipt as the date of filing in court is not one. of those enumerated
d~es not mean that it is ~10t · applic~ble to proceedings in hi.unJ.cipal
tnal courts .. The r.eas?n is ~hat there are. circumstab,ces indicating
that the enumeration is not 1Bt.endedto be ~ftclusiye, as shown by the·
fact that to exc~p.de the provision and others not mentioned therein
would be produ~ve ~f undesirable consequences riot intended :by its
fr~ers, and. dis~ptive of the principle that uniforii::rity of rules is
designed to srmplify procedures in ail.courts.se
205Escnlfano v.· AV:ila, G.R. No. 30375 September 12 1978 85 scna 245· itin
82 C.J.S. 668. , · .· • ' ' • · • CI g
206Gollle~
v. V~ntura, 54 Phll. 726 (1930).
2°1EsCribilno
20"Manabat
v. AV:ila1 G.R. No. 30375; September 12 1978 85 SCRA 245
v, Aquino, 92 Phil. 1025.(i953). ' · ' · ·
For instance, adherence to the legal maxim should be rejected

if its application will result in incongruities or a violation of the R
equal protection clause of the Constitution.s«
The principle of expressic unius est exclusio alterius may
be disregarded if .adherenee thereto. would -. cause inconvenience,
hardship, and injury to the public intereat.w For instance, where a
statute provides that the "majority of the (municipal) council elected
shall constitute a quorum to do business," which "shall be presided
by the mayor," and another statute requires that the vice-mayor,
or in his place, the councilor.who-ol)tained the largest number of
votes, should perform the duties of the mayor in the event of the
latter's temporary incapacity, this enumeration would . ordinarily
be interpreted as exclusive, following the rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius and therefore preclude the majority members of the
council from transacting business should the mayor, vice-mayor and
councilor receiving the largest number of votes boycott the council
meeting. However, to construe the enumeration as exclusive or to
apply the maxim would lead to inconvenience, hardship and injury
to public service, as it would place in the hands of these three officials
an instrument to defeat the law vesting the legislative power in the
municipal council by merely boycotting or refusing to attend the
sessions of the council .. Hence, -the maxim should be disregarded
and the statute construed to mean that should these three officials
be unable to discharge their duties for any reason, the councilor
receiving the next highest. number of votes can preside over the
sessions of the council.s=
In the last analysis; the question as to whether the express
enumeration of things, persons or consequences excludes all others
not mentioned depends upon legislative intent, The maxim is
resorted to as. a guide in ascertaining the' probable intention of the
lawmaker. 211 Wherethe legislative Intent shows that the entinieration
is not exclusive, the maxim does not apply. 21•
214 Chua
v. Civil Service Commission, 206 SCRA65 (1992).
215 Javellano
v. ,Tayo, G.R. No. 18919, December· 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 1042
(1962). i / -~ . .
=tua.
7Ta~ra
21
v, Gavino, 79 Phil. 421 (1949):
"Escribano
21
v, Avila, G.R. No. 30375, September 12, 1978, 85 SCRA 245; Tabo-
ra v. Gavino, 79 Phil. 421 (1949); Olfato v, Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52749,
March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741.
336 • ·STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
for tax exemption will violate these established principles and

unduly derogate sovereign authority."
Where expressio, etc., is not applicable

The Court in Coconut Oil Refiners Assn., Inc. v. Torres, G.R.
No. 132527, July 29; 2005 ruled that expressio unius est exelusio
alterius is not applicable where words are used by example only.
The Court ruled:
The phrase "tax and duty-free importations of raw
materials, capital and equipment" was .merely cited as an
example of incentives that may be given to entities operating
within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly argued
.· that the maxim expressio· unius est exclitsul· alterius, on
which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive
interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by
way of example. It is· obvious from the wording of Republic Act
No. 7227, particularly the use of the phrase '"such as," that the
enumeration only meant to iilustrate incentives that the SSEZ
is authorized to grant, iii line with its being a free port zone.
Furthermore, said legal maxim should be applied only as
a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise
manifest, and should not ·be permitted. to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the Legislature. · ·
5.26. Doctrine of casue omissue,

The rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est states that
a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally. The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has
been omitted from a legislative enumeration, In other words, the
maxim operates and applies only if and when the omission has
been clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the
enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein.w The
court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the omission
even though the ,omissi9n may have 'resulted from inadvertence or
because the' case in question was not foreseen or contemplated. 220
219 People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657 (1962).

220 Cartwrite v. Cartwrite, 40 A2d 30, 155 ALR 1088 (1944).
338 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION·
farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by 5

another," and the phrase "immediate farm household" as "members
of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons, w
whether related or not, who are
dependent upon him for support e
and who usuhlly help 'operate the farm enterprise," the term t
"members of the family of the tenant" includes the tenant's son, son-
in-law, or grandson even though they are not dependent upon him t
for support and living separately from him because the qualifying' t
phrase "who are dependent.upon him for. support" refers solely· to
its last antecedents.namely, "such qther.persoµpr persons,,whether
related to the tenant or not" and.becanse.in the-absence of a clear
and categorical. im,lier~tive, the court will not construe statutes k a
sense .inconsistent.
. with the
. . rational unity
, of the FilipinoI family.w
In Florentino v. Philippine National Bank,228 the question
raised . is whether holders . of. backpay· . certificates can compel
government-owned baili 'to' accept said certificates in payment o:f
the holder's cibligations fu ·the barik .. A statute• provides that the
holder of a backpay certllicate'inay apply th'e same 'for payment
of "obligations' subsisting at. the tune . ?fl})e 'approval of· this
amendatory act for which, .the applicant, inay directly be liable to
the government or to anY' riiits branches or iristrUm.entalities, ·~r
to corporations owned or controlled by the government, or to any
citizens of the Philippines or. to any association or corporation
organized under the laws.of'the Philippines, who may be willing
to accept the same for such settlement," The Philippine National
Bank, a government-owned blink, contends that the phrase "who
may be willing to accept ·the same for such settlement," which
implies discretion, qualifies corporations owned or controlled by
the government and it cannot therefore.be compelled to accept such
backpay certificate in payment of the holder's. obligation with it.
The court, invoking the doctrine of last antecedent, ruled that the
phrase qualifies only its last. antecedent, namely, "any citizen of th,e
Philippines or association or corporation organized under the laws
of the Philippines." It noted that there is a comma before thephrase
"or to any citizen, etc.," separating said .phrase from the proceeding
one which thereby impll~i:Hha.t the qualifyfug phrase applies only to
its immediate. antecedent.Aceo.i:dillgfy, the corirt held that backpay
certificate holders 'can compel gove~ent:owned. banks to accept
said certificates for payment of their obligations with the bank.
22'1}>angillii8.n v, Alvendia;' 101 Phil. 794 (1957).

22898 Phil. 959 (1956),
People v. Tamani= illustrates the application of·reddendo sin-

gula singulis. One of the questions raised in this case is when to
a
count the Ifi-day period withinwhich to appeal judgment ~f con-
viction in l:l crimina,l action - whether from the date of promulga-
tion of judgment or from the date of receipt of'the notice of judgment.
Section 6, Rule 122 df the Rules of Court provides that "an appeal
must be taken.within MEie.n, (15) days from promulgation or notice
of the judgment or order 'appealed from." In holding. that the 15-
day period should be counted from the promulgation and not from
receipt of copy of the judgment, the .(!oµrt.,.s_ai,d: ."Th~ word 'promul-
gation' in Section 6. should be construed as referring to ~udgment';
while the word 'notice' should be -construed as
referring to 'order.'
That construction is sanctioned by the rule ot reddendo singula sin-
gulis .''235 In another case,236 whichinvolves the qµestio:ri"as to wheth-
a
er a Chinese holding a nonconfrolposition iii retail establishment,
which is a wh~lly nationalized business, comes within th~. prohibi-
ti~IJ. .ag~s~ alien~. ~te~~nillg,Jn ~he ~~~~~illE)P.t, operation, ad-
ministration or -. control t11.ereof (na~1on,Af,izeg or partly nationalized
enterprise), whether as ah ofliqer~ employee otlabprertherein," the
court, ruled that the words "mall,agemeIJ.t,'C>p_ei-a#on; administration
or control," followed by the phrase "whethefas an ofl).cer, employee
or laborer therein" signify' following the rule of reddendo singula
singulis, that the entire scope ?f personnel .activity, including thi!.t
of laborers, is covered by the prohibifion ~garnst the eni.pfoYm.enf6f
aliens, It added that.by. readirig the. words "management, operation,
administration oreontrol," in connection with.the positions-therein
enumerated, cone cannot draw any-other conclusion than that they
cover the entire range of employment.
. In Am~4ora V· . Qourt,. of Appeals, 287 one of .the issues raised 'is
whether Articie ~18.0)>fthe Civil Code.iwhieh state~ that "Lastly,
1tea~hers Of heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be liable
for damages caused by their pupils, ~d students or apprentices so
long as they remain in their custody" applies to all schools, academic
as well as non-academic. The Supreme Court ruled: "Where the
school is . academic rather than technical or vocational in nature . _,
. ,. : ,;t_~
"""G.~ No. 22160, January 21, 1974, 55SCRA 153 (1974).
2861bid:
at p.157.
23"King
v. Hernaez, 114 Phil. 730 (1962).
237160
·· SCRA 315 (1988); see Pasco v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan 160
SCRA 784 (1988). '
irrespective of what word or phrase is used to introduce it. In short;

it is a question of legislativeintent='
5.32. Proviso lilay erilurge sctjpe of law.

It has been.held that "even though the prim~ purpose of the
proviso is to l:ii:ajt or restrain the general.language of a statute, the
legislature, . unfortunately, does not always use. it with. technical
correctness; consequently, where its use creates an ambiguity, it is
the duty of the court to ascertain tl),e legislative intention, thtough
resort to the usual rules of construction applicable tC> statutes
generally and give it effect even though the statute is thereby
enlarged, or the provision.made to. assume the; force of independent
enactment and although a proviso.assuch .has no existence apart
from which it is designed to limit or qualify."242 ·
A proviso may thus enlarge, instead of restrict or limit, what

otherwise is a phrase. of limited import had there been no proviso
qualifying it. For instance, i;i statute provides that "it shall be unlawful
for any person to carryconcealed about his person any.bo~e, knife,
dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That this provision
shall not apply to firearms ·in the possession of persons who:have
secured a license therefor. or .who are
entitled. to . same tinder the
provisions of this Act." It ls
claimed that under.this provision, an
unlicensed firearm concealed aboutthe person c:loes not come with
the phrase "other deadly ~eapoµ," following' the rule of ejusdem.
generie. The court said that such contention mightbe tenable had
there been no proviso which, in excepting from the prohibition the
car:rying of a licensed . firearm; clearly implies that an unlicensed
:firearm is included in the phrase "other deadly weapon." The court r.
added that.in this case, the proviso of the act clearly indicates.that in
the view of the.legislature, the carrying of unlicensed revolver would.
be a violation of the Act. By the. proviso it manifested its. intention
to include in the prohibition weapons other than the armas blanccis
therein specifled.e=
---------
241
,/'. J L~
Mani}.a Electric. Co. v. Public Utilities Employee8' Assn., 79 Phil. 409

(1947). .
242Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v, Filipinas Compania de, Seguros, 107
Phil. 1055, 1060 (1960), citing E.T. Crawford, Statutory Construction,pp. 604'605.
243U.S.
v. Santo Niiio, 13 Phil. 141 (1909).
and Trade Administration. If the· intent of the law is to exempt wheat

flour from the provisions of the Act, the proviso would have been
placed in the section containing the repealing clause.w Similarly,
where an earlier section of a statute contains a
proviso, which is
not embodied in a later section thereof, the proviso .should, in the i.
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, be confined to qualify
only the section to which it has been appended, for had the intent
been to applyit to both sections, or words would have been inserted
therein to make that intent clear.us
In Flores v. Mironda,249 the contention of petitioner that
approval by the Public Service· Commission of the· sale of a public
service vehicle was not necessary because of the proviso in Section 20
of Commonwealth Act No. 146 was rejected, said Sectio:ry20 reading
in p¢ that "it shall be unlawful for any public service vehicle or for
the owner, lessee or operator thereof, Without. the previous. approval
and authority of the Commission previously had xx x to sell, alienate,
xx x its property, franchise, certificate, privilege, or right, or any
part thereof; xx x Provided, however, That nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent the, transaction from being negotiated
or completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation,
or lease by any public service. of any of its property in the ordinary
course of business." The Supreme Court held that "the proviso xx x 1:
means only that the sale Without the required approval is still valid .j
and binding between the parties" and the "phrase in the ordinary
course of business x x x could not have been intended to include the
sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property
that may be conceivably disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary
course of its business, like junked equipment."
In another case, one of the issues raised is whether the proviso
introduced by the phrase "Provided, That" qualifies both project
employees and casual employees, or onlythe latter, in the provision
which states: "x x x except where the employment has fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined 'at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal
in nature an9- ~h,~· employment is for the duration of the season."
247Chinese Flour Importers Assn. v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil. 469

(1951).
248Collector of Internal Revenue v. Angeles, 101 Phil. 1026 (1957).
249105 Phil. 266, 270-271 (1959).
346 . STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION .
statute itself.262 The latter provision, whether a proviso or not, is

given preference because it is thelatest expression of the dntent of
the legislation.w ·
5~37. Exceptions, geileraDy.

An exception consiets of. that which would :•o~~rwise be
included in the .provision from, which it is ~xcep~~d.2M It . is a clause
which exempts som~~g_from, . th~;pperation of a statute by express
words. It is generally expressed.in.such words as "except," "unless
otherwise," ·a,nq.,"shall not .apply;" .and such. s:iµajar words as are
used to take out.of the enactment something wp:i~h would otherwise
be part of its ~u.bject ma#~r.;.• HoY{ever, an
exce.ppon need. not be
introduced.by.the.words "except"·or "1lples~.... An exception.will be
constnied as such iif it removes something from the operation of a
provision.of.law.w . - ·
The function of an exception is neither to color nor to dominate
nor to destroy the general nlle. lt is often said that all. exception
confirms the general rule. It should not be construed to qualify the
words or phrases constituting the general rule~2".7 · · ··
It is well-settled that•the. express mention of exceptions

operates to exclude other ·exceptions; and conversely, those which
are not within the enumerated exceptions are deemed included in
the general rule.258 Thus, where a.statute expressly excepts certain
matters from the operation ofthe statute, the dmplicationis that
without such· exception, the matter comes. within the general rule.
is
That is why there need for.the.expressexception. 209•And a.thing not
being excepted, it must be regarded as coming within the purview. of
the general rule, expressed in the maxim, exceptio firmat regulam in
casibus ·non exceptis. 280
. Exceptions, as.a general nli~,: should be •strictly ~ut;reasonably
construed;_they extend. only so-farasJ;l>,eir language fairly warrants,
'~oi:romeo v. Mariano, 4iPliil:322 (1921).

268Arenas v, City of San Carlos, G.R No. 34024, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA 318.
2MChartered Bank-of India v, Imperial, 48 Phil. 931 (1921).

'""Manila J]JJ~';: ce.' v, Public Utilities Employees' Assn., 79 Phil. 409
(1947).
208Pendon v. Diasnes, 91 Phil. 848 (1952).
211"Heras Teeheiikee vi Direetor-of Prisons,.76 Phil; 756 (1946).
208State v, Reed, 170 A2d 419, 91 ALR2d 797 (1961).
211"Cervantes v: Central Bank; 91·Phil. 359(1952). SeeSee, 5.21, supra:
260Hodges v. Municipal Board oflloilo, 19 SCRA 28 (1967).
348 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
during Sundays and legal holidays. In resolvi.ng:.the question in

the negative, the court.helde "Said Section 4 consists of two parts:
the first, • which . is ·the .enaetment clause, probib~ts a person; firm
or corporation, business establishment or place or center .of labor
from compelling an employee or laborer to work during Sundays
and legal holidays, .unless tJ:.i,~lo;n;ne.~ . pay~. the la"tite,r,.®. aq~tip;n.;;tl
sum of at least twenty-five per eentum of his regular remuneration;
and the second part; which is an exception, exempts public utilities
performing some public servieexx :x•f:rom th~ prohibition established
in the enactmentclause, As appellant is a 'Pfiblfo:utility that supplies
electricity and provides•trieans :oftl'ansporlation to'the public, itis
evident-thatthe appellant is exempt:'from:the qualified· prohibition
established inthe enactment-clause, ancbnay•coiripel its employees
or laborers to work dUriri.g• Sundays and legal; holid~jrs without
pa:ymg;them said extra c6hipensation;'"l1o •hold:thattb'.e·exception
or second part of Section '4 ,dilly exempts ipublic utilities -mentioned
therein from tlie pr<ihibitiotl't0ucompel'employees'for laborers to
work during those days, is to make an e:X:ception;toa•general rule
that does not exist, ,bec.allBe, th~,pr()lp~~tion ill ,thE1. ~na~ent clause
.is not' an absolute. prohibition to compel a labor:er . or eil1ployee to
work during Sood~ys and i~g~1q~~q~ys. '!'he pJ:o:hlbl.tion to COID:P~l
a laborer or employee to work dWfug.those days is qualified by the
clause 'unless he is paid an additional sum. of at least twenty-five
per centum of his regular remuner~ti8h/ \Vhich'l~ ib.separl:i:ble from
the prohibition which they ·qualify and of whichthey are part and
parcel. The second portion of Section 4js in:i;eality an exception, arrd
not a provisoalthoughit, is Introduced bytheword 'provided,' and.it
is elemental that an exeeption.takes out of an-enactment, something
which would otherwise be a part ofthe•subjectmatter.ofit."2615
in· Tolentiho v. Secr(!,tary o(Finance~2se it rs' claimed that the
"except" clause hi the prdvisfoh of Aft .. VI, SeC-. '26(2) · of the 1987
Constitution, wb.ich: reads: "No~ 'bill passed by · elther HoU:Se shall
become a fa:W Unless :tt has pas~ed. three "r~~dings oh separatif!l:lays,
and printed C,6pies thereof iriitsifuial form have been di~trihuted
to its Members '~ee days ·;l)~fore its passage, except .wb'.en the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate ~naetinent to
. me~t a public'ehlljmify of emei'gency,"~:qu:Afifies'():ttly its nearest
•, a'ritecedent;; li'drllfily' the distnbutfrbi. of the prihte'd bill in its. final
form three days from its final passage, and not the three readings
268Ibid., at PP• 411412.

266 54 SCAD 671, 235 SCRA 630 (1994).
Appeals.:m1The issue raised iri:this:case is whether actual receipt of

a registered mail after. the fi.vef-day<period ·provided for in Section
8, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court;;i'which states that "service by
registered mail is completeupon-actualreceipt bythe addressee; -:
but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five days
from the date offirst n,:otice ;~fthe postmaster, the service shall take
effect at theexpiration df such time," is the date from which to count
the prescriptive period to comply<~th certain :iiequirerb.ents. The
Supreme Court ruled that the service is completed on the filth day
after the first notice, even if he actually received the mail months
later." "Indeed, the structure of the sentence permits no other
inference. The second part is separated by. a semicolon, and begins
with 'but' which indicates that the following is an exception to the
rule enunciated in the first that service is completed upon actual
receipt."
5.40. Saving clause.

A saving clause is· a clause in a provision oflaw which operates
to. except from the effect of.the law whatthe clause provides.s- or
to save something which would otherwise be lost.:m It is usually
used to except· or. save something from the effect of a· repeal of· a
statute. Thus, the Jegislature, iii repealing a .statute, may preserve,
in the form of a saving clause, the right of the state to prosecute and
punish offenses committed in violation of the repealedlaw.278 Where
existing procedure is altered or substituted byanother, it is usual
to save those proceedings pending tinder the old law at the time the
new law takes effect, by means of a saving clause.s= ·
A saving clause should be construedin the light of the intent or.
purpose which the legislature had in mind in providing it in a statute,
the principal consideration being to effectuate such intent or carry
opt such purpose ..it should be given a liberal or strict construction
d~periding upon the kind of interpretation that should, considering
itsnature, be given to.the statute. as a whole.
__ ......_.......___....,...••.. , ,.J,
216106 Phil. 1144, 1148 (lS59) ..
:n1Bautista v. Fule, 85 Phil. 391 (1950).
272Jbanezde Aldecoa v. Hongkong &·Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil, .228 (1915).
=0ng Chang Wing v. U.S., 40 Phil. 1046 (1910); Lagrimas v. Director of Pris-
ons, 57 Phil. 247 (1932).
27'1baiiez
de Aldecoa v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228 (1915).
upon only a part of a section since one portion may be qualified

by the other portion. Where a requirement is made in explicit
and unambiguousterms, no discretion is left to the judiciary.
It must see to it thatits mandate is obeyed. (Catiis v. CA, 482
SCRA 71 [2006])
In Aquino l). Quezo~f(]ity,'~jR. Nqtl.37534; August 3, 2006, the
Court ruled:
A rule of statutory-constrtiction is that a statute must
be construed as a wliote. The riieahlng of the law is not to be
extracted from a single part, portion or section or from isolated
words and phrases, clauses or sentences, 'but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, In
line with this rule, the Court finds that SE:lcFion 65's notice
of delinquency should be read in line with the Section 67's
statement that the different tax remedies: do not require a
formal demand for the payitlent but may be substituted by the
notice of delinquency. Reference to the' notice of delinquency
in relation to tax remedies; in general, illustrates the former's
function as a prerequisite to all the individual tax remedies
subsequently detailed .. Also, the phrase "noticeof delinquency
as required in Section sixty-five" found on the last part of Section
67 further underscores its mandatory nature and interrelation
to the three remedies.
It is incorrect for the respondents to claim that notice of
delinquencyhas limited application only to distraint of personal
property. They mistakenly lumped Section 65 exclusively with
Sections 68to 72 and, in so doing, restricted its application from
the other tax remedies. Section 65 is to be construed together
with Sections 66 and 78 and all three operate in reference to tax
methods in general. Definitely, there is no more logical way to
construe the whole chapter oil "Collection of Real Property Tax"
(Sections 56 to 85)than to stress that while three-methods are
provided to enforce collection on real property taxes, a notice
of delinquency is a requirement regardless of the method or
methods c,?.o_~~-
Thus, while the Court agrees with the . respondents'
interpretation that there are three methods by which taxes
may be enforced, petitioners are correct in insisting that two
notices must be sent to the taxpayer concerned. Nevertheless,
fact that will generally not be resolved-on apetition for review.

Second, records bear out that a Notice of Intent to Sell dated
October 6, 1982 was sent by the Treasurer's Office to Solomon
Torrado. While this was not captioned as a "Notice of Delin-
quency," itS contents sUfftciently inform the recipient of the
deficiency iii real prqpei:t{tlixes, arid this notice is apart from
the subsequent Notice ·of Sale seht lln.media'.tely prior to the
auction sale: · ·
Hence, on. the common issue concerning compliance with
P.D. No. 464, the Court.rules in favor of respondents,
The Court proceeds to the common issue of actual versus
constructive notice ofsale.
Petitioners Aquino argue that actual. notice .{~ required
and, therefore, the mailing of the Notice of Sale to their last
. .known address, which they had abandoned;' did not constitute
valid notice under the law .. Petitioner Heirs likewise argue
that constructive notice to the delinquent owner of the real
property by mailing is not sufficient, especially when the local
government concerned. is aware that the mailed notices have
not reached the owner,
The applicable provision in regard to this ·issue is found
in the last paragraph. of Section 73, quoted above. Under said
provision; notices: of the sale ,at public auction may be sent to
the delinquent taxpayer, either (i) at the address as shown in
the tax rolls or property tax record cards. of the municipality
or city where the property is.• located or (ii) at· his: residence,
if known to such treasurer or batrio·captaini'Plainly, Section
73 gives the treasurer the option of where ·to send the notice
of sale. In giving the treasurer the option, nowhere in the
wordings is tliere an indication of a requirement that notice
must actually be received bythe intended recipient; Compliance
by the treasurer is limited to· strictly following the provisions
of the statute:He maysend it at the address of the delinquent
taxpayer as shown in the tax rolls or tax records or to the
residence if known by him or the-barrio captain.
In Hoth,..;etitions, the City Treasurer opted to comply with
the first option. Petitioners Aquino and Petitioner Heirs do
not deny that notices were sent to their or their predecessor's
address, as shown in the tax records. The named persons in
the notices sent by City Treasurer were the correct delinquent
city where the property.is located or at his residence, df known

to such treasurer or barrio 'captain. Petitioner Heirs· have not
shown thattlie City rreasurer or barrio captain actually knew
that Solomon Terrado's residence was No. 20 North Road,
Cubao, Quezon City.; Therefore,. the 1City' Treasurer. could not
be blamedfor havin:gmailed the notices to the address shown
in the tax records, which was inconformity with Section 73.
. 111 flisppsing pf thes~ ~p.i~sues~ F4~re ,is n~ further need
to discuss the issues-of estoppei~d g~~ f~th. . .
6.02. Intent ascertained from statute as w'.li61e~ · ·

The intent" or· meaning of -a· <statute should be ascertained
froin the statu:tEi rfu!ten as a whole and not from lab: isol~ted part or
provision the:reof':ii(The 'legislative meanirig is fo1be extracted from
·a
the statute as whole)Its cla\ises ate not tel be-segregated; but every
part of a statute iato be construed with reference-to every-other
part and every word and phrase in. connection wfth its context> This
is so because' the law is the best expositor of itS,elf. 6 Qptima statuti
interpretdtrix est ipsum. statrituni: The best interpreter of a statute
is the statute itself.• · ' ' · · · ·
It has been held that in the proper interpretation .of statutes,
it is not permissibleto inquire in.to the.motives w}ric4.inflµenced the
legislative body, except insofar'a~· such motives are disdqsed by the
statute itself/' ' .• .. . .
The court in a case explained the rule in detail:
"The particular vrotds, clauses ~d phrases shoul~ not be

studied as.detached aild is~lated expressions, QJ,lt the whole
and evecy p~ of the. S~~~t~ must. be ~ops~dEffed in fixing the
meaningof any ()fits p8;rls and.inorder to produce a harmonious
8Manila Lodge No.'161 v. Co\lrl of AppeBl~. c.R. No. 4foo1, Se~~mber 30,
1976, 73 SCRA.l62;,Bon;om~,v:1~ariano,;RPbil. 32:2 (1921). '·
4Tamayo y. Gsell, ,35 Phil. !:!53 (1~11?,); Ab<iitiz Shipp~ Corp, v, City of Cebu,
G.R. No. ~452~, ~~ 61,]965,' 13~,S(?~.~\); SanciaDgcQ,v. ~no, 137 SCRA 671
(1985); Co=ssi'on& of Internal Revenue v:>·TMx·Sales, In'c.,,205 SCRA 184 (1992).
~Lopez_v, El Hogar·Eilipino;·.47 Phit 249;(1925). . , , .: · ·
"IA;lyola GrandV,ill~tto1neowner.s,<~uth) Assn.; Inc. ;v:.,(:ou,rt ofAppetV-s, 276
SCRA 6&1 (1997), citingAgpalo, Statutory Co718truction, 3rd ed,, p.197 ..
7Del Mat v. PhlL, Amtiseili'ent and G'ainiiig Corp.; 138 SCAD 952; 346 SCRA
485 (2000).. . . .
to enactment of R.A. No. 6758 .should continue. to be received by

them. This issue depends upon the proper interpretation of the first
sentence of Sec. 12 ofR.A. No.. 6758, which states that "such other
additional compensation not otherwise specified. herein as. may be
determined by the DBM shall be deemedineludeddn the standardized
salary rates herein prescribed," and the second sentence of said
-Sec, 12, which provides that "Such otheradditional compensation,
whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents 'only as
of July 1, 1989 not.integrated into the standard salary rates shall
continue to be authorized." The Court ruled that the first sentence
is a "catch-all provision" that refers to allowances, while the second
sentence refers to benefits in the nature of financial assistance and
not allowance. The Court cited. rules of statutory construction to
explain its conclusion, thus:
"Cardinal is the . rule in statutory construction ·~hat the

particular words.elauses and phrase should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but. the whole and every
part of the statute must· be considered in fixing the . meaning
of any of its parts and in order to produce a. harmonious
whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and
give effect. to all its. provisions whenever possible.' And the
rule - that statute must be construed as a whole - requires
that apparently ·.conflicting provisions should be reconciled
.. and harmonized, if possible. It is likewise .a basic. precept in
statutory construction that.the intent ofthe legislature is the
controlling factor .in the interpretation of the subject statute.13
With these rules and theforegoing distinction elaborated upon,
it is evident .that the two seemingly irreconcilable propositions
are susceptible to perfect harmony. · Accordingly, the Court
. ,.
concludes that under the aforesaid 'catch-all provision,' the ~·,
legislative intent is justto include the fdngebenefits which '
are. in the nature of allowances and. since . the benefit under ,•
'
controversy is not in the same category, it is safe to hold that

·
'
· .: ·· '.
subject educational assistance is not one of the fringe benefits

· within the contemplation of the first sentence of Section 12
but rather, of the second sentence of Section 12, in relation to L
Section 17.of:ij..A. No. 6758 xx x.""
., •I .~
13Citing
Ruben Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., pp. 181, 183, 38;
14110 SCAD 353, 311 SCRA, p. 767.
I
f
360 STATUI'ORY CONSTRUCTION
harmonious, and sensible."18 Courts .should adopt a construction

that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible .. This
rule is expressed in the maxim, ut res magis valeat quam.pereat or
that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of
the statute - its every word.» Hence, where a statute is susceptible
of more than one interpretation, the court. should adopt such
reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision
thereof operative and effective and harmonious vrith each other,«
In JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. v. NLRC,21 three
provisions of the POEA rules are involved: (1) a provision which
requires cash or surety bond as a requirement for perfecting an
appeal; (2) another provision which requires cash bond and surety
bond to answer for all valid and legal claims against the employer;
and (3) another provision which requires the amountto;be placedin
escrow to answer for claims of recruited workers.It is claimed that
the appeal cash or surety bond should not be required for perfection
of appeal from a decision of the POEA because the recruitment
agency has already posted bonds and escrow money. In rejecting such
contention, the Court ruled: "Under the petitioner's interpretation,
the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned.POEA
Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow
money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section
6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the
contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Sections 4 and 17. The
rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative
should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions
should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole. "22
18Republic
v. Reyes, G.R. No~ 22550, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 170, 193 (1966);
U.P. Board of Regents v. Auditor General, G.R. No. 19617, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
5, 19 (1969).
19Almeda
v. Florentino, G.R. No. 23800, December 21, 1965, 15 SCRA 514
(1965); U.S. v. Estapia,.37 Phil. 17 (1917); JMM Promotions & Management, Inc. v.
NLRC, 46 SCAD"492; ~28SCRA129 (1993).
20Javellana
v. Tayo, G.R. No. 18919, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 1042 (1962);
Radiola-Toshlba Phil., me. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 199 SCRA 373 (1991),
citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction,p. 182.
2146
SCAD 492, 228 SCRA 129 (1993).
=tu«, p. 138.
construction of Sec. 50. The Court.held that the contention has no

merit:
"Itis true that Sec; '50 grants the DAR primary jurisdic-
tion to determine and adjudicate 'agrarian reform matters' and
exclusive originaljurisdiction over 'all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform,'. except those falling un-
der the exclusive jurisdiction of the Deparlh;ient of Agrlculture
and the Department of Environment and· Natural· Resources.
It is also true, however, that Sec. 57 provides xx x TheSpecial
Agrarian Courts shall have original and ~X:clusive jurlsdictioli
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners, and the 'prosecution of all criminal offenses un-
der this Act. x x x The provision of Sec. 50 must b~ construed
in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving
.· the determination of just compensation· and criminal cases
for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the -plenitude
of power conferred on the· I)AR, Indeed, there is a reason for
this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which
cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases ~f eminent domain
(for such are takings under R.A.. No. 6657) and "over criminal
cases" because "the valuation of property in eminent domain
is essentially a.judicial function which cannot be vested in ad-
ministrative agencies xx x."2s
Sajonas v. Court of Appeals29 involves the issue as to what period
an adverse claim annotated at the back of atransfer certificate of title
is effective, which fu. turn depends upon the interpretation of Sec. 70
of P.D. No. 1529, which reads inpart: "The adverse claim shall be
effective for a period. of thirty days from . the date of registration.
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may
be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party
in interest: Provided, however, That after cancellation, no second
adverse claim based on the same ground shall b~ registered by the
same claimant." In holding that the effectivity of a duly annotated
adverse claim does not lapse 'after thirty days but continues until
cancelled by the court in a verified petition filed for the purpose, the
Court applied the,
~ . . i;W.es
.-
of statutory construction, thus:
=tu«, pp. 762-763.

29 71 SCAD 542, 258 SCRA 79 (1996).
364 STATUTORY CONSrRUCTION
the adverse claimant -an opportunity to 'be heard, providing

a venue where ~e piopriefy: of his claimed interest be can
established ortevoked:;allifor;thepurpose ofdetermini:iig at last
the existence of any enc'imibrimce on the title: arising from such
adverse claim. This is ill line with the provision 'immediately
following:
-. (· ,.i" ' '··.1.= ;··.---, :· ·.: ' .·; ' ,-!-_ .... _,. - - •
'Provided~' lwwever' Th.at' .after.' cancellation, no second

adverse clatm sllrilf be ;e.?f ster~~ by the simie el~aht.'"•0
' '
6.06. Speciiµand genel"~~proVisio~ in sam.~,statute.
Where there is a particular or, special proyis~9n and a general
provision in the same
statute.alt4jth~J~~r:~~~sin,(}stCo~re1}~~s~ve
sense would overrule the former, the particular or special provision
must-be operative and thegeneralprovision mustbetaken to affect
only the other.parts of the statute to which it may properly apply.
In other .wordscthe particular or special· provision is construed as
an exception to the general provision. In this way,,allthe provisions
are given effect. •1
6.07. Constru~~i~n~~not. ~q-r'ende:r:.pJ:~Vision

nuga~,ory.
Another corollary of the rule that the whole statute should, if
possible, be given effect is that a provision of a statute should be so
construed as 'not to' nllllify or' rend~~nuS-iitory another provision of
the same statute.« · ' · '· ··
Thus, Sec.·24. of P.D. No.:464, otherwise known as "The Real
Property Tax Code," which provides the effective date of assessment
or re-assessment of property, subject to. tax and made applicable
protectively, and Sec. 25 thereof which covers other property subject
to assessment and to back taxes, should be construed together and
both given effect, for "if Section 24 is the only applicable provision
in. cases where a ~.ayer hai:; eluded the, pa.yme.At of the correct
amount of taxes .for more .t9._~ nine;(~) years,.as,m@s case, Section
~.5 of P.D. No. 4,64 which r~qltjt'.es, the payment of back taxes will be
rendered superfluous. and nugatory." sa
______ #_. ·,; '~
»tu«, pp.·95:98.
81Lich~tico
& Co. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138 (1922); Cassion v. Banco Nacional
Filipino, 89 Phil. 560 (1951).
32People
v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil, 664 (1958). .· . .. .
.
83Sesbreiio
360 (1997).
v, Central Board of,.A,ssesslllent Appeals,
. ,' ' ' ' ' '
.SCAD 62, 270 SCRA
'
iii
with the general plan of the whole statute. However; if there be no

such ground for choice between inharmonious provisions or sections,
the latter provision or section, being the last· expression of the leg-
islative will, must, in construction, vacate the former to the extent
of the repugnaney,» It has been held that in ease of irreconcilable
conflict between two provisions of the same statute, the last in order
of position is frequently held to prevail, unless it clearly appears
that the intent of the legislature is otherwise. 39 Thus, where a provi-
sion of a statute states that the board of medical examiners shall be
composed of six members to be appointed by the President from a
list of not more than twelve names approved and submitted by the
Philippine Medical Association, and a later provision of the same
statute allows the reappointmentofµi.eµi.bers whose terms expired,
a person reappointed by thePresidsnt need not be in the list of rec-
ommendees of the Philippine Medical Association,«
Where there is apparent conflict between two laws or provisions
of a law which refer to the same subject matter and they cannot be
harmonized and made to. stand together by a fair and reasonable
interpretation, the circumstances of their passage, among other aids
to construction, should be inquired into to determine which should
prevail. For instance, Rep. Act No. 1631 granted letter carriers a
Pl.00 post allowance. per day, while Rep. Act No. 1800, a general
appropriations act, prescribed post allowances for letter carriers and
special delivery messengers of P0.50 each day. In holding that letter
carriers were not entitled to P0.50 in addition to Pl.00 under Rep.
Act No. 1631, the Court took into account the fact that at the time
the P0.50 post allowance was proposed, Rep. Act 1631 had not been
enacted, indicating the legislative intent not to grant letter carriers
the P0.50 post allowance in addition to what had been provided in
Rep. Act No.1631, and the fact that the subsequent appropriations
act granted letter carriers and special delivery messengers post
allowances of Pl.00 and P0.50 each day, respectively. In this
instance, the earlier law was made to prevail over the later law.41
.
'· :.u!..
.
Lich1:mco
38
& Co. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138 (1922).
39Cuyegkeng
v. Cruz, l08·Phil.1147 (1960); Montenegro v. Castaneda, 91 Phil.
882 (1952).
40Cuyegkeng
v. Cruz, 108 Phil. 1147 (1960).
41Manila
Letter Carriers' Assn. v. Auditor General, 108 Phil. 605 (1960).
IUustrative of the rule is Paras v. COMELEC. se The issue raised

in this case refers to the interpretation . of the phrase "regular local
election," in Sec. 74 °of the LoealGovsmment Code of 1991 which
states that "Any elective focal o:$c~a.I, may be the subject of a recall
election only once. during his term of office for loss of confidence" and
"No recall shall take place Within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption of office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election." The question is whether tli'e phrase "regular
local election" includes.the SKeleclion which is set by Rep. Act No.
7808 to be held very three years from May 1996, while the regular
local election was held in: May 1995, also every three years thereaf-
ter. Pursuant to Sec. 7 4 of the Code, there would be no recall election
from May 1995 to May 1996 nor from May 1997 to May ~998, except
from May 1996 to May 1997. If the SK election which was scheduled
in May 1996 is included in the phrase "regular local election," there
would be no recall election from May 1996 to May'l997, which would
mean that there would be· no recall election at all, rendering the re-
call provision nugatory. TheCourt ruled that to construe the phrase
"regular local election" as including SK elections, "no recall election
can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code:"· It heldthat it would "be :inore in keeping with
the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular lo-
cal election· as one· referring to an election where the office held· by
the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and
be filled by the electorate." lt added that this construction is in ac-
cordance with. the rule that in the "interpretation of a statute, the
. Court should start with the assumption that th~ legislature intended
to enact an effective law, andthe legislature is not presumed to have
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute." An interpretation
should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, de-
stroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insig-
nificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.xx x It is likewise
a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with-the Constitution. Thus, the interpreta-
tion of Section 74 oftheLocal Government Code, specifically para-
graph (b) thereof, should not be .in conflict with the Constitutional
mandate of Sf:!ctnon 3 of Article X ofthe Constitution to 'enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and .ac-
5076 SCAD 40, 264 SCRA 49 (1996).

370 STATVTORY CONSTRUCTION
meaningless in the sen~e of adding nothing to the law or having no

law
effect whatsoever theizem.04· Nor sh:o'uld a word ·be -so construed as to
Cha
re~der other wordsor phrases'assceiated with it serve no purpose,«
that
This means . ~hat alleif?rls sho~d be exerted to ·give some meanillg offi
to ev~ry word or phrase used in a statute. For' the legislature in
othe
enacting a law, is presumed-to: have used the word or phrase. for a
que
purpo~e. In short' t~~·legisl~tfil."e, in enacting a statute, is supposed a c
not to insert a provision which is unnecessary and a surplusage,e
que
and
6.12. Application of rule. the
Som: cas~s may ;b~ cited to..
illustrate the rule, In Mejia v. ma
city
Balalon?, the issue raised refers totheinterpretation of Section 88
of the City. C~arter; of Dagupan Cit~ ~hicJ?. reads: "The c!ity govern- "an
1such
me~t provided form this charter shall be 'organized on a. date me
as ~ay b? fixed byW,~ ~~.~~dent of.th~ P!lllippines and upon the
qualification oft~~ city mayoi: ~d theappointment or election of the req
members .. ~fth,,e ¥1U:filcipal b<>8A'4: Pending the next general electicm co
~d m~cipal officiaJs, the ofii<!es ofthe members of the board shall pe
be filled by the ~pp~in~~n~.of.the':President of the Philippines, with ref
~he consent of,th~ ~om,["1ss~o~ on Appointments." Should the phrase Th
. next general election•. be .t~e. °:e~ one after the creation or coming res
mto exi.stence of the city, ~~ch is the date the law took effect, or a
should it be 1'.he ,n~xt one ~er the organization of the city govern- ci
ment by Presid~ntial P.rocla.ma~ion? The court ruled that the phrase fo
refers to the next ~eneral el~ction after the city came into being and ye
not the one afterits,organizatiOn by Presidential proclamation. "To A
hold that the next general elections to which thelaw refers 'are those al
to be held after the date of the organization ofthe city government he
set b! the President, would make the alternative provision for the q
election of the members of the board nugatory or superfluous be- to
cause on the date set for organization of the governmentof the City th
of Dagupan, there would never be members of the Municipal Board b
elected. "6s . · ·
c
o
.....
04Uyten~U:.
v. Bepublic, 95 Pim: S90 (1954)~ People v. Gatchalian 104 Phil.
664 (1958); MeJ1a v. Balalong, 81 Phil: '497'(1948)-'Niere' v, Court of First j tali . f
o
N
Negros Occidentl)l>,'g.:a!No. 30324; November 29;,,f973 54 SCRA165 SeensSec 4celo8 a
supra. ' · · · · •
t
MJavellima v. Kintanar, G.R. No. 33169, Ju:ly 30 1982 115 SCRA 627
58~foGee v. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 (1954). ' ' ·
5781 Phil. 497 (1948).
MRepublic Act No. 170.

59Mejia
v. Balalong, supra.
uninterrupted domicile or legal residence, ' irrespective of actual

residence, for said legal residence or domicile is obligatory under the
law, even in the absence of the requirement contained in said clause,
and it is well-settled that, whenever possible; a legal provision must
not be so construed as to be a useless surplusage, and, accordingly,
meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no
effect whatsoever thereon. This consequence may be avoided; onlyby
construing the clause in question as demandingactual residence in
the Philippines from the filing- of'the petition for naturalization to its
determination by the court.t=
In Manila Lodge No. 761 u. Court of Appeals,es 'the law involved
is Public Act 1360, which authorized the pity of Manila to reclaim
a portion of Manila Bay,. to. {orm' part. of the Lunet1 extension
and stipulated that the reclaimed land "shall be property of the
City of Manila." The Act also provided that the Cify of Manila "i's
hereby authorized to set aside a portion thereof at the north end
for a hotel site and either to lease or sell. the same." The question
is whether said reclaimed land is ·patrimonial land or. of.public
dominion intended for public use. The answer to the question would
determine the main issue of whether the sale of a portion of.the
reclaimed area without legislative authorization is null and void.
The court held that if the land is patrimonial; it can be disposed of
without statutory authorization. The Act uses the phrase "is hereby
authorized." To authorize means to empower, to give a right to act,
and "hereby'' means "by means of this statute or action." To hold that
the reclaimed land is patrimonial property, which can be disposed of
without statutory authorization; is to render the provision of the law
to the effect that the City of Manila -~is hereby authorized to lease
or sell" a portion thereof superfluous. And to so construe the statute
as to render the phrase superfluous would violate the elementary
rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must begiven to every word,
clause, and sentence of the . statute and that a statute must be so
interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative. . .
6.1-3. Statute and its amendments construed together.

The rule that all parts of a ~tatute are to be harmonized and
reconciled so ~~t.e'ffect may be given to each and every part thereof
lbid., at p. 893.
62
63 G.R. No. 41001, September 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 162 (1976).
tional limitations. Courts should accordingly presume that it was

the intention of the Iegislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just
law and one which operates no £urtherthan may be necessary toef-
fectuate the specific purpose of the law.""
It is a well-settled rule .of statutory censtruction that a statute
should be construed whenever possible in a manner that will avoid
conflict with the Constitution." The statute must be read and
understood in the light of such provisions of the constitution as may
bear on the subject so as fa harmonize the former with the Iatter and
avoid their conflicting with each other. It should not be construed in
such a way as Will give rise to a constitutional :dotibt/i Nor should
it be interpreted in such a maimer as will render its application
violative ofa constitutional inliibition.12 Under the same principle,
the constitutionality ofa statute should not be prejudiced by applying
the· statute · in a mariner that Will render it unconstitutional.w
The statute should instead be interpreted to assure its being In
consonance with, ratherithan repugnant to,· any constitutional
command or prescription. It should be given a ·con'struction that is
in harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law.14
Where a statute is reasonably susceptible of two constructions,
one constitutional and the other unconstitutional, that construction
in favor of'its constitutionality slla:ll be 'adopted, 1~ andthe construction
that Will render;itinvalid.frejected.1• To. save the statute from a
declaration of unconstitutionality, · it must be given a reasonable
69ln re Guarina, 24 Phil 37 (1913).

7"Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San Miguel Corp. v. Avelino, G.R.
No. 39699, March 14, 1979, 89 SCRA 69; Automotive Parts & Eqwpment Co. v. Lin-
gad, G.R. No. 26406; October 31, .1969; 30 SCRA 248; Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,
87 Phil. 309 (1950); In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (19i3).
71Abellana
v, Marave, G.R. No. 27760, May 29, 1974, 57SCRA106.
72People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1SS5); · · · .: . · ·· ·.
73
Assoaacion AgricUltores 'de' Talisay-Silay; Inc. v. Talisay-Silay Milling Co;;
Inc., G.R. No. 19937, February 19, 1979, 88 SCRA 294.
74Mutuc
• v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 32717, November 26, 197.0, 36
SCRA 228; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. V; Land Teriure Adm., G.R. No. 21064, Febru-
ary 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413; .American Bible So'ciety v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386
(1957). > .'.t. .". .· .· '
75Alba
v. Evaiig~lista, 100 Phil. 683 U957); Maddumba v. Ozaeta, 82 Phil 345
(1948); Benguet Exi)loration, Inc. v. Department of AgricUlture and Natural Resourc-
es, G.R. No. 29534, February 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 285 (1977); De Ia Cruz v. Paras, G.R.
No. 42591, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 569.
76Assosacion
AgricUltores· de Talisay-Silay, Inc. v. 'I'alisay-Silay 'Milling Co.,
Inc., G.R. No. 19937, February 19, 1979, 88 SCRA 294.
376 · · 'STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
laws effective upon-approval or on any other date without previous

publication is to collide with or ·Violate the due -process clause of the
Constitution. which requires publication of a law before it becomes
binding. Hence, where the.lawarerely.provtdes that it shall take
effect immediately, it means that it shalltake effect after. fifteen
days from publication in the Official Gazette; unless it provides a
different date of effectivity from publication in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general publication, in which case it shall take
effect as thus otherwise provided." '
6.15. Statutes in parimateria; ·

Statutes are, in: pari materia when: they relate to the same
person or thing, or have the same purpose or object, ·Qi' cover the
same specific or particular subject matter.83 TheJater atatute may
specifically refer . to the prior statutes. However, the fact that no
reference is made to the priorlaw does not mean that the two 'laws
are not in pari materia» I,t .is sufficient, in order that they may be
considered in pari materia, that the two or more statutes relate
to the same. -specific subject matter. Conversely, two or more laws
are not in pari materia if they refer to different specific matters,
although they bothfall under the same broad subject. 86
6.16. How statutes·in pari materia construed.

The rule is that a statute should be so construed not only
to be consistent ·with itself but also to harmonize with other laws
on the same ~ubject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
intelligible system.•The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare
et concordare leges legibus.est optimus interpretandi modus, or every
statute must be sd construed and harmonized with other statutes as
to form a uniform system of'jurisprudence.s Consistency in statutes
as in executive issuances is of prime importance, and, in the absence
821J'aii.ada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986).

