CIA-Warsaw Pact Forces For OPNS Against NATO 15 MAY 1973
CIA-Warsaw Pact Forces For OPNS Against NATO 15 MAY 1973
CIA-Warsaw Pact Forces For OPNS Against NATO 15 MAY 1973
PPROVED FOR.
RELEASE - HISTORICAL
COLLECTION DIVISION
HR70-14 DATE:
OSR-1539/2 07-18-2012
15 May 1973
4j n SalR~i "'. /
"Contents
Page
Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - 1
eI
Contents
Page
F. Combat Effectiveness. . . . . . . . . . . 27
Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
G. Operational Concepts. . . . . . . . . 28
1. The Ground Campaign . . . . . . . 28
2. The Air Campaign. . . . . . . . . . . 29
3. Naval Campaigns . . . . . -. . . . .. 30
Norwegian Sea-Barents Sea
Operations. . . . . . . . . .30
Baltic Sea Operations . . . . . . 31
North Atlantic Operations . . 31
Mediterranean-Black Sea
Operations. . . . . . . . 31
4. The Theater Nuclear Strike Plan . . . 32
Issues..... ........... 33
Soviet Response to NATO Use of
Nuclear Weapons..... . . .. 33
Feasibility of Soviet Preemptive
Strike.... . . . .. 36
The Questions of the Use of
Nuclear -Weapons-at-Sea. . -.--
36
Soviet Response to Advanced
Buildup of Western Europe . . . 36
The Interdiction of Oil Shipping
from the Persian Gulf ..... 37
Other Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
V. Tables . ....... . . . . . . . . . . . 41
A. Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Divisions . . -. 42
B. Warsaw Pact Air Forces in East Europe . . 43
C. Soviet Tactical and Long Range Air
Forces West of The Urals. . . . . . . . 44
-II-
I.
Contents
Page-
-III-
t~
Warsaw Pact Forces for Operations Against NATO
Summary
Ground Forces
Air Forces
I
provide defense of rear areas. About 2800 of these
are located opposite the NATO Central Region.
Performance limitations impair the capabilities of
Pact tactical air forces for deep strikes. For
this mission, the Pact relies mainly on the Soviet
medium bombers based in the USSR, most of which
are aging TU-16 Badgers.
Naval Forces
-2-
may soon be introduced. Ground air defense systems
are being increased and modernized, aircraft with
better low-level attack and load-carrying capabili-
ties are being introduced, and reconnaissance
capabilities are being improved.
-3-
in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, however,
could launch a conventional attack on short notice,
but could achieve only limited objectives without
reinforcement and more logistic support.
Strategic Redeployment
Operational Concepts
-4-
' f
land armies brought forward from the western USSR.
These armies are then expected to drive to the
rapid conclusion of the European campaign.
-5-
approaches to the USSR and interdict logistics and
reinforcements from the CONUS. The primary effort
of the Baltic Fleet would be directed toward
seizing control of the Baltic Sea and its approaches.
It would also conduct amphibious operations in
support of Pact ground forces. The Black Sea Fleet,
augmented in the Mediterranean by submarines of
the Northern Fleet, would attempt to neutralize NATO
aircraft carriers and amphibious assault forces
in the Mediterranean and would assist in operations
aimed at. seizing control of the Turkish Straits.
-6-
of specialists. Consequently, in the Soviet view
the main distinction with respect to the employment
of nuclear weapons appears to lie.between use and
nonuse.
-7-
-- Implications of success or failure of the
initial Pact air operations for NATO and the
Pact. Strengths anid weaknesses of $he
Pact concept for air operations.
-8-
OSR-1539/1
-9-
Czechoslovak first echelon and ten understrength
divisions, including two small special purpose
divisions, of the Polish first echelon also could
be committed immediately without mobilization if
the situation dictated. These ground force divi-
sions would have limited effectiveness and endurance
if so used. After about three days of mobilization (DIA
believes less than a week), two additional East German reserve
divisions would be activated, Czechoslovak forces would increase
to 12 divisions and Polish forces to 15 divisions, all
fully manned. Support forces also would be brought
to wartime strength. These divisions would be at
varying levels of initial combat effectiveness,
depending mainly on the number of reservists in
each division.
2. Air Forces
3. Naval Forces
-10-
The Baltic Fleet submarine force consists
of fewer than 30 medium- and short-range diesel
submarines and a variety of missile-equipped and
gun-armed surface combatants. Emphasis in this
fleet is on a large force of cruise-missile
equipped small combatants. The Baltic Fleet also
has, with assistance from Polish and East
German Navies, a modest amphibious assault cap-
ability. The primary mission of these forces would
be to gain control of the Baltic and its approaches
and to conduct operations in support of Pact
ground forces in the NATO Northern and Central
Regions. Additionally, submarine elements of the
Baltic.Fleet probably would contribute to any
Northern Fleet interdiction campaign against the
UK and the Low Countries.
