Country Policy and Information Note Hazaras Pakistan July 2022

Country Policy and Information Note
Pakistan: Hazaras
Version 3.0
July 2022
Preface
Purpose
This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by
Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human
rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an
exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme.
It is split into 2 parts: (1) an assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI.
These are explained in more detail below.
Assessment
This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note - that is information in the
COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw - by
describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general,
whether one or more of the following applies:
• a person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm
• that the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions
amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and
339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules / Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR)
• that the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing
there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual
threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a
situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and
339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules
• a person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)
• a person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory
• a claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of
leave, and
• if a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’
under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis,
taking into account each case’s specific facts.
Country of origin information
The country information in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with
the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European
Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008,
and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and
Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training
Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy,
balance, currency, transparency and traceability.
The structure and content of the country information section follows a terms of
reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to this note.
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All information included in the note was published or made publicly available on or
before the ‘cut-off’ date(s) in the country information section. Any event taking place
or report/article published after these date(s) is not included.
All information is publicly accessible or can be made publicly available. Sources and
the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors
relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:
• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
• the currency and detail of information
• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources.
Multiple sourcing is used to ensure that the information is accurate and balanced,
which is compared and contrasted where appropriate so that a comprehensive and
up-to-date picture is provided of the issues relevant to this note at the time of
publication.
The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s)
expressed.
Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote. Full details of all sources cited
and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.
Feedback
Our goal is to provide accurate, reliable and up-to-date COI and clear guidance. We
welcome feedback on how to improve our products. If you would like to comment on
this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in
March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to
support him in reviewing the efficiency, effectiveness and consistency of approach of
COI produced by the Home Office.
The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the
function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy.
The IAGCI may be contacted at:
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
5th Floor
Globe House
89 Eccleston Square
London, SW1V 1PN
Email: chiefinspector@icibi.gov.uk
Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the documents which have been
reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s pages of
the gov.uk website.
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Contents
Assessment .............................................................................................................. 6
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Basis of claim ........................................................................................... 6
1.2 Points to note ........................................................................................... 6
2. Consideration of issues ................................................................................... 6
2.1 Credibility.................................................................................................. 6
2.2 Exclusion .................................................................................................. 7
2.3 Convention reason(s) ............................................................................... 7
2.4 Risk .......................................................................................................... 7
2.5 Protection ............................................................................................... 10
2.6 Internal relocation ................................................................................... 11
2.7 Certification ............................................................................................ 11
Country information ............................................................................................... 12
3. Legal context ................................................................................................. 12
3.1 Constitution ............................................................................................ 12
4. The Pakistan-Hazara community ................................................................... 12
4.1 Population .............................................................................................. 12
4.2 Location .................................................................................................. 13
4.3 Identifying characteristics ....................................................................... 14
4.4 Socio-economic situation........................................................................ 15
4.5 Documentation ....................................................................................... 16
4.6 Political representation ........................................................................... 16
5. Treatment by the state ................................................................................... 17
5.1 Discrimination and harassment .............................................................. 17
6. Societal treatment and attitudes .................................................................... 19
6.1 Community relations ............................................................................... 19
6.2 Anti-Shia Hazara sentiment .................................................................... 20
7. Security situation ........................................................................................... 21
7.1 Militant threats and attacks ..................................................................... 21
7.2 Security situation in Quetta..................................................................... 24
7.3 Security situation outside of Quetta ........................................................ 26
8. State protection.............................................................................................. 27
8.1 Provision of security ............................................................................... 27
9. Access to, and treatment in, services ............................................................ 30
9.1 Education ............................................................................................... 30
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9.2 Employment ........................................................................................... 31
9.3 Healthcare .............................................................................................. 32
Terms of Reference ................................................................................................ 33
Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 34
Sources cited ........................................................................................................ 34
Sources consulted but not cited ............................................................................ 37
Version control ....................................................................................................... 39
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Assessment
This section was updated on 14 July 2022
1. Introduction
1.1 Basis of claim
1.1.1 Fear of persecution and/or serious harm by state or non-state actors
because the person is ethnic Hazara.
1.2 Points to note
1.2.1 Hazaras are an ethnic group, the majority of whom are Shia Muslim. They
have a distinct appearance making them easily identifiable from the majority
of Pakistan's population.
1.2.2 For information on non-Hazara Shia Muslims see the Country Policy and
Information Note Pakistan: Shia Muslims.
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2. Consideration of issues
2.1 Credibility
2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing
Credibility and Refugee Status.
2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for
a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas
should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum
Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).
2.1.3 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of
origin, decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language
analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).
Official – sensitive: Start of section

The information on this page has been removed as it is restricted for internal
Home Office use.
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Home Office use.
Official – sensitive: End of section
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2.2 Exclusion
2.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for
considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable.
Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits.
2.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be
excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of
exclusions than refugee status).
2.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction
on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention,
Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

Home Office use.

