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SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW AY 2022-2023 • 1T - PFR

ESPIRITU VS CA
MARCH 15 1995 | GR 115640

TOPIC: Module 3: VOIDABLE MARRIAGE (ART.45-54)

The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination

ARTICLE 49 “The court shall give paramount consideration to the moral

MOTHERS AS BEST CUSTODIAN OF CHILDREN BELOW OR OVER 7

FACTS:

In 1984, Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding entered a common law relationship in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Rosalind Therese, their daughter, was born on October 7, 1987.

While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and
upon their return to the United States, their second child, Reginald was born on January 12,1988.

The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California where she used to work as a nurse.

Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but was sent back by his company to
Pittsburgh and had to leave his children with his sister, copetitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.

Teresita returned to the Philippines and on 1992 she filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children.

On 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental
authority over the two children and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with
visitation rights to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and gave custody to Teresita and visitation
rights on weekends to Reynaldo. The Court of Appeals invoked provisions of the Civil Code and Family
Code as basis of granting custody to respondent.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that child custody should be given to
respondent Teresita.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that child custody should be
given to respondent.

Court of Appeals resