1NC – T

Interp: Affs must reduce military presence in the entire West Asia-North Africa region.
Violation – they specify Israel

In
Words and Phrases ’08 [Volume 28, p. 204-215] TDI
—Reynolds v. Larkins, 14 P. 114, 10 Colo. 126 Colo. 1887. In the act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall
have
jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, etc., the word “in” should be construed
to mean “throughout” such counties.

Region
Dictionary [Dictionary.com; No Date; https://www.dictionary.com/browse/region/] brett TDI
1. an extensive, continuous part of a surface, space, or body:a region of the earth.

2. Usually regions. the vast or indefinite entirety of a space or area, or something compared to one:

Negate on limits and ground — spec explodes limits to every individual or subset of
country AFF which moots neg prep and skews ground based on perceptions of large
withdrawals like Assurance or Deterrence and country-specific DAs.

Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention.

 1NC – T
Interp: affs must only defend reducing military presence.
Military presence includes US military assets but excludes operations directly engaged
in combat.
James S. Thomason et al. 2. Ph.D., International Relations, Northwestern University, Senior Analyst,
Strategy, Forces and Resources Division, Institute for Defense Analyses. Robert J. Atwell, Robert Bovey,
William E. Cralley, James Delaney, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Kongdan Oh Hassig, Charles Hawkins, Gene
Porter. “Transforming US Overseas Military Presence: Evidence and Options for DoD.” July 2002. IDA
Paper P-3707.
WHAT IS OVERSEAS MILITARY PRESENCE?
Our working definition of US overseas military presence is that it consists of all the US military assets in overseas
areas that are engaged in relatively routine, regular, non-combat activities or functions.1 By this definition,
forces that are located overseas may or may not be engaging in presence activities. If they are engaging in combat (such as Operation

Enduring Freedom), or are involved in a one-time non-combat action (such as an unscheduled carrier
battle group deployment from the United States aimed at calming or stabilizing an emerging crisis
situation), then they are not engaging in presence activities. Thus, an asset that is located (or present) overseas may or may not
be “engaged in presence activities,” may or may not be “doing presence.”
We have thus far defined presence activities chiefly in “negative” terms—what they are not. In more positive terms,
what exactly are presence activities, i.e., what do presence activities actually entail doing?
Overseas military presence activities are generally viewed as a subset of the overall class of activities that the US

government uses in its efforts to promote important military/security objectives [Dismukes, 1994]. A variety of
recurrent, overseas military activities are normally placed under the “umbrella” concept of military
presence. These include but are not limited to US military efforts overseas to train foreign militaries; to
improve inter-operability of US and friendly forces; to peacefully and visibly demonstrate US
commitment and/or ability to defend US interests; to gain intelligence and familiarity with a locale; to
conduct peacekeeping activities; and to position relevant, capable US military assets such that they are
likely to be available sooner rather than later in case an evolving security operation or contingency
should call for them.2

Violation---they defend aid and assistance, that was CX. We’ve inserted their cards
below.
Withdrawing aid---green
Sullivan et al. ’11 — Patricia; Associate Professor in the Department of Public Policy at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies. July 2011; “US
Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation”; Foreign Policy Analysis; Volume 7; //IL

Generous US military funding runs the risk of creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more
willing to ignore US interests (Mott 2002). Recipient states should be more likely to defy the United States if
they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to punish them for defection (Walt 2005). US
dependence on recipient states for oil, troop basing, over-flight permission, counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations, etc… makes
withdrawing aid potentially more costly for the United States than for the aid recipients. It may be easier
for aid recipients to find alternative suppliers than it would be for the United States to find an equally
valuable place to base its troops.
The epitome of the Reverse Leverage model may be the post-September 11, 2001, relationship between the United States and Pakistan.
Washington has sent several billion dollars in military aid to Islamabad since late 2001, when it enlisted Pakistan as an ally against Al Qaeda and
the Taliban (Rohde, Gall, Schmitt, and Sanger 2007). In its rationale for the sale of 36 F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan in 2006, the Bush
administration notes:

Given its geo-strategic location and partnership in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Pakistan is a vital ally of the United
States….This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping an ally meet its
legitimate defense requirements. The aircraft will also be used for close air support in ongoing operations contributing to GWOT.

Although the military aid provided to Pakistan’s government has contributed to its ability to survive a dedicated insurgency by the Taliban and
to some success in rooting out militants in the Northwest Provinces, most analysts believe the vast amount of aid has failed to generate the
kinds of outcomes it was meant to produce. Most striking has been the lack of progress in establishing control of key Taliban and Al Qaeda
strongholds. But there has been a notable lack of cooperation in other key areas as well. Pakistan continues to emphasize military capabilities
aimed at India rather than counterinsurgency and has indicated a desire to negotiate with the Taliban. In 2009, the government released A.Q.
Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist, believed to be behind the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to US enemies. Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence remains closely linked to the Taliban and other terrorist groups, including the group responsible for the 2009 terrorist
attack on Mumbai (Bajoria 2009; Mazzetti and Schmitt 2009; Murphy 2010; O’Hanlon 2010; Traub 2010). While it is beyond the scope of this
paper to make claims about the specific motivations behind Pakistan’s foreign policy, it is certainly plausible that Pakistani leaders are operating
on the assumption that the United States is dependent on Pakistan to the extent that it has little choice but to continue to subsidize its
government. After a decade in which Pakistan received no U.S. military aid at all, the government received an average of $235 million a year
between 2002 and 2004 (USAID 2006). At the end of that period, its overall level of cooperation with the United States had dropped to one-fifth
of its 2001 level (King and Lowe 2003a,b).

The Reverse Leverage model anticipates that states are more likely to receive US military aid if they have qualities that make
them particularly important to perceived US security needs. However, the model also suggests that the more important a recipient
state is perceived to be, the less likely that state will be to increase its cooperation with the United
States in exchange for higher levels of aid. In fact, if the amount of aid a state receives is itself indicative of its security value to
the United States, states should become less cooperative the more aid they receive. Moreover, the United States should be reluctant to
decrease military aid to states that are defiant. If client states gain reverse leverage over their patrons, we would not expect to see donor states
reducing or eliminating aid in response to uncooperative behavior. Instead, the United States should be unwilling to punish bad behavior, and
past levels of aid should be extremely strong predictors of future aid levels (Lewis 1979).

<<<TEXT CONDENSED NONE OMITTED>>>

Hypothesis 3a: States that the US believes are critical to its security interests will be more likely to receive military aid but less likely to increase their cooperation with the United States as the amount of aid they receive increases. Hypothesis 3b: All else equal, states that receive large amounts of military aid from the United States will be less cooperative than states that receive smaller amounts. Hypothesis 3c: The United States will not reduce or eliminate aid when countries become less cooperative. Data and Measurement Our data set includes annual observations of all 184 dyads formed by the United States and a potential aid recipient between 1990 and 2004. Accounting for missing observations for some dyads in some years, there are 2,586 dyad-year
observations in what is structured as a panel data set. Dependent Variable: Cooperation As a measure of foreign policy behavior, we use events data from the Virtual Research Associates’ (VRA) 10 Million International Dyadic Events Dataset (King 282 US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation and Lowe 2003a,b). Each event in the data set represents a foreign policy action by a source country toward a target and is machine-coded from Reuters News Briefings between 1990 and 2004. The events are categorized according to the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) guidelines established by the VRA (Bond, Bond, Oh, and Lewis T. 2003) and then assigned a numerical value according to the Goldstein (1992) Cooperation Scale, which weights the IDEA
categories according to how cooperative or conflict-oriented they are. Actions are given scores that range from -10 (Military Attack, which represents extreme conflict) to 8.3 (Extend Military Assistance, which indicates extreme cooperation).3 VRA generates monthly cooperation and conflict scores for each directed dyad from the sum of the Goldstein scores. Our analysis is concerned with behavior directed by a source state toward the United States as a target state. For each dyad formed by the United States and a potential aid recipient, we calculate an aggregate behavior score by subtracting a state’s score for conflictual behavior toward the United States in a given month from its score for cooperative behavior toward the United States. The result is a
(theoretically) continuous variable (cooperation) that captures increasingly cooperative behavior toward the United States as values become more positive and increasingly conflictual behavior toward the United States as values become more negative. Because our explanatory and control variables are recorded at yearly intervals, we use the average of a country’s monthly cooperation scores over a calendar year as our dependent variable. The mean of this variable is 1.38, which suggests a general tendency toward low-level cooperative behavior with the United States between 1990 and 2004. The VRA data set is particularly useful for our analysis because it is able to capture a wide range of behavior toward the United States in a systematic way. From a
methodological standpoint, the comprehensiveness of the measure and the likelihood that it contains a significant amount of extraneous ‘‘noise’’ mean that our quantitative analyses will be biased toward finding no relationship between military aid and a state’s behavior. We must therefore be cautious about concluding that a statistically insignificant correlation means that aid has no effect. However, given that we are accounting for such a wide range of behavior by the recipient state, results suggesting that US military aid is correlated with significantly higher or lower levels of cooperation would allow us to make a stronger argument about the effect of US military aid on recipient state behavior. Explanatory Variables Military Aid We define military aid as
‘‘total bilateral military assistance loans and grants’’ as reported by USAID through its Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook). The ‘‘Greenbook’’ measure of military assistance includes aid for several programs, including International Military Education and Training, Military Assistance Program Grants, Foreign Military Credit Financing, and Transfers of Excess Defense Articles.4 The measure excludes military assistance that is given for economic development purposes (which is captured in a separate measure of economic 3 For a full discussion of the weighting scheme, see Goldstein (1992). While the events data we use to code our dependent variable code the extension of military assistance as a cooperative action, note that our primary independent variable
measures military aid provided by the United States, while the dependent variable would only capture military aid a state extended to the United States. 4 For countries that receive the largest amount of US military assistance, the vast majority of aid comes as part of the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP). According to the US State Department, the FMFP is designed to ‘‘provide grants for the acquisition of US defense equipment, services, and training.’’ In 2006, FMFP funds accounted for over 90 percent of total military aid to Egypt, Israel, Pakistan, Jordan, Colombia, the Philippines, and Poland. Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock F. Tessman and Xiaojun Li 283 aid) and assistance given for counternarcotics and counterproliferation efforts, as well commercial
military sales (USAID).5 We use the natural log of total US military aid delivered to a country in constant 2002 US dollars in our models. We also create a variable (milaiddep) that measures the relative dependence of the recipient country on US military aid. This variable is generated by dividing the amount of military aid by the GDP of the recipient country.6 Shared Preferences We expect that, all other factors being equal, some states have embedded foreign policy interests that are more aligned with those of the United States (Gartzke and Jo 2002). Geographic, cultural, economic or ideological considerations make certain states more likely to have foreign policy preferences that align with US interests. Because our objective is to isolate the independent
impact of US military aid on recipient state behavior, we aim to disentangle cooperation with the United States that occurs due to inherent preference similarity from cooperation that results from the provision of US military aid. To capture latent preference similarity, we look at the similarity in alliance portfolios between the United States and the recipient state. The variable (shared) takes the form of an S Score (Signorino and Ritter 1999) that approaches 1.0 as portfolios are perfectly aligned and falls toward 0 as alliance portfolios become less similar.7 For example, the US–Libya dyad has an S Score of 0.09 in 1990, while the US–Canada dyad has a score of 0.96 during that same year. We use the EUGene program (Bennett and Stam 2000) to generate S Scores
for all of the dyads in our study. Security Centrality As a measure of the extent to which the United States perceives a state as important to its security interests, we create a variable (allies) that indicates that a potential aid recipient had a mutual defense pact with the United States (Gibler and Reid Sarkees 2004). Control Variables Economic Aid We control for US economic aid provided to a country. There is no consensus on whether military and economic aid is essentially substitutable. Recipient states may use economic aid to increase military spending (Stein, Ishimatsu, and Stoll 1985; Travis and Zahariadis 1992; Zachariadis et al. 1990). Some forms of security-oriented aid are also classified by USAID as economic in nature and are not considered part of the
military assistance package that a country receives from the United States (USAID). In order to account for this empirical ambiguity and USAID classification decisions, we decide to include two kinds of variables measuring economic aid. The first (econaid) is again taken from the USAID Greenbook; it indicates the ‘‘total economic assistance, loans, and grants’’ given from the United States to recipient states (USAID). As a measure of the relative significance of aid to the recipient country, we create a second variable (econaiddep) that is simply the amount of economic aid divided by the GDP of the recipient state. 5 Full documentation is available through the USAID ‘‘Greenbook’’ at the USAID Web site http://qesdb.usaid. gov/gbk/. 6 We also measured aid
dependence by dividing US aid to a country by total OECD aid. This eliminates all OECD countries from the analysis (400 observations) but does not change the sign or significance of the coefficient on the variable. 7 Others have measured alliance portfolio similarity using a tau-b measure; for an extensive discussion of the relative merits of the S score and tau-b, see Bennett and Rupert (2003). We also estimate models using UN vote congruence as a measure of preference similarity. This variable is never significant. 284 US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation Democracy Democratic states may be less likely to see US hegemony and influence attempts as threatening (Goldsmith, Horiuchi, and Inoguchi 2005). On the other hand, democracies may be less
susceptible to influence (Lai and Morey 2006) or may even face domestic political pressure to counter what is perceived as increasing levels of US military dominance by engaging in defiant foreign policy behavior (Walt 2005). Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) argue that it will be more costly to buy policy concessions from national leaders that rely on the support of a relatively large proportion of their population. Leaders that depend on large ‘‘winning coalitions’’ for their political survival cannot use aid to buy-off their supporters and are less likely to move from policies that are beneficial to their populations to policies preferred by foreign aid donors. To account for the potentially divergent reaction of democracies to US military aid, we create a
dichotomous variable that distinguishes between democratic and nondemocratic recipient states.8 We use the Polity IV data set (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2003). US Troop Presence A large, well-established presence of American soldiers on the ground may reduce the need for a separate military assistance program or mitigate the impact of changes in military assistance delivered by the United States to the host country. Conversely, a large troop presence may exacerbate a potential backlash against increases in military aid that are seen as indicative of US attempts to dominate the recipient state (Walt 2005). We thus include a variable that is calculated as the natural log of the number of US troops present in a given year. We get our data from a 2004 report
published by the Heritage Foundation.9 National Capabilities It may take more aid to buy policy concessions from states with more resources (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007). Governments of more powerful states may also face less domestic pressure to counter military aid with foreign policy resistance as a way to show resolve against potential US dominance. We measure the capability of the recipient state by taking the natural log of its gross domestic product (GDP) in constant 2000 US dollars. We obtain this measure from the latest version of Gleditsch’s Expanded Trade data (Gleditsch 2002). Methods In order to explore the relationship between levels of military aid and levels of cooperation with the United States, we estimate the following four
equations to test our hypotheses. Cooperationit ¼ ai þ b1mil aidit1 þ hCooperationit1 þ dXit1 þ eit ð1Þ Cooperationit ¼ ai þ b2milaiddepit1 þ hCooperationit1 þ dXit1 þ eit ð2Þ Dmil aidit ¼ ai þ hmil aidit1 þ b3DCooperationit1 þ dXit1 þ eit ð3Þ CooperationitjAllocation ¼ ai þ b4alliesit1 þ b5mil aidit1 þ b6ðmil aidit alliesit1Þ þ hCooperationit1 þ dXit1 þ eit ð4Þ 8 States with a Polity score greater than eight are classified as ‘‘democratic’’ and coded with a ‘‘1’’. All other states are coded with a ‘‘0’’. 9 The full report can be accessed in Microsoft Excel format through the Heritage Foundation Web site at: http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda06-02.cfm. Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock F. Tessman and Xiaojun Li 285 where the subscripts i and t denote unit
(country) and time (year), X is a vector of control variables, and ai represents the country dummy variables to control for country-specific fixed effects.10 All independent variables are lagged one year to account for possible simultaneity bias. We also include the lagged dependent variable in all of our models and employ Huber–White robust standard errors to account for potential autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.11 Equation 1 tests hypotheses H1a and H3b, which make opposing predictions about how the amount of US military aid a state receives will affect its behavior toward the United States. equation 2 models the relationship between recipient state dependence on US military aid (defined by aid as a percentage of recipient state GDP) and that
state’s level of cooperation with the United States (hypotheses H1b and H2a). Equation 3 tests hypotheses H1c and H3c, which make contradictory predictions about how the United States responds to changes in a recipient country’s behavior. Finally, equation 4 tests hypothesis H3a from the Reverse Leverage model. Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses and predictions about the signs of the coefficients on the key explanatory variables corresponding to each hypothesis. The nature of our data and hypotheses presents several estimation challenges. First, both US military aid and recipient state behavior vary across time and from country to country. We address this by pooling cross-section and time-series data and controlling for unobserved country-specific
characteristics. Second, the Arms for Influence model anticipates a reciprocal relationship between military aid and recipient state behavior: a state’s level of cooperation with the United States increases the amount of aid it receives and the amount of aid a state receives increases subsequent levels of cooperation with the United States. To control for this potential endogeneity bias, we estimate our models for equation 1 through equation 3 with two-stage least squares (2SLS).12 Following Lewbel (1997), we use higher moments of the endogenous variable as instruments. In equations 1 and 2, we also include US GDP per capita as an instrument: a higher GDP translates into a bigger budget and more money available for distribution. TABLE 1. Theoretical
Models and Predicted Result Theoretical model Hypotheses Predicted result Arms for Influence H1a: Aid increases cooperation b 1 > 0 H1b: Aid dependence increases cooperation b 2 > 0 H1c: Cooperative behavior will increase aid b 3 > 0 Lonely superpower H2a: Aid dependence decreases cooperation b 2 < 0 Reverse leverage H3a: Aid provides less leverage over allies b 4 > 0, b 5 > 0, b 6 < 0 H3b: Aid decreases cooperation b 1 < 0 H3c: Uncooperative behavior will not decrease aid b 3 = 0 10 The fixed effects model is a common choice for macroeconomic data (that is large N and small T). 11 Table A1 in the appendix reports the correlation matrix of exogenous variables. The correlations between our primary explanatory variables and the controls are below 0.5
with two exceptions. The GDP and US troops variables are correlated at 0.63. The correlation between the variable indicating the presence of a defense pact with the US and the alliance portfolio similarity variable is 0.86. However, the S score and alliance variables are never used in the same model. We are therefore reasonably confident that the standard errors we report are generally unbiased.12 The statistical consequence of a reciprocal causal process is that the military aid variable would be correlated with the error term of the cooperation equation, so that we would be unable to estimate the effect of assistance without bias. The standard approach to this problem is to utilize instrumental variables or two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. See
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2006, Introductory Econometrics, 3rd edition. Mason, OH: Thomson South Western, pp. 525–535 for an accessible explanation of this estimation procedure. For a recent application in the IR literature, see Rudra 2005. 286 US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation Finally, hypothesis 3a from the Reverse Leverage model anticipates a selection effect: States that the United States believes are particularly important for maintaining US security interests should be more likely to receive US military assistance. However, once they receive aid, the level of aid should be less likely to influence the foreign policy behavior of these states than of states the United States is less ‘‘dependent’’ on for its security. We employ a Heckman selection
model in estimating equation 4. In the selection stage, state characteristics predict whether a state will receive US military aid. The second stage estimates the effect of the amount of military aid received on the behavior of those states that receive aid. We include an interaction term in the second stage as the exclusion restriction, as well as to test for a differential effect of aid on states that have a higher security value to the United States. Results and Discussion We present the results of our analyses in tables two through four.13 Because we structured our investigation around three competing theoretical models, this section presents results as they apply to the separate hypotheses that are relevant to each model. While the Arms for Influence model
anticipates a positive and reciprocal relationship between levels of military aid and recipient state cooperation with the United States, the second two models highlight potential perversions in the aid-influence connection. The Lonely Superpower model predicts that increasing dependence on US military aid will create incentives for leaders to be less overtly cooperative with the United States in an effort to counter any perception that their foreign policy is dictated by a foreign power. The Reverse Leverage model anticipates that military aid recipients will exploit the fact that the United States relies on them to provide some specific good—and the availability of alternative arms suppliers—to defy the broader interests of the United States with impunity. Table 2
displays results from estimating equation 1 through equation 3. First, we note that statistical tests corroborate the validity of our instruments. Using Stock and Watson’s (2006) rule of thumb, the first-stage F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are jointly zero should be greater than 10 for a single endogenous regressor. The first-stage F statistics in our models show that the instruments are more than sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variables. In addition, the Hansen J statistics indicate that the first-stage estimation instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms. In the results from equation 1, we see that, contrary to Hypothesis 1a (Arms for Influence), but consistent with Hypothesis 3b (Reverse Leverage),
there is a significant, negative correlation between levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation. Economic aid, on the other hand, appears to have no effect on recipient state cooperation. The recipient country’s GDP and S score are also not correlated with a state’s behavior toward the United States. Recipient states that are democratic, and those that have US troops stationed on their soil, appear to be more cooperative with the United States, all else equal. Table 3 presents results from using equation 1 to simulate the substantive impact of the statistically significant independent variables on recipient state cooperation. States that do not receive any US military aid display an average 13 Our models are robust to a range of alternative
specifications and additional control variables. For example, we estimated all models excluding Israel and Egypt because these countries receive disproportionately large aid packages and have unique relationships with the United States. Since excluding these countries does not affect our findings, we report results using all countries. In addition, including the CIRI index of Physical Integrity Rights as a control for the human rights record of the aid recipient does not change the results in any model and none of the CIRI coefficients are significant. Due to space limitations, alternative specifications are posted in an online appendix at http: ⁄ ⁄ . Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock F. Tessman and Xiaojun Li 287 level of cooperation with the United States of +1.5 when all other
variables are held constant at their means. The model predicts that states that obtain the average amount of US military aid ($20 million) will be less cooperative—scoring an average of )11 on the cooperation-conflict scale. An increase in US military aid to one standard deviation above the mean leads to an additional six-point reduction in the monthly cooperation score of the recipient state. In contrast, an increase in the number of US troops from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises recipient state cooperation almost one point. Democratic recipients are on average four points more cooperative than nondemocratic recipients. Equation 2 is designed to test the effect recipient state dependence on US military aid has on a state’s level of
cooperation with the United States. Hypothesis 1b (Arms for Influence) proposes that greater dependence leads to greater vulnerability and a tendency for states to exhibit higher levels of cooperative behavior. Hypothesis 2a (Lonely Superpower) has divergent expectations; dependence creates incentives for leaders to push back against the United States, which manifests in lower levels of cooperation in states with high levels of dependency. Our results lend no support to either hypothesis. Both military and economic aid dependence have statistically insignificant effects on recipient state cooperation. In this equation, only lagged cooperation, recipient state GDP, US troops, and alliance portfolio similarity have significant effects on states’ behavior toward the
United States. Richer states tend to be less cooperative, while states that have an alliance TABLE 3. Substantive Effects of Statistically Significant Variables on Aid Recipient States’ Level of Cooperation with the United States (Equation 1) Min Y ¢ Max Y ¢ Mean Y ¢ + 1 SD Y ¢ US military aid (million USD) 0 +1.5 $3,400 )24.7 $20 )10.7 $155 )16.6 US troops (in thousands) 0 )3.84 22.7 +2.23 1.54 )0.23 10.2 +0.7 Democratic recipient 0 )0.9 1 +3 (Notes: Substantive results are on the original scale transformed from the log scale. Y¢ = the predicted level of cooperation a potential military aid recipient will display toward the United States when the variable of interest is set to its minimum, maximum, mean, or mean + 1 standard deviation and all other variables are at their
mean value.) TABLE 2. Cross-Sectional Time-Series Models of US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation with the United States Lagged Cooperation 0.398 (0.068)*** 0.437 (0.076)*** Dependent Variable H1a & H3b H1b & H2a H1c & H3c Log of Military Aid (b1) )3.026 (1.194)** Log of Economic Aid 0.263 (0.268) Military Aid Dependence (b2) )2.410 (2.027) Economic Aid Dependence 3.918 (3.133) DCooperation (b3) )9.845 (4.356)** Lagged military aid )0.480 (0.156)*** Recipient GDP )0.317 (0.586) )1.542 (0.719)** )11.746 (8.022) Democratic recipient 2.101 (1.071)** )0.396 (0.375) 9.761 (7.728) Log of US troops 0.492 (0.210)** 0.142 (0.190)** 11.204 (3.667)*** S-score (alliance similarity) )0.517 (2.288) 4.415 (1.890)** 55.670 (37.193) Observations 2204
2204 2239 Countries 165 165 165 First-stage F statistics 11.53 11.729 22.969 Hansen J statistic (chi-square) 0.2377 0.6816 0.1976 (Notes: Robust standard errors in parantheses. *significant at <0.1; **significant at <0.05; ***significant at <0.01.) 288 US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation portfolio similar to the United States and states with US troops stationed on their soil exhibit significantly more cooperative behavior on average. The final hypothesis from the Arms for Influence model predicts that the United States will punish uncooperative governments by reducing assistance in year t in response to lower levels of cooperation in year t-1. In contrast, hypothesis 3b from the Reverse Leverage model predicts that US aid will not respond to a change in
recipient state behavior. Results from estimating equation 3 once again lead us to reject a prediction from the Arms for Influence model. Instead of a positive correlation between more cooperative behavior and subsequent military assistance, we find that higher levels of cooperation lead to smaller aid packages in the following year. For every one-point improvement in the average monthly cooperation of the recipient state, US military aid drops by approximately $9.8 million in the following year. We also find that levels of military aid tend to gravitate toward the mean; there is an inverse relationship between the level of military assistance provided during year t and the amount of military aid in the following year. While equation 3 provides no support for the
third Arms for Influence hypothesis, it is consistent with the spirit of the Reverse Leverage model (although the effects are worse than we anticipated). The United States does not appear to reduce aid—and in fact appears more likely to increase military aid—when a country’s behavior becomes less cooperative (and more conflictual). States that improve their cooperation with the United States should expect to receive less military aid rather than a reward for good behavior in the following year. The final hypothesis we test is Hypothesis 3a of the Reverse Leverage model. This hypothesis predicts that the United States will direct more military assistance to states that are seen as important to US security interests. However, these ‘‘high value’’ states are
expected to be unresponsive to US attempts to influence their behavior through the provision of military aid. Results from estimating equation 4 with a two-stage selection model are presented in Table 4. They provide some evidence that the United States has less leverage over allies than non-allies. In the allocation stage, countries with which the United States has a defensive alliance are more likely to receive military aid than other states. 14 At the same time, while equations 1 and 2 demonstrated that states that do not receive any US military aid are more cooperative on average than states that receive aid, among those states that do receive US aid increasing the amount of military aid appears to have a positive effect on cooperation. However, the amount
of US military aid has a smaller effect on the behavior of US allies than nonallies. The cooperation score of a state that is not allied with the United States is predicted to increase from 0.37 to 2.57 when the amount of US military aid to the state increases from the 50th to the 75th percentile. The effect of an identical boost in aid to a formal ally of the United States is to increase cooperation from 0.66 to just 1.55. It appears that US military aid is less able to buy better behavior from states with which the United States has formal security ties—perhaps because the United States is not likely to decrease military aid when allies are uncooperative.

