JAYAPRAKASH AND THE UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT OF 1942 WITH PARTICULAR

REFERENCE TO BIHAR
Author(s): Ratneshwar Mishra
Source: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress , 1997, Vol. 58 (1997), pp. 564-571
Published by: Indian History Congress

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44143961

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 JAYAPRAKASH AND THE UNDER-
GROUND MOVEMENT OF 1942 WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO BIHAR
Ratneshwar Mishra*

There were two phases of the Quit India Movement of 1942: the firs
that lasted only for a few weeks during August and September1 th
year, and the second, that closely followed the first and lasted for abou
a couple of years. The former, very quickly suppressed, was some
what successful in so far as the British authority at least momentarily
seemed to have been replaced by the authority of the masses and th
latter, though successful in harassing the colonial rulers, was largely
failure as it could not achieve its aims; on the contrary it rather brough
bad name to the Congress and the Indian National Movement. This
second phase, characterised by underground guerilla activities, has
received scant attention from historians, some recent studies2 not with-
standing. The historians tend to highlight the successful not the losers
for the simple reason that the latter are not significant.3 The secon
phase of the great Movement is generally viewed as retrogressive in
as much as it seems to have undone Gandhi's work of last about a
quarter of a century by unleashing forces of violence. But even this
had its significance as it was illustrative of the dictionary of violence
and non-violence in Indian politics represented by Jaya Prakash
Nar ay an4 and Mahatma Gandhi respectively.
J.P. was the mastermind behind the militant underground move-
ment of 1942. After Gandhi and other leaders had been arrested in
the wake of the August movement, the Congress Socialist Party5 and
some other leftist parties like the Forward Bloc and the Hindustan
Red Army got together and from its Central Directorate in Bombay
started guiding the revolutionary activities. A variety of revolution-
ary literature was prepared and distributed in far-flung areas.6 Sucheta
Kripalani, Rammanohar Lohia, Ramnandan Mishra, Achyut Patwar-
dhan, Aruna Asaf Ali and Sadique Ali were prominent all-India lead-
ers associated with this movement.7 J.P. was authorised to guide this
movement and local leaders were directed to conduct it in a manner
best suited to local conditions.8 Subsequently J.P. organised an All
India Azad Dasta at Bakro Ka Tapu in the Terai region of Nepal to
promote guerilla warfare against the British. It was followed by the
formation of Bihar Provincial Azad Dasta, which soon had its branches
• LM754, Darbhanga, Bihar

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 Modem India 565

in different districts and even in smaller localities.9

In a lengthy signed open letter10 written from 'somewhere in In-

dia', J.P. provided the ideological basis for this venture. After pin-
pointing the lack of efficient organization and a complete programme
of National Revolution as the cause of the downward course of the
August rebellion he proceeded to enumerate future tasks for the rebels.
These were, (i) to banish all depression from the minds of the people,
(ii) to work for nothing less than the complete overthrow of imperial-
ism from India and (iii) to get ready for the next major offensive. Elabo-
rating these points he maintained that the suppression of the August
movement did not mean the end of the tunnel, on the contrary it was
just a pause before taking the leap by building up organisational infra^
structure to carry forward the revolution to its logical end. He also
Sought to give a definite programme for future governance as it was
not enough to supplant the foreign rule which, at any rate, had almost
been achieved even during the August movement in many areas. In
the process he preached violence but simultaneously took care not to
defy Gandhian non-violence. He accepted that some violence had
been committed under extreme provocation during the first phase but
at the same time ridiculed the hullabaloo by the imperialists over this.
According to him they had already perpetrated enormous violence and
were still not pledging non-violence in response to all that had been
done or was being done by Gandhi and his non-violent adherents. He
was very clear on the point that the rebels and not the imperialists had
the freedom of choosing the weapons - violent or non-violent - for
carrying forward the rebellion. Justifying violence against the British
he further argued that Congress was committed to resist aggression
by arms and the moment the 'Quit India' resolution had been adopted
India became free and the British the aggressors. Moreover, by putting
Gandhi in jail the British had themselves removed the brake on vio-
lence. His commitment to 'Quit India' resolution was total and there-
fore any compromise formula like Rajgopalachari's proposal of 'Na-
tional Government' was not acceptable to him. He concluded the let-
ter by giving a call to the personnels in the armed forces, the peasants,
the workers in the factories and in the fields, the students, the teachers
and the rest to fight to the finish against the British. The victory was
assured as the world forces were drawing the doom of imperialism in
any case.