"'City ofNaga v. Agna, G.R. No. 36049, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 285; Bagatsing.
v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631; December 17, 1876, 74 SCRA 306.
"Government Yi. Municipality of Binangonan, 32 Phil. 643 (1915).
MF!ores v•. :'Sari Pedro, 102 Phil. 44 (1957). ·
MRep~lic v. Asuncion, 49 SCAD 573, 231 SCRA 211, citing Ruben E. Agpalo,
Statutory Construction; p. ·192 (2nd ed., 1990); Cabada v. Alunan m, 73 SCAD 521,
260 SCRA 838 (1996), citing·Ruben E. Agpalo;StatutoryConstruction, 192 (2nd ed.,
1990); Valera v. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1948); Corona v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA
378 (1992), citing Agpalo, Statutory Con.Struction, p. 192.
378 STATUTORY CONS'rnl]CTION
against the other-Courts should.harmonize them.,.if this is possible,

because they are equ~y the handiwork ofthe same legislature.~ ,
The Court sums·up-;·. the ru:ie:
..:.-1,·:.:·,:,
in case;9sthus:
·- - .
(W)e ruled that ' stattites • in ·:pari materia should . be

construed together: to attain the_ purpose of an expressed
nation~.policy. - '' -- · - · -
"On the assumptionrthat whenever the legislatuee enacts
a provision· it has in niind the previous statutes. relating to the
same subject matter, it is h~ld.that in the absence of any express
repeal or Sinendment \h~rei.D:>th~ n~w·
ptd-rlsion vvas' enacted
ill accord-With-the ·iegislati~e''l)6licy'~m'.Hoffiea· m .tfiose prl9r
statutes; and they allsMU:ld'be ccnstrued togetherx-:Provl'sfons
in an act which are otjiittediti:another act reh#in:gfu thErsarile
subject matter will be applied fu• a prdce~diligunderthe other
act when -not fo.consistelit With its purpose: Prior statutes
relating to the same' subject matter ate to be compared with
the new provisions, and if pbssible by reasonable <:oristructiJn;
both are to be construed'that effect is given to every proVisiti:i:i
of such. Statutes in pan m:<:iteiiq~although iri apparent conflict,
are so far as reasonablypoasible'constrriedto be in harmony
with each other."
It has been held that "~ t;4e.. construction ofa particular
statute, or in the interpretation of any of its. provisions, all
acts relating to the same, subject, orhaving th~ same ge~epil
purpose should be_ read in connection wit4-- it, _ as together
constituting one law: The endeavor show!! be made by traciD.g
the history of the legislation on the subject, .to ascertalli the
uniform and consistent purpose of tp.e'legisfature, or to di.scover
how the policy of the.legislature with r~ference to the subject
or
matter has been changed modified. from time to time. With
to
this purpose in view, t}i~refR:i;e, it is proper consider not' only
acts passed at the same session of the legislature, but also acts
passed at prior and subsequent sessions, and even those which
have been repealed.?»
112Gordon v . .Veridiano II, l67. SCRA,51:(1988). --

93Vda. de.Urbano v. QSIS, G.R.:No.137904, October 19', 2001.
IMQld Hoinest.ead Bakery v. Mar&h, 75 Cal, App. 24 7, 242 P 749 (1926); see also
Valera v. Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 (1948). -
380 .STATUTORYiCONSTRUCTION
Statutes inpari materia sheuld-berread and con8ttued together

because· enactments: ofrthe · same. legislature 'on; the. same .stibj~
are 'Supposed to ;rorm.. part; ofcene itinifohn system; later statutes
are supplementary or, complimentary .to the earlier •enactments
and, in the passage: of its acts~ .:.ther·lC:)gislature is .supposed to
have in mind the existing .legislations: on, the:· subject and to .have
enacted its new act with reference thereto .. Having: thus in mind
the previous s~tu~ ~latjngto ~hf3. ~~e.subje~ ~Eitt~r·. whenever ,
t4e legi~1a1'.4re~hacti3. ~~i}.~\y tEl-Wdt}~~;d~~fu~a.t~'!ia.y~ en,act.ed, th~ L'.
new'' rovisibn m'acc6i'dance'\v1th'thcfl~gis1ative·policy embodied in
thos:prior '~tliajfes 'f1.i?:a/ u#J'.~~~ i~eN.i,S lri,i'e~f~,s!J''i~i>eaJ. 6f~~e 6!d
laws the all should be coristfuecf"ro'ether. ~ co~truirig them, the
oid ;tJture~'
··-
~~latii{
···: · :-g~(\
I·_.··
. t01··_th'.e''
· ~:
Jairi~()~~~ri~Jioili.&
.' .'·r-::-----._."T··· ·:·• ;r-:·,._·;··:_· .. ·.
;'r._:,-,_
be ;~omp'at~d
,.'''• · ~ ·····'.'··
~with
the new. proVi~~~6nsajldif'P.<>sS.~ble,by re.9.~ona,:b~~;coiistJilicti~n, both
should be colistru~d 't'l!Ei~ '~ffe(#;
eacb.:101 ' ,. ' ' ' ' ,, '•' . '• '
may']?~
' ' ' ·,
~ven ~·· ~yeg' provision of
' ' ·,
6.18., Wh~re h~o~~ti~i;t:~s)mi);,sl[lible~

ff two· or jno~ Iaws-on ·tlie slilri.e11Subjectl1canriot· possibly be
reconciled· or h~onized; dii.tf hti~· to,. ··ve1:Wa . in favor of·the other.
There cannot&~tWo cf,'·· "ctiri.g1aws';o1fthe' same•subject··Either
the two laws are reconciled and harmonized or, if they cannot,· tbe
earlier one must Yield to the later one, it being the later expression
or legislative· will.10? ' '<· ; ! ' ~
6:19. lliustration
. ' ' ·.
ol.t' he rid~.
. i::·
Where a statute provides- that the; ~a.yor shall hold. office

for four years unless sooner. re:m:oV'ed;";the phrase "uhl~ss .sooner
removed" should be read cin>telation,to removal statutes and
construed to -mean that the.;Jiiaybr· cannot, be· rernoved during his
term except for cause as proVided'by law and after due process, since
the legislature is presumed to have Su.cWremovahtatutes in mind
when.it employed the phrase.t= A statute which directs that "when
the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines
as a grave felony, the court
shall.order his confinement in one of
the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, who shall not be
permitted to. l~ave wi.tp.out'J4·st tjbtajping .·permission. of ,the same
..
101City ofNaga v. Agna, G.R. No. 36049• May 31, 1976;.71SCRA176.
102City of Naga v. Agna, supra; Erena v, Vergel.de Dioe, 85 Phil. 17 (1947).
103Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil 456 (1953).-.
382 .STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION
.· another province is prohibited by the retail trade law. The Supreme

Court ruled otherwise and said.thatthe retail trade law and Section
19~.~fthe ~ax Code.are inpari,matetja.Jtstated that the trial court
"overlooked entirely, however, ~11~.cJear provision of Section 199 of
the Internal Revenue Code x x x whichhas.not ,been repealed either
exp;ressly or implledlyby Republic Act No~ Uso.""The legality of such
transfer, .therefore, CaIJ.)n,nQ Wise be •(J.Uestioned·. and. COIJ.Sequently
petitioner's business in pµiliague~ should not .be considered as a
new one in coniempiat~on:·o:(tlie.~.aforesajd Republic Act N'o. 1180."
v:
lli C & C Coni~reial, Corp. · National Waterworks &
Sewerage Authority,1 the issue refers to the interpretatjon·of two
(Yf
statutes requiring that preference be .made in the purchase and

use of Phfhppine-made materials and products, Republic Act No.
912 in .Section ·2 provides that "in the construction or tepair work
x
undertaken by the Government, x x Philippine-made' materials
arid products, whenever avilil'able, practical and usable xx x shall be
used.in.saidcohstrUCtionor I"epmr workxx.x," Ort the otherhand,
Commonwealth Act No; 138,' otherwise known' as. the Flag Law,
gives native products preference in the purchase ofarticles by the
Government,inclUdinggoverninent-;ownedorcontrolledcorporations;
The argument has been advanced that since Commonwealth Act No.
138 expressly includes-purchases by government-ownedcompanies
while Republic Act No, 912 merely relates to construction or repair
by the Government, government-owned or controlled corporations
have been excepted from the operation of the later statute. In
rejectiiig such argument, the court said. that being statutes in pari
materia, they should be construed to attain the sanie objective - to
give preference to· locally produced. materials in purchases, works
or projects of the Government=- the accomplishment of which will
be defeated if government-owned or controlled corporations are
excluded from the operation of Republic Act No. 912; ·
In Cab~cla v. Al~nan iu» .the issue is whether or not an .
appeal lies from the decisfon of regional appellate board imposing
disciplinary action against a member of the Philippine National
Police under Sec. 45ofRep.AciNo. 6975, whieh reads:
"Sec. 45; :finality of disciplinary action. - The disciplinary
action' imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and
ex~tOry: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by
107G.R. No. 27275, November 18, 1967, 21SCRA984 (1967).

10873 SCAD 521, 260 SCRA 838 (1996).
therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has

decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its decision may still
be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG."109
In Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. CA,110 the issue raised was
who was entitledto "breakages," which refers to the fraction often
centavos from dividend of winning horse race. tickets. Republic Act
No. 309 as. amended by R.A No. 6631.and RA No. 6632 is silent
on the matter' but the practice .is 'to use breakages for anti-bookie
drive and other salE! promotions of a(:tivities of the horse racing club:
Thereafter, Executive OrdersNos:'88 and89 allocated the breakages
to beneficiaries therein.specified. The Court ruledthat R.A. No. 309,
as amended, and the Executive Orders should be' harmoriized, and
as thus harmonized, all breakages derived from all races on any
race day should be distributed and allocated in accordmicewith the
Executive Orders because "No law can be viewed in a condition of
isolation or as the beginning of a: new legal system. A supplemental
law becomes ah addition to the existing statutes, or 'section 'thereof
and its eft'e<itisnotto chaiige in anyway the provisions of thelatter
but merely t6 extend the operation thereof, or give additional power
to enforceitsprovi~fons; as the case may be. In enacting a particular
statute, legislators are pr{!stjinedto have full kri<>wledgeand to have
taken full cogiiizari.ceof tM existing laws oil the same subject or
those relating·thereto. "111
6.20. General and speeial statU~s.

A general statute is a statute whichapplies to all of the people
of the state or to all of a particular class of persons in the stare,
with equal force.w It is· one which. embraces a class of subjects or
places and does not omit any subject or place naturally. belonging
to such class.w It is one of universal application affecting the. entire
eommunity.o- On the other hand, a special statute, .as the tennis
generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or
"'"Ibid., pp. ~· citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statr1rtory Construction, 192 (2nd

ed., 1990). .,, . ./ .l
118300 SCRA 181 (1998).
=tu«, P• 195.
112U.S. v. Serapio, 23 Phil. 584 (1912).
113Valera s: Tuason, 80 Phil. 823 .(1948); Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. 31711,
September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190 (1971).

114Bagatsingv. R&mirez, G.R: No. 41631, December 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 306.
Thus; P..D. No. 959; as amended, 'which confers upon. the

National Housing Authority exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving µp.spµnd r,ea1;.~st~~~'<;Bu,,~m.~~s ;~\l'.~ctjces and . claims
involving refund and any·. otlJ,e:i;-:. ~Imm$.· ,agamst. land -, developers
prevail over B.P: Big. 12~ ~ru,c'figr~t~ J.Wwo1~'.'~~itl
poUI"ts.~ener~
jurisdiction, over.such cases, ·evE!ll ~h~ll ~lu~l,att~r:w~ ~n,~~d later
than theforinerbecau8eB.:P. B.lg.129 is agenerallaw.and P.D.No.
957, as' ~end~d,is ·~ special !~~·~1 .. .. ; ; ; ' '.. . ..
P~D. No. 1869·· authorized the· PAQCOR'·to centralize and

regulate all games of chance, includirig c;asirios'on land arid sea
within Philippiiie territorial jup~dictiori. On. the other hand,
the Local Government Code 'of 1991; a later law, empowers focal
government uni~s to en9:ct. ptdirlances t0 prev~ht 44
·'s~ppress
"gambling and other prohiln~dJ~~es ofchance, . . '.ft1e.9otiit ~ed
that these fy.ro statutes should b~J~aimonized. ~Qµ ~he ,assup:tption
of a conflict hetWeen P.D. No.1869' and the Code; the proper action
is not to uphold one and annul.the.other; but to,~veeffect.to both by
harmonizing.them ifpossible .. ·This.is,possible in the case before us.
The proper solution of the problem at. hand.is to hold.that under the
Local Government Code, local· government units may (and. indeed
must) prevent and suppress all kinds. of gambling within their
territories. except onlythose allowed by statutes like P.D. No. 1869.
The exception reserved in such laws must be· read into the Code; to
make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually
complementary."= ·
Where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
particular case,' the one designed therefor specially should prev~.
In accordance with this rule, Republic Act No. 776 which empowers
the general manager of the 'Civil Aeronalitics' Ad:ministratio11. to
lease real prope'rtjr wider its administration prevails . over the
Administrative Code, a geiier.allaw, which authorizes the President
of the Philippines to execute a lease contract relating to real property
belonging to the Republie.w
· In Calingin .v. CA, [G.R. No. l546i6. JUiy 12; 2004], the Court
citing Lapid u, CA, ruled that where two'Iaws apply to a particular
~· y·,~ . . .· ·. :· . . . . ·.'.
i:uSolid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal, 177.SCRA·72 (1989). ·

122Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., 63 SCAD 367, 234 SCRA 255, 272
(1994). . ·. . ; .· . . ' .
1281..everiza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 282 (1988).
388 STATU'PORY CONSTRUCTION -
6.22. Qu~ations of.the r,Ule~ · .

The rule that the general law must yield to the sped.alla\v in the
specific and pf)ItjcµlliJ:'..,l!lubject; e.wl?i:~c~cl in thela~:r, irrespectiv~ of
the date' of passage o(tM special law, is no~ ab,solute .. On.e exception
is that where . theJegislatµre; ~l,ero::ly intended the Iater - general
enactment fu.cover.the,w~ole su,bj~ct; an,d,t().,1i~P~a:l, all prior laws
inconsistent j;herewitQ, •the:gei;tel"al law ;prevail,_S;;ove:i; a special law
on the subject._I~-such·qase~ tl~er~:is a repeal of:the speci~ 1~~·123
- Another exception tQ.:_the pm;Ci.J>ie.'~is whe~, :th~
-s~§itl law
inere1y; estabush¢s_'a ge~ffr~'~tUle"while _Fhe ge,#e~_a:11~"7 cj:ea~s
a - si>ecil,ic_·~~ .si>~Ci81}·1ue,: .-~
wbi~~ c~s~ the, .g~il~ral .1a~ ·.pfyv~
over the s1lecia'f:.1~~'.'.2::'P>-~~PP:n~~~~~}~t a S~f~a:l law .q.nda ~UbJect
prevails over a general law-on the same suoJect presuppos~s that
the.general lawrrefersrtc 1Jhe;SUbject;ingeneral and ·the special law
treats the same subject1in•patticill.ar. The rule does not apply where
the situation is reversed, that'is,.·the generallaw·treats'the subject
in particular· and the' specialilaw refers <to it in general. In this
situation; the general law prevails overthe Special law in the event
ofrepugnancy or cdilflict bet_Ween the two laws.121 . - .
6.23. :lb;re:rence~tiitute's~
·, 1 .
'.
A reference statute is a statute which refers to other statutes
and makes them applicable to the subject of legislation. It is
incorporation in a statute . of another statute -l:>Y reference. The
adoption of a statute by reference m.akes it as much .a ~a.rt'..
of the
adopting statute as if it had been incorporated . therein m ~·
Reference statiites are frequently used to avoid encumbering
the statute books of unnecessary repetition; and. they 'have been
recognized as a1t fil)pro;ved;riieth~ of Iegislaticn, in the absence of
constitutio:D.ai:restnctfons.128' ' .
-
126!.ichiiuoo v. civil Aeronautic8J3o~. G.R. No. 32979, February 29, 1972, -~

SCRA 670· Gaerlan v. Caiu.big, G.R. Ni>. 23964, June 1, 1966, i 7 SCRA 376; Marii:iel
v, De la Fuente, 9iPhiJ.. 302 US52).'' ._ .- . ' •
.. v:
~City- of.Mani1a •Teotico, G\R. No. 23052, J anwu")".29, l968; ·22 SCRA 276.
See Sec. 10.28, irifra, for detaile,d, discussion as to when a later, generallaw repeals a
prior speciallaw on the same subject: . . .
'21Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41636, December 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 306
(1976). -
128Jlrimicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446 (1953); People v. Martin, G.R. No. 38019,
May 16, 1980, 97 SCRA.591'. (1980).
6.25. Reenacted statutes.

A statute which reenacts a previous statute. or the. provisions
thereof is known as a reenacted statute. A reenactment is one in
whi~h the provisions of an ear lie~
statute are reproduced in the' Sl:lllle
or substantially. the same words.= The reenactment may also be
madeby reference. Thus, where a statuteprovidestha,talllawsnot
inconsistent with the' -provisions thereof are 4~tm1ed Incorporated
and made integral parts-_thereofby reference; such previous laws on
the same subiect ln.atter-~e deemed reenacted.w .
It is presumed that' tb.elegislature kJ:i~~si ~o~hil:ction which
has been fil_ven J?y the courts .to a statute which has been reenacted
by it. The reenactmeitt is aJ~gislative expressf.011 of ,intention to
adopt the . construction as w~IJ. a~. the langl1age of: the.' prior act,. It
is accordingly a settled rule of statutpry const:ni,cti.<).n t}).at when a
statute or a provision.thereof has been construed by the .court ofla,st
resort and the sam'.e is substantially reenacted, 'the legislature may
be regarded as, a4c>piin.g, such con~ction, and· the -constructicn
becomes an integral part of the reenacted statute with the force
and effect of a legislative command.w In the interpretation of the
reenacted statute, the courtswillfollow the construction which the
adopted statute-previously received.i« .
The case of Montelib~no v: Ferrer» illustrates-the application
of the rule. Section 3 of the City Charter ofMaiiila provides thatthe
"prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila: (cityflaeal) shall have
charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors, and violations
of city ordinances, . in the Court .· of First· Instance'and municipal
courts of the City of Manila, J;Ie shall investigate all charges of
crimes, misd.enieanors, and viol,ati6ns of ordinances and prepare the
necessary informations or. make· the . neces~ary .complaints. ·agaiD.st
the. persons accused, and discharge all other duties .iii respect to
criminal prosecutions enjoined upon provincial fiscals," The .,cot.irt
has construed this provision to mean that criminal complaints filed
by offended parties directly with the courts without the intervention
------."'"""':"',{· .
IMJn re Dick; 38 Phil. 41 (1918); Dykes v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 259 NW
700, 98 ALR 1332 (1935). . · ·. . .·
is5Laz~ v: Commission on Elections, .123 Phil. 907 (1966). ·
138/n re Dick, supra. ' . · .
187~fo:iitelibano
v. Ferrer, 97 Phil.. 228 (1955).
1ssg7 Phil. 228 (1955).
392 STATUTORY'CONSTRUCTION
6.27. Qualification of the rule.

The rule that w}J.en a judicial or contemporaneous construction
has been given to a statute, ~e r~p.aci;n,>.etlt~fthestaiuteis generally
held to be in effect alegisl~tive adoption o.fthe·construetioil, applies
only when the statute iscapable of the coristruclion.given to it and
when that construction has become a settled rule· of conduct. "2
6.28. Adopted statutes.

An adopted·statute is a statute-patterned after, or copied from
a statute of a foreign country, Tn-eonstruing an adoptedstatute, it
is proper for the court to take into consideration the construction of
the law by the courts of the country from which it is taken, as well
as the law itself and the practices. under it, for the l(;lgislature is
presumed to have adoptedsuch construction and practices with the
adoption of the law.''" The presumption does not,·ifowever, apply to
construction given the statute subsequent to its adi:'iption,although it
has persuasive effect on the interpretation of'the ~dopted statute. '"
I .. ! .{
142The
Dollar Savings Bank v. United-States, 22 L. ed. 80 (1873).
''"See Sec. 3.28, supra, for a detailed•discussion on the subject.
'"State v. Hill, 869 P2d 363, 91 ALR 2d 750 (1962),
7.03. Liberal construction, defined,

Liberal construction means such equitable construction
as will enlarge the letter. of a statute to accomplish its intended
purpose, carry out its intent, or promote justice.6 It does not mean
enlargement of a provision which.is clear, u,pru.nbiguous and free
from doubt, for a•sfatUte which is
'plain arid deh is not subject to
construction.7 Nor does it mean thatthe.werds should be forced out
of their natural meaning, tlb~rai ~on'.st~ction is that construction
which expands the meaning of a statute to meet cases which are
clearly within the spirit or reason thereof orwithin the evilwhich
the statute was designed to remedy, or which gives a statute its
generally accepted meaning to the end that the inost comprehensive
application thereof may be accorded; without bein,g fn,con,sistent
with its language or doing violence to any of its terms.' In short,
liberal construction niearis that the 'words·'should receive .a fair
and reasonable. interpretatio:ii,. so as to. attain the intent, spirit and
purpose of the law,s · · · · -. ·
7.04. Liberal eonstructton applied, generally.

Where a statute is ambiguous· and capable· of more than one
construction, the literal meaning of the words. used may be rejected
if the result of adopting said meaning would be to defeat the purpose
of the law.> Instead, the statutewill be givena liberalinterpretation
so as to save the statute from obliteration. No rule of construction is
better accredited than that which is expressed in the Latin maxim,
ut res magis valeat quam pereas» By liberai construction, the court
from the language used, the subject matter, and the purpose of the
legislature will be able to find out the true meaning of
the statute.
There is a sharp distinction; however, between construction of this
nature and the act of the court in engrafting upon a law something
which it believes ought to have been embraced therein. The form.er
is liberal construction and is a·legitimate exercise of'judicial power.
The latter is judicial legislation forbidden by the tripartite division of
6Causeyv.puil(o\od Country, 135 S.E. 40.

7See Sec. 2.15~ 11upra. . ·. · · . ·
8Crescent
City v. Griffin,87 P2d 414; Maryland Cas~~ty Co. v. Smith, 4o S.W.
2nd 913. . . . . ·· · · · · ·
"Laurence v. McCalmont, 43 U.S. 426, 11 L~ ed. 316 (i844).
10Jtiera
v. Palmorali, 40 Phil. 105 (1919).
11Javellana
v. Nuftez, 40 Phil. 761 (1920).
396 · STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
7.06. Constructian'taking ili.t<Jconsideratfongeneralwelfare

or growth of civilization. ·
·Some· authorities ·advocate «a construction which 'seeks an
expansive application o£ statutesdo.attain the general welfare; This
construction is based on the ·maximirsalus ·populi es.t suprema lex.
Thus, statutes enacted for the public good are tobe construeddiberally,
Statuta pro publico commodo late interpretantur. An authority on
the subject expounds.or, thi~}~j!.,_.<.>ftpons~ru.cti(:)n; "'.l'he!;lf. is; for me
in all cases a principle of statutory construction not to be found, in
the 'bookS, but which' fot~·the Philippine 'Isl~ds is all-important.
IIi the :resolutio1f of: all qriestit>n.s;'l begin' With these queries; What
is for the best ;mtetest of the Filipino' people? How under the law
can the progress- of the Philippiri.e Islands be' advanced.7. From. this
viewpoint, which as a matter of fact is herein in accord with ·the
logical interpretation of the law, there is but one possible result - to
assist the legfslatrife in Its' enactment' of the law 'and the executive
in its eru6rcemenf ~f the law by a judicial Interpretation which will
makelegislativeintention and executive action effective:"16
An~ther'·~uth~ritr thhlE!
alo~g·'eiimilru' line,s: "ThE! statute in
general ha~ ti.q,
:~cu1ate ;orga11~, f9Fla'_Vlllaking purposes - the
legislature and the tribunal. The first organ makes ne;w law, the
second att~sts ~d 'eonfirms oldJaw,c'though under, cover of doing it
iiitrod11c~s many new pri.Ilciplefs.Fq;l\f;tlitU~S and judicial decisions
alike comeinto being and grow out ofthe'same common roots, the
supreme g()~d, of sociefy. Itis ,li (.\on~ec~aWd legal fudofu that the
reason of thelaw isthe life oftlie law. The'reason lies in the soil of
th~ co:Dimon welfare. Consequently; if the judge Jlniits himself to the
printed pagesof the statute; and' doe~'ttbt go out into the open spaces
of actuality ancU:lig down 'de'ep· into his common soil, he fails in his
noble calling, and'beconies subservient fu' formalism.?»
.' '
. It has. also been. held that statutes must be interpreted in
the ·light. of the;~~~,of ci~ation and v~g cgn~tjons. The
interpretation that "if the man is too long for the bed, his. head
should be chopped off rather than enlarge the old bed or purchase a
new one" should not be given such statutes.v
,;... ' .(
16Justice Malcolm dissenting, U.S. v.•Estapia, 37'Phil. 26i 29. (1917).

16Justice Perfecto· concUrring,:Gomez v; Government Insurance Board, 78 Phil.
221, 224 (1947).
"Enriquez v. AS. Watlion & ce.; 22 Pliil. 623, 637, 638 (1912).
398 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION•
in favor of the accused= This means that penal statutes cannot be

enlarged .or extended _by intendment, implication, or any equitable
consideration. 24 And the court must not bring cases. yrithin the
provision of a statute that are not clearly embraced by it, nor by a
narrow, technical, or forced'construetion exclude eases from it that
are obviously within i~s provision." Thus, ~here a statute penalizes
the commission of an act oncertain specific occasions, it cannot be
construed to penalizeit on all occasions,»
Thelanguage.o(li.penal statu'.te cannot be enlarged beyond the
ordinary meaning ofita.termsin order to carry into efl'ect;the general
purpose for which the statute was enacted; Only .those persons,
offenses; and penalties clearly included, beyond any reasonable
doubt, will be. considered within the operation of the st~tute. They
must come clearly within both the spirit and the.letter ofithe statute
and-where there.is a reasonabledoubt, it must.be resolved in favo;
of the person accused of violating the statute.•~ In other' words, no
person should be, brought within the terms of a statute. who is riot.
clearly within .them, nor sholl1d any act be pronounced crimin~
which is not clearly made so by the statute."" · · ·
For instance, Sec. 11 of RA. No. 7659, which amended Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, provides that the death penalty for rape
may b~ imposed if the "offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim." This
provision cannot be extended to apply to an offender who is not the
common law spouse of the.parent of the.victim, .but is the common-
law husband of'thegirl's grandmother because he is not one of those
enumerated therein. For "Courts must not bring cases within the
provision of the law which are not clearly embraced by it. No act can
_23Peopl~ v. Subido, G.R..No. 21734, Septembe~ 5, l975, 66 SCRA 545; People v,

Yu J~, 99 Phil. 725 {1956); People v .. Elkanish, 90J'hil. 53 (19ql); Suy,Sui v. People,
92 Phil. 684 (1953); People v. Bstapla, 37 Phil. ·17 (1917); People v. Jacson, 54 i>hil.
1761(1929); People v. Purisima, G.R, No. 42050, November 20; 1978, 86 SCRA 542·
People v. Terrado, G.R. No. 2362!j, November 25, 1983, 125 SCRA 648. '
24People
v: Garcia, 85 Phil; 651 (1950).
26Northern i:;ea,¢ties Co. v.United States, 193 U.S. 197, 48 L. ed. 679 (1904).
26U.S.
v. g-sta'.pia, 37 Phil. 17 (1917); Go Chico v. Martinez 45 Phil 256
(1923). / • .
. 27J>eople v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1950), citing Crawford, Statutory Construc-
tion, pp. 460-462. · ' · ·
""U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243 (1917)· U.S. v. Madrigal 27 hil 347
p·
(1914). ' , .
included as punishable is excluded, the term "charitable" should be

strictly construed so as to exclude solicitation for "religious" purposes
in the scope of the law; 32
In Laurel v. Abrogar, G:R. No. 155076, Febniary 22, 2006, one
of the issues was whether or not international telephone calls using
Bay Super Orient Cards through' the telecommunication services
provided by PLDT for such calls, or; in short, PLDT's business of
providing said telecommunication services, are proper subjects of
theft under Article -308 ofthe Revised Penal Code. The Court ruled
that the· information charging such alleged offense -did fall under
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and ordered the information
dismissed. The Court held:
, "On the second .Issue, we .flnd and so hqid that the
international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card
holders, the telecommunication services provided by PLDT
and its business of providing said services are not personal
properties under Article 308'of the :Re\ri.sed· Penal Code. The
construction by the responde:rits of.Artide'308ofthe said Code
to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid international
telephone calls, telecommunication ·services and business· is
contrary to the letter and intent of the law. .
The rule. is that, penal laws are to be construed strictly.
Such rule is founded .on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals · and .on : the plain principle that the
power of punishment is vested in.Congress, not in the judicial
department. It is Congress, not the Court; which is to define
a crime, and ordain its punishment. Due; respect for the
prerogative of Congress. in defining crimeS/felo.nies -constrains
the Court to .refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws
where a "narrow interpretation" is. appropriate. The Court
must take heed to language, legislative history and purpose, in
order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of'the conduct
the· law forbids. However; when the congressional purpose
is unclear, the court must apply the rule of Jenity, that is,
ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved ill; favor oflenity.
'!'"·.;1.·:·· - .' .
. Penal , statutes may not be . enlarged by implication or

intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used; and may
32 Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, 55 SCAD 100, 236 SCRA 197 (1994).

402 STATU'i'ORY CONSTRUCTION ·
The ·statutory. •definition''' of ~takingr and •movable. property

indicates that, clearly, not. all personal properties may· be the
proper subjects of theft. The general-rule isthat.unly movable
properties· which'~ have . physical or material . existence and
susceptible of.occup·ationhyfuiother are proper objects of theft.
As explained .py. Cuelo Callo11:. ~Co$a,juridicamente es toda
sustaneia, cqrpora~, material, ,$,1.f#ceptible de ser aprebendida
que tenga un.valor.cualquiera/',
' . . . . . . · ..
'
· · · ··
' '
According to: Cuello Callon, in . the context. of the. Penal

Code, only ·those movable properties which can be taken and
carriedfrom the·place•they are found· are proper subjects of
theft. lntangible·•properties' such as rights· and ideas are not
subject of theft· because the· samecannot be "taken" from the
place it is found and is Occupied cir appropriated. · i
xxx
Thus, movable properties under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or
interests to-which fhey'relate. A nakedright existing merely in
contemplation oflaw,·'although'it maybe very valuable to the
person who is entitled fo exercise it;is not the subject of theft or
larceny. Such rights or interestsare intangible and cannot be
"taken" by another. Thus, right to produce oil, good will.or an
interest in business, or the right to engage in business, credit
or franchise are properties: 'so is-the credit line represented by
a credit.card. However, they;are no~ proper subjects oftheft or
larceny because tliey ate Without·form oi substance; the' mere
"breath" oft.he congi:e,ss. o~ ·~e
other hand; goods, wares and
merchandise. of businessmen and credit . cards issued 'to them
are movable properties with physical and material. existence
and may be taken byanother; hence, proper.subjects of theft.
Th~re is "taki:#g" · 9r per~Qri~(~ ptoperty, and theft is
' consummated when the o:q'ena~f tihlaWfu.JJ.ya'.cquires.P,C)ssession
of personal :Pr9pe'.rty eve~ if f?(a· short time; or if'. such property
is under the dominion and' 'control of the thief. The taker, at
some particular amount, must have obtained complete and
absolute,;..p~ession and -control. of the property adverse to
the ~ghts of.tb:e: owner or the. Fawful·possessor thereof. It is
not necessary 'that the property be 'actually earned a.way out
of the physical possession 'of the lawful possessor or that he
should have-mads his· escape with it, Neither asportation nor
404 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ·
either in a close tank or forced· through a pipe; Havmg reached

_the premises 'of'the c0nsumer,;it maybe used in anyway he
may desire, . ~!"in~, . like .ill11P,1Pi~ting gas':· capable of being
transformed. either, ll;lt<?: he,at~ .. H.g}l.t,, or P~W~l.">, at ~~ · option
of the purchaser. hi Woods V.. People, the Supre~e Court of
Illinois declared that there. IS' rtothmg 'iii th.~ hatti.re of used gas
for illuminating purposes·'Which r.enderf3•it .ineapable of being
feloniouslytaken. and; carried. away, It ds a ·vruuable:article of
merchandise, bought; .and- sold-like -othen, personal ppoperty,
susceptible.ofbeingisevered from.a mass or larger quantity and
of'being transported.from place to. place.
Gas aria eleclrlchl eneigy shoUlcl not be equate!i with
business or services provided by business entrepr~n~uts to the
public. Business doea not-have .an exact defu:iitio:d. Business
.is' referred· as .that which ecenpies,the. time, attention and
labor of men for the .purpose 9flivelilioo(i;or;prpfit. i1;.~11i~races
everythingthat whic}la person can·be. emploged.Business may
also. mean employment, occup~;tion, or .prcfession, Business
is also defined:;:f!.S,: a commercial J~.~vity fo:f'.:: g$. b!'m~fit or
advantage. Bµ~ine~f3;,.}ike. services-in busine,Sf3,., alth,ough are
properties; are .i{~t prp_per. sq."bject~'ortheft pnder .·~~.;Revised
Penal Code because th~ :~i:inie:cam;1pt, be );ajtE'.n",or;~~,ccupied."
If it were .otherwiae, as cliili.D.edby; the. respondents, th,ere;would
. : "'·' . . ., - I ' ' ' :.• . ···" f ·.
; . .
J ... · .. ·'. ' . , ·' . , ·. - .• ~. , • \.
be no j'Pidical dll.fer~n,c~.b~~e,e~ ,th~.t~g Rf1the b~~~ess of

a person, or ~h~ servicea.p,ro~~e,d,l~Y Wpi f~r gain, .vi.lJ-a.~ .l(~, the
taking ofgoods,WEll'.es,oJ.;mel'.cha:t;i;dise,,w: (l(lWPment.~mprising
his business, tr it was. ftf3 intend.on to' include ''1!iusi:iless" as
personal property µnder AI:ticl~ 30S of tbe Re'.vised Penal Code,
the Philippine J:..egia~a,~µn! siiQuid J:i~ve spoken, µ). l8Jl.guage
that is clear and. defili.ite: that ~u~iliess is . personai property
under Article 308 (){the RevisedPenal Code: · ·
We agree with the contention of.the .petitioner that,
as gleaned from . the . material av,erments of the- Amended
Information, he is charged of "stealing the.mtemetional long
distance calls Qelongixtg to Pt.Dr and the use thereof, through
the ISR. Contrary to . the qailli.s of the OSG 'and respondent
PLDT, the petitioner is not charged of stealinkP20,370,651.95
from said'i-egpond~nt~:Said itnount of P20,370,65L95''alleged
in the ,.AriiendedInformation is the aggregate amountof access,
transmission or termination charges whichthe PLDT expected
from the. international lorig distai:ice.calls of-the ball~rs with
the use of Baynet Super Orient Cards sold b:f Baynet Co: Ltd.
should not· allow by "making 'the phone company bend· over

and' grab its 8nkles"):.e A:"phreaker" is one who engages in the
act of manipulating. phon~s and illegaily .markets-telephone
services. Unless the p~:ne 'eompany replaces all iti;i hardware,
phreaking would: be iriipo$sil)fo,~tci:.sfup~ 'r}ie. phone ·companies
in NorthAmericawere impelled.fu replace all their hardware
and adopted: full digital sWitclilit!t System' mown . as the
Common Channel Inter OffleeSignaling. Phreaking occurred
only during the 1960's ruid'1970's; decades after the Revised
Penal Code tookeffeet. · ··
. The ·petjtio11er is, , 11-0t ichar~ed,,. under · the Amended
Information; for, Jh.~ft .of Jele~oillIIi.unication . or telephone
services offe:r;ed .by PLpT <. ~v~n :If he· Is, .the terpi "personal
property" . under Article 3Q~ ;of the · R¢yised .· :·Pen;:tl Code
cannot be interpreted, beyond. its 13~aID.s1 ., so as to .jnelude
"telecommunication or telephone services" or computer services
for that matter. The.word "serviC,~."has avariety of meanings
dependent: upon the 'C(,)ht~xf/or the: Sense iJ]/Whfch if i!3USed;
and, in sofue·hist8p.¢es, itnu1.yihcluge a $Ble; Forinstru:ice, the
sale of food by 'restam-ants is .usuhlly referred 'fu. as "s'ervice,,,
although an acfuaJ shlejs fuv()lv~d; It may al~ mean the duty
or labor. to be reilderea by one petson to another;:performance
of laborfor the benefit of another: ht the case of PLDT, it is to
render iochl and in~riiatiorihl teleco:hununid1.tions ~ervfo~s an'.d
such oth~r se:tvites as ·authorked' by the CPCA'iSstied by the
NTC. Even at common l~w, neithertinie nor services may he
taken and. <>ceupied or ilpproptia;ted ... A service is gene,:aily not
considered property@d a: theft ofseivjce woUld riot,therefore,
con~titute theft since there' can be no caption or asportation,
Neither.is the unaiitl:iorized use of.the equipment and facilities
of PLDT by the petitioner theft under, the aforequoted provision
of the Revised Penal. Code.
. Ifit ~as the intent ~fthe Phlllppine Legisfatfire, in 1930,
to include services to be the subject oftheft,,lt: should have
incotj)orat¢ the same in Article 30ffofthe Rt?vliiedPenal Code ..
The Le~I.11t}tre'·'c)jd. ti()t. I11f~ct; the ReYised Penal Code does
not eve:rfcd:rltain a: definition: of·semces. · ·.
·xxx
In the Philippines; Congress has not amended the Revised
Penal Code to include theft-ofservicee or theft of" business as
7.09. Reason why penal statutes are strictly construed.

The reason for the rule that penal statutes are construed
strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused is that
the law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual; the· object
is to establish a certain rule by coriformity to which mankind would
be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. The purpose of strict
construction is not to· enable a guilty person to escape punishment
through a technicality but to provide a precise definition offorbidden
acta=
7.10. Acts mala in se and mala prohibita•

The general rule is that a penal statute will not be. construed
to make. the commission of certain prohibited acts criminal without
regardto the intent of the doer, unless there is a clear legislative
intent to the contrary. In other words, to constitute a crime, evil
intent must combine with an act, Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit
a
rea, the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention
were so. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus, ·an act done by me
against my will is not my act. 34
In acts mala inse, such asthose penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, criminal intent, apart from' the act itself, is required,
but in those which are mala prohibita the only inquiry is, has the
law been violated, Whether a statute is to be so construed depends
upon the intent of the. legislature, taking into consideration the
nature of the offense, the purpose to be accomplished and such other
factors as will throw light upon the meaning of the language. 36 Such
words as "voluntarily," "knowingly;" or "willfully" impart; criminal
intent as a prerequisite. 88 Where a statute plainly prohibits an act to
be done and uses no word implying that.the prohibited act shall be
done knowingly or willfully, and the act.is-done, the statute implies
the guilty intept;.alth,ough the offender was honestly mistaken as to
the·meaning of the law he violated. Where the language is plain and
positive, and theoffense is not made to depend upon the positive,
willful intent and purpose, nethingis left to interpretation.87
88People
v;;.Piµjaima. G.R. No. 42050, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542;
Paanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112 (1986); Ursua v. Court of
Appeals, 70 .SCAD123, 256147 (1996). . .
34U.S. v; Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488 (1910).
36U.S. v. Go Chico, H Phil.128 (1909). .

36U.S. v. Ah Chong, supra; People v, Salazar, 106 Phil. 221 (1959).
87U.S. v. Go Chico,supro.
heavy penalty ranging from five to ten years of imprisonment, has

been narrowed and strictly construed as to include, as an additional
element of the crime: the cWyi:O:g of the weapon in furtherance of
rebellion, insurrection or sub~grsio:r;i, such being the evil sought to be
remedied or prevented by the. statute as disclosed in its preamble ....
The rule that a penal statute should be so construed with
strictness so as· to safeguard the rights of the defendant finds
application in Azarcon v. Sandiganpdyan.•5The question is whether
a private person can be. considered; a public officer by reason of his
being designatedbythe.Bureauoflnternal Revenue as a depository
.of distrainedproperty, so as to make the conversion thereof the crime
of malversation falling within thejurisdiction of theSandiganbayan.
The Court ruled inthe negative, thus: "However, we find p.o.provision
in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of
such requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a private individual
to act as a depository cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution argues that 'Article
222 of the Revised Penal Code· x xx defines the individuals. covered
by the term 'officers' under Article 217 xx r of the same Code. And
accordingly, since Azarcon becameva depository -of the truck seized
by the BIR he also became a public officer who can be prosecuted
under Article 217 x x x.' The Court is not persuaded. Article· 222 of
the RPC reads: 'Officers included in the preceding provisions. - The
provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in
any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial, or
municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any-administrator or
depository of funds or property.attached, seized or deposited by public
authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.i.x x
x 'Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms, arid interpretation
would be resorted to only· where· S: li~ral interpretation would be
either impossible or. absurd or 'would lead to an injustice.' This is
particularly observed in the,intetj>retation ofpenal statutes which
'must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the
rights of the defendant xx x.' The language of the foregoing provision
is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public
44 People v. Purisima, G.R. No. 42050, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542
(1978).
48 79 SCAD 954, 268 SCRA 747 (1997).
412 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION•
Moreover, the rule. that. penal statutes are to be ' strictly

construed against the State applies only wherethelaw is ambiguous
and .there is .doubt as· to1 its.:inellnirig. Where-the ilaw'is -clear .and
unambiguousvthe-ruledsee not apply. For instanceowhere.a statute
requires that .an: employer· shall rpay a minim uni wage of not less
than a specified amount and punishes any::person who willfully
violates any of its provisions, the fact that the nonpayment of the
minimum wage is not specifically declared unlawful, mnlike other
prohibited acts therein mentioned, does not mean that. an employer
who pays his eillpl~yeesless thB:rith,~ ptei§bjh~d ¥Jnikllin:
~;ig~ is
not liable' crimlnally, for· th~ nonpii'.yment ()f the minimum wage is
the vecy act sought to b~-~rijoirie'cfby'tlle'law and tostrictiy construe
it by saying that _such· act is_ n8t, ctlnlinally puhish,~ple is1to':defeat
the object of the law, which is to provide a rockbottom ~age to be
obse&ed. by ali'ein.ploy~~~'-~ ·. · · · · · . ·
,7.13. Statutes in derogation of rights.

People in a republicari state· enjoy certain rights, which are
either inherent or guaranteed by the Constitution or protected by
law .. However, rights are not-absolute, and.the state, in the exercise
of its police power.cmay .enact legislations curtailing or restricting
their enjoyment, As these: statutes are in derogation of common
or general 'rights;' they are generally strictly construed and rigidly
confined- to cases clearly within .their+scope or. purpose,» Tb.us,
statutes authorizing.the expropriation of private land or.property,»
allowing the taking of deposition,» fixing the ceiling of the price
of commoditias= limiting the .exercise of proprietary rights by
individual citizens,« ·and suspending the period of prescription of
actions, are statutes in derogation of common or general rights; and
are accordingly construed strictly.66
60 People v. Gatchalian, 104 Phil; 664 (1958). . , . .

"'Realty Investment, Inc. v. Valderama,"84 Phil. 842 (1951); Phil. National
Bank v. Jacinto, 88 Phil. 376 (1951); Herrerias v. Javellana, 84 Phil. 608 (1949).
62Arriete
v. Director of Public Works, 58 Phil. 507 (1933).
68Nuiiez
v. Ntiiie't, 53 Phil. 782 (1928).
64Herrerias
v. Javellana, 84 Phil. 608 (1949).
1111Republlc
v. Sandiganbayfth\'•96 SCAD. 842, 293 SCRA 440, 455-456 (1998),
citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 212.
MRealtY Investments, Inc. v. Villanueva, 84 Phil. 842 (1951); Phil. National
Bank v. Jacinto, supra.
appeal's to be of secondary significance compared with the advantage

gained by the grantee. 811
Strict construction 'requires that· those who invoke a special
privilege granted by a statute must comply strictly with its
provisions. 68 Privilegia recipiunt largam. interpretationem ooluntati
consonam concedentis, or 'privileges ate to be interpreted in
accordance with the Will of him who grants them.;111 Aild he who fails
to strictiy comply with the will oft~_e granter loses· such privileges.
a
Thus, where. an ~11:tity .is granted iegislative franchise to operate
electric light and power, on. condition thatit should start. operation
within a specified period, its failure to start operation within the
period resulted, in- the .forfeiture of the ftanchise.68 For rights or
privileges which exist only by virtue ofstatutes come into.being.only
after s~rictc():rnpliap.ce with.all.the conditions found in the statutes,v
In the matter ofrighµ; and privileges granted subj~ to conditions,
the maxim duralex sed lex may properly be applied."
7.16~ Legislatiye grants to local government units.

Legislative grantsin favor oflocal government units are grants
of a public nature, and hence, should be strictly construed against, the
grantee. One compelling reason given for the strict interpretation of
a public grant is that there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation'
ofpublic money or property which results in an unfair advantage
to the grantee and for, that reason, the grant should be narrowly
restricted in favor of the public. Hence, the letter of the statute
should be narrowed to exclude inatters which, if included, would
defeat the policy of the legislature. 71 . · ·
7.17. Statutory grounds for remo:vill of officials.

Statutes relating to suspension or removal of public officials
are strictly construed. The rule is expressed in different ways which
811C
. & .C Commercial Corp. v .. ,National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority,
G.R. No; 27275, November 18; 1967, 21SCRA984. . ·
68J>agdaiiganan'v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 104 Phil. 910 (1958).
6'11Jarreto v; Tua8oo, 50 Phil. 888 (1926).
68Butuan
Siiwrriill, Inc. v. Bayview Theater, Ine., 96 Phil. 137 (1954).
""C & (!. Commercial Corp; v. National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority,
G.R. No~ 27275, November 18; 1967; 21SCRA984.
"'ButuanSawmill, Inc. v. Bayview Theater, Inc., supra.
71Manila
. Lodge No. 761 v, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41001, September 30,
1976, 73 SCRA 162.
one, and it does not become vested until he files a petition and
establishes by competent and satisfactory evidence that he has all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified by law.r
In 'case of doubt, the doubt is resolved against the applicant, and his
petition for naturalization is denied.s
7.19. Statutes imposing

·~ ·... .
taxes
.
and customs duties.
Thepower to-tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited
in its range, acknowle.dging in its very nature no limits, so that
security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of
the legislatut~\~·hlch impose'$ thetax on the constituency who are to
pay it. So potent is the po~erthat it was once opilled thattlie "power
to tax involves the power to destroy." Taxation is adestn{ctive power
which interf'ered.'\viih the personal and property rights Of the people
and takes. from .them a portion of their property for the support of
the government. Accordingly, trui: statutes must beconstrued strictly
against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.'"
Where the question is whether a statute subjects a matter,
property, or person to tax, the statute is to be construed strictly
against the subjection.to tax liability, and it will not be-construed
as imposing. a .tax unless it does so clearly, expressly and
unambiguously. 80'A tax cannot be imposed without clear and express
words for that purpose. The ·general rule of requiring adherence to
the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to
tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended
by implication. In case of doubt, , tax statutes are to be construed
most strongly against the government and in favor of thesubjects or
citizens because burdens are not to be imposed nor presumed to be
imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly import. •1
11Mo Yuen Tai v •. Republic, 115 Phil. 401 (1962).