-11-
4. Peripheral Strategic At-tack Forces
Soft Multilauncher
SS-4 420 400
SS-5 40 40
Subtotal
Hard Multilauncher
SS-4 80 70
SS-5 -45 30
Subtota, I! lO~
Total 585 540
-12-
B.. Salient Characteristics' of Fact Forces
1. Ground Forces
The structure, equipment, and posture of
Warsaw Pact ground forces accentuate initial combat
and shock power and austere logistic support. Pact
troop strength is concentrated mainly in heavily
armored divisions*'which are both smaller and more
numerous than NATO divisions, while service support
and logistic elements are relatively austere.
The divisional maneuver elements are com-
prised entirely of tanks and mechanized infantry
elements. The divisions have high ratios of tanks
to personnel, and when fully equipped have high
tactical mobility. However, about one-third of
the infantry in the Pact divisions--mainly those
in the second echelon forces--would have to ride
in trucks because.of a shortage of APCs.
-13-
2. Air Forces
3. Naval Forces
-14-
The three western fleets are hampered by
their division among three widely separated locations,
two of which--the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets--
are susceptible to blocked straits.
Soviet ASW forces have no significant
capability for defending an area or a sea lane
from submarines and would even be hard pressed to
defend themselves from submarine attack on the high
seas.
-15-
self-propelled artillery may soon be
introduced.
-16-
Ic.~~ '.
improved at tactical levels with the replacement
of older vehicles with newer vehicles with greater
lift capacities. In addition, the number of
vehicles assigned to motor transport units has
increased.
2. Doctrinal Trends
Implications of Force Trends for Doctrine
-17-
IC,..
f c
war with NATO is likely to escalate to theater
nuclear war is still in effect and the forces
continue to be configured for optimum efficiency
in the nuclear environment, but,
-18-
G,
and convert to a war footing. Pact planners appear
to deal with surprise attack only from the stand-
point of NATO nuclear strike, and even then it is
addressed mainly as a "worst case" planning hypo-
thesis.
B. Pact Mobilization Capability
-19-
The mobilization of air forces can be carried
out in a similar fashion using the same mobili-
zation system. Tactical air units, which are
generally manned and equipped at higher levels
than are ground forces units and have lesser
mobilization requirements, could probably mobilize
a greater proportion of their units secretly.
-20-
j ;.
__ssue'
-21-
at maximum speed, and with maximum
reasonable utilization of capacity of
facilities
-- no efforts toward concealment attempted .
-- use of the most appropriate means and
route of movement
-- route capacity not limited by nonmilitary
traffic, outages, or by the extent of the
military requirement
Pact documents, __
ndicate-that Pact-planners---
_ ---
expec that a period of tension would precede any
outbreak of hostilities. Pact planners
appear to rely heavily on a period of tension to
provide them with the necessary time to mobilize
their forces and put their nations on a war footing.
Most units in the western USSR would be ready
for movement within about three days of the start
of mobilization. Where the forces would be de-
ployed once they were brought forward is unknown.
Additional time would be required to complete the
organization of the units into armies and fronts
in the forward area and to prepare for coordinated
offensive operations.
The manner in which large scale redeployments
are to be carried out has been the subject of much
-22-
sf .LI..
Li
Issues:
Norwegian Sea
we would
expect-to see the deployment of intelligence
collection vessels into the southern Norwegian Sea
and the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap area at the be-
ginning of a period of political tension. At
about the same time submarine reconnaissance
patrols would be established in the same regions,
as well as the central and northern part of the
Norwegian Sea. Soviet naval aircraft would
begin daylight reconnaissance flights over the
Norwegian Sea and Gap areas.
-23-
south--to establish an echeloned reconnaissance
and strike network, as seen in major fleet exercises.
Baltic Sea
Mediterranean Sea
The Soviets apparently maintain a minimum
war-fighting naval force in the Mediterranean during
peacetime. With the onset of tension, reinforcement
for surface ships and-auxiliaries would come from
the Black Sea Fleet and for submarines from the
Northern Fleet.
North Atlantic
-24--
some 80 naval strike aircraft based in the Far
East could be moved to the European area, but
Moscow would want to retain most of these aircraft
as well as the reconnaissance and ASW units in the
Pacific. Moscow probably would also improve its
strategic posture by deploying additional ballistic
missile submarines off the US coast.