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Conclusion

In this paper, we attempted a systematic investigation into the relationship between US military aid and
the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the states that receive that aid. We aimed to improve on the
existing literature by building and testing three explicit theoretical models (Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower
and Reverse Leverage), focusing on a new measure of cooperation generated from events data rather than UN voting records, and controlling
for preference similarity, so
that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior
independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.
We test seven hypotheses associated with three different theoretical models and find mixed results. There is little evidence in favor of the Arms
for Influence model: there is an inverse relationship between absolute levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation, and there is no
relationship at all between recipient state dependence on US aid and recipient state behavior. Thus, while the Lonely Superpower hypothesis
was on the right track by predicting an unorthodox relationship between aid and cooperation, it did not perform as well as some of the Reverse
Leverage hypotheses when it came to explaining exactly what form such unorthodoxy would take.
In several ways, the
Reverse Leverage model was quite accurate: (i) states receiving military aid from the
United States exhibit lower levels of cooperation than states that do not receive military aid, (ii) in the population of
all states, higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behavior, and (iii) the United States does
not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. Together, these results suggest that US
military assistance is allocated for reasons that are largely independent of overall recipient state behavior toward the United States. The
Reverse Leverage model contends that military aid is delivered to states that the United States depends on for security reasons. Realizing
their leverage over Washington, states that receive high amounts of aid are actually more able to engage
in uncooperative behavior than are states that the United States does not depend so heavily upon. We
attempted to test for the effects of an aid recipient’s ‘‘security value’’ directly by comparing US allies to nonallies. Consistent with the Reverse
Leverage model, we find that states with a defensive alliance with the United States are more likely to receive US military aid but less likely to
respond to aid by increasing their cooperation with American preferences.

More aid---green
Rad ’23 — Assal; nonresident fellow. December 12, 2023; “Biden’s approach to Gaza has irrevocably
tarnished US credibility”; TRT World; https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/bidens-approach-to-gaza-has-
irrevocably-tarnished-us-credibility-16215040; //IL

The creation of these globally accepted rules was meant to prevent and hold accountable all actors who
violate its precepts. Whether it be Hamas or Israel, no one should be above the law.

Yet, throughout this crisis in Gaza, the Biden administration has openly placed Israel outside the scope of
responsibility. While double standards in US foreign policy are nothing new, the brazen way in which this contradictory approach has been
showcased by the United States during two different conflicts - one in Ukraine and the other in Gaza - has sparked a global outcry.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the US and its allies took immediate action, sending weapons and support to
Ukraine and swiftly making Russia the most-sanctioned country in the world.

Within the first month of the war in Ukraine, the Biden administration formally declared Russia had committed war crimes. Within the first
year, the US had welcomed 271,000 Ukrainian refugees.

The contrast with how the Biden administration has dealt with Israel and Palestinians in Gaza could not be starker. As
the international
community rallies to bring an end to Israel’s heavy bombing campaign, condemn all violence against
civilians, and secure a ceasefire, the US has vetoed every attempt to do so.
This includes most recently after the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres invoked Article 99 of the UN Charter which has not
been used in decades.

As human rights groups and global NGOs call out Israel’s actions as possible war crimes, American officials say
that they cannot make such assessments and are not carrying them out at this time. While Israeli Holocaust scholars are using
the term “genocide” to describe what is happening in Gaza, the Biden administration is bypassing
Congress to supply more weapons to Israel and asking for an additional $14 billion in aid for Israel.
Though US officials have scoffed at the comparison between Israeli and Russian actions against civilians, the idea merits an examination. The
narrative that claims the
current conflict in Gaza began on October 7 is terribly misleading and ignores a decades-long
military occupation of Palestinian land by Israel, which is illegal under international law.

It ignores the continued

expansion of Israeli settlements, the 16-year Israeli blockade of Gaza, the crimes of apartheid
carried out by Israel, and the extensive list of humiliation and oppression millions of Palestinians face every day.
What is the point of intentional law if it is only applied selectively? This is the question on the tongues of many critics of the Biden
administration’s policies. The most outrageous part of Biden’s
approach in Gaza is how blatantly it contradicts the
rhetoric his administration has employed throughout his presidency.
Led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken, US foreign policy was supposed to be centred around diplomacy and the
international “rules-based order,” which this administration has gone to great lengths to boast about and promote as one of its
core principles. After all, that was the profound meaning of the simple declaration: “America is back.”

The reality has been a harsh reminder that the America of Donald Trump was not an aberration. The
Biden administration’s absolute
refusal to heed the calls of the international community, human rights advocates, and global NGOs—all
while maintaining “unconditional aid” to Israel—has given the Israeli government carte blanche to do anything it wants,
including the mass killing of thousands of civilians and the displacement of nearly two million Palestinians.

As such, Biden has done more in the last 10 weeks to damage the idea of an international rules-based order than his predecessor ever did. If
the US is showing through its actions that Israel does not have to follow any rules, then why would any other country feel obliged to adhere to
them?

As stated by the UN’s Guterres, “the brutality perpetrated by Hamas can never justify the collective punishment of the Palestinian people.”
There is no justification for the indiscriminate mass slaughter and destruction of civilian life that we
have witnessed in Gaza in recent months, where children, civilians, UN aid workers and journalists are being killed at a historic pace.
United Nations officials have repeatedly stated that nowhere is safe in Gaza, Doctors Without Borders has pleaded for a ceasefire while Gaza’s
medical system collapses, as thousands of Palestinians face starvation.

If this is not the collective punishment of an entire people, then what is? By directly funding and supporting these crimes—
as the world watches in despair and demands a ceasefire—the Biden administration has cast off the
veneer of US credibility and the efficacy of a rules-based order.
Aid is distinct from presence
USAF 22, [Usafacts, 5-3-2022, "How much does the US give other countries in military aid?," USAFacts,
https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-does-the-us-give-other-countries-in-military-aid/, accessed 1-
12-2024, panav]

Examples of military aid include funds for training or paying a country’s military, as well as sending
weapons, vehicles, and other military equipment.

Vote neg:
1---GROUND – they explode it by fiating the mechanism by which they solve the
advantage, i.e. that a presence would spillover to arms sales. That part is not intrinsic
to presence proposal, but the act of fiating it makes it a certainty which creates
uncontestable internal links and explodes prep burden – they moot offense like
governments won’t regulate, presence doesn’t spillover or turns like presence hurts
future aid.
2---LIMITS---Extra T justifies withdraw presence and end world hunger, lets them fiat in infinite offense
which is impossible.
 1NC – DA
Presence is stable but the plan undermines assurances to Saudi Arabia — that causes
autonomy, fill-in, and re-intervention — each turns case.
Mazzucco 22 [Leonardo Mazzucco, Analyst at Gulf State Analytics (GSA), Washington Institute, 1-24-
2022, “Growing Pains: The Promise and Reality of Biden’s Middle East Policy”
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/growing-pains-promise-and-reality-bidens-middle-
east-policy HKR-MK]

However, Gulf
states are also wary of the domestic shift within the United States away from military
involvement in the region, even as the administration’s focus on a troop draw-down seems less likely to bear fruit. Calls to do so have been
a common fil rouge dominating the electoral presidential campaigns of Obama, Trump, and Biden. Once in power, however, U.S. presidents
from both parties have faced substantial difficulties in turning these electoral promises into sustainable, concrete policies. Ambitious
agendas, fueled by strategic realignment or populist sentiment against decade-long “endless wars,” have butted up against
the realities of the region’s conflicts, along with the vested interests of the U.S. military and its industrial
partners in ensuring stable defense budgets. Washington is also aware of the fact that if the United States reduces its
troops in the region, it is likely to once again create a security vacuum.
Downsizing would also require a rethinking of American military bases and accepting the sunk costs of their building and maintenance. In the
Gulf alone, the U.S. 5th Fleet is harbored in Manama, Bahrain and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forward headquarters is at the Al
Udeid Air Base in Qatar. Troops are stationed at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, and Al Dhafra Air Base in the
UAE. Troop reductions and minor closures are planned, but major structural transformation is not currently scheduled.