7 8Cu v. Republic, 115 Phil. 600 (1962).
79Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority v, Marcos, 74 SCAD 295, 261
SCRA 667 (1996), citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction (1990 ed.), p. 216; Quim.po
v. Mendoza, G.R,No; .33092, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 73; Froehlich & Kuttner v,
Collector of Customs, 18 Phil. 461 (1911); Collector of Internal Revenue v. Angeles,
101 Phil. 1026 (1957). '
80Marinduque
Iron Mines Agents, Inc. v. Municipal Council of Hinabangan,
Samar, G.R. No. 18924, June 30, 1964, ll'SCRA 416.
"'Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 82 SCAD 45, 271
SCRA 605 (1997).
juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the trucing

authority ... Exemptions contained in tax statutes must be strictly
construed against those claiming the exceptions. 87 The basis for the
rule of strict construction is to minimize the different treatment
and foster impartiality, fairness.rand equality of treatment among
taxpayers ... Accordingly, he who claims an exemption from his share
of the common burden of taxation must justify his· claim by· showing
that the legislature intended to exempt him by words too plain to
be mistaken.89 For exemptions from taxation are not favored in law,
nor are they presumed. They must be expressed in the clearest and
most unambiguous language and not left to mere implications." It
has been held that "exemptions are never presumed, the burden is
on the claimant to establishclearly his right to, exeip.ptjon and an
alleged grant of exemption wilJ be strictlyconstrued ana
cannot be
made out by inference or inlPJiCations but; must be beyond reasonable
doubt. In other words, sincetaxationis the rule arid exemption the
intention to make an exemption ought to be expressed in clear and
unambiguous terms."91 ·
Illustrative of the rule that tax exemptions should be strictly

construed is Commissioner of Internal Revenue. v -. ·CA. 92. The issue
raised is whether containers and packaging materials can be
credited against the miller's deficiency tax. The BIR claimed that
there should be no tax credit pursuant to the proviso of Sec. 168 of
the Tax Code.which reads:
83Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No. 17888, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA
754; Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 21841,
October 28, 1966, 18 SCH.A; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, G.R. No.
20812, September 22, 1967, 21 SCRA 180; Government v. Monte de Piedad, 25 Phil.
42 (1916); Asiatic Petroleum.v, Ramos,.49 Phil. 466.(1926); House vs. Posadas, 53
Phil. 338 (1929); Greenfield v. Meer, 77 Phil. 394 (1946).
ll'TUnion Government Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 16809, Janu-
ary 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 304.
BBMaceda v. Macaraeg, 197·SCRA 771 (1991).
89Surigao
Consolidated Mining Co., Inc. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. 14878, December.2.6, 1963, 9 SCRA 728.
90Jai
Alai.Co~;,.. Court of Tax Appeals, 106 Phil~ 345 (1959); Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 28812; September 22, 1967, 21SCRA180;
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., G.R. No. 22611, May 27,
1968, 23 SCRA 715.
91Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank, 102 Phil. 477, 480 (1957), cit-
ing Cooly on Taxation, 4th ed., Vol. 2, p. 1303.
92103 SCAD 720, 303.SCRA 508 (1999).
420 ;STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
is favored. Thus, where·P.D. No.1955 withdrew.all tax exemptions,

except those embodied inthe Real Property Code, a law which grants
certain industries real-estate tax,,exemptions under -the Real Estate
Code, the intention to limit the exemption-to only those provided
in the Code and to exclude those prescribed .in-other laws is clear,
in keeping with the principle . of statutory construction that, tax
exemptions are constrtied strl~tly a:g~~ttaxpayers and cannot l)e
granted byimpiicatiori.94 . · · • · · ·· ·
; . ' I ' : - . I :]• .~· £: ' .
Courts may not indulge in expansive construction and write

into the law an exemption not therein set forth.: Where a statute
has granted hi e~f~ss' teiµis'~ert~ exemptions, those are the
only exemptions fu be cti*§i(lered'.9•.Tq'illu~trate: Where a statute
exempts from special hll'porttax, eqtliprrient '."for use ofindustries,"
the exemption d6es not extend to those used ihdispensing gasoline at
retail in gasolineatations.s A s'fatute'authoiizirigthe holding by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes-Office of horse races and providing
thatthe "racing club holding theseraces shall be exempt from the
payment of any municipalor national. tax" cannot, be construed to
exempt the racing club from paying income tax on rentals paid to it
for use of the race tracks and other paraphernalia, for what the law
exempts refers only to those to be paid in connection with said races. 97 .
I'
;~·
The constitutional provision exempting from. taxation charitable I ·~
institutions, churches, parsonages-or convents appurtenant thereto,

mosques, and nonprofit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and
improvements actually' directlj' and exclusively used for teligious or
charitable purposes, refers only' to exemption from payment of taxes
assessed on such properties thus enumerated, as property taxes,
and not from all kinds of taxes.•• Where a statute provides· that
the tax provided therein shall not'be collected on foreign exchange
used for the payment of "fertilizers 'when imported by planters or
farmers directly or through their cooperativee.r-the importation of
fertilizers by an entity which is neither a planter nor a farmer nor a
cooperative of planters or farmers.is not.exempt from payment of the
.. -: ~
94 Benguet Corporation v, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, 210 SCRA 579
(1992). '' ' . .. ' " ·' .. . '
95Esso StandariJ, 'Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No.
21841, October is•. ;i966, 18,SCRA 488. ' .. · . . . . .

v.
96EiiBQ·Standard Eastern, Inc. Ac:ting Commissioner of Customs, supra. i'
(1956).
111Collectclr of hi.ternal''Revenue ,;. Mahila Jockey Club, Inc., 98 Phil': 670 !~
., .
9"Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 19201, June 16, 1965,.
14SCRA292.
,1·5:
422 STATQTORY CONSTRUCTION
Illustrative case on strict construction of statute granting tax

exemption . .
In PLDT v. Province of la,guna, G.R. No.' 151899~ August
~6, 2005, the issue is whetheror not :f?LD'f is e;xempt from paying
franchise taxes, pursuant tothe following proViEiions of R.:A. 7925,
which reads: . · · ·. · -.
SEC. 23~ Equality of Treatmen] in the Telecommunica-

~ons Induatry ., Ari.y ad,vai>.tB;ge, favor,J>tjyilege,· e;~mption, or
immunity _granted under ~Xi.sti;ng francJ:rlses, or niay hereafter
be granted, shall ipsofaclo becolile. p~ of pre-\Tio\islygranted
telecommunications .franchises and, shall be accorded iinmecli-
ately and unconditionallyto • fhe gran:~es of such franchlses:
J>;ovi<J,ed, how~~er, That the -fo~egoing shall rieitq~:r ;:ipply to
. nor affect provistons of :telec9i:p.m,U,ilicatfonS: franchises concern-
in~ territory ~vered by the franc)#se; the life span of the fr~-
chise, or the type of the service authorized by the franchise.
. . PLDT is a holderofa.leglslative franchise, pursuanttowhich

.1t rs exempt from the payment of franchise tax .. However the LocaI
~vemment Code of 1991 withdrevt: existing trui: exempti~ns, ~hich
~eluded ~at.~f P~T Conse9uently,.the Province ofl,aguna, iii
the exercise of its taxing power under the Local Government Code
imposed franchise taxes on PLDT: Thereafter; RA No. 7925 wru;
enacted, Sec. 23. of which grants ·"Equality of Treatment in the
Telecommunications Industry." Invoking Sec. 23 of said law PLDT
filed a c.lai~' for refund of taxes, contending that Sec:. 23' ~~ts it
tax exen;iptions. ·. ·
Thus, the issue. raised is whether· or not ~der Sec; 23 of RA
7925 PLDT is entitled to tax exemption. The Court ruled that PLDT
is not tax exempt. Itheld: .
. In PLPT vs. City of Pavao, and again in PLI)T.vs. City of

Bacolod, et al., this Court has interpreted Section 23 of Rep~
Act No. 7925. There, we .ruled that Section 23 does not operate
to exempt PLDT from tlie·payment of franchise tax. We quote
what we have said in Davao and reiterated in Bacolod.
In sum,' it does not appear that, in approving Sec. 23 of
R.A. .No, 7925, Congress Intended it to operate as a blanket
tax exemp.tion to all te~ecommUnica:tions entities~ Applying the i
rule of strict construction oflaws granting tax exemptions and
the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal r i
I
I
eignty.'Iil Tennessee vs. Whitworth (117 U.S., 129, 136), it

was said: 'In all cases of this kind the question is as to the
intent of the 'legislature; the presumption always being
against any surrender of the taxing power.' In.Farrington
vs. Tennessee and Couitty of Shelby (95 U:S., 379; 686),
Mr. Justice Swayne said:' ... When exemption is claimed,
it must be shown indubitably to exist. At the outset, every
presumption is against it A well-founded doubt is fatal to
the claim. It is.onlywhenthe terms of the concession are
too explicit to admit fairly )of any other. construction that
the proposition can be supported.'
The tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in
clear language that leaves no doubt of the intention of the
Iegislature to grant such exemption. And, even if it is granted,
the exemption must be interpreted in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
xxx xxx XXX.
The fact is that the, term 'exemption' in Sec. 23. is too

general. A cardinal. ruleJn statutory construction is that
legislative intent.must be ascertained from a consideration of
the statute as a whole and not merely of a partteular provision.
For, taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey
a meaning which is different from the one actually intended. A
general provision may actually have a limited application if
read together· with other provisions. Hence, a consideration of
the law itself in its entirety and the proceedings of both Houses
of Congress is in order.
xxx xxx xxx
R.A. No. 7925 is thus. a legislative enactment designed
to set the national policy on telecommunications and provide
the structures to implement.it to keep up with the technologi-
cal advances in the industry and the needs of the public. The
thrust of the law is to promote gradually the deregulation of the
entry, pricing, and operations of all public telecommunications
entities and-thus. promote a level playing field in the telecom-
munications industry, There is nothing in the language of Sec.
23 nor in the proceedingsof both the House of Representatives
and the Senate in enacting R.A. No. 7925 which shows that it
contemplates the grant of tax exemptions to all telecommuni-
is required to pay a tax of three percent (3%) on all

gross receipts from business transacted. Petitioner's
theory· would require that, to level the playing field,
any "advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or im-
munity". granted to Globe must be extended to all
telecommunications companies, including Smart. If,
later, Congress again grants a franchise to another
telecommunications company imposing; say, one
percent (1%) .franchise tax, then all other .telecom-
munications franchises will have to be adjusted to
"level the playing field" so to speak. This. could not
have been the intent of Congress in enacting Section
23 of Rep. Act 7925. Petitioner's theory will leave
the Government with the burden of havjng to keep
track of all granted telecommunications franchises,
lest some companies be treated unequally. It is dif-
ferent if Congress enacts a law specifically granting
uniform advantages, favor, privilege, exemption or
. immunity to all teiecoi:Ilmunicatioris entities ...
On PLDT's motion for reconsideration in Davao, the
Court added in its en bane Resolution-of'March 25,2003, that
even as it is a state policy to promote a level playing field in
the communications industry, Section 23 of Rep: Act No. 7925
does not refer to tax exemption but only to exemption from
certain regulations and requirements imposed by the National
Telecommunications Commission: ·
, x x x. The records of Congress are bereft of any dis-
cussion or even mention of tax exemption. To the contrary,
what the Chairman of the Committee on Transportation,
Rep. Jerome V. Paras, mentioned in his sponsorship of
H.B. No.·14028, which became R.A. No .. 7925, were 'equal
access clauses' in interconnection agreements, not tax ex-
emptions. He said: ..
There is also a need to promote a level playing
field in the telecommunications industry. New en-
titi~s must be granted protection against dominant
.-carriers through the encouragement of equitable ac-
cess charges and equal access clauses in interconnec-
tion agreements and the strict policing of predatory
pricing by dominant carriers, Equal access should
be granted to all operators connecting into the inter-
As in Davao, PLDT presently faults the trial court for not

giving weight to;the ruling ofthe BLGF which, to petitioner's
mind, is an administrative agency with.technical expertise and
mastery oyer the specialized matters assigned to it. Again, to
quote from:: our ruling in Daoao:
To be sure.fhe BLGF is not. anadministrative agen-
cy whose findings on questions of fact are given weight
and deference in the courts: The authorities cited by peti-
tioner pertain to the· Court of'Tax Appeals, a highly spe-
cialized court which performs judicial functions as it was
created for the review of tax cases. In contrast, the BLGF
was created merely to provide consultative services and
technical assistance to focal governments andthe general
public on focal· taxation, 'real property assessment, and
other related matters, among others. The question raised
a
by petitioner is legal question,' to wit,. the interpretation
of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 7925. There is; therefore, no basis
for claiming expertise for the BLGF. that. administrative
agencies are said to poseess in their respective fields.
With the reality that the arguments presently advanced by
petitioner are but a mere reiteration if not: a virtual repetition
of the yery same arguments it has already raised in Da1Jao and 1
in Bacolod; all of'whicli arguments and submissions have been

extensively. addressed ··and. adequ,~teiy . passed 11p0;q by this
Court in. its decisions in said two, (2) PLDT' cases, and noting
that the instant recourse has not raised any new fresh issue to
warrant a second look, it.ttoo.anuet have to fall.
7.21. ·Qualification of rule .. ·

The rule that statutes granting tax exemptions are be strictly tO
construed .ag~st the . taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
power is not absolute. Where the provision of the law .is clear and
unambiguous, so that there. is no occasion for the co~ seeking the
legislative intent, the law-znust.be taken as it is, devoid of judicial
addition or subtraction. For where the law provides no qualification
for the. granting.·ff· tax exemption, the. court ia-not. at: liberty to
supply one.102.F.of instance, a tax-free product comprehends tax-free
· '~pubJc EJ.Q~ MiJl,s, Inc. v. CoIJ¥Ili11J1iO~~r of Internal }te~enue, G.R. No.

25602, February 18; 1970, 31 SCRA 520; Commissioner of Customs v. Miinila Electric
Co., G.R. No. 23623, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 469.
Pl,000.00 a month does n:ot embrace the Republic ofthe Philippines,

the law not having expressly included it within its scope.108
7.23. Statutes authorizirig suits against the government.

The Constitution provides .that the'. "State may not be sued
without its consent.r= This provision: reaffirms the· universal rule
that the sovereign is exempt from suit, in the absence of its consent
in
to be sued usually the formofa.statute.tothat effect, not because
of any formal conception or absolute theory but .on the logical and
practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. Nullum
tempus occurrit regi.v» Moreover, to allow suits against the state
or any of its agencies, without its consent or waiver, ~s to subject
the state to inconvenience and loss of governmental efficiency, with
adverse results ':far greater than those that· may arise if the doctrine
of non-suability is abandoned or restricted.v' For these reasons, a
statute whereby· the state gives its consent to be sued is strictly
construed, and the waiver of immunity from suit, being in derogation
of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred.t= To justify a suit against
the state or any of its agencies, the statute conferring the right to
maintain the action must be plain and positive, and its meaning
should not be left to doubt.w Thus, the law authorizing the Bureau of
Customs, an agency of the government, to leasearrastre operations,
a proprietary function necessarily incident to its governmental
function, may not be construed to mean-that the state has consented
to be sued.whenit undertakes to.conduct arrastre services itself, for
damage to cargo.w
108Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R.
No. 60403, August 3, 1983. See Angat River Irrigation System v. Angat River Work-
ers' Union, 102 Phil. 789 (1957).
109Art. XVI, Sec. 3, Constitution.
"0Republic v. Villasor, G.R. No. 30671, November 28, 1973; 54 SCRA 83; Ka-
wananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S; 349, 51 L. ed. 834 (1907).
ll1Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Republic, G.R. No. 26386, September 30,
1969, 29 SCRA 598; Switzerland General Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Republic, G.R. No. 27389,
March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 227; Metropolitan Transp. Service v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819
(1948).
112Mobil
Phil~)'ilt!Jloration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, G.R. No. 23139,
December 17, 19"66;'18 SCRA 1127; Equitable Ins. & Casualty Co., Inc. v. Smith, Bell
& Co. (Phils.), Inc., G.R. No. 24383,August 26; 1967; 20 SCRA1121.
"8Compaiiia General 'de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Government, 45 Phil. 663
(1924).
114Mobil
Phil. Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre.Service, G.R. No. 23139,
December 17, 1966, 18SCRA1120.
and all doubts should be resolved in favor ofthe general provision

rather than the exceptions. Where a general rule is established by a
statute with exceptions, the court will. not curtailthe former nor add
to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception
excludes all others.ialthonghit.is always proper in determining the
applicability of this rule to inquire whether, in the particular case,
it accords with reason and justice.w
The rule· on execution' .. pending· appeal must .be strictly
construed being.an.esceptiontothe general rule. Applying this rule
on statutory construction;it should be interpreted only so far as the
language thereof'fairlywarrants, and al1 doubts should be resolved
in favor of the general rule rather than the.exceptions.w
Similarly, a statute, nile'or sit~ation.wliich alloJs exceptions
to the' requirement of wa:i-r~t of arrest or search warrant must be
strictly construed.Tt cannot. b"e construed liberally to extend arrests
or seizures without warrant beyond the cases specifically provided
or allowed by law. To do so would infringe· upon personal liberty and
set back a basic right.w
A preference is an exception to the general rule and it is what
its name implies. By it, one person is given a superior right or claim
over the other; For this reason, the law as to preference should be
strictly construed.i= ·
A proviso should be interpreted consistently with the legislative
intent. In an attempt to determine the legislative intent, the proviso
should be strictly construed. The reason is that the legislative
purpose set forth in the general enactment expresses the legislative
policy and only those expressly exempted by the proviso should be
freed from the operation of the statute.w
118Salaysay
v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956), citing 69 C.J. Sec. 643; Commis-
sioner of Internal ~'{~bue v. CA, 103 SCAD 720, 303 SCRA 508 (1999).
119Planter&P1'0ducts,
Inc. v. CA, 114 SCAD 886, 317 SCRA 195 (1999), citing
Agpalo, R., Statutory Construction;1986 ed., p. 224;
120People
v. Valdez, 104 SCAD -551, 304 SCRA 140 (1999).
121Ramon
v. Herridge, 47 Phil. 98 (1924).
122Salaysay
v. Castro, 98 Phil. 364 (1956), citing Sutherland, Statutory Con·
struction, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 471-472.
It has also· been held 'that ."hi carrying out andmterpreting

the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and
substance to the liberal and; compassionate spirit of the law as
provided for in Article 4 of'the New Labor Code. which states that 'all
doubts in the implemenfatiori and interpretation of the provisions
of the Labor Code including ifs' dmplementing rules and regulations
shall be resolved in fafor:of18:bol'."'1sQ '
. The rule that .labor.. ~a

social welfar.eJegu;lation should be
liberally construed ·in favor .of the, laborer is based on the premise
that the · statute is ambiguous, The liberal . construction and
interpretation-does not applywhei;e;theiahor:and social legislation
is clear and leaves no room for interpretation, in which/case the law
has to be applied without construction.i=
. ' .
When t~o holidays fall on the: same date; will the worker be
entitled to only one holiday pay? Stated .differently, if there are ten
holidays, will the fact that two.holidays.fall on the same day.reduce
holiday pay by one day holiday pay? The Supreme Court said "no," in
Asian Transmission Corp. v. CA, G.R. No~ 144664[March 15, 2004],
applying he liberal interpretation of labor laws.
Holiday . pay is .a legislated· benefit enacted as part of the
Constitutional imperative that the 'State ,shall afford protection
to labor -. Itspurposeis not merely "to prevent diminution of the
monthly income of'the workers on 'account of work.interruptions. In
a
other words, although thejvorkeris forced to take rest, he earns
what he should earn,
that!~, his holiday pay." It is also intended to
enable the worker to participate in the national celel:)rations·h~ld
during the days identified as with great historical and cultural
significance. . ·
Independence Day (June 12), Araw ng Kagitingan (April
9), National· Heroes. Day (last. Sunday of August), Bonifacio Day
(November 30) and Risal Day (December 30) were declared
national holidays to afford Filipinos with, a recurring opportunity to
commemorate the heroism -of the Filipino people, promote national
identity, andde~pen the spiritof patriotism. Labor Day (May 1) is
'( ,;· .
Manila Electric Co. v. NLRC, 175 SCRA 277, 283 (1989).

180
Corporalv. Employees' Compensation Commission, 54 SCAD 243, 235 SCRA
181
165 (1994).
7.27. Gen:eralwelfare clause;

The gen~raj wt#are clause ,on, the. power of local g?v:enipt;i;nt
has two branches. One branch attaches itself .to the main trunk .of
municipal authority and relates t6 stl.c:h ordhiances and regulations
as may be necessary· to carry into effect and discharge. the powers
and duties conferred upon local legislative 'bodies 'by law. The
second branchis much more independent of the specific functions
enumerated by law.·It authorizes such ordinancesas shall seem
necessary and proper to provide forthe health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the: morals, peace, good order;', comfort,
and convenience of the local· government unit· and the i:Ilhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.182 · ·
The general. welfare. clause should be construed/ liberally in

favor 'of th1r local governinerit linits;1ss It should 'be so interpreted,
in case of doubt, as to give niore powers .to local governments in
promoting the. economic ·~ondition;, ~ociai1 welfar1:i,. and . material
progress 'of th.~ people in ,the ctjnlln.i.mity.184 Ail
interytetation
that would Iimit the general welfare clause to such govern.me~tlil
functions only as are without proprietary aspects would thereby
often cripple·local governments in the face of the very evils that said
clause intended to remedyr'I'he generalwelfare clause is elastic and
must be responsive to: various social conditions; .it:is not· confined
within the narrow circumscription· of precedentls- resting on -past
conditions;'. it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of
life. The very essence ofthe general welfare clause requires-that it
be given a liberal construction.w
7.28. Grant of power tolocal governments.

The trend with respect to . the powers of. municipal
corporations .• is·'froni a limited. self-government tofull·'b.uthnomy.
The interpretation of'statutes affecting ·~9cal governments follows
such trend, ':froni' stri~t to lib~r_hl interpre~atii)n. ''f}ie old rule is that
municipal corporations~ bein.g'mere creatureso,fthe law,,have orily
132Phil.
LOngpi..stan.ee'Telephone Co. v. Qity,ofDavao, G.R. No. 23080, October
30, 1965, 15 SCRA.:24'4. · ' · ·,' .. . ·
'1380rti_ga~ &·Co., Ltd. v, Feati Bank & TrustlC<i.; G.R. ·No.-24670, December 14,
1979, 94 SCRA 533; Proctor & GamblePMC v. Municipality ofJagna, G.R. No. 24265,
December 28,J979, 94 SCRA 894. . • . . , .. ; , .. , .
·
136Phil.
':Rep.
184Sec. 12, Act No. 2264; Sec. 4, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
Long Distance Tel. Co. v. City of Davao, supra. .
arid material progress of the people ihthecom:tnunity." Sectionfi of

the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
"In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision.on a power of a local government unit
shall be liberally interpreted in. its favor, and in case. of doubt,
any question thereon .·shal1 . be . resolved in. favor of devolution
of powers and of the. lower local government unit, Any fair
and reasonable doubt. as to tile existence of the power shall be
interpreted in fa:vor of the local government unit concerned;
(b) In case· of doubt; any tax ordinance or revenue
measure shall be construed strictly against the foci¥government
'unit ertaCtkg it, and liberally mfavorof'the taxpayer. Any Jax
exemption.fncentiveor relief granted by any local government
unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed
strictly against the person claiming it; ·
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shallbe
liberally interpreted· to give more powers· to local government
units in accelerating economic 4eveloprilent and upgrading the
quality of life for the people in the community;
(d) Rights and obligations existing on the date of
effectivity of this Code and arising outof'contracts or any other
source of prestation involving a local government unit shall be
governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts
or the law in force at the time such rights were vested; and
(e) In the resolution of controversies arising under this
Code where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort
may. be had to the customs and-traditions in. the place. where ! .
the controversies take place~"140
7.29. Statutes granting

..,
ta:rlng
...
power.
\. -
Before the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973,

the rule is that a.local government unit, unlikethe sovereign state,
is clothed w'ith'iio inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute
must plainly show an intent to· confer that power or the. city or
140Sec. 5,.Rep. Act.No. 7160.

act promptly in the making of assess~e~t, an~ :to

citizens because
after the lapse of theperiod of prescription, citizens wo~d have a
feeling of security against unscrupulous tax agents who will always
find an excuse to. inspect the books of taxpayers, not to· dete~e
the latter's real liability, but to take advantage of every opportunity
to molest peaceful, law-abiding citizens. The laws on pre~cription
being a remedial measure should be interpreted liberally in a v:ay
conducive to brlxiging about the beneficial purpose of affordmg
protection to the taxpayers~1«
7.31. Statutes imposing penalties for nonpaymentof tax.

Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of taxes within the
required· period a,re liberally construed in. favor of the 1government
and stnctly observed and interpreted agamst the taxpaye~~ Strong
reasons of public policy support this rule. Such· laws are intended
to hasten tax payments or to punish evasions or neglect of duty
in respect thereto. If delays. in tax .payment are t~ be con~oned for
light reasons, the laws imppsing penalties for: delinquencies would
be rendered nugatory, and the maintenance of the government and
its multifarious activities would be precarious, as tax.payers are
willing or unwilling to pay their obligations to the s~te in time. The
imperatives of public welfare will not approve of this resµlt.1••
Similarly, while courts will not enlarge, by construction, the
government's power of taxation, they will not place upon tax l~ws
so loose a construction as to permit evasions on merely fanciful
and insubstantial distinctions. When proper, a tax statute should
be construed to avoid the possibilities of tax evasions. Construed
this way, the statute, without resulting in injustice to the taxpayer,
becomes fair to the govemment.w
7.32. Election laws.

Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed
to achieve their purpose - to effectuate and safeguard the will
of the electorate in the choice of their representatives - for the
application of election laws involves public interest ~d imposes
upon the Coµunission on Elections and the courts the imperative
1"Republic v. Ablaza, 108 Phil. 1105 (1960).

•'"Jamora v. Meer, 74 Phil. 22 (1942).
•46!,orenzo v. Posadas, 64 Phil. 393 (1937).
would make the manner and method of performing a public duty of

greater importance than the duty itself. "m
The provisions of the election law which candidates for office
are required to comply are generally regarded as mandatory; Thus,
the provisions prescribing the qualifications of candidates, requiring
the filing of certificates of candidacy, 1.•2 defining election offenses,
and limiting the period within, which to. file 'election contests, are
mandatory and failure to comply with such. provlsions are fatal.
Moreover, where the law , provides that a departure from the
prescribed form or statutory requirement will be fatal, such law is
mandatory. .
The provisions of the election law designed to determine the
will of the electorate are liberally construed, The courts/frown upon
any, interpretation that would hinder in any' way not only the free
and intelligent casting of thevotes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment .of the results. thereofl= Technical and· procedural
barriers should not be allowed. to stand if they constitute an obstacle
in the choice of their elective officials.'" · ·
Election laws intended to safeguard the will of the people· in
their choice of their representatives should be construed liberally :!
. ,
to achieve such purpose.w Courts should accordingly interpret
election laws in such a way as to give effect to the express will of
the electorate.w For the application of election laws involves public
interest and imposes upon the courts the imperative duty toascertain
by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected
by the people.w
One of such laws is the law governing election protests, which
should be liberally construed to the end that the popular will
expressed in' the election of public officers will not, by reason of
purely technical objections, be defeated.w Technicalities should not
=tu«, at pp. 214-215; Lambonao vs. Tero, 15 SCRA 716 (1965); De Guzman
vs.Board of Canvassers; 48 Phil. 211 (1925).
'"'Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 ·Phil. 208 (1918).
1""Rodriguez
vs. COMELEC, 119 SCRA 465.
1"Ginete
ys~ _;Afc!an.gel, 21 SCRA 1178; Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA
M& . .
Ibiµii:o v. Dao, 110 Phil. 553 (1960).
156
168I'urisima
v. Salonga, G.R. No. 22335, December 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 704.
167Ibasco
v. Ilao, supra; De Leon v. Guadiz, G.R. No. 55922, May 26, 1981, 104
SCRA951.
158Miro
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 57574, April 20, 1983.
7.33. Amnesty proclamations.

Amnesty proclamations shollld h,e liberally 'con,~tru,~d so' as to
is
carry out their purpose, which to encourage the return to the fold
of the law of those who have veered from the law. Hence, in case
of doubt as to whether certain persons come within the 'amnesty
proclamation, the doubt shollld be resolved in their favor and against
the state.16" ·
Amnesty and par4Qn are synonymous, and for this re.~son, the
grant of pardon should .likewise be c;o~s}rued liberally .in favor of
those pardoned and strictly agaip.~t}he state, for where two words
are synonymous, the rules -for interpreting one will apply, to the
other .166 .. -
7.34. · S.tatu,tes prescribing prescrtpfions Qf crimes.

A statute of limitation or prescription of offenses is in the
nature of an amnesty granted l)y tQ.e state, declaring that 'after a
i ·.
certain time, oblivion shall.be ca,sp over.the of'fens~ Hence,,statutes
of limitations are liberally construed ill. favor; of the accused, not
only because such li};)f:!rali);Y of construction ,b;e,l<>ngs to .. al,l acts ?f
amnesty and grace, but because the very eajste,~~~ of the .statute is
a recognition and i;i.qti:ficatiqn by the legi.slatpi:-e§l'the fact that time,
while it gradually· wears out proofs and Innocence, has assigned to it
fixed and positive periods hi which it destroys proofs of guilt.w
Thus, in the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes,
that which is most favorable to the accused ia.to be adopted. In
accordance with this rule, the date fron:i. which prescription must
commence under Article 91 ;of.the Revised Penal Code which states
that 'the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
the crime is discovered by the offended party, . the authorities, or
their agents' shollld be construed, insofar as crimes of falsification
of public documents which are registered with the Registry of Deeds
are concerned, must be reckoned from the time the document is
registered and not from the time the crime is discovered, registration
being a constructive notice to .the whole world. The application
of the rllle on constructive notice in the construction of Art. 91 of
165People v. Gojo, S4Phil. 107 (1949);:·Tolentino v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948).

166Tolentino v. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300 (1948).
16"People
v. Moran, 44 Phil: 387 (1923);Yapdiangco·v. Buencamino,:G.R. No.
28841, June 24, 1983; Francisco v, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 45674, May 30, 1983;
People v. Doque, 212 SCRA 607 (1992).
effectivityofpension awards, it shall be construed to take effect from

the date it becomes due· and not from the date the application for
pension is approved; so as to grant the pensioner more benefits and
to discourage inaction on the part of the officials who administer the
law.112 However, while veteran or pension laws are to be construed
liberally, they shouldbe so construed as to prevent a person from
receiving double pension or compensation, unless· the law provides
otherwise.r= · ·
Retirement or pension fa;~
are also liberally construed. Being
remedial in character, _a statute creathig pension or establishing
retirement plan should be liberally construed and administered in
favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal
~pproach aims to ac¥eve .th.e·
hu.manitarian p~ses
1of the law
m order that the efficiency, secunty and well-being of government
employees may be enhanced.v- · ·
The Courtin Santiago v. Commission on Auditr» explained the
reasons why retirement laws are liberally construed in. favor of the
retirees: "Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor
of the retiree because their intention is to provide for sustenance,
and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his
life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful
government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement
gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his service.
That generosity is the least he shol.lld expect now that his work is
done and his youth is ·gone .. Even as he feels the weariness in his
bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he
should be able to luxuriate fa the thought that he did his task well,
and was rewarded for it:"
In Ortie o, Commission on Elections,» the question raised is
whether a commissioner of the Commission on Elections is deemed
to have completed his term and entitled to full retirement benefits
172Board
of Administrators Veterans Adm. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 37867, Febru-
ary 22, 1982, 112 SCRA 59. . .
173Chavez
v. Mathay, G.R. No. 29311, February 27; 1971, 37 SCRA 776; Legaspi
v, Executive Seci;e~;G.R. No. 36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253; Borromeo
v. Government.ServiceInsurance System,.110 Phil.1 (1960).
1740rtii
v. Commission on Elections, 162 SCRA 812 (1988); Borromeo v. CSC,
199 SCRA 911 (1991); In Re Judge Reyes, 216 SCRA 728 (1992).
175199
SCRA 125, 133 (1991); see also Lopez v. Cowt of Appeals, 215 SCRA
514 (1992).
176162
SCRA 812 (1988).
In In re Pinedar» the Court clarified the Plana . doctrine. It

stated that "when in.the interest of liberal construction the Court
allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules" on retirement, "there are
ample reasons behind.each grant of an exception. The crediting of
accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age· or length
of service is not done. indiscriminately." "There must be present
an essential factor - before an application under -the Plana or
Britanico rulings may be granted. The Court allows a making up .or
compensating for lack ofrequired age or service only if satisfied that
the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and
dedication to the public service." t-
In In re Manin,179 the issue raised is whether a justice of the

Supreme Court, who availed of the disability retirem,ent benefits
pursuant to the provision that "if the reason for· the retirement be
any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office
and prior· to the. date of retirement he shall· receive. only a gratuity
equivalent to ten years salary and allowances aforementioned with
no further annuity payable monthly during the rest of the retiree's
natural life," is entitled to a monthly lifetime pension after the ten-
year period. Following the liberal interpretation of retirement laws,
the Court ruled that "if at the time of retirement he was already
entitled to retire under Section 1 ofR.A. No. 910 and to receive his
5-year lump sum plus a lifetime pension after five years, his having
applied for disability retirement under Section 3 of the law in order
that he may receive the 10-year. lump sum gratuity, should not
result in the forfeiture of his right to a lifetime pension ifhe should
still be alive after ten (10) years from his retirement." "The ten-year
lump sum payment provided in Section 3 ofR.A. No. 910 is intended
to assist the stricken retiree in meeting his hospital and doctors'
bills and expenses for his support. The law is not intended to deprive
him of his lifetime pension if he is also alive after ten years. The
retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his old age, not to punish
him for having survived."
In Cena v. Civil Service Commissions» the issue raised is
whether or not a government employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11
years, 9 month~ pnd 6 days of government service, may be allowed to
continue in lhe service to complete the 15-year service requirement
187 SCRA 469, 475 (1990).

178
187 SCRA477, 482 (1990).
179
1~11 SCRA 179 (1992).

sions of the law, and should.be for the sole 'purpose of carrying
into effect its· general provisions."
7.37. Rules of Court.

The. Rules of Court, being procedural, . are to be construed
liberally with the end- in view ofrealizing their purpose - the proper
and just determination ofa litigation.181 A liberal construction of the
Rules of Court requires the courts, in the exercise of their functions,
to act reasonably and not capriciously, and enjoins them to apply
the rules in order to promote their object. and to assist the parties
in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
cases.w While procedural laws are no other, than techpicalities in
their entirety, they were adopted not as ends Inthems,elves for the
compliance with which courts havebeen organized and-functions,
but as means conducive to the realization ofthe administration of
law and justice, Technicalities, when they are not an aid to justice,
deserve .scant consideration .from the· courts. 183 For this reason, the
Rules of Court 'should not be interpreted ·to sacrifice substantial
rights of a litigaiit at the altar of technicalities to the consequent
impairment of the principles of jtistfoe.104 Nor should technicalities
be resorted to in derogation ofthe intentarid purpose of the rules.w
The rules should instead be so construed as to give litigants ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims, and· that 'a 'possible
denial of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, should be
avoided.186
As well said in a case: "Lapses in the literal observance of a
rule of procedure will be overlooked when they do not involve public
181Berkenkotter v, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 36629, September 28, 1973, 53

SCRA 228 (1973); Haberer v. Martinez, G.R. No. 39386, January 29, 1975, 62 SCRA
162 (1975); City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA
342 (1969).
182Cabunilas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46476, December 29, 1977, 80 SCRA
706 (1977); Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910); Mitschiener v. Barrios, 76 Phil.
55 (1946). . .
"'"Blanco y. _:i.;!ediabe, 63 Phil. 124 (1936); McEntee v. Manotok, 113 Phil. 249
(1961).
1114Cabiinilas v. Court of Appeals, supra.
185Berkenkotter
v. Court of Appeals,supra.
188Quibuyen
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 16854, December 26, 1963, 9 SCRA
741 (1963); Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Const. Co., G.R. No.
35630, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664 (1982).
action. They make valid that which, before the enactment of the
statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to acts done
that would have bee~ invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws
have been complied with. Curative statutes, by their very nature,
are retroactive.w
Redemption laws, being remedial in nature, are to be construed
liberally to carry. out their purpose, which· is 'to enable the debtor
to have his property applied.to pay as many debtor's liabilities as
possible.192 Similarly, statutes providing exemptions from execution
are interpreted liberally in order to give effect to their beneficent
and humane purpose; and to this end, any reasonable doubt should
be construed in favor of the exemption from execution.w Laws on
attachment are, also liberally.
construed in order to promote
I
their
objects and assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice.v- ·
AB instruments of credit, ·warehouse receipts play a very
important rol~ in modern commerce, and accordingly,. warehouse
receipt laws are given liberal construction in favor of bona fief,e
holders of such receipts.v-
The purpose ofthe probation being to give first-hand offenders a
second chance to maintain his place in society through the process of
reformation, it should 'be liberally construed to achieve its objective.
Thus, the probation ia,~Ill.ay liberally beconstrued by extending the
benefits thereof to any one not specifically disqualified.w
A statute granting· powers· to an: agency created by the
Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of
the purposes and objectives for which it was created.w
191Narzales
v. NLRC, G.R. No; 141959, October 2~, 2000, 134 SCAD 773; Zu-
lueta v. A!iia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 138,137, March 8, 2001.
192Enage
v. Escano, 38 Phil. ·557 (1918); ·Javellana v. Nu.Ilez, 40 Phil. 761
(1920). ,·· .. ' ~-. . ' .
193Belen
. V. Dli Leon, G.R. No~ 16412, November 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 793.
194C!lirtral
Capiz v. Salas, 43 Phil. 930 (1922).
196Bank
of the PhilippineIslands.v, Herridge, 47 Phil. 57 (1924).
196Santos
To v. Patio, G.R. No, 55130, January 17, 1983, 120· SCRA 8. But see
Tolentino v. Alconcel, G.R. No. 63400, March 18, 1983, 121 SCRA 92.
197J3uenaseda
v. Flavier, 44 SCAD. 1026, 226 SCRA 645 (1993).
itself authorizes their validity.' Where a statute is mandatory, the

court has no power to distinguish between material and immaterial
breach thereof or omission to comply with what it requires. What the
law decrees must be obeyed against pron of sanction or declaration
of nullity of what is done in disregard thereof.s
A directbcy ;statute .is :a:~tatUtec which is permissive or
discretionary in nature and. :r;µ~r,ely outlines the act to be done in
such a way that no Injury can' :hisult from ignoring it or that its
purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed
and substantially the same result obtained," A statute which merely
operates to confer discretion upon a person, namely, to act according
to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled
by the judgment ~d conscien.ce ofothers, is directory.j·Conside,ring
the nature of a directory statute, the nonperformance of what it
prescribes, though constituting in. some instances an irregularity
or subjecting the official concerned to disciplinary or administrative
sanction, will not vitiate the proceedings therein taken.•
8.03. Whenstatute is mandatory or directory.

There is no universal .rU.l~
by which directory provisions in a
statute may in all circumstances be distinguished.from those which
are mandatory. Neither is
there an absolute test for determining
whether a statutory direction is to be. considered .mandatory or
directory. In the determination of this question; the primary object is
to ascertainlegislative intent. The legislative intent mustbe obtained
from all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination
does not depend on theform of the statute. Consideration mustbe
given to the entire statute, its object, purpose, legislative history,
and the consequences which would result from construing .it one
way or the other, and the statute must be construed in -connection
with other related .statutes. Words of permissive character may
be given a mandatory signiflcance in order to effect the legislative
intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot
6 Art. 5, Civil Code; Buyco v. Phil. National Bank, 112 Phil. 588 (1961).
6 Sarina v:,,.Co~ of First Instance <ifBUkidnon, G;R.' No. 28511, August 22
1968, 24 SCRA"7la'. . . . • '
7Milliir v. Lakewood Housing Co., 180 NE 700, 81ALR1239 (1932).
8Capati
v. Ocampo, G.R.No. 28742, April 30, 1982, 113 SORA 794;Meralco
Securities Corp. v. Savellano, G.'R. No. 3618l;October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 804.
9Marcelino
v. Cruz, G.R. No. 42428, March 18, 1983; Phil. Assn. of Free Labor
Unions v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 2228, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 40.
forbids is performed. Does the statute prescribe a result in addition

to, or apart from, what it requires? Will third parties suffer as a
consequence of whatthe person charged by the statute to do within a
prescribed limit fails to do? Does the law give a person no alternative
choice? Is what the statute prescribesa matter of substance and not
of form? Will there. be more injury to the public by a disregard of
what the law provides? If the answers are in the affirmative, the
statute is, as a rule, mandatory; otherwise, it is directory.
- Whether· a statutory requirement is mandatory or directory
depends on its effect. If no substantial rights depend on it and no
injury can result fromignoringit; and the purpose of the legislature
can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and
substantially-the same results obtained, then the statute will gener-
ally b_e regarded as directory; but if not, it will be mandatory.'2
Similarly, statutory requirements intended for the protection of
the citizens and by a disregard of which their rights are injuriously
affected are regarded as mandatory; they must· be followed or the
acts done will be invalid. The power of the officer in such cases is
limited by the manner and conditions for its exercise.»
A statute will not be construed as mandatory and requiring a
public officer to act within a certain time limit even if it is couched
in words of positive command if it will cause hardship or injustice
on the part of the public who is not at fault,> Nor will a statute
be interpreted as mandatory if it will lead to absurd, impossible or
mischievous consequences. The statute will instead be construed as
directory, so as to avoid such results, without prejudice to subjecting
the officer concerned to administrative sanction for his failure to do
what the law requires.v
8.05. Language used.

Statutes using words of command, such as "shall," "must,"
"ought" or "should," or prohibition, such as "cannot," "shall not"
or "oug ht not, ,, are generally regarded as mandatory.'" The use of
,
words of command or of prohibition indicates the legislative intent
________ ,, ,!
'2Mille~ v. Lakewood Housing Co., 180 NE 700, 81 ALR 1239 (1932).

13Lyonv.
Alley, 32 L. ed. 899 (1889).
14Querubin
v. Court of Appeals, 82 Phil. 226 (1948).
'"Marcelino v. Cruz, G.R. No. 42428, March 18; 1983.
'"Brehn v. Republic, G.R. No. 18566, September 10, 1963, 9 SCRA 172.
458
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTiON
be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original

record of the record or the record on appeal." .
The Court sustained the dismissal of the appeal by the appel-
late court, thusr ·
"The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory

character of the Rule. The term "shall" is a word of comm.and
and O~e Which h~s ~ways or which must.bs given a COinpulsox;
me~g, and 1.t ..is generally imperative or mandatory.
Peti~o~ers cannot give a different interpretation to the Rule
an~ ms1st. that payment of docket fee shall.bs made only upon
their.receipt of a notice from the trial court to pay. For it is a
rule in st:atutory construction that every part of the statute
must be mterpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must .be interpreted together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. Indeed, petitioners cannot deviate from the
Rule.
Also under Rule 41 of the same Rules, an appeal to the

Court of Appeals from a case decided by the RTC in the exercise
of the latter's, original jurisdiction, shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from· the :notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. Such appeal IS made by filing a noties thereof With the
court that rendered thejudgment or final order and by serving
a . co~y o~. that. noti~e upon the. adverse party.· Furthermore,
wit?ID this same penod, appellant shall pay to the clerk of court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the
full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
The payment ~f docket fee within this period is mandatory
for the perfection of appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court
would not ~e; able to act on the subject matter· of the action,
and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory.
Time ·and again, this Court has consistently held that

payment of do~et fee within the prescribed period is mandatory
for the perfect10n of an appeal. ·Without such payment, the
appellate cow-t d~es not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed
from becomes final and executory .
. Petitioners ==
that the Appellate Court, in issuing the
assailed Resolutions, gave premium to technicalities rather
intent not to use the word "must" as mandatory-but merely as direc-

tory is evident and it should be given .such meaning. 22
One test used to determine whether' the word "shall" is
mandatory or discretionary is whether. non-compliance with what
is required will result in the nullity of the act. If it results in the
nullity of the act, theword is used as a command. Thus, in Director
of Lands v. ·Court:ofAppeals,23 the law requires in petitions for land
registration that "upon receipt of the: order of the court setting the
time for initial he~g; the .Com.missioper of Land Registration
shall cause a. notice of Wtil:ll hearing to be published in the Official
Gazette arid once in a" newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines." The Court heldthat the law.-~*pres$ly requires that the
initial hearing be· published not only i.Il'the Official Gazette but also
ina newspaperof general circulation because due process demands
it and· the reality that the Offi~ial G~~ette is not widely read and as
circulated as newspapers of general· circulation, These make the
use of the word "shall" imperative, so that the decision. in.the land
registration case which was tried without, the initial hearing being
published in a-newspapar of general circulation is a nullity.
8.07. Use of''may."

The word "may'' is an auxiliary verb showing, among others,
opportunity or possibility. Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase
"may be" implies the possible existence of somothing,« .
Generally speaking, the use of the word "may' in a. statute
denotes that. it is directory in. nature. 'word "riuiy" is generally'fhe
permissive only and operates to conferdiscretion,«
' I • • • • .-. •
The word "may'' as used in adjective laws, such as remedial

statutes which are construed liberally, is only permissive and not
mandatory. Thus; the word "may"in Sec, 63 of.the CorporationCode
to the effect that "shares of stock so issued are personal property
and may be transferred by delivery of the. certificate or certificates
22Loyola
Grand: Villas :Homeow'ners (South) Assn., Inc. v. :Court of Appeals, 85
SCAD 420, 276 SCRA 6Sl(;1997). .. ..
23 Supra. ·r:)l _· · · . •· · · •' · ' ·
24Leg8zpi
.(;,Estrella,· 189 SCRA 58 (1990).
""Grego v. COMELEC, 83 SCAD 923, 27 4 SCRA 481 (1997), citing R.E. Agpalo,
Statutory Construction,p. 239 (2nd ed., 1990); Bersabel v. Salvador, G.R. No. 35910,
July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA l 76j Dizon v. Encarnacion; 119 Phil. 20 (1963); Cabaluna v.
Ventura, 4 7 Phil. 165 (1924); Castillo v. Sian, 105 Phil. 622 (1959). r
For instance, the word "shall" in Section 2 of Republic Act No.