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2.3 Convention reason(s)
2.3.1 Actual or imputed race or religion.
2.3.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a
refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of an actual or imputed Refugee Convention reason.
2.3.3 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds see the Asylum
Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
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2.4 Risk
a. State treatment
2.4.1 In general, Hazaras are not at risk of persecution or serious harm from the
state. While some Hazara face official discrimination, in general this is not
likely to be sufficiently serious by its nature and/or repetition, or by an
accumulation of various measures, to amount to persecution or serious
harm. Each case must be considered on its own merits with the onus on the
person to demonstrate that they would be at real risk from the state.
2.4.2 In a total population of nearly 243 million, an estimated 600,000 to one
million Hazaras live in Pakistan. Around half a million live in Quetta,
Balochistan, mostly concentrated in enclaves known as Hazara Town and
Mariabad (Mari Abad) due to the general security situation in Balochistan.
There are also Hazara communities living elsewhere, including Islamabad,
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Karachi, and Lahore. The majority of Hazaras are Shia Muslim, whilst the
majority of Muslims in Pakistan are Sunni. A multiple-sourced report by the
European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) notes that Hazaras living in
rural areas speak Hazaragi, an eastern dialect of the Persian (Farsi)
language, while those in urban areas also speak other languages including
standard Persian, Urdu and English
2.4.3 The Constitution provides for the equality of citizens and the protection of
minorities. However, according to Minority Rights Group International
(MRGI), in the Pakistani context, ‘minority’ usually refers to religious
minorities – that is Hindus, Christians and Sikhs – who are constitutionally
recognised. Sectarian and ethnic minorities, such as Shia Muslims and
Hazaras, fall outside this commonly accepted definition of ‘minority’ and are
not explicitly recognised under the Constitution (see Legal context).
2.4.4 Hazaras report delays and refusals in issuing Computerised National Identity
Cards (CNICs) by National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)
officials, which the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) attributed
to their ethnicity. CNICs are required to access public services. According to
the HRCP and the Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive
Development (CREID), Hazaras have to prove they are Pakistani and not
Afghan refugees in order to obtain passports and CNICs (see
Documentation and Discrimination and harassment).
2.4.5 The Hazara population is concentrated in Hazara Town and Mariabad (in the
city of Quetta), which were subject to heightened restrictions on movement
imposed by the provincial government in response to coronavirus (COVID-
19), prior to a formal lockdown. According to the US Commission on
International Religious Freedom and the Institute of Development Studies
(IDS), Hazaras were blamed for bringing the virus into Pakistan, after
returning from a pilgrimage in Iran despite the fact that they comprised only a
small proportion of both Shia and non-Shia returns from Iran. According to
the Balochistan provincial apex committee, the decision to restrict movement
was in response to concern about increased risk of spreading the virus.
Hazara employees from some government offices were furloughed, whilst
non-Shia staff continued to work. Access to healthcare was restricted during
COVID-19 as some doctors refused to treat Hazaras (see Discrimination and
harassment and Healthcare).
2.4.6 A study by CREID found that community members in Quetta, particularly
women, face harassment and intimidation by security officials and that
security checks are more strictly enforced for Hazaras at check points (see
Discrimination and harassment).
2.4.7 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on
Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
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b. Societal treatment
2.4.8 Information on the societal treatment of Hazaras beyond Quetta was limited.
Based on available evidence, in general, the level and nature of societal
discrimination faced by Hazaras is not sufficiently serious by its nature
and/or repetition, or by an accumulation of various measures, to amount to
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persecution or serious harm. Each case must be considered on its own
merits with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they would be at real
risk from societal actors.
2.4.9 A Baloch nationalist leader and CREID considered that Hazaras have cordial
relationships with non-Hazaras in Quetta, mainly Balochs and Pashtuns, with
whom they maintain social, business and work ties (see Community
relations).
2.4.10 Shia Muslims generally, but particularly Hazaras, faced online harassment
after the first confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Pakistan were largely
amongst Shia pilgrims from Iran. Hate speech threatening sectarian and
ethnic revenge also occurred following the killing of a Pashtun man in
Hazara Town in May 2020. In the days following the attack 2 Hazaras were
reportedly subjected to revenge attacks, with one killed. Sectarian hate
speech by Sunni extremists targets Hazaras, who they deem heretics due to
their Shia faith (see Anti-Shia Hazara sentiment and Community relations).
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c. Treatment by non-state armed groups
2.4.12 In general, Hazaras are unlikely to be at real risk of persecution or serious
harm by non-state actors. Overall the number and frequency of incidents,
relative to the size of the population of Hazaras living in Pakistan, is low.
Each case must be considered on its own merits with the onus on the person
to demonstrate that they would be at real risk from non-state actors.
2.4.13 Armed sectarian groups including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Islamic State (IS) are known to target Shia
Muslims, including Hazaras (see Security situation).
2.4.14 The majority of attacks occur in Balochistan. Hazaras can be vulnerable to
attacks when they leave their enclaves in Hazara Town and Mariabad in
Quetta, which, according MRGI, is because Hazaras are clearly identifiable.
This causes some restriction on their freedom of movement, which in turn
limits access to education, employment and healthcare. However, according
to the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(DFAT)’s January 2022 report, there are no reports of targeted attacks on
Hazaras outside Balochistan since 2014 (see Security situation and Access
to, and treatment in, services).
2.4.15 According to Pakistan’s National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), at
least 2,000 Hazaras (0.2% of the estimated 1 million Hazara population)
have been killed in terrorist-related incidents and targeted killings between
1999 and late 2017. The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) recorded 383
deaths due to attacks between 2006 and 2021. The SATP recorded a peak
of attacks in 2012 (42), which have subsequently declined to an average of 4
per year (see Security situation).
2.4.16 In April 2019, an attack claimed by LeJ and Islamic State targeted the
Hazara community at a market in Quetta, killing 9 Hazaras and at least 10
others. In August 2019, one Hazara was killed in an explosion at a shoe
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market in an area of Quetta where the shops are mostly owned by Hazaras.
No one claimed responsibility. In January 2021, the Islamic State group
claimed responsibility for abducting and killing 10 Hazara miners in Mach,
about 50km east of Quetta (see Security situation).
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2.5 Protection
2.5.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state they
will not, in general, be able to obtain protection from the authorities.
2.5.2 Where the person has a well-founded fear from non-state actors, the state is,
in general, willing and able to provide effective protection, which is
accessible, to Hazaras. A person’s reluctance to seek protection does not
mean that effective protection is not available. Each case must be
considered on its facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that
protection is not available.
2.5.3 The government has taken reasonable steps to operate an effective legal
system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of criminal acts
(Country Policy and Information Note on Pakistan: Actors of protection). This
includes measures to limit the capability of terrorist groups that target the
general public as well as Shia Muslims. Security forces have also provided
some protection specifically to Hazaras, particularly those living in Quetta,
including check points around the Hazara enclaves and security escorts
outside of the enclaves and during religious processions The government
reported to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in
January 2022, the measures it has undertaken to enhance protection
including the investigation of all incidents and violence against the Hazara
community (Provision of security).
2.5.4 The reported case of AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT
31 (IAC) (26 January 2011), heard on 11 November 2010, found that
‘Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection, a claimant may still
have a well founded fear of persecution if authorities know or ought to know
of circumstances particular to his/her case giving rise to the fear, but are
unlikely to provide the additional protection the particular circumstances
reasonably require (per Auld LJ at paragraph 55(vi))’ (headnote 2).
2.5.5 Decision makers must also take particular account of past persecution (if
any) and consider whether there are good reasons to consider that such
persecution (and past lack of sufficient protection) is likely to be repeated
(see headnote 3 of AW).
2.5.6 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum
Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status and the Country
Policy and Information Note on Pakistan: Actors of protection.
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2.6 Internal relocation
2.6.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm
from the state, they are unlikely to be able to relocate to escape that risk.
Where the person’s fear is of persecution or serious harm by non-state
actors, in general, there are parts of the country where a person would not
have a well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of serious harm and it will
be reasonable for them to relocate. Each must be considered on its
individual facts.
2.6.2 Whilst freedom of movement, particularly in and around Quetta, is limited
due to security concerns, travel is still possible. There are a number of
Hazara communities across Pakistan, including in larger cities such as
Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad, and the country is large and diverse with no
general barriers to freedom of movement (see Population, Location, Security
situation and the Country Policy and Information Note on Pakistan:
Background information, including internal relocation).
2.6.3 Hazaras can face difficulty in accessing employment because of
discrimination by employers within the non-Hazara population, while Hazara
women face additional obstacles due to prevailing patriarchal attitudes and
cultural norms (see Employment and, for assessment on internal relocation
for women, the Country Policy and Information Note Pakistan: Women
fearing gender-based violence).
2.6.4 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be
taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and
Refugee Status.
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2.7 Certification
2.7.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’
under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
2.7.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and
Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and
Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
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Country information
This section was updated on 24 June 2022
3. Legal context
3.1 Constitution
3.1.1 Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees equality of all citizens1. Article 36
provides for the protection of minorities 2. Article 20 provides for freedom of
religion ‘subject to law, public order and morality.’ 3 Article 28 provides that
‘any section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture shall have
the right to preserve and promote the same and, subject to law, establish
institutions for that purpose.’4
3.1.2 According to an October 2016 report on freedom of religion or belief in
Pakistan, by Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), a UK-based non-
governmental organisation (NGO), which works to secure the rights of
minorities and indigenous peoples:
‘While in the Pakistani Constitution several references are made to
“minorities”, no clear definition for this term is set out, resulting in ambiguity
regarding what constitutes a “minority”. However, “minority” in the Pakistani
context is commonly understood to refer to religious minorities specifically,
thereby limiting the constitutionally recognized minority groups to those such
as Hindus, Christians and Sikhs. This has implications for “internal
minorities” such as Shi’a who, while Muslim, are a sectarian minority, as well
as for ethnic, linguistic and national minorities who are not clearly
constitutionally recognized as such. Particularly vulnerable are those groups,
such as Hazara Shi’a, who face intersectional discrimination on account of
their ethnicity and religious identity, but also those who face caste
discrimination, all of which fall outside of the commonly accepted definition of
“minority” in Pakistan.’ 5
See also Discrimination and harassment.
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4. The Pakistan-Hazara community
4.1 Population
4.1.1 Pakistan’s population was estimated at nearly 243 million as of 2022 6.
According to the most recent national census conducted in 2017, 96% of the
population are Muslim, generally believed to be 80% to 85% Sunni and 15%
to 20% Shia, according to the US Department of State (USSD) 7. The
1 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Article 25), 1973

5 MRGI, ‘Freedom of religion or belief in Pakistan’, October 2016
6 CIA, ‘The World Factbook – Pakistan’ (People and society), 4 May 2022
7 USSD, ‘2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan’ (section I), 2 June 2022
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majority of ethnic Hazaras are Shia Muslim 8, mostly of the Twelver Sect,
although a small number are Sunni and some belong to the Ismaeli sect 9.
According to MRGI, reporting in June 2018, ‘Hazaras are an ethnic group
predominantly based in Afghanistan, but also with a large population in
Pakistan…’10
4.1.2 The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) (formerly: European
Asylum Support Office, EASO) report on Pakistan, dated August 2015
(EUAA Pakistan report 2015), based on a range of sources, noted:
‘Historically, Hazara migrated to Pakistan from central Afghanistan. Some
Hazara families’ origins in Quetta can be traced back to the late 19th
century, though the majority of the community immigrated in two waves – the
first during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 onwards, and the
second in 1996, when the Taliban regime in Afghanistan began to target the
Hazara. Existing local networks enabled the Afghan Hazara to avoid staying
in refugee camps and to integrate better into Pakistani society.’11
4.1.3 Sources estimated 600,000 to one million Hazaras lived across the whole of
Pakistan 12 13, with 500,000 residing in Balochistan’s city of Quetta 14 15, which
had a total population of around 1.1 million (2017 census)16.
4.1.4 On 7 February 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
recorded that, of the 117,547 new arrivals into Pakistan from Afghanistan
since January 2021, 17% [just under 20,000] were Hazara 17. The Human
Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), an independent organisation which
monitors the human rights situation in Pakistan, noted in its 2021 annual
report that after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, a
‘significant number’ of Hazara refugees took ‘temporary shelter’ in Hazara
Town and Mariabad, which are areas in Quetta 18.
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4.2 Location
4.2.1 Pakistan’s National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) study on
Hazaras, published February 2018 and based on a sample of data from 85
respondents including ‘Senators from different political parties, Home
department of Balochistan, Police, Notables, Civil Society, Hazara
community leaders, Asylum seekers, students, activists, journalists and
people from other sects’ in the location of Alamdar Road (Mariabad) and
Hazara town districts of Balochistan, noted that Hazaras resided in different
areas of Pakistan, ‘including, Parachanar, Karachi, Sanghar, Nawabshah,
Hyderabad, different parts of Punjab and Gilgit Baltistan.’ The report also
8 EUAA/EASO, ‘Pakistan Country Overview’ (page 101), August 2015

9 DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Pakistan’ (paragraph 3.3), 25 January 2022
10 MRGI, ‘Pakistan Shi’a and Hazaras’, June 2018
14 HRW, ‘“We are the Walking Dead”: Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan’, 29 June 2014
16 PBS, ‘Population census – District wise – Quetta’ (Table 25), 2017
17 UNHCR, ‘Pakistan: New Arrivals from Afghanistan Update (7 February 2022)’, 11 February 2022
18 HRCP, ‘State of Human Rights in 2021’ (page 115), 2022
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noted that, due to the violence faced in Quetta, some Hazaras, particularly
youths, felt inclined to relocate to Punjab or Islamabad. The same source
said that, aside from Quetta, other areas of Balochistan in which Hazaras
lived included Sanjawi, Much, Zhob, Harnai, Loralai, and Dukki.’19
4.2.2 The Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in its
January 2022 Country Information Report Pakistan (DFAT 2022 report),
which draws on DFAT’s on-the-ground knowledge and discussions with a
range of sources in Pakistan and elsewhere, as well as open source
information, noted that ‘Most [Hazaras] live in enclaves in Quetta due to the
security situation in Balochistan. Smaller populations live in Karachi, Lahore
and Islamabad. Hazaras outside Quetta tend not to live in enclaves to
reduce the risk of ethnic profiling, discrimination and attack.’ 20 According to
the same source, the 2 enclaves in Quetta were called ‘Hazara town and
Mariabad.’21
4.2.3 In its February 2019 report, DFAT noted that that Hazara Town was located
to the west of the city of Quetta, near the cantonment and Benazir hospital,
whilst Mariabad was to the east, near the Pakistan air force base 22.
4.2.4 A December 2020 report based on a study of 44 Shia Hazara participants in
Quetta, by the Coalition for Religious Equality and Inclusive Development
(CREID), an international research consortium led by the Institute of
Development Studies (IDS), noted that:
‘Mari Abad is the oldest Hazara locality in Pakistan while Hazara Town
started developing in the 1990s as a result of population growth. Mari Abad
is surrounded with rugged tall mountain ranges on two sides, an army
cantonment on the third side and is connected to the main city on its fourth
dimension. Hazara Town is located along the western bypass and is
surrounded by Pashtun and Baloch populations. There is a 12–12.5km route
connecting the two neighbourhoods.’23
4.2.5 The Diplomat, a current affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region, reported
on 16 April 2019, that the 2 districts of Hazara Town and Mariabad were
connected via Spini Road – a distance of 11.6 kilometres 24.
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4.3 Identifying characteristics
4.3.1 The EUAA Pakistan report 2015 noted, ‘Those living in rural areas speak
Hazaragi, an eastern dialect of the Persian (Farsi) language, while many
Hazara in urban areas of Pakistan also speak other languages including
standard Persian, Urdu and English.’25
4.3.2 According to Ethnologue: Languages of the World, a comprehensive
reference work that provides information and statistics for all of the world’s
19 NCHR, ‘Understanding the Agonies…’, (pages 4 and 10), February 2018. Available on request
22 DFAT, ‘Country Information Report Pakistan’ (paragraph 3.2.8), 20 February 2019
23 CREID, ‘The Multi-Layered Minority: Exploring the Intersection…’ (page 10), 1 December 2020
24 The Diplomat, ‘Hazaras Gripped by Religious Extremism in Balochistan’, 16 April 2019
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known living languages, as of 2018 Hazaragi was spoken by 97,600 users in
Pakistan in Quetta district, Karachi and Islamabad 26.
4.3.3 MRGI noted that Hazaras have ‘clearly identifiable features’ 27. The NCHR
report noted that Hazara people have ‘unique facial features [that]
distinguish them from others.’28 The EUAA Pakistan report 2015 stated, ‘The
Hazara are an ethnic group of Eurasian origin which makes them visibly
distinct from many other Pakistanis…’ 29 The DFAT 2022 report noted, ‘The
Hazaras are an ethnic group of distinctive East Asian appearance, native to
the Hazarajat region of Afghanistan.’30 The CREID report described the
Hazara as having ‘Mongolian facial features.’ 31
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4.4 Socio-economic situation
4.4.1 The CREID report noted that:
‘Hazaras commute to both enclaves [Hazara Town and Mariabad, Quetta] on
a daily basis for work or to meet their extended family. Hazaras in Quetta do
not own agricultural, industrial or commercial lands, and a vast majority of
them rely on government/private sector jobs while the remaining bulk are
either unskilled labour or they have small businesses. Most of the population
comprises middle-class or lower middle-class families with the exception of a
very small number of families who are either pre-partition migrants or have
more than two family members working abroad.’ 32
4.4.2 The same source stated that ‘Mari Abad and Hazara Town are not the
wealthiest enclaves in Quetta but are (particularly Mari Abad) one of the
most advanced and highly organised localities in Balochistan in terms of
education levels, urban administrative mechanisms and cleanliness.’ 33
4.4.3 According to the US Department of State (USSD) human rights report for
2021, ‘Community members complained that increased security measures
had turned their neighborhoods into ghettos, resulting in economic
exploitation. Consumer goods in those enclaves were available only at
inflated prices, and Hazaras reported an inability to find employment or
pursue higher education.’ 34
4.4.4 The DFAT 2022 report noted ‘Medical, education and other services inside
the enclaves are basic. Food and other essentials must be brought in from
outside, and prices are reportedly double those elsewhere in Quetta.’35
See also Access to, and treatment in, services.
Back to Contents
26 Eberhard D M and others, ‘Ethnologue: Languages of the World’ (Pakistan), 2022

28 NCHR, ‘Understanding the Agonies…’, (page 3), February 2018. Available on request
34 USSD, ‘2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Pakistan’ (section 6), 12 April 2022
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4.5 Documentation
4.5.1 According to an HRCP report on a fact-finding mission conducted in August
2019 in Pakistan's Balochistan province: ‘Obstacles to what should be tasks
the average Pakistani citizen might take for granted – such as having
passports and national identity cards issued – remain a key problem for the
Shia Hazara community. Government authorities ask them to prove that they
are indeed “Pakistanis” and that they have not “emigrated” from Afghanistan.
The community believes this is indicative of systemic discrimination.’ 36
4.5.2 The DFAT 2022 report noted that ‘Some Hazaras are documented Pakistani
citizens or possess other forms of documentation that permit them to legally
reside in Pakistan. Others are undocumented. Whether a Hazara is legally
entitled to access public services and the like depends partly on their
documented status…, although other factors may curtail access regardless,
including the security situation for Hazaras in Pakistan.’ 37
4.5.3 According to the same report ‘While most Hazaras in Pakistan can obtain
formal identification such as Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs),
Hazaras claim National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA)
officials at times cause delays for Hazaras. Hazaras have suffered lethal
attacks outside the NADRA office in Quetta while trying to obtain passports
and CNICs. As a result, many Hazaras do not feel safe leaving the enclaves
to apply for documentation.’ 38
See also Treatment by the state – Discrimination and harassment and
Access to, and treatment in, services.
For further information on CNICs see the Country Information Note on
Pakistan: Documentation.
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4.6 Political representation
4.6.1 The Hazara community in Balochistan is represented by the Hazara
Democratic Party (HDP), who have 2 provincial assembly representatives 39.
The Tehreek-e-Suba Hazara, located in Abbottabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KP), is a registered political party with the Election Commission of Pakistan
(ECP) 40, but holds no seats in the KP provincial assembly41. The Majlis
Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM) was reported to be the most prominent voice
for the Shia community42, and holds 11 seats in the Balochistan assembly43.
The DFAT 2022 report noted in regard to Shia Muslims (not specifically
ethnic Hazara) that, ‘They are well represented in parliament and regularly
contest elections for mainstream political parties.’ 44
36 HRCP, ‘Balochistan Neglected Still’ (page 9), 2019