J.P. on his part had been assiduously preparing himself for revo-
lutionary task ahead. He had become a Marxist while still a student in
the United States of America. 11 On return to India he joined the In-
dian National Congress and during the Civil Disobedience Movement

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566 I HC: Proceedings , 5Ã/A Session , 7PP7
in 1932 when senior leaders of the Congress were in jail he was asked
to act as General Secretary of the Party. He made use of this opportu-
nity to organise an underground office of the Congress and directed
the movement in different parts of the country. He, along with some
other socialist leaders, started contemplating to give socialist orienta-
tion to the policy and programme of the Congress. The nucleus of
such a socialist party already existed in Bihar. A Bihar Communist
Party had already been formed as early as in 1929 by some progres-
sive young men and some socialist minded persons like Phulan Prasad
Verma, Rambriksha Benipuri, Ganga Sharan Sinha and Ramodardas
(later famous as Rahul Sankrityayan) cooperated with this party. Its
manifesto was drafted by J.P.12 and its name was changed to Bihar
Socialist Party. Soon some other leaders organised Socialist groups
or Congress Socialist Parties in Bombay, Kerala and Delhi. J.P. along
with some other leaders undertook to encourage formation of provin-
cial Congress Socialist Parties and subsequently affiliated them with
the All India Congress Socialist Party formalised at Bombay in 1934.
As part of Congress the C.S.P. had the support of Nehru and Bose and
for a time it seemed to be pushing the Gandhians and the rightists into
the background. Tripuri Congress in 1939 served to bring Gandhi
and J.P. nearer when the socialists supported the Tant Resolution'
restricting powers of Bose, the Congress President, and the Gandhians
accepted the 'National Demand' to start militant Civil Disobedience
movement without any ultimatum13
In October 1940, however, when in the wake of Gandhi's indi-
vidual Satyagraha over 20,000 Congressmen went to jails and the
Congress almost ceased to function upto December 1941, J.P. tried to
pursuade C.S.P. to rope in such terrorist organisations as the Revolu-
tionary Socialist Party and the Hindustan Republican Socialist Asso-
ciation with a view to forming its 'Underground Wing' and designed
to engage in 'illegal activities'. For funds the Socialists were advised
by J.P. to resort to the 'Old methods' which the Government inter-
preted as political dacoities.14 He also urged upon the masses to spread
the movement in the towns and the villages simultaneously and be-
siege the police stations and 14/1 subdivisional and district offices.15
They were also persuaded to take recourse to violence to achieve
their goal.16 Gandhi expectedly denounced all secret methods and vio-
lence but ironically supported J.P. in effect when he said that if some
Indians advocated the use of armed and physical force, why should
the British Govt., which uses the same force, complain.17 'Quit India'
Resolution of Congress was, in a way, the fulfilment of the aspiration
of J.P. and the C.S.P.11

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 Modem India 567

Thus, the C. S. P. and some oth

guidance of J. P. had consumma
tionary movement with a view to
before the Quit India Resolution
J.P. had endeared himself to Ga
formulations and also captured t
his dramatic escape from the Ha
1942 along with some of his tr
Hanumannagar police outpost
Narain Singh and other membe
open the jail to set him and oth
many political prisoners fled aw
and Monghyr Jails. Consequentl
ate terrorist outfits and gangs o
Congressmen and many others
and tried to fill the vacuum cre
Rebellion.22