304 which states that "banks or other financial institutions owned
or controlled by the Goverrunent shall, subject to availability of
funds xx x, accept at a discount at not more than two per centum for
ten years such (backpay) certificate" implies not a mandatory, but a
discretionary, meaning because of the phrase "subject to availability
of funds.?» Similarly, the word "shall" in the provision to the effect
that a corporation violating the Corporation Law "shall, upon such
violation being proved,. be dissolved· by quo warranto proceedings"
has been construed as "may."ss
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code
of 1991, provides that an appeal from an adverse decision 'against
a local executive elective official to the President "shall not prevent
a decision from becoming final or executory." It has b~en held that
the word "shall" in the provision is not mandatory because there is
room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing
officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision and there is
nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are 'deprived
of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order,»
Illustrative case in the use of "shall"

In Acosta v. Adaza, G.R. No. 168617 [February 19, 2007],
the issue is whether the Secretary of Justice can still entertain
a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor when the
information has been filed in court and the accused has already been
arraigned, The resolution of the issue depends upon whether there
is a conflict between Sec. 7 and Sec. 12 of the Rules of Proceclure
of the Department of J~stice, and requires reconciliation of these
provisions and application of rules of statutory construction. In
holding that the petition for review filed after the accused has been
arraigned has to be dismissed, .the Court ruled:
In a Resolution dated 11 July 2002, the DOJ reversed and
set aside the 30 August 2001 resolution of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of'Iligan City anddirected the said office to withdraw the
Information for Estafa against petitioner.
,
i' '~ i ,-t
32Diokno
v. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., supra. .
33Government
v. El Hogar Filipino, 50 Phil. 399 (1927).
34Berces,
Sr. v, Guingona, Jr., 59 SCAD 131, 241 SCRA 539 (1995).
The Court of-Appeals in a Decision-dated 21 July 2004 granted

respondent's petition and reversed'theResolutions of the ·DOJ· dated
11 July 2002 and 30 ·January 2003.
In resolving the first.issue; the Court of Appeals, relying heavily
on Section 7 ofDOJ Circular No. 70 which states "[i]f an information
has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the
petition shall not be given due 'Course if the accused had already
been arraigned," ruled that since . petitioner was arraigned before
she filed the petition for· review with the DOJ, it was. imperative
for the DOJ to dismiss such petition. It added that when petitioner
pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to have waived her right to
reinvestigation and right to question any irregularity that surrounds
it.
Anent the second issue, the Court of Appeals declared that the
existence of probable cause or the lack of it, cannot be dealt with
by it since factual issues are not proper subjects of a Petition for
Certiorari.
In disposing of the last issue, the Court of Appeals held that
the order of the trial court dismissing the subject criminal case
pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the DOJ did not render
the petition moot and academic. It said that since the tri:tl court's
order relied solely on the resolutions of the DOJ, said order is void
as it violated the rule which enjoins the trial court to assess the
evidence presented before it in a motion to dismiss and not to rely
solely on the prosecutor's averment that the Secretary of Justice had
recommended the dismissal of the case.
Dissatisfied by the Court of Appeals' ruling, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration setting forth the following grounds:
1. That the over-all language of Sections 7 and 12 of
Department Circular No. 70 is permissive and directory such that
the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact
that the accused had been arraigned;
2. That the contemperaneous construction by the Secretary
of Justice should be given great weight and respect;
3. Th.?'t;,$,e~ion 7 of the Circular applies only to resolutions
rendered pursuant to a preliminary investigation, not on a reinves-
tigation; ·
4. That the trial court's order of dismissal of the criminal
case has rendered the instant petition moot and academic;
the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should. not take cognizance of

the petition, or even give due course thereto; but instead dismiss or
den~ it outright. The ,app~P;i:tte ?Ourt added that the word "may" in
Section 12 should be read air"shall" or "must" since such construction
is absolutely nece~~.-w:to 'giy~ effeCi; 'to the apparent intention of the
rule as gathered frori:ithe context;
' - . - ' . .' ,. '. . ~-) _. . .
. As to . th,e,. cont~pipofaneo'us construction of the Secretary of
Justice, the Court oi,Kppeals stated' that the same should not be
given weight since it ~~·s errori~o~eL . . . .
Anent petitioner's, argument that Section 7 of the questioned
circular applies only to original resolutions that brought about
the filing of'the corresponding informations in court, but not to
resolutions rend~red: ~ursuant to a motion for reinvesJ:igation, the
appellate court simply brushed aside such contention as having no
basis in the circular questioned. • · ·.
It also r~j~cted p~titloner's· pr~testation that her arraignment
was forced upon her. since she failed to present any evidence to
substantiate the same. .
It is petitioner's contention that 'despite her being arraigned,
the supposed waiver of her right, to preliminary investigation has
been nullified by· virtue• of the trial· court's order or reinvestigation.
On this score, the Court of Appeals rebuffed such argument stating
that there was no "supposed waiver of preliminaey investigation"
to speak of for the. reason that petitioner had actually undergone
preliminary investigation. .· ·
Petitioner remained unconvinced with the explanations of the
. Court of Appeals.
Hence, the instant petition.
Again, petitioner contends that the DOJ can give due course to
an appeal or petition for review despite its having been filed after
the accused had already been arraigned. It asserts that the fact of
arraignment of an accused before the filing of an appeal or petition
for review before the DOJ "is not at all relevant" as the DOJ can
still take cognizance of the appeal or Petition for Review before it. In
support of this contention, petitioner set her sights on the ruling of
this Court in Crespo u, Mogul, to wit: ·
'The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a

complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as to.its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
468 STATUTORY1eONSTRUCTION ,.
same. Ascorrectly pointed out-by-respondent, the emphasized

portion in the;Crespo ruling' is a p8rc~lof the entire paragraph
<which relates tO;:the duty and jUrisdictiorfof the trial court to
determine for'itself whetheror notto di!smissa case before it,
and-which-states -·that- such duty comes •into play regardless
of whether: such motion - is filed before' or after arraignment
and upon'wbosefnstnictions. Th.e·aHusiorr·to the Seeretary of
Justice -as';reviewmgrthe· records of investigation and giving
Instructiorrs.for th(filing:ofa motion to dismiss in the cited
ruling does n'Ot take into consideration of whether the appeal
or petition before''the Secretary of Justice was filed after
arraignment. •SignificMitly, in-the Crespo case, the accused had
not yet be:en ~aigne4_wf.e:o. t}ie.~J?P;e~ o:r)letition fo~ review
was fi~ed befo:e t~e DOJ. Undoubtedly, P;etj.~ioner'1.reliance,on
the said case 1s misplaced. · · ··
- Also unavailing is petitioner's fovocatiOn of the cases of
Roberts z{ Court ofA.p[Jeals and Marcelo' v. CouH:ofAppeals.
As in Crespo v.' Mogut,''ii~:l.therRoberts v. Cbi.irt'of :Appeals nor
Marcelo v. Court of Ap[JeiilstoCik into accourit' of W'nether the
appeal'or.~~~tiO:n before theSecf~taryofJustfoe was filed after
arrhlgnmerit.,:Just'-1i4'e fo.:th~ Crespo· ease, the accused in both
Robertso, Cburl-OfA[J}/ealsaiidMar'celo v~'Courtbf4ppeals had
not yet been arraigned when the appeal' or petition for review
was-filed before the D()J.- .
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of the provisions ofDOJ Circular No. 70 violated
three basic ntles ·n:i statu~ry construction. First, the rule that
the pro-vision tj!at appears last in the order of position in the
rule or regulation" must prevail, Second, the rule that the
con~mporan~ris CHnsti:uction of a. Statµte or regulation by the
°'~c~rs w:Jt~ eaj'ol'~~ it should l:ie.~ven weiglit. Third, petitioner
lifted a portion froni Agpalo's Statutory Construction where
the word "shall" had been construed as a permissive, and not a
mandatory language. · • •. . ·
The all too-famili~ rule in statutory_ construction in
this case, an administrative rule of pr~c~dke,. is that when a
tule
statute ,o,r is clear and uriambiguons, interpretation need
notbe.resorted to. Since Section 7 of the subject.circular clearly
and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal
or a petition-for review filed after arraignment, no resort to
interpretation is necessary.
It is noteworthy that the principle- cited by petitioner

reveals that, to find application, the same presupposes that
"one part of the statute cannot be reconciled or harmonized
with another part without nullifying one in favor of the other."
In the instant case, however, Section 7 is neither contradictory
nor _irreconcilable with Section 12. As can _be seen. above,
Section 7 pertains to the action on the.petition that the DOJ
must take, while Section 12 enumerates the options the DOJ
has with regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of
an appeal,
AB aptly' observed by respondent, Section 7 specifically
applies to a situa'ti9n on whafthe bOJ mustdo when confronted
With an appeal or a petition·:for review that is either clearly
without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or filed after an
accused has already been arraigned, i.e., he may dismiss it
outright if it is patently without merit or manifestly intended
to delay, or, ifit was filed after the accused has already been
arraigned.the Secretary shall not give it due course.
Section 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal.
Under said section, the DOJ may take any of four actions when
disposing an appeal, namely: ·
1. reve~se thi appe~ed resolution;
2. modify the appealed resolution;
3. affirm the appealed resolution;
. 4. dismiss the appeal .altogether, depending on the
circumstances and incidents attendant thereto. ·
As to the dismissal ofa petitionfor review or an appeal,
the grounds are provided for in Section 12 and, consequently,
.the DOJ must evaluate the pertinent· circumstances and the
facts of the case in' order to determine which ground or grounds
shall apply. .. · ·
Thus, when an aecused has already been arraigned, the
DOJ must not give the appeal or petition for review due course
and must dismiss the same. This is bolstered by the fact that
arraignlnent of the accused prior to the filing of the appeal or
petition for review is . set forth' as one of the. grounds for its
dismissal. Therefore, ill such instance, the DOJ, noting that
the.a.:1'aignme11:tof an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or
petition for review is a ground for dismissal under Section 12 ,
not more than twoper centum for ten years such (backpay)
certificate" implies not a mandatory, but a discretionary,
meaning because of the phrase "subject to availability
of funds." Similarly, the word "shall" in the provision to
the effect that a. corporation violating the.corporation law
"shall; upon such violation being proved, be· dissolved by
quouiarranto proceedings" has been construed as ":i:nay."
After a judicious scrutiny of the cited passage, it becomes
apparent that the same is not applicable· tothe provision in
question. In the cited passage, the word "shall" departed from
its mandatory import connotation because it was connected
to certain . provisos/conditions: "Subject to the availability
of funds"· and "upon such violation being proved," No such
proviso/condition, however, can be found in Section 7 of the
subject circular. Hence, the word "shall" retains its mandatory
import.
At this juncture; the Court of Appeals' disquisition in this
matter is enlightening: ·
Indeed, if the intent of Department Circular No. ·

70 were to give the Secretary. of Justice a discretionary
power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review de-
spite its being outrightly dismis_sible, such as when the
accused has already been arraigned, or where the crime
the accused is being charged With has already prescribed,
or there is no reversible
.. -·· error . that
' - .
has. been
- .
committed '
or that there are, legal or factual grounds warranting dis-
missal, the result would not only be incongruous but also
irrational and even unjust, For then, the action of the Sec-
retary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would
serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of
time; Moreover, to give the second sentence of Section
12 in relation to its paragraph (e) a directory application
would not only subvert the avowed objectives of the Cir-
cular, that is, for the expeditious and efficient administra-
tion· of justice, but would also render its other mandatory
proyis!Qn's - Sections 3, 5, 6 and 7, nugatory.
;"'
In her· steadfast effort· to champion her case, petitioner

contends that the issue -as to whether ·the DOJ rightfully
entertained the instant case, despite the arraignment of the
accused prior to its filing, has been rendered moot and academic
words of positive prohibition; · such as . "shall .not," "cannot," or

"ought not," or which is couched in negative terms importingthat
the actshall not be done otherwise than designated is mandatory,«
Prohibitive or 'negative .vv?t.g~,~aji r¥e!y, if ~~~ri be directory, for
there is but one way to Ob(:!y tne.coln.niarid, "thousfiall not," and that
is to completely refrain i'rofn
dofog.the forbidden~et.s7 · ·
· · B.MA'ND.ATORY STATUTES
8.10. Statutes
..
conf~rring
~· . '-.' . power.
: '
Statutes which confer upon a public body or officer-power

to perform acts which concern the public interests or rights of
individuals, are generally regarded as mandatory although the
language Used is permissive only since such statutes are construed
as imposing rather than conferring privileges,» The power is given
not for the benefit. of the public officer· but for that of third persons.
It is placed with the depository to meet the demands' of'rights, and to
prevent a failure.of justice .. It is given as a remedy.tothose entitled.
to invoke its aid; and who wouldotherwise be remediless. fu all such
cases, it is held that the intent of the legislature was not to devolve
a mere discretion, but to impose a positive and absolute duty which
can be enforced. 39
8.11. Statutes granting benefits.

Statutes which require certain steps to be taken -or certain
conditions to be met before persons concerned tan avail of the
benefits conferred by law are, with respect to such requirements,
considered mandatory. For this reason, failure of a person to take
the required steps orto meet the conditions will ordinarily preclude
him from availing of the statutory benefits. The rule is based on
the maxim, vigilantibus et non.dormientibus jura subueniunt, or the
laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. Potior 40
3 "Brehn
v. Rep~pli.c, 118 Phil. 1442 (1963); McGee v, Republic, 94 Phil. 820
(1954). t .. ,, . . .
3 7McGee·v. Republic, 94 Phil. 820 (1954). . .
38De
M~sa v. Meneias, G.R. No. 24583, October 29, 1966 18 SCRA 533· Primi-
cias v. Municipality ofUrdaneta, G.R. No. 26702, October 18, i979, 93 SCRA 462.
39/n
re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
'°Mendoza v. Caya, 98 Phil. 107 (1955).
is the underlying . reason why such statutes or rules are construed

as mandatory,«
Such statutes orrulesreqµire strict.not substantial, COD.1:Pli~c~.
Accordingly," they are :rlbt
'wfilvabre; nor 'can ·they~ be'the subject 'of
agreements or stipula,tjons bylitigapts.50 '
For instance; Section 187,'of R.A. ~o~ '7160 requires thaf tlie
dissatisfied taxpayer who qliestion1fthe v8.li.dit)t'or legality of a. fax
ordinance must' 'file his 'i!Pl>ealtd~th~ Secretacy of Justice;· within
30' days from effectmcy0th:ei'eof; In cas'e tlle Secretary decides the
appeal,' a period' als(fof30 days is' allowed for an aggrieved party
to go to court. But 'if the Secretacy'does not act thereon; 'ftfter the
·lapse· of 60 'days, a' 'party Cbuld · alfeady proceed-to seek relief in
court; These three separate periodsiare'Clearlygi·vei:l'for~ompliance
as a prerequisite before seeking' redress in 'ii competent i!ourt;·Such
statutory. periods ate' set oo prevent· delays·as ~eU as enhance the
orderly and 'speedy discharge of judicial functions1·Forthis reason
the courts construethese provisions bf stattites as- mandatory."'
The proyisio~~of the.law kd the rµl~s conc~mmg the 1Dtlnner
and the period of t~g' ;;ippea,I''are mandatory' .· and jurisdi<#()nitl,
compliance with which is essential'to enable the appellate court to
take cognizance of the appeal. •2 Unless the requirements of law are
complied with, the decision of the lower court will become final and
preclude the. appellate cotltt' frdm' acquiring junsdfotiun to review
it. •3 The reason is that sound public p()pcydemands that, 11t the risk
of occasional .errors, judgments ofco1!]rj;s aswell as. alilnini.strative
tribunals should become final at some definite date fixed by)aw."'
Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. 7 public :ii:ite.rest requires
that by the vecy nature.of thingsthere must be. an end to a legal
controversy."" , '··\.
49Shioji v. Harvey; 43 Phil. 333 (1922); Alvero v. De la.Rosa, 76 Phil. 428

(1946).
"°Valdez v. Ocaman, 106 Phil. 929 (1960); Altavas v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil.
940 (1960); Gachon v. Devera, Jr., 84 SCAD 12, 274 SCRA 540 (1997); Valdez v, Aeu-
men, 106 Phil. 929 (1960). -,
"'Reyes v.'COA, 105 SCAD 290, 230.SCRA486,492 (1999), citing Agpalo, Stat-
utory Construction,Third Edition, 1995, p. 266.
52Gutierrez
V:· q~prt ofAppeals, GiR. No:·25972, November 26,.1968, 26 SCRA
. .,. .,1·.
32. ' ,,
53Alvero-v.
De ta Rosa, 76 Phil. 428 (1946); People v. Tamiini; G.R. No. 22160,
January 21, i974, 55SCRA153.
M.Antique v. Sawmill,Inc. v.;Zayco, G:R. No. 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA
316; Espiritu San Miguel,.63 Phil. 615 (1936).
55Government
v. Del Rosario, 54 Phil. 138 (1929).
protection or benefit of the party. affected, is mandatory.s A stat-

ute which requires a court to exercise itsjurisd.iction in a particular
manner, follow a partieular.procedure, or subject to certain limita-
tions, is· mandatory, and an act beyond those limits is void asin
excess of jurisdiction,v Where failure to comply with certain pro-
cedural requirements will have the effect of rendering the act done
in connection therewith void, the statute prescribing such require-
ments is regarded as mandatory= -even though the language. used
therein is permissive in nature." ·
Fo~ instance, theii.Sectfoni7,.Rule 3,oftlie old Rules of Court
provided that "afte~· a PartY
dies. and the claim is not thereby
extinguished; the. court shall. order, upon proper notice, ~lie: legal
representative. of ;the deceased. to, appear and to be. substituted for
the deceased, within a period, .of thirty (3(i) days, or withll{ such time
as may be granted. if
the legal representativefails to appear :within
said period, the court may w:derthe.opposing party to produce the
appointment of a legal representative of the. deceased within a tiine
to be specified by the court, arid the representative shall immediately
appear and on behalf of the interest ofthe deceased." While this
provision, because of the use of the permissive word "may" seems
to imply that 'it isi:discretionary for the court to order the opposing
party to produce the appointment of a legal representative when the
legal representative of the deceased, notwithstanding notice, fails to
appear, the procedural requirement goes to the very jurisdiction of
the court, for "unless and until a legal representative-is for him duly
named and within the jurisdiction Of the trial court; noadjudieation
in the cause could have been accorded any validity or binding effect
upon any party, In-representation of the deceased, without trenching
upon the fundamental right to a day in court which is the very
essence ofthe constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process,"
and accordingly, the provision is mandatory.s
8.15.' Election laws on conduct of election,

The provisions of election laws governiri.g the conduct of
elections and prescribing the 'steps election officials are . required
to do in connection 'therewith are mandatory before the elections;
r •
---'""'-- ........
-: ,,. ... ,t
""De Mesa v, Mencias, G~R. No. 24583, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 533.
59Burtnett
v. King, 205 P2d 657, 12 ALR2d 333 (1949).
80Gabriel
v. Encarnacion, 94 Phil. 917 (1954).
81De
Mesa v. Mencias, G.R. No. 24583, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 533.
02De
Mesa v. Mencias, G.R. No. 24583, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 533.
such a case, should be respected; which can be effected by construing

the provision of the law involved as directory.s
8.16. Electiorilaws on qualification and' disqualification.

The rule that election laws are mandatory before but notafter
the elections applies ~niy to· those provisi~q:s which are procedural
in nature affecting the conduct of the elections aswell as to those
which direct or require election. officials u; do or perform certain
acts, the purpose of such construction being to preserve the sanctity
of the ballot and carry out the will of the electorate.s
The rule does not apply to provisions of the election laws
prescribing the time limit· to file certificates of candidacy and
the qualifications
.,. ·. .
and disqualiflcations to . elective office.
•' ·.',' ' - - ' ..--
These
' /
provisions are considered mandatory even· after the elections. Thus,
where a candidate filed his· certificate · of candidacy beyond the
period required by law, he-is disqualified to run for the office as
his certificate is void. 70 Where a candidate is, by law' disqualified;
the circumstance that he received the highest number of votes does
not qualify him for the.office, nor does it validate his election. If the
petition for his disqualification is filed before the election but finally
resolved against him· thereafter, in consequence· of which he was
allowed to continue With his candidacy and to be voted, the votes
cast in his favor. are considered void and he shall be ousted from
office."
8.17. Statutes prescribing quallfications for qffice.

Eligibility to a public office is ofa continuing nature and must
exist. at the commencement of the term
and during the occupancy
of the office. Statutes prescribing the eligibility or qualifications
a
of persons to a public office are, as rule, regarded as mandatory,
a
This means that if person ls not qualified at the time he assumed
office, . or if he loses -such eligibility or qualifications· during the
""De los Reyes ~..pociriguez, supra.

69See Sec. 8~15;8upra.
70Gafor
.v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No, 52365, January 22, 1980, 95
SCRA431. . . . .
'llTecson v, Commission on Elections, G,R. No: 52451, March 31, 1981, 103
SCRA 671; Santos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52390, March 31, 1981, 103
SCRA 628; Sanchez v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 16878, April 26, 1961, 1 SCRA 1102.
482 STATUTORY CONS'llRUCTION
C~ DmECTORY STATUTES
8.20. Statutes presctj},~g gµ_id&nce

f~r of6.cer8.
There are statutory reqilisitions intended.for guidanceofefflcers
in the conduct of business devolved' upon 'them: which do· riot limit
their power or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions
ineffectual. Such generally.ace-regulations designed to secure order,
system and dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which
the rights· of parti~s ,interested iliay not be irijuriousiy affected,
Provisions . of this character are.
hot.usually regarded as mandatory •.
unless accompanied by D.egati~e V\rords importing that the acts
required shall not be done in any othermanner or timethan that
designated." · 1
8.21. Statutes prescribip.gmanner ,ofjudicial action.

Statutes prescribing the requirements as to the manner of
judicial action that judges should follow in the discharge: of their
functions are, as a rule, m:erely directory, It should not be assumed in
the absence of specific language to the contrary that the legislature
intended that the right of'parties should be seriously affected by the
failure of a court or some officer to comply strictly with the statutory
requirements of official action. The legislature often enacts statutes
for the purpose of providing an orderly procedure for the conduct
of public business, but procedure .is secondary in importance to
substantive right, and the non-observarice of such procedure
should never be permitted to affect .substantive right, unless the
intention of the legislature is dearly expressed. The direction is
as to a matter which is not of the essence' of thething to be done,
and if there is nothing to suggestthat the legislature intended that
strict compliance therewith should be essential to the validity of a
decision, the decision thus rendered is valid. It is universally held
that statutes of this nature are merely directory, and non-compliance
therewith is not necessary to the validity of the proceedings.78
i ! .(
'"Lyon v. Alley, 32 L. ed. 899 (1889).

7 80campo v. Cabangis, 15 Phil. 626 (1910);. Fuentes v. Director of Prisons, 46
Phil. 22 (1924).
statute is mandatory.s The better-rule is.that where a construction

of a time provision as mandatory' will cause greatinjury to persons
not at fault or result In a miscarriage of justice, such consequence
should be avoided by construing' the 'statute as· directory, for reasons
of fairness, justice and fair play require such co'tjstruction~83 :
··: • •• • - '·,
•
! •• '
It has been held that a statute.requiring rendition ofjudgment

within a specifiedtime is .generally construed to be.merely directory,
so that non-compliance with.them does not.invalidate the judgment
on the theory that if the-statute had intended, such result, it would
have clearly indicated it. The difference between a mandatory
and a directory provision Is often· madeon grounds of eipediencr;
the reasons being that less'injliry results 'to the 'general' public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter - of the law and that' judges
would otherwise abstain from re:tid.erfug;decisionsa.ftertlie period to
render them had iapsedbecause"theyfackedjurisdiction
.,.. ..' .. ·... .
to do so.8'
Querubin v. Court of Appeals» is a case in point. - This case
involves a petitionchallengingthejlllisdiction ofthe Court of,Appeals
from continuing to decide an election case because the required
period to resolve it has expired. The statute involved provides that
appeals in election cases "shall be decided within three month!'!after
of
the filing of the case' in the office the : eierk of court." The court,
construing this provision, ruled that while its purpose is' to impress'
the need for speedy disposal of election contests, as imperatively
demanded by public interests, it is merely directory in D.a:t~. 'To
dismiss an election contest- or the appeal taken therein because
the respective courts, regardless of cause or teason,· have failed tb
render final decisions within the time limits of sald 'actions is to
defeat the administration of justice upon factors 'beyond the control
of the parties. That would defeat the purpose of the due process
of law and would make of the. admfnistration of justice in election
contests an aleatory process where the litigants, 'itrespective ofthe
merits of their respective claims, Wm be gambling for a deadline,
The dismissal in such cases will constitute a miscarriage of justice.
The speedy trial required by the law would be turned into a denial of
. ' ! 'J. .-
82See Portillo v, Salvanti, 54 Phil. 543 (1930), which was subsequently over-
ruled in Querubin v. Court of Appeals, 82 Phil. 226 (1948).
83Mareelino
v. Cruz, G.R. No. 42428, March 18, 1983; Querubin v. Court of
Appeals, 82 Phil. 226 (1948).
MRomualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 64 SCAD 358, 248 SCRA 300 (1995).
8082 Phil. 226 (1948).
the essential act.' Thus, insaid case; the.statute under exami-

nation was construed merelyto be directory.
brith.isvie~, a:uthoritiesareoiie in sayirigthat. .. 'Statutes
requiring the rendition of judgment .forthwith -or immediately
after the trial or verdiet have been held by soriiecbµrts to be
merely directory so that non-compliance With, them does not
invalidate the judgm~nt; on the thebcy that if the' statute had
intended such result 'it would. clearly Have indicated it.' xx x
Such cq~stri.ictio~ applies equally to the constitutiop.al
provision· tinder. consideration. In MckeU v. School Dis. of
Philadelphia, ·it was ruled that 'thelegal ·distlliction between
directory and m..~datory laws is applicableto fundamental as
1
it is to statutory laws.' •· ·
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question

indicates that it, falls within the exception. rather than . the
general rule. By the phrase 'unless 'reduced 'by the Supreme
Court,' it is evident that the period prescribed therein is
subje<;t. to. modification . by. this Court in. accordance with
its prerogative under Section 5(5) of Article X of the New
Constitution to 'promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in allcourts x x x.' And there can be no doubt
that said provision .having been incorporated for reasons of
expediency, relates merelyto matters of.procedure. Afbermarle.
Oil & Gas Co. v. Morris declares that constitutional provisions
are directory and not mandatory, where they refer to matters
merely procedural.
In practice, we have assumed a liberal stand with respect
to this' provision. This Court had at various times, upon proper
· application and for meritorious reasons; allowed judges of
inferior courts additional time beyond the three-month period
within which to decide cases submitted to them. The reason is
that a departure from said provision would result in less-injury
to the general public than. would· its strict. application; To hold
' that non-compliance by 'the courts with the aforesaid provision
would result in loss of jurisdiction, would make the courts,
through, w:hich conflicts are resolved, the very instruments
to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of having failed
to render a decision within the allowed tenn: Such an absurd
situation could not have been intended· by the framers· of our
fundamental law.
Chapter IX
PROSPE:CTIVE.ANDRETROACTIVE
STATUTES
A. IN GENERAL
9.01.· Prospective and retroactive statutes, defin~d. ·

·According to their application, statutes may be prospective or
retroactive. A prospective statute is one which operates upon facts or
transactions that occur after the statute takes effect, one that looks
and applies to the future.1 A retroactiye Jaw is a law which creates a
new obligation, imposes a new duty or attachesa new disability: in
respect to a transaction alreadypast.However, a statute is notmade
~etroactive because it draws on antecedentfacts for its operation, or
~other words, part of the requirements for its. action and application
is drawn from a time antedating its passage.s
For instance, a law may be made operative partly on facts
that occurred prior to the effectivity of such law without being
retroactive, such as Republic Act No. 7167 granting increased
personal exemptions from income tax to be available thenceforth
that is, after said Act became effective and on or before the deadline
for filing income tax returns, with respect to compensation income
earned or received during the calendar year prior to the date the law
took er:ect.a Ano~er definition states: "A retroactive law, in a legal
sense, is _on~ which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired
under existing laws,· or creates a new obligation and imposes a
~Laceste v; S~s, Phil.

56 Phil ..472 _(1932); Lopes v. Cow, 40 997 (1919) ..
. Camacho v. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848 (1948)· Magno v.
Bautista, ~-Phil. 967 (1949). '
3Umali v. Estanislao, 209 SCRA 446 (1992).
488
490 ··STATUTORY:co:NSTRUCTION
from office-as a result of anadministrativeicasefrem running for

local elective positions cannot be applied retroactively todiaqualify
a person who was adininistratively removed from his position prior
to the effectivity of'said'Code from thereafter running for an· elective
position,>
The reason for the general rule; as embodied· in Article 4 of the
Civil Code, is that a. law is a: ruleestablished fo gW:de actions With no
binding effect until it is enacted; hence,:iVhas no 'application to past
but only to future times.-Thi:s-'is whyit is saidthatthe law looksto
the future only; and has no retroactive effect unless the' legislature
may have formally given that effect to thela:w.i1 Nova constitutio
futuris formam imponere'debet non praeteritis. A new statute should
affect the future, not the past .
.
The principle of prospectivityapplies to statutes, administrative
rulings and circulars andjudicial decisions. In Co v. Court ofAppeals, 12
the Court cited instances applying -the principle of prospectivity,
thus:
"The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or

amendatofy, has been applied in many cases. These include:
Buyco v. PNB, 2 SCRA682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic
Act No. 1576·which divested the Philippine National Bank of
authority to accept back pay certificates hi payment of loans,
does not apply· to an offer of payment made. before. effectivity
of the-act; Largiulo v. Masagarida, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June
30, 1962), ruling that RA. No; 2613, as amended by R.A. No.
. ' ·' '.' i :~ . .. . :·- - ' . ·. ' :
3090 on Jurie, 1991, granting inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship casea, could Iiotbe given retroactive effect, in the
absence of a saVuig clause; Larga v. Ranada~ Jr., 64 SCRA 18,
to the effect that Sections .9 and
10 of Executive Order No. 90,
amending Secti.6:h 4 of P.D. No. i 752, couldhave no
retroactive
application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that
a personcannot.be convicted of'.viol~ti11g . Circular No .. 20 of
the Central Bank; when the alleged violation occurred. before
publication of tlie' Circuiar in the Official (}azette; Baltazar v.
_.,:' .;; . :_;;~ <!

10 Grego,.v.
COMELEC, supra, citing R.E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction,254
(2nd ed., 1990). ' ' . ' · . · ' ·.
11Lopez
v. Cow, 40 Phil, 997 (1919); Nilov.rCourt of Appeals, G.R. No. 34586,
April 2, 1984; Bolotbotv. Coilit of Appeals, 205;SCRA 419 '(i992). '
1245
SCAD 538, 227 SCRA 444 (1993).
The presumptionis that all Iawsoperate prospectively, unlessthe

contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and unequivocally
expressed orrreces'satily implied. r4: In every'caseof doubtsthe doubt
will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws.v Hence,
where a· statute: is susceptible: of, a' construction. other than· that of
retroactivity;» or where-a retroactive application willt~ri.der the law
unconstitutional; the ·statute ·wilFber.given. a prospective effect and
operation,v The presumptiomapplies whether the statute is in the
form of an original enaetment.san amendment; or a repeal.v
The pie's~ptf~n agafu's(th~ retro~ctive op~ration of statute~
is stronger with reference to substantive iaws afl'ectb;tg pending
actions or. pro~~edi,pgs. 1( has ac('.Ordingly been held 'that, unless
the contrary cleariy app~.#s, no substantive .~iatute/han be so
construed retroactively.as to affect pending litigations.', .
9.04. Words or plirases·indicating prospectiVity.

. , ~. ~.
Apart from the. p~f!smnptioij" that.Iaws.operate pro~p(lctively,
the legislature sometiines indicates its intent not to give .a statute a
retroactive effect on past or pending actions, matters or transactions.
Where by its terms a statute is to apply,"hereafte~;" or "thereafter,"
a
or is to take effect immediately or at 'fixed future date, or where
a statute conta4is, in the .enacting Clause, the phrase "from and
after the passing of this Act," or employs such words as "shall have
been made" or "from and after". a designated date, the statute is
prospective in operation only.2° The word "shall" iii a statute implies
that the lawmakers intend the enactment to be effective only in
future,» Where a statute provides that it "shall take effect 'upon
"lburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234 (1959); People v. Zeta,_98 Phil. 143 (1955); Cas-
tro v. Collector oflnternal Revenue, G.R. No. 12174, December 28, 1962, 6 SCRA 886;
Commissioner v. Lingayen GUlfElectric Power Co., Ii:ic., 1G4 SCRA 27 (1988).
16Montilla
v. Agustinia Corp., 24Phil. 220(1913); Cebu Portland Cement Co.
v. Collector ofJnternal Revenue, G.R. No .. 20563, October 29,.1968, 25 SCRA 789
(1968).
"'Vanderbilt v. Atlantic Coast ..Line, R. Co., 125 S.E. as7, 52 ALR 287 (1924).
17Fariners
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Berks Country Real Estate, 5 A2d 94,
121 ALR 905 (1935). .' . · .·. , · ,
'"Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107
Phil. 1055 (1960)(LoMnzo v. Posadas; 64 Phil. 353 (1937). '
19Ih111'191
:\>. Labes, supra. '·. : . . . · . . , .. , ,
201buran
v. Labes, supra; Co v. Collector of Internal Revenue 100 Phil. 464
(1956). ,
21Cebu
Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 20563,
October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 789 (1968). ·
B. STATUTES·GIVEN PROSPECTIVE·
EFFECT
9.06. Penal statut"'s, generally.

As a general rule, penal laws or those laws which define offenses
and prescribe penalties for their .violatfon operate prospectively."
Article 21 of the ReV:i.sed 'Penal · Code provides that "no felony
shall be punishableby any penaltynot prescribed by law prior to
its commission." This provision is a recognition of the universally
accepted rule that no penal law can have a retroactive effect, which
means that no act or omission shall be held to be' a crime, nor its
author punished; except by virtue of a- law .in force at the•time the
act was committed,» It is based on the well-known l~g81 maxirh,
null um crimeri sine poena, nulla poena sine legis, or thete is no crime
without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law.
9.07. Ex post facto law.

The Constitutionp~vides. that no ex post facto htw sJiall be
enacted. S3 This . constitutional. provision prohibits the . retroactive
application of penal laws which are in the nahu:e of ~ post facto
laws. An ex post... facto
·
law. is any
., .
ofthe
· .
followii:lg:
. · . ···i·
(1) a:, law which
makes criminal an act done before the pass~ge of the law and
which was ·innocent when .done, and punishes sU:ch 'act; (2) alaw
which aggravates a crime, or. makes. it greater than it was, when
committed; (3) a law which changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than that annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) a law which alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offense; (5) a law which assumes to
regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty
or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful;
and ( 6) a law which deprives a person accused of a· crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as protection
of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of.amnesty,»
31 People v, M9~an, 44.Phil. 387. (1923). . ·

32 U.S. v. Maciisaet, 11 Phil. 447 (1908); People v. Moran, supra.
33Art
.. m, Sec. 22, 1987 Constitution.
re
=i« Kay :Villegas Kami, Inc., G.R. No~ 32485, October '22, 1970, 35 SCRA
429; Tolentino v. Angeles, 99 Phil. 309 (1956); Nu:ii.ez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. s
50581, January 30, i982, 111 SCRA 433 (1982); Meja v. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457
(1988).
bar against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of

separation of powers by confining the legislature fo rule-making
and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation ofjudicialfunctions.
History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil
that the constitutional prohibition is directed, The. singling out of
a definite minority, the Imposition of a' burden on. it,. a legislative
intent, and the retroactive application to past conduct .suffice to
a
stigmatize a statute as billofaJtw.Iider. 'rile reqUiremen't that the
law must apply retroactively arid reach past. conduct follows from
the nature of a pill of.attainder as
a le~elative a~udication o:fguilt.
'l'hus, a bill of'attainder is cfoubiY.'objeeti6nable:because of its ex·pQst
facto features. This is ·the historic explanation for uriiting the tWo
mischiefs in one clause - "no ex post facto law or biu/of attainder
a
shallbe enacted." Accordingly, if statute Is a .bill of attainder, it
is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto.law, the
reasons that establish that it is not, are persuasive that it is nota
bill of attainder.s · ·
9.09. Whenpenal laws applied retroactively.

It is a well-settled principle· that penal laws cannot be given
retroactive effect, except when they are favorable to the' accueed.s
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code'Provides that "[p]enal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule
5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the application
of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same."43 This class of penal laws does not fall underthe
term ex post facto law, the enactment of which is prohibited by the
Constitution.« The provision authorizing the retroactive application
of penal lawsfavorable to the accused is one ofthe exceptions to the
general rule that all laws operate prospectively.v
The rule that penal laws which are favorable to the accused are
given retroactive effect is founded on the very principles on which
•1 People '?·' F~i;dr; G.R. No. 32613·, December 27, 1972, 48 SCRA 382; Montene-
gro v. Castaneda, ~1 Phil. 882 (1952). ·
42U.s,·v. Macasaet, 11 Phil. 447 (1908); People v. Alcaraz, 50 Phil. 520 (1932).
43Escalante v. Santos, 56 -Phil, 483 (1932); see also Art; 366 of the Revised
Penal Code.
"People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923).
46Laceste
v. Santos, 56 Phil. 472 (1932).
498 STATUTORY•C0NSTRUCTION
.The . general rule· that an -am:endatory statute rendering an

illegal act prior to its enactment-no longer illegal, is given retroactive
effect does not apply· if the· amendatory statute expressly provides
that it shall not apply retroactively but only, . prospectively from
and .after a specific date. In such instance, courts cannot give the
amendatory statute retroactive effect. 55
9.10. Statutes substanrive in nature,

A substantive law is a law which creates, defines or regulates
rights concerninglife, liberty or property, or the powers of agencies
or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs.»
Substantive law creates substantive right, and the two terms in this
respect are said to be synonymous; Th'e term "substan¢ve right" 'is
one which includes thpse, rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of'normal.relations, Substantive law
is that part of the law which creates, defines, and regulates rights,
or which regulates rights and duties which give rise to a cause of
action, as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes
the method of enforcing rights .or. obtains redress for their invasion;
that part of the law which .courts are.established. to administer,»
As applied to criminal.Iaw.jsubstantive.Iaw is that which declares
what acts are crimes-and prescribes the punishment for committing
them.s
By its very nature and. essence, substantive law operates
prospectively. 5• A substantive. la}'\!' 1Il~Y not be construed retroactively
without somehow . affecting previous . ()r. past. rights. Or obligations;
hence, it should be given a strict and prospective construction, In the
absence of clear, plain, and unambiguous intentto the contrary,«
Thus, in the absence of a contrary inteiit,.a statute which lays down
a
certain requirements to be complied wl.t;hbefore case can be brought
to court," or freezes the amount of monthly rentals for residential
55 Larga v. Raiiada, 164 SCRA 18 (1988).

""Primicias v. Ocampo, 93 Phil. 446 (1953).
57Bustos.
v)L~~to. 81Phil .. 648 (1948);.First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 49 SCAD '405, 231 SCRA 30 (1994).
118Bust0s
v. Lucero, supra; Aquino v. Military Commission No. 2, G.R. No.
37364, May 9, 1975, 63 SCRA 546~ .
5"Tolentino
v. Alzate, 98 Phil. 781 (1956).
SOEspiritu v. Cipriano;G;R.·No. 32743; Februaryl5, 1974, 55 SCRA 533.
81Tolentino
v. Alzate, supra.
the existing' law 'on the subject, a later statute restricting' such
jurisdiction or transf~:rriJig,it'•fu -another-'tribuaal will· not be. so "
construed asto affe~ Ale p~~~l~;-.~ctio;n, ~.ess the statute.itselfso i
provides or~ess~expresi;i,pr9w~1~i;Y.~ori:J.s aI"l:lJJseµ.89 Copve:r~ely, a
where a court ha'3.no jurjs9ictii:)noyer a,cer;t,$ C1¥1eb11t nevertheless n
decides' it, frpin.. wmch .~ppeal, is t.::ikeJ;J,,J~, .s~atute:en,acted during the t
pend ency of the'~:Pi>eal yestingjllris!Iicti~n iipon such trial court over b
the subject' IIi~~r or such cas~ ~ay,P.ot be,give~ retroactive effect o
so as to validate ,the Jui:lg,i;µe11t-of the court (i quo, in the absence of t
a.saving .cb1use,~~-~er~:~ cOJ;J,lP,l~t P~J?.~-~ court is defective h
because it ~d :µo~ allege .spffipeilt cause: of'action, it m11y not be b
validated by a subsequent lawwhich affects s:ub.e1tantive rig}its and
not merely procedural matters'. 7t ·' ·· · . . . ·.
'· . ·.,' . - ; ' .,, ,; ' : ' '.'. ' ;. 9
.The . rule .against .the ,retroactive . operation of ;statutes in
gener!ll ~pplies ·~<>~ str~PglYmt~ respe'* ~. stj~~~tive laws tb,at a
affetj; J.>endn~w.a~o,ns or proceedings, UiiJess :~!", contr8:1"Y cle~l~ t
and plainly appears. and only when no vested pghts ai:e, im:gaire,d,
o
'statutes whichare subs~tjvein charapt~r are ~r~sumed intended a
not to be applicable to pending_ca~E!~ ,aJ?.d proceedings,» .:
Thus, a Iawwhich abolished personal cultivatioil·by a landowner
as a ground to dispossess a tenm:itfrom his landholding would not be e
applied to a pending appealed case' which was heard· and decided by s
the trial court under an earlier law which authorized a landowner t
to dispossess his tenant on the ground of personal cultivation of t
the land, absent a legislative intent to make the law applicable to a
pending cases." s
a
In Yu Oh v. CA [G.R. No. 125297, June 6, 2003], the Court
ruled:
1
R.A. No -, 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended
B.P. Big. 129,. and vested on the MetrOpolitan,. Municipal
·and Municipal Circuit Tria,J. Courtsjurlsdictfon to try cases
punishable: by imprisonment of'not more than. siX (6) years.
, Since R.A. No .. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent
that said law is substantive.
.,.. ,; /· ;~ .
. ·-,·
S
69Ibur8n v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234 (1950).
•0Largado v. Masaganda, 115 Phil. 519 (1962). &
71Republic
v.
Prieto; G;R. N'o~ 17946, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 1004.
12Jburan v. Labes, supra. J
"'Balatbat v. Coilrt of Appeals, 205 SCRA 419 (1992). J
has already obtainedvand is exercising jurisdiction over a

controversy, its jUrlsdiritionto proceed tothe :finaldetermination
of the case is not.affected<by:hewlegislation.placing jurisdiction
over such proceedingsin·anothedriburial. An exception to this
rule, however, lies. where the statute either expressly provides
or is construed to the -effect that it is. intended to operate on
actions pending before its enactment. Hence, this Court has
held that a law may be given retroactive effect if it so provided
expressly or if retroactiVityds necessarily implied therefrom
and no vested right .or obligation .. of contract is impaired and
it does not deprive a person of property Without due process of
law.
It is readily apparent from the provisions .Of the 1987
Constitution and the LGC of 1991 that their new provisions
and . requirements regarding changes in the constitution of
political Units are intended . to apply. to all existing political
subsidiaries immediately, •i.e., including· those with pending
cases filed under the previous regime, since the· overarching
consideration· of these new provisions is the need to empower
the local 'government'unit~ without further delay. ·
' Furthe~or~ •• th~ RTC' can still review the decision 'of
the Sanggun~ang Panlalawigan under the new set-up; in.the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, so no substantial prejudice
is caused by allowing retroactivity.
The Court; therefore, sees no error, much less grave abuse
of discretion, on the part of the CA in affirming the trial court's
dismissal of petitioner's complaint.
9.13. Statutes affeetlngvested rights.

A vested right or .interest mi;i.y be said to mean some right or
interest in property that bas become. fixed or established and is no
longer open to doubt or controversy.77 "Rights are vested when the
right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property
of some particular person or persons, as a. present interest. The right
must be absplu,te; complete; and unconditional, independent of a
contingency, and a mere expectancy of future benefit ora contingent
interest ill property founded on anticipated continuance of existing
77Buyco v. Phil. National Bank, 112 Phil; 588 (1961).

The rule is illustrated by the abolition of'the death penalty and

its subsequent re-imposition, that is, those accused of crimes prior
to the re-imposition of the death penalty have acquired vested rights
under the law abolishing it, as the Court in a case explained:
"In the light-of the discussion above, there is no question
that the abolitfoil of the death penalty benefits herein accused-
appellarits. Perforce, the-subsequent re-imposition of the death
penalty will not affect them, x xx; ·
There is no question that a person has no vested right
in any rule of iaw which entitles him to insist that .it shall
remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has hea vested right in
the continued existence of astature which precludes its change
or repeal, nor in any omission to legislative on 1{particul¥
inatter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be so· applied
a
retroactively as to impair right that accrued underthe old law
(Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed.,p. 264, citing Benguet
Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil; 711[1956]; Laurel
vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372[1946]). Courts have thus given statutes
strict constriction to· prevent their retroactive· operation -in
order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with
vested or existing rights. Clearly; accused-appellant's rights to
be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty; accrued or
attached by virtue of Article 22 of'the Re-vised Penal Code. This
benefit cannot be ta.ken away from them. "88
9.14. Statutes affecting obligations of contract.

It is well-settled that any contract entered into must be in
accordance with, and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time
of execution. Such law forms part of, and is read into, the contract even
without the parties expressly saying so.87 Laws existing at the time of
the execution of contracts are the ones applicable to such transactions
and not later statutes, unless the latter provide. that they shall
have retroactive effect.88 Later statutes will not, however, be given
88people v. Pat:ll]ih, Jr., 311 SCRA 186, 211"212 (1999).

87Enrique
f,Yupangco, Inc. v. Velayo, G.R. No. 50439, July 20, 1982, 115 SCRA
307 (1982); Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No.
25389, June 27, 1968, 28 SCRA 1115 (1968); Ortigas & Co., Ltd. v. Feati Bank &
Trust Co., G.R. No. 24670, December14; 1979, 94 SCRA 533.
88pbil. Virginia Tobacco Adm. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 34628, July 30, 1979, 92
SCRA 172 (1979).
conclusion. Before the claim was. collected, a sfatute was enac~d

prohibiting the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered m
prosecuting veteran's claims. For collecting his fees pursuarrt-to t~e
contract for professional services, the lawyer was prosecuted ~or vio-
lation of the statute. In exonerating the lawyer, the court said that
the statute prohibiting the collection of attorney'sfees c_a.nµot be ap-
plied retroactively so as to adversely affect the contractfor prof es~
sional services and the fees themselves; The court added that the
fact that the 5% fee was contingent; and did not become .: absolute
and unconditional until· the .ve;ter~'s claim. had been. collected ,by
the claimant when .the statute wa.salready in force did not alter.the
situation. For the distinction between vested ar,uiabsolu~ pghtsjs
not helpful and that ·a better view to handle the problem is.to,;de,clare
those statutes attempting to affect rights which the cour;ls fin~ to ~e
unalterable, invalid as arbitrary and unreasonable, thui;i Iaeking m
"due process." The court concluded that the 5%·,fee. allowed by the
old law is "not.mireason:able;" Services were rendered thereunder~
claimant's benefits. The right .to the fees accrued upon such rendi-
tion. Only the·payment of the fee was conting~nt upon the approval
of the claim; therefore, the right was not contingent. For a right to
accrue is one thing; enforcement .thereof by actual payment is an-
other. The subsequent law enacted afterthe rendition of the servi~es
should not as a matter of simplejustice affect:the agreement, which
was entered into voluntarlly,by the parties·a.s:expresslydire~d in
the previous law. To apply the new law to the case of defend~t-ap-
pellant so as to deprive him of the agreed fe~ J7ould be arbitrary
and unreasonable as destructive of the inviolability of contracts, and
therefore invalid as' lacking in: due process; to penalize him for col-
lecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of'justice." ·
9~16. Repealing and amendatory a:cts.

Statutes which repeal earller~rprlor laws operate prospectively,
unless the legislative intent to give them retroactive ea:~c~ clearly
appears. However, although a repealing statute is intended to
be retroactive it will not be so construed if it will. impair vested
rights or the ~bligation.S of contract, or unsettlematters th~t had
been ~egally.<Jo~~dnder the old law ..1~ Repealin~ stat':1tes which are
penal in nature are generally applied retroactively if favorable to
/ .,
»iu«, at pp. 147-148.

l('°See Sec. 9.13, supra.
508 · STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ·.
to require payment of the tax onsuch business torthe,periodprior

to the amendment.w ; · : .
In Buyco ihPhilippineNd;tional Bank;i01 tb.e:qµestiori raised is
whether petitioner Buyco Ctulidon;ipel the Phi,lippine Nati911iµ 138nk
to accept .hls baekpay certijii:ate tn ipaynienti9f ihis :indebte~ess, .~
the bank. A,t • tb.e,time:: (Aprjl-.24,s1~!5Ei) .he, off'eJed, to: P~Y wi:th> his
'backpay certifi.cate;.Rep11bli<;.1\~'~o. ·89J gl\ve.him:thE! -ri~htto·haye.
said certificate appli® W.d>~yment ,9Ulj.s gbligatig~. $uQseque.ntJ.¥:,
however Republic Act No. 1576 was enacted on June 1~, 1956
aniendfug the ch~r of thJ:Phil,lppiD;e ~i;ttforialB'B.rik ~d.proViding
that the bank sh8.ll have Ii~' authorlty't6'·~~~ept ti!lckpay certifi.cate
in payment ofinc:lebfudfiess' ~the b~._ Fo~ thts~reason, tli.~ bm,ilc
refused ~ accept)>etitfoii~t:S~!co'.s'b.8,<:~~~·~eitijica~fin. '~?l~g
that petitioner!Buyco a<:q11Jret1' a:ves¥. nglit w have his c~ttificate
applied in payment ofhis 6bligatiori to the ?arik, the co\Jrl 88J.d: ~Law,s
shall have no ret:roa<:tive effect uitless the contrary is provided. It rs
said that the la\V iookS th ihe• futur~ only and has no retroactive
'effect unless the legislature Iriay have formally given that effect to
some legal provisionsjthat all statutes are to' be co:ns~rued ?s haVin:g
only prospective· operation, unless the· purpose and. intention of ili.e
legislature to give them a retrdaciive effeet'is expressly decreed or-is
necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of
doubt must be resolved against retroactive effect .. These p~~ples
also apply to; amendments of stawt.es. Republic Act,No, 157:6~~.e~
not contain any, provision regarding its'. retroacti~e effect nor. '$:u¢h
may be implied 'from its i¥1guag~ .. It simply stat.es its ~tre~vity
upon approval. TJ;ie1 am~Jld.ment,,there.fore, has no retroa~Y~ effect,
and the present case should be.,goye.rn,e.d by ~e. law a,td;},le ~~e the
offer in question was ma,de.,~e;ntle.;is familjarthat ~r SJ?. actis
amended, the. otjgin,al ,act c.ontinues. to·. l>,e,,ipJorce .~th regard ,1;o all
rights that had accrued prior to suc:P ari\~pcbne11t. "106
Where a: contract is eritered;i:iltc) liY'·filie parlies'on the basi1:1 of
thelaw then previiili:rig,'the a.lneriaroentof~aid Iawwillnot affect the
terms of said contract/hie ruleapplies even if one ofthe'contracting
parties is the govel'n.Ilien.t.100 ' • • ·
1°"1m.perialv. Collector of Internal Revenue,.97 Phil. 992 (1955).

101112 Phil. 588 (1961). . .
1081bid., at p; 592. . ...
109Insular Government. v. .Frank, 13 PhiL236·(1909).
deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions

- those which have accruedorare.pendfng.w
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to. actions pending and -undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent.wThe fact that procedural'statutes may somehow affect
the litigants' rights may not precludetheirretroactive application to
pending actions. 'The retroactiveaJ)plication.-ofprocedurallaws is not
violative of anY right; of a person who may.feel that he is adversely
aff~cted.111 Nor is the .retroaetive application of procedural. statutes
constitutionally ~bjectionable. ns The reason is that as
a general rule,
no. vested right may ~ttach to, rior. 8rise 'fyom, .procedur~Jaws.11~ #·
has been held that "a person has. no vested right .in an:y' particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to .the trial
of his case ' whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
.-'
existing
rules of procedure.v=
Thus, the provision of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 .in Section
39 thereof prescribing that "no, record on appeal shall be required
to.take an appeal'lis procedural in nature and should therefore be
applied retroactively to pending actions. Hence, thequestion as to
whether an appeal from an adverse judgment should be dismissed
for failure of appellant to file.a record on appeal within thirty days as
required under the old rules, which question is pending resolution at
the time Batas Pambansa. Bilang 129 took effect, became academic
upon the effectivity of said law because the law no longer requires the
filing of a record on appeal and its retroactive application removed
the legal obstacle to giving due course to the appeal.w A statute
which transfers the jurisdiction to tcy certain cases from a court to
116 Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927).

11 6People v. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 (1946); Alday v. Camillon, G.R. No. 60316,
January 31, 1983; Enrile v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 36 Phil. 574 (1917);
Hosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927); Guevara v. Laico, 64 Phil. 149 (1937).
117Gregorio
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 22802, November 29, 1968, 26.SCRA
229; Tinio v. Mina, G.R. No. 29488, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 515; Yakult Philip·
pines v. Court of Appeajs, 190 SCRA 357 (1990); Atienza v. Brillantes, 60 SCAD 119,
243 SCRA 32 (1995).' ~
""Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946).
119Billones
v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 17566, July 30, 1965, 14
SCRA 674; Pastoriza v. Division Superintendent, 106.Phil. 216 (1959); Aris (Phils.),
Inc. v; NLRC, 200 SCRA 246 (1991).
120Concepcion F
v. Garcia, 54 Phil. 81, 83 (1929).
121Alday
v. Camillon, G.R. No. 60316,.January 31, 1983.
512 STATUTORY-CONSTRUCTION
.,
statutory construction, the'$peciallaw will prevail over a .statute or
law of general application. Jurisdiction having been conferred by a
special statute therefore prevails over the jurisdiction granted by a
general law."
In Subido, Jr. u, Sandigaribrz,yari,126 the. Court ruled that
"R.A. No. 7975, in further.mneri~g_P.D.No. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural
matters, is clearly a procedural l~:w,Le., one which prescribes rules
and forms of procedure ofenforcing' rights or obtaining redress for
their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.
Moreover, the petitioners even suggest- .that it is likewise curative
or- remedial statute: one which cures defects and adds to. the- means
of enforcing existing obligations. x x x All told; as a pro~edural and
curative statute, R.A. No .. 7975 may validly be given· retroactive
effect, there being no impairment of contractual or vested rights. "128
Statutes regulatingthe·procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undermined. at the time of
their passage. In that sense and to that extent, procedural laws are
retroactive. Thus, where atthe time the action was filed, the Rules
of Court provides that a "petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper
shall not be entertained by the appellate court," the subsequent
amendment thereto deleting the sentenceimplies that the.appellate
court is no longer prohibited from entertaining petitions to appeal
as. pauper litigants, and may grant the petition then pending action,
so long as its requirementS are complied with.121
9.18. Exceptions to the rule.

The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions
or proceedings admits certain exceptions. The rule does not apply
where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication
provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation,
or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested
rights.128 Under appropriate· circumstances, courts may deny the
retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to do so
i . ,1·1~
126 78 ,SCAD 104, 266 SCRA 379 (1997).

l!li!Jbid., pp. 390-391, citing Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction,pp. 268-
272 (2nd ed., 1990).
12'1Martinez v. People, 127 SCAD 113, 332 SCRA 694 (2000).
128flosana v. Diomano, 56 Phil. 741 (1927).