E. Logistics Capabilities
Logistic Transport
-25-
army level stores, Pact planners see the combined
use of road and rail to serve logistic transport
links.
Pact motor transport elements are not sufficient
to support the all-mobile stock and transport
system stated as a goal in Soviet doctrine. Pact
logistic writings reflect recognition of the
inadequacy of the military vehicular inventory
alone to satisfy their potential needs in a war
with NATO. They indicate that until such time as
the goal of an all vehicular logistic transport
system is met, measures would be taken to in-
corporate railroad, barge transport, and forward
storage into various parts of the system.
Issues:
-- To what extent would logistics con-
strain the size and intensity of initial attack
without logistical buildup?
-- What is the functional relationship
between logistics endurance time and logistical
buildup? How many months buildup, for example,
is required per week of additional endurance?
-26-
-- Would logistics limit endurance of
Pact forces in offensive operations?
F. Combat Effectiveness
Issues:
-27-
G. Operational Concepts
1. ' The Ground Campaign
-28-
are expected to drive to objectives rapidly.
-29-
escalate the conflict to nuclear war. Suppression
of NATO air defenses by tactical aircraft is con-
sidered to be a prerequisite, because--due to the
limited range and payload capabilities of current
Frontal Aviation aircraft--the Pact is forced to
rely on conventionally armed medium bombers for
the major strike on NATO air bases.
3. Naval Campaigns
-30-
After the initiation of hostilities some
of these forces would move south to attack carrier
task forces in the eastern Atlantic. Once the
immediate carrier threat was eliminated, submarines
from the Northern Fleet would be assigned interdic-
tion roles.
The Northern Fleet amphibious forces would
conduct small raids against key targets in Norway
in support of Warsaw Pact ground forces in the
NATO northern region.
-31-
4. The Theater Nuclear Strike Plan
-32-
{ .
would resort to nuclear weapons. They have
undoubtedly been encouraged in this view by the
continued stress on nuclear escalation in NATO
doctrine and exercises. Beating NATO to the
nuclear punch, therefore, is not only regarded as
militarily advantageous but also as potentially
decisive. On the other hand, they may also
consider that the initial use by NATO of tactical
nuclear weapons may be constrained by political
considerations. DIA believes that with the present
imbalance of conventional forces in Europe the
Soviets almost certainly would not initiate the use
of nuclear weapons in a conflict between NATO and
the Pact except possibly for preemption if they are
convinced that NATO intends. to employ such weapons.
They would prefer to bring such a conflict to a
successful conclusion by conventional means alone.
Nevertheless, they will maintain and perhaps improve
their theater nuclear capabilities as a deterrent
to the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons by
NATO.
Issues:
-34-
Probably the overriding consideration in the
Soviet stand on nuclear escalation is a funda-
mental skepticism that a graduated nuclear strategy
is feasible. Given the general lack of experience
among nations in nuclear warfare, the Soviets may
feel that once nuclear weapons are used, even on
a limited scale, a psychological barrier is
crossed beyond which human behavior becomes un-
predictable. The Soviets may feel that the
pressures on political leaders from the military
and possibly the general public to respond force-
fully and without restraint would likely be the
same regardless of the weight of an aggressor's
attack or the targeting concepts he employed.
-35-
regions of Europe, .the employment of only tactical
nuclear weapons will also spell complete catas-
trophe. Ivanov, who is commandant of the Soviet
general staff academy, also characterized another
aspect of graduated nuclear strategy--use of
selected nuclear strikes to demonstrate resolve--
as a concept that is valid only in a theoretical
sense.
-36-
The Interdiction of Oil Shipping from
the Persian Gulf -- During NATO-Warsaw Pact
hostilities, supplies for Western Europe would be
threatened by Soviet submarines. The issue is
whether the Soviets would allocate a part of their
force to undertake a major effort to interdict the
flow of crude oil from the Persian Gulf.
Other Issues:
fare?.
-37-
HR70-14
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Blank Page
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V. TABLES
-41-
II
Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Divisions
Stationed Soviet
East Germany 10 10 20
Poland 2 2
Czechoslovakia 2 3 5
Subtotal T3 I3 -7
Indigenous
East Germany 2 4 2 8
Poland 5 8 1 1 15
Czechoslovakia 5 5 2 12
Subtotal 17 17 T T 2 35
Total in Eastorn Europe 26 30 1 1 4
In Westorn USSR
. Baltic MD' 3 33 1 7
Belorussian MD 8 2 10
Carpathian MD 3 .8 1 - 12
Subtotal TI 13 7 29 .