Regardless of its feasibility, Gulf Arab monarchies view the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, part of the February 2020 Doha
Agreement, as a game changer in regards to U.S. presence in the region. Since the early 1980s, these countries viewed the U.S. military
footprint as an insurance policy against existential threats to their security, whether originating from Saddam
Hussein or the Ayatollahs of Iran. The GCC monarchies have since raised doubts about the United States’ willingness
to stand up and deter looming threats to the stability of the ruling families. With Washington signaling its
intention to avoid the risk of entrapment in regional conflicts—especially when American interests are not directly at
stake and viable exit strategies are not clearly defined—Gulf monarchies are struggling to adapt to the idea of the United States pivoting
away from the Middle East and giving up its decade-long role of security guarantor.
The arm sales’ circle continues unabated with the Biden team, and multi-million weapon contracts successfully navigate twists and turns in
Congress. However, state officials in Riyadh remain skeptical about Washington’s commitment to playing the long game in the region, especially
in circumstances where its support is needed most. The issue of resupplying dried-up Saudi stockpiles of interceptor missiles is a critical case in
point.

To avert this risk, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have increasingly resorted to a balancing posture in their foreign policy that
threads between the genuine desire to diversify their arms procurement networks away from traditional American suppliers
and the tacit intention to reawaken U.S. interest towards the Middle East. By reaching out to Washington’s
competitors in the arms business, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are responding to the need for strategic autonomy in a post-U.S.
region while putting pressure on American weapon dealers, who might lobby for a revamped U.S. military
outreach to the Middle East in Washington’s halls of power if they feel that their market shares are
threatened.
Saudi Arabia signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia in August 2021, while the UAE purchased 80 Rafale fighter jets from France in
December 2021 and inked a $3.5 billion contract with South Korea to acquire surface-to-air missiles in mid-January 2022. The Seoul-made
Cheongung II, a medium-range surface-to-air missile system based on Russian technology, is considered to be more efficient in intercepting
ballistic missiles and armed drones than its American counterpart, the Patriot PAC-3. By making no secret of their intentions to diversify the
arms supply chain, the Arab Gulf monarchies are providing numerous instances for the Biden team to reflect on the long-term consequences of
a U.S. withdrawal on both Washington’s regional strategic interests and the American arms industry.
However, to what extent this policy might prove successful is open to debate. State officials in Washington as well as their counterparts in
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi understand that the Gulf monarchies’ military apparatus is largely designed to operate in sync with U.S. weaponry
systems and technologies. Even with a GCC push to reduce dependency on American arms, running a highly diversified armaments architecture
is a time- and resources-consuming endeavor—an option that neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE can currently afford. Consequently, the primary
need to preserve armaments’ interoperability is bound to keep this bidding game within its long-established boundaries.

As Washington debates the issue, U.S. warships are still stationed in the Gulf and no closures of major U.S.
military installations in the Arabian Peninsula are scheduled. Despite President Biden’s calls for more scrutiny
of human rights violations, so far the administration has adopted a business-as-usual approach to U.S. arms export
policies rather than distancing itself from Trump-era approaches. In November 2021, Saudi Arabia bought $650-million’ worth of
missiles and missile launchers, and Secretary of State Blinken recently confirmed the sale of F-35 combat aircrafts to the UAE.

*The signal alone that Biden’s pulling out of the Middle East encourages Saudi prolif &
hedging toward China and Russia.
Einhorn 5-24-2023 (Robert Einhorn, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security,
Strategy, and Technology, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, "Will Putin’s Invasion Spur
Nuclear Proliferation?," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/will-putins-invasion-spur-
nuclear-proliferation/, accessed on 1-11-2024) AB

A fifth reason
for concern is the relative decline in post-Cold War U.S. primacy and widespread uncertainty
about the future of U.S. overseas presence and commitments. Since the NPT negotiations in the 1960s, the United States has
been the driving force in building and strengthening the global non-proliferation regime. It remains the regime’s leading supporter, but its clout has diminished —
and its ability to persuade or pressure others to follow its lead on non-proliferation matters has declined.

When the United States dominated the worldwide civil nuclear energy market, it had leverage to compel civil nuclear recipients to accept strict non-proliferation
constraints as conditions of supply. Today, countries embarking on nuclear energy programs can choose from a range of nuclear suppliers, including some that are
less insistent on rigorous non-proliferation controls as conditions of supply.

The effectiveness of U.S. sanctions as a non-proliferation tool depends heavily on the dominant role of the dollar and the U.S.-led international financial system in
facilitating worldwide trade and investments. But countries often targeted by U.S. sanctions are beginning to work together to develop alternative payment
methods that would reduce their vulnerability to American pressures.

With the perception that the United States is pulling back from its overseas presence and
commitments, especially in the Middle East, some traditional U.S. friends, such as Saudi Arabia and
Turkey, are more inclined to hedge their bets, reach out to others like Russia and China, and resist U.S.
non-proliferation demands.

The Biden administration has sought

to restore confidence in the international role of the United States, and it
has had considerable success. But foreign audiences are aware that future presidential transitions could bring a return of America First policies.
In theory, the combination of these five developments might be expected to result in a significant increase in the number of countries with nuclear weapons.
Indeed, that is what many pundits predict.

But nuclear proliferation doesn’t occur in theory. It occurs in particular countries — with particular relationships with
allied states and potential adversaries, particular financial and technical capabilities, and particular
domestic balances of political power.
To gain a better understanding of real-world prospects for proliferation, it is essential to focus on individual countries — and on their particular incentives and
disincentives for acquiring nuclear weapons. I’ll briefly discuss several countries often considered the most likely to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.

Consensus of experts and Saudi officials agree perception of U.S. security is the only
determinant of whether Saudi Proliferates. They don't even need to construct it.
CFR 8 [Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate Report based on hundreds of interviews with key
officials produced by Bradley Bowman, Staff member for the Middle East, based on interviews of 100s of
individuals in DC and the Gulf States, February 2008, Committee on Foreign Relations "Chain Reaction:
Avoiding A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East," https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-
110SPRT39674/html/CPRT-110SPRT39674.htm]

SAG=Saudi Arabian Government

The development of a Saudi nuclear weapon represents one of the most serious and most likely
consequences of an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, it will place tremendous pressure on Saudi
Arabia to follow suit. The only factor that would likely dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear
weapon would be a restored United States-Saudi bilateral relationship and a repaired Saudi perception regarding the
reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If the United States does not take deliberate actions in the coming years to achieve
both of these objectives, an Iranian bomb will almost certainly lead to a Saudi bomb. The vast majority of individuals
interviewed believe that Saudi Arabia represents the country most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb.
Significant disagreement among many parties exists regarding the Saudi's final decision, as well as their capability to obtain a nuclear weapon.
However, high-level U.S. diplomats in Riyadh with excellent access to Saudi decision-makers expressed
little doubt about the Saudi response. These diplomats repeatedly emphasized that an Iranian nuclear weapon frightens the
Saudis ``to their core'' and would compel the Saudis to seek nuclear weapons. Those who believe Saudi Arabia would not respond to an Iranian
acquisition of nuclear weapons by pursuing a weapon of its own usually emphasize one of three arguments. The first suggests the value the
Saudis place on their relationship with the United States would dissuade them from taking a nuclear decision that would severely damage their
most important bilateral relationship. Undoubtedly, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States. The United States has served as
Saudi Arabia's most important security guarantor since 1945. However, Saudi Arabia values its relationship with the United States because the
United States has served Saudi Arabia's interests. If Saudi Arabia comes to believe the United States cannot or will not
protect the Kingdom and its core interests, the Saudi regime will not hesitate to develop the
independent means to deter its enemies. If the United States does not take assertive steps now to restore Saudi faith in the U.S.
security guarantee, this will increase the likelihood that the Saudis will respond to a perceived decline in the reliability
of U.S. security guarantees and the emergence of an Iranian nuclear threat by pursuing an independent nuclear
deterrent. The second argument frequently cited relates to the character of the regime. Some argue the Saudi regime is too conservative,
too timid to take such a bold and controversial step. However, the Saudi regime's undoubtedly conservative and occasionally timid approach to
foreign relations has not kept Saudi Arabia from taking covert and controversial measures in the past in order to protect its interests. The Saudi
acquisition of 50-60 CSS-2 missiles, 10-15 mobile launchers, and technical support from China at a cost of about $3 to $3.5 billion in the late
1980s provides an example. These missiles, which represent some of the longest-range missiles in the world, were acquired by the Saudis after
the U.S. decision not to sell the Saudis surface-to-surface missiles. This Saudi move-apparently conducted without the knowledge of Israel or
the United States-reflected anything but a conservative or timid approach. While the acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a much
greater challenge to the bilateral relationship, the CSS-2 affair demonstrates that in order to ensure its own security, Saudi Arabia will not
hesitate to aggressively bypass or risk alienating the United States in order to protect Saudi interests. The third argument often cited relates to
Saudi Arabia's nuclear technology capabilities. Saudi Arabia lacks the human expertise and the technical knowledge necessary to develop a
nuclear weapons program on its own. Experts consistently describe Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure and know how as far inferior to Egypt
and Turkey. However, many individuals emphasize that the U.S. should not underestimate Saudi Arabia's
ability to buy the technology required. Many scholars and U.S. diplomats believe Saudi Arabia may have
some sort of formal or informal understanding with Pakistan regarding nuclear weapons. Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia have common interests and complementary assets. Pakistan has a nuclear capability and
limited money, while Saudi Arabia has no nuclear capability and virtually unlimited money. While no solid evidence exists to confirm the formalization of such an agreement, some circumstantial evidence suggests an agreement or ``understanding'' may exist. EGYPT (CHAPTER 4) An Iranian