514 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION'
the redemption void. The Court of Appeals applied the new role
retroactively and thus j.nvalidated the redemption. Appling the rules
of statutory construction, the Court reversed the appellate court and
ruled in favor of the validity of the redemption. The Court explained
why:
It is evident that if we apply the old i-ole on :finality of
judgment, petitioner redeemed the siibjeet property withiil:
the 120-day period of redelilptiOiireckoned from the -appellate
court's 'entry of judgment:' The appellate' court; however' ;'did
not apply the old role but the. 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedlire. In fine, it applied tfie new rule retroactively and we
hold that given
the facts'( of'tliecaseat bar this
.s,
an
is error.
·.··,
'
There is .no dispute that rules of procedure c~- be .given
retroactive effect. This general role, however, has well-delineated
exceptions. We quote author Agpalo.1s.2
9.19. Procedural laws.

Procedural laws are adjectiy~ laws which prescribe rµles and
forms 'or procedure' of enforci¥g lights or ,obtainiiig redres~fot their
invasion; they refer to rUles "of procedure bywhich c_ol.ll1;s ap~~yip.g
laws of all kizj.ds can properly .adiriin:is~r justice. They mcl~~~ rules
of pleadings, practice andevidence. Asapplied to:_ctjmiri~l~~.t}i~:y
provide or regulate the steps ~Y which one who commits -~- c~e is
to be punished. · ·
The • general role that statutes are prospective and 'not
retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been
held that "a retroactive law; .in a .legal sense, is one which takes
away or impairs vested rights acquired underlaws, or creates-a new
obligation and imposes a new duty, or. attaches a new disability,
in· respect of tranaactions: or considerations · ftlr.eady past. Hence,
remedial statutes or· statutes' relatirig ·to remedies or modes '·of
procedure, which do not create new or take away vested .rights,
but only .. operate in furtherftD.ce'ofthe ~IJ?.~dY:1or ~0nfipnatio~_of
rights already' existing, do not conie.within tl;leJeg_al- conception ~f!l
retroactive law;;~r. the general 'rule ~gllinst ~he reti-o~ctive pper~t~pii
of statutes.""'Tlie general rule against giving statutes retroactive
operation-whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to
132 Statutory Construction,1986 ed., pp. 269-272.

516 · STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION
9.20. Exceptions, to the rule.

The rule that procedural l~w~are appllca~l~to.penafng ~.~i~D.s
or proceedings admits. certain exceptions... The rule .doea not. apj>lY,
where the . statute itself expressly or by . necessary impllcation
provides that pending actions ·a.r~
excep&'d:'ti-6m it~ operation, 'or
where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.
Under appropriate circumstances, courts, may deny the .retroactive
application of'procedural laws·intheevent that to do sowould not be
feasible or would work injustice; Normay procedural laws be applied
retroactively to-pending actions· ifto d,o: so would dnvolve intricate
problems of due process or impair the independence of the-courts.
We hold that section 1, Rule S9 of t~e 1997 Revised Rules
of Procedure should. not be given. retro,activ~ efrEict in ihis. case as
it would result in great injustic~'to the petitioner. Undoubtedly,
petitioner has the right to redeem the ~ubject lot and .this right
is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the , procedural rule
then existing aswell as the. decisions of this Cotirt governing the
reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by
the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure. which ·if applied retroactively
would result in his losing the right to .radeem the' subject lot. It is
difficult to reconcile the retroactive:-application of this procedural
rule with the rule .of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with
the loss· of the subject Jot when he faithfully followed the laws and
the rule on the period afredemption when he made the redemption.
The subject lot may·only be-34,829 square meters but as petitionel'
claims, "it is the only. property left. behind ·by their father, a private
law practitioner who was felled by an assassin's.·b11llet."
Petitioner fought to recover this lqt frota:· 198~. 'I'~ )ose it
because bf a changeof procedure on the date ofreckoning of the
period . of redemption is iheqtiitous. The manner. o( exercis~g. the
right cannot be chahg~d and the change applied retroactively if to
do, so will defeat the. right of redemption of the. petitionet'which is
already vested. · ,., . .
. .. . ; .... ·,- .. ,.,,_ " -. -
9.21. Curative statutes,
Cur~tive remedial statutes are healing acts. They are .remedial
by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing
obligations. The rule in regardto curative 'statutes is tliatif the
rI
to render valid and effective attempted acts which would ~be

otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended.".1811 :
Bytheir very nature, curative statutes are ret~actf~~-~. They

are forms of retroactive legislations which reach back .on past
events to correct errors cjf irregularities and· to render valid and
effective attempted acts which would be' otherwise ineffective for
the purpose ·the parties :inte11:ded.1•0 A few examples ·~a:~ be 'Cited.
"E.O. No; 111, amended Article 217 of the
Labor Cede to widen
the workers' access to the govei:nnlen.t.fo:r redress ofgrievances by
giving the Regional· Directors 'and. -the Labor' Arbiters concurrent
jurisdiction over cases involving money claims. ~S amendment,
however, created a situation where thejurisdiction. of the Regional
Directors and the Labor Arbiters ovei'lapped. As a~remeiJV, R.A No.
6715 further ~end~d 'Article 217 by ci¢lin~ating 'their' respecti~e
jurisdictions. Under RA. No. 6715, the Regional ·Director has
exclusive original jurisdiction over 'cases Involving' claims; provided:
(1) the claim is presented by an employer or person employed in
domestic or household service, or house helper under the Code; (2)
the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement;
and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or house
helper does not·exceed P5;000,00.' All other cases are within the
exclusive and original jurisdiction •of the Labor Arbiter. KO. No.
111 and R.A. No. 6715 .are therefore curative statutes. A curative
statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal
proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would
otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal
requirements.v« Statutes intended to. validate what otherwise are
void or invalid marriages, being curative, Will be-given retroactive
effect.w A statute which provides that a contract shall be presumed
an equitable mortgage .in any of the cases therein enumerated,
and which is designed. primarily to curtail evils brought about by .~·
contracts of sale with right of repurchase, is remedial in nature and
will be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of
the statute.w Where at the time an action is filed in court the latter
139 lbid., p. 7.5'4• ¢ting Agpalo, Statutory.Construction,:1990ed., pp~ 270-271.

140 Developfuelit Bank·ofthe Phils. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 28774, Febru-
ary 28, 1980,,96 SCRA 342; Santosv. Duata, G.R. No. 20901, August 1965, 14 SCRA
1041. . . ,
141Erectors,
Inc. v. NLRC, 70 SCAD 512, 256 SCRA 629, 635 (1996).
142Adong
v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43. (1922).
143Santos
v. Duata, G.R. No. 20901, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 1041.
520 STATUTORY CONSTRlJCTION
;.;;.t.
a new right in favor of other 'natural-born Filipinos who (had)

lost their Philippine citizenship: but now desire to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship,' because-prior to the promulgation of
P.D. No. 725 such former Filipinos would have had-to undergo
the tedious and cumbersome process· of•n:aturS:liZation but
~ - :.' '
with the advent of P.D. No. 725 they could ·no#ttre-acquire
their Philippine citizenship under the simplified pfocedure of
repatriation.
xxx
In the light of the foregoing; and prescinding from the
wording of the. preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative
intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation.
'(A) retroactive operation is given to· a statute: or ~endment
where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from
a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof.'
It is obvious to the Court; that the statu:te was meant to 'reach
back' to those persons, events and transactions. not otherwise
covered by. prevailing law and ·jurisprudence .. And inasmuch
as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right
equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode,
the right against' uni-easonable searches and seizures and
other guarantees enshrined in the BiUofRights, therefore the
legislative intent to give retrospective operation to .P .D. No. 725
must be given the fullest effect possible. '(l)t has been said that
a remedial statute must be so construed as to inake it effect the
evident purpose for which it 'Was enacted, so that if the reason
of the statute extends to· past transactions, as well as to those
in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute
does not in terms so direct, Unless to do so would impair some
vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty.' This is
all the more true of P.D. No. 725, which did not specify any
restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation
granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can
the retroactivity of P.D. No. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering
that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost
his Filipiho''cftizenship muchlater, on January 20, 1983, and
applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it. is true that the law was already in effect at the
time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless,
grant of which, in effect, retroacted to the date of the contract

of sale.w
An example of a curative' statute is one which confirms, ratifies

and validates the sale or transfer of a public li:lfid awarded to a
grantee, which a ·prior law prohibits its sale Within· a certain' period
and makes such sale null and void, because the former legalizes
what otherwise is an invalid 'transaction tinder the old law.wSection
442(d) of the Local Government Code of ·i.991, which provides that
municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances
or executive orders and-which hav~ their respective sets of elective
municipal officials holding office. at the :time of-the effectiVity of the
Code shill henceforth be· considered. as regular-municipalities, is
also a curative statute, asit validates the creation of muaicipalities
by executive orders which had been held to. be an.invalid usurpation
of legislative power.t= . .' , . ·.
. Where there is doubt as to wheth~r'a government.agency.under
the then existing law, has the al1thoricy to enter· into a negotiated
contract for the construction of a government project under the
build-lease-and-transfer scheme; 'the· subsequent· enactment of a
statute which recognizes· direct ·negotiation of contracts under such
arrangement' is 'a- curative' statute as' all. doubts and-precedural
lapses that might have attended the negotiated contract have been
cured by the subsequent statute.w
9.22. Limitations of rule.

While remedial: or curative statutes are forms of retroactive
laws, they Will not be . given retroactive effect if to do ·so Will
impair the . obligations of contract or disturb vested. rights.w Only
such administrative or curative features of the statute as will not
adversely affect existing rights will be-given retroactive operation.v-
149De Castro v. Tan, 129 SCH.A, 85 (1984); Llantino v. Co Liong Chong 188
SCRA: 592 (1990). . ' '
150Republic v. Atencio, 178 SCRA 713 (1989).
151Municipality pf ~an Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 57 SCAD 332, 239
SCRA 11 (1994). r · ,i "'· · ·· · ..
152"fatad v, Garcia, Jr., 60 Sei:AD 480; 243,SCRA 436 (1995).
'""Development Bank of the Phil. v, Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 28774, Febru-
ary 29, 1980, 96 SCRA 342; Resolution on motion for reconsideration September 21
1982, 116 SCRA 636. ' '
164Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Lanes, 49 Phil. 466 (1926). -
524 : STATUTORY.·CONSTRUCTION' r· .
took effect, and retroactive.inithe sense that it applies to; causes that
accrued before.its·passage;159 However; a statute.oflimitations . wil1
not be given:retroamve·operation.tO' eauses.of action that. accrued
prior to its enactmeritifto do so willremoveabaroflim.itation which
has become complete or-disturb existing: claims .without allowing -a
reasonable time to bringactions>thei:eon.160 .' · · ·
· The 1egis1.~tµr~-u~Uhliflh4ft:3itj;s i~s iiit~mt to aJ>p1:r. statutea or
limitations retroactlvaly, For instance, A:fti~le 1116 of the Ci®. 'Code
provides that "[p ]rescription already 'running' befor~ ·the efrectiVity
of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if
since the time this Code took effect· the eiliire period herein required
for prescription should. elapse, the present-Code shall be applicable
even though by the former laws a longer.periPd might be ,,required."
This provision-in.a sense .is retroact~w.since it;1,1pplies/to a.eause
that accrued .prior to, its effectivity :w}ljcll,;wheni:filed~has prescribed
under the new <:Ji.vii C,ode even .thoug.Q.,;the period.of pr.esctjption
prescribedunder the . oldlaw .has.not ended at.the time the.action
is. filed in·court:~~1.It has. been.held thatthe,legislature intended.a
statute of limi~tions.to have a :i;et:J:'oactive,,Qpe~Q:tj.on to existing
causes, where it, requires that "actions already co:oµD.enced before
the-effective date of th.is Act shall not be afl'ect,ed,by the.period herein
prescribed" since it applies, by.such,pr.ovisio:p.·; to allcauses still to
be filed,162 or where •.it provides .t:tiat~it shall go ll)toei:fect aftel" a .~ed
period since it applies to.all existing-causes tobeprosecuted within
the fixed period.w
The fact that . the. legislature has mdicated' ·fiiat. a statute
relating to prescription should be given retroactive effect · Will ;:riot
warrant giving it such operation if to do so Will impair vested rights.
A statute of limitations pres~riomg'a longer period to file mi action
than that ~p~cified,.~~~r tjie old)a'\!,i;nay npt, be ~o construed as
having a :ret~active,pp,eratiO;n,e-ven i(it ~o pioviqes,' .~s .to reyiye
a 5a~se ~}iat, .~~8i9Y,:.P;:i;:esctjbi:i~ :unqer th~. olct,~~ttj~.,lor, th.at
will.impair the vested right of t9-e person against y;i:hom the cause
'""KbziSek'.V; Brigham, 210'N.W• 622;c49 AI:.It:126o (1926). ,·. . .:

1"1'Billone!fvlCaMt
of lndllStrial Relations; G.R; No.17566, July 30, 1965, 14
SCRA 67 4; Louisville Cooperage Co. v. Rudd,· 1~4 SW2d 1063, 114 .ALR 763 (1939).
161Nagrainpa
· v. Nilgrainpa, 109 Phil.c107.7 (1960). . . · · ,
'62J3illones. v. Court of'l.i'idustrial Relations;1 G;R. No.17566, July 30; 1965, 14
SCRA674. · · ,·
"1"Louisvill.e Cooperage Co. v. Rudd, 124 SW2d• 1063~ 144 ALR 763 (1939).
However, inCorales v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 161

a similar issue as that.in Billones was raised hut the court arrived
at a different. conclusion. The question raised· in the Coraies case
is whether a claim: for workmen's compensation which accrued
under the old <:Workmen's Compensation Act.bnt, .flled after March
31, 1975 is barred: by the. provision of the .New Labor :code which
repealed the · Workmen's,:Compensation Act. and requires that
"workmen's compensation claims. accruing prior to the effectivity of
this Code x x x shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of
the Department ofLal:)or.not later thanMarch, 31, 1975; otherwise
they shall be barred forever.t'= The court ruled that this provision
does not apply tp Claims for workmen's 'compensation that accrued
before the Labor Ccide took eifect,_'eveh if such claims were not filed
not later than,March3r, ~'975,, because tlie "presCriptivifperiod for
Claims which accrued .tj~der th:e 'Workriten;s Coi±ipensatiqn Act, as
amended; is ten (10) years" which "Is a nght founded onstatute" antl
"hence is a vested ngpt" that cannot be impaired by the rett()actlve
application of the Labor Code. · · ·· ·
In Billones and Coralee cases, the statutes re~pe~velyinvolved
therein shortened. the period of prescription to bring and file actions.
In Corales, the court considered the right to prosecute the action
that accrued under the old, law as one founded on law and a vested
right. In Billones, while the court said that such.right to bring-an
action that accrued under the. old law is not a vested right, it did
say that the right is one protected. by the due process clause of the
Constitution. The-problem confro:p.tingthe~ourt ~poth cases ishow
to safeguard-the right to bring the action.whose prescriptive period
to institute it has been shortened. _by Jaw. To solve the problem;
the court in the. Coralee case construed the statute of limitations
as inapplicable to the action that accrued before the new i~w took
effect; the court irl theBillones case gave.the claimants whose rights
have been affe~~d; one year fromthe date.the.law took.effect within
which to sue .0:11, their claims, The courj; certainly h~ the. power to
construe statutes;,it is generally held;tl),at the court has no power
to read into the law. something which t;]ie law itself did not provide
expressly or impliedly. On this basis, the Corales case appears to be
predicated on firmer grounds .
., ". ,;·' . ~.
167G.R.
. No. 4'.4063, February 27, 19!79, 88 •SCRA 547; see also Billories v. Em-
ployees' Compenaation Commission; G.R. .No, ·44031, February.:14, 1980, 96 SCRA
111, which reiterated the doctrine laid down inthe Billones case ..
168Art.
292, Labor Code.
prospective effect and. may not· be applied to pending proceedings

in which judgment has already been rendered at the time of its
enactment. Th.U,s; wh~re a statute. shortened the period for talring
appeals from. t~ •· ~~ys tO fifte~n days from notice of judgment,
an appeal taken withi.D. thirty d:ays but beyond fifteen days from
notice of the judgment promulgated before the statute took effect is
deemed seasonably' perl~d;t73 · ·
I'
:J.
173Berliner
v. Roberts, 349 P2d 498, 81ALR2d 413 (1960); Cook v. Massey, 220
P 1088, 35 ALR 200 (1923).
either expressly or impliedly.' Express amendment is done by

providing in the amendatory act that specific sections or provisions
of a statute are amended as recited therein- or, as commonly
indicated, "to read as follows:'>, .Tb:e section or sections affected are
then reproduced as amended. s ·
10.03. Ameri~ebt ~} . briplic~tl~ii.

. !' -, :-"· ~ :•
An ame~d:ment by irilplfoation ii{deitlier,presmned nor favored.

On the contrary, every statute should be harmonized With other
laws on the same subj~;;:~p.; th,e;~absel:lce of a clear inconsistency
between them.t The legisfatlve ill.tent to 'amend a prior law on the
same subject is usually shown by a statement in the later act that
any provision of law which is Inconsistent ~h~l'.~with ;:~ modified
accordingly. s The absence of such a provision in
the statute does not,
however, mean that the subsequentlawmay no.longer operate to
amend or modify a prior. act on the same subject;· it so operates' as
long as there is an Irreconcilablerepugnancy between them,s ,
There is an
in).:Pli~d rulie;naip:~µ,t ~here a pfl.r(ofa pri~r. st~tµte
embracing the. same. subject as; the'· later act· may not be· enforced
of
without nullifYing the pert;i;i.ie~t' ;p,ro~sion'' t!le latter, 'hi ~hlch
event, the. prior. act is. deemed' amend~ or modified to the eXtent
of the repugnaney, .Thus, V:.h~r~ a. statute which requires that the
annual realty tax on lands or, bllil~gsbe paid.on or before a speci-
fied date,.subject .to penhlty,ofa,percentage of the. whole amount
of tax due in case ofdelayed' :p~yment, is amended by autP,o~ing
payment of the tax in four equal installments to become due' ori
or
before specified dates, the penalty provision of the earlier sfutU.te
is deemed modified by implication in ~he sense that the penalty for
late payment of an installment' under the laterlaw will be collected
and computed .only on the installment that became due and unpaid,
and not on the whole amount of annual tax as provided in the old
statute. The legislative intent to change the basis on which to com-
pute the penalty is. clear when the later law: allowed payment of the
annual tax in four installments. For to compute the penalty on the
whole amount of annual tax 'ror late payment of only one install-
------,, ,!,{.
'David v. Dancel, G.R. No. 21485, July 25, 1966, 17 SCRA 696.
5Eetra,qa
v. Caeda, .84 ~hil. -791 (1949). ·
"People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651 (1~50).'
7People v. Olarte, 108 Phil. 756 (1S60).
8Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224 (1919).
"Garcia Va:ldez·v. Tuason, 40 Phil, 943 (1920).
portions of an act unchanged, such portions are 'continued in force

with the same meaning and effect they have before the amendment'.
So where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall
be amended to readas recited in the amendatoryaet, suchportions
of the existing law as are retained either literally or substantially
are regarded as a continuation of the existing lawand not as a new
enactment.11 For instance, where a statute which provides that
it shall be in force for a period of two years from its approval is·
amended by another statute which provides that it shall be in force
for a period of four .Years. after its approval, the four years is to be
counted ~om, the. date the original .statute was approved arid not
from the date the amei;td~t;oryact was enacted.. is
10.06.,Meaning oflaw changed by amendment, I

An amendatory act is' construed by compariilg it with the
original statute to determine its proper construction. As a rule, an
amended act should be given a construction different from thatdfthe
law prior to its ;:tmEmdnien~. for, it, is. presumed that the legislature
would nothaveamended it had it notwanted to change its meaning.»
The fact that the amendment "¥as made shows, as a rule, that prior
to the introduction 'of the amendment, the. statute had a different
meaning,« whic4 the amendment changed In, all the particulars
touching which a· material ,change in th,e languim~ of the later act
e:nsts .. •1 The deliberate selection. oflanguage in$~ amendatory act
?iffenng from that. of the original act indicates ·that ,~eJegislature
intended a change in the Iaw or in .its IP.eanin:g,and the court should
ende~~or to give effect: ~o such intent,» 'Ib.us1 where a statutory
?efinition of term containing a general rule and an exception thereto
is amended by eliminating. the exception, the legislative intent is
clear that th~ term' should now include the exception within the
scope ?fthe general rule,» And.where a section of'a statute requiring
payment of P'?-blication fees. in land registration pr6ceEidings,. except
m cases where the value of the land does notexceed P50,000;0o; is
7Estrada
1
v. Caseda, 84 Phil. 791 (1949); People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 615 (1950).
Estr~da v,
18
pas~pA, supra; . . . . .·
19Manila
Ele'ctric Co. v. Board of Utility Commissioners, 3();'I~hilo' 387 (1915).
20Palan~v.
City ofManila, 41Phil.125 (1920). .: ·
21U.S.
v. Pashaw, 50 F. 749, 38 L. ed. 505 (1894).
22S~s
v: Castillo, G,R:. No, 29755, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 853· Portillo
v. Salvam, 54 Phil. 543 (1930). '
""Victorias Milliiig Co., Inc. v. Social Security System, 114 Phil. 555 (1962).
differently, rights which have.become vested under a statute before

its· amendment-may 'not-be affected by such .amendment, .as·the
amendatory act should not be .applied retroactively so as to nullify
such rights. 31
10.09. Effect of amendment on jurisdiction.

It is well-settled that tbe jurisdiction of a court to try cases is
determined by the law inforce at-the time the action is instituted,»
a
Once jurisdiction to try case is acquired, that jurisdiction remains
with the court ·. until the case · is . finally . decided therein. In the
absence of a. clear legislative intent to the contrary, a subsequent
statute amending a prior act' with the effect of divesting the court of
jurisdiction may not be construed to operate to oust jurisdiction that
has already attached under the prior law ,33 for it will be a'. "subversion
of the judicial process to take a cause from a court having jurisdiction
before its final· decision is given."a• Thus, where a. court originally
obtains and exercises jurisdiction pursuant to an existing law, such
jurisdiction will not be overturned and. impaired by the subsequent
amendment.of'thelaw, unless expreas.prohibitory.words or words of
similar import are used.35
The rule applies to quasi-judicial bodies. P.D. Nos. 1691 and
1391 vested Labor Arbiters with original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases llivolVing employer-employee · relations, including
money claimsarising out of any Jaw or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas employment. Pursuant to such laws, an
overseas worker filed a money claim against his recruiter, and while
this case was pending, E.O. No. 797 was enacted, which vested
the POEA With original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
including money claims, arising out . of law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas employment.' The issue was whether
the decision of the labor arbiter in favor of the overseas worker was
invalid, as he proceeded to hear. and try the case. notwithstanding
the promulgation of'E'O. No, 797. The Court sustained the validity
· of the decision and ruled that the labor arbiter still had the authority
~~~~_.._~.~-
31
~·
Escasura~v.'San
.
Miguel, Inc., 114·Phil. 25 (1962); Buycov, Phil. National
Bank, supra; People v. Butler, G.R. No. 50276, January 27, i983; 120·SCRA 281.
32Rilla'roza
v, Afciaga, G.R. No. 23848; October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 717.
33Rillaroza
v.·Arciaga;·supra; .
34Governnient
v. Gale, 24 Phil. 95, 100 (1913).
35Iburaan
v; Labes, 87 Phil. 234 (1950).
536 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION .
10.12. Constructionto harmonize different provisions.

In the. revision or codification of laws, the presumption is
that its author has maintained a consistent philosophy or position.
Consequently, the different provisions of a revised statute or code
should be read· and construed together, Such construction Will be
adopted as will reconcile or harmonize the various provisions and
a
avoid a conflict between them,« The rule is that code is enacted as
a single, comprehensive statute, and is to be considered assuch and
riot as a series of disconnected articles or provisions." Where there
is, however, an irreconcilable 'conflict be~ween parts of a revised
sta~ute or a code, that which is best in accor~~h the general plan
or, m the absence of circumstances upon which to base a choice, that
which is later in physical position, being the latest· expression of
legislative will; will prevail. •2 ./
10.13. Whatis omitted is deemed repealed.

In the revisio~ or codification of laws, al1~art~ and provisions of
the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or codeare deemed
;epe~ed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise, expressly or
impliedly. 43 The reason is that a revision or codification is, by its very
nature and purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on the
~ub~ect and an expression of the whole Iaw thereon, which thereby
indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate those
provisions of the old laws that are not· reproduced in the revised
statute or code.44
The repeal by revision or codiflcationof'former laws is possible
only if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole
subject to be a complete and perfect systemin itself. Itis the rule that
a .subsequent statute is deemed. to repeal a prior. law if the former
revises the whole.subject matter of the former statute. When.,both
intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, then all parts
and provisions of the prioract that are omitted from the revised act
ar? deemed re~ealed. Before there can be an implied repeal under
this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the
later act be the substitute to the prior act.46
"°Sanchez y; !µgo;, G.R. No. 25494, June 14, 1972 45 SCRA 368
41B~gv.
Director of Prisons, G.R. No. 30364, Jttly 28, 1969, 2S SCRA 850.
42Li.chauco
& Co. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138 (1922) .
..apeople v. Benuya, 61 Phil. 208 (1935).
«Joaquin v. Navarro, 81 Phil. 373 (1948).
46Mecano v. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 500 (1992).
the "effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced -by a new

Administrative Code which dncorporatesin a: unifieddocument-the
major structural, functional, and. procedural principles and rules of
governance" does.not evince a legislative intenf to entirely supplant
the old Code. What this whereas clause showsfia the intent to cover
only those aspects of government that pertain: to administration,
organization and' procedure, understandably because of the many
changes that transpired .in the government' structure since the
enactment of.the old Code." _
l0il4. Change in phraseology.

The change in phraseology in the. revised, statute pr :CQ~e, from
that of the old laws does not, by itself, imply that, it wa·~ tptl-intention
of the.. lawmakers to .amend, or change the.constructicn of the .old
laws. For It is a well-settled rwe that ill the revision, or codiflcation
of statutes, neither an alteration in phraseology nor.the omission
or addition of words. in the later statute. shall be. held necessarily
to alter the construction of the former acts. And the court is only
warranted in holding the construction of a statute, when revised or
codified, to be changed, where the 'iftte:nt of the legislaturetto-make
such change is clear, or the language used fa the· new a:ct plainly
requires such change of construction. It should be remembered that
condensation is a necessity in the' work of revision' or codification.
Very frequently; words which do 'not materially affect the sense will
be omitted from the statute 'as incorporated in the revised 'statute or
code, or that some general idea will be expressed in briefphrases.
No design ofaltering the law itseJ!fJCoUld rightly be predicated upon
such modification of the language." Of course; if there has been· a
material 'change or omission; which clearly indicates ail intent to
depart from the previous •construction of the old laws, then· such
construction as-will effectuate'such intentwill be.adopted.'8 ·
10.15. Conttnuation of existing Iaws;'

. A codification should be construed -as a •. continuation of the
existing statutes, In such case, . the presumption obtains that the
codifiers did not intend to. change the law as it formerly existed. The
rearrangemel)t ,9, sections or parts of a statute, or the placing of
47Greenfield
v. Meer, 77 Phil. 394 (1946), citing Black on Construction and
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., pp. 594-595.
48See
Sec. 3.25, supra.
law, and (2) that a provision be enacted to substitute, the declared

policy of exemption from taxes as an essential factor for the splvency
of the GSIS. fund, had not been met. It further .contends that the
Local Government Code did not comply with the second· condition
imposed by law, namely, by providing a declared policy of exemption
from taxes as an essential factor
, .-
for
._1·;_,>
.the solvency of the GSIS fund.
The Court ruled the condition imposed by Sec. 33 tied the hands
of future legislators and hence, the withdrawal oftax exemption by
the LGC is valid and has not been affected by the conditions imposed
Sec. 33. The Court held;
"However, P.b. No. 198i did not stop there, serving
merely as it should to restore the previous' exemptions on the
GSIS. It also attempted to' proscribe fut1~e attem~ts to
'alter
. the tax-exempt status of the GSIS by imposing unorthodox
conditions Jor its future ,:repeal. Thus, as .intimated earlier,
a second paragraph. was .added to Sectio:i:L33; containing the
restrictions relied upon by the tRTC and presently invoked by
the GSIS before this Court.
xxx
···: . .
-
Absent Section 33 of P.D: No. 1146, as amended, there

would be no impediment ·iii. squarely applying the express
provisions of Sections 193,232and 2346fthe·Local Government
Code, as the Court did iI1. Mactci1t' and recently in Philippine
Rural Electric Cooperatives As~ociation,Jnc. et al. v. Secretary
oflnterior And Local Gouernment.et al.and in ruling.that the
tax exemptions of GSIS were vVi.~h~awn by. th~ . Code. Thus,
the crucial. propositdonis. whethe:r the ®~El. tax exemptions
can be deemed as w,ithdrawi;i by the .Local Government Code
notwithstanding Section sa of:p,D. No. ll46 as amended.
Concededly, it does n6t appear that at the very least, the
second conditionality of Section 33 has been met. No provision
has been enacted '.'to substitute the declared P9liCY: of exemption
. from any and all taxes ,a~ an,essentjal factq1'.{or the S()!veno/ of
thefund," Yet the Court isaverse to employin,g i;hl,13 framework,
in the first pJace as utilize'd.by the RTC, for we recognize a
fundameiltai flaw in Section 33, particularly the amendatory
secondparagraph introducedby P.D. N9. 19.81.
The second paragraphofSeetion .~3 of P.D. No. 1146, as
amended, effectively imposes restpcli,olis'on the competency of
The citation .is particularly apropos to -our present task,

since the question for resolution is. primarily one of statutory
construction, i.e., whether or not Section 33 of P .D. No. 1146 has
been repealed by the Local Government Code, It is evident that
we cannot render effective.thedid, amendatory second paragraph
0
. of Section. 33 .as. _the RTC for by .doing so, we would be

giving sanction to a. disingenuous means employed through
legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a particular
mode of repeal.
10.18. Repeal, genel-aIIy.

The repeal of a statute is .either total. or partial, express or
implied. A statute which has been totally repealed)s/rendered
revoked. completely, while a partial repeal leaves the unaffected
portions of the statute in force; A declaration in a statute, usually in
its repealing clause, that a particular and specific 11:1.w, identified by
its number of title, is repealed. is an express repeal; all other repeals
are implied repeals,» The failure to add a specific repealing clause
·indicates that the intent was not.to repeal any existing law, unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and rep1lgnancy exist in the terms of
the new and old laws, which latter situation falls under the category
of an implied repeal,»
Laws are repealed only by the enactment of subsequent
laws; they are not repealed, nor their violation nor non-observance
excused, by disuse or customs and practice to the contrary,» The
change in condition and circumstances after the passage of a law,
which necessitated the enactment of a statute to overcome the
difficulties brought about by such change does not operate to repeal
the prior law, nor make the later statute so inconsistent with the
prior act as torepeal it. 06
10.19. Repeal by implication.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a
statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
------
.
0
1 ··,,,'A
2Mecano,.v. C~mmission on Audit; 216 SCRA 500 (1992); citing Agpalo, Statu-
tory Construction, p, 289 (1986). ·
MMecano v. Commission on Audit, supra:
64David
v. Dancel, G.R. No. 21485, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 696.
06City
of Manila v. Reyes, 99 Phil. 986 (1956).
to create repugnancy. In order to effect a repealby implication, the

later statute must be.so irreconcilably-ineonsistent and repugnant
with the existing law that they eannot be made tO reconcile and
stand together. The clearest case'pessible must be made beforethe
inference of implied repeal may-be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed.61 "It is necessarythen," says the court in a case, "before
such repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes
or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that
the latter be inconsistent With tfo{former. There must be a showing
of repugnancy, clear and. convincing in character. The language
used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable
with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls
short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is.a manifest
1
indicati~n oflegislative purpose to repeal."G•
· The fact that the terms of an earlier and later provisions of
law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance, as to constitute
the latter an implied repeal of the former, For instance, the fact
that Section 28 of Rep. Act No. 7166 pertaining to canvassing by
boards of canvassers is silent as to how the board of canvassers shall
prepare the certificate of canvass 'and as to what will be its basis,
which details are provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 231 of
the Omnibus Election Code, an earlier statute, which states that
the "respective boards of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of
canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the
right hand of each member, supported by a statement ofthe votes
and received by each candidate in each polling place and, on the
basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained
the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality
or barangay" and "Failure to comply with this requirement shall
constitute an election offense," did not thereby iinpliedly repeal
the second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code
and render the failure to comply with the requirement no longer an
election offense, the provisionsbeing reconcilable . ss
. Irreconcilable inconsistency between two laws embracing the
sanie subject may also exist when the later law nullifies the reason
--------.
81Iloilo
"""'·· ·.i' .~. .
Palay & Com Planters Assn., Inc. v, Feliciano; G.R. No. 24022, March
3, 1965, 13 SeRA 377. ·.. .
62Villegas
v. Subido, G.R. No. 31711, September 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190, 196-
197; Jalandoni v. Endaya, G.R. No. 23894, January 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261.
MAgujetas v. Court.of Appeals, 73 SCAD 560; 261SCRA17 (1996), citing Ru-
ben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., pp. 287-288.
In case of sickness· ea used by. or connected directly with

the performance of some act-in the line of duty, the department
head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the
necessary hospital fees.
For employees of a city, the time allowance and dis-burse-
ments contemplated above. shall not be granted except upon
recommendation of the Municipal Board or.Council of the city;
in the case of employees ofa provincial government, upon the
recommendation of the provincial board..and.in the case of.em-
ployees. of a municipal or municipai district; government, Up<)Jl,
the recommendation of the municipal council or municipal dis-
trict mayor, as the case may be."
' I
The 1987 Administrative CQ~t:! provides that ~Alllaws, decrees,
orders, rules and.regulations, orportions thereof, :IDc1;msisten~.with
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The Court
held that the new Code did not repeal Section 699 ofthe old Code:
"Ther~ are two categories of repeal by implication. The
first is where provisions in the two 'acts on the same subject
ma~r are in an irreconcilable conflict, the' later.· act
to the
of
extent ofthe conflict constitutes an fulplied repeal the earlier
one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of
the earlier one and is clearly intended as'·a.·~ubstitUte, it will
operate to repeal the earlier law. · ' · ·
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place
when two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so
clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that
they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and· both cannot be
given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without
nullifying the other.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new
Code does not cover nor attempt to coyer the. entire subject
matter of the old Code ... There are several matters treated in ·
the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the
provisions on notaries public; the leave law, the public bonding
law, militaxy~eservations; claims for sickness benefits under
Section 699 and still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the
provisions of the two codes on the matter of the: subject claim
are in an irreconcilable conflict. Iii fact, there can be no such
presumption is against inconsistency and repugneney for the

legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject
and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. "69
In Ty u, Trampe= the issue raised is whether P.D. No, 921 on
real estate taxes has been,repealedimpliedlyby Rep. Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as. the Local Government Code ofl,991 on the same
subject. In holding that there has be~n no implied repeal, the Court
said: · · ·
"From the above, it is clear thatthe two laws are not co-
extensive and mutually inclusive in their scope and purpose.
While RA. No. 7160 covers almost all governmental.functions
delegated to local government units all. over the cowitry, P.D.
No. 921 embraces only Metropolltan Manila Area ahd is limited
to the administration of financial services. therein, especially
the assessment and collection of real estate (and some other
local) taxes.
Coming.down to specifics, Sec. 9 of P.D. No.921 requires
that the schedule of values ofreal properties in the Metropolitan
Manila Area shall be 'prepared jointly by the city assessors
in the districts created therein; while Sec. 212 of ltA. No. 71
states that the schedule shall be prepared 'by the provincial,
city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within the
Metropolitan Manila ~ea ·for the, different· classes of real
property situated in thefr'.respedive focal government units for
enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned.' x x x.
It is obvious that harmony in the provisions is not only
possible, but in fact desirable, necessary and consistent with
the legislative intent and policy; xx x.11
InHagad v. Gozo-Dadole.» it is claimed that Sec. 19 of Rep. Act

No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act, which grants disciplinary authority
to the Ombudsman· to discipline elective and appointive officials, t
except those impeachable officers, has been repealed by Rep. Act No.
7160, the Local Governl:nent Code, insofar as local elective officials f
are concerned, because the latter is a subsequent law which vests
~ /~ .
t
P
69 Ibid., pp. 506-508, citing Agpalo, Statutory Construction,289 (l986). N
16 66 SCAD 115, 250 SCRA 500 (1995).
»tu«, p. 516.
72 66 SCAD 543, 251 SCRA 242 (1995).
there was neither express nor implied repeal of Sec. 6 of P~D. No.
1597, the two laws. being reconcilable .. For. while the Philippine
Postal Corporation is allowed tofix its own personnel compensation
structure through its board of directors, the latter is required to
follow certain standards in formulating said compensation system,
and the role of the DBM is merely to ensure that.the action taken by
the board of directors complies with the require:rn;ents of the law.M
Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 451 and Section 42 of Batas Pambansa
Big. 232 illustrate repeal by implication. Section 3(a) provides
that "no increase in tuition or other school fees or
charges shall be
approved unless sixty per centum (60%) of the proceeds is allocat~d
to increase in. salaries or wag-es of the members of the faculty'."
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 was ell:acte<}; Sectioi143
of which provides that "each private school shalldetermine its rdte
1
of tuition arid other schoolfees or charges. Thi rates and charg~·s

adopted by schools pursuant to this provision shall be collectible, :and
their application or use authorized, subject to rules and regulations
promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports."
The issue raised is whether Section 42 ofBatas Pambansa Big. 232
impliedly repealed Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 451. The Court held that
there was implied repealbecause there are irreconcilable differences
between the two laws. "Under Pres. Decree No. 451, the authority
toregulate the imposition of tuition: and other school fees or charges
by private schools is lodged with the Secretary ofEducatlcin and
Culture," while under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Big. 232, the
private school determines "its rate of tuition and other school fees
or charges." P.D. No. 451 "provides that 60% of the incremental
proceeds of tuition fee increases shall be applied or used to augment
the salaries and wages of members ofthe faculty and other employees
of the school, while B.P. Big. 232 provides that the incremerrt shall
be applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated
by the Ministry of Education.w
In GSIS v. City Assessor of Iloilo, G.R. No. 147192, June 27
2006, o~e of the issues rai~ed is whether RA 8291, a subsequent
law, which grants tax exemptions to GSIS funds and properties;
has repealed Sec, 234 of the Local Government Code of 1991 · which
withdrew t~ · ~~ptions. The Court answered the issue 'm the
negative ~d explained why and the effects ofrepeal, as follows:
Intia,
74
Jr. v. COA, 106 SCAD 226, 306 SCRA 593 (1999).
Cebu
75
Institute of Technology v. Opie, 156 SCRA 629 (1987).
552
GSIS assets. and properties from legal .processes was unwar-

ranted; These processes included the levy and garnishment of
its assets for truces or claims enforced against it. The Court
there ruled that the exemption under Section 39 of the GSIS
Charter ~hotild be read consistently with its avowed purpose
- the maintenance of its actuarial solvency to finance the re-
tirement, disability and life insurance benefits ofits members.
The Court meant that the true-exempt properties and assets of
~SIS refe:z-ed tc) those that remained at its disposal and use,
e1t~er for mvestnient oi: for income-gener~ting purposes. Prop-
erties whose actual and beneficial use had been traruiferred to
private taxable persons, for consideration or otherwise, were
excluded and were thus taxable. · ·
. InMacta,n CebulnternationalAirportAuthorib v. Marcos,
. the Court ruled that the exemption of a government-owned or
controlled _corporation· from taxes and other tharges was not
absolute and could be withdrawn, as in fact certain proVisions
of the LGC, including Section 234 (a), were deemed to have
expressly withdrawn the tax-exempt privilege of petitioner as
a government-owned corporation.
Irreconcilable conflict between two laws resulting in implied
repeal of the former law, is exemplified by David v. Comelec [G.R.
No. 127116, April 8, 1997]. The Court ruled:
It is basic that in case of an irreconcilable conflict between

two_ laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails.
Legie posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale
is simple: A later law repeals an earlier one because it is the
later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers
knew the older la_w and intended to change it. In enacting the
older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one
and hence could not have intended to change what· they did
not know '. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by
subsequent on~s - and not the other way arbund.
Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term ofoffice of barangay
officials was :fix~~:l at "three (3) years which shall begin after
.the regular e!!¢i~n of bm:a_&a! officials on the second Monday
of May 1994. This provision is clearly inconsistent with and
repugiiant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states that such "term
shal! be for five years." Note· that both laws refer to· the same
officials who were elected "on the second Monday of May
1994."
554
I
STATUTORY.'.€0NSTRUCTION'·
I
specifical~y:·applies to. focal ·govertnnent.tinits. It specifically
and defirutivelyprovidesin its Sec. 43-c that "the.term ofoffice I
of ba.r~ngay·offic1als . ' . shall be forthree years." It is a special l
l
provision that applies only to.the term of barangayoffieiais who
wer~ elect_ed on the second Monday of May 1994. With such
P~1~ulanty;rt;he provision cannot be deemed a general law.
Petitioner may. be correct in alleging that RA 6679 · ·
l b t th · . ·. . . 1s a special
aw, u · ey are incorrect m stating (without however ivin
the rea~ons the~efor) t?at-RA 7160 is necessarily a g!erJ
law. It is a special law msofar as it governs the term of offl
of barangay officials; In its repealing. clause RA• 7160 t tee
that "all e al . . . ' . . s a es
. g ner and. special laws ... which are inconsistent
with ~y of the p:ovis1ons of .this. Co,de are hereby repealed
'" modifi~d. ·~~cording~y/' There being :a clear repugnance and
. mcompatibil1fy:betwe~n the two specific proVisio:iis,they cannot
~tand together. '!'he. l.~ter law, :RA. 7160, should thus prevail
in accordance with i.ts· repe. aling clause Wh''. . ... b.c.
l .. • ,- · : . · . · . en a su sequent
. aw encompasses entrrely the subject matter of the :6
enactments, the latter' is deemed repealed. ormer
10·21·
Implied repeal by revfsion or codification.
The legislative intent to repeal -:a prior law is also shown b
the enactment. of a statute revising or codifying the former laws o~
the ~hole. subject m.a~ter. 'The revised statute or code is in effect
a . legislative declarat10n that whatever is embraced . . 'th.
statute shall ail .' d · h · . · · .· . . m e new
. prev . ~ w atever is excluded' th~refrom shall
frs discarded .•1• The revised statute or Code, . as disclosed by its
r~ework and substance, must be intended to . cover the whole
:~bJec~ to be a complete and perfect system in its'elf in order that
e prior statu~es or parts thereof which are not repeated in the
new statute will be deemed impliedly repealed 77 Thus wh
statute is revised . f · , ere a
. d ' or a series o 1 egislative acts on the same subject
arbe. revit se and consolidated into one, covering the entire field of
su oec matter all parts a d · . f
th t . ' . n provisions o the former act or acts
a ·. are ormtted from the revised act are deemed repealed. 7• The
7•People v. Ahjiuefe: G.R. No. 26551 F b

v. Benuya, 61 P~. 208 (1935). ' e ruacy 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 410; People
77In
~~~:~~~~i~;,;· :a~~~~~:hil.
re Guzman 73 Phil 5
Pamil v. Teleron, G.R..No, 348S4, 208 (1916); see
75People
v. Benuya 61 Phil 208 (191 · ' · · .· · .
People v, Perfecto, 43Phil. 887 (1S22). 6); People v. Castro, 43 Phil. 842 (1922);
556
In Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez,aathe issue raised is whether

Sec. 18 of Rule 41 ofthe pre-1997 Rules of Court, which provided
that appeal in habeiis corpus cases be taken within 48 hours. from
notice ofthejudgment, has been repealed by thel'.991 Rules ofCivil
Procedure, which provides in Sec. 3, Rule 41 theroof, that appeal
from judgment or final order shall be taken wjthin .· 15. days from
receipt thereof, in view of the fact that the Sec. 18 of the, pre-1997
Rules of Court, Rule 41 was omitted in S.ec. 41,ofthe 1997 Rules. The
Court ruled that Sec. 18_ was repealed,in acco;rdance with the well-
settled rule ofstatutory construction that p!QYil'1ions of an old law
that were not reproducedin the revision' thereof covering the same
subject are deemed repealed and dis.caj-ded. ".rhe omission shows the
intention of the rule-making body, the Supreme Court jn this case,
to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not reproduced
in the revised statute or Code. . . . . ';
10.22. Repeal by reenactment.

Where a statute is a r.e!')µaCtme:µt of .the whole subject in
substitution of the previous laws on the matter, the latter disappears
entirelyandwhati~ omitted in.the reenactedlawis deemed repeaj~d. 84
The reenactment, if Complete and COrnprehensive,.is regarded as the
expression of the whole law-on, the subject, and thereby operates as
an implied repeal of the prior law 011, the same subj,ect.85
Where a law amends a' specific section of a prior act by provicling
that the same is amended so as to read as follows, which then quotes
the amended provision, what is not included in the 'reenactment is
deemed repealed. The new statute is a substitute for the original
section and all matters in the section that are omitted in the
amendment are considered repealed;«
In GSIS v. City Asses~orpf l~oilo, G.R. No. 147192, June 27
2006, one of.ths issues raised .is. wh,ethe:r RA 8291, a subsequent
law, which grants tax exem,ptions to GSIS funds and properties;
has repealed Sec. 234 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
withdrew tax exemptions.· The Court answered the . issue in the
negative, follows: . . . ·
--------~
88134
.. ,/;..
SCAD 252, 340 SCRA 765 {2000), citingAgpalo, Statutory Construction,

1990 ed., p. 2·84.
84Parras
86Joaquin
v. Land Registration Commissio», 108 Phil. 1142 (1960).
v. Navarro, 81 Phil. 373 (1948).
""Parras v. Land Registration Commission, 108 Phil. 1142 (1960).
558
GSIS assets and properties from legal processes - was unwar-

ranted. These processes included the levy and ganrislunent of
its assets for "taxes or claims enforced against, it. The Court
there ruled that the exemption under Section 39 of the GSIS
Charter should - be read consistently with-its avowed purpose
- the maintenance of its actuarial solvency to finance the re-
tirement, disabilityahdlifeinsurance benefits of its members.
The Court meant that-the tax-exempt-properties and-assets-of
GSIS referred to, ~hose that remained at its disposal and use,
either for investment or for income-generating purposes, Prop-
erties whose actual and beneficial use had been transferred to
private taxabl~ persons; for _consid~~~tirin or otherwise, were
excluded and were thus taxable.
I
In Mactan Cebu Int(!rnat,ionalAirport Autho/.ity v. Marcos,
'the Court ruled that the exemption of a government~owned or
controlled corporation from taxes and other charges was not
absolute and could be withdraWn., as in fact certain provisions
of the LGC, including Section 234 (a), were deemed to have
expressly withdrawn the tax-exempt privilege of petitioner as
a government-owned corporation.
I
10.23. Other forms of implied repeal. - t
't
The most .powerful implication of repeal is that which arises I
when the later of two laws is expressed in the form of a universal
negative. The repugnance of two statutes is more readily .seen-when
't
'f
r
the later act is in the form ofa negative proposition than when both i'
laws are stated in the affumati-Ve. Ther'e is a cleai-distinction between
affirmative and negative statutes in reg~ci to their repealing effects
upon prior legislation, which Ifi.ay be expressed by saying that
while an affumative statute ~foe~ ilo~ impliedly repeal the prior law
a
unless ari: intention to effect repealis manifest, a-negative statute
repeals all corrtlicting provisions unless the contrary intention is
disclosed. •7 - -
The legislative intent te repeal is also shown where it enacts

something in general terms - and afterwards it. passes another on
the same subject, which though expressed in affumative language
introduces speciafconditions or restrictions, the subsequent statute
will usuaJJ.y be considered. as repealing by implication the former
""Valdez v. Tueson, 40 Phil. 943 (1920).

560 STATUTORY. CONSTRUC'rION ·.
The circumstance that a later statute which is inconsistent

with a prior law on the same subject does not contain aclause
repealing generally'all. laws and parts thereof which are repugnant
therewith does not prevent itfrom operating to repeal by Implication
such inconsistent laws or parts thereof. It has' been held that "such
a clause repeals nothing' that would not be equally repealed without
it. Either with or. without it, the real question to be determined is
whether the new statute is in.fundamental and irreconcilable conflict
with the prior statute on the subject.''92 Such being the rule, it may
well be asked: What then is the significanca of the repealing clause
to the effect that "all laws or. parts thereof which are inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly?" The significance is that the presence of such general
repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the legislative
intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter,
whether or not the prior law is a special· law .. Without such clause,
a later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior special law on
the same subject, as the latter is generally regarded as an exception
to the former,» But with such clause contained in the subsequent
general law, the prior special law will he deemed repealed, as the
clause is a clear legislative .intentto bring about that result," unless
the general law contains a saving clause,«
10.25. Repeal by implication not favored.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of
~tatut~s by implication are not favored,« The presumption is against
mcons1stency or repugnancy and, accordingly, against implied
97
repeal. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws
on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting
92Valdez v. Tuason, 40.Phil. 943, 950 (1920).