Leningrad MD 2 6 A - 9
Total Opposite Northern Flank 7 T -
Stationed Soviet
Hungary 2 4 6
Bulgaria (8)6 (3)5 5 11/5
BRomania 2 . 10
Subtotal 2~ (2VM JT 27/5
- In Southwestern USSR
Odessa MD 1 5 1 7
Transcaucasus MD (1) (10)11 1 12
North Caucasus MD (1) (5)6 - 6
Subtotal (3)T (20)22 2 - -
Kiev MD 6 4 10
Moscow MD 2 3 1 6
Ural MD 1 2 3
Volga MD 3 3
Total Strategic Reserves T7
P T 77
RES - Reserve Division
Key: TD - Tank Division Activated on M-Day
MRD - Motorized Rifle Division BDE - brigade
ABND - Airborne Division (all Airborne MD - Military District
divisions are strategic reserve . ASLD - Assault Landing Division
subordinate to Ministry of Defense)
Data in parenthanco indicate DIA ' differencea uith currant CrA catimaten.
, WARSAW PACT AIR FORCES IN EAST EUROPE
Numbers i'n parentheses indicate total combat aircraft estimated to be operationaZly available (OA).with Pact combat
air unite. They include aircraft with these unite in excess of. the estimated standard unit equipment (UEJ aircraft shown
by the nunbere not in parentheses. The eatra aircraft are believed to be intended to provide ready replacements for wartime
losses as wetl as serving to replace aircraft temporarily inactive due to maintenance or repair.
-43-
t t
C, SOVIET TACTICAL AND LONG RANGCAIR FORCES WEST OF THE URALS
Tactical Air
Forces
Fighter 72(80) 120(140) 72(80) 108(120) 108(120) 72(80) 0(0) 108(150) 660(735)
Ftr./mr. 36(40) 108(120) 108(120) 36(40) 36(40) 0(0) 72(80) 36(40) 432(480)
Lt. Bmr. 90(100) 0(0) 60(70) 0(0) 30 (30) 0(0) 10(10) 0(0) 190(2i0)
) Pecce. 30(45) 30(30) 46(50) 63(65) 62(70) 0(0) 46(50) 62(65) 339(375)
TOTAL TA - 228(265) 258(290) 286(320) 207(225) 236(260) 72(80) 128(140) 206(220) 1621(1800)
Long Range Air Force Northwest Bomber Command Southwest Bomber Command Total
!lumbers in parehthsees indicate total combat aircraft estimated to be, operationalZy available (OA) with Pact combat
air unite. They include aircraft with these unite in exaess of the estimated standard unit equipment (UE) aircraft shacMt
ey the nuMbere not in parentheses. The extra aircraft are believed to be intended to provide ready replacemente for Vartime
lcesse as well ae serving to replace aircraft temporarily inactive due to maintenance or repair.
-44-
D. Current Disposition of Naval Forces
Submarines Fleet
Northern Baltic Black
Nuclear Attack 21 0 0
Surface Ships
Missile Cruisers 5 2 4
Cruisers 1 4 6
Missile Destroyers 6 10 16
Destroyers 5 9 11
Destroyer Escorts 28 25 24
Amphibious 18 28 20
-45-
E. Surface Ship and Submarine Availability*
Helicopter Carriers 0 0 1
Cruisers 1 3 4
(t ssile Destroyers 5 5- 6 13
Destroyers 2 6 5-6
Submarines
Nuclear Cruise Missile 15-17 - - -- - - 0 - -- - - 0-- -
Nuclear Torpedo Attack 10-14 0 0
Diesel Cruise Missile 6- 7 ,0 0
Diesel** Torpedo Attack 25-27 1- 2 0
Sevastople to Kithira 1 D 2 D
* Forces designed for distant operations capable of getting underway within three days.
* Long range only.
-46-
F. Soviet Maior Surface Ships and Submarines
Typically Available by Area Over Time*
a rface Combatants
Submarines -
Nuclear
Diesel
Cruise Missile 2- 4 4- 5 1 1 1
This table has not been coordinated witk the Defense IntelZigence Agency.
-47-
G. Naval Aviation
Fleet
Northern Baltic Black Sea
Light Bombers 34
Tankers 21 13 13
Reconnaissance 50 10 -3
ASW-Fixed Wing 52 10 28
ASW-Helicopters 60 40 90
Submarines 4 0 4 0
Destroyer 2 2 4 0
Amphibious 0 6 22 0
-48-
S n ____________________