In Bihar, the Azad Dasta was organised on very disciplined lines

with a strict and authoritarian hierarchical structure.23 Every member
of the Dasta was asked to add Azad as a suffix to his name and to take
a pledge to carry on fighting till India became free even if it meant
laying down his life and to observe absolute allegiance to the organi-
sation with preparedness to suffer any punishment including that of
death for breaching its rules.24 Suraj Narain Singh was made con-
vener of Bihar Provincial Azad Dasta. Sardar Nityanand Singh de-
serted military service and became its director.
Azad Das tas were formed in many districts of Bihar, viz.
Muzaffarpur, Gaya, Bhagalpur, Monghyr, Santal Parganas, Hazaribagh,
Purnea etc. In some districts the organisation was divided into groups
as in Bhagalpur. Siaram Singh, Mahendra Gope and Parsuram Singh
led three different groups there but after Parsuram's arrest the Gope
group merged with Siaram Singh to remain just one group. In several
districts there were many centres of the Azad Dastas as in Purnea
where Maisaili in Kodhe, Maheshpur in Barari, Khajauri in Raniganj
and Sanjhaghat in Dhamdaha were prominent centres. Khush Lai, an
absconder of the British army, was in-charge of military training in
Purnea.25 J.P. himself was the Supreme Commander and there were
200 military deserters with arms and ammunition to help train the ci-
vilians. Regular meetings were held to maintain some kind of organi-
zational control over the Dastas and all sorts of things were done to
raise money for their 'subversive campaigns'. Sympathy of the local
populace, including the gentry, also ensured, at least in the beginning,

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568 IHC: Proceedings , 58th Session, J 997

of some kind of financial help.26 In fact, the rural masses got bewitched
by anti-colonial stance of the Azad Dastas and supported them heart-
ily without getting bothered about the morality and propriety of their
actions. Symptomatic was the example of Dhanaura where the entire
village openly rose in opposition to the British rule and fearlessly pro-
vided refuge to the rebels.27 Similarly many activists like Siaram Singh
of Bhagalpur were so emboldened by the popular support that they
carried on the acts of sabotage even in the presence of the police. By
and large, however, the rebels remained underground until 1944 and
carried on such activities as attacking police outposts and Govt,
offices, felling telephone poles, cutting telephone wires, looting the
Govt, armouries, treasuries and post-offices, using firearms and ex-
plosives and committing dacoities.28
It must be remembered that the Azad Dastas were controlled by
the C.S.P. and the C.S.P. itself remained all along a part of the Indian
National Congress. In order to take advantage of the popularity of the
Azad Dastas some professional dacoit gangs established links with
them and infiltrated so inseparably into the rank and file of Congress
party that it became difficult to distinguish real Congressmen from
dacoits and even appeals by recognised Congress leaders to keep off
the gangsters did not make any sense. To save their skins the Con-
gressmen also insinuated that the dacoits had been purposely released
by the Govt, to join the Congress and give it a bad name.29 What was
still more disturbing was the fact that dacoits even carried on their
profession by raising slogans in the name of Gandhi. Furthermore,
they committed dacoities in the houses of petty zamindars and small
businessmen thereby alienating these traditional propertied support-
ers of the Congress. Gandhi and other leaders in jail were disturbed
over these developments. Gandhi was constrained to say, "I have high-
est admiration for the courage, patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice
of people, say, like Jayaprakash Narayan. But Jayaprakash cannot be
my ideal". Gandhi now seriously thought of securing his own release
and pulling Congress out of the morass. Precisely at this time the new
Viceroy Lord Wavell also favoured release of Gandhi, not withstand-
ing the emphatic opposition to the move by the British Premier
Chruchill, , ^ that a dialogue with him could be started to put a brake
on the unseemly development. Accordingly Gandhi, the best insur-
ance against violence, was released on medical ground in May, 1944ģ30
Other Congress leaders were also gradually released and the process
of reorganisation of the Congress began which necessarily meant the
peripheralization of the Congress Socialist Party. The underground
movement had already come almost to a halt with the arrest of J.P. on
18 December, 1943.31

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 Modem India 569

Some of the conclusions that

underground movement of 194
der the leadership of the C.S.P.
1. The underground movement
was dominated by the leftist gr
ment alive for quite some tim
resulting from the state repres
gress leadership and ban again
gress, the C.S.P. and others. T
2. The underground movement
very disciplined lines but wit
ments infiltrated into it and
were now required to work w
mainly composed of low caste p
village society as political pro
of acute material deprivation
lead to increased dacoities in
movement or not but with po
their profession with some d
proportionately lost some of
formulation that 'social crim
ticipates future popular movem
that the seeds for the rise of de
the late sixties and afterwards is discernible in the otherwise abor-
tive underground movement of 1942.
3. J.P. had got thoroughly disillusioned with the completely non-vio-
lent movements launched by Gandhi since 1930 and had noticed a
similar disillusionment among the masses who seemed to him to
be ready for an open violent rebellion. He, therefore, unceasingly
worked for it. At the same time he took care not to antagonize
Gandhi in the process. Consequently the underground movement
was characterised by a queer conglomeration of votaries of both
violence as well as non-violence, each respecting the other while
steadfastly clinging to their own chosen creed. Some of J.P. 's fol-
lowers considered it the most spectacular achievement of their
leader, for they thought that the forces violent or non-violent that
had been released during the first phase of the movement could
be channelised and sustained only through his efforts34 The fail-
ure of the second phase, however, left J.P. still more disillusioned
and he thereafter became sort of a wanderer in-the realm of politi-
cal thought and action in a bid to 'take hold of the chaotic and
conflicting forces of society... in the service of the common-
wealth'.35