See
93
Secs. 10.26, et seq., infra.
"'Gaerlan v. Catubig, G.R. N~. 23964, June 1, 1966, 17 SCRA 376.
~6Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 40 Phil. 224 (1919).
Sta. ~~acia Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 49 SCAD 33, 230 SCRA
513 (~994), citing ~a_Jo, Statzi.tory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 295; Valdez v. Tuason,
40 Phil. 943 (192(J,);;Ptill. Amencan Management Co., Inc. v. Phil. American Manage-
me~t EmplOY,eeg Assn., G.R. No: 35254; January 29, 1973, 49 SCRA 194; Villegas v.
Subido, G.R:No'. 31711, September 30, 1971; 41SCRA190 (1971); De Jesus v. People
G.R. No. 61098, February 22, 1983, 120 SCRA 760. '
97]]oilo Palay & Corn Planters Assn., Inc. v. Feliciano G.R. No. 24022 March
3, 1965, 13 SCRA 377. ' '
562 STATUTORY €0NSTRUCTION
has impliedly repealed or amended:Article 2209 .of the Civil Code

which states that:
"Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a

sum of money; and the debtor incurs in delay.ithe indemnity
for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall
be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the. absence
of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six percent per
annum." ·
In answering the issue in the negative; the Court ruled that

"repeals or even amendments by implication are not favored if two laws
can be fairly reconciled. xx x Inthis case, Central Bank Circular No.
416 and Art. 2209 ofthe Civil-Code contemplate different.situations
and apply to different transactions. In transactions in:'volving loan
or fo~bearance of money, goods or credits, as well. as judgments
relating to such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits,
the Central Bank Circular applies. It is only in such transactions
or judgme~ts.where the_~esidential·Decree allowed the Monetary
Board to dip its fingers into. On the other hand; in cases requiring
the p~yment of indem.llities as damages, in connection with any
delay in the performance of an obligation other than those involving
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code applies. For the Court, this is the most fair reasonable ·and
logical interpretation of the two laws. We do not see any co~ct
between Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code or any reason to hold that the former has repealed the latter
by implication." ·
. Co_urt~ are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another
by i~plicat10n, ~d they will not make such adjudication if they can
refrain :fi;>m do~g ~o, .or if they can arrive at another result by any
construction which is JUSt and reasonable. Moreover, courts will not
enlarge th~ me~g of one _act in order to decide that it repeals
another .by ~p~cation, nor will they adopt an interpretation leading
to an adjudication of repeal by implication unless ifis inevitable and
a clear and explicit reason therefor can be adduced.v-
.
~·
" J ~-
'°'National Power Corp. v. Angas, 208 SCRA 542 (1992).

inconsistency between the two laws, the·later law fixing the term of o
barangay officials at three (3) years shall prevail.r= . l
w
10.27. General law does not repeal special law, generally. a
It is a well-established principle· of legal hermeneutics that a
general law on a subject does notoperate to'repeal a prior special law 1
on the same subject,119 unless it' Clearly appears that the legislature
has intended by the later general act to modify orrepeal the earlier a
special law.»- The presumption.against implied repeal is stronger s
when, of two laws, one isspecial and the othergeneral; and this rule s
ap~lies even though the terma of the general act are broad enough i
~ mclude the. matter covered by the special statute.w The principle l
is expressed m themaxim, generalia epecialibus non derogant, ·A t
general law does not nullify.a specific or special law.m !
. The reason why a special law prevails over a general law is w
that the legislature considers and makes provision for all 'the C
circi:mstances of the particular case. The legislature having specially i
considered ail of the facts and circumstances. in 'the particular c
case in granting a special charter, it will riot be considered that r
the legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions C
repu~ant ~ t~e pro.visions of the charter, and withoutmakirig'any t
mention of'ita mtention to amend or modify the charter, intended to t
amend, repeal or modify.the special act.w · o
a
The general arid special la~s are read and construed together,
l
and ~hat repugnancy between them is reconciled by constituting the
c
special law as ,an exception to the general law. In other words, the
l
gen~ral law yields to the special Iaw in the specific and particular
a
subject embraced in the latter.w The principle applies irrespective
t
c
t
::David v. COMELEC,,81SCAD482, 27l;SCRA 90 (1997).
See Sec. 6.20, supra.
111Camacho
· · f ~: H
v. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848 (1948); Valera v. Tua-
I :; '
e
so~, 80 Phil. ~23 (1948); Lichauco & Qo. v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138 (1922); Butuan Saw-
' C
mill, I~;· v. C_1ty of;i'lutuan, G.R. No. 21516, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 758. . · o
2Manila Railroad Co. v. Rafferty, 40 PJµI. 224 (1919); CommissiOner oflnter-
nal Revenue on Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 487 (1992).
"9Lichauco & Gb1v. Apostol; 44 Phil. 138 (1922).
;:;De Vil.Ja v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 722 (1991). o
. Kepner v. U.S., 11 Phil. 669 (1904); Bagatsing v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 41631,
Ap~ 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 306; Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City ofButuan, G~R. No. 21516, 1
April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 758; Commissioner oflntemal Revenue v, Court of Tax Ap- 3
peals, 195 SCRA 444 (1991).
such public services, 'in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair
competition detrimental to operators and to the public interests.' a
By the nature ofthe 'service being rendered by the National Power p
Corporation, i.e., the harnessing and then distribution arid sa:le of t
electric power to the consuming public, the contingency intended to t
be met by the legal provision under consideration would not.exist. N:o i
other conclusion appears possible, therefore, than that the authority b
of the PublicSe:rvice Commission under Repuolic Act No. 2677 over r
the fixing of rates of charges of publrc utilities owned or operated by p
governln.ent~ovmed.·O.r·,conttolled corporatfons, can only be exercised r
where the charter Of the go~ernmeiit corporation concerned does riot
contain any pl'o~sion to the contrary."ua ; t
In Philippine Railway. Co. v. Collector of Internal Reoenue,120 it L
appearsthat the Philippine Railway Co. was granted .il. legislative t
franchise to operate a railway line pursuant to Act No. l497, Section i
13 of which reads: "In consideration of the premises and of the i
operation of this concession or franchise, there shall be paid by the s
grantee tothe Philippine Government, annually, x x x 'an amount s
equal to one-half of'orie per centum of the gross earnings of the s
grantee xxx," Oil the other hand, Section 259 of the Internal Revenue t
Code, as runended byRe~~blicActNo~ 39,provides that "there shall t
be collected in respect to all existing' and future franchises, upon e
the gross earnings or receipts froiii the business covered by the law T
granting a franchise tax of.five p~r centum of such taxes, charges, t
and percentages as are
'specified in the special charters of the t
corporation upon who:in such franchises are conferred, whichever
is higher, unless the provisions he"reof preclude the imposition of
a higher ta:X x x x." The question is whether Section 259 of the Tax
Code has repealed Section 13 ofAct No. 1497. The coUrt·ruied that
there was no implied repeal and said that charters or special laws,
such as Act No. 1497, stand upon a different footing from general
laws. Once granted, a charter becomes a private contract arid cannot
be altered nor amended ~xceptbyconsent of allcoiicerned,.unlessthe
right to alter or repeal is'eXi>ressly reserved. The reason is that the
legislature, in passing a special charter, has its attention directed
to the special 'facts and' circUm.stances which the act or charter is
intended to meet. The legislature having specially considered all
ofthe facts ~;cir.cunistaD.ces in the particular case in granting
a special chartar, it will not be considered that the legislature, by
119Ibid. at pp. 935-936.

12091 Phil. 35 (1952).
It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment .of a

later legislation which is· a general law cannot be construed
to have repealed a special law. It is well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that 'a special statute, provided for a particular
case or class. of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,
?eneral in its terms, provisions and application, unless the
intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the
general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in
the special law.'
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a
special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces
the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.
The special law is to be taken as an exception to.the general
law in the absence of special.circumstances forcinga contrary
conclusion. This is because implied repeals arenot favored and
as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of
the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or
altered by a subsequent general law bymere.implication."= .·
Where a statute provides that clerks of courts of municipal
courts shall be appointed by the .mufilcipal judge at the expense of
the municipality and where a.later law was enacted providing that
employees whose salaries are pajcl out of the municipal nmds shall
be appointed by the municipal may()r,
the later lawcannot be shld
to have repealed the prior law as to vest iD. the municipal mayor the
power to appoint municipal clerk of court, as the subsequent law
should be construed to comprehend only subordinate officials of the
municipality and not those of the judiciary.w Acity charter giving
real estate owner a period of one year within which to redeem a real
property sold by the city for nonpayment of realty tax from the date
of sue~ auction sale, being a special law, prevails over a general law
~~ting landowners a period of two years to make the redemption.v-
Similarly, the ~i~ Se~ce Law o~ the procedure for the suspension
or removal ~f civil · service employees does 'not 'apply with respect to
the suspension or removal of members of the local police force as the
Police Act, which is a special'law, governs the matter.w '
=u«;
G1!r9a
123
PI(56~t;.
v. Pascual, 113 Phil. 632 (1961).
124 Goroon
v. Court of Appeals; G.R No. 37831; November 23, 1981, 109 SCRA
388.
Sto.
125
Domingo v. Delos Angeles, G.R. No. 30135, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA
139.
The general rule that-a generalIaw .eannot- be construed. to

have repealed :1 sl!eci?I.la!;~7( ~ef~ impii.catio:n, ~dmit~ of e~ception,
as when the intent to repl:),a1. or alter ~s ma.mf'est. For instance,
Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 551 provides that any provision of'law or local
ordinance to
the contrary, the'friilichise tax payabl({by'"a:ll grantees
of franchise to generate, distribute iitid sen electric clirrerlt' forHght,
heat and power shall be two percent (2%) of their gross ret:eipts~ On
the other hand, Sec. 137 of the Local Government Code CR.A. No.
7160) states that"Notwithstl;l,llding any exemption granted .by any
law or other special law, the province ma¥1iIIH>!)se a t~:.?n:bus~ess
enjoying a franchise, ,at a rate not exceeding fift;y per~n,_t .(50%)
of one percent (1%) of t"!i~ gross. annul receip~s' lC x,x.":')?11~.(;ptip;
ruled that the phrase "not~thstan:4ing any exefflp~iO,ll:ITT:~t~d)?Y
any Iaw or other special law" is all-enoompassing ,aiiµ _de.~ that
the .legislature intended to. withdraw. all tax exe]llptions enjoyed by
fr~chise. holders, and urls intent i~ ,made more Il1~te~t 'l;)y. Sec.
193 of the Code, wh~n it pr.ovides fhat ~es~.:<ithe~~.~ 'pt,~vi.ded
in this code, tax exemptions or incentives g'i;filited, tp
O.(presently
enjoyed by all persons, except local water districts, cooperatives, and
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are
withdrawn upon the effecti~ty of
the Cocie.· Such express mention
of those who are to enjoy tax exemptions excludes all. others not
expressly mentioned. ts• ' . . • .. ..
Gaerlan v. Catubig= illustrates the principle. The questiop

raised is whether Section 12 of Republic Act No, J'.70, as amended,
the City Charter of Dagupan City, .w:qich, ~e('.l ,fhe minimum age
qualification for members of the city crolln.cilat tw!"nty-three years,
has been repealedby.Section $' of:Rep,ublic Act;No. 2259,. el).titl~~ ~A.en
Act making elective the o~ce,s ofmJ.1.yor,·yi~~!QayQr ~d,-co~cilors
in chartered cities" which fixed the· age qualification for such
positions at twenty-five years. The court ruled that there was an
implied repeal of Section 12 of the charter of Dagupan City because
the legislative intent to repeal the charter provisionis.cle,ar from
the fact that Dagupan City, unlike some ·tjties~ .is not ''.61;1~. of those
cities expressly excluded by the;;law.fromitiip,,pe~atiq;riaiid from the
circumstance that it provides that all acts or parts thereof which
are inconsistent therewith are rep~aled. Moreover, the cd{n-t;)~.dded:
"Given the f~tl'iat Dagupan CitY beydndp'e.rf:tdve:ntufe is remov~d
185 City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes, 105·SGAD 144, . .305 SCRA 353
(1999).
188 G.R. No. 23964, June 1, 1966, 17 SCRA 376 (1966),
572 STATIJTORY' CONSTRUCTION
to achieve the purposes for.which the.law was enacted, that is, the
standardization of salaries of all - employees in government-owned
and/or controlled corporations to achieve 'equalpayfor substantially
equal work.' Henceforth, PITC,should now be.considered as covered
by laws prescribing a compensation - .and. position classification
system in the government
., . .
including . RA. No.,6758;"
.'
1~
;
10.30. Effects.of r~peal~gen"'~~y.

The appeal or-a statute renders it inoperative as of the date the
repealing act takes effect. The repeal is by no means equivalent to a
declaration that-the-repealed statute isinvalid'from the date of its
enactment. On;the contrary, it continues in the statute book as the
law of the· land touchingthe - subjebt matter df which iV''treats; and
unless the contrary: apJ.)elirs, the repealed statii.te loses none of its
force and effects as a law gdve:i'ning acts which it'is applicable prior
to its repeal.w - - ' ' - - - - - - c '
The repeal' of a law does not undo the consequences of the

operation of the statute while in. force, unless such result is directed
by express Ianguage or by necessary inip~cation, except as it may
affect rights which' become .ve~ted; whe~ the repealediact "was
in force.wNeithertherepeal of'al~w tenders ij_:tegal wliat under
the repealed act is legal; nor, ap~E)nf~y legislative intent to the
contrary, makes legal what under the former law is illegal.w -
For instance, Batlis Pambansa 'Blg, 337; known as the Local
Government Code; was repealed by Republic Act No. 7160, known
as the Local Government Code: of issi, which took effect on January
1, 1992. Section S(d) of the n~w Code provides that rights and
obligations existing on the date of'the effectivityof'the newCode and
arising out of contracts or any 'other source Of prestatfon· involving
a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and
conditions of said contracts or the law in force atthe time such rights
were vested.s-
140309_ SCRA, p. 191.

141U.S. v. Cuna, 12 Phil. 241 (1908); U.S. v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5 (1917).
142Ramos
v. Municipality ofDaet, 105 Phil. 154 (1959).
'"'Ramos v. Municipality ofDaet, supra.
144Macasiano
v. Diokno, 212 SCRA 464 (1992).
In the absence of a legislative intent to' the contrary; the

expiration or repeal of a statute does not render legal what, under
the old law, is an illegal transaction, so as to· deprive the court or
tribunal of the authority to act on a case involving such illegal
transaction. Thus, where a law declares certain importations to
be illegal, subject to forfeiture by the Commissioner of Customs,
pursuant to which the latter initiated forfeiture proceedings, the
expiration of the 'law· during the pendency of the proceedings· does
not. divest the· Commissioner of· Customs of the jurisdiction to
continue to resolve the case; nor does it have the effect ofmaking
the illegal importation legal· or of setting aside the decision of the
commissioner on the matter. If the expiration of the law is brought
about by the passage of a repealing statute, the Tatter may not be
given retroactive effect so as to defeat any action or transaction
effected under .theold statute, unless the contrary.is provided.w
10.32. On jurisdiction to try criminal case;

It is well-settled that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal
case is determined. by the law in force at the time the action is
instituted'.152 Once jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired,
that jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally
determined. A subsequent statute amending or repealing a prior
act under which the court acquired jurisdiction over the case with
the effect of removing the court's jurisdiction may not operate to
oust jurisdiction that has already attached, 163 unless the contrary is
provided, express prohibitory words are used.v- or the criminallaw
violated is itself repealed.w
10.33. On actions, pending or otherwise.

The general rule is that the repeal of a statute defeats all
actions and proceedings, including those which are still pending,
'
Lazaro v. Commissioner ofCustoms,.G.R. No. 22511 May 16 1966 17 SCRA
151
36. ' ' '

152Rillaroza
v. Arciaga, G.R. No. 23848, October.31, 1967, 21 SCRA 717· Ferrer
v. Pecson, 92 Phil.17~,.(1952); People v. Adolfo, G.R. No. 24191 March 21 i965 13
SC.RA 599 (1965)/. " ' ' '
163Rillll!oza
v. Arciaga, supra; People v. Pegrum, 58 Phil. 715 (1933); People v.
Veloso, 67 SCAD 101, 252SCRA135 (1996).
154Iburan
v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234 (1950); Rillaroza v. Areiaga, supra.
155People
v. Almuete, G.R. No. 26551, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 410; People
v. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000 (1947)~ ·
repeal of a law, vested rights or the obligations of contract, except in

the legitimate exercise of police power.w
Examples may be cited to illustrate the principle. Where
a statute gives holders of backpay certificates the right to · use
said certificates to pay their obligations to government financial
institutions, the repeal of the law- disallowing such payment. will
not deprive holders thereof whose rights become vested under. the
old law of the right to use the certificates to pay their obligations
to such :financial institutions.e' Rights to workmen's compensation
benefits which accrued under the Workmen's CoinpensationAct can
be enforced even after its repeal 'by the new Labor Code, although
under the latter, illness. is no longer compensable.w Where a statute
gives an appellant the right to appeal from an adverse dfcision, the
repealof such statute after an appellant has already perfected his
appeal will not destroy his right to prosecute the appeal, nor deprive
the appellate court of the authority to decide the> appealed case.w
In Republic v. Migrino,'64 one ofthe issues raised is whether
prosecution for unexplained wealth under Republic Act No. 1379
entitled an "act declaring forfeited in favor of the state any property
found to have _been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or
employee and providing for the procedure therefor,''. has already
prescribed, The Court :ruled: "In his pleadings, private respondent
contends that he may no longer be prosecuted because of prescription.
He relies on Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 which provides that
'the right to· file such petition [for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
wealth] shall prescribe within four years from the date of'resignation,
dismissal of separation or expiration of the term of the officer or
employee concerned.' He retired on May 9, 1984, or morethan six
(6) years ago. However, it must be pointed out that Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 137_9 shouldbe deemedamended or repealed by
Arliele XI, Section 15 ofthe 1987 Constitution which provides that
'the right of the· State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees· or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppal,'
·• ... .
Ayog v. C\µ1~1 Q!R. _No. 46729, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 492.
'00
Buyco v.,'Phil.'National Bank, G.R. No. 14406, June 30 1961 2 SCRA 682.
1"1
1"2nill
--n ones v. Employees' Compensation Commission, G.R.' No. 46200' . July 30
1979, 92 SCRA320. . ' '
168Un
Pak Leung v. Nigorra, 9 Phil. 486 (1908); Priolo v. Priolo 9 Phil. 566
(1908). '
164189
SCRA 289, 302 (1990).
a prospective construction of statutes is applicable to statutes which .

repeal tax laws. ;Where such statute is not maderetroactlve..a tax
assessed before the repeal is collectible afterwards according to the
law in force when the assessment orlevy was made.w
10.37. Repeal and reenactment, effect of.

The simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does
not affect the. rights and liabilities which have accrued under the
original statute, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal and
continues the law in force without interruption.w The rule applies to
the simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a penal law. Thus, the
repeal of a penal law, under which a person is charged with violation
thereof, and its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same
act done by him under the old law; will not preclude the accused's
prosecution, nor deprive the court of the jurisdiction to try. and
convict him.w However, where the reenactment ofthe repealed law
is not simultaneous such that the continuity of the obligation and
the sanction for its violation from the repealed law to the reenacted
law is broken, the repeal carries with it the deprivation of the court
of its authority to try, convict and sentence the person charged with
violation of the old law prior toits repeal.v-
10.38. Effect of repeal of penal laws.

The repeal without qualification of penal law deprives the court
of the jurisdiction to punish persons charged with, 11 violation of the
old law prior to its repeal.112 In short, where the repeal is.absolute,
so that the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the person charged
undertheoldlawcannot be had and the action should be dismlssed.v'
The same effect results where the repealing statute wholly fails to .
penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized
in the repealed law.v-
168 Co v. Collector of Internal Revenue, supra, Citing Cooley, Taxation, 638, Vol.
2.
169American BIJ;t!.& Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
17oU.S. v. ~wi'a, 12 Phil. 241 (1908); Ong Ching v. U.S., 40 Phil. 1046 (1910).
171People
v .. Almuete, G.R. No. 26551, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 410.
172!'eople
v. Almuete, supra.
17"People
v. Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225 (1935); Phil. Assn. oLFree Labor Unions v.
Court of First Instance of Rizal, G.R. No. 49580, January 17, 1923, 120SCRA 1.
174People
v. Pastor, 77Phil. 1000 (1947).
10.39. Distinction as to effect of repeal and expj,ration of

law.
' '
There is a difference between absolute repeal of a j>eiiiil law

and expiration of a criminal statute by its ownforee,insofar as their
effects are concerned. In absolute-repeal, the crinie is obliterated,
and the stigma of conviction ofan accused for violation of'the penal
law before its repeal is erased; '.['he eXpiration of a penal law by its
own force does not have that effect.181 ·' · ·
10.40. · Effect of repeal of municipal charter. 1

In the absence of a· provisiontothe contrary, the - superseding
of the old charter by a new one has' the effect· of abolishing the g
offices under the old charter. The general rule is thaf the repeal i
of a charter destroys all offices under it, and puts mi· end to the I
functions ofthe incumbents, Thus, theconversion of a municipality f
into a city by the passage of a charter or a statute to that effect has i
the effect of abolishing.all municipal offices then existing_µn!;Ier the s
old municipality, save those excepted iii the charter itself'.182 I
a
10.41. Repeal or nullity of ~pealing Iaw, effect of. o
t
When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself m
repealed, the law .first repealed shall not be' thereby revived unless r
'expressly so provided. Thus, the express repeal of B.P. Big. 395, d
which repealed Sec. 1 of P.D; No. 666 declassifying the ship building c
and ship repair industry as a public utility, by E;O. No. 226 did not p
revive Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 666, as said executive order did not provide
otherwise.w
e
Where a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will a
have no effect of repealing the former statute. The former or old n
statute contiiiues to remain in force.w p
s
t
i
t
;·. I~
mkig'Beng v. Conmrlssioner ~f Iml:nigration,100 Phil. SOl (1957);

182Mendenilla v. Omandia, G.R. No, 17803, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 536. 4
183JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v, CA, G.R. No.124293, November 20, 2000, 137
SCAD838.
184Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 (1931).
all private rights must be determined and all public authority ad-
ministered. s ·
11.02. Origin and history of the Philippine Constitutio~s.

The present Philippine Constitution ·is what is commonly
known as the 1987 Constitution, which is a r~vi.sion ofthe 1931$ and
1973 Constitutions. 'WblI~ the ·.new'' 'Constitution:. has superseded
the 1935 and 197$ Constitutions, a number of the provisions of the
latter were re-enacted in the 1~87 Constitution. ·
How the 1935 Constitution came aboutis explained in a
case: "By the AC;t of Congress (of the United States) -of March
24, 1934, popularly k;noWI1 as the fydings~McDuili.e L~w,. the
people of the Philippine Isl;:i:nds were ~uthotjz~d to adopt
a coru,;titution,. sµl:)ject to the ~ond,i~io:ns . and qualifi.catfolls
prescribe1 in.said.Act, T!>t~ law required thiie ~~tµic~steP~for
the adoption of t}ie constitution, The first w~s the drafting and
approval of the. conf!titut~on by the constitutional convention
authorized to be called, .under the' Act; the. second was ..the
certification by the President of the Uilited Stat~s that the
constitution so drafted and. approved . conformed . with th~
provisions of the. same, Act; and the third was the· ~atification
of the constitution by. the people of the Philippine Islands at
an election or: plebiscite called . for the purpose of ratifying
or rejecting the same. On. July 30, 1934, the constitutional
convention Il1-et for the purpose of drafting . a constitution
and the constitution subsequently drafted was approved. b;
the convention on February 8, .1935. The constitution was
submitted to the President of the United States on: March 18
1935; and on March. 23, 1935, the President certified that th~
Constitution conformed substantially withthe provisions of the
Act ofCongress approved March 24; 1934. On May 14, 1935,
the-Constitution was ratified by the people."•
On the other hand, the 1973 Constitution was adopted in re-
sponse to popular clamor for meaningfulchangesin the fundamen-
tal law to meet mounting problems of the country. Accordingly, "on
March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No.
2, which wasamended by Resolution No. 4, of said body, adopted on
June 17, ;~67, calling a convention to propose amendments to the
"Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 78 SCAD 764, 267 SCRA 408 (1997).
'People v. Linsangan, 62 Phil. 646; 648-649 (1935).
.
I.
and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves."• It has

also been said that the Philippine Constitution has one fundamental
purpose, which is to protect and enhance the people's· interests, as
a nation collectively and as persons individually. The interpretation
of the Constitution should: be done with a view to realizing this.
fundamental objective.•
11.04. Constitution construed lls enduring for ages.

A constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigen-
cies of a few years but is to endure through a long lapse of ages; the
events of which are locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Provi-
dence,> It governs the life of the people not only at
the time of its
framing but far into the Indefinite future. It is neither spinflexible•
nor immobile as to bar the adoption of novel and unorthodox mea-
sures. It is adaptable to various Crisis of human affairs. It embodies
not only rules for the passing hour, but principles for ail expanding
future as well,» It is. something solid, permanent and subatantial.
Its stability protects the rights, liberty 'and property of the rich ·an:a
the poor alike~12 · · · ·
A constitution should be construed in the light of what actually

is, a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also
the unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged. from the
time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic
process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive
and not static,» Its construction ought not to change With emergencies
or conditions." Nor should a constitution be construed to inflexibly
identify its text with the circumstances that irispii-ed its adoption,
for that would make it incapable ofresponding to the needs of the
future. Neither should it be interpreted narrowly or pedantically, for
8Gold
Creek Mining Corj>. v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259; 264 (1938); People v.
Derilo, 271 SCRA 633 (1997). ,
9
Acar v. Ros!li, G.R. No, 21707, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 625.
1°Comniissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 20812, September
22, 1967, 21SCRA180 .•
11J.M.
Tuas\f'li ee«, Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. 21064, Feb-
ruary 18, 1970,,3iSCRA 413. ·
12{].S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
13Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao; Inc. v; Land Registration
Commission, 102 Phil. 596 (1957).
14U.S.
v. Ang Tang Ho, supra.
that it may-have in common. Its words should be given their ordinary th

meaning except where technical terms-are employed."21 di
pr
It is a well-established rule thatthe 'language of the constitu- R
tion, as much as possible, should be understood in the sense it has
in common use and that the wordsIn constitutional provisionsare
to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are ge
employed= - th
pr
Where the Constitution - does not specifically define the in
terms used therein, they should be construed in their general arid
c
ordinary sense. Thus, since Sec. 7, Art. XIII of the Constitution
does not provide· a definition of the term "subsistence fishermen" in
the provision which states that "the State shall protect the rights g
of subsistence fishermen, especially Of local communities, to the re
preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both in
inland and offshore" and· such "protection shall extend· to offshore ru
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion," 1
the term shouldbe understood in its general and-ordinary sen~e, to a
refer to those whose catch yields are the irreducible minimum for o
their livelihood.» - · t
In Ordillo v. Commission on Elections» the issue raised is c
whether the sole province. of Ifugao can, validly, be constituted the a
Cordillera Autonomous Region under Section 15,, Articl~ X of .the u
1987 Constitution, which states that "There shall.be created autono- c
mous regions in Muslim Mindanao and, in the Cordilleras consisting "
of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographlqalare~s<sh~ng C
common and distinctive historical, !iDd 'cultural h;~ritage, economic c
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the a
framework of this Constitution and. the natjonaJ, soverei~tY as well n
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the' Philipj>mes.'j In an- c
swering the issue in the negative, the Court ruled that the keywords n
- provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas.connote
that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. In
its ordinary sense, "region" means two or more provinces, Following
the rule that the language of the Constitution, as much as possible,
should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that
_____ 21
_...._.,,. _.,/ ,.(.
People,.v. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633, 668 (1997); Occefia v.- Commission on Elec-
tions, supra. '
22Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997).
230rdillo
v. Commission on Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1992).
24Supra.
the term "Batasang Pambansa," which means the regular national

assembly, found in many sections of the 1973:Constitution refers to
the regular, notto the.interim,BatasangPambansa.29
Words which have acquired. a technical meaning before they
are used in the constitution must.be taken in that sense when such
words as thus used- are construed. It may be presumed that what the
members of the constitutional convention. had in· mind when they
drafted the constitution are the well-known technical meanings
of the words then prevailing; indeed, certain expressions which
appear in the constitution are obviously technical, and where such
words have such use prior to. the adoption of the constitution, it is
presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used
such expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. 30
' ' ' /
11.06.. A.ids
.
to . construction,
. 1
generally.
.
Apart from the language of the constitution as the primary

and intrinsic aid to constitutional construction, . courts likewise
resort to such extraneous aids as the history or realities existing
at the time of the adoption of the constitution, proceedings of the
convention, changes in phraseology, prior laws andjudicial decisions,
- contemporaneous constructions, and consequences of alternative
interpretations, to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or
purpose of the provision being construed.
It has been held that the most important single factor in
determining the intention ofthe people from whom the constitution
emanated is the language in which it is expressed. The imperfections
of language, however; as a vehicle for conveying meanings·result in
ambiguities that must be resolved by 'resorting to extraneous aids
for discovering the intent of the framers. One of the more important
of these is a consideration of the history of the times when the
provision was adopted. The debates of the constitutional convention,
contemporaneous construction and practical interpretation by the
legislative and executive departments, especially 'iflong continued,
may . be resorted to resolve, but not to create, ambiguities.
Consideration of the consequences' flowing from alternative
constructions of d9ubtful provisions constitutes an important
interpretative devite. The purposes of many of the broadly phrased
29Lozada
v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 59068, January 27, 1983, 120
SCRA337.
30Krivenko
v. Register of'Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
The existing realities that confronted the framers of the

Constitution can help unravel the intent •behind a constitutional X
provision. Thus, what otherwise is a vague constitutional provision
may be clarified by a resort to the realities then-existing. For instance,
to what does the term "incumbent President" in Section 3; Article
XVII on the transitory provisions of the 1973 Constltutionrefer?
The Court in Aquino v. Commission on. Elections» inquired into the
factual setting of the provision in resolving the question, thus:
"The next issue is whether he (President Ferdinand E.

Marcos) is the incumbent President of the Philippines within the
purview of Section 3 of Article XVII on the transitory provisions
of the new or 1973 Constitution. As heretofore stated, by Virtue
of his re-election in 1969, the term of Presidenf:M:Af..cosunder
/
the 1935 Constitution
' . ' .. ·
was to te'rininate on December 30. 1973
. ' 'i-.
'•i'. ··: .• --: - .. '· : . .·_- . ' - .•
The new Constitution 'was approved· by the Constitutional

Convention/on November 30, 1972,,still duiini his in~bency.
Beingthe onlyincumbent~iesident()fthe Philippines at the tini~
of the· approval of the .new Constitution by the Constitutional
Convention, the Constitutional Convention .had nobody in
mind except President Ferdinand E. Marcos who shall initially
convene the interim Assembly. It was the incumbent President
Marcos alone who issued Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081
on September 21, 1972 arid issued orders and decrees as well
as instructions and performed other acts as President prior to
the approval. on November 30, 1972 of the new Constitution
by the Constitutional Convention and prior to its ratification
on January 17, 1973 by the people. Consequently, since
President Marcos was the only incrimbent President at the
time, because his term under the 1935 Constitution has yet to
expire on December 30, 1973, the Constitutional Convention, in
approving the new Constitution, had in mind only him when in
Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the new Constitution it provided
that all the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions and
acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President
shall be part of the law of the land.'>
In his co~cu;ging opinion in the Aquino case, Justice Antonio
put the r~.e this way: "The only rational way to ascertain the
""G.R. No. 40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275 (1975).

3762
SCRA 296-297.
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not; unless other-

wise provided in this. Constitution, hold any other office or employ-
ment during their tenure," In holding that Executive Order No. 284
violates said constitutional provision and is therefore null and void,
the Court examinedthe history of the times, the conditions under
which the constitutional provision was framed, and its object. It held
that before the adoption of the constitutional provision "there was a
proliferation of newly-created: agencies; instrumentalities and gov-
ernment-owned and controlled corporations created by presidential
decrees and other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head or
sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries, emolu-
ments, per diems, allowances and other prerequisites of office. Most
of these instrumentalities have remained up to the present." "This
practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government
soon led to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took advan-
tage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In fact, the hold-
ing of multiple offices. in government was strongly denounced on the
floor of the Batasang Pambansa. This condemnation came in reac-
tion to the published report of the . Commission on Audit, entitled
'1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations, Self-Governing Boards and Commissions'
which carried as its Figure No. 4 a 'Roster of Membership Govern-
ing Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations Eis
of December 31, 1983.m "It was therefore quite inevitable and in
consonance , with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that
the 1986 Constitritional Commission, convened as it was after the
people successfully unseated former President Marcos, should draft
into its proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration
which are envisioned to remedy, if not correct; the evils that fiow
from the holding of multiple governmental offices and employment."
''Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies·
of the constitritional provisions-in question, the intent of the framers
ofthe Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the Presi-
dent and his official family 'insofar as holding other offices or em-
ployment in the government or elsewhere is concerned." "Moreover
such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13 Article VIi
with other pfo~ions of the Constitrition on the disqualifications of
certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or
employment. Under Section 13, Article VI, (N)o Senator or Member
of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or em-
ployment in the Government ... " Under Section 5(4), Article XVI,
'for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office i

or position during his tenure.' Surely, to say that the phrase 'unless a
otherwise provided inthis Constitution-fcund in Section 13, Article a
VII has reference to Section 7, par. (1) of Article IX-B would render
meaningless the specific provisions of the Constitution authorizing 1
the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet, and to act
as President without relinquishing the Vice-Presidency where the
President shall not have been chosen or fails to qualify. Such absurd n
consequence cart be avoided only by interpreting the two provisions t
under consideration as one, i.e., Section 7; ·par. (1) of Article IX-B H
providing the general· rule and the other, i.e., Section 13, Article i
VII as constituting the exception thereto. In the same manner must r
Section 7, par. (2) of Article IX~B be construed vis-a-vis Section d
13, Article VII." "It is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction· that no one provision of the Constitution is to be e
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all i
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject areto be brought o
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes t
of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should c
be considered and interpreted together ·as· to effectuate· the. whole t
purpose of the Constitution and 'one section is not to be allowed to t
defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be d
made to stand together." "In other words, the court must harmonize t
them, if practicable, and must lean-in favor ofa construction which w
will render every word. operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory."
"Since the evident purpose of the framers of the .• _ 1987
Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President,
Vice-President, members. of the Cabinet, their deputies and T
assistants. with respect to holding multiple government pffices. or
employment in the government during their tenure, the .exception
to this prohibition must be read with, equal severity. On its face,
the language of'.Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it
must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation of the privilege of holding multiple government offices or
employment. Verily, whenever the language used in the constitution
is prohibitory, it ia'to be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivorlaJ.i':fiegation. ·The phrase 'unless otherwise provided
in this· Constitution; nrust be given a literal interpretation· to refer
to only those particular instances cited in the Coiistitution itself, to
wit: the Viee-Presidentbeingappointed as a member of-the Cabinet
under Section 3, par. (2), ArticleVII; or acting as President in those
courts shall be fixed by law'' and "during their continuance in office,

their salary shall not .be decreased," the Court ruled: "The debates,
interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission
disclosed that the true intent of'the framers.of the 1987 Constitution,
adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary
taxable. The ascertainment ofthat'intent is butin keeping-with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent
of the framers of the organic· law- and of the people adopting should
be given effect. The· p:ririlary task in constitutional eonstruction is 'to
ascertain and thereafterassure the realization: of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in'the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifyfng' theConstitution
were guided mainly by the .explanation. offered by th«r' framers. x
x x It would be strained. construction to read into the. provision I
an exemption in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional I
Commission. "48 · ·
I.
I'
Luz Farms v. Secretary ofthe Department of Agrarian Reform»
~
illustrates the rule that the debates. or proceedings may be resorted
to, to ascertain the intent' of the framers of the Constitution as to
the meaning of a phrase or word used therein. The Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 includes the land used for raising
livestock, poultry and swine within the term "agriculture" as the
word is employed in Section 4, Artiele XIII 'of the Constitution as the
coverage of the agrarian land reform. The question raised is whether
the term "agriculture" as used in the Constitution embraces raising
of livestock, poultry and, swine .. In ascertaining the meaning of the
term, the Court ruled:
"Ascertainment of the meaning of the provision of the

Constitution begins with the Ianguage of the document itself.
The words' . used. in the Constitution. are to be given their
. ordina.ry mealrlp.g except y;her~ technical terms are employed
in which case tJie significance thus attached to them prevails
(J.M.Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA
413 [1970]).
It is, ~~l'lerally .held that; in construing constitutional
provi~~mis ,, which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning,
46N'itafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284, 291-292 (1987);

see also Sarmiento v. Mison; 156 SCRA 549 (1987). ·
•1192scRA 51, 56-58 (1990).
within a province, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the Ordinance appended

to the 1987 Constitution,' Said Section 2 reads: "The Commission
on Elections· is· hereby - empowered to: make minor -adjustments of
the- reapportionment herein made," In ascertaini:hg the meaning of
the phrase "minor adjustments," the Court relied on the proceedings
of theConstitutional Commission, which revealed the intent that
the phrase "niinot~itdjl:lstroents" refers only to an instance where a
municipality which has been forgotten is included in the enumeration
of the composition ilfii ooligtessiorial district and not to thetransfer
of one municipality from one district- to another' which has been
considered a substantive or major adjustfuent. Being possessed of
only the power to make minor adjustments, and what .it decreed
was a substantive adjustment, the Court declared the resolution as
void. , I
However, while historical discussion on the floor of the

constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive,«
The proceedings of the convention· are less conclusive of the proper
construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings
of the proper construction of a statute, since in the latter case, it is
the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former,
courts are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through
the discussions-and deliberations of their representatives,w
While it is permissible to consult the debates and proceedings
of the constitutional conventionin order to arrive at the-reason and
purpose of'theresulting' Constitution, resort theretomay be had only
when the other guides fail as said proceedings are powerlessto vary
the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention are of value as showing the views
of the individual members, and asindicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the Views of the large majority
who did not talk, much less of the mass of the citizens whose votes
at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. The
proper interpretation depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than the fi.amers' understanding thereof,"
'"J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land 'i'en~e Administration, G.R. No. 21064, Feb-
ruary 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
"°Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
•1Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991).
legal hermeneutics, their conclusions mi;ty not, simply on account of

membership in the convention, be a shade better in the eyes of the
1~~ . . ; . ' '
11.10. Previous laws andjudicial rulings.

A constitution shall be held to 'be prepared and adopted in
reference to existing statutoryla.Ws, upon'the provisions of which in
detail it must depend to be sefin·a praCtkfil operation. Courts are
a
bound to presume that the people adopting constifu.tfon familiar are
with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its
provisions relate and' upon which,they express their judgment and
opinion in its adoptien.s.Couzts should take into consideration such
1
laws ·in_ construing the constitution. aa
Similarly, the framers of th~ ,constitution are presumed to be
aware of prevailing judicial docttjp.es or rulings concerning which
are the subject of constitutiona,l provisions, Courts.may pr~per~y take
such rulings into account in coni;itrui.Jlgthe constitutional provision
involved. Thus, if theframe17s of the constitution adopted a principle
different from what .the courts had previously enunciated, they did
so to overrule said.principle,«
11.11. Changes in phraseology.

Provisions. ~f the constitution ,are the result of prop?~als that
had undergone a. number of revisions and chariges in phraseology
before their final adoption. These changes in phraseology may be
inquired into to ascertain the intent or purpose ofthe provision as
:finally approved= However, the mere deletion -ef a phrase from a
proposed provision before its final· adoptionis not detenninative of
any conclusion. It could have been done becausethe framers of the
constitutionconsidered it superfluous. Deletions inthe preliminary
drafts of the convention are, at best; negative guides which
""Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).

37See
Dissentin~ Opinion of Justice Ozaeta, Perfecto v. Meer, 86 Phil. 567
(1950). t', ,,
33Co~sioner
of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 20812, September
22, 1967, 21SCRA180; Kepner v. UiS., 11 Phil 669 (1904). .
9Torres v. Tan Chim, 69 Phil 516 (1940); Talaroc v. Uy; 92 Phil. 62 (1962).
60J>hilippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Mathay, G.R. No. 25554, October
4, 1966, 18 SCRA 300.
and not mandatory, for to construe it.as mandatory is to make such

judges lose jurisdiction. over the cases in the event they fail to de-
cide them within the period, which consequence will cause greater
injury to the public than when it is interpreted to be merely direc-
tory. For as the Court explained, "to hold that noncompliance by the
courts with the aforesaid provision would result in loss of jurisdic-
tion, would make the courts, through which conflicts are resolved,
the very instrument to foster unresolved causes by reason merely of
having failed to render a decision within the allowed term,'' which
"absurd situation could not have been intended by the framers of our
fundamental law."88
11.13. Constitution
. construed as a. whole.
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in
isolation from the rest. Rather; the constitution must be interpreted
as a whole, and apparently, conflictingprovisions should be reconciled
and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force
and effect.69 In other words, the constitution should be construed to
the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but
in conjunction with· all. other· provisions;' unless the contrary is so
clearly provided.10
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that
no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject ·should be· considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made
to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them,
if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory."
,
-------..;.- ,.~.
8&Marcelinov.·Cruz, supra.
""Ang-.Apgco v. Castillo, G.R. No. 17169; November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 619
(1963); Peralta v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 47771, March 11, 1978, 82
SCRA30.
70Chiongbian
v. De Leon, 82 Phil. 771 (1949).
71Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,· 194 SCRA 317 (1991).
11.14. Mandatory or directory •. ·

The established rnle is that con'.stitutiorial provisions are to be
construed as mandatory, unless
lifilipr~ss pt6~si0ri or by.1letessary
implication, a
different iiitenti.ori 'is maitlfested.:· The 'difference
between a mandatory and dfyeciO:r.y provisioil is often determined
on grounds ofexpediency, the reason being thad~ss injury results
to the general· public by disregarding than by e~orcing the letter· of
the fnildamental law ,74 • · • ·· · •
. '
It has been held that f'in the interpretation of Constitutions,
questions arise as to whether particular· sections are mandatory
or directory. The courts usually hesitate to .declare that a
constitutional provision is directory merely in view of the tendency
of the legislature· to disregard provisions which· are not/said to be
mandatory. Accordingly, it is the general ruleto regard constitutional
provisions as mandatory arid not to leave any discretion to the will
of a legislature to obey· or to disregard them. This presumption as
to mandatory quality is usually followed unless it is unmistakably
manifest that the provisions-are intended to be merely directory. The
analogous rules distinguishing mandatory and directory statutes are
of little value in this connection and are rarely applied in passing
upon the provisions of a constitution." "So strong is the inclination
in favor of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that
it has even been said that neither by the courts nor by any other
department of governnient 'may any provision of the- Constitution
be regarded as merely directory; out that each and every one of its
provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without
reference to the; rules distinguishing ·between the directory and
mandatory statutes."75
The reason why provisions of the constitution, are generally
regarded as mandatory is that in a constitution, the.sovereign itself
speaks and is laying down rules which for the time being at least
are to control alike the government and the governed, Its provisions
are binding upon all departments of the. government.76 However,
the fact that the legislaturefailedto-enact-the necessary legislation
as required by the constitution· does not 'make the legislature
;
I/~
------'-
Marcellilo v. Cruz, G.R. No. 42428, March
74
18, 1983, 121 SCRA 51; Vargas v.
Rillaroza, 80 Phil. 279 (1948).
75Ta:fiada
v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, Footnote 11, pp. 1088-1089 (1957), quoting
11 Am. Jur. 686-687.
76Vargas
v. Rillaroza, 80 Phil. 279 (1948).
Moreover, there is merit in the argument 'of' the intervenor

Province of Batangas that, if indeed the framers intended to allow
the enactment .of statutes making the release of IRA conditional
instead of automatic, then Article, X, Section 6. of the· Constitution
would have . been worded differently. Instead of reading "Local
government units sh.ail _hape q just share, as determined by law, in
the natiOnal taxes . which. shall be automatically released to 'them"
(italics supplied), it would have read as follows, so the Province of
Batangas posits:
Local government units shall have a just share, as deter-
mined by law, in the national taxes which shall be [automati-
cally] released to them as provided by law, or
. Local governmentunits shall have a just share" in the na-
tional taxes which shall be [automatically] released to them as
provided by law, or
Local government units shall have ajust share, as de-
termined by law, in the national taxes which shall be auto-
matically released to them subject to exceptions Congress may
provide. (Italics supplied)
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the . Constitution,
only the just· share of local governments is qualified by the
.words "as determined by law," and not the release thereof,
the plain irriplication is that Congress is not authorized by the
Constitution t9 hinder or impede the automatic release of the
IRA.
Indeed, that Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution did bind
the legislative just as much as the executive branch was presumed
in the ruling of this Court in the case of The. Province of Batangas v.
Romulo which is analogous in many respects to the one at bar.
In Batangas, thepetitioner therein challenged the constitu-
tionality of certain provisos of the GAAs for FY 1999, 2000, and 2001
which set up the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LG-
SEF). The LGSEF was a portion of the IRA which was to be released
only upon a finding pf the Oversight Committee on Devolution that
the LGU concefu.ed had compliedwith the guidelines issued by said
committee .. -This Court measured the challenged legislative acts
against Article X, Section 6 and declared them unconstitutional - a
ruling which presupposes that the legislature, like the executive, is
mandated by said constitutional ·provision to ·ensure that the just
national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be determined by law;

and (3) the "just share" shall be automatically released to the
LGUs.
xxx
Webster'.s Third New International Dictionary defines
"automatic" as "involuntary either wholly or to a major extent
so that any ~ctivity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex
nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of
an automaton.". Further, the word "automatically" is defined
as "in an autom1;1tlc. manner: without thought or conscious
intention." Being "automatic," thus, connotes something
mechanical, spontaneous .and perfunctory.xx x" (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) I
Further on, the Court held:
To the Court's mind, the entire process involving the
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally
impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the mA or "just share"
of the LGUs irr the national taxes, To subject its distribution
and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms
· uriilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time
to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs
of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the
release nm; automatic, a :flagrant violation of'the constitutional
and statutory mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs "shall
be automatically released to them." The LGUs are; thus, placed
at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
Where the law, the Constitution in. this case, is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says,
and courts have no choice but to see to it that the· mandate is
obeyed. Moreover, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the
.use of the word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. Its use in
a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)" " 1"
While "automatic release" implies that the just share of the

local governments determined by law should be released to them
as a matter of course, the GAA provisions, on the other hand,
It bears stressing, however, that in light· of the proviso in

Section 284 of the Local Government Code which reads:
Provided, That in the event that the national government

incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of
the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation
of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and· Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and
subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both
Houses of Congress and the· presidents of the "Uga," to make
the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment
of local government units b:ut in no . case shall the allotment
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third. fiscal year pr~ceding the
current fiscal year: Provided, further, . That in the first year of
the effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in
addition to the' thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment
which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential
public services, be entitled to receive the a.mount equivalent to
the cost of'devolved personal services. (Underscoring supplied),
the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of
the mA is, as held in Batangas:
... If the national intemalrevenue collections for the
current fiscal year .is less than 40 percent of the collec-
tions of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what
should be automatically released. shall be a proportionate
amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The
adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis de-
pending on the actual collections of national internal rev-
enue taxes for the quarter of the current :fis~al year. xx x
A final word. This Court recognizes that the passage of
the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable
intent to "lower the. budget deficit 'in line with prudent fiscal
management." The pronouncement in Pimentel, however,
must be echoed: "[T]he rule of law requires that even the best
intentions. JI?:Yi!lt be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitutioil and the law. Verily, laudable purposes ~ust be
carried out by legal methods."
unless made with the assistance.of counseV Thereafter, in People

v. Luuendino, the Court through M:r· Ju~tice Florentino P. Feliciano
vigorously taught: 'x x ·x T!le ?6~fqn~
_tha(a:h, '¢iqou#~~lep~ jvaiver
of the right to counsel is not tci'be'given leg,N:. ~ff~ct :Vta'sJ'iii.tially a
judge-made one and was first announced on 26April1983 mMorales
v. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985inPeople v. Galit. xx x.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventtially becamepart.ofSection
12(1) of the 1987 Constitution;·:that,.doctrine1aff<f>.rds no comfors-te
appellant Luvendino for the <retjuiretiients-an.d restrictions outlined
in Morales and Galit have no· rretroaetive effect and do not reach
waivers made . prior to ·26 April 198:3:. the: date: of-promulgation of
Morales.?»
Illustrative of the rule df :ret~oactivity is Co v. ,Elecfotal
Tribunal= where 'the Court'h~i'd that Sec. f, par. s, .Art(·rv of th~
1987 Constitution, which stat~~ that ''Th6sei born before Janu'aey
17, 1973, of Filipino mother~, wno elecfPhilipphi~:~itizenship upon
reaching the age of majorify". are
citi.iem~' of the 'Philippines, has
retroactive effect, the' clear "intent the' framers as shown of by the
language of the provision being't~ make it llht bnly prospective but
also retroactive. · · ' · · · ' · · ·
; . ... • . . . - : . ' .•· , _- <[ ,. : . • ..
11.16. Applicability
. '
.of raj.es
'. of statutocy
. '·'·"'··
construction
.. ,.
• '
A good number oftherules of,statutoiy construction areap-

plicable to the construction of the -eonstitution. In appropriate cases,
they may be employed in construing constitutional.provisions,"
Sarmiento· v. Mison» is· a good exampfo~m which the: Supreme
Court applied a
number Of rules '.of>stlitutC>ry · construetion iii
construing a constitutional :pro.Vision: Thi:! issue-raiseddn.thiscase
is whether or notthe appointment of'a Commissi0ner16fCustoms fa
·subject to•cOnfirmation by the C61n.Drissi0non Appointments. 'The
Court ruled:
"Thls case assumes a~1fo~ sigmnc~c~p~ca~!)(;l,\t bottom
, . . · line, it involves a confilc~ bei,ween tw~ Ci). great. ~e;part~~~ts
of government, the Executive and Legislative Departments. It
also occurs early in the life of the 1987 Constitution .
(' J·~
•
-. ,:_,.ti
»tua; pp. 258•260.