39 Balochistan Provincial Assembly, ‘Members’, no date
40 ECP, ‘List of Political Parties enlisted with ECP’, 7 January 2022
41 Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, ‘Members Directory – By Party’, no date
42 News International, ‘Survival is a luxury Hazaras in Karachi can afford’, 20 May 2015
43 Balochistan Provincial Assembly, ‘Members’, no date
Page 16 of 39
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5. Treatment by the state
5.1 Discrimination and harassment
5.1.1 The USSD human rights report for 2020 noted:
‘On March 25 [2020], the Balochistan chief secretary announced, that these
two enclaves, Hazara-town and Marribad, were to be sealed off in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic, alleging that residents of the enclaves had contracted
the virus in greater numbers. Although no Hazara government employee had
at the time tested positive for COVID-19, according to media sources, he
further furloughed all Balochistan government “staff … belong(ing) to the
Hazara tribe.”’45
5.1.2 On 31 March 2020, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom
(USCIRF) Commissioner Anurima Bhargava stated ‘“We are troubled that
government officials in Balochistan are scapegoating the already vulnerable
and marginalized Hazara Shi’a community for this public health crisis… This
virus does not recognize religion, ethnicity, or border and should not be used
as an excuse to discriminate against a single community”.’ 46
5.1.3 On 17 April 2020, the IDS reported on discrimination faced by Hazaras after
the spread of COVID-19 in Pakistan was largely blamed on Shia pilgrims
returning from Iran, despite the fact that Hazaras comprised only a small
proportion of both Shia and non-Shia returns from Iran:
‘In Balochistan, measures specifically targeting and restricting the
movements of Hazara Shia began to be announced by a number of public
authorities, prior to any formal overall lockdown. Notifications by the
Inspector General of Police, Balochistan, sent members of Shia Hazara
community “on leave to prevent the outbreak of covid-19” while the Water
and Sanitation Authority (WASA) stated that “Employees belonging to
Hazara tribe and residing in Marriabad and Hazara Town should be
restricted to their areas”. Finally, the Chief Secretary, the most senior
administrative authority in Balochistan, announced that Quetta will be
cordoned off from rest of the province and Hazara localities within it will be
cordoned off from the rest of Quetta.
‘There are also many cases of targeted discrimination which are not being
publicly reported. Mohammad Aman, a prominent activist from the Hazara
community, informed us that in some institutions and offices, employees
belonging to the community were forced to go on leave, whilst their non-Shia
colleagues continued to go to work.’ 47
5.1.4 Dawn news, however, suggested that such targeting was in response to
concern about increased risk, stating the Balochistan provincial apex
committee’s decision to restrict movement and conduct testing ‘on a massive
level’ in Hazara Town and Mariabad related to the large number of people
45 USSD, ‘2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Pakistan’ (section 6), 30 March 2021
46 USCIRF, ‘USCIRF Troubled with Targeting of Hazara Shi’a in Pakistan amid…’, 31 March 2020
47 IDS, ‘Pakistan’s Hazara Shia minority blamed for spread of Covid-19’, 17 April 2020
Page 17 of 39
who had recently returned to these areas from Iran 48. Hazaras were
nevertheless targeted with hate speech on social media following detection
of early cases of COVID-19 amongst members of the community in
Balochistan 49 50.
5.1.5 No recent reports of discrimination against Hazaras in relation to COVID-19
could be found amongst the sources consulted (see Bibliography).
See also Anti-Shia Hazara sentiment and Healthcare.
5.1.6 The USSD human rights report for 2021 stated that ‘Community members
also alleged government agencies discriminated against Hazaras in issuing
identification cards and passports.’ 51
5.1.7 The CREID report noted that residents of Hazara town were ‘… harassed by
security officials on the pretext of checking CNICs [Computerised National
Identity Cards] more often than the inhabitants of Mari Abad. This is because
Hazara Town is relatively newly developed and is home to some Afghan
Hazara refugees.’ 52 The report added ‘… there is a political and
administrative campaign (structural discrimination) trying to prove that all
Hazaras are refugees. Doing so decreases the legitimacy of Hazaras and
hinders their access to legal documents, and they are looked at with
suspicion and asked to prove that they are pre-1979 migrants.’ 53
5.1.8 The CREID report noted that:
‘… those who travelled outside Hazara areas shared that they had to face an
extra layer of policing. Initially, when these check posts were installed
around all the major gateways to Mari Abad and Hazara Town, the Frontier
Corps (FC) guards (a paramilitary force) on duty were non-locals and were
noted for inappropriate behaviour with people in general and women in
particular. All Hazaras – male and female – need to pass through one of
these check posts either to enter the city areas or to go home. With vehicles
carrying women, the guards often take the opportunity to intimidate them by
looking at them steadily and intently. Sometimes the women would be asked
irrelevant questions just for the purpose of buying time to look at them. Most
of the women would not talk about it owing to power imagery attached to the
FC and some internalised it as if it is normal and acceptable to be harassed
at check posts.’ 54
5.1.9 A participant in the CREID study implied that only holders of a Cantt (military
cantonment) pass could enter the enclaves reserved for Hazaras. The
participant indicated that the checks made by the Frontier Corps, who
manned the checkpoints, were more strictly enforced for Hazaras. For
example, when travelling to college, students, even when carrying a student
48 Dawn, ‘Balochistan top body reviews post-lockdown situation’, 26 March 2020