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570 IHC : Proceedings , 58th Session, 1997
END NOTES

1 . Hereafter the August movement.

2. Vinita Damodaran, Broken Promise: Popular Protest, Indian Nationalism an
Congress Party in Bihar, 1935-1946 , O.U.P., 1992, pp.245-283 and Tripti Soma
Vidarbha Men Bharat Chhodo Andolan (in Hindi), Unpublished Ph.D. thesi
Pt. Ravishankar University, Raipur, 1996, pp. 137-152.
3. Alan J. Reinerman, "The Failure of Popular Counter Revolution in Resorgime
Italy : The Case of the Centurions, 1831-1947", The Historical Journal , 34
1991, pp. 1-20.
4. Hereafter J.P.

5. Herafter C.S.P.

6. Home Political File, 3,3 1 , 42.

7. Ibid, 3, 10,43.
8. Wickenden's Report, in P.N. Chopra, ed., Quit India Movement : British Secret
Report , New Delhi, 1976, p. 288.
9. N.M.P. Shrivastava, "Individual Satyagraha and Quit India Movement", in P.N.
Ojha, ed., History of Indian National Congress in Bihar 1885-1985 , Patna, 1985,
pp. 545-546. Also see, Arun Bhuyan, The Quit India Movement , New Delhi, 1975,
p.119.
10. R. Totenham, Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances of 1942-43 , Govt, of
India, New Delhi, 1943., pp.70-74.
1 1 . Jayaprakash Narayan, From Socialism to Sarvodaya , Kashi, 1959, p. 10.
12. Rambriksha Benipuri, "Bihar Samyavadi Party Ki Sthapana", Sangharsha (Hindi),
May 13, 1940.
1 3 . Girija Shankar, "Socialists and the TripuriCongress", The Quarterly Review of His-
torical Studies, Vol. XV, No.4, 1975-76, pp.209-214.
14. Home Political, File 8,15,41.
15. R. Totenham, op. cit. pp.74-77.
16. A.I.C.C. Papers File, G-26, 1942.
1 7. Modern Review , November, 194 1 , p. 43 1 .

18. B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Conqress , Vol.1, Bom-
bay, 1946, pp.463-464.
19. Home Political, File 1, 11, 43.
20. Ramnandan Mishra, Jogendra Shukla, Suraj Narain Singh Gulab Chand Gupta and
Shaligram Singh. See N.M.P. Shrivastava, op.cit., pp.533-534.
2 1 . Rammanohar Lohia, Shyamnandan Singh, Baidyanath Jha and Kartik Prasad Singh
were also rescued along with J.P. See Arun Bhuyan, op.cit., p. 11 8.
22. Vinita Damodaran, op.cit., pp. 245-283.
23. Home Political, National Archives of India, File 5,64,43.
24. Arun Bhuyan, op.cit., p. 114.
25. K.K. Dutta, History of Freedom Movement in Bihar , Vol.III, Patna, 1959, p.444.
26. Vinita Damodaran, op. cit. pp. 263-269.
27. Fortnightly Report (I), May 1943; (2) June, 1943.

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 Modem India 571

28. Vinita Damodaran, op.cit., pp.245-

29. Bihar State Archives, Political Spe
30. Lord Wavell, The Viceroy Journal,
31. K.K. Datta, op.cit., N. 273-275.
32. Ibid., p. 275. Also see, R.C. Majumda
dia , Vol. Ill, Calcutta, 1963, p. 559-66
33. Vinita Damodaran, op.cit., p.269.
34. Deonath Rai, "August Kranti : Hims
Renu, ed., Nayee Disha (Hindi), Augus
35. Jayaprakash Narayan, Towards Stru

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