acquisition of nuclear weapons would ignite a heated debate in Cairo as to whether Egypt should pursue nuclear weapons. Although such a development in Iran would hasten Egypt's nuclear energy efforts, in the view of almost all of those interviewed, Egypt would most likely choose not to respond by pursuing its own nuclear weapons. The potential Israeli response and the impact on Egypt's relations with the United States represent the most important reasons. Two pillars undergird Egyptian national security strategy: peace with Israel and a security partnership with the United States. While both Israel and America remain very unpopular with the Egyptian people, the Egyptian regime relies on peace with Israel and aid from the United States to maintain its security and its power. An Egyptian pursuit of nuclear weapons would destabilize--if not topple--the Israeli and American pillars of Egypt's national security strategy. Egyptian leaders considering a pursuit of nuclear weapons would need to consider the Israeli response. If the past is any indication, there is no reason to believe a new Egyptian nuclear weapons program would evade Israeli
attention. Such an Egyptian program and the Israeli response could reignite open hostility between the two states. Additionally, an Egyptian nuclear weapons program could severely damage the bilateral relationship between Egypt and the United States. Egypt leans heavily on U.S. aid, as well as U.S. military assistance, and an Egyptian nuclear weapons program would endanger both. Therefore, as long as peace with Israel and a security relationship with the United States remain in Egypt's interest, the disincentives for an Egyptian nuclear weapons program appear to outweigh the incentives. However, two wildcards--the response of Israel and Saudi Arabia to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon--could decisively shape Egypt's response. If Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon in the next few years, this would represent a major strategic and political shock to Israel. As a result, the Israeli Government would face tremendous domestic political pressure to respond in an explicit and bold way. The nature of the Israeli response could prove decisive in shaping Egypt's response to an Iranian bomb. Secondly, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear
weapon would substantially shift Egypt's cost-benefit analysis regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Egyptians see themselves as the natural leaders of the Arab world, based largely on Egypt's proud history, its dominance of Arab culture and media, its large population, and its relative military prowess. However, staff frequently encountered a feeling among Egyptian officials and scholars that Egypt's leadership role has deteriorated in recent years. Egyptians view Saudi Arabia as the country attempting to replace Egypt as the leader of the Arab world. While Saudi Arabia has only one- third of Egypt's population, Saudi Arabia's oil wealth and its role as ``guardian of the two holy mosques'' give it a unique position from which to challenge Egypt's leadership. Within this context of competition between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a Saudi acquisition of a nuclear weapon would represent a uniquely threatening challenge to Egypt's self-conception and regional influence. While Egypt would view an Iranian bomb as a negative and disconcerting development, in the end, Iran does not represent an Arab or Sunni power. Thus, despite Tehran's
efforts to blur ethnic and religious differences, it is unlikely that Iran will ever be able to unify Sunni Arab powers beneath its leadership. The same cannot be said of the Saudis. The Saudis are Arab and they are predominantly Sunni, and in sharing these two important characteristics with Egypt, a Saudi nuclear bomb would represent a more proximate and more serious threat to Egypt's prestige and national identity. In short, the manner with which Israel and Saudi Arabia respond to the potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons will have a potentially decisive influence on Egypt's decision regarding nuclear weapons. TURKEY (CHAPTER 5) If Iran acquires nuclear weapons in the next decade, this would also place significant pressure on Turkey to follow suit. Turkey and Iran do not see themselves as adversaries, but Turkey believes the centuries of peace and relative stability between the two states and their predecessor empires derive primarily from the rough balance of power between them. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically tip the balance in Iran's direction. Turkey believes this increased Iranian power would lead to a more
aggressive Iranian foreign policy and a marginalization of Turkey. Such a development would significantly undercut Turkey's desired role as a respected and powerful mediator between east and west. In such a scenario, there would be strong voices in the Turkish General Staff, as well as among ultra-nationalist politicians, arguing for Turkey to respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Thus, the possibility still exists that Turkey would respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by developing nuclear weapons as well. At the same time, there are significant disincentives to a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. First, doing so would severely damage United States-Turkish relations, which represent an essential component of Turkish national security. Second, such a development would endanger Turkey's good standing in NATO, another key component of Turkey's national security. Third, a Turkish pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons would seriously undercut any remaining chance of Turkish accession into the European Union. Fourth, powerful popular voices within Turkey would likely oppose a Turkish attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Unlike
Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, the democratic system in Turkey would enable these popular forces to influence Turkey's decisions on these issues. Staff believes U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of NATO will serve as the decisive factors in Turkey's decision regarding nuclear weapons. If the bilateral relationship with the United States is poor and Turkey's trust in NATO low, Turkey would be more likely to respond to Iranian nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear weapons as well. However, a fully restored bilateral relationship with the United States and a renewed Turkish trust in NATO provide the best means to discourage a Turkish pursuit of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, staff found evidence of strain in the U.S.- Turkey relations and skepticism regarding the reliability of NATO security assurances for Turkey. Prior to President Bush's meetings with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan on November 5, 2007, Turkish-United States relations were at one of the lowest points in memory. Since this visit, relations between the two countries have begun to rebound, but much work remains. Also, real and
perceived delays and failures of NATO in fulfilling its commitments to Turkey in 1991 and 2003 have contributed to a widespread Turkish disenchantment with NATO. If these Turkish perceptions toward the United States and NATO do not significantly improve, an Iranian bomb could lead to a Turkish bomb. CHAIN REACTION: AVOIDING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST ---------- Chapter 1: Introduction In 1984, George Shultz wrote, ``It is no exaggeration to say that controlling the spread of nuclear weapons is critical to world peace and, indeed, to human survival. It is a cause that deserves and receives top priority in our foreign policy.'' In the years since Secretary Shultz's observation, the threat posed to the United States by nuclear proliferation has only grown worse. The diffusion of scientific knowledge related to nuclear weapons and reactor technology in the last two decades has dramatically increased the danger to the United States and its interests.\1\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The author would like to thank the Congressional Research Service generally and Paul Kerr, Christopher
Blanchard, and Jeremy Sharp specifically for their research assistance. The author would also like to thank Jay Branegan and Robert Einhorn for their helpful input. However, the views expressed here are the author's alone. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A global nuclear energy ``renaissance'' appears to be underway due in large part to concerns over greenhouse gas emissions that accompany fossil fuel consumption and the inability of oil and natural gas supplies to meet the burgeoning global demand for energy. In the Middle East, these energy dynamics, as well as a desire to match Iran's nuclear progress, have ignited and renewed widespread interest in nuclear energy. In addition to Iran, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Yemen, have all expressed interest in nuclear energy. While some of these states appear more committed to pursuing nuclear power than others, the growing demand for energy, combined with strategic calculations related to Iran, virtually guarantee that the Middle East of 2025 will be populated by at least 3-4 states engaging in nuclear power
generation.\2\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ For purposes of this report, the Middle East is defined by Egypt in the west, Turkey in the north, Iran in the east, and Yemen in the south. This definition specifically excludes the countries to the west of Egypt (the Maghreb) and countries to the east of Iran (Pakistan and Afghanistan). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This growing presence of nuclear energy in the Middle East will exacerbate current global trends in which nuclear materials and technology are becoming increasingly available. Without comprehensive international reform, this increased availability of nuclear materials and technology will reduce the supply-side obstacles to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, thereby shifting the cost-benefit analysis of many states in a dangerous direction. Increasingly, states that seek a nuclear weapons capability will have access to the knowledge and materials necessary to obtain it. This is not to suggest that technical hurdles to the development of nuclear weapons will cease to exist, but only that the proliferation of nuclear energy
technology and know-how will lower these hurdles. For many states, this development will reduce the time and resources required to obtain a nuclear weapons capability. Since the supply-side obstacles to nuclear weapons proliferation continue to decrease, the international community must place greater emphasis on the demand-side of the issue. In other words, U.S. policy must place a greater emphasis on identifying and addressing the ``nuclear drivers'' that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons. The international community should continue its efforts to control and regulate nuclear technologies and materials, but must take its efforts further. An effective nuclear nonproliferation strategy must be comprehensive, focusing on both the availability of nuclear materials and technology, as well as the demand for nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, since the end of the cold war, U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy has been decidedly one-sided-- often neglecting to evaluate the reasons states pursue nuclear weapons. If U.S. policy continues to neglect the ``nuclear drivers'' that motivate states to pursue nuclear weapons, U.S. efforts to
stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East will almost certainly fail.\3\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Gawhat Bahgat, ``Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East,'' the Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies (Winter 2005). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Since the advent of nuclear weapons in the last months of World War II, 29 states have pursued nuclear weapons. However, 18 of these states willingly abandoned their programs--a decision often called nuclear ``rollback.'' \4\ These 18 case studies provide ample evidence that states can be dissuaded from pursuing nuclear weapons when the international community--and often the United States in particular--addresses the state's motivations behind its quest for nuclear weapons.\5\ The history of nonproliferation does not teach that states eyeing nuclear weapons inevitably get them. Rather, the history teaches that nonproliferation efforts succeed when the United States and the international community help satisfy whatever concerns drove a state to want nuclear weapons in the first place. In other
words, if the United States can accurately identify and address the motivations--or ``nuclear drivers''--that compel or encourage Middle Eastern states to pursue nuclear weapons, it may be possible to interrupt the nuclear proliferation momentum in the region. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, ``Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,'' Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007). \5\ The countries that have ``rolled back'' are Norway, Italy, Indonesia, Egypt, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Libya. The Iraqi program was discovered and reversed by force and the Iranian program continues. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- the ramifications of an iranian nuclear bomb In light of this global nuclear energy ``renaissance'' and with the benefit of these historical lessons, this study attempts to identify the ramifications of a potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear
weapons. More specifically, this report assesses the likelihood that neighbors of Iran would respond to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon by seeking nuclear weapons of their own. Furthermore, this study seeks to identify the steps the U.S. can take now, as well as in the future if Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, to prevent a regional nuclear arms race. Such a study may seem unnecessary to some in light of the December 2007 NIE, but Iran's nuclear program remains one of the most serious threats to U.S. interests and Middle East peace. Iran continues to enrich uranium-the most difficult component of a nuclear weapons program-and continues to conduct work that could contribute to nuclear weapons development. As the NIE states, Iran now possesses the ``scientific, technical, and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.'' Consequently, the NIE judges ``with moderate confidence'' that Iran will have enough highly- enriched uranium (HEU) to produce a nuclear weapon by 2010- 2015. Furthermore, because the motivations inspiring the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons remain
unaddressed, Iran remains unlikely to fully abandon its long-term drive to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. If in fact Iran halted the other aspects of its nuclear weapons program in 2003, this action almost certainly represents a tactical pause rather than a strategic change of course. In short, Iran now possesses the means as well as the motivation to develop nuclear weapons. Consequently, based on Iran's acquired capabilities and Iran's continued motivations, it is entirely possible that the United States could confront a nuclear-armed or nuclear weapons capable Iran in the next decade. If such an undesirable scenario were to occur in the next decade despite the international community's best efforts, the U.S. must not be caught unprepared. The U.S. must know what to expect and must know what steps to take to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse. An Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon or a nuclear weapons capability would dramatically shift the balance of power among Iran and its three most powerful neighbors--Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey. This fact raises many questions, including: How are these three countries
responding today to the Iranian nuclear program? How would Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara respond if Tehran were to cross the nuclear threshold and acquire nuclear weapons? Would they pursue nuclear weapons of their own? What factors would influence their decisions? What can the U.S. do now and over the coming years to discourage these countries from pursuing a nuclear weapon of their own? Based on 5 months of research and interviews with hundreds of officials and scholars in the United States and seven Middle Eastern countries, this report attempts to answer these questions. In order to do this, each chapter touches on the respective country's relationship with Iran and the United States, identifies the incentives and disincentives that would influence the state's response to a nuclear-armed Iran, and provides policy considerations that would reduce the chances the state would respond by pursuing nuclear weapons. Chapter 2: Historical Lessons on Nuclear ``Roll Forward'' and ``Rollback'' If Iran were to develop a nuclear weapon or nuclear weapons capability in the next decade, preventing a nuclear chain reaction in the region
would represent one of the most difficult and complex challenges the U.S. has confronted in years. Fortunately, a significant case study history already exists that provides invaluable information on why states make decisions with regard to the development or relinquishment of nuclear weapons programs. According to a comprehensive study by the National Defense University's (NDU) Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 29 states have pursued nuclear weapons (``roll forward'') since 1945. Of these 29 states, 18 of them willingly abandoned their programs--a decision often called ``rollback.'' \1\ This substantial sample size offers four particularly valuable patterns and lessons that can inform U.S. policy in the Middle East. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ The countries that have ``rolled back'' include Norway, Italy, Indonesia, Egypt, Switzerland, Sweden, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Libya. The Iraqi program was discovered and reversed by force and the Iranian program continues.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- First, there rarely exists a single explanation for a nation's decision to pursue nuclear weapons. According to the NDU study, the most influential ``roll forward'' factors have been: assessment of threat, breakdown of global nonproliferation norms, national pride and unity, personal leadership, strategic deterrent, and perceived weakening of security alliances. The most influential ``rollback'' factors have been: foreign pressure, impediments to development, international standing, personal leadership, net loss of security, and a reassessment of the threat.\2\ While this list clearly underscores the preeminent role of security calculations in the decision of states regarding the development of nuclear weapons, other factors consistently impact the nuclear decision as well. Scott Sagan, a respected nuclear proliferation scholar, highlights the importance of security considerations in the nuclear ``roll forward'' decision, but he also emphasizes the influential role of domestic sources. According to Sagan, the parochial interests of actors in the nuclear energy establishment, important interests
within the professional military, and domestic interests of politicians can increase the likelihood that a country will pursue nuclear weapons.\3\ Other scholars agree that one can not dismiss the importance of domestic factors, but place greater emphasis on individual political leaders. For example, it is difficult to ignore the pivotal role of Nasser (Egypt), Gaddafi (Libya), Ben-Gurion (Israel), and the Shah (Iran) in their respective country's nuclear decision.\4\ Regardless of the factors one chooses to emphasize, the overall point is clear. Although security considerations usually play a preeminent role in the nuclear proliferation of states, a number of other factors play a decisive role as well. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, ``Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,'' Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007). \3\ Scott D. Sagan, ``The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,'' Current History (April 1997). \4\ Gawdat Bahgat, ``Nuclear Proliferation and the Middle East,'' The Journal of Social, Political,
and Economic Studies (Winter 2005) 408. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The South African case study underscores this point. South Africa established its Atomic Energy Corporation in 1948. By the end of the next decade, South Africa was conducting indigenous nuclear research and development. In the mid-1970s, South Africa decided to develop a nuclear weapon capability. According to some reports, South Africa tested a nuclear device in 1979. By 1989, South Africa had built six crude atomic bombs and was at work on a seventh. According to F.W. de Klerk, South Africa decided to build nuclear bombs for a ``credible deterrent capability,'' with the decision being made ``against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat in southern Africa,'' and ``South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance, should it be attacked.'' \5\ In addition to these publicly cited explanations, there were nine major motivations for this South African nuclear program, according to the NDU study. Among these incentives were a perceived threat from communist and African
nationalist power, the personal interest of Prime Minister P.W. Botha, a sense of political isolation, and the weakening of civilian oversight of the military.\6\ South Africa only relinquished its nuclear weapons after the coincidence of four developments, each of which appear to be critical to the South African decision. These include: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Bill Keller, ``South Africa Says It Built 6 Atom Bombs,'' New York Times (March 25, 1993). \6\ Rebecca Hersman and Robert Peters, ``Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,'' Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007). Reassessment of Threat. The end of the cold war reduced feelings of insecurity as 50,000 Cuban troops withdrew --------------------------------------------------------------------------- from the region. Desire for International Standing. After the end of Apartheid, the South African regime sought to normalize relations with the rest of the world in order to achieve the political and economic assistance that would accompany such a move. The normalization of
relations required South Africa to relinquish its nuclear weapons. Personal Leadership. President F.W. de Klerk's personal leadership represented a critical factor in the South African decision. Regime Change. As the Nationalist Party prepared to relinquish power to the African Nationalist Congress, the Nationalist Party feared the ANC might share nuclear weapons or technologies with its allies in Libya, Cuba, the PLO, or Iran.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \7\ Ibid. South Africa Case Study. Although, some explanations are more important than others, these case studies demonstrate that a single reason cannot explain a country's decision to ``roll forward'' or ``rollback'' its nuclear weapons program. Second, a state's decision regarding the development of nuclear weapons should not be viewed as a single, distinct, irreversible decision. On the contrary, history consistently demonstrates that the proliferation decisionmaking process of states can be better understood as a series of decision points in which states ``dial up'' or ``dial down'' their programs in an effort to keep options open. Decisions related to
proliferation evolve slowly and incrementally. Undoubtedly, leaders make specific policy decisions in response to a particular set of initial motivations, but these decisions are frequently reassessed and reversed as the program progresses in response to new developments. While this finding provides hope for those who seek to reverse nuclear weapon programs, it also suggests that the international community can never ``rest on its laurels,'' trusting that a state has irreversibly turned its back on nuclear weapons. In other words, the U.S. can never declare victory in nonproliferation, either with regard to a particular country or a set of countries. Nonproliferation will have to remain a permanent fixture of U.S. policy. In the future, the increasing diffusion and availability of nuclear technology and know-how will make it easier for states to ``dial up'' their nuclear weapons programs. Third, the ``drivers'' of a state's nuclear weapons program should not be viewed as constant. In other words, the motivations that catalyze a state's nuclear program probably differ from the motivations that help to sustain that nuclear program. The ``drivers''
propelling the program forward continue to evolve over time. Often, as a state's nuclear program develops, constituencies emerge, momentum builds, and people ``rally around'' the program. As a result, stopping a program that has already begun presents more of a challenge than preventing the onset of a program in the first place. Once leaders make the decision to pursue nuclear weapons and work begins, discontinuing the pursuit in the face of international pressure would promote an image of weakness that could likely result in political difficulties. Although the initial motivation may have had an overwhelmingly security-centric focus, the political desire to create a domestic and international image of strength may motivate the decision to continue nuclear weapons development. Fourth, due to its relative power and global influence, U.S. policy often has a strong influence on the decisionmaking of states regarding nuclear weapons. Whether the state represents a potential adversary or a consistent friend, policies of the U.S. often play a decisive role. With potential adversaries, U.S. respect and recognition, the extension of a
nonaggression pact, or the credible promise of economic and political benefits can sometimes convince potential adversaries to ``rollback'' their nuclear weapons programs. U.S. policies have played an even more decisive role in dissuading allies from pursuing nuclear weapons by extending a reliable U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella over the ``vulnerable'' ally. Several countries began nuclear weapons programs and decided not to see these programs through to completion due in large degree to a U.S. or U.S.-led security guarantee. These countries include Australia, Italy, Norway, South Korea, and Taiwan.\8\ This is not to suggest that the U.S. security guarantee represented the only factor in the ``rollback'' decision of these countries, but the extension of a reliable U.S. security umbrella appears to have influenced each state's ``rollback'' decision. In the cases of Germany and Japan, both countries can easily obtain nuclear weapons but have chosen not to because of their integration beneath a NATO (Germany) or an American (Japan) security umbrella. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Rebecca Hersman and

all of these countries have the technical capacity to obtain nuclear weapons in a
Robert Peters, ``Nuclear U-Turns: Lessons From Rollback for Preventing Future Proliferation,'' Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (National Defense University, 27 June 2007). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Today,

matter of months or a few short years. Yet, they chose not to because of their respective cost- benefit
analyses. Pursuing nuclear weapons demands a large amount of finite money and other resources and
could invite punishing international political pressure and economic sanctions. At the same time, little
need exists to pursue such an undesirable policy because these countries do not view nuclear
weapons as necessary for their national security. This belief derives primarily from the fact that these
countries rest comfortably beneath a U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella. If these countries ever begin to
question the reliability of this security umbrella, they would almost certainly reassess past nuclear
weapons decisions. One can envision three scenarios that could prompt such a ``roll forward'' decision by U.S. allies and friends. In the
first scenario, a state relying on a U.S. or U.S.-led security umbrella can begin to question the reliability of that guarantee due to an escalating
perceived threat not matched by a proportional increase in the reliability or capability of the U.S. security guarantee. This relationship between
threat perception and the perception of the U.S. security guarantee is more subjective and psychological than objective and quantifiable.
Nonetheless, in a growing threat environment, a static U.S. security guarantee can lead to a reassessment of a state's nuclear decision. In the
second scenario, states could also begin to question the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee in a static threat environment if the protected
state perceives a decline in the capability or will of the U.S. to serve as a security guarantor .
In the third and most problematic
scenario, a mounting threat perception accompanied by a simultaneous perceived deterioration in the
reliability of the U.S. security guarantee, creates the most intense incentive for a state to
reassess its nuclear decision. In any of these three scenarios--an increase in the perceived threat, a decrease in the perceived
reliability of U.S. security guarantee, or both--the result can be the same; the state looks elsewhere to defend itself. If another security
guarantor can be found, the state may seek a new security relationship to replace the U.S. If a partner with both the capability and will to
perform as a security guarantor does not exist, the state will seek to improve and expand its internal defense capabilities--likely via nuclear
weapons. Thesebroad historical observations and potential scenarios suggest U.S. policymakers should
be concerned about recent developments in the Middle East. In the eyes of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
Turkey in particular, Iran's nuclear program has heightened threat perceptions, while the U.S. intervention in Iraq has damaged Arab and Turkish perceptions regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. As a result of this dangerous synergy, these three states in particular appear to be moving deliberately in the direction of a nuclear hedging strategy that would position them to obtain a nuclear weapons breakout capability in the next two decades. A Middle East populated by a Saudi, Egyptian, and/or Turkish nuclear weapons capability could dramatically reduce regional security and could significantly endanger U.S. interests. The U.S. must take in the next 2 to 3 years to reduce Arab and Turkish threat perceptions and to restore their confidence in the U.S. or U.S.-led security guarantee. Absent deliberate U.S. action in the next few years, the future Middle Eastern landscape may include a number of nuclear armed or nuclear

weapons capable states vying for influence in a notoriously unstable region. Chapter 3: Saudi Arabia The development of a Saudi nuclear weapon represents one of the most serious and most likely consequences of an Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, it will place tremendous pressure on Saudi Arabia to follow suit. The factor most likely to dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon would be a restored United States- Saudi bilateral relationship and a repaired Saudi perception regarding the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If the United States does not take deliberate action in the coming years to achieve both of these objectives, an Iranian bomb will almost certainly lead to a Saudi bomb. This chapter will support these arguments in five sections. The first section will describe the possible ramifications of a Saudi nuclear weapon. The second section will explore Saudi perceptions of Iran and the Iranian nuclear program. The third section will describe the nascent Saudi nuclear energy program. The fourth section will set out the arguments as to why an Iranian bomb will likely beget a
Saudi nuclear weapon. This section will discuss the centrality of the United States security guarantee in Saudi thinking. The fifth section will suggest those policy actions that might help discourage the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO Of any Middle Eastern state, Saudi Arabia is the state most likely to pursue nuclear weapons in response to the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon. While acknowledging the difficulty inherent in accurately predicting the ramifications of a Saudi nuclear weapon, one can envision a host of likely or possible outcomes that would dramatically undermine peace and stability in the Middle East and severely endanger U.S. interests and security. At some point in the Saudi process of developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon capability, Israel would likely detect the Saudi nuclear activity. Israel might strike a small number of Saudi targets in order to eliminate the program in its infancy. Even if the Saudis could obtain a nuclear weapon without Israeli knowledge, it is difficult to imagine a passive Israeli acceptance of a Saudi nuclear weapon, which the Israelis would likely view as
an existential threat. If the Israeli response to a Saudi nuclear weapons program took the form of a military attack it would be seen in the Arab World in the context of an attack from the Jewish state against the Islamic holy land and home of the ``two holy mosques.'' Such an Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia would represent one of the greatest offenses to Muslims in history and would incite an unprecedented level of radicalization directed against Israel and the United States, possibly resulting in a regionwide conflict between Arab States and Israel. A Saudi nuclear weapon might also spur a regional nuclear arms race. Iran would likely respond by increasing the number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal, the accuracy of their delivery systems, and the variety of their launch platforms. If Israel took either of these steps--especially in an overt and explicit manner--it would place tremendous political pressure on Egypt to respond.\1\ The Egyptian response could consist of a renunciation of its peace treaty with Israel, a repudiation of its relations with the United States, or the initiation of an Egyptian nuclear weapons program. The Egyptian people
would undoubtedly demand the government take some forceful and substantial action. This interaction between Israel and Egypt would also be exacerbated by the existence of a Saudi nuclear weapon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ This report does not take a postition on the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons. Although Israel has not officially acknowledged it possesses nuclear weapons, a widespread consensus exists in the region and among experts in the United States that Israel possesses a number of nuclear weapons. For Israel's neighbors, this perception is more important than reality. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Even if Israel didn't react in this overt way to a Saudi move, a Saudi nuclear weapon would put great pressure on the Egyptians to follow suit. Egypt views itself as the leader of the Arab world and a Saudi nuclear weapon would directly challenge this self conception. Moreover, a Middle East that includes a nuclear-armed Iran and Saudi Arabia would also place significant pressure on the Turks to respond in kind. While this ``nuclear cascade'' or chain reaction may
represent the worst case scenario, it is not outside the realm of possibility if Saudi Arabia responds to Iran by pursuing a nuclear weapon. While it is unlikely that such a nuclear cascade would unfold exactly in this manner, the odds that some of these developments may occur requires that the United States assess the likelihood that Saudi Arabia would pursue a nuclear weapon and take steps to decrease this likelihood. SAUDI PERCEPTIONS OF IRAN AND THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, the United States would be wise to immediately focus on the Saudi reaction. If Saudi Arabia demonstrates restraint and does not pursue nuclear weapons, it might be possible to forestall a regional nuclear arms cascade, thereby allowing the United States to focus on containing and potentially rolling back Iranian nuclear forces. Conversely, if Saudi Arabia does respond by pursuing nuclear weapons, this could well ignite a regional nuclear arms chain reaction as described above. This would also significantly reduce the likelihood that the international community could convince Iran to relinquish its nuclear weapons. Staff
interviews confirm the findings of Rand researchers Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic Wehrey that ``Saudi Arabia's reaction is a leading concern among all regional states,'' and the ``Saudi reaction is likely to be the pivot around which inter-Arab debates resolve.'' \2\ Therefore, the United States must take note of what the Saudis say and what may influence their decision. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\ Dalia Dassa Kaye and Frederic M. Wehrey, ``A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of Neighbors,'' Survival (Summer 2007). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- What the Saudis Are Saying When asked about the Iranian nuclear weapons program, senior and mid-level Saudi officials express an apparently unanimous belief among the upper-echelon of the Saudi Government that the Iranian nuclear program does not solely exist for peaceful purposes. One senior Saudi official told staff confidently, ``Iran is determined to get a nuclear weapon.'' While staff found a significant degree of doubt among other GCC states as to whether Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons, Saudi officials conveyed no sense of doubt
regarding Iran's intentions. One senior, long-serving U.S. diplomat in Riyadh said he had ``never met anyone from the King on down who didn't think it was a nuclear weapons program.'' According to one senior Saudi official, the Saudis have even told the Iranians that the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG) believes Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon. Saudi officials believe Iran wants a nuclear weapon in order to become a regional superpower, to alleviate a sense of marginalization, to serve as a deterrent, and to be a more dominant force in the Gulf. While senior Saudi officials describe a nuclear-armed Iran as ``an existential threat,'' most Saudi officials do not believe Iran would actually use nuclear weapons against Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia worries that Iranian nuclear weapons would encourage and enable the Iranians to pursue a more aggressive, hegemonic foreign policy in the region. However, it would be inaccurate to completely characterize SAG anxiety regarding Iranian nuclear weapons as purely a ``balance of power concern.'' Based largely on Iran's subversive activities directed against the Saudi regime in the 1980s, some senior
Saudi leaders find a nuclear-armed Iran especially disconcerting. Such past Iranian subversion efforts has imbued the senior Saudi leadership with an intense distrust of Tehran. Saudi Arabia currently fears Iranian influence, and finds the notion of a nuclear-armed Iran all the more disconcerting. When asked about the U.S. response to this apparent Iranian drive for nuclear weapons, Saudi officials encourage the United States to place greater emphasis on diplomatic initiatives, while opposing a quick resort to violence against Iran. Several senior Saudi officials appear to hope that stronger international sanctions, combined with face-saving means for the Iranians to change course, could resolve the nuclear crisis. When presented with a hypothetical choice between a nuclear-armed Iran and a U.S. attack, a significant number of Saudi officials interviewed explicitly or implicitly preferred a U.S. attack. A correlation seems to exist between the seniority of Saudi officials and views on Iranian nuclear weapons. More senior Saudi officials tended to be more ``hawkish'' in their viewpoint toward Iran. Some key Saudi officials believe a U.S. attack could

set the Iranian nuclear program back over a decade. More cautious members of the senior inner circle express concern that a military attack would affect ``everything and will not be easy to pull off,'' and doubt whether a U.S. attack could destroy all key components of the Iranian nuclear program. Based on U.S. actions in Iraq, some key Saudi officials feared a ``nightmare'' scenario in which the U.S. attacks Iran but fails to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. When asked if Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons in response to Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, senior and mid-level Saudi leaders echo the official Saudi line, dismissing the notion as ``ridiculous'' and saying Saudi Arabia would be the ``last country to get nuclear weapons.'' Several senior Saudis suggest that Saudi
Arabia would rather rely on a U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, when pressed, some senior Saudi
officials candidly state that SAG would seek to obtain nuclear weapons or rely on a nuclear
guarantee from Pakistan while simultaneously buying parts

on the market. It is entirely possible that such statements simply represent an effort by the more hawkish members of the Saudi inner circle to promote a U.S. attack on Iran. However, too many other factors suggest Saudi Arabia would take these steps to dismiss these comments as disingenuous. While the senior members of the Saudi regime have an especially ``hawkish'' perspective on Iran, in a meeting with several members of the Majilis ash-Shura (the Saudi Parliament), staff found a perspective quite distinct from the opinions expressed by senior and mid-level officials of the Saudi regime. While these Majilis members have limited influence over the decisions of the Saudi government, their views provide some insight into viewpoints outside the royal family. This group of Majilis members unanimously questioned the reliability of U.S. claims that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons (this meeting took place before the 2007 NIE), dismissed the threat posed by Iran, and

opposed a U.S. attack on Iran. One Majilis member appeared to summarize the consensus view saying ``Haven't we had enough wars . . . war is not in the interest of anyone.'' Another member predicted that a U.S. attack on Iran would cause the Shia to ``stand with Iran'' and would cause the Sunni to hate America even more. Members unanimously decried a perceived U.S. double standard when it comes to Israel and Iran, asking why the United States turns a blind eye to alleged Israeli nuclear weapons while opposing the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program. Members unanimously supported Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy and questioned why the United States would talk directly and unconditionally with the North Koreans, but would not do so with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Sunni-Shia Dimension While much of the Saudi perspective toward Iran and the Iranian nuclear program can be understood from a traditional security and balance of power perspective, a complete understanding of the Saudi viewpoint requires an appreciation of the sectarian dimension as well. Despite public diplomatic niceties exchanged between the
two powers, Saudi officials view Iran as a ``global ideological threat'' and a dangerous potential adversary. The Saudis base their view on 3,000 years of history and the events of the last few decades. However, a large portion of the Saudi perception of Iran is rooted in sectarianism. The Saudis view the Iranian threat at least partly through a Sunni-Shia lens. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, the Saudis will, to a large extent, view it as a ``Shia bomb.'' The Sunni-Shia divide would represent a major incentive for the Saudis to respond to an Iranian nuclear weapon by pursuing one of their own. To understand how this Muslim religious divide could play a role in the Saudi nuclear decision, it is essential to have at least a cursory understanding of the sectarian differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the Saudi regime's relations with the Saudi Shia and Iran. The sectarian differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia represent one of the central causes of the tensions between the two countries. Religious ideology plays a large role in informing Saudi foreign policy and would likely represent a key aspect in the Saudi decision on nuclear
weapons. The Iranian population is 89 percent Shia and only 9 percent Sunni.\3\ A Shia religious hierarchy headed by Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei controls the reins of power in Iran and views itself as the spiritual vanguard and shepherd of Shia worldwide. In contrast, Saudi Arabia is overwhelmingly Sunni, with a Saudi Shia population of only 10-15 percent.\4\. The Saudi royal family is Sunni and has maintained a long alliance with the leadership of a particularly strident wing of Sunni Islam founded by Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ ``Iran,'' CIA Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html #People. \4\ ``Freedom in the World 2007: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties'' (Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, 2007) 687. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This form of Wahhabi Islam has dominated Saudi Arabia since the nation's founding. It views the Shia as rafida (those who reject the faith). This religious classification of the Saudi Shia later served as justification for Ibn Saud's decision to enforce
the payment of jizya (an Islamic tax imposed on non- Muslims) against the Shia residing in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.\5\ As a result of this widespread view of the Shia as pseudo-Muslims or non-Muslims, the Shia in Saudi Arabia have suffered from a severe lack of religious freedom and civil rights. To complicate matters for the Saudi regime, the concentration of Shia in Saudi Arabia happens to be colocated with Saudi Arabia's major oil fields. As the Saudi oil industry matured, an increasing number of Saudi Shia transitioned from working on farms to working in menial jobs in the burgeoning oil industry in Saudi Arabia's eastern provinces. In 1950, it is estimated that 60 percent of ARAMCO employees were Shia. According to a senior U.S. diplomat in Saudi Arabia, that number now stands at roughly 70 percent. While King Abdullah has taken steps to improve the plight of Shia in Saudi Arabia, staff meetings with various members of the Saudi Shia community clearly demonstrate that a widespread perception of inequality persists among Saudi Shia. This Shia predominance in ARAMCO and in the vicinity of the oil wells that represent
the well-spring of Saudi wealth and power represents a major source of concern and potential vulnerability for the Saudi regime. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \5\ Madawi al-Rasheed, ``A History of Saudi Arabia'' (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002) 41, 89. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The domestic tensions between the Saudi regime and the Saudi Shia impact Saudi-Iranian relations and would influence the Saudi decision on nuclear weapons due to a number of specific events in the last few decades. The 1979 Iranian Revolution had a profound impact on Saudi Arabia's sense of insecurity and its perception of the Saudi Shia. As already detailed, the House of Saud's insecurities did not just appear in 1979, and tensions between the Sunni ruling family and the Saudi Shia date to the birth of the Saudi state. However, the 1979 Iranian Revolution dramatically exacerbated both of these problems. The new Iranian regime questioned the Islamic credentials of the Saudi regime, criticized the Saudi regime's relations with the United States, and emboldened the Shia residing in Saudi
Arabia. In 1979, encouraged by the Iranian Revolution, the Saudi Shia took to the streets in Saudi Arabia's eastern provinces to commemorate Ashura--a Shia rite outlawed by the Saudi regime that mourns the death of Hasan and Husayn. The Saudi regime responded by dispatching 20,000 National Guard soldiers. The following year, the Saudi Shia held large demonstrations and a series of strikes in Qatif to commemorate the first anniversary of Khomeini's return to Iran.\6\ The Saudi National Guard responded aggressively, killing some demonstrators and dispersing the rest. Following these uprisings, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution developed. This clandestine Shia organization representing the Saudi Shia in the eastern province was comprised primarily of students from the University of Minerals and Petroleum in Dammam and workers in the oil fields. This organization broadcasted from Iranian radio stations in an attempt to reach the Saudi Shia and opened an information office in Tehran to promote political activism among the Saudi Shia.\7\ The anti- Saudi rhetoric of the Iranian Government promoted agitation among Saudi
Shia and escalated tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Ibid, 143-147. \7\ Ibid, 147. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- When war broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980, Saudi Arabia sided with Sunni-led Iraq against the Shia-dominated Iran. Saudi Arabia felt threatened by both states. Both Iran and Iraq had larger populations and more powerful militaries than Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein's efforts to promote pan- Arabism and Iran's attempt to export its form of Islamic revolution threatened the Saudi regime. However, Saudi Arabia provided an estimated $25.7 billion in aid to Iraq because Saudi Arabia saw Iran's export of Shia Islamic revolution as the greater of the two threats. As the Iran-Iraq war continued throughout the 1980s, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca for the Hajj became another source of religiously grounded tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Each year, thousands of Iranians made the trip to Mecca to participate in this important Muslim tradition. While in Saudi Arabia, many Iranian pilgrims would organize demonstrations and
denounce the Saudi regime for its relations with the United States. Clashes between the Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces became a regular fixture of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca during the decade. In 1987, major clashes occurred between the Saudi security forces and protesting pilgrims in which 400 people were killed, including 275 Iranians.\8\ After this incident, tensions mounted dramatically between the Iranian regime and the Saudi Government, with the Iranian leadership calling for the ouster of the Saudi royal family. The Saudi regime responded to the hostile Iranian rhetoric and suspected incidents of Iranian sabotage and subversion by introducing a quota system partly intended to reduce the number of Iranian pilgrims in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj. While Saudi Arabia and Iran enjoyed a period of detente in the 1990s, the Sunni-Shia animosities and insecurity still continue to resonate deeply in the thinking of the Saudi regime. This Saudi history with Iran and the Saudi Shia has imbued the Saudi ruling family with a deep skepticism regarding the intentions of the Iranians and the loyalty of some Saudi Shia. This
troubled past with Iran and the Saudi Shia figures prominently in Saudi thinking and would significantly shape the Saudi response to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Michael Ross, ``Gulf Supply Ship Hits Mine; Sinks Another; Blast Rocks Saudi Plant on Coast; Iranian Sabotage Hinted,'' The Los Angeles Times (Aug. 16, 1987). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- THE SAUDI NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM In December 2006, Saudi Arabia joined the five other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to announce their intention to explore the development of a shared nuclear power program. These six countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) join Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, and Turkey as countries who have expressed interest in developing nuclear energy programs in the wake of Iran's nuclear activities. The GCC states have taken great pains to cooperate with the IAEA fully and to progress in a transparent manner. At the initial announcement, the Saudi Foreign Minister said, ``This is not a secret and we are doing this out in the
open. Our aim is to obtain the technology for peaceful purposes, no more no less.'' \9\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ Abdullah Shihri and Diana Elias, ``Arab States Study Shared Nuclear Program,'' Associated Press (Dec. 11, 2006). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Despite these assurances, numerous individuals interviewed by staff expressed a belief that the GCC announcement should be seen primarily as a response to Iran's nuclear program. Analysts and scholars in the United States and the Arab world interviewed by staff believe the Saudi-led announcement was intended to communicate to the Iranians, ``we can play this game too,'' while building a foundation of nuclear knowledge and expertise that would be useful should Saudi Arabia decide to pursue nuclear weapons in the future. This is not to suggest the Saudis do not have an energy- based argument for their interest in nuclear energy. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Saudi Arabia's Water and Electricity Ministry (WEM) predicts that the country's electricity demand will double by the years 2023-25.
Saudi Arabia already uses large amounts of its oil for domestic energy needs. In fact, 7 years ago, 16 of every 100 barrels of Saudi oil were consumed in Saudi Arabia. This year the amount of Saudi oil consumed in-country has grown to 22 of every 100 barrels, even as the global oil market has become tighter. As the Saudis seek to build an industrial infrastructure and employ more Saudis, consumption demands will continue to grow.\10\ Given the high price of oil and gas, the Saudis would rather export their fossil fuels than burn them. A nuclear power capacity would allow the Saudis to export more oil and gas and consume less. However, the timing and the forum for the Saudi-led announcement suggests the primary purpose of the decision was to warn the Iranians and begin the process of a nuclear-hedging strategy that will keep Saudi Arabia's nuclear options open. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \10\ Neil King, ``Saudi Industrial Drive Strains Oil-Export Role,'' Wall Street Journal (Dec. 12, 2007). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- This does not mean that Saudi Arabia and the other GCC
states will have a nuclear power generation capability in the next 5 years. Since the December 2006 announcement, several rounds of GCC meetings have been held, but little tangible progress appears to have been made. In the case of the GCC states, tangible progress toward a nuclear energy program lags far behind the political rhetoric and ambition. In other words, a shared GCC nuclear power generation capacity remains at least a decade in the future if not longer. Most of the government individuals interviewed by staff in the GCC seem to be unaware of the magnitude of the task involved in developing a nuclear power program. Nonetheless, the GCC rhetoric, and especially the Saudi rhetoric, should be considered as more than mere political positioning. A genuine desire to develop a nuclear power program exists in the Middle East. This desire appears to be partially motivated by energy considerations and mostly motivated by a desire to match the Iranian nuclear program and to keep options open regarding nuclear weapons. If current trends continue, U.S. decisionmakers should expect to see a GCC nuclear power generation
capacity within the next two decades. While this development may be unwelcome to many U.S. observers, the U.S. Government has supported the GCC expressions of interest in nuclear energy. As the GCC program progresses, the United States should monitor closely the degree to which the GCC states cooperate with the IAEA and whether these states express an interest in enrichment or reprocessing. WILL THE SAUDIS SEEK A NUCLEAR WEAPON? One of the central questions staff attempted to answer throughout this study was whether Saudi Arabia would respond to an Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon by pursuing a weapon as well. In addition to the responses detailed above from Saudi Government officials, staff interviewed a large number of U.S. officials and Saudi scholars in Saudi Arabia, as well as a significant number of U.S. scholars in Washington. While responses varied, virtually every person interviewed by staff believed that Saudi Arabia would be the country most likely to pursue a nuclear weapon in response to an Iranian bomb. Significant disagreement existed regarding the Saudi's final decision, as well as their

capability to obtain a nuclear weapon, but almost all individuals agreed that the United States should monitor Saudi Arabia, specifically. One senior U.S. diplomat said a Saudi nuclear weapon would be the ``real downside'' of an Iranian nuclear weapon, predicting that a Saudi pursuit of a nuclear weapon would be ``virtually certain.'' Referring to the Saudis, another senior U.S. diplomat with excellent access to the highest levels of the Saudi Government said that the idea of an Iranian nuclear weapon ``frightens them to their core'' and would lead the Saudis to pursue a nuclear weapon of their own. Some acknowledged these Saudi fears, but argued that the importance of the bilateral relationship with the United States would dissuade the Saudis from pursuing a nuclear weapon. Most individuals interviewed
argue that any future Saudi decision regarding nuclear weapons would be primarily based upon
the Saudi assessment of the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee. If the Saudis believe the United
States lacks the will or capability to defend Saudi Arabia against a nuclear-armed Iran, Saudi Arabia is more likely to
pursue a nuclear weapons capability of its own. To appreciate the importance of U.S. security guarantees in Saudi strategic
thinking, it is necessary to briefly review the history of United States-Saudi relations.

Nuclear war.
Sanders 23 [Alicia Sanders, Policy and research coordinator for the International Campaign to Abolish
Nuclear Weapons, 7-7-2023, Newsweek, "Now Is the Time for Saudi Arabia To Join the Nuclear Ban
Treaty," https://www.newsweek.com/now-time-saudi-arabia-join-nuclear-ban-treaty-opinion-1811402
HKR-MK]

Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons would be dangerous and illegal. Saudi Arabia can and should take technical
steps to mitigate this risk, including increasing access for international nuclear inspectors. But to put definitively to rest any doubts about its
nuclear intentions, Saudi Arabia should join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) without delay, thereby forswearing all
nuclear weapons activities, including development, use, and threat of use.
With the risk that nuclear weapons could be used at an all-time high, following Russia's threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine and the
escalation of nuclear tensions on the Korean peninsula, all efforts must be made to prevent further proliferation, which only increases
the risk of nuclear use.
Nuclear weapons have uniquely horrific effects. They are weapons of mass destruction that kill innocent civilians on a mass scale, burning
bodies, leaving eyeballs hanging from their sockets, and scarring descendants of survivors for generations with radiation-caused diseases and
psychological trauma. A 300 kiloton nuclear weapon (a common-sized nuclear weapon across arsenals) dropped on Riyadh would kill nearly
500,000 people immediately people immediately, instantly injuring nearly a quarter of a million more men, women and children, including
causing third degree burns for everyone within 6.3 kilometers of the blast's hypocenter. There is no adequate health care response for such a
tragedy, as medical professionals have warned repeatedly in the advocacy for nuclear abolition.

While Saudi Arabia, like other nuclear-armed states, would try to assure the international community that its
nuclear weapons are only intended for "deterrence," and meant to keep the peace, the Russian invasion of Ukraine
has demonstrated all too clearly the problems with deterrence theory. This strategic theory is based on the
flawed premise that leaders of nuclear-armed nations will always act rationally and in their states' best
interest, clearly communicating their intentions so their adversaries may respond accordingly . It
ignores the possibility of human error, of miscalculations, or misunderstandings that have always existed and
brought us to the brink of nuclear war in the past, but which are now even more likely with the increased use
of artificial intelligence.
 1NC – CP
CP: The United States should condition its military presence in Israel on Israel’s
compliance with international humanitarian law. The United States should begin
assessing Israeli military operations to determine compliance and if Israel violates the
terms of the agreement, the United States should substantially reduce its military
presence in Israel.

Solves but avoids the Saudi DA.

Bertrand Lillis and Lee 23 (Natasha Bertrand, Katie Bo Lillis, and MJ Lee, “Biden administration makes clear it has no plans to
place conditions on military aid to Israel despite pressure from lawmakers,” CNN, December 13, 2023,
https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/13/politics/us-conditions-military-aid-israel/index.html)

The Biden administration currently has

no plans to place conditions on the military aid it is providing to Israel,
officials told CNN, despite growing calls by Democratic lawmakers and human rights organizations for the US
to stop providing weapons unless Israel does more to protect civilians in Gaza. Speaking to Democratic donors in
Washington this week, President Joe Biden acknowledged that he has had tough conversations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
about Israel’s military campaign, how Israel is losing international support, and the need for a two-state solution led by the Palestinian
Authority. But he said even throughout those discussions, “we’re not going to do a damn thing other than protect Israel in the process. Not a
single thing.” Echoing that sentiment, US officials told CNN that the US has no plans to shift its position and draw any red lines around the
transfer of weapons and munitions to Israel. They noted that the administration already expects allies and partners to use US-made equipment
in accordance with international humanitarian law and pointed to Israel’s practice of embedding military lawyers with Israel Defense Force
units who determine beforehand whether a strike will be proportional and legal. But rather than independently assess each
Israeli strike that the US deems concerning or disproportionate, the US leans on Israel to justify strikes
after the fact, a US official said. And while Biden said last month that conditioning aid was a “worthwhile thought,” the president ultimately
believes that a strategy of quiet pressure on Israel to change its tactics has been more effective than threatening to withhold weapons, the
official said. In a move underscoring how committed the US remains to arming Israel, the State Department transmitted an emergency
declaration to lawmakers late Friday night for the sale of thousands of tank munitions to Israel, bypassing the standard 20-day period that
congressional committees are typically afforded to review such a sale. The
State Department did not provide any
assurances to lawmakers that the administration would monitor how the munitions are used , a
congressional source told CNN, and some Democratic lawmakers were unhappy with the move. “It’s a mistake for the Biden admin to bypass
Congress to approve the sale of tank ammo for Israel amid unacceptable civilian harm,” Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts
said Monday on X. “Weapons
transfers demand public scrutiny and thorough review. U.S. military aid should
be contingent on upholding our values and international law.” Contrast to conditions on Ukraine The US places
conditions on the military equipment it provides to Ukraine and has made clear to Kyiv that it cannot use
US-provided weapons to attack inside Russia. But there are no such red lines on the aid being provided
to Israel. The US has advised Israel against opening another front in the war by launching a large-scale
attack on Hezbollah, officials said, but has not threatened to cut off aid if they do. In its supplemental funding
request to Congress, the Biden administration included provisions that would lift several existing limits on US weapons transfers to Israel. The
provisions would waive the current monetary cap on replenishing Israel’s internal stockpile of US-provided weapons, known as the War Reserve
Stockpile Allies-Israel, allow the Pentagon to transfer weapons to Israel even if they are not obsolete or surplus to the US’ own stocks, and
shorten the amount of time afforded to Congress to review weapons sales to Israel. Asked on Monday about reports that Israel used US-
supplied white phosphorus munitions in an attack that injured civilians in southern Lebanon earlier this year, National Security Council
spokesperson John Kirby told reports that “any time that we provide items like white phosphorous to another military, it is with the full
expectation that it will be used in keeping with those legitimate purposes and in keeping with the law of armed conflict.” The
US does not
consider the death of civilians as the result of a military operation to be itself a violation of the law of
armed conflict, one of the US officials explained, because that is not the standard set by international
humanitarian law— which says only that civilians must not be directly targeted in attacks. Rather, the US
is judging the legality of Israel’s operations on whether its strikes are proportional and seeking a
legitimate military target. But officials acknowledge they are not conducting real-time assessments of
each Israeli strike, what weapon was used, and how many civilians were killed as a result. That is at least
partly because it is “nearly impossible” to do so in such a high-intensity war zone, two officials explained. Israel also purchases weapons from
several different countries and does not tell the US each time it uses a US-provided bomb or munition. But human rights
organizations have demonstrated that such an accounting, even if limited to case-by-case studies, is
possible. An investigation by Amnesty International released last week found that a US-made Joint Direct Attack Munitions guidance system
was used in two Israeli airstrikes in Gaza in October in which 43 civilians are said to have been killed. The US has provided approximately 3,000
JDAMS to Israel since October 7, one source familiar with the US’ weapons sales to Israel told CNN. A senior defense official told CNN on
Monday that while the Pentagon is not conducting a formal review of the Amnesty report, officials on the Pentagon’s Civilian Harm Mitigation
and Response team “will consider the report along with other publicly available information related to civilian harm as they carry out their
responsibility to advise senior DoD leaders.” Some lawmakers and human rights activists argue that the US appears
to be shirking its obligation under international law to keep track of how Israel is using US-provided
weapons, particularly the larger “bunker-buster” bombs that leave a signature and fragmentations that
the US could assess. The US has provided at least 140 such bombs to Israel, the source familiar with the weapons sales said. “ The US may
share responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by Israel with US-
supplied weapons, as all states have a duty not to knowingly contribute to internationally wrongful acts
by other states,” Amnesty warned in a statement. The Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health says over 17,000 Palestinians have been killed
since Israel declared war on Hamas on October 7, when the organization killed over 1,200 Israelis in the worst terror attack in Israel’s history.
The Biden administration is keeping track, to some extent, of how many US-provided bombs Israel has used in the war. In closed-door briefings
to lawmakers, officials said the intelligence community estimates that Israel dropped 22,000 US-provided guided and unguided bombs on Gaza
in the first six weeks of war, according to a source with direct knowledge of the matter. Democratic lawmakers have stepped up their calls for
the US to do more. Last week, more than a dozen Senate Democrats announced they would be supporting an amendment to the Biden
administration’s supplemental funding request that would require the president to verify to Congress, within 30 days, that countries receiving
US military aid as part of that supplemental are using it in accordance with international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict. “It is
imperative that all assistance to Israel abide by U.S. and international law, prioritize the protection of
civilians, assure the provision of desperately needed humanitarian assistance to civilians in Gaza, and
align with a long-term vision for peace, security, and two-state diplomatic solution,” Democratic Sen. Ed
Markey of Massachusetts said in a statement last week. Language in the annual intelligence authorization bill for 2024, if
passed, would also require the intelligence community to notify Congress if any US-provided intelligence used by a third nation results in civilian
casualties. The legislation was written before October 7, but has gained new relevance as scrutiny around Israel’s use of American aid in Gaza
has grown.

Porter is a solvency advocate for us and proves that we solve the first advantage
about moral hazards---green
Porter ’19 — Patrick; Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham.
April 16, 2019; “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”; The Washington Quarterly;
Taylor & Francis; Volume 42; Issue 1; //IL & CYang
Despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Trump has materially increased American alliance commitments. U.S. troop deployments and investment in
NATO have risen, troop deployments to the Middle East and arms sales to Gulf States have risen, and the frequency of FONOPS in Asia has
risen. If the United States maintains its alliances and refuses to revise that choice, then it must rediscover what its alliances are for. They are not
“ends” in themselves, but means to an end, namely protecting American security interests. To make alliances serve that purpose, however,
Washington should exert some discipline on its allies. This is so especially in the Middle East, where U.S.
clients too often act in ways that infringe on U.S. security interests. Only recently, it was revealed that Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates transferred U.S.-supplied weapons to Sunni jihadi groups with Al Qaeda links in Yemen, adding to a long record of
Saudi sponsorship of anti-Semitism in schools and jihadist preaching, as well as passive support for Isla mist causes and organizations. The
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence’s ties with the Taliban and the Haqqani network are well known, admittedly a difficulty Washington has
been wrestling with for decades. Cultivated as a bulwark of stability in Central Asia, Kazakstan has embarrassed Washington with its human
rights violations while pursuing defense cooperation with Moscow.
 the United States should restore what used to be part of its
To make alliances work for its interests,

repertoire as a great power — the imposition of conditions on its protection, and the
credible threat of abandonment. In other words, contrary to the standard orthodoxy often invoked by Trump’s critics, a
critical ingredient in an effective patron-client relationship is the cultivation of a reputation for limited
reliability, if not unreliability. Thus, the United States should make clear that it is willing to walk away and that its
alliance commitments are conditional on its ally’s prudent behavior. In a world of worsening rivalries,
the U.S. ability to control escalation and limit inadvertent spirals depends partly on its capacity to restrain
third parties and keep its initiative. To make this threat credible, it may require the United States
occasionally to terminate an alliance relationship.
There are fine lines to be walked here. The United States has alliances for the most basic purpose of augmenting its power, its reach and the
totality of its presence. From this perspective, it is in Washington’s interests to have militarily proficient friends. But its alliances have other
rationales that cut against that simple desire. Another central historical purpose of American alliances in the postwar period is to contain its
allies. By providing security, Washington in theory removes incentives for its allies to rearm and reassert themselves as challengers. This
imperative, to depress allies’ defense expenditure, requires in turn that Washington must establish a reputation for being a reliable security
provider. Failure to maintain that baseline of confidence could lead the client to pursue belligerent self-help, or even other allies in lieu of the
United States. Yet, establishing a reputation for reliable security provision can and does have a perverse result —
it creates a moral hazard. Allies’ confidence in American backing can embolden them to behave
recklessly in ways that Washington dislikes. Conversely, the dependency Washington forms on the
alliance, as an indispensable platform for its power projection, creates reverse leverage, making Washington reluctant
to attempt to impose itself with threats of abandonment or even public criticism.33

Some allied states have tested the possibilities of this relationship with a spirit of adventure, tolerating or
encouraging militant Islamist activity, suppressing peaceful protests, committing human rights
violations, locking up citizens of allied countries in humiliating and brazen fashion, and threatening or carrying out
military campaigns against Washington’s wishes with strategically corrosive results, such as the present onslaught
in Yemen. Even the most outspoken supporters of the U.S.-Israel alliance will admit that U.S. guarantees

have not restrained Tel Aviv from settlement expansion. As Asia becomes more competitive, a rearming Japan
could also start to test alliance boundaries, either because of lost faith in American security guarantees or because it takes them for granted. In
Eastern Europe, the cast-iron guarantee built into NATO could lead states to miscalculate and behave recklessly
against Russian minorities in their own territory, quickly fomenting a cross-border crisis.

There is a difficult balancing act to be struck here, if the United States chooses to maintain allies to increase its material strength while
containing those same allies. The threat of abandonment, or withdrawal of patronage, was once a greater part of U.S. diplomatic repertoire
behind the scenes.34 The
United States explicitly threatened West Germany, South Korea and Taiwan in
order to prevent nuclear proliferation, for instance. It seems to have receded to an extent, after the Cold War, when the sense
weakened of the need to keep allies in line coercively. Trump’s public humiliation of and threats to allies, usually followed swiftly by increased
U.S. commitment, are probably too hollow and less effective in the long run than the quiet threats made by past administrations.

Certainly, the United States has an interest in preventing allies being complacent about American guarantees, or worse, of the United States
being so anxious about losing access and influence that it dare not exercise it. One of the superpower’s greatest advantages is
its ability to leave. This is a possibility it should deftly exploit. Against traditional orthodoxies about “global leadership,”
the overall U.S. position would benefit from the possibility that Washington might not have an ally’s
“back” if it behaves recklessly against the superpower’s stated preferences, or if it hedges too much in favor of
rivals. In other words, U.S. alliances are likely to serve U.S. interests better if it ceases fetishizing them.
Resolved requires the plan be certain.
Webster’s Revised Dictionary 1996 ((1.) RESOLVED MEANS “HAVING A FIXED PURPOSE;
DETERMINED; RESOLUTE”)

Ought means certain.

Merriam-Webster ND [Merriam-Webster Dictionary; “Ought.”; https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/ought; accessed 12/15/23]

used to express obligation

ought to pay our debts
 1NC – CP
The United States should
---initiate a suite of diplomatic measures to reduce escalation risks with the Russian
Federation and the Republic of China, including arms control measures, diplomatic
channels, hotlines, and joint military exercises.
---Forswear the first use of nuclear weapons against the Islamic Republic of Iran
Solves conflict with russia
 1NC – Lebanon DA
Biden’s balancing pressure and reassurance to stop Israel from expanding the Hamas
war into Lebanon. That causes massive regional escalation.
Lee 1/4/24 [MATTHEW LEE, Associated Press. "Blinken heads to the Mideast again as fears of regional
conflict surge." https://apnews.com/article/us-israel-hamas-gaza-iran-lebanon-hezbollah-houthis-
10ead93b054519d6e8739438455d48b7]

WASHINGTON (AP) — As the Biden administration grapples with an increasingly tense and unstable situation in the
Middle East, Secretary of State Antony Blinken is heading to the region this weekend for the fourth time in
three months on a tour expected to focus largely on easing resurgent fears that the Israel-Hamas war
could erupt into a broader conflict.
With international criticism of Israel’s operations in Gaza mounting, growing U.S. concerns about the end game, and more immediate worries
about a recent explosion in attacks in the Red Sea, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq, Blinken will have a packed and difficult agenda. He
leaves just days after a suspected Israeli attack killed a senior Hamas leader in Beirut and, while a White House spokesman said “nobody should
be shedding a tear” over his death, it could further complicate Blinken’s mission.