50 HRCP, ‘Citizens – COVID 19 – Government: Pakistan’s Response’ (page 26), July 2020
54 CREID, ‘The Multi-Layered Minority: Exploring the Intersection…’ (pages 20, 21), 1 December 2020
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card, were individually checked on a daily basis whereas other vehicles
appeared to pass through without incident 55.
See also Documentation and Provision of security.
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6. Societal treatment and attitudes
6.1 Community relations
6.1.1 The 2018 NCHR report noted that:
‘Senator Kabeer Muhammad Shahi, a Baloch nationalist leader from
National Party (NP), told NCHR that there is no issue between Hazara and
Sunni community in Balochistan. We have lived peacefully and had marriage
relations with each other. It is an international agenda to foment sectarian
violence in Balochistan, he added. Similarly some members of civil society
also said that, “the persecution of Hazara community is not a
religious/sectarian issue, there is something else behind the killing of this
community”.’ 56
6.1.2 The CREID report stated that:
‘Hazaras have cordial relationships with the non-Hazara population of the
city that are mainly either Bloch [sic] or Pashtun, and have social, business
and work ties with them. However, there is an exceptionally low (almost
zero) trend of intermarriage between Hazara and non-Hazara ethnic groups.
Even if someone chooses to do so, it is disapproved of by the community.
One of the main reasons for this is sectarian identity as the non-Hazara
ethnic groups hail mainly from the Sunni sect.’ 57
6.1.3 A Pashtun man, identified as 23 year-old Bilal Noorzai was killed in an attack
in Hazara Town in May 2020 58 59. The USSD 2020 human rights report
stated ‘On May 29 [2020], a mob in Quetta’s Hazara town killed a young
Pashtun man and seriously injured two others. Accounts varied regarding
the cause of the attack. According to one version, the Pashtun men were
harassing Hazara women, while another attributed the violence to a
monetary dispute. Authorities arrested 12 suspects for their alleged
involvement in the attack.’ 60
6.1.4 According to the IDS, ‘In the days following the attack, Muhammad Hadi, a
Hazara traffic police constable on duty, was allegedly beaten up by a
Pashtun mob. In another incident, a Hazara teen, Syed Ismail, was shot
dead by unknown assailants in an incident which police considers a case of
tribal revenge.’61
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58 24news, ‘12 arrested over Hazara Town lynching in Quetta’, 30 May 2020
59 Naya Daur, ‘Pashtun Man’s Brutal Murder Intensifies Sectarian Hatred In Quetta’, 1 June 2020
61 IDS, ‘Hazara Women: The Lynching That We Didn’t Do’, 9 September 2020
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6.2 Anti-Shia Hazara sentiment
6.2.1 The USSD human rights report for 2020 noted that, after the outbreak of
Covid-19, Hazaras, ‘… were harassed online by social media users who
referred to the virus as the “Shia virus” and alleged that Hazara migrants
from Iran had introduced the virus to the country.’ 62
6.2.2 In a report on the Pakistan government’s response to COVID-19 the HRCP
described in further detail the situation and its effect on religious minorities:
‘… the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Pakistan was that of a young
man returning from pilgrimage to Iran. This was followed by a slew of cases
stemming from the quarantine camp in Taftan – again, among pilgrims
returning from Iran. Thus, the first wave of confirmed cases in Pakistan was
concentrated disproportionately among pilgrims from Iran, who were almost
all Shia Muslims. Many of those who travel to Iran overland through
Balochistan are members of the Hazara community, which has been the
target of a concerted hate campaign by multiple groups for some time. The
detection of cases in the Shia community led to an outpouring of hate
speech and discrimination against them. Social media sites such as Twitter
were inundated with messages targeting the Shia community in general, and
Hazaras in particular.’63
6.2.3 As noted in the CREID report:
‘The hate talk against Shia Hazara includes derogatory terms using animal
names (culturally it is derogatory to call someone a dog or pig) and abusive
words. Whenever there is mention of a woman, it has abusive sexual
connotations. There is a huge trend of takfir, a practice of calling another
sect heretic, in which Sunni extremist groups raise slogans against Shias
and called them Kafir (infidel). Hazaras are also referred to as Kafir, which
was recently visible in the anti-Hazara protest led by Pashtuns against the
lynching of Noor [Bilal Noorzai, attacked and killed in Hazara Town in May
2020 64 65], where they were also called “the most cursed creature”.’66
6.2.4 Media sources reported on the protests which followed Noorzai’s murder,
where ‘protestors chanted slogans against the murderers’, demanding the
arrest of the perpetrators 67 68.
6.2.5 The IDS noted that the lynching of Bilal Noorzai ‘… was followed by an
unprecedented torrent of hate speech against Hazara Shias. Videos from
Pashtun social media users openly urging for tribal and sectarian revenge
went viral.’ 69 Naya Daur, a bi-lingual digital media platform, reported
‘Following the incident, social media was abuzz with hateful posts from both
sides where users were promoting sectarianism and ethnic hatred. Some
63 HRCP, ‘Citizens – COVID 19 – Government: Pakistan’s Response’ (page 26), July 2020
64 24news, ‘12 arrested over Hazara Town lynching in Quetta’, 30 May 2020
67 Express Tribune, ‘Lynching of youth sparks tensions in Quetta’, 31 May 2020
68 Balochistan Post, ‘Civilians protest against the Quetta incident near the CM house’, 30 May 2020
69 IDS, ‘Hazara Women: The Lynching That We Didn’t Do’, 9 September 2020
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geenralised [sic] the Hazara community as evil and others accused the
Pashtun community of playing the victim card.’ 70
6.2.6 According to Digital Rights Monitor (DRM), the internet was shut down in
Quetta for 2 days to quell the online hate speech 71, though other sources
said the reason for the shutdown was not known 72 73.
6.2.7 The US Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report for
2021 (USSD IRF 2021) noted that ‘Sunni groups held large sectarian rallies
in Peshawar and Karachi in September and October, with speakers warning
religious minorities, including Shia and Ahmadi Muslims, of dire
consequences if anything they said was deemed blasphemous against the
Prophet Mohammed’s companions.’ 74
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7. Security situation
7.1 Militant threats and attacks
7.1.1 The USSD IRF 2021 noted:
‘Armed sectarian groups, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Tehreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the once-banned anti-Shia group Sipah-e-
Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which is connected to other organizations banned
by the government as extremist, and groups designated as terrorist
organizations by the United States and other governments, continued to
stage attacks targeting Shia Muslims, including the predominantly Shia
Hazara community.’ 75
7.1.2 According to the SATP’s datasheet (which didn’t specify ethnicity), sectarian
attacks decreased from 10 incidents in 2020 to 5 in 2021 76.
7.1.3 The USSD IRF 2021 cited the SATP data but noted ‘Data on sectarian
attacks varied because no standardized definition existed of what constituted
a sectarian attack among reporting organizations. According to journalists,
when reporting on attacks with a suspected sectarian motive, media often
refrained from reporting the victim’s sectarian identity in an effort to avoid
stoking tension among sectarian groups.’77
7.1.4 According to respondents in the NCHR study, published 2018, ‘Most
members of Hazara community were of the view that their persecution is not
just sectarian. They explained that other Shia groups are living peacefully in
Dera Murad Jamali and Jafarabad in Balochistan, which gives weight to the
view that these killings are not religiously-motivated against Shias as only
Hazaras are being targeted.’ 78
71 DRM, ‘Mobile Internet suspended in Quetta amid protests to “stop the spread…’, 2 June 2020
72 The Balochistan Post, ‘Mobile services suspiciously shut down in Quetta’, 2 June 2020
73 DRF, ‘Quetta Internet Shutdown’, 11 June 2020
74 USSD, ‘2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan’ (Exec summary), 2 June 2022
76 SATP, ‘Incidents of Sectarian Violence Pakistan’, no date
77 USSD, ‘2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan’ (Section III), 2 June 2022
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7.1.5 The 2018 NCHR report further noted:
‘According to Hazara community members one of the reasons for their
persecution could be associated with the socio-economic prosperity which
they enjoy. They explained that Hazaras have built shops, markets, buildings
and shopping malls in the hub of city and also progressed rapidly in
Balochistan, in all spheres of life, economy, trade; education, sports etc as
compared to other native communities. That is why land mafia could be
involved in their killing, forcing them to abandon their running business and
prime properties, leaving Quetta for other parts of the country. However,
among non-Hazara respondents, no one identified the involvement of land
Mafia in the killings of Hazaras in Quetta.
‘Some respondents from Hazara community have indicated the possibility
that some persons of Hazara community could also be involved in the
killings of their own community. Moreover, some non-Hazara respondents
also endorsed this view. However, no credible information or evidence has
been provided to substantiate the claim.’79
7.1.6 The 2018 NCHR report added ‘However, there were some respondents from
Hazara community who declared their persecution as a sectarian issue.
They were of the view that Hazara are affiliated to Shia sect and
consequently to present day Iran, a declared Shia State.’ 80
7.1.7 The Home and Tribal affairs department of Balochistan told the NCHR that:
‘… terrorists infiltrating from Afghanistan are involved in Hazara killings.
There have been fewer incidents of target killings of Hazaras since 2014 as
compared to previous years as federal and provincial governments have
taken measures to control the sectarian issue. The District Superintendent
Police (DSP) legal Quetta, Najam-Us-Saqib also told NCHR that terrorists
involved in Hazara killings come from Afghanistan. He further said that these
terrorists hire native people for this purpose. According to him the violence
against Hazaras has been minimized to a good extent.’ 81
7.1.8 The NCHR report noted that, according to Senator Usman Kakar, ‘… in
Quetta Hazaras are not the only target, but Balochs, Pashtuns, and other
communities are unsafe too. This view was supported by some of the
Hazara representatives, who were of the view that they should focus on
collective struggle for their emancipation from violence, rather than migrating
place to place which adversely affects their identity.’82
7.1.9 The DFAT 2022 report noted that militant organisations including, Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi (LeJ), ), ‘… a radical Sunni militant group that follows the Deobandi
school of Islam’ and ‘seeks to eradicate Shi’a influence from Pakistan’ 83,
and the terrorist group, Islamic State (IS) ‘… consider the Hazaras “infidels”
who are “worthy of killing”.’ 84
81 NCHR, ‘Understanding the Agonies…’, (pages 7 to 8), February 2018. Available on request
Page 22 of 39
7.1.10 Data on the number of fatalities varied according to sources, depending on