82199 SCRA 692 (1991).
83Marcelino v. Cruz, G.R. No; 42428, March 18, 1983, · 121 SCRA 51.
84156 SCRA 549 (1987).
614 . -. STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION:
whom the President shall appoint. The,s:e-fo:ur (4):groups, to

which we will hereafter refer from time to time; are;
First. the heads o(the executive dep~ents, am-
bassadors, other public ministers and conl!!uls, 9fficers of
the armed forces from the ~ill 'of colonel or navalcap-
tain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in
him in this Constitution; ·
Second, all 9ther o:iiice:d! of the Gove:rn.riient whose
appointments arenot otherwise-provided fo:rby law;
Third, those whom ih.e President may be authorized
by'la~ to appoi.ht;' · ·
. Fourth, ~ffi~er~ lower in rank whose ~.poµitment
the Congress may py law yest in the fre~ide:rlt alone.
The· first group. of offiffers· is clearly appointed with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of
such officers are initiatedbynomination and, if the noniination
is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Presi-
dent appoints.
The second, third rih.d •fourth groupsof officers are the
present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the
President With or Without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointnients? By following the accepted rule
in constitutional and statutory construction· that an express
enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
would follow that only those appointments to positions ex-
pressly stated in the qrs~ group reqltjre the consent (confirma-
tion) of the Commission on Appointments. Butwe need not rely
solely on this basic rule of constitutional construction. We can
refer to the historical background as well as to the records of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission to. determine, with more
accuracy, if not precision,. the intention of the framers of the
1987 Constitution and the. people adopting it, on whether the
appointments by the President, under the second, third and
fourth groups, require the consent (confirmation) of the Com-
mission pn_,~ppointments. Again, in this task, the following
advice of Mr. Chief Justice J. Abad Santos· in Gold Creek is
apropos:
1.
In deciding this point; it should be borne in mind that

a constitutional provision must be presumed to have been
However, the Batasang Pambansa may-by law vest in the

Prime Minister, members. 'of'the Cabinet, the Executive
Committee;· Courts, Heads of Agencies, Commissions,
and Boards· the power to appoint inferior officers in their
respective offices." ·
Thus, in the 1935 Constitution, almost all presidential

appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the
CommissiOn'onAppointmeiits_,Itis now a sad part of our political
history that the powe:r·ofcoirlinriation by tli~ Commission on
Appointments, under the 1935 Constitution, transformed that
commission, many times, into a venue of "horse-trading'' and
similar malpractices;
On th~ other hand, the 1973 Consti~tion, /~nsistent
with the ,a~thoritariaJl pattern in. which it was molded and
remolded . py - suc~i;is~ve, ari;t~ndn;terits, placed the absolute
power of appo:i,nhpen:tiil, the. President with hardly any check
.on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two (2) extremes, one, in the 1935 Consti-
tution and the rither, in the 1973 Constitution; it is not difficult
for the Court to state that the framers of the 1987 Constitu-
tion and the people adopting it, struck a "middle ground" by
requiring.the consent (con:fir,ination) of the Commission on Ap~
pointments. for the first group of appointments and leaving to
the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of
other officers, i.e.,.t;hose in the second and third groups as well
as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
support this conclusion. The original text of Section 16, Article
·. VII, as proposed by the Comrilittee on the Executive of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, read as follows:
"'Section 16. The president shall nominate and,

with the consent of a Commission oii Appointments,
shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, ambassadors,• other public ministers and consuls,
or oflicer»'of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or na"val captain and all other officers 'of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment
otherwise provided for by law :and those whom he may be

authorized by law to appoint ... xx x" (Bmphasis.sup-
plied.) ·
With particular reference to the word "also," implies
that the President shall "in: like manner" appoint the officers
mentioned in said secondsentence, inother words, the President
shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence .
in the· same manner· as. he appoints .offleers mentioned in the
first sentence, that is, by nomination and with the consent
(confirmation) of ~e Commission on 4;I>PQintments.
Amicus curiae's reliance on the word "also" in said second
sentence is not necessarily supportive of the conclusion he
arrives at. For, as the Solicitor General argues1 the word
"also" could mean "in addition; as well; besides, too" (Webster's
International Dictionary, p. 62, 1981 edition)<which meanings
could, on the contrary, stress that the word "also"in said second
sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating
and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence,
can appoint without such consent (confirmation) the officers
mentioned in the second sentence.
Rathe~ than Iimit the area of consideration to the possible
meanings of the word "also" as used in the context of said
second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance
from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by
thePresident and .appointments, whereas, the second sentence
speaks. oruy. ofappointm.e:nt by the President. And, this use of
different language in two (2) sentences proximate to each other
underscores, in linewith Judge· Learned Hand's observation
that "words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition" but, more
so, because the recorded proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission clearly and expressly justify such differences.
As a result of the innovations introduced in Sec. 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, there Eire officers whose
appointments. require no confirmation of fhe Com.nrissionon
Appointments; even ifsuch officers may be higher in rank,
compared-ta-some officers whose appointments have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appoin,tments under the
first sentence of the same Sec. 16, Art.VII. Thus, to illustrate,
the appointment of the Central· Bank Governor requires no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, even if he
that, as to lower-ranked officers, the Congress may byfaw vest

their appointment in the /President, in the courts, or in the
heads. of the various departments, agencies; commissions, or
boards in thegovernment.iNo reason, however, is submitted
for the use of the wo;rd "alone" :iD. said third sentence. ·
The Court is ;not impressed:by'both arguments. It is of the
considered>opinion; after a careful study of the deliberations
of the 1986 Constitutional Oommission; that the use of the
word "alone" after the: word "Presideat" in said third sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more .than, anything else, a slip or
lapses in draftsmanship. It will be recalled that, in. the 1935
Constitution, the following provision appears at the end of par.
3, Section 10, Article VIrthereof- r
"x x x; but the Congress may by law vkst the ap-

pointment bf 'inferior officers, in the President alone, in
the courts; or in the: heads of departments." [Emphasis
supplied]. .
The ab~ye provision .in the 1935 Constitution appears
immediately after the provisions which .makes practically
all presidential appointments subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, thus - ·. ·. ,
. i'3.: . Th~ P;esiderit'~hall
nominate and with the con-
sent of the Commission .on Appoint~,ents,,shaJl. appoint
the heads of the executive departments and,.p~eaus, offi-
cers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and
Air Forces. from the rank of captain orcommander, and
allothsr'offieers. Of the Government whose appointments
are not herefu.·provided for, and those whem he may be
authorized by' law to appoint; x xx"
Jn other· words, since the 1935 Constitution subjects, as
a general rule; presidential a:E>pointments to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments, the same 1935 Constitution
' saw fit; by way of an exception to such rule, to provide that
Congress m~y, however, by1awvest .theappointmentofinferior
officera :foqtiiy~eftt to "officer§ lower in .rank" referred-toin.ths
1987 Con8litiiti6n~. in the President alone , in the courts , or in
the heads of departments;
In the· 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed
out,'the clear andexprass intent of its framers was to exclude
the operation. of self-executing provisions, prescribe a practice to

be used for their enforcement,' provide a convenient remedy for· the
protection of the rights· securedor the.determination thereofzor place
reasonable safeguards around the.exercise of the right. The fact that
legislation may supplement and addtoorprescribe·a·penaltyfor the
violation of a self~executing•constitutionalprovision does not render
such a provision- ineffective in .the absence. of such legislation. The
omission from a constitution .of any express provision for a remedy
for enforcing a right or liabilitytis.not necessarily an indication that
it was not iritended to.be self"executing.87
The rule is that in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. Unless
the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the· Constitution
should be considered self-executing; as a contrary mle i\vould give
the legislature discretion to deterniine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. Theseprovisions would be subordinated to the will of
the lawmaking body; which could make them entirely meaningless
by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute,«
An example of a self-executing constitutional provision is Sec.
10, second par. of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which states
tha~ "in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos." In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,s9 the issue
raised in connecti?n with this constitutional provision, is· whether
in the sale at publicbidding of the majority ownership of the Manila
Hotel a qualified Filipino entity can match the winning ·bid of a
foreigner and be entitled to the award of the contract of sale thereof.
The resolution of the issue depends on whether the provision is self-
executing or non-self-executing which requires enabling legislation
to implement it, The Court ruled that the qualified. Filipino entity
must be given preference by granting it the option to match the
winning bid because the provision is self-executm'g, thus:
''On t)i~ other hand, Sec. io, second par., Art. XII of the
, 1987 Constitution is mandatory, positive command which
is completeIn itself and which needs no further guidelines
or im;pleme:riting laws or rules for its enforcement. Ftoci its
very wor¥Jhe''~r<>\7is_i,on does not require any ·l~W.siation to
87Manila
88lbid., Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 78 SCAD 764, 267 SCRA 408 (1997).
citing Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., pp. s~10.
8978
SCAD 764, 267 SCRA 408 (1997).
624 STATUTORYCONSTRUCTION
There are oerba legistratiolegie estanima; tuuiut magis valeat

quam pereat, ·
The Court in Francisco, Jr. u.House of Representatives [G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003], exi>fain.ti<i 'tile maxims of constitutional
construction, as follows: · · ·· · · · · · ·· ·
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant
petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution
itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional
construction.
First, uerba 'legie, that is, wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration/ this Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself'in our
search for its meaning, We do not of course.stop there, but
that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words
in which constitutional· provisions are couched. express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which. case _the ·significance ·thus attached
to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law
to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have iii common use. What
it says according to the text· of the provision to be con-
strued compels acceptance and negates the 'power of the
courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the fram-
ers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a
minimum.
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The
words of the Constitution-should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. And· so did this Court apply this
principle)n,Givil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary in this
wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction
is the intention underlying the provision under consider-
ation. Thus, it has been held that the Court in constniing
separated from all. the, others, to be considered alone, but

r
'
that an theprovisiotis;bearing-upon a particular subject

are -to· be brought· into View and to be so interpreted as to
effectuate the great·putposes of'the instrument, Sections
bearing.on a.partieular subject shouldbe considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of
the Oonstitation-and one 'section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, ifby;any·reasonable construction, the two
can be inade to standtogether. ·
In other words, the court must harmonize them if
. ' '
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative; rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.
.,.-, ·..
. I
/
If, however, the plain meaning of the word i~ not found
to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same
.· ·
v;
case of CiVilLiberties Union. Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded: · ·
Whileitis permissiblein this jurisdiction to consult

the debates.and proceediags.of the constitutional conven-
tion in order .to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution,. resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the'terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
nal
clear. Debates in the constituti0 convention "are of val-
ue as showing the views of the individual members, and
as indicatjng the reasons, for their votes, but they give us
nolight ~s tothe ;vt¢ws of the large Jl).ajority who did not
talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose
votes at the polls gave that instrumentthe force of funda-
mental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
from What appears upon its face." The proper interpreta-
tion therefore depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting-it than in the framers' understanding
thereof. '
11.19. Co:r;ist?I~iidnso~us. Constitutional provisions adopt-

ed 1? 1987Constitution.
Most provisions on police power, eminent domain, taxation and
on the Bill of Rights in the 1987 Constitutions, as well as in the i935
and 1973 Constitutions, were taken from or patterned after the US
ee,' office or agency, when such act or omission appears to

be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance,
any public official or employee ofthe_GOvermnen,t, or any
subdivision, agency or ~strumentaiitjr thereof, as well as
of any go\i'ernmell.t-owned or controlled corporation With
original charter, t6 perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, orto _st;op, prevent, and correct any abuse
or impropriety iii the performance of duties.
(3) ··'Direct th~officerconcenied'ili take' appropriate
action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, cen-
sure, or prosecution, ensure compliance therewith. and
(4)' Direct the officer concerned, iD: any appropriate
case, and· subjeet·h~ such. limitations as may be' provided
by law, to furnish: it with copies of documents relating to
contracts and transactions entered into by 'his office in-
volving the disbursement or use of publicfunds or prop-
erties, to the CqIJUni~s.io,n ,on Audit for appropriate and
report ariy in:eglllarjty .a~ion. ·· ·· · ·
- .' .· . ·... ~ : ·. . l.. . . .
· (5) ••·,Request' any government agency for assistance

and information necessary in the discharge of its respon-
sibilities, and to exarhliie, if necessary, pertinent records
and' documents. · ·
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation
when circumstances so warrant and With due prudence.
(7) 'p~tefnl~he the causesofinefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fyaud, and. corruption ill the Govern-
ment and make recommendations for their elimination
and the observance ofhigh stillidards. of ethics and effi-
ciency. · ·
(8) Promulgate its rules and procedure and exer-
cise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
.
as may he· provided by law.
'
The ;- ~n'.fuiie:i-iitioD. •· of these powers is· non-exclusive.

Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known a~ The
Ombudsman Act of .198~, on November 17, 1989 giving the
' Office ;S~ch o:t;ller powers that it may need to efficiently perform
the task given by the Constitution, viz:'
sibilities, and to examine, ff necessary', pertinent records

and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by· is investigation
of thEl:'matters mention'ed m paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and
(4) hereof, when circumstances sowarrant and with due
prudence: Prouided, 'That the Ombudsman under its rules
and regulations ;may' determine ·what cases may not be
made.public:Provided;'{Urihet, Thatany publicity issued
by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes 0finefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Govern-
ment, and make recommendations for their elimination
and the observance of high standards of ethics and effi-
. I
ciency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoe-
na duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation
or inquiry, including-the power to examine and have ac-
cess to bank. accounts and records;
(9) ' Ptimsh for contempt in accordance with the
Rules of Court and Under the same procedure and with
the same penalties providedtherein;
. . (101 Delegate to th~ Deputies, ·or its investigators
or rep~e~eA1;atives such authority or duty as shall ensure
the eff~ye•.exercise, or, performance of the powers, func-
tions, and duties herein or hereinafter. provided; ·
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for
the recovery of ill~gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after February 25, 1986. and the prosecution of
th:~ panie~·m.volved therem. x x i
0
. . .
In fine.the manifest intent ofth~ lawmakers was to bestow

the
on Office oft.he' Qmb-udsrtiahfuiladministrative disciplinary
aceo;rd
authority . in . with the constitutional deliberations.
Unlike the Qmh1,1dsriian-lik.e agencies 'of the past the powers
of which eaj;elJ,Ci;;a· no J,ilc:>re th.at), making findings of fact and
reco:pl,ll'.l~datiol1~;andthe Ombudsman: or Tanodbayan. under
tlie 19,73.Cc:>Jl8ijt\ltionvvho ~ay file .atid.prosecute criminal, civil
·.· or adriiiiristrative cases agrurist public officials and employees
only in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the
-. 1987 Constitution andR.~: No •. 6770 is intended to play a more
BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), ofArticle XI of

the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only "recom-
mend" the removal of the public official or employee found
to be at fault, to the public official concerned.
For their part, the Solicitor General and the· Office of
the Ombudsman argue that 'the word· "recommend" must be
taken in conjunction with thephrase "and ensure'compliance
therewith:" The proper interpretation of the Court's statement
in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the authority
to determine the administrative liability ofa public official or
employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office
or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In
other words, it m:erely concerns' the procedural aspect of the
Ombudsman's functions and not its jurisdiction. ·
We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents,
Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the
subject Oonstitutionalprovision. Firstly, a cursory reading of
Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure
of the complainant therein to present substantial evidence to
prove the charges of.the administrative case. The statement
that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at
best, merely an obiter. dictum and, as it is unsupported by
sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations
xx x [h]ence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this
Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Laja, where we emphasized that "the Ombudsman's order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer
or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is
actually mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the
penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we
also held - -
While
. ' Section
.
15(3). of RA 6770 states that the Om-
budaman -has the power to "recommend x· x x removal,
suspension, demotion x x x" of government officials and
~mployees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the
Ombudsman in the.alternative may "enforce its disciplin-
ary: authority as provided in Section 21" of RA 6770.
of civil service .laws; rules and regulations in administrative

proceedings.dnitiated+by the •DECS 'Secretary, In contrast,
-, herein respondentsMasing,andTayactac were administratively
charged ·m .letter-complainta' duly filed before the Officeof the
Ombudsman for Mindanao. The charges were_ for violations
of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as. the Cod~ of Conduct
and Ethical 'Standards for Public Officials ·and Employees,
collecting - unauthorised, .fees, failure to · remit authorized
fees, failure tQ account. f<ir~ pµblic funds, oppression, serious
misconduct, discoUJ.i;esy. in the , conduct of official duties, and
physical. or mental incapacity or dis~ility due to immoral or
vicious habits. In.short, the acts and omissions complained of
relate to, respondents,' conduct as public official and ~mployee,
if not to outright graftand corruption. '
Th.ti authority of ffi.:e' Officeof the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative mvestigatioiis is beyond cavil. ¥ the principal
and prjmazy co:inplafu.t$ and.ahi.on center against erring public
.: officers b.d employees: it is rliandated by-no less than Section
13(1),Article XI of the Constifution. In conjunction therewith,
Section 19 of R.A.' No: 677o·'grants to the Ombudsman the
- authority to act on an ad.Dnnis.trati'vecomplaints, viz:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. - The Ombuds-
man sh8.n act on all complaints relating, but not limited,
to acts or omissions whlch: - -
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or dis-
criminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an
agency's functions, though in accordance with law;
( 4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts;
'
(5) Are in the exercise· of discretionary powers but
for an imyroper purpose; or
~- _,,1. -· '
_ (6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administra-
tive investigations conducted by the Officeof the Ombudsman
-,
Article XI of ·our present 1987 · Constitution pro-

vides:
ARTICLE XI·
.ACCOUNTABILITY ~F PUBLIC (lFFICERS
SECTION 1. Public office is a public .trust, Public

officers ~d employe~{mµ,st.at-.all tj.p>.e~ be. accountable
to the people, . serVe them 'vvi,th utwq~t' responsibility,
integrity, l~ya}cy, ancl e.ffi,~iep.cy, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest live~: ·
SECTION 2. TheiPresident, the Vice~President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, the Members qtthe Con-
stitiitional Commissions, arid the· Ombudsman may be
removed fromoffice, on.impeaehmentfor, and conviction
of, culpable violation-of the. Constitution, .treason.. brib-
ery, gr.aft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other. public officers and employees may
be removed from office. as; provided bylaw; .but not by im-
peachment;
SECTION 3. (1) "The 'House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment. ·
(2) . A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed. by a,ny Member of the House, 'of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included i,n the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote
of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House
within sixty .session days from such referral, together
with . the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall
be calendared for consideration bythe House within ten
session days from receipt thereof .
•
"(3}' ~· A vote of at least one-third of fill the Members of
the House shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable
resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and- 16 of Rule V

of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress.are unconstitutional for violating the pro-
visions of Section 3,• Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the'second impeachment com-
plaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeach-
ment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require
this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an im-
peachable offense. Such a deterniination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the. sound discre-
tion of the legislation, Such an intent is clear from the delibera-
tions of the Constitutional Commission.
Although Section 2 of Article XI oftheConstitution enu-
merates si.X ~ounds f~r impeachment, two of these, namely,
other high crimes and b~trayal of public trust, elude a precise
definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find
no betikr -Way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of pub-
lic trust andother high crimes than by alluding to both posi-
tive and negative .examples· of both, without arriving at their
clearcut definition.or even a standard therefor, Clearly, the
issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under
Section 1, Article VIII.
xxx
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker
De Venecia; argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules do not'violateSeetion 3 (5) of Article
XI. of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initi-
ate" does not mean "to file"; that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it
is the House of'Representatives, as a collective body, which has
the exclusive pewer to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate col'ild'hot possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as
Section' 3 (2); Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be
accomplished in.3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives;
or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Finally, it should be noted that the· House Rule relied

upon by Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella.says ~at
impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee
votes. in favor of impeachment or when the. House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not
say "impeachment proceedings" are initia~d but r~t~~r ~e
"deemed initiated." The language is recogmtion that initiation
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an atte~pt to
postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) '
xxx
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is
of the same view as is Father Bernas, whowas al~o a member
of the 1986Constitutional Commission, that.the word "initiate"
as used in .Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding,
however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to
set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father
Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiateallcases of impeach-
ment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period
of one year, (Emphasis s~pplied) refers to tw? objects,
"impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding.
Father Bemas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence
is "impeachment case." The object In the second sentence is
"impeachment proceeding," Following the principle ofreddendo
singula singuilis, the tertn "cases" must be distinguished from
the term "pri>ceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controv4!rsy'ihat must be decided by the Senate; Above-quoted
:first,provisiOn provides that the House, by a vote of one-third
of all its members, ·can bring a case to the Senate. It is in
that sense that the· House has "exclusive power" to initiate
all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However,
proceedings," this-was met by a proposal to delete the line

on the ground that the vote of the House does not .initiate
impeachment proceeding 'but. rather the filing of a complaint
does. Thus the line was deleted and is not found in.the present
Constitution. ·
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall o;einitiated' against tlie same
official more than once WitlUtLa: period. of one year," it means
that no second verified coih:Pla.intmay be accepted and'referred
to the Committee on Justice for actlon, ·:By his eiplanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the
meaning of"to initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that
the Constitution is ratified by. the peopie, both orcij.nary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that. ordfu.tii'Y people
read ordinary meaning 'into ordfnary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratif.Y #tirds as they understand.it and not as
sophisticated lawyers ~6nfuse it.
xxx
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing and referral or endorsement· of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the
filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives With the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI· becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official Within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 ofRule V of the House Impeach-
ment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1)
if there is a finding by the· House Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance,
or (2) once the House itsblf affirms or overturns the :finding of
the Committee on Justi~ that the verified· complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House ofRep-
resentatives-of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeach-
ment ~Y ·at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules
clearly contravene Section 3. (5) of Article .XI since the rules
give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from fil-
ing and referral.
necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the

.m
·c:
eaning
; .
of the Constitution without need of referendum.
!· ·: ' ' .- " ..
·
x x x-.
Th~· provisions o(Sectio~~.)6 ,ap.d 17 t>{R~e V of the
House . :rinpeachjnent RUJ.es which s~ate .th~~ ~mp~~chment
pro~eed,ings are deemed fil.itiated·,~~) if'there is_:~. P11?W(by the
House Cohu:iritfue on Justice that the verified coniplamt and/or
restilutiJri ~·sufficient in stibstahce,'of: (2) once the House itself
affiri:rl~ or overturns the flliiliri:'g'
·ofiheCo~~e t>n _J'ustice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is· not sufficient
in substance, or (3) by the filing 'or endorsement before the
Secretary-General oftl.ie House pfl;t,epi:esent,ajives of a verified
co~piamt or a resolUti?n of ~p~4~hw:ent l)y ~t Jeasy'1/3 of the
members ofthe House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article Xi as they givethe term "iriiti~te".am~anij;lg different
froni "filing." · · · ··. · · ·
xxx
Having c~nduded, ~~t ~1?-e,, ~ti~p01i. ~es place by the
act of filing of.the i.mpea~hpieri.t c?i:nplaintan4, referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action 'taken thereon,
the me~~.of.S~~on·~ (~) ,<>f:Ai'.ti~le XI beco#ie~ .elear. Once
an impeachment ooinplain't liS:s been initiated fu the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed· against the same official
within a oneyear period followmg Article XI, Section 3(5) of
the Constitution. ·
In fine, considering tnat\he first impeachment complaint,
was filed by former President . Es,p-ada against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August,5,:2003;·the second impeachment complaint
filed 'by Representatives Gilberto· C. Teodoro, Jr• and Felix
William· Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October
23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation . of. :iµip~achment .. · proceedings against the same
a
impeacp.able,;~:ljicer wi,thiil one~year period,
~ "
!xxx·
ILthere is anything constant about this country, it
is that there is always .a .phenomenon that -takes the center
stage of . our individual and collective consciousness as a
squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, .no other course

of action can be h~d but for it to pass upon that problem head
on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially
entangling itself with the process of impeachment has
effectively set up a regime ofjudicial supremacy; ia patently
without basis hi fact and in law,
This Court in. the. present petitions subj~d tp judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits oQ!y 1;b:elD.aiti.i1Jsu.e of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the
Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-
year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not gl> about assuming
jurisdiction where it h~d -. none, ..nor indi1:1Crimin~zy turn
justiciable issues.out of.decidedly political qu.0sti~ms. Because
it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to completnent the
discharge by the executive and legislative- of their own powers
to bring about ultimately the beneficent. effects of having
founded and orderedour society upon the rule oflaw. ·
It is sugg~sted that by ow t8.ki,rig coglli.z~ce of the issue
ofconstitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the
Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually dosed
ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in
ruling on said issue is as much atstake asis that of theChief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth: ..
. ·. . :
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with

all other courts has long held and been entrusted with the
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of
the personalities involved in the suits or actions, This Court
has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by
whomsoever stood to' benefit or. suffer . therefrom, unafraid
by whatever imputations or speculations ·-, could be made to
it, so long as it rendered judgment according to· the law and
the facts. Why can it not now oetrusted to wield judicial
power in these ~petitions just because it 'is the highest ranking
magistrate wH.o is involved when it is anincontrovertible fact
that the fundamental issue is riot him but the validity of a
government branch's official act astested by the linrits set by
the Constitution? Of course; there are rules ·on the inhibition
of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in
648
STATUTORY·CONSTRUCTION
The·.court ruled that the petition as no· merit thus:
"'1'!1e L~bino Group miserably failed to comply ~th

the basi~ r~q~ei:rients of.the Constitution for conducting
a. ~eople s rmtiativ:e, Thus, there is even no need to re-
visitSantiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal
based alo~e on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution
For follo~g; the C()lJ,f-t's ruling in Santiago, ~o grav~
ab1uctis~ ()f discretion is attributable to the Comniission on
E e ons,
. 1. Th~ Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with

Section 2, Article XVII ofthe·Constitution on Direct Pro-
posal by the People. · .!
~e~on 2, Arti~l~ XVII of the ConstitutioriJs the governing

constitutional pr()v:ision. that allows a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
. Sec .. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may like-

wise be dir~~ly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petitio~ of at least twelve per centum of the total
n~ber of registered voters of.which every legislative dis-
tnct m?-st be represented by at least three per centum. of
the registered voters therein ....
'!he delibera~ons of the Constitutional Commission vividly
explam the me~g .o~ ~ an:tendin,en:t "directly proposed by
the people through rmtiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the meehanies. Let us

say some voters want to propose a constitutional amend-
ment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amend-
me~t readyto be shown to the people when they are asked
to sign?,
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed

Madam President. ' .· '
MR;""ROI>RIGO:What:does the sponsor mean? The

· dr~ fs:ready and shown to them before they sign. Now
who prepares the draft? · · '
. I
. ' MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves Madam Pres-
ident. · '
various·.Stateconstitutionsincorporatean.initiative clause. In
almost all States whith allowinitiative petitions,the unbending
requirement is that the peoplemust first see the full text ofthe
proposedamendments beforethey sign to signifytheir assent,
and that thepeople .must sign on an initiative petition that
contains the full text of the proposedamendments..
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly
explainedin. several decisionsof various courts, x x x
Section 2, Article · XVII of· the Constitution: does not
expressly state' that th~ petition must set forth the full text
of the proposed. ameiidments.· However, the. deliberations of
the framers of our {)onstit4.ti0nclearlyshowthat the framers
intended to. adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on
people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commissionexplicitly reveal that the. framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people
must sign on a petition containingsuchfull text. Indeed,Section
5(b) of RepublicAct No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum
Act that the LambinoGroupinvokesas valid, requires that the
peoplemust sign the "petition ... as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures
froni the people.~e proponents secure the signatures in their
private capacity and not as. public officials. The proponents
are not (iisinterested parties who can .impartially explain the
advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments
to the people.The proponents present favorablytheir proposal
to the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those
who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents
observed the. constitutional . requirements . ·in gathering the
signatures. The proponent~bear the burden ofprovingthat they
complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated
by attachm,en,p.,.d'hefull text of the proposedamendments.
The LambinoGroupdid not attach to their present petition
with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed as
their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this
652 STATUTORY CONSTRl.:JCTlON
. 2006 signa~-gathering .. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged

th.at the petition af25 >.August 2006,."inacetlrately stated .and
failed to correctlyreflect their proposed'amendments;~····
.The. Lambfn« Groll~ ~~v~r ~~geci ~ the 25 August
2006 petition or the a,~. f\?!{U~.t, ~099 ~~11ded petition with
the. ~OMELEC that they 'circulated printed copies of the' draft
petiti~n together. with the signature .sheets, Likewise, the
L~bmo Group didnot allege in their present petition before
thi~ .Court that they cirCUlated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
~heets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition
is attached to, or circulated with, the signature sheets.
It is ?*:Yin ~h~~.9ol1~?Hciat,edR~plyto the OpP,bsition~in-
!:µterv~n~onstJ:i.at,the LaJAhino(}roup firstclrumed that th
circulated ~h,~."petitjon tor ~tiat;iy~.f4ed,With#ie COMELE~.~
thUS; . . ,r, · ·.. ··
xxx
'.1;11~ Lamb~o (}roup cites as authofity Corpus Juris
Secu"!dlfm, stating 'that' "a 'signer who' did not read the
1?-ea.su;e ~ttached ~ a refereiidtup 'p~tition cannot ques-
tion his signature on the ground' that he did not under-
stan~ the ~ature ?f~J:i.~ a.et:"The.LambinoGroup quotes
. an autf~nty tha~ cites .· ~· proposed change attaehed to
the.p~tit10n signed py'the people. Even the authority the
Lambino Group quotes requiresthat the proposed change
must?e attached to the petition. The same authority the
L~?m~ Group quotes requires the people to sign on the
petition itself.
Indeed, it' is basic in American jurisprudence that the

propos~d-~~ndme~t .must be. incorporated With, or attached
~o: ~he. rmtiati~e peti~on signed by the.people. In the present
~tiative, the.~bmo Group's ·proposed changes were not
.·. ~co~orated ~th;:or .attach~d. to, the ~ignature sheets. The
ambino Gro~ll s citation of Corpus Juris. Secundurii · ulls the
rug from utider their feet. · · P
. It'. is ~xtremely doubtful that the Lambino Group

pre~ared, p~ted, circulated, fro:tn·February to August 2006
during the signature-gatheHng·]>eriod,the draft of the petition
deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire

nation.
This lucidly' shows the absolute need . for the people to
sign an . initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments to avoid fraud or niis:r:epresentation. In
the present initiative, the 6.3 million signatories had to rely
on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group
because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the
proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on the 6.3
million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed
changes would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the
regular Parliament simUitarieously with the· local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs ano1;hljl~ surprise
on the people who. signed the signature. sheets. The proposed
changes .mandate the interim Parliament to make further
amendments. or revisions to the. Constitution. The proposed
Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Withill forty-five days from ratification
of these ap1Emd,nie~ts, the interim Parliame~t shall con-
vene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Con-
stitution consistent withthe principlesof'Iocal autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy, (Emphasis
supplied) ·
xxx
The Constitution entrusts . to the people the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This· Court
trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this
Court do not personally know the people who sign the petition.
However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption:
the full text of the proposed amendment is :first shown to the
people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed
the petition.
In short, the. Lambino Group's initiative is . void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement ~~ ~ection 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that
the initiati"v.e·:must be "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition."
·. · 2. The Initiative violates Section 2; Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives.
to propose revisions to the-Constitution, the people cannot

propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.
xxx
It is well established that when a constitution
specifies the manner in which it may be amended or
revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments,
revision.. or other change: bruy through the use of one of
the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes
that there is a difference between an amendment and
a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the
measure here in question that it is not an amendment
as that term is generally understood .and as i~is used in
Article N, Section 1. The document appears to be based
in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by
the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized
by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, ... and submitted to
the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to_receive in the
Assembly the two-third's majority vote . of both houses
required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of
adoption, ....
While differing from that document in material
respects, the measure - sponsored _ by the plamtiffs is,
nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present
constitution ....
To call it an amendmentis a misnomer.
Whether - it be a revision or a new constitution, it
is not such a measure as .can be submitted to the people
through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the
requirements of Article XVII, Section 2(1); if a new
constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called
in the manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1 .....
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute
that a people's initiative can: only propose amendments
to the· Constitution since the Constitution itself limits
initilltW~s to' amendments. There can be no deviation
fr-Om- the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising
the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by
6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the
specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the

Lambino Gr_oup's, initi~?ye · i,~ a revision and not merely an
amendment, Quantitativ.e.ly, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes overhaul two ai-ti,cle~ - 4rt;icle VI on the Legislature
and Article VII on .the · E~ecutive . - • affecting a total of
105 provisions . in the entire Constitution, Qualitatively,
the proposed changes · alter substantially the basic plan of
goveI'IliD.ent, from· presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral-legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of
the Constitution, as wh~ri. the. three great co-equal branches
of government in the present Constitution are reduced into
two. This alters, the separation of powers in the Constitution.
A shift from the present aicameral-Presidential /system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches
is a radical change in the structure of government,
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the
locus of Executive Power alters the separatfon of powers and
thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the
abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system
of checks-and-balances Within the legislature and constitutes a
revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from
a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President
and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt
a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that
the changes.will radically alter the framework of government
as setforth in.the Constitution.xx x
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a
few specific· and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to
add new provisions deemed necessary .to meet new conditions
or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete
or that a(e jUdged to be dangerous. In revision, however,
the gujding original intention, and plan contemplates a re-
examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire
document, to determine how and to what extent they should
recorded 'proceedings is best suited· to undertake a revision. A

revision requires harmonizing not>only several provisions; but
also the altered principles with thd§e;t1hat'remain unaltered,
Thus, constitutions · l'lofinally · · authi>rlze · deliberative ·bodies
like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to
undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow
people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable
deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions. '
xxx
This drives home the point that the people's initiative
is not meant ·for revisions" Of the Constltution- but 'only for
amendments, A shift from the present Bica:hieral-I>fesidential
to 'a UniC:am:eral~Parliamelitacy. system reqtrlre's harmonizing
several provisions ill many' attiel~s of the Coristitution. Revision
of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result
in gross absurdities in the· Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoe~e~ that the Lambino
Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus
the present inltiative is void' and unconstitutional'because it
violates Section 2, ArtiCle XVII of the Constitution litniting
the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments 'to this
Constitution."
xxx
5. Conclusion
The Constitutiori, as the fundamental law of the land

deserves the utmost respect and obedience ofall the citizens of
this nation; No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly
ame~ding or revising it in blatant violation of. the clearly
specified modes of amendment and revision laid-down in the
Constitution itself.
T() allow such change in the fundamental law is to set

adrift the Con!!~tution. in unchar,tered waters, to be . tossed
~d turned l;!y~every dominant political group of the day. If
this Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the
new dominant political . group that comes . will demand its
own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
662 ·STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
This Court cannot betray its-primordial duty to defend