“We don’t expect every conversation on this trip to be easy,” State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said.
“There are obviously tough issues facing the region and difficult choices ahead. But the secretary believes it is the
responsibility of the United States of America to lead diplomatic efforts to tackle those challenges head on, and
he’s prepared to do that in the days to come.”

Blinken leaves late Thursday on his latest extended Mideast tour, which will take him to Turkey, Greece, Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the West Bank and Egypt.

Apart from Gaza-specific priorities he will bring to Israel — including pressing for a dramatic increase in
humanitarian aid to Gaza, a shift toward less intense military operations and a concerted effort to rein
in violence against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank by Jewish settlers — Blinken will be seeking regional
assistance in calming the situation.

“It
is in no one’s interest, not Israel’s, not the region’s, not the world’s, for this conflict to spread beyond Gaza,” Miller
said. Thekey elements to preventing this will be deterring attacks by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi rebels on
commercial Red Sea shipping, deterring attacks on Israel by Lebanon’s Iran-backed Hezbollah and
deterring attacks on U.S. military facilities and interests by Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria.
Yet, U.S. influence with Iran is minimal and it must rely either on its own military deterrence or on partners to make the case with Iran that a
regional war would be catastrophic.

“Strategically, Iran is winning,” said Paul Salem, head of the Washington-based Middle East Institute. He said Hezbollah and the overall network
of Iranian-allied groups are pleased with what the current level of hostilities has achieved.

“Iran is sitting pretty,” he said. “It doesn’t need to do anything dramatic. It is kind of on the winning side.”

Since the Gaza war erupted with Israel’s response to the deadly Oct. 7 Hamas attacks, the Biden administration has
been seriously concerned about a potential spread in the conflict.

It had breathed a sigh of relief in the weeks following the start of the the Israeli operation, when it
successfully counseled Israeli officials not to mount pre-emptive strikes against Hezbollah in Lebanon
and sent two aircraft carrier strike groups to the eastern Mediterranean to serve as a deterrent.
Focus and signaling are key --- otherwise, the entire region ignites.
Abutaleb 11/10/23 [Yasmeen Abutaleb is a White House reporter for The Washington Post. She
joined The Post in 2019 as a national health policy reporter. "White House urges Israel to curtail settler
violence in West Bank.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2023/11/10/white-house-israel-
west-bank-violence/]

The Biden administration is

ramping up pressure on Israeli officials to rein in rising settler violence in the occupied
West Bank, fearing that a failure to do so will further inflame an already combustible situation and
potentially open a second front as Israel wages a military campaign in Gaza to eradicate Hamas.

Most of the world’s attention has focused on Israel’s invasion of Gaza, which has left more than 10,000 Palestinians dead. But the war in Gaza
has stoked a spike in violence in the West Bank, raising concerns among Biden officials that emboldened hard-
right settlers will ignite a multi-front conflict and increase the risk of a Palestinian uprising in the territory.
Thursday marked one of the deadliest days in the West Bank since Hamas’s bloody Oct. 7 attacks on Israel, with 14 Palestinians killed in Jenin
and four elsewhere in the territory, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry. Nearly 200 Palestinians have been killed in violent clashes in
the West Bank over the past month.

President Biden and his top aides have sharpened their criticism of settler violence and raised the issue
repeatedly in calls with top Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, according to people familiar with the
matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity to disclose private talks. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last week that he had
received a “clear commitment” from Israeli officials that they would condemn and address the violence.

U.S. officials are urgently working to keep the war in Gaza from turning into a broader regional
conflagration, seeking to temper anger in the Arab world, repeatedly warning Iran not to encourage its
proxies — particularly Lebanon’s Hezbollah — to get involved and pushing Netanyahu to crack down on the
violence in the West Bank, where instability threatens to undermine the fragile restraint that the
various parties have exercised so far, experts say.

Israeli confidence in American defense commitments are key. If they think the US
won’t defend them, they’ll go all-out to win the war.
Vinjamuri 10/18/23 [Dr Leslie Vinjamuri Director, US and the Americas Programme; Dean, Queen
Elizabeth II Academy for Leadership in International Affairs. "President Biden’s Middle East visit reveals
the challenges for US diplomacy – and the cost of American withdrawal from the region."
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/10/president-bidens-middle-east-visit-reveals-challenges-us-
diplomacy-and-cost-american]

All of this has raised the ante for US diplomacy, which will need to speak to multiple audiences. Quiet
diplomacy designed to influence Israel’s response to the attacks by Hamas must be balanced by
diplomacy that can demonstrate to governments in the region that the US is serious about its
commitment to protecting civilians on both sides of the conflict.

The US will need to show that it can work with Israel, Egypt, and other state and non-state actors in the
region to help put effective humanitarian measures in place

This is a tall order, but the US ability to contribute to peace in the region depends on it. The US will
need to show that it can work with Israel, Egypt, and other state and non-state actors in the region to
help put effective humanitarian measures in place.
America’s public diplomacy may be even more essential to prevent the widening of the conflict. US
support of Israel is coming under intense public pressure.

Causes global nuclear war.

CPI 10-18. Chennai Print India, Indian News Agency citing Brandon Weichert, who holds a Master of
Arts in Statecraft & National Security Affairs from the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. "The
Israel-Hamas Conflict: Is World War 3 on the Horizon?". 10-18-2023. https://chennaiprint.in/world/the-
israel-hamas-conflict-is-world-war-3-on-the-horizon/

As the Israel-Hamas conflict enters its 11th day, experts are warning of the potential for wider regional
implications, with consequences extending far beyond the Middle East.
The recent attacks on Israel have led to increased concerns about the escalation of the conflict. Retired Colonel Miri Eisin, who now heads a
counter-terrorism institute at Reichman University in Israel, notes the critical question: “Whether this will lead to a bigger war is the $64,000
question.”

Adding to the complexity, geopolitical

tensions are already running high due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
and strained US-China relations. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has cautioned that the world is entering a
dangerous period, with a rise in operational nuclear warheads owned by major military powers.

Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has long raised alarms about Iran’s nuclear program. While he has threatened action
against Iran in the past, the recent assault by Hamas may provide an opportunity to act on those
threats. If Israel finds evidence of Iranian involvement, it could have global implications.

The Middle East remains a potential hotspot for a new world war, with Iran’s influence on the rise,
backed by allies in Beijing and Moscow.

Geopolitical analyst Brandon Weichert warns that the Middle East, empowered by its allies, is where the next global
conflict is likely to emanate.
Additionally, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been described as one of the most dangerous developments in Europe since the end of World
War II. Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian president, has warned that Nato members’ military aid to Kyiv could lead to World War Three.

China’s growing tensions with the United States have also been a significant concern. The modernization of China’s military has raised alarm in
Washington, especially regarding the situation in Taiwan, a potential flashpoint in a regional conflict.

In Northeast Asia, security dynamics have become more volatile due to China’s military threats and the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine. North Korea’s relations with the United States are tense, adding to regional instability.

Furthermore, concerns about artificial intelligence triggering

global conflicts have arisen. While no state openly seeks
to automate its nuclear weapons systems, the integration of AI with command systems is a growing
consideration.

The Israel-Hamas conflict is one part of a complex global landscape, where tensions are running high,
and experts are watching closely for any potential signs of a broader conflict. The situation remains fluid, and the
world is on alert for any developments that could further escalate tensions.
Case
 Moral Hazard
American support for Israel is not presence- its arms sales and vetoing sanctions at
the UN which are all things the aff can’t solve
1---No internal to human rights---their evidence doesn’t say withdrawal in Israel
restores relations broadly on HR policy. Alt causes like US border policy, which
undermines leadership image
2] The plan is only substantial, it maintains some level of aid. That retains moral
hazard b/c Israel thinks we still back them. Doesn’t solve the allies scenario because it
maintains the perception of American support of Israeli HR atrocities. BUT the
perception of withdrawal is sufficient for our links.
3] Decades of U.S Israeli support thump. Perception can’t be reversed overnight
because ties are entrenched in national history. At worst, solvency takes years before
credibility is regained on the international stage.
2---Presence cuts backfire---operations shift to the CIA, temporary missions, and
private contractors.
Bishara 10 [Marwan Bishara is Al Jazeera English's senior political analyst and the editor, “US wars:
People vs Generals,” www.aljazeera.com/blogs/imperium/2010/08/2558.html]

While the Obama administration continues to affirm its intention to withdraw US troops from Iraq and
Afghanistan, the US' military presence in the Muslim world is actually expanding and this is exacerbating tensions
and inflaming animosities. Barack Obama's promise to open a new page with the Muslim world on the basis of mutual respect
and interests - supplemented and enforced by the use of soft rather than hard power - now rings hollow. This is most evident in the
withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq and the corresponding surge in Afghanistan - an exercise in redeploying
military forces, not extracting them. As the gap between words and deeds declarations and policies public diplomacy and military strategy
deepens, so the political and strategic crisis facing the Obama administration continues to deepen. Enduring presence There are now more than
140,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan - from the 100,000 Americans to the three Austrians - in an estimated 400 bases. But, almost a decade
after it invaded and a year after the adoption of a new AfPak strategy, the escalation of fighting there serves to underline the failure of the US
to implement an effective counter-insurgency strategy. The complete military and political failure in places such as Marjah, in Helmand
province - which was presented as a prototype for future operations - has further complicated the military mission in the country. But Robert
Gates, the US secretary of defence, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and General David Petraeus, the commander
of US forces in Afghanistan, have been unequivocal in insisting that their priority is to 'get the job done' - which places a big question mark over
previous presidential commitments to draw troops down by the end of next year. The US generals are adamant and are lobbying their Nato
allies to also expand their presence in the country. [ibimage==3445==blogpostFeaturedImage==none==self==null] And in Iraq ... US and Iraqi
generals question the wisdom of a total US troop withdrawal by the end of next year, with some like Lieutenant-General Babaker Zebari, going
as far as to speak of another decade of US deployment in the country. Moreover, the US state department's decision to hire and deploy a
private army of some 7,000 additional mercenaries in Iraq - to add to the estimated 200,000 private contractors already deployed there and in
Afghanistan, is further militarising its diplomatic presence in the region. As of next month, there will still be some 50,000 US soldiers in more
than 100 military bases in Iraq. As former US Colonel Andrew Bacevich, the author of an insightful new book called Washington Rules and
whose son was killed in Iraq, told EMPIRE: If it looks and sounds like an occupation, the US presence in Iraq will still be just that. The political
paralysis in the country and recent escalation of violence aren't making matters any easier. The wider region A new report show that the
Obama administration is intensifying its secret war and covert operations in the Muslim world, including assassinations through the use of
drones. Muchof this is being executed by the CIA, turning the intelligence agency into, in the words of The New York
Times, a
"paramilitary organisation". Other covert operations are being carried out by unaccountable
private contractors who are complicating US missions and rules of engagement.
4---Attacks since 10/7 have declined, its stabilizing.
Meghann Myers 12/7. Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy,
personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. “Attacks on US troops in Iraq and
Syria have resumed, Pentagon says.” Military Times. 12/7/2023.
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2023/12/07/attacks-on-us-troops-in-iraq-and-syria-
have-resumed-pentagon-says/

After a Thanksgiving weekend break that coincided with a humanitarian pause in the Israel-Hamas war, Iran-backed
militias have
resumed attacking bases housing American troops in Iraq and Syria, although less frequently than in
October and November.
The Pentagon has recorded 78 attacks total, spokeswoman Sabrina Singh told reporters on Thursday. That number includes five attacks since
Nov. 29, the last day of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire.
“Look, in terms of the attacks on our forces I think it’s important to remember that it’s good that we
have not seen attacks on our forces in the last 24 hours,” Singh said. “We would like to see that continue.”
It’s hard to say whether the attacks will escalate to previous levels, Singh added, when multiple attacks were taking place daily between Oct. 17
and Nov. 22.
There have been 66 total injuries, Singh said at the briefing, a number that’s held steady since late November. Officials have not specified how
many of those incidents included traumatic brain injuries.
Singh said of the possibility of additional attacks. “But I would remind you that when
“I can’t predict the future,”
we have decided to respond, it has been deliberate. It has been effective.”
Since October, there have been three preplanned, targeted strikes on facilities in Syria aimed at destroying weapons
the militias use in their attacks.
The Pentagon confirmed in late November that troops have taken immediate action in response to
attacks as well, including using air assets to strike a vehicle in Iraq as it fled following an attack.

1AC Porter is about threatening allies with withdrawal, not committing. That’s
categorically distinct.
Following through causes waves of proliferation---it’s incentive-based. PURPLE.
Porter ’19 — Patrick; Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham.
April 16, 2019; “Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition”; The Washington Quarterly;
Taylor & Francis; Volume 42; Issue 1; //IL & Cyang rc roshan

There are fine lines to be walked here. The United States has alliances for the most basic purpose of
augmenting its power, its reach and the totality of its presence. From this perspective, it is in
Washington’s interests to have militarily proficient friends. But its alliances have other rationales that
cut against that simple desire. Another central historical purpose of American alliances in the postwar
period is to contain its allies. By providing security, Washington in theory removes incentives for its
allies to rearm and reassert themselves as challengers. This imperative, to depress allies’ defense expenditure, requires in
turn that Washington must establish a reputation for being a reliable security provider. Failure to maintain that baseline of confidence could
lead the client to pursue belligerent self-help, or even other allies in lieu of the United States. Yet, establishing
a reputation for
reliable security provision can and does have a perverse result — it creates a moral hazard. Allies’ confidence
in American backing can embolden them to behave recklessly in ways that Washington dislikes.
Conversely, the dependency Washington forms on the alliance, as an indispensable platform for its
power projection, creates reverse leverage, making Washington reluctant to attempt to impose itself
with threats of abandonment or even public criticism.33
Host of alt causes to HR cred. It’s inevitable – inserted in PURPLE.
Koh ’20 — Harold; Sterling Professor of International Law at Yale Law School. He is the State
Department’s Legal Adviser and Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Democracy. June 2020;
“Why U.S. Leadership Matters for the Global Defense, Protection and Promotion of Human Rights”;
American Foreign Service Association; https://www.afsa.org/why-us-leadership-matters-global-defense-
protection-and-promotion-human-rights; //IL

Particularly in
a time of COVID-19, climate change and refugee outpourings, U.S. leadership matters in the
global defense, protection and promotion of human rights. The coronavirus pandemic has unveiled the
close global intertwining of environment, health, economy and human rights. Climate-caused injury
destroys animal habitats, triggering zoonotic (animal-to-human) diseases, causing pandemics that
shatter lives, exacerbating income inequality and spurring the rise of authoritarian governments that
perpetuate climate injury. Unless we break this vicious cycle, more pandemics will surely come.

9---No US HR modeling
Dr. Afsheen John Radsan 12, Professor at the William Mitchell College of Law, Assistant General
Counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2002 to 2004; and Dr. Richard Murphy, AT&T Professor
of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, 2012, “The Evolution of Law and Policy for CIA Targeted
Killing,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy, Volume 5, p. 439-463

Most of the charges leveled against the CIA drone campaign turn on the interpretation and application
of international law in the form of either treaties or custom. One should recall that international law
binds American officials only if it is also U.S. law. This fact leads to the problem of determining just which
international laws convert into U.S. law. Some cases are easy: A treaty approved by the Senate
constitutes a type of U.S. law, although making it domestically enforceable may require additional
legislation.17 Some cases are hard: determining the binding force of customary international law, for
example.18 Moreover, even if some piece of international law has become U.S. law, there is always the
possibility that the United States, as a sovereign power, might change it – e.g., by withdrawing from the
treaty. Coupling this point with an aggressive understanding of the President’s foreign affairs and
commander-in-chief powers, Michael Paulsen says that the President may freely abandon or suspend
the United States’ international law obligations, even many enshrined in domestic law.19 Professor
Paulsen offers an admonition that the force of law on a sovereign is on some level always up to the
sovereign and is fraught with policy considerations. The Obama administration, however, is not bogged
down in academic debates; the Administration states that the United States should (and indeed does)
follow all relevant international law.20 Both proponents and opponents of the CIA drone campaign thus
largely agree on the framework of the discussion.

Part of the reason they can agree is that many norms of international law are vague and even border on
the vacuous. International humanitarian law (IHL), for instance, forbids attacks that cause
“disproportionate” or “excessive” collateral damage to peaceful civilian interests. No responsible party
is likely to defend its attacks by claiming a right to cause “excessive” collateral damage. No, that party
will contend that its attacks honor proportionality – though critics will claim the contrary. The norms of
international law, no doubt, leave room for major disagreements about interpretation and application.
This wiggle room helps ensure international law’s existence by reducing incentives for nations to
withdraw from a regime they might otherwise regard as too restrictive. But it also limits the power of
international law to compel agreement from all interested parties on whether an attack was legal,
particularly in light of uncertain facts and a lack of neutral observers . Unanimity over the legality of the
CIA drone campaign is thus highly unlikely. This said, as detailed below, international law leaves ample
room for the Obama administration to defend the campaign’s legality.