their method of recording – which was not always clear – and the timescales
cited.
7.1.11 The 2018 NCHR report said that at least 2,000 Hazaras had been killed by
militants since 1999 85. The report documented 47 attacks (bomb blasts,
suicide attacks and alleged targeted killings), which resulted in over 500
deaths between October 1999 and October 2017. Media sources were cited
in some, but not all of NCHR’s recordings 86. The Home Department of
Balochistan told the NCHR that, ‘“Since January 2012 to date [October
2017], 509 individuals, from Hazara community, have been killed and 627
injured in different incidents of sectarian violence, which mostly took place in
District Quetta.’ 87
7.1.12 According to data provided by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP),
between 2006 and 2021 there were 78 attacks against Hazaras in
Balochistan resulting in 480 injuries and 383 deaths, nearly half of which
occurred in 2013 when 198 people were killed. Attacks appeared to peak in
2012, when SATP recorded 42 incidents. Between 2015 and 2021, attacks
averaged 4 per year88. For wider context of the general security situation in
Balochistan, during the same period (2006 to 2021) the SATP recorded
2,574 incidents resulting in 3,969 civilian fatalities 89.
7.1.13 The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), a think tank which
produces annual security reports mapping conflict and violence in Pakistan,
based on field research and media publications 90, recorded 81 Hazara
casualties (24 deaths and 57 injured) from sectarian violence in Balochistan
in 2019 91, though did not provide any detail nor note whether these
casualties were from a single or multiple attacks.
7.1.14 The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), a research and advocacy think
tank, security report for 2019, based on sources including newspapers,
magazines, journals, field sources and screening of official records, cited ‘A
major sectarian-related suicide attack targeted Hazara community members
in Quetta causing significant casualties (21 deaths; 48 injured).’92 (see
Security situation in Quetta).
7.1.15 The CRSS, SATP and PIPS did not record any specific attacks against
Hazaras in 2020 93 94 95. However, the HRCP noted that there were 4
sectarian attacks against Hazaras in Balochistan during 2020 96, though did
not provide further details. The USSD IRF 2020 report stated, without
85 NCHR, ‘Understanding the Agonies…’, (Chairman message), February 2018. Available on request
88 SATP, ‘Civilian Data: Attacks on Hazaras Balochistan’, no date
89 SATP, ‘Datasheet Balochistan: Yearly fatalities’, data till 21 June 2022
90 CRSS, ‘Annual Security Report – Project summary’, no date
91 CRSS, ‘Annual Security Report 2019’ (pages 30 to 31), 2020
92 PIPS, ‘Pakistan Security Report 2019’ (page 25), 5 January 2020
93 CRSS, ‘Annual Security Report 2020’, February 2021
94 SATP, ‘Civilian Data: Attacks on Hazaras Balochistan’, no date
95 PIPS, ‘Pakistan Security Report 2020’, 15 June 2021
96 HRCP, ‘State of Human Rights in 2020’ (page 114), 2021
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elaborating, that, ‘Throughout the year, unidentified individuals targeted and
killed Shia Muslims, including ethnic Hazaras…’ 97
See also Societal treatment and attitudes.
7.1.16 Whilst not explicitly mentioning Hazaras, the USSD IRF 2020 report referred
to ethnicity, noting ‘There were multiple reports of targeted killings of Shia
Muslims in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, although because religion and ethnicity
were often closely related, it was difficult to categorize some incidents as
being solely based on religious identity.’98
7.1.17 In 2021, at least 10 Hazara coal miners were killed in Balochistan after being
kidnapped by IS 99 100. For further details, see Security situation outside of
Quetta.
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7.2 Security situation in Quetta
7.2.1 Referring to Hazaras living in Quetta, the MRGI stated in June 2018
‘Because of their clearly identifiable features, it is dangerous for them to
travel out of their neighbourhoods.’ Commenting on the freedom of
movement for Hazaras, that same source said that this was ‘… heavily
restricted due to threat of attack’ and that ‘… the Hazara community in
Quetta has been effectively ghettoized to two predominantly Hazara areas,
namely Hazara Town and Alamdar Road. Insecurity has in turn affected
other areas of their everyday life, including access to education and
employment.’101
7.2.2 The NCHR 2018 report noted:
‘The existing situation of Hazara community is precarious, who are facing
enormous difficulties in exercising their fundamental human rights i.e. right to
life, freedom of movement, right to higher education, and right to participate
in the earning of their daily living and access to necessities of life. They are
also having limited social opportunities due to fear of violence. During the
field work, a Hazara student expressed that, “A Hazara cannot visit the
whole city of Quetta without inviting danger to his life”.24 They feel threated
and targeted while going to Iran for pilgrimages. They also feel fearful to go
to shopping centers and earn livelihood in Quetta as their movement is
limited to a few safe areas of Quetta.’ 102
7.2.3 The same source added:
‘In the wake of security situation in Quetta, threat perception has reached to
such a level amongst the Hazara community that according to some
community members, Hazaras always try to hide their identity while
travelling and dealing outside their communities. The Hazara respondents
explained that while going outside their areas they have to conceal their
identity by covering their heads. The bike riders usually wear helmet in order
97 USSD, ‘2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan’ (Exec summary), 12 May 2021
98 USSD, ‘2020 Report on International Religious Freedom: Pakistan’ (section II), 12 May 2021
99 Al Jazeera, ‘Pakistani Hazara families refuse to bury dead after attack’, 4 January 2021
Page 24 of 39
to conceal their identity instead of wearing helmet for safety. The unique
facial features i.e. cheek bones, Sian eyes; nose and language make the
Hazaras easily identifiable. They said that they cannot offer prayers in open
areas, as their prayers differ from other sects which expose their identity.
The respondents said sometimes they represent themselves as Uzbeks
when asked, and omit words from their names to conceal their Shia Hazara
identity. The respondents further added that Hazaras are known for
cleanliness but the situation has forced them to such an extent that in order
to conceal their identity and avoid attacks they intentionally keep their
vehicles unclean while traveling in the city.’ 103
7.2.4 As noted in the HRCP report on a 2019 fact-finding mission:
‘In Quetta, the Shia Hazara community resides primarily on Alamdar Road
and Hazara Town. Their movement outside these areas is managed by
security forces, including the FC [Frontier Corps]. Their access to education
and employment remains limited, their businesses have suffered and many
other aspects of their lives have been affected severely. There is insufficient
access to well-functioning hospitals and universities in these areas. A
campus of Balochistan University was to have been set up on Alamdar
Road, but there has been no progress in this regard. HDP [Hazara
Democratic Party] leaders were of the view that this was because no land
was available; they claimed that the authorities of the cantonment area,
which is adjacent to Alamdar Road, should be approached and asked to
provide land to make the prospect of a campus viable as soon as
possible.’104
7.2.5 Reporting on an attack in April 2019, the English language news site, Dawn,
stated that 9 Hazaras and 10 other civilians were killed by an improvised
explosive device (IED) in Quetta’s Hazarganji market on 12 April 2019 105.
Reuters stated that 8 Hazaras died, adding that ‘The attack came after a lull
of at least a year in violence against the mainly Shi’ite Hazara minority in the
province, though there have been isolated shootings. The blast took place at
Hazar Ganji, a fruit and vegetable market on the outskirts of Quetta.’ 106 The
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which provides information on terrorist
events based on reports from a variety of open media sources107, stated ‘In
addition to the bomber, at least 20 people, including a Frontier Corps (FC)
member, were killed and 48 people were injured in the blast.’108
7.2.6 According to Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Abdul Razzaq Cheema, the
market blast targeted the Hazara community. However, Home Minister
Ziaullah Langove believed no specific community was targeted 109. Langove
later said that the explosion stemmed from a suicide attack, not an IED 110.
Both the Islamic State and the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) separately claimed
104 HRCP, ‘Balochistan Neglected Still’ (page 8), 2019
105 Dawn, ‘20 killed, 48 injured in attack targeting Hazara community in Quetta’, 12 April 2019
106 Reuters, ‘Pakistan market suicide bombing kills 18, half of them minority Hazaras’, 12 April 2019
107 GTD, ‘Overview of the GTD’, no date
108 GTD, ‘GTD ID: 201904120002’, 12 April 2019
109 Dawn, ‘20 killed, 48 injured in attack targeting Hazara community in Quetta’, 12 April 2019
110 Reuters, ‘Pakistan market suicide bombing kills 18, half of them minority Hazaras’, 12 April 2019
Page 25 of 39
responsibility for the attack 111, although, according to Dawn news, ‘a little
known faction of the Taliban had claimed responsibility for the blast, saying it
collaborated with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).’ 112 The GTD noted ‘A TTP
spokesperson later denied any involvement in the incident.’113
7.2.7 In August 2019, The Express Tribune reported that a blast outside a shoe
market on Mission Road, Quetta, killed one Hazara and injured 13 others,
most of whom were ethnic Hazaras, according to Quetta’s Detective
Inspector General (DIG) 114. The News International noted that the explosion
killed 2 and injured another 10 115. Dawn news noted that most of the shops
around the area that was hit were owned by Hazaras 116. However, according
to The Express Tribune, the DIG stated ‘“I don’t think Hazara community has
been targeted because many people belonging to other communities were
also among the injured.”’ 117 At the time the incident was reported, no group
had claimed responsibility 118 119.
7.2.8 Security force personnel were hit by a suicide bomber on 5 September 2021
near an FC check point on Quetta-Mustang Road, as they gathered to head
to Hazarganji market to provide security to Hazara vendors. The TTP
claimed responsibility 120.
See also Provision of security.
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7.3 Security situation outside of Quetta
7.3.1 Dawn reported on the deaths of 2 Hazaras in an explosion in Balochistan’s
Ziarat district in June 2019. The blast, which targeted their vehicle, also
injured 7 other Hazaras. The group, from Quetta, were visiting Ziarat for
sightseeing 121. The GTD reported that the explosive device detonated in
Ziarat and was attached to the vehicle carrying Hazara civilians, killing 3 and
injuring 4 others 122.
7.3.2 Reporting on an attack against Hazara miners in January 2021, Al Jazeera
noted that ‘Unidentified gunmen stormed a coal mine near the town of Mach,
about 50km east of Quetta, on [2 January], pulling out ethnic Hazaras… from
their residential quarters.’ Although earlier reports stated that the death toll
was 11, a senior security official told Al Jazeera that 10 Hazaras were killed,
after they were marched to nearby mountains and shot 123. According to the
111 GTD, ‘GTD ID: 201904120002’, 12 April 2019