and protect the Constitution. The Constitution, . which
embodies tjie ~pl~'.s soverei@:will,is. th~JJ.iWe of this Court.
· This Co~ eXistS t0 defend @;d protect the' Constitution. To
allow· ~s _ constituti<)naj.Iyii:innn .· ·. initiative, :Propelled by
deceptively·. g"f;itheretl · sign~fur,es; . to •alter basic prlnCiples - in
the CoriStituti:on·~s to Sllow ·a d~stforation. of the C'onstitution.
To allow ·such $.J.tera'.titnfin.d dese~ration is to los~ thls Court's
raison. d'effe. . . . . . . . .
· David v. f\rtoyo
Iri David· vArtoyo~ G~R. No. 171391), May 3, 2006, the
issue raised refers ·to · the ·_ · constitutionality of'. Presidential
ProcJamatioJ:i'No>iOl7 issued by the President on February
24·. - 2006,' which declared a' state of national emergency. Said
.pp No.1017".reads: ·
, Nq~l, ~RE}l'ORE, I, Gloria Ma~ap;\gal".Arroyo,
President .:' oftl;te, Republic. of .the: Philippllie~ and Com-
m,~4er~in~C_lri~fof th~. 4!me~ ·ro~~s. of.the ~b:iliJ>pines,
by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
. Article 7 ofthe Philippine CortstitutiOnwhi~h states that:
"The President • ; . whenever itbecomes ~necess8cy, ...
may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress •.
. rebellion . :. ., " and.in my capacity as their Commander-
in~Chief,, do herebycommand the Armed• Forces· of the
Philippines, to maintainIaw and. order.throughout the
Philippines, ·prevent or .suppressall forms of lawless vio-
lence as well aE:J anY:actQf insurrection or rebellion and to .
enforce obedience to all the.laws and to all decrees, orders
. and_ regulations pr~mulgated by me. personally or upon
my direction; B_nd as provided in 'Section '17'. Article 12
of the Cdnstitution do· hereby -declare a· State of National
' - Emergency. · · · ·· ·
. , The d~b~ration of a sta~e pf national emergency fraises a
num.l>er. ofque~tions;such_as-whether. or not is·it a declaration
of', mSrtjal )~w, $ether it_· e¢l>owers the. President to. issue
•. ~e<:r~~s ,aiiyi!~;m,ff.~es•,i~8:9.~~ ~~~-m~m:l~w ~y· then
·• 'Pi;e,s1de:pJ--Mar<:P~·W4etjier.~t~rnpowersthe f>re_s1i;l~ntto take
qye,r tb'.e operations_ of public' utilities; etc. In' an!rJiefu.g these .
~~~~~s the Court partly declared J?J:>H)17 unconsµtutional.
Second provision:
"And to- enforce obedience to all the laws and to. all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated· by me per-
sonally or upon my direction";
Third provision:
"As provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Consti-
tution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency."
First Provision: Calling-out Power

The first provision pertains to the President's calling-out
power. In Sanlakas v. Executioe Secretary, this Court, through
Mr,. Justice Dante 0. Tinga, held.that Section 18, Ar,ticle VII of
the Constitution reproduced as follows:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence; invasion or re-
bellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it; .he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the .privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under mar-
tial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report ·
in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly; by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Mem:bers in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend .
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be deter-
mined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
_ The po~es~·, if not in session, shall within twenty-four
hours folfoVling such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordli.nce with its ru!es without need of a can.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
666 · STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction

between the President's. ·authority to declare a "state· of
rebellion" (in Sanlakas) and. the authority to proclaim. a state
of nati~nal emergency. While President Arroyo's authority
to declare a "state of rebellion" emanates from her powers as
ChiefE~ecutive, the statutOry authoritycited in Sanlakas was
Secti0z1··1; Chapter ·2,· B6ok I~ _of the Revised 'Admttiistratlve
Code of 1987, which provides: ..
SEC. 4. Proclamations. - Acts of the President
fixing a date or declaring "a· status· or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the op-
eration of a specific law or regulation is made to.depend,
shall be promulgated. in proclamations which ~hall have
the force of an executive order.
President Arroyo's declaration of a "state of rebellion"
was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4
cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legalsigniflcance, and deemed not written.
In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state
of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, 'Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling
on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision
on the State's extraordinary power totake over privately-owned
public utility and businessaffected with public interest: Indeed,
PP 1017 calls for the exercise of'an awesome power. Obviously,
such Proclamation cannot be. deemed harmless, without legal
significance, or not written, as il1 the case of Sonlakas,
Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP
1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is not so. What
defines the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain
therein that. what the President invoked wa~ her calling-out
power.
•
The deeltiration of Martial Law is a '\varn[ing] to citizens
that t~ military power has been called upon by the executive
to assist in the maintenance of.law and order, and that, while
the. emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and
punishment, not commit any acts which will in any way render
Second Provision: "Take Care" Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President
to ensure that the laws be{aithfu]ly executed. This is based on
Section 17, ·Article. VII whi.bh teads:
. .
SEC. 17. The &e.sident shall have control of all the
executive .departme~t~; bµr~at1s, and. ?ffi,ces. H.e shall en-
sure that the laws b~Jaithful1y executed.
AB the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,
the primary ru.D.ction of the President is to enforce the laws
as wen• as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing
laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his department. Before assuming' office, he
-is required to take an oath, or affum.atiQR to the effect that as
President of-the Philippines, be will, among others, "execute
its laws." In the exercise of'.such function, the President, if
needed; may employ the powers .attached to his office as the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,
including the Philippine N'ati<mal J>olicMllld(lrthe Department
of Interior and Local Government.
Petitioners, especially Representatiyes Fr~c~s .Joseph G.
Escudero, SaturOcampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casi:fi,o, Liza
Maza, andJoselVirador arguethat PP 1017 is unconstitutional
as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the. power to enact
laws and -decrees in violation of Section .1, Article VI of the
Constitution, which vests th~ power to ena~~ l~ws in Congress.
They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction."
Petitioners' contention is understandable .. A reading of
PP 1017 operative clause. shows that itwas ~d from Former
President Marcos' Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, r, FERDINANDE. MARCOS,

President.of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vest-
ed upon"me by Article VII, Section 10,. Paragraph (2) of
the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines
as defined in Article .L, Section 1 of the Constitution under
martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the ArmedForces of the Phil-
or temporary interest which only concern a particular

officer or· offi~· of the .Government shall be embodied· in
memerandunrorders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars, - Acts of the Presi-
dent on. matters . relating to internal . administration,
which the President desires to bring to the attention of all
or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of
the Government, for information or compliance, shall be
embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or. Special Orders. - Acts and com-
mands of the President in his capacity .as Commander-
in-Chief of the. Armed Forces· of the Philippines.shall be
issued as general or special orders. /
President Arroyo's ordinance power , is limited to the
foregoing Issuances. She cannot issue decreessimilar to those
issued by Former President Marcos under PP10SLPresidential
Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding
force as. statutes because they were issued by the President
in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of
Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconsti-
tutional insofar. as .it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate "decrees." Legislative power is peculiarly within
the province of.the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categori-
cally states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress.of the Philippines which shall consist ofa Senate and
a House of Representatives." To be sure, neither Martial Law
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo's exercise· of legislative power by issuing de-
crees.
Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and
laws through the military?
As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no
authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void
and, the~efor~.1eannot be enforced. With. respect to "laws," she
' cannot cruf.the military to enforce or implement certain laws,
such as customs laws, laws governing family and property
relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She
can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws
pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.
Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is· an encroachment on the

legislature's emergency powers.
This is an area that needs delineation.
A distinction must be drawn between the President's
authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to
exercise emergency powers, To the first; as elucidated by the
Court, Section 18, Article Vll grants thePresident such power,
hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But
to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article Vl of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of vwo~thirds

of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting sepa-
rately, shallhave the sole power to declare the existence
ofa state of war.
(2) ln times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress i:nay, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to exercise . powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner with-
drawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof;
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of
the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other
national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our
Constitution was. to withhold from the President the authority
a
to declare "state of national. emergency" pursuant to Section
18, Article VII (calling-out power) ~d. giant it to Congress
(like the declaration of the existence.of a state of war), then
the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, .they did not
intend . that Congress should first authorize the President
before he· can deelarea "state of national emergency." The
·. logical conclusion then is. that President Arroyo could validly
declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in
the abseni:e.9~a Congressional enactment.
BUt the exercise of emergency powers, such as thetaking
over of privately oVVIJ.ed public utility or business 'affected with
public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation
from Congress.
It is clear that if the President had authority to issue

the orderhe pid, :it must: be-found in some provision of.the
Constitution. And it is n()~~\aimed that express constitu-
tional language grants this power to the Preside~t. ri:ie
contention is that presidential power should be implied
from the aggregate of his powers under .the Constitution.
Particular reliance . is placed on provisions in Article II
which say that ''The executive Power shall be vested in a
President ... "; that "he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed"; and that he "shall be Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.
The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise
of the President's military power as Commender-m-Ohief
of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts t'o do so by
citing a number of cases upholding broad p~wers in military
commanders engaged fa day-to-day fighting in a theater of war.
Such cases need not concern us here. Even though "theater of
war" be an expanding concept; we cannot with faithfuln~ss
to our constitutional system hold that the Commander-m-
Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such
to take possession of private property in order to keep labor
disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the nation's
lawmakers, not for its military authorities.
Nor can the seiz~e order be sustained because of the
several constitutional provisions that grant executive power
to the President; In the framework of our Constitution,
the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a ,lawmaker. The
Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to
the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor
equivocal· about who shall make laws. which. the President is
to execute. The first section of the first article· says that "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
of the United States.
La .prqnil-B Laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos

,In its original decision in La Bugal-B' Laan Tribal
Association, Inc. vs. Ramos ;non January 27, 2004, the Supreme
92G.R. No. 127882, January 27, 2004.

zone, and' reser:ve its use and eirjoyment exclusively to Filipino

citizens. .
The Co11gre~~ ~ay,by l'iiw,,ano* ,sm.all,~scale-q.tiliza~on
of natural resources hY Fµipirio citizen$, as as.
vr~ll cooperative
fish f~%• wi~h prlori,~.t~~s~b~i~t~nce' fishermen ,an,d fish-
workers in. rivers, lakes,
' ~ .· . bays and
' .. lagoons.
' ·. ' .
... .
·'
The President may enter' into' agreements with foreign-

owned corporations mvolVing either technical or-fmancial
assistance for large-scale exploration, · development, and
utilization of minerals petroleum; and .. other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by
law.sbased on raalcentributions to the economic gi;owth and
general welfare of the cq-qµ~ry. In such aITTX.ements; the State
shall promote the developmentand use ofIocal scientific and
technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congresa 'of every contract
entered into iii accord~~e With· thi,s P.rovi!!lion, within thirty
days from its execution. ' ' '
No Restriction ofMeaning by a Verba Legis Interpreta-
tion
To interpret the foregoing provision; petitioners adamant-
ly assert that the language of the Constitution should prev~;
that the primary method ofinterpreting itfs to seek the ordi-
nary meaning of the words used in its provisions. They rely on
rulings of this Court, such as the following:
"The ,fundamental principle in constitutional con-
struction however is that the prlmary.source from which
to . ascertain constitutional 'intent or purpose is the lan-
guage of the provision itself. The presumption is that the
words in which the eonstitutional provisions· are couched
express the objectiv~ sought'to be attam~d; In other words,
verba le'gis prevails: Only when the meaning of the words
used is unclear mid 'eqUivocM should resort be made to
extranemG aids' of oonstruciion and interpretation, such
· as the pr~eed.ings of the CQnstitutionhl Commission or
co~vention to ·shed light on and ascertain the true intent
or purpose of the provision being construed."
Note that in: all the three foregoing .mining' activities

- exploration, development-and ;utilj.zation ~ the S~te may
undertake· such EDU, activities by -its.elf or in tandem with
Filipinos or Filipino corporations, except in two instances: first,
in small-scale u:tilization<ofnhtliral.tesolirces, which Filipinos
may be allowed by'law ti> undertake; and second, .in large-scale
EDU of'minerals, petroleum: and 'mineral. oils; which may be
undertaken by the State via "agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance"
as provided by law. · ·
Petitioners claim that . the piµ;ase. "a~eem1mts . x x x
invol~g . eitiiet . techm,cai or, financial . assistance" simply
means tecluii~ai assist~ce or fuianci~I'~slstaiice agreements,
nothing more:~~imd nothfug else. Tlley ;insist. that ~here is no
ambiguityin the phrase, and that' a plaln-reading of paragraph
4 quoted above leads to the inescapable conclusion that what a
foreign-owned coipoi:~t,ion Ill;aY: ep~r,infu;.wi~ the government
is merely an: agreement· for either financial or technical
assistance only, for the large-scale exploration, development
and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils;
such a limitation, they argue, excludes foreign management
and operation of a mining enterprise.
This restrictive interpretation, petitioners believe, is in
line with the .general ipolicy .enunciated by the Constitution
reserving to Filipino citizens •and:· corporations the . use and
enjoyment. of the c0up:try's natllJ:'.~. r~sources~ They maintain
that this · Court's Decision ijf ~anuary. 27, 2004 correctly
declared the WMCP Ff.AA'.; along with' pertinent provisions of
RA 7942, void-forallowing atforeign contractor to have direct
and exclusive management of a mining enterprise. Allowing
such a privilege not only ·:runs counter to the "full control and
supervision" that.'tiie State Is c,0nstitUtion@y. mandated to
exercise over the exploration, developmentand utilization of the
country's natural resources; doing' so also veste in the foreign
company "beneficial ownership'Lof our mineral resources. It
will be recalled that the Decision of January 27,.: 2004 zeroed
in on "management or. other forms of assistance" or other
activities' as§ticiated vrith the "service contracts" of the martial
law regime, since "the management or operation of mining
activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature
of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of
the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate."
agreement. Thus, we are now led to the conclusion that the

u~e of ·th~ word "involving"··implies that· these agreements
with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial
or technical assistance .. The difference in sense becomes very
apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or
financial assistance" against "agreements including· technical
or financial ·assistance." This much· is unalterably clear in a
verba legis approach.
.·Second, if the real futentio~ bi the drafters was to confine
foreign corporations. to financial . Qr technical assistance and
not~g more, their language would hav~ certainly been so
unmistakably restrictive ~d stringent as to leave no doubt in
anyone's mind about their true intent. For example, they would
hav~. ~sed the ~entence foreign corporations are absolutely
pr~~b1tedf'.roi;n Involvementdn.themenagement or operation of
mimng or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search
for such stringent wording yields negative· results, Thus we
·come to the inevitable conclusion.that there was a conscious
and deliberate de~sion to avoid the use of restrictive wording
that ~spe~, an _mtent not to use the expression "agreements
x x x 1;fivolvmg either technical or financial assistance" in an
exclusionary and limiting manner.
. Deleti~n o[ "Service Contracts" to Avoid Pitfalls of Pre-

vious Constitutions, Not to Ban Service Contracts Per Se
. Third, we do not see how a verba legis approach leads to
the_ ~~clusion ~at "the management or operation of mining
activiti.es by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature
of service contracts, was precisely the evil that the drafters of
the 1987 Constitutfon sought to eradicate." Nowhere in the
above-quot:ed Section can be discerned the objective to keep
out. of foreign.hands the m.anagement.or operation of mining
activities or .the plan to eradicate serviceeontracta as these were
understood m the 1973 Constitution; Still, petitioners maintain
that the deletion or omission from the 1987 Constitution of
the ~rm "service contracts" found in the 1973 Constitution
the
. sufficiently }'rf!yes drafters' illtent to exclude foreigners
from the maniigement of the affected enterprises.
To-~ur mind, however, such intent cannot be definitively
and conclusively established from the mere failure to carry the
same expression or termover to the new Constitution, absent a
682
mining operations, as there. would be far greater need for them

in the sniall~r~scale milling; a~tivities (and even in non-mining
areas). Obviously; the pro\ii'sion in -question was'intended to
refer to· agreements other· than those. for mere financial or
technical assistance.
In like manner, there w.ould be no need to require the

Presid_ent of the . Republic ·-. to report . to :Cqngress, if only
financial or technical .assistance agreements are involved.
Such agreements are in t}ie. nature of foreign loans that -
pursuant to Section 20 of Article.VII ofthe.1987 Constitution
- the President may contract or guarantee, merely with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. In turn, the B~ard is
required to report to Congress within thirty days from the end
of every quarter of the calendar year, not thirty day~ after the
agreement is entered into.
And if paragraph. 4; p_er,nllt~- only agreeme~ts for loans

and other forms of financial, ortechnical assistance what is
the point of requiring that they be. based on real ~ontrlbutions
to t~e economic growth and general, welfare of the country?
For instance; how is , one . to measure and assess the "real
contributio.ns.".to the "e.conomic; growth" and "general welfare"
of the country that may ensue from a foreign-currency loan
agreement ona technical-assistance agreement for, say, the
refurb~shing of anexi.stingpower generating plant for a mining
operation somewhere in ~ndana9? Such a criterion would
make more sense when applied, to a major business investment
in a principal sector ofthe'industry.
The conclusion is el~at and inescapable ~ a verba legis
construction shows that' paragraph· 4 is· not to be understood
as one limited _oitly to foreign Ioans(or other forms of financial
~upport) and to fEichnical ass.istalic,e. There is defillitely more to
it t~an that. ~ese' are provision_s permitting participation by
forei~ companies; ~equiringthe President's report to Congress;
and using, asyardstick, contributions based on economic growth
~d: general welfare. These were neither accidentally inserted
into the _c~~~tuti~n nor carelessly ·cobbled· .together by the
drafters _m· lip s~n:ce to shallow nationalism. The provisions
patently have significance and usefulness in a context that
.allows agreements ·with foreign· companies· to include more
than mere.financial or technical assistance.
designed to ladle the large-scale development' and utilization

of mineral, petroleum and related resources ·with impossible
conditions, and to 'remain forever and permanently "reserved"
for future generations ·ofFilipiilos. •
A M~re Jt,ell$°'nabieLOok ~~,t~e Charter'sflain Lan:guage

Sixth, we shall now lookcloser atthe plain.languags of
the Charter and.examiningthe logical inferences. The drafters
c~ose·to,emphai;iize,aiid·highlight agreements x xx involving
either technical or financial assistance .in relation to foreign
corporations' participation in large-scale EDU, The inclusion
of t~s clause on "~e~Jinica,l, or financial assistance" recognizes
the. fact that. foreign business entities and multinational
corporations ate the ones withthe resources and know-how to
provide technical and/or financiaJ. assistance of the magnitude
and type required for large-scale explorauon, development and
utilization of these' resources. . '
The drafters ..,.. whose ranks included many academicians
economists, businessmen, lawyers, politicians and government
officials - were not unfamiliar with the practices of foreign
corporations and multinationals.
Neither were they so. as to believe that these entities would
provide "assistance" without conditionalitiss or some quid pro
quo. Definitely, as business P,!';rso.nswellknow and.as a matter
of judicial notice, this matter is, not just a question ~f signing a
promissory note or executing.a technology transfer agreement.
~oreign corporations usually require that they be.given a say
m t~e. management, for instance, of day-to-day operations of
the. joint venture. They would demand the appointment of
their Ownmen as, for example, Operations managers, technical
experts, quality control heads, internal auditors or comptrollers.
Furthermore, they would probably require seats on the Board
-of Directors - all these to ensure the success of the enterprise
· ·.and the repayment· of the loans and other financial assistance
and. to make certain that the funding. and· the technology they
supply woul,.q.~~tog~to waste. ~~imately, they would also want
to protecttliei'i: business reputation and bottom lines.
. . In short, the' drafters Wm have .to be cr~~ted with enough
pragmatism and savvy to know that these foreign entities will
not enter into such "agreements' involving assistance" without
686
. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Section · 23. Advertising entities. affected. by para-

graph (2), Section 11 of Article XVI of this Constitution
shall have :five years from its ratification.to comply on
a graduated. and proportionate basis with the minimum
Filipino ownership requirement therein.
xxx xxx
Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agree-
ment between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States of Aniericaconcerning military bases, for-
eign military bases, troops, or facilities shallnotbs allowed
in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, rati-
fied by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a na-
tional referendum held for that purpose, and recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting State,
Section 26. The authority to issue sequestration or
freeze orders under Proelaination No. 3 dated March 25,
1986 in relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall
remain operative for not more than eighteen months after
the ratification of this Constitution. However, in the na-
tional interest, as certified by the President, the Congress
may extend such period."
A sequestration or freeze order shall be issued only upon
showing of a primafacie case. The order and the list of the
sequestered or frozen properties shall forthwith be registered
with the proper court. For orders issued before the ratification
of this Constitution, the corresponding judicial action or
proceeding shall be filed within six months from its ratification.
For those issued after such ratification, the judicial action or
proceeding shall be commenced within six months from the
issuance thereof. · · · ·
The sequestration or freeze order is deemed automatically

lifted if no judicial action or proceeding is commenced as herein
provided.
It is inconceivable that the drafters of the Constitution

would leav~ ~ an important matter - an expression of
sovereignty as it were - indefinitely hanging in the air in a
formless· and ineffective state. Indeed, the complete absence
of even a general framework only serves to further deflate
petitfoners' theory, like a child's balloon losing its air.
Will Commissioner Jamir.· answer a· few· ... clarificatory

questions?
MR. JAMIR: Yes, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ. This particular portion of the section
has· reference to what was popularly known before as service
contracts, among other things, is that correct?
MR. JAMIR. Yes, Madam President.
. . .
ME. SU:AREZ. As it .is formulated, the President may
enter into seryice contracts. but subject to the guidelines that
may be promulgated by Congress?
MR. JAMIR. That is correct. ,
MR. SUAREZ. Therefore, that aspect of negotiation and
consummation will fall on the President, not upon Congress?
MR. JAMIR. That is also correct, Madam President.
MR. SUAREZ. Except that all of these contracts; service or
otherwise, must be made strictly in accordance With guidelines
prescribed by Congress?
MR. JAMIR. That is also correct.
MR. SUAREZ. And the Gentleman is thinking in terms of
a law that uniformly covers situations of the same nature?
MR. JAMIR. That is 100 percent correct.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. JAMIR. Thank you very inuch.
The following· exchange leaves no doubt that· the commis-
sioners knew exactly what they were dealing vrlth: service con-
tracts.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Gascon is recognized.
MR. GASCON. Commissioner Jamir had proposed an
amendment with regard to special service contracts which was ·
accepted by the Committee. Since the Committee has accepted
it, I would like<tO ask some questions.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Gascon may proceed.
MR. GASCON. As it is proposed now, such service contracts
will be entered into by the President with the guidelines of a
MR. BENGZON. The reason we made that shift is that

we realized the original proposal could breed corruption. By
the way, this is not just confined to service contracts but also to
financial assistance. If we are going to make every single con-
tract subject to the concurrence of Congress - which, according
to the Commissioner's amendment is the concurrence of two-
thirds of Congressvoting separately - then (1) there is a very
great chance that each contract will be different from another
and (2) there is a great temptation that it would breed corrup-'
tion because of the great lobbying that is going to happen. And
we do not want to subject our legislature to that
Now, to answer the Commissioner's apprehension by
"general law," we do not mean statements of motherhood.
' '
Congress c:an build all the restrictions that it wishes into
that general law so that every 'contract entered into by the
President under that specific area will have to. be uniform. The
President has no choice but to follow all the guidelines that will
be provided by law. ·
MR. GASCON. But my basic problem is that we do not
know as of yet the contents of such a general law as to how
much constraints there will be in it. And to my mind, although
the Committee's contention that the regular concurrence from
Congress would s~bject Congress to extensive lobbying, I think
that is a risk we will have to take since Congress is a body
of representatiyes of the people whose membership will be
changing re~arlY as there will be changing circumstances
every time certain agreements are made. It would be best then
to keep in tab and attuned totheinterestofthe.Filipino people,
whenever the President enters into any agreement with regard
to such an important matter as technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of
natural resources or service contracts, the people's elected
representatives should be on top of it.
xxx xxx
MR. OPLE, Madam . President, we do not need to
suspend the set!ision. If Commissioner Gascon needs a few
~utes?.J can fill up the remaining time while he completes
his proposed amendm.ent. I just wanted to ask Commissioner
Jamir whether he would entertain a minor amendment to
his amendment, and it reads as follows: THE PRESIDENT
rather, foreign investment in.and management of an enterprise

involved in large-scale exploration, development and utilization
of minerals, petroleum,' and other mineral oils. .
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Noll~do is recognized.
MR; NOLLEDO. Madam President, I have the permission
of the Acting· Floor Leader to speak for only two minutes in
favor of the amendment of Commissioner Gascon.
THE PRESIDENT:· Commissioner Nolledo may proceed.
MR. NOLLEDO. With due respect to the members of
the Committee andCommissionar Jamir, I am in favor of the
objection of Commissioner Gascon.
Madam President, I was one of those who refused to sign
the 1973 Constitution, and one of the reasons is that there
were many provisions in the Transitory Provisions therein
that favored aliens. I was shocked when I read a provision
authorizing service contracts while we, in this Constitutional
Commission, provided for Filipino control of the economy. We
are, therefore, providing for exceptional instances where aliens
may circumvent Filipino control of our economy. And one way
of circumventing the rule in favor of Filipino control of the
economy is to recognize service contracts.
As far as I am concerned, if I should have my own way,
I am for the complete deletion of this provision. However,
we are presenting a co:rtipromise in the · sense that we are
requiring a two-thirds vote of all the Members of Congress as a
safeguard. I think we should not mistrust the future Members
of Congress by saying, that the purpose of this provision is to
avoid corruption. We cannot claim that they are less patriotic
than we are. I think the Members of this Commission should
know that entering into service contracts is an exception to the
rule on protection of natural resources for the interest of the
nation, and therefore, being an exception it should be subject,
whenever possible, to stringent rules; It seems to me that we
are liberalizin~.t 1the rules in favor of aliens.
,. "
I s~y these things with a heavy heart, Madam President. I
do not claim. to be a nationalist, but I love my country. Although
we need investments; we must adopt safeguards that are truly
re:ftective of the sentiments of'the people and not mere cosmetic
may enter. So, beyond the .reach of any service contract will
be lands of the public domain, timberlands, forests; marine
resources, fauna 'and flora, wpdlil,'e and national parks.
Atl;e.i; the -Jamir amendment was voted upon and approved
by a vote of21 to}O with .2 abstentions, Commissioner Davide
made the following. s:fa,:tement,. which is very relevant to our
quest: · · ·
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR DAVIDE. I am very glad that Commissioner Padilla
emphasized minerals, -petroleum and mineral oils. The Com-
mission has just approved the possibleforeign entry into the
development, explo~ati~n and utilization of these mfierals, pe-
troleum and othermineral oils by virtue of the.Jamir amend-
ment. I voted iii favor of the Jamir amendment because it will
eventually· give way to· vesting ·in exclusively Filipino citizens
and corporations wholly owned by Filipino citizens the right to
utilize the other natural resources. This means that .as a mat-
ter of policy, natural resources should be utilized and exploited
only liy Filipino citizens or corporations wholly owned by such
citizens, But byvirtue of the Jamir amendment, since we feel
that Filipino capital may not be enough for the development
and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils,
the President can enter into service contracts with foreign cor-
porations precisely for the development and utilization of such
resources. And so, there is nothing to fear that we will stagnate
in the development of minerals, petroleum and mineral oils
because we now allow service contracts.xx x.
The foregoing are mere fragments of the framers'
lengthy discussions of the provision dealing with agreements
x x x involving either technical or financial assistance, which
ultimately became paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII
of the Constitution. Beyond any doubt, the members of the
ConCom were actually debating about the martial-law-era
service contracts for which they were crafting appropriate
safeguards.
In tbe .Jroting that led to the approval of Article XII by
the CQD.Com, the explanations given by Commissioners
Gascon, Garcia and Tadeo indicated that. they had voted
to reject this provision -on account. of their objections. to the
· · "constitutionalization" of the 1'!'sel'Vice contract" concept.
percent of which is owned by such citizens ..._ the exploration,

development and_utilization'ofnatural resources.
This provision was promptedby the perceived insufficiency
of Filipino capital and· the feit need for forei,gu investments in
the EDU of minerals and petroleum resources.
The framers for the most part debated about the, sort of
safeguards that would be considered adequate and reasonable.
But some of them, .having more "radical" leanings, wanted
to ban service contracts altogether; for them, the provision
would permit aliens to exploit and benefit from the nation's
natural resources, which they felt should be reserved only for
Filipinos.
In the explanation of their votes, the mdividdhl comm.is-
. sioners were heard by the entire body. They 'sounded off their
individual opinions, openly enunciated theirphilosophies, and
supported or attacked the provisions with fervor. Everyone's
viewpoint was heard.
In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy
and Patrimony - including paragraph 4 allowing service
contracts with foreign corporations as an exception to the
· general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same article
- was resoundingly approved by a vote of 32 to 7, with 2
abstentions.
Agreements Involving Technical or Financial Assistance

Are Service Contracts With Safeguards
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that
the phrase agreements involving either technical or financial
assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service
contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety,' the new ones
are between foreign corporations acting as contractors on the
, one hand; and on the other, the government as principal or
"owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign
contractors provide capital, technology and technical know-
how, and'fuariagerial expertise in the creation and operation of
large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government,
through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control
and supervision over the entire operation.
the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding

thereof."
The notion that the deliberations reflect only the views of
those members who spoke out and not the views of the majority
who remained silent should be clarified. We must never forget
that those who spoke out were heard by those who remained
silent and did not react. If the latter were silent because they
happened not to be present at.the time, they are presumed to
have read the minutes and kept abreast of the deliberations.
By remaining silent, they are deemed to have signified their
assent to and/or conformity with at least some of the views
propounded ortheir lack of objections thereto. It was incumbent
upon them, as representatives of the entire Filipino people, to
follow the deliberations closely and to speak their mili.ds on the
matter if they did not see eye to eye with the proponents of the
draft provisions. -
In any event, each and every one of the commissioners
had the opportunity to speak out and to - vote on the matter.
Moreover, the individual explanations of votes are on record,
and they show where each delegate stood on the issues. In sum,
we cannot completely denigrate the value or usefulness of the
record of the Con Com, simply because certain members chose
not to speak out.
It is contended that the deliberations therein did not
necessarily reflect the thinking of the voting population that
participated in the referendum and ratified the Constitution.
Verily, whether we like it or not, it is a bit too much to assume
that every one of those who voted to ratify the proposed Charter
did so only after carefully reading and mulling over it, provision
by provision.
Likewise, it appears rather extravagant to assume that
every one of those who did in fact bother to read the draft
Charter actually understood the import of its provisions, much
less analyzed it uis-a-oi« the previous Constitutions. We believe
that in reality, a good percentage of those who voted in favor
of it did Sf> ]Jlflre out of faith and trust. For them, it was the
product of the hard work and careful deliberation of a group
of intelligent, dedicated and trustworthy men and women of
integrity and conviction, whose love of country and fidelity to
duty could not be questioned.
In vie:w of the foregoing, discussion, we, should reverse

the Decision of Jap.uary 27,. ~.004;· and in .fact'now hold:a view
different from that.of the.Decision, xx x
Senate of the Philippines v; Ermita, G;R. No. 169777,

April 20, 2006
This case involves the constitutionality o(Executiye Order
No. 454,which, bars theappearance of ex~cutive officials from
appearing and being asked questions before legislative bodies
or committe without presidential consent. · ·
The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as
follows:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of in-
quiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the 'right of the peo-
ple to information on maiters of public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave
abuse of discretion when 1;4,ey implemented E.O. 464 prior
to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
The Courtresolved the'1issues as follows'
Essential requisites for judici<;il review

Before proceeding to. re~oWe the issue, of'the constitution-
ality ofE.O. 464, asceitain:nient of'whether the requisites for a
valid exercise of the' Court's power of judicial review are; pres-
ent is in order. ·
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution,
the power of judicial review is ·subject to lifuitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the 'person 'challenging the act
' must have standing to chall~:tige the valiclity of the subject act
or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a· 'personal and
substantlel iaferest iii the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct ihjury as aresult of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised ·at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality 'must be the
very lie mota of'the ease, ·
tial interest in the case; such that he has sustained or will sus-
tain direct injury due to the enforcement ofE.O. 464.
That the Senate of the Philippines has a
fundamental
right essential not only for intelligent public decision-
making in a democratic system, but more·especially for sound
legislation= is not disputed. E.O. 464, however; allegedly stifles
the ability ofthe members of'Congress to access information
that is crucial to law-making.a Verily, the Senate, including
its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest
over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party
to assail the constitutionality of E.0. 464. Indeed, legislators
have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and
are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
In the same vein, party-list representatives SaturOcam-
po (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casiiio (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador
(Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano
(Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue, to
question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any
claim that an investigation called by the House of Representa-
tives or any of its committees was aborted due to the imple-
mentation ofE.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that
a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional
rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investiga-
tion in aid oflegislation and conduct oversight functions in the
implementation oflaws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise
meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats
in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and
is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process
consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list
system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who
lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the
formulation and enactment· of legislation that will benefit the
nation. 95 ' .' ~
93 /d., at 279.
»iu«.
96 Section 2 of The Party-List System Act (Republic Act 7941) reads:
establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or

other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard ~f a· constitutional or statutory prohibition
by the public respondent agency or instrumentality - of the
government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct
and specific interest in raising the questions being raised. The
first and last determinants not being present as no public funds
or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and
169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of
the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing
to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its
legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only
a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the
political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or tiµ-eatened,
is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part
to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.
In fine, PDP-Laban's alleged interest as a political party does
not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
Actual Case or Controversy

Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing
the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate to
its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those
on the North Rail project and the wiretapping controversy.
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy,
there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually
withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited
officials. These officials, they claim, merely communicated to
the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the
President, not that the President prohibited their attendance.
Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend
· the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the
instruction not to attend without the President's consent was
based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces,
'not on E.O. 464.
Respendents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest
on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse its
power 'of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress,
and that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the
validity ofE.O. 464.
under that Constitution, the Court 'already recognized that the

power of inquiry i!' inherent in.the. power to legislate.
Arnault involved a ·senate i,nv~sH.ga~ion of the reportedly
anomalous purchase of _th~ Buenavista and. Tambobong
Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who
was considered a leading.witness in the controversy, was called
to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to
answer the questions of the senators on an important point,
he was, by resolution ·of the Senate, detained for contempt.
Upholding the senate's power to punish Arnault for contempt,
this Court held: ·
Although there is no 'provision in the Consfitution

expressly investing eitherHouse of Congress -<vi.th power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legisla-
tive function as to be Implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry - with process to.enforce it - is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. Alegis-
lative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the ab-
sence of information respecting the conditions. which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite infor-
mation - which is not infrequently true - recourse must
be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown
that mere requests for such information are often unavail-
ing, and also that infonhation which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so .some means of compul-
sion is essential to obtain what is needed ....
That this power of inquirJ'iEI broad enough to cover officials
of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case.
The power of inquiry, the Court thetein ruiea; is co-extensive
with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a
proper subject of legislation and those which- may be a proper
subject o~,i.n,~stigation are one; It follows ctI:lat .the operation
of government, being a legitimate subject. for legislation, is a
proper' subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of
the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper
ed without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also

mandates that the rights of persons appearing in.or affected by
such inquiries be "respected, an imposition that obligates Con-
gress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts,
upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they
belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be
exceptional circumstances, none appearing toobtadn at present,
wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of
inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of
the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department
under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending· on the
particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive ,Branch to
forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are
still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions fall under the. rubric of"executive privilege." Since
this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being
• mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses, and in
its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for
determining the constitutionality ofE.o: 464.
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this
jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation
of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best
understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the
legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege •as "the power of
the Government · to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as
"the right of the President and high-level executive ·branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
'ultimately the public."
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, riot a clear or unitary
concept. k ha; encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe,
in fact; comments that while it is customary to employ the
phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak
of executive privileges "since· presidential refusals to furnish
information may be actuatedby any of at least three distinct
appropriate exercise of the executive' .domestic decisional and

policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting
the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory
and deliberative communications.
TIIBt a type of information is recognized as privileged does
not, however, necessarily mean . that it WQWd be considered
privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of
a claim of privilege, the question that must be. asked is not
only whether the requested information falls 'Wi,thiri one of the
traditional privileges, but also. whether that privilege should
be honored in a given procedural setting. ·
The leading case on executive privilege in the United
States is U.S. v. Nixon, decided in 1974. At issile in that
case was the validity of President Nixon's claim ·Jr executive
a
. privilege against subpoena issued by a district court requiring
the production of certain tapes and documents rela:tmg to the
Watergate investigations; The claim of privilege was based on
the President's general interest in the confidentiality of his
conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that
while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality
in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the
extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President's
powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the President's claim
of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against
the public interest in the fair administration ofcriminaljustice.
Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it -was not there
addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or
against congressional demands for information.
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive
privilege against Congress are rare. Despite frequent assertion
of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning
with President Washington's refusal to turn over treaty
negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S.
Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue. However, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in
a case decided, earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized
the Presidetlt's privilege over his corrversations against a
congressional subpoena. Anticipating the balancing approach
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon,· the Court of
Appeals ·weighed the public . interest protected by the claim
of privilege against the interest that would be served by
separation of powers," by which the Court meant Presidential

conversations, correspondeneesjand discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. It also held t~.;:tt information-on military and
diplomatic secrets and those aff~ing .national security, and
information on investigations of crimes bylaw enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted
from the right to information.
From the above discussion . 011 the meaning and scope
of executive privilege,.bot;h .inthe United. States and in this
jurisdiction, a Clear · principle emerges. Executive privilege,
whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a
sensitive character, While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not dependllig on the
ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are
exempt from the duty to disclose infomiatfo» by the.mere fact of
being executive officials. Indeed, tq.e.. extraordinary character of
the exemptions indicates thatthepresumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and iii favor of disclosure.
Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the
officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing. before Congress, Tb.ere are significant
differences · between the. two provisions, however, which
constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions
separately. · ·
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It
does not, unlike Section 3, require a· prior determination
by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The
President herself has, through the challenged order, made
the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section
3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 · is not
made to depend on the department heads' possession of any
information which might be covered by executive privilege.
In fact, in p::iarked contrast to Section 3 vis-a-vis Section 2
there is J?,O reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, th~
required' prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article
VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to
as the question hour.
be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this,

Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President,
because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to
inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that
matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in
contempt of the House.
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant
to be discretionary in the question. hour' it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Com.missioner
Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the
amendment to make the appearance of department heads
discretionary in the question hour. '
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members
of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely in
recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on
question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the
original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on
inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following
exchange during the deliberations:
. MR; GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman
of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer,
to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson
of the Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide; to give
his reaction.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER(Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have
only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of
putting it as Section 31, it ,should follow Legislative Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee
say? ,
,.. •·"- .
MR.. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to
reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG.Actually, we considered that previously
when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21,
known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific

provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution which
made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same
perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established
by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of
the legislature and are directly accountable to· it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of
government is the immediate accountability of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They
shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program
of government and shall determine the guidelines of national
policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of
office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their
term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in
office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National
Assembly. The moment. this confidence .is 'lost the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.' ·
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the
mandatory nature of such appearance during the question
hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to
a system of separation of powers. To that extent, the question
hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction; departs
from the question period of the parliamentary system. That
department heads may not be required to appear in a question
hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered
powerless to elicit information from them in an circumstances.
In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period,
the need to enforce Congress' right to executive information
in the performance of its legislative function becomes more
imperative. As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to
tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Con-
gress has the right to obtain information from any source
- even from officials,of departments and agencies in the
executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike
the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system
such as .,,that in Britain, a clear separation between the
legislative and' executive branches. It is this very separa-
tion that makes the congressional right to obtain informa-
tion from the executive so essential, if thefunctions of the
Congress as the elected representatives of the people are ·
718 STATU'l'ORY CONSTRUCTION
of powers. While the executive branch is .a co-equal branch of

the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for informa-
tion.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is
by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere
fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official
may be exempted from this power - the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment .. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are
also exempt from this power of inquiry, Unlike the Presidency,
judicial power is vested in. a collegial body; hence, each member
thereof is exempt on the basis not only . of separation of
powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional
independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute,
as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted
it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief
Justice.
Having established the proper interpretation of Section
22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to
pass on the constitutionality of Section 1ofE.O.464.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of
Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference
to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited
in its application to appearances of department heads in the
question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section
22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as
possible, in a way that wiiI render it constitutional.
The r,.eq~ment ·then to secure presidential consent
under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
questionhour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22 Article
VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in
the question hour is discretionary on their part. ,
first secure the consent ofthe President prior to appearing before

Congress, This requirement effectively bars the appearance
of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The proviso allowingthe President to give its consent
means nothing more than· tha:t the President· may reverse a
prohibition which already exists by virtue ofE.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the
determination by a head of office,. authorized by the President
under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official
is in possession of information that is covered by executive
privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the
official's not showing up in the legislative investigation.
I
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464

to justify his failure to be present, such. invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a
head of officeauthorized by the President, has determined that
the requested information is privileged, and that the President
has not· reversed such determination. Such declaration,
however, even without mentioning the term "executive
privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information
is being withheld by the.executive branch, by authority of the
President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is
an implied claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent
Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon
illustrates the implied nature ofthe claim ofprivilege authorized
by E.O. 464. It reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by

the Committee of the Whole regarding the North Rail
Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29
September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that
officials of the Executive Department invited to appear
at the meeting will ~ot be able to attend the same with-
out the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive
OrdE)ir'N4>~ 464 (s.· 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance
Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To
The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The
Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inqui-
ries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And
collegiate courts; or executive sessions of either house of

Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of in-
formation cannot be . pried open by a co-equal branch of
government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and
assessments, free from the glare of publicitY and pres-
sure by interested parties, is essential to protect the in-
dependence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise
Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not
the situation in the instant case.
Section 3 of E.0, 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed

outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of
executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess
the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine
whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed
on a case-to-case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor
and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in
an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid
per se. By its very nature, andas demonstrated by the letter
of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied
claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied
by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether
the information demanded involves military or diplomatic
secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section
2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered
by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left
to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by
the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be
comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in
the phrase "confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive
order."
Certainly, Congress ,has the right to know why the
executive considers the requested information privileged. It
does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an
authorized head ~f office, has determined that it is so, and that
the President has not overturned that determination. Such
declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested
informationconld be classified as privileged. That the message
is couched in terms. that, on first impression, do not seem like
- that those who evaluated claimant's product were involved in

internal policymaking; generally, or in this particular instance.
Privilege cannot· be-set up by· an unsupported claim,. The facts
upon which the privilege is based must be established.' To find
these interrogatories. objectionable, this. Court would have to
assume that the evaluation and classification of claimant's
products was a matter of internal policy formulation, an
assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua
sponte.
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department. of Energy similarly
emphasizes that "an agency must provide 'precise and
certain' reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested
information." · ·
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America amplifies, thus:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege re-
quires a specific designation and description of the docu-
ments within its scope as well as precise and certain
reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this
specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim
short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protect-
ed. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more
than its. sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the
applicability of the claim. An improperly asserted claim
of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the
fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as
Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim
in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow
the Court to make a just and reasonable determination
as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in
which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling
reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny,
would make a farce of the whole procedure.
Due respect for a , co-equal branch. of government,
moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly
statingthe grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in
McPhaul vtU,'S:
We think the Court's decision in United States v.

Bryan, 339 U.S. 323~ 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to
these questions. For it is as true here as it was there,
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine

whether the withholding of information is justified under the
circumstances of each case. It severely ;fhistratEls the power of
inquiry of Congress.
I
In fine, Section :'.\ and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be

invalidated. ·
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it
merely provides guidelines, binding' only on the heads of office
mentioned in Section 2(b); t>n what is covered by executive
privilege. It does not purport . to be conclusive on the other
branches of government. lt may thus be construed as a mere
expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature
and scope of executive privilege.
, Petitioners, ·however, · assert as another ground for
invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful
delegation of authority to the: heads of offices in Section 2(b).
Petitioner Senate of the. Philippines, .in~piµ-ticular, cites the
case of the United States where, so it claims, only the President
can assert executive privilege to withhold information from
Congress. .
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides
that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to
bear the President's authority and has the effect of prohibiting
the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the
express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
appearance. of such official. These provisions thus allow the
President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to
the exceptional nature oftheprivilege .. Executive privilege, as
. already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the
unique role and responsibilities of the ex0cutjve branch, or in
those instances where exemption from disclosure :is necessary
to the-disch?I'ge,oflljg~y important executive responsibilities.
The doctrilfe o( executive p:tjy;ilege is thus premised on the fact
that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity; be
kept confidential.in pursuitofthe public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect

for such officials does not.' change the infirm nature of the
authorization itself.
Right to Information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress
for the appearance of executive officials·.· in .the hearings
conducted by it, and not with the demands of . citizens for
to
information pursuant their right to information on matters of
public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however,
that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely
the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to
information. '
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the
right of Congress to information which underlies the power of
inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents p~1,1ant to his rlght to information
does not have the same, obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to lllformation
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony ~Qlll. government
officials. These powers belong only to Congress 'and not to an
individual citizen. ·
Thus, while Congress is 'composed of. representatives
elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry,
the people-are exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are
generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance
tending to unduly limit disclosures of information . in such
investigations necessarily deprives the people of information
which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed
to be a matter of public' concern. The citizens are· thereby
denied access to information which :they can use in•fomiulating
the~ own ~~ on the matter before· Congress - opinions
which they can then communicate to their representatives and
other government offic;ials through the various legal means
allowed by their freedom of expression. ThU$ holds Valmonte
v. Belmonte: ·
the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it

was implemented.
Conclusion
_Congr~ss undoubtedly has a.right to inform~tipn from the
executive branch whepeyer it is spui,h.t ~ aid of legislation, If
the executive branch Withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it ni~st-~o a~sett it arid' state.the reason
therefor and why ff must be respected. -
The infirni: provisions of E~O, 464; however, allow
the executive branch to evade oongressfonal requests. for
information without need of clearly asserting a ri~ht to do so
_ and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mereexpedient
of invoking said provisions, the power ,of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid oflegislationis frustrated. Thatis impermissible.
For [w]hat republican theory did accomplish, ... was to reverse
the oldpresumption in favor ofsetj'ecy, based onthe divine
right of kings and nobles, 'and replace it with a·pres'umption in
favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty.
(Underscoring supplied) -
. . '
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive

branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed
valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power
of our legislature to inquire into the .operations ofgovernment,
but we shall _have given up something of much greater value
- our right as a people to take part in government.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum - What is ex.pressed puts an end to

that which is implied.
Ex necessitate leffes:.., , 11py .n~S1'!¥Y im,p]i~tionpf law.
._., ··~ --. --, -\,!'; .' \':···,,.- .. ~-~-- ......)1~ ··-"
Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat - False

deseriptionidees. not. preeladerceestruetion .nnr vitiate the
meaning of the statute; . - ;,, .-:;-, D' ·;
Favores ampliandi sunt;:ddia -restrittgenda· - Penahlaws which ate

favorable to the accused aretgiv~n •retroactive effect: .: ·-·'
Generate dictum geittraliter ~st ittterptetandum -' : A general
statement· is'-underst.OOd)fu aigeneral se:i:ise.
Generalia oerba siint ge~rolite'r•fo:reltigenda- '--- What is• gener81.Iy
spoken ·shall be gener8lly Uhffer8rodd. ; ; : --' J' ' ; ;;
G-ener~lia specialibus non derogani~ Ai~ne~~ l~~ does n~t nullify

a specific or special law. ·•
Hoc quidem perqtiirfii "durum est;'··sed 'ita lex 's'Chpta est· - It is
exceedfuglffurrd'btit so thel'awis Wt:i.tte:ii. ' ': ._ - . ' -
lmpossibilium nulla obligatio est - Th~re is n~ ~bllgati~n to do an
- impossible tlili:ig. - -. - ' ·
.. . ... ,• ... .~ '-
Index animi sermo est - Speech is the index of intention.

I~ eo quod plus sUI ;;~~!' ine1Jt-~~-mi~. -·The greater.Includes
the lesser,.-, .. ·
,
Interest reipublicae ut sit finis liti~",;,, - Public interestrequkes that

by the vei;y nature of things. there must be an end to a legal
controversy. · - · ' - ! · - - -- -- - ··
Interpotare et concordare leffe,bus est • 6pti;,;,zis interpotandi '~odus

....:;; Every statute must be so censtrued .and: .harmonized with
other-statutes as to formuniform system of'law.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res ~ valeat quam pereat ..:.. - A law
should be interpreted with a view to 'upholding .father than
destroying it.
I nterpretatio ta tie" '"'-in. ambiguis semper fienda est · ut eoitetur
inconoeniens et absurdum - Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to
be adopted.
Ratio legis - Interpretation according to spirit.

Ratio legis est anima legis -The reason of the law is its soul.
Reddendo singula singulis - Referring each to each; referring each
phrase or expression to its appropriate obiect.or let each be put
in its proper place. ·
Salus populi est suprema lex - The voice of the people is the supreme
law. .
Surplusagium non nocet ·~· Surplusage does not vitiate a statute.
Stare decisis et non quieta mouere - Follow past precedents and do
not disturb what has been settled.
Ubijus, ibi remedium - Where thereis a right, there is a/rem~dy.
Ubi lex non distinguit, nee nos distinguere debemus - Where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
Utile per inutile non vitiatur - The useful is not vitiated by the
non-useful.
Ut res magis valeat quam pereat - That construction is to be sought
which gives effect to the whole of the statute - its every
word.
Verba accipienda sunt secundum eubjectam.materiam - A word is
to be understood in the context in which it is used.
Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire - Words ought to
be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the
words.
Verba legis - Plain-meaning rule.
Vigilantibus et non dormientibus Jura subveniunt - The laws aid
the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
Verba legis non est recedendum - From the words of the statute
there should be no departure.
-B-
Backwages (Methods of Computation), 225
Barangay Ordinance, E34
Bill
defined, 6
passage steps of bill into law, 6-10
readings (first, second and third), 6- 7
conference committee, 7-9
authentication, 9
president's approval or veto, 9-10
Bill of Attainder, 495
Budget Process (Phases), 17
-C-
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, 336
Citizen (Questioning Constitutionality of a Law/Right for Judicial
Review), 78
City Ordinance, 65
Code,39
Codification (Construing), 538
Comma,163
Conference Committee
defi.ned,8
function (broader), 8
Congress
composition, 4
legislative power, 4
restrictions and powers with passage of· revenue and
appropriation bills, 18-23
granting of emergency power to the president, 673
power of inquiry, 705
right to information, 730
Constitution ·
defined,581,657
on defining and vestinglegislative power, 4
self-executing and non-self executing provisions; 5
mandatory requirement of expressing the subject in the title
... ·'
of statute, 10
purposes, 11-12
effect of insufficiency of title, 14
record/journal in legislative proceedings, 23
Corpus Juris Secundum, 652

Courts
judicial power, 69, 73
limitations on the power of judicial review, 75, 700
incapable to construe statute which is clear from doubt, 126
may not enlarge the scope or revise a statute,.151
do not pass upon questions of wisdom,justice or expediency,
155
resort of legislative deliberations, 176
on looking to thehistory of thetimes, 189
disregarding contemporaneous construction, 196
correcting clerical errors, 232 ·
regarding absurdity ori the ::meaning of statutes, 236 .. 243
liberal construction of rules of court, 450
cases literal stricture of rules are relaxed, 451
issues in E.O. 464, 700
Curative Statutes
defined,451,516
conditions such statutes will be given retroactive effect, 522
-D-
Department of Agrarian Reform (Primary Jurisdiction), 361
Directory Statute · ·
defined,454
determining statute as either mandatory or directory, 454-456
use of certain words (i.e, shall, must and may), 456-467
statutes classified as directOry, 482-487
Distingue tempora et concordabis jura, 379
Dura Lex Sed Lex, 209
Effectivity Clause, 15
Ejusdem generis
purpose of the rule, 115 30~, 315
illustrations, 310
requisites for th~ rule to be applicable, 313
Election Laws ,. ., ·" ·.
purpose,.440
as manilatory or directory statute, 478
Election Recall (Limitations), 241
Enacting Clause, 14
defined,384
· organs for law-making purposes, 396
General Welfare Clause ;._;,
branches,436
applieablerules forinterpretation;438.
General Welfare Legislations, 433J ,. ' ; ·
Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum
· principle of, 276
illustrative example, 277
Generalia specialibus non derogant
principle, 564
application, 565
-H-
Holiday Pay (Purpose), 434
House of Representatives . . .
purpose of· certain bills exclusively orig:ln.ati:J'lg from lower
house, 16 · · · ·' t' . · '
record of proceedings, 23 ·'
rules of proceedings, 24-27
-·1-·
Impeachment
rules of, 636
substantial issues for impeachment, 637
In Pari Materia Statutes
defined,376
rule of construing, 376
Incidental Power, 261
Interest (Material Interest), 69 , .
Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus' interpretandi
modus, 376
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat
principle of, 365
reason and qualification, 365
Interpretation (Statutory)
defined, lQ.4 .'~ •
cardinal rule, 107
purpose, 107
Item in a Bill, 21
Item in an Appropriation Bill, 21
on approving contemporaneous construction, 199

power to amend, 529
O
purpose of revisions and codification, 535
O
rule in construing codification, 538
repealing power, 539
Libel, 306
Liberal Construction, 394 O
Limited Government, 42 O
O
Local Government .
legislative power, 64 . . · . . .· ., ' •·
power to appropriate money for welfare of inhabitants, 262
legislative grants, 414 . · · . ·. · . ·· .
general welfare clause on the power of local government; 436
rules regarding statutes granting of taxing power, 439 P
Local Law, 2 ·
-M- P
P
Macarandang Doctrine, 142
Mandatory Statute . ,
defined, 453 · . . . . · .· ·. . . .·•·.. . '.
determining statute as either mandatory or 4irecto11• 454456
use of certain words (i.e, shall, must and may), 456-457
statutes classified as mandatory, 474-481 · ·
Martial Law (Declaration of), 666
May (Auxiliary Verb), 460
~e
Memorandum Circulars, 34
Pe
Memorandum Orders, 34
Municipal Ordinance, 65 Pe
Ph
Must (Auxiliary Verb), 459
Ph
-N-
National Wages and Productivity Commission (Powers), 132 Ph
Nationalism, 623 Pl
Naturalization Laws, 415 Po
Negative Statute Pre
defined,473 Pr
distinction V{itli an affirmative statute, 558
Nemo tenetur ad impossibile, 253
Noscitur a sociis · Pr
rule of, 302
illustrative examples, 303-308
powers in passage of revenue and appropriation bills, 18-23

presidential issuances (ordinance power), 34, 98, 669
types, 98
period issuances will take effect, 99
roles, 38
delegation of legislative powers, 47 ·
message to legislature, 174
on power/authority to deport; 262
vested power to appoint, 262, 613
some acts beyond the power of the president; 264
as the commander-in-chief, 664
calling-out power, 665
agreements with foreign corporation on utilization of natural
resources, 676 1
requirements before entering service contracts, 697 .
Private Statute, 2
Procedural Laws, 509, 514
Processing Plant, 275
Proclamations (Presidential), 34
Prospective Statute
defi.ned,488
principle ofprospectivity, 489
terms indicating prospective -effect, 493
statutes with prospective effect, 494-508
Provincial Ordinance, 66
Provisos
role and purpose, 341
as additional legislation, 343
'on enlarging scope of the law, 342
qualification, 343
difference with exception, 34 7
Psychological Incapacity (Ground for Annulment Guidelines), 148
Public Administrative Agency (Rule-Making Power), 43, 55
Public Statute, 2
Purview or Body of Statute, 15
-R-
Ratio Legis est Animti, 230
Ratio Legis, 2,14
Reddendo si;igula singulis, 339
Redemption Laws, 452
Reenacted Statute, 390
exceptions, 388
prevailing over general law, 564
repealing general laws, 569 ·
Special Statute, 384
Stare decisis et non quieta novere, 140
Stare decisis, 202
Statute
de:fined,l
classifications, 2-3
manner of:referring or .identifying, 3
general parts, 10-16; 157-162
preamble, 10, 160
illustration, '161
title, 10-12, 157-159
context, 162
general aids for construction, 163-172
punctuations marks, 163
capitalization ofletters, 165
headings or epigraphs, 166
lingual text, 167
intent/spirit of the law, 168
considering whole and each part of statute to extract
the intent, 356
prevails over the letter, 213-214
limitations, 218
policy of the law, 169
suppression of mischief intent, 170
dictionary, 171
consequences of various constructions offered, 172
presumptions, 172
looking on prior laws to ascertain intent oflawrn:aker, 178
superior to administrative regulation, 43
declaring the unconstitutionality oflaws, 66-67, 87
requisites to resolve constitutionality, 68
raising the question of constitutionality, 73
vague statute, 87 '
effect of unconstitutionality, 88
orthodox . ~ew, 90
modern view, 90
strict view, 90-91
inapplicability due to change ofcircumstancea affecting
validity, 91
748 STATUT(')J.tY:.CONSTROCTION
essential·.elementslmatters,t:l\11 ·
cardinal rule, 114 • •r · ·•
ejusdem genens:rme; 115';' :309, 315 ; "
by an administrative agency; 13T '' _, '"
aids to conStniction/157--172' --
conscience and:eqility, 2'15 ''' · · .·
role of reason oflaw, 23()
avoiding danger of public mretest; 247
progressi~idriM'r'ptefu:tioh; 27'8 ;. · .· =: _,
rule of where' faws doesvnot' lnstiriguish, oomtS should not
distinguish, 2g:l ·' .: • ·' ., "
rulf:! of constrllii:ig :3 Statute •3'.iHi: wliole/351 . '
consttufug thin&tute iii hartnony with the Coristitutidn, 373
Statutory Min:innllii.Wage, 133' · · ' · ., -, 1 "··
Strict Construction, 393 · ·
Subic Bay Freeport , ..
purpose, 52 -
rights and obligations, 53
Subic Special Economic Zone, 51
Substantive Law, 498
Substantive Right, 498 . .. . . .
Subversion (Elements that prove' liability for, such 'circumstances),
149
Sugarcane Planter (Statutory Definition), 272
Supplemental Statute, 3~9 · · ·
Supreme Court
rule-making power, 62
decisions as part of legal system, 139,
subjected as non-retroactive, 140 .
en a
power of bane to modify or reverse doctrine, 145
on issuing guideliries to define a law/sfutute, 1li_7 · _
conditions ruling will come' Witlifu doetrine 6'fstare decisis,
203
-T-
Taxes
as a power ,..4~6 :•
strict construing of statutes imposing taxes and duties, 416
strict eonstruetion of statutes granting exemptions; 417<'
illustrative cases, 422-428
effect of exemption, 429
CASE INDEX
ACORD v. Zamora, G.R. No. 144256, June 8, 2005 , 605

Acosta v: Adaza, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007 462
Alonto v. People, G.R. No. 140078, December 9, 2004 297
Anet v, Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2004 152
Aquino v. Quezon City, G.R. No.137534, August 3, 2006 352
Asian Transmission Corp; v. CA, '
G.R. No.144664,March 15, 2004 , 434
Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, . .
G.R. No. 175895, April 12, 2007 , .L 145
Calingin v. CA, G.R. No. 154616. July 12, 2004 '. 386
Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corp. v. Microasia
Corp., G.R. No. 169080, December 19, 2007 .. , 174
Cemco Holdings, Inc. v. National Life Insurance Co.,
G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007 144,196
City of Baguio v, Marcos, G.R. No. 26100,
February 28, 1969 · ; .: 158
City of Davao v. RTC, G.R. No. 127383, August 18, 2005 539
Commssion on Audit v. Province of Cebu,
G.R. No. 141386, November 29, 2001.. ; .. 256
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Express,
· G.R. No. 152609, June 29;·2005 134, 201, 316
Coconut Oil Refiners Assn., Inc. v. Torres,
G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005 323, 336
DAR v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005 58
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 662
David v. Comelec, G.R. No. 127116, April 8, 1997 552
Enriquez v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303, August 25, 2005 .457
Executive Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,
G.R. No. 164171, February 20, 2006 .46
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives,
G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003 75
Garcia v. Social Securj.ty Commission,
G.R. No. 17-0735, December 17, 2007 112, 316
GSIS v. City Assessor oflloilo, G.R. No. 147192,
June 21, 2006 550, 556
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/. L0nv--f!V.Fjfhlt- ~Plhc..RUBEN E. AGPALO

No portion of this book may be copied or

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

1.20. Presidential issuances . 34

F. EFFECT AND OPERATION

A. NATURE AND PURPOSE

3.33. Generally . 190

4.25. Doctrine of necessary implication . 254

5.01. Generally . 269

B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO

6.14. Statute construed in harmony with

7.01. Generally ~ . 393

8.10. Statutes conferring power , ..,, .. ; ......•....•............... 474

8.20. Statutes prescribing guid.ance·fdt offkei's ... , .. :.''.;···;··· 482

B. REVISION AND CODIFJCATION

orders issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power

1.03~ Permanent and te~poraey statutes.

2 Sec. 1, Proclamation No; 3, March 25, 1986, known as Freedom C~nstitution

1.07. Legislative power of Congress.

The Constitution has explicitly provided .that legislative. power

I•Occeria v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 755 [1980].

However, a law may not be declared unconstitutional when

1.09. Steps in the passage of bill into law.

a) First and second readings of bills.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 CRA 268 [1997).

differences will be settled by the Conference Committees of both

2 •sec. 27[1], Art. VI.

thus precludes the insertionrof riders in legislation, a.rider being a

A fourth purpose rriay-he ~4d~d. Thetitle of.a ~~atute is, used as

copiprehen.~iv~e · ~~~ug~ as t<>, in~l11?~ }he.·.ge~~r~ ,8bj'eCt 'V.:hl.c~ the

· e) · Effect of itt~ufftciency of title.

'4BPeople v. Valensoy, 101 Phil. 642 [1957].

Paras, 123 SCRA 569 [1983].

declaration finding the earlier law unconstitutional. The power to

1.11. Meaning of certain bills originating from lower House.

The enactment of an appropriation bill follows the usual route

1.13. Restrictions in passage of budget or revenue bills.

68Sec. 25[1], Art. Art. VI.

3. Procedure in approving appropriations. - The procedure

67!'hil. Association, Inc. v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 [1994].

9. No public funds tobe spent except by law. ~No money shall

1.15. Power to issue its rules of proceedings.

MArroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 [1997].

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule.

1.17. Enrolled sm,

OOMoralef!'V:.Stl.bido, 27 SCRA 131 [1969].

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is

D. ISSUANCES, RULES AND ORDINANCES

1.20. Presidential issuances.

100Pesigan:v.$'geles, G.R. No. 64279, April 30, 1984.

SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center

branch of government of power belonging to another will be

contending state policies - the primacy of national security,

basic distinctions .between absolute and limited government.

1.21. Administrative rules and regulations.

public interestt= public welfar.e;n9. interests. . of law and order.=

mpeople v. R?se11thhl, 68 Phil. 328 (1939); Municipality of Cardona v. Binang-

In another case,126 the.law involved was Sec. 6 ofR.A. No. 6646,

1.22. illustrative cases on validity of executive orders, rules