6---The US is restraining Israeli action now and avoids broader war. The aff risks
fracturing ties and causing Netanyahu to go rogue.
Peter Baker et al. 12/31. Edward Wong, diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times who
covers foreign policy from Washington. In more than 24 years at The Times, he has reported from New
York, Baghdad, Beijing and Washington. As Beijing bureau chief, he managed The Times’s largest
overseas operation, Julian E. Barnes, national security reporter for The New York Times covering the
intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times’s Washington bureau in 2018, he wrote about security
matters for The Wall Street Journal, based in Brussels and Washington. He has more than 17 years’
experience covering U.S. national security, the military and related matters for the Journal, The Los
Angeles Times and U.S. News & World Report and Isabel Kershner, correspondent in Jerusalem for The
New York Times covering Israeli and Palestinian politics and society. *chief White House correspondent
for The New York Times, responsible for covering President Trump, the fourth president he has covered.
He covered President Obama for The Times and Bill Clinton and George W. Bush for The Washington
Post. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/31/us/politics/us-israel-hamas-war.html#:~:text=The
%20Americans%20recognize%20that%20Israelis,little%20concern%20about%20possible
%20consequences.
The resolve of that dramatic presidential trip to Israel has given way to frustrating phone calls, sharp public comments and exhausting
marathon meetings. The relationship has grown increasingly fraught as Mr. Biden has involved himself more
intensely in the conflict than almost any other issue in three years in office. The president and his team
have intervened time and again to steer Israel away from what they consider the excesses of its
retaliation only to have the Israelis defy them at critical moments. Mr. Biden has seen growing internal
resistance to his backing of Israel, including multiple dissent cables from State Department diplomats. In November, more than
500 political appointees and staff members representing some 40 government agencies sent a letter to
Mr. Biden protesting his support of Israel’s war in Gaza. Congressional Democrats have been pressing him to
curb Israel’s assault, and the United States has found itself at odds with other countries at the United
Nations.The friction appears to be coming to a head as the new year arrives. The Biden team recognizes that its challenge is not just Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, since Israelis across the board support the military operation that according to the Gaza Health Ministry has
killed more than 20,000 people. But there is no serious discussion inside the administration of a meaningful change in policy, like cutting off the
arms supply to Israel. Instead, Mr. Biden remains determined to navigate the crisis within the crisis by using the credibility he earned through
steadfast support of Israel to shape its next chapter, although it is unclear how much leverage that gives him.
During a tense conversation a week ago, Mr. Biden pressed Mr. Netanyahu to scale back the war to a surgical
operation relying more on special forces raids targeting Hamas leaders and tunnels than wide-scale
bombing. The Israeli leader then sent his right-hand adviser, Ron Dermer, to Washington for what ended up being a nearly four-hour
meeting at the White House the day after Christmas, where he assured Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Jake Sullivan, the national
security adviser, that Israel would soon shift to the targeted phase that Mr. Biden has been urging.
The first signs of such a shift could be seen in the coming weeks as Israeli forces wrap up operations in
northern Gaza and begin withdrawing many troops from that area, Mr. Dermer told them. But he did not give
a firm timetable, and the Americans pressed him to begin the transition sooner rather than later. Mr. Blinken plans to head back to Israel in
early January, when Israeli officials hope to give him a decision on next steps.
At the same time, Mr. Biden’s
team has been quietly working to negotiate a new hostage deal. William J. Burns, the
C.I.A. director, met with his Israeli counterpart and Qatar’s prime minister in Warsaw earlier in December to advance a proposal
for a
seven-day halt to the fighting in exchange for the release of another 35 to 40 people seized on Oct. 7 ,
including civilian women, badly wounded men and other men over 60 years old.
And there are even
quieter efforts underway to negotiate through intermediaries an arrangement with
Hezbollah to pull back from the area near Lebanon’s border with Israel, preventing the eruption of a
wider war in the region and allowing tens of thousands of Israelis who have fled their homes to return.
This account of the relationship between the United States and Israel over the past 12 weeks is based on multiple interviews and trips to the
region with key American and Israeli officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to share details of internal conversations and
deliberations. It is a complicated story where officials on both sides say public assumptions do not always match the private reality.
Fears of a Wider War
The first week after the attack was the most volatile and dangerous. Mr. Biden’s
biggest fear, according to advisers, was an
expanded war in which Iran would empower proxies in addition to Hamas to attack Israel, or Israel
would launch a pre-emptive war against such forces.
As he learned about the attack on Oct. 7, Mr. Biden conducted three conference calls and three in-person meetings with his national security
team, delivered a statement to the media and made separate calls to Mr. Sullivan; Jon Finer, his deputy national security adviser; Mr.
Netanyahu; King Abdullah II of Jordan; Vice President Kamala Harris; Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III; and two congressional Democrats
who were in Israel, Senator Cory Booker of New Jersey and Representative Dan Goldman of New York.
He would go on to send a steady procession of officials to the region. Mr. Blinken has made three trips to the area with five stops in Israel, once
even joining a meeting of Israel’s war cabinet. Others who have traveled to the region include Ms. Harris; Mr. Austin; Mr. Burns; Mr. Sullivan;
Brett McGurk, the president’s Middle East coordinator; Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence; Gen. Michael E. Kurilla, the head of
U.S. Central Command; and Lt. Gen. James Glynn, who led Special Forces against the Islamic State.
Mr. Bidenhas now spoken directly with Mr. Netanyahu 14 times, in addition to calling the leaders of
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, as well as Pope Francis. Every presidential call
with Mr. Netanyahu typically involves a preliminary meeting with Mr. Biden’s advisers and a debriefing afterward. Mr. Dermer then often calls
Mr. Sullivan for another hourlong discussion.
On Oct. 11, Mr. Biden made an urgent call to Mr. Netanyahu. The Israelis had gotten vague intelligence that
Hezbollah was about to launch a major strike against Israel, and the Israelis, pushed by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant,
were preparing to strike first. The Americans got wind of the situation but believed the intelligence was not so
clear.
Joined by Mr. Blinken and Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Biden spoke with Mr. Netanyahu and other Israeli officials to press
them not to attack. If you do this, the Americans argued, you will guarantee the very thing we think we
can prevent and deter. The Israelis agreed to back down. Mr. Biden, who had already sent one carrier group to the eastern
Mediterranean to deter Hezbollah from joining the fray, sent a second one.
American officials began racing to Israel, first Mr. Blinken, then Mr. Austin. On Oct. 13, Mr. Austin privately warned Mr. Gallant that the Israelis
needed to establish humanitarian corridors and a defined set of rules to protect Palestinian cities, citing America’s experiences with urban
warfare in Iraq.
Mr. Blinken spent a week traveling around the region, briefing the president each day by secure line. On one day alone, he conducted nine
hours of talks with the Israelis, and at one point was forced to evacuate during a rocket attack to an underground bunker six floors beneath the
surface. Mr. Blinken and his aides sat in one room while Mr. Netanyahu and his war cabinet sat in another. Mr. Netanyahu shuttled back and
forth between the rooms, listening to American proposals and bringing them back to his team. He agreed to let humanitarian aid into Gaza as a
condition for Mr. Biden visiting.
Mr. Biden’s advisers and allies said his personal involvement has averted a broader war and influenced Israel’s
approach, even if not as much as he would hope.
 Iran
**No great power draw in.
Glaser ’17 [John; 1-9-2017; Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; “Does the
U.S. Military Actually Protect Middle East Oil?” National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
skeptics/does-the-us-military-actually-protect-middle-east-oil-18995?page=0%2C1]
In addition, the balance of power globally and in the region today is favorable for energy security.
First, an external power gaining a stranglehold over the Persian Gulf region is implausible. The Soviet
Union is long gone and today’s Russia suffers from systemic economic problems that hinder its
potential to project power in the Middle East. China, while increasingly powerful in its own
sphere, lacks the political will to dominate the Gulf.
The regional balance of power is also favorable. According to Joshua Rovner, “the
chance that a regional hegemon will emerge in the Persian Gulf during the next twenty years is slim to
none. This is true even if the United States withdraws completely.” No state in the
region possesses the capabilities necessary to conquer neighboring territories or gain a controlling
influence over oil resources, and most are bogged down and distracted by internal problems.
Overall the region is in a state of defense dominance: while too weak to project
power beyond their borders, the major states do have the capability to deter their
neighbors, making the costs of offensive action prohibitively high.
So, three of the major scenarios that have traditionally justified a forward deployed military presence in
the Persian Gulf—the entrance of a hostile external power, the rise of a regional hegemon and a military
clash among the major states—are exceedingly unlikely even absent the U.S. military presence.

The US spanks Iran conventionally, Russia and China never draw-in, and we use the
opportunity to pre-emptively evaporate Iranian nukes
Bryen 20 – Bryen, Stephen, 6 January 2020, “There’s a silver lining in a potential US-Iran war,” AsiaTimes,
https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/theres-a-silver-lining-in-a-potential-us-iran-war/ Stephen Bryen is a leading expert in security strategy and
technology. He has held senior positions in the Department of Defense, on Capitol Hill and as the President of a large multinational defense and
technology company. He writes for Asia Times, American Thinker, the Jewish Policy Center and for many other newspapers and magazines. He
has published four books on security subjects. Dr. Bryen was twice awarded the Defense Department's high civilian medal for Distinguished
Public Service. He was also the founder of the Defense Technology Security Administration and served as a Commissioner on the US-China
Security and Economic Review Commission. Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and at the American Center for Democracy
[Harker KB]

If conflict breaks out, the US will use bunker busters and precision weapons to destroy Iran’s missile and
nuclear weapons centers Many Democrats are trying to whip up hatred for US President Donald Trump over the killing of Iranian
General Qasem Soleimani, who was taken out by a drone strike on January 3 near Baghdad’s airport. The Democrat thesis is that Trump will
guide America into a full-scale war with Iran and lead to the massive loss of US military personnel and bases. These assumptions appear to be
based on a faulty interpretation of what the Soviet Union used to call “the correlation of forces.” In this reading, America has put itself in a
position to be victimized by the Iranians and there isn’t much we can do about it. In effect, the Democrats’ argument is the same one Iranian
leader Ali Khamenei advanced: the US “can’t do a damn thing against us.” The facts don’t match either the bluster of Khamenei or that of some
Democrats running for president. Candidate Tulsi Gabbard went so far to say that Trump’s action was “unconstitutional.” If she was right then
virtually all US presidents would be guilty of similar offenses. The
US is in a very strong position versus Iran. It has a vastly
superior air force including stealth bombers and fighter planes, modern and effective naval forces
including aircraft carriers, missile defense Aegis cruisers and nuclear submarines. The US also has superb
intelligence and situational awareness, something the Iranians lack. Top of Form Iran has short, medium and some long-range
rockets, and the ability to use terrorism to its advantage. Beyond that, Iran has little else. The Iranian navy is worthless
as a fighting force. Its air force is made up mostly of old planes that are hardly flightworthy. It does not
have precision weapons. Iran does have drones and aging Russian cruise missiles. It also has proxy forces that can
cause trouble for Israel in the form of Hezbollah and, to a degree, Hamas. But not much more. (In fact, Hamas was celebrating the demise of
Soleimani, handing out candies in the Gaza strip. After all, Soleimani killed countless Palestinians in Syria.) The
US has formidable
allies in the region. Israel has a first-rate air force, missile defenses, submarines and strike naval assets. It
has a well-disciplined and trained army along with civil defense to protect its citizens. Like the US, Israel has excellent situational
awareness and intelligence assets, formidable command and control capabilities, and deep fighting
experience. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other allies in the region also have frontline fighter aircraft and
competent naval assets. Like Israel, they also have some missile defenses. They are supported by the US,
have precision weapons, and in a setting of general war can be useful and effective assets. Iran has none
of these things. Its questionable allies – China and Russia – are not going to get into a war with the United
States over Iran. The argument that China needs Iran’s oil doesn’t stand up: there is so much oil available
from the Gulf states, Russia, even the United States that the argument makes little sense. The Russians,
for their part, have not prevented Israeli strikes on Iranian operations in Syria (Hezbollah plus Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards). In fact, it can be argued that they have aided and abetted Israel to some degree. Why would they risk war
with the United States? If Russia did so it would lose its growing support in Europe, trash any chance of a
political settlement in Ukraine and probably end up going broke. Speculation about a combined Russian and
Chinese intervention is unrealistic. Russians still understand what correlation of forces means. Legally
speaking, neither Russia nor China has a security agreement or defense treaty with Iran. Russia does
have a military cooperation agreement, but the agreement says nothing about Russia coming to Iran’s
aid. The cooperation agreement is not a defense treaty. Similarly, China has a military cooperation
agreement with Iran, but it imposes no obligations on China and is not a defense treaty. With President
Trump’s clear threat to forcefully answer any Iranian action against the US, the critical issue is whether Iran would talk itself into a fight with the
US. Bottom of Form Given the nature of the Iranian regime, its tendency toward extreme posturing and its ambition to dominate the Middle
East and Persian Gulf, nothing can be ruled out. But if
Iran does go to war, there is a silver lining: heightened conflict
could provide the opportunity to end the country’s budding nuclear ambitions. If conflict breaks out, the
US could use its bunker busters and precision weapons to annihilate as much of Iran’s missile and nuclear
weapons centers as possible. That would definitely end the Mullahs’ rule and the Middle East would be
spared the growing threat of nuclear war.

4---No risk of Iran war---Biden will find an off-ramp and Iran has no incentives to
escalate.
Michael C. Horowitz 20. Professor of political science and the interim director of Perry World House at
the University of Pennsylvania. **Elizabeth N. Saunders, associate professor in the School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. **Article
cites Dan Reiter, professor of political science at Emory University. “War with Iran is still less likely than
you think.” The Washington Post. 01-07-2020.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/01/07/war-with-iran-is-still-less-likely-than-you-think/

But as other analysts have noted, fears

of World War III are overblown. Even after this escalatory move, many
factors that made war between the United States and Iran unlikely in June remain unchanged

. There will no doubt be consequences — but general war remains unlikely.

But could the United States and Iran stumble into war?

Although the killing of Soleimani was a deliberate act by the United States, much fear about escalation
between the United States and Iran surrounds the potential for a conflict spiral through miscalculation.
Fortunately, this type of escalation is rare. As Dan Reiter explained here at The Monkey Cage during a spike in tensions
with North Korea two years ago, “powder kegs” rarely explode into war by accident.

Those worried about accidental war may also point to reports that the Trump administration developed the plan to kill Soleimani in haste,
suggesting there was insufficient effort to think about how Iran might respond.

But if and when it does respond, Iran’s action is likely to be highly considered. This may be worrisome — but it’s not war by accident or
miscalculation. If Iran’s leaders take an action in response that triggers a general war, it will probably be because they decided it was a risk
worth taking.

Retaliation by Iran is not the same as war

It’s important not to move the goal posts for how we define war. At the same time, it’s also key to distinguish
tit for tat between the United States and Iran from a general war involving ground troops.
This is not to deny the risk of a damaging retaliatory move from Iran that may result in American casualties and lead to long-term complications
for the United States in the region.

But even retaliation may not come right away. Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution argues that Iran is
likely to “bide its time” despite anti-American protests in Iran during the widespread mourning for Soleimani.

Domestic politics still act as a brake — in both the United States and Iran

As TMC editor Michael Tesler wrote over the weekend, war

with Iran is unpopular in the United States and is unlikely to
help Trump win reelection. And Trump has long said he doesn’t want a Middle East war.

Similarly, despite short-term domestic pressures to retaliate, Iran’s leaders want to stay in power and
do not want to risk their regime in a costly war — and war between the United States and Iran would
probably be very costly.

So how did we get here, and what happens next?

Back in June, we wrote about one risk that could increase the odds of war: “if Trump’s hawkish advisers present an option that seems like it
could be kept limited, but actually carries a strong likelihood of escalation.” According to news reports, Trump chose the option to kill Soleimani
on short notice, surprising even some of his advisers and setting off a planning scramble.

But we also noted that Trump

has backed away from tough stances before. If the past is any guide, having now
looked tough, Trump may seek an off-ramp. And as Sarah Croco, Jared McDonald and Candace Turitto have pointed out here at
TMC, Trump is unlikely to be punished if he flip-flops and backs down.

And even if Iran strikes back — as it says it will — it is also likely to try to avoid escalating the conflict
significantly. Finding such a finely calibrated option is, of course, a difficult problem, but neither miscalculation nor domestic politics are the
most likely drivers of further escalation in this case.

What might prevent the two sides from finding the offramps? One factor is if the administration, with Mike Pompeo at the understaffed State
Department leading the hawkish charge, does not fully consider diplomatic options or engage in a robust set of invisible, back-channel
consultations that would produce such options.

The stakes are high

Another concern is that this crisis has higher stakes for Iran than last summer’s tanker or drone encounters. We know that war can occur even if
both sides don’t want it when one side doesn’t believe the other’s commitment not to attack in the future. If Iran doesn’t believe the United
States will really leave its regime alone, it might frame the stakes of the Soleimani killing in the strongest possible terms, planning for significant
escalation.

But that seems unlikely, given

that the United States is far more powerful than Iran and a general war would
probably mean the end of Iran’s regime. And Iran’s leaders might alternatively believe Trump does not want a
war, especially given his publicly stated interest in reducing the U.S. military’s footprint in the Middle
East. Indeed, a challenge for Iran’s leaders is that they may agree with commentators who have noted that Trump has not made clear what he
wants.

Blowback may be coming, and the U.S. strike against Soleimani may increase the risk of bad outcomes
short of an all-out war. Those are reasons for concern. But it’s critical to distinguish such consequences from a general
war.