112 Dawn, ‘Islamic State says it was behind Quetta's Hazarganji market bombing’, 13 April 2019
113 GTD, ‘GTD ID: 201904120002’, 12 April 2019
114 Express Tribune, ‘Blast hits Hazara community’s shoe market in Quetta’, 6 August 2019
115 The News International, ‘Quetta blast kills two, leaves 10 injured’, 6 August 2019
116 Dawn, ‘One killed, 10 injured in blast on Quetta's Mission Road’, 6 August 2019
119 The News International, ‘Quetta blast kills two, leaves 10 injured’, 6 August 2019
121 Dawn, ‘2 Hazara tourists from Quetta killed in blast in Balochistan's Ziarat’, 8 June 2019
122 GTD, ‘GTD ID: 201906080001’, 7 June 2019
Page 26 of 39
think tank, the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), 4 other
miners were injured in the attack, for which IS claimed responsibility 124.
7.3.3 The DFAT 2022 report noted ‘While there have been no attacks outside
Balochistan since 2014, Hazaras have previously been targeted in Karachi,
Peshawar and elsewhere. Militant groups retain the intent and capacity to
attack Hazaras throughout Pakistan.’125
7.3.4 The same source said, ‘Large urban centres such as Karachi, Islamabad
and Lahore have ethnically and religiously diverse populations, and offer
some anonymity for people fleeing violence by non-state actors… Hazaras…
avoid living in enclaves to reduce the risk of being targeted.’126
Back to Contents
8. State protection
8.1 Provision of security
8.1.1 The 2018 NCHR report noted:
‘According to Home Department of Balochistan, special measures for the
security of Hazara community have been ensured including:
‘(1) 19 platoons of FC [Frontier Corps] personnels [sic] deployed for the
security of Hazara community living in Marri Abad and Hazara town.
‘(2) Permanent check posts established at the entry/ exit points of the areas
where Hazara community lives.
‘(3) Permanent FC/Police patrolling frequent routes where Hazara
community moves from Hazara town to Marri Abad and back via Spini road.
‘(4) 410 FC personnel, 310 Police personnel, 393 Levies personnel, 126
Vehicles, 16 Jamming vehicles, and 7 Levies APCs, provided on permanent
basis for the safe movement of Shia Zaireen enroute from Quetta to Taftan
and back.
‘(5) Permanent FC/ Police escorting Hazara shopkeepers proceeding to
markets for purchase of goods/service.’ 127
8.1.2 The 2018 NCHR report noted that ‘The [Hazara] community also questioned
the measures taken by the Provincial Government for their protection;
instead of giving them protection, L.E.As [law enforcement agencies] are
often engaged in unnecessary searching and checking of Hazaras
themselves at various check posts.’128
8.1.3 The NCHR were told in a brief statement by Senator Mushahid Hussain
Syed Chairman Parliamentary Committee on China-Pakistan Economic
124 CRSS, ‘Annual Security Report 2021’ (page 30), 2022

Page 27 of 39
Corridor (CPEC), in regard to the killings of Hazara, that ‘… it is ethnic
cleansing of Hazara community and we have failed to protect them.’129
8.1.4 The USSD IRF 2021 report noted that:
‘The government continued to implement its National Action Plan against
terrorism, by countering sectarian hate speech and extremism and by
conducting military and law enforcement operations against violent groups…
Civil society groups continued to express concerns about the safety of
religious minorities. Multiple civil society groups and faith community leaders
stated the government had increased efforts to provide enhanced security at
religious minority places of worship.’ 130
8.1.5 According to the USSD human rights report for 2021 ‘Hazara contacts
reported increased surveillance by authorities due to the arrival of Hazaras
from Afghanistan following the August 2021 Taliban takeover… Authorities
provided enhanced security for Shia religious processions but confined the
public observances to the Hazara enclaves.’131 The CREID report noted that
‘heavy security arranged by the state’ was provided during religious
processions for Ashura, Chehlum and Yom-e-Ali 132.
8.1.6 The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and
Documentation (ACCORD) noted in a report on religious minorities in
Pakistan, based on a range of sources and published in March 2021:
‘Referring to the situation of Hazaras, HRCP in June 2020 provides the
following information on state protection available:
‘“The plight of Quetta’s Hazara community continued in 2019, though with
lesser intensity than previous years, with one major attack against the
distinct Shia community. […] The relentless attacks on the community and
the state’s failure to stem them has forced the majority of Hazaras into two
enclaves inside the provincial capital, from where they mostly move out
under the protection of law enforcement agencies in a convoy just to get
groceries. It was members of this convoy that became the target of a bomb
attack in April 2019, killing 20 people and injuring over 40, including several
Hazaras. Following the attack in Hazar Ganji’s fruit and vegetable market,
members of the beleaguered community staged a sit-in against the
government for failing to protect them despite repeated attacks and called for
the true implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP). After several
days of protest, Prime Minister Imran Khan visited the protesters, assuring
them of justice and NAP’s complete implementation”…’ 133
8.1.7 The same report noted:
‘France 24 reports in January 2021 that after an attack claimed by the
Islamic State group in which eleven coal miners from the Hazara community
were killed, up to 2,500 Hazara blocked a road on the outskirts of Quetta
refusing to bury the dead and demanding better protection. France 24
quotes an activist as saying that “[t]his is systematic ethnic cleansing of
133 ACCORD, ‘Pakistan: Religious minorities’ (page 101), March 2021
Page 28 of 39
Hazaras in Balochistan and our security forces are behaving like lame
ducks, doing nothing”…’
8.1.8 On 7 January 2021 it was reported on the Balochistan government website
that ‘The Government of Balochistan has decided in principle to conduct an
inquiry into the alleged negligence of all the concerned departments
committed in the Mach tragedy. In this regard, the Chief Minister has
directed to constitute Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to probe into the Mach
incident.’ 134
8.1.9 Al Jazeera stated in January 2021 that ‘Both enclaves [Hazara Town and
Alamdar Road] are surrounded by high walls and barbed wire, with security
personnel heavily restricting entry to non-Hazaras. The government says it
can guarantee members of the community’s safety within the walls of the
enclave, but that they remain at risk if they leave.’ 135
8.1.10 The Government of Pakistan’s (GoP) February 2022 report to the UN
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (UNCERD), noted:
‘With respect to the Hazara communities, the Government has held high-
level meetings with all relevant stakeholders in order to provide protection to
this community. In January 2021, PKR 2.5 million [approximately £9,900 136]
was paid to each victim family as compensation for the killing of 11 coal
miners in Mach, Balochistan. Judicial probes are carried out immediately as
a matter of state policy if any member of religious minority has his or her
rights infringed. Moreover, special measures taken by the Home Department
of Balochistan for the Hazara community include the deployment of 19
platoons of security personnel for the security of Hazara community living in
Marri Abad and Hazara town, establishment of permanent check posts at the
entry/exit points of areas where Hazara community lives, permanent police
escorting of Hazara shopkeepers proceeding to markets for purchase of
goods/services etc.’ 137
8.1.11 According to the GoP, ‘In case of any incident of violence against [the]
Hazara community, action is taken by the law enforcement institutions under
the law of land… All cases or incidents and violence against … Hazaras…
are being investigated and perpetrators are held accountable.’ 138
8.1.12 In June 2021, the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) Balochistan
conducted an operation in Quetta to arrest IS terrorist Fazal ur Rehman,
alias Shaan, but he was killed in the ensuing fire exchange. Shaan was
allegedly directly involved in the killing of Hazara coal miners in January
2021 139.
8.1.13 See also Security situation and the Country Policy and Information Note on
Pakistan: Actors of protection, for information on the state criminal justice
system generally.
134 Government of Balochistan, ‘High level meeting regarding law & order situation’, 7 January 2021
136 Xe.com, ‘2,500,000 PKR to GBP - Convert Pakistani Rupees to British Pounds’, as at 25 May 2022
137 GoP, ‘Combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic…’ (paragraph 56), 10 February 2022
138 GoP, ‘Combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic…’ (paragraph 61), 10 February 2022
139 The News International, ‘Terrorist wanted in Machh massacre killed’, 23 June 2021
Page 29 of 39
Back to Contents
9. Access to, and treatment in, services
9.1 Education
9.1.1 The CREID report indicated that ‘Quality of and access to education both
physically and financially, and security issues are some of the main
challenges related to education mentioned by the participants for Shia
Hazaras, particularly for women in Quetta. Teenage participants who were
students complained of discriminatory attitudes in educational institutes both
by non-Hazara and non-Shia teachers and students.’ 140
9.1.2 The CREID report indicated that access to higher education was difficult in
Quetta due to the security situation, but also noted that the quality of
education was lower than other regions, ‘Besides security, one of the
reasons behind the significant presence of Hazaras in urban centres such as
Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad is the unavailability of quality education in
Quetta.’141 The report added:
‘… there are only three main universities in Quetta. All three of them have
been made inaccessible for Hazaras as the student buses for the
Balochistan University of Information Technology, Engineering and
Management Sciences (BUITEMS) and Sardar Bahadur Khan Women’s
University (SBK) were attacked, and the University of Balochistan is
considered a no-go zone for them as many people from their community
have been attacked and killed there by terrorists… During the discussion
some of the participants estimated that around 80–90 per cent of higher
education students dropped out of universities after university buses carrying
mostly Hazara students were bombed in 2012 and 2013.’ 142
9.1.3 As noted in the DFAT 2022 report, ‘Schools exist within the enclaves, but
there is little opportunity for higher education. Many Hazara students have
abandoned the hope of higher education due to the risk of travelling. A small
number of wealthier Hazaras send their children to study at universities in
Lahore or Islamabad, where they reportedly feel safer.’ 143
9.1.4 Due to security threats in Quetta, Hazara women have faced greater
restrictions on accessing education as their movement has been curtailed by
family members, as noted in the CREID report, which added that the law and
order situation made it ‘… extremely difficult for Hazara girls to get an
education outside of their Hazara-populated towns.’ 144 One participant in the
CREID study stated that mobility was restricted for both men and women
due to the ‘unfavourable security situation.’ 145
9.1.5 Participants in the CREID study also stated that Hazara students faced
discrimination by non-Hazara teachers, staff and students, particularly at
142 CREID, ‘The Multi-Layered Minority: Exploring the Intersection…’ (page 19, 20), 1 December 2020
Page 30 of 39
university. They said that they were not given opportunities for growth and
development and faced discrimination on sectarian grounds, for instance,
being called ‘kafir’ (infidels) 146.
Back to Contents
9.2 Employment
9.2.1 The CREID report noted:
‘The overall security situation has severely affected the economic conditions
of the community permanently. Although both men and women experience
lack of job opportunities due to restriction on mobility, security risk,
stereotypes against the community, and because the presence of Hazaras
places non-Hazaras at risk of violence. Private sector organisations either
released or denied hiring Hazaras as they believed that their office or
vehicles could be targeted if a Hazara was there...’ 147
9.2.2 The CREID report noted that Hazara women faced greater challenges in
seeking employment, not least from their own community due to prevailing
patriarchal attitudes and cultural norms:
‘For Hazara women, the challenges are double as they also face
discrimination at the hands of the community in the form of moral policing
and tribal honour that prevents them from exploring job and work
opportunities. This also encompasses searching for jobs, going to work, and
interaction with the non-Hazara population…
‘The idea of shame and honour associated with women and the stereotype
that a working woman brings shame to the family’s name is also something
quite common in the community that restricts women from becoming
financially independent and pushes them towards further marginalisation.’148
9.2.3 The same source noted ‘In general, there are fewer job opportunities in
Quetta. But for poor Shia Hazara men and women it is even more difficult as
they cannot commute freely to all parts of the city nor will people hire them
due to security risks, leading to economic havoc for the community.’149
9.2.4 According to the DFAT report:
‘Many Hazaras in Quetta provide services to their own communities within
the enclaves; others move to other cities across Pakistan to work. Whether a
Hazara can relocate strongly depends on their personal resources and
family connections. In the past Hazaras were often employed in the military
and public service, but few now apply for these jobs due to discrimination
and fear of attacks. Since the IS attack in Mach in January 2021, Hazaras
are reportedly too scared to work in the Baloch mining industry, previously
an important source of income. High rates of unemployment and limited
prospects have reportedly led to a sense of hopelessness among Hazara
youth in Quetta.’ 150
146 CREID, ‘The Multi-Layered Minority: Exploring the …’ (pages 21 to 23), 1 December 2020
148 CREID, ‘The Multi-Layered Minority: Exploring the…’ (pages 29 to 31), 1 December 2020
Page 31 of 39
See Security situation outside of Quetta for information on the attack on
miners in Mach.
Back to Contents
9.3 Healthcare
9.3.1 The 2018 NCHR report noted that, according to Hazara community
members, the 2 main government hospitals – Bolan Medical Complex and
Civil Hospital – were located in unsafe areas and people feared travelling
there for treatment. The private hospitals in Hazara areas were often
unaffordable. The report stated that Hazaras ‘… have limited access to
healthcare facilities, as government hospitals are situated outside the areas
in which they reside.’ 151
9.3.2 On 9 July 2020, the IDS reported on the discrimination faced by Hazaras
attempting to access healthcare facilities. One Hazara women explained she
had to go for a pregnancy-related ultrasound scan ‘in disguise’ and with the
help of a non-Hazara woman to speak on her behalf. The gynaecologist who
referred her for the scan said he had been told not to make such referrals to
the scan doctor so he told his Hazara patients to disguise themselves 152.
9.3.3 Sources reported in 2020 that Hazaras faced discrimination during the
COVID-19 pandemic after they were blamed by some for bringing the virus
into Pakistan 153 154.
9.3.4 The IDS gave examples of 2 Hazara men who, in April 2020, sought hospital
treatment for non-Covid-related reasons but were denied. One of the men
said he was told by a doctor at the Civil Hospital in Quetta that they were not
allowed to treat patients from Mariabad. In response, ‘… the Director of
Medical Services of the Civil Hospital, Dr. Javed Akhtar, denied any formal
discrimination. “There has been no official or otherwise [discriminatory]
statement by the administration and the hospital is fully functional and open
to all. There’s a general fear regarding the outbreak and local doctors are not
immune to that fear. But someone might have said something in their
personal capacity”.’ 155
9.3.5 According to the DFAT 2022 report, ‘Those [Hazaras] who can afford to
travel to Karachi for medical treatment do so, while others must attend
Quetta hospitals outside the enclaves, where they have been attacked in the
past.’156
Back to Contents
152 IDS, ‘“Go in disguise to receive medical treatment”- religious discrimination in…’, 9 July 2020
154 IDS, ‘Pakistan’s Hazara Shia minority blamed for spread of Covid-19’, 17 April 2020
155 IDS, ‘“Go in disguise to receive medical treatment”- religious discrimination in…’, 9 July 2020
Page 32 of 39
Terms of Reference
A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) is a broad outline of what the CPIN seeks to cover.
They form the basis for the country information section. The Home Office’s Country
Policy and Information Team uses some standardised ToR, depending on the
subject, and these are then adapted depending on the country concerned.
For this particular CPIN, the following topics were identified prior to drafting as
relevant and on which research was undertaken:
• Legal rights
• The Hazara community in Pakistan
o Demography – population distribution, religion
o Identifying characteristics – language, features
o Political representation
• Security situation
o Hazaras living outside of Quetta
o Hazaras living in Quetta
o Attacks and casualties
o Motivation
o Road safety
• State response, treatment
o Provision of security and redress
o Discrimination and harassment
• Societal treatment and attitudes
o Community relations
o Anti-Hazara sentiment
• Access to and treatment in services,
o Employment and education
o Health
Back to Contents
Page 33 of 39
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Back to Contents
Page 38 of 39
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1 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Article 25), 1973

8 EUAA/EASO, ‘Pakistan Country Overview’ (page 101), August 2015

26 Eberhard D M and others, ‘Ethnologue: Languages of the World’ (Pakistan), 2022

36 HRCP, ‘Balochistan Neglected Still’ (page 9), 2019

48 Dawn, ‘Balochistan top body reviews post-lockdown situation’, 26 March 2020

111 GTD, ‘GTD ID: 201904120002’, 12 April 2019

124 CRSS, ‘Annual Security Report 2021’ (page 30), 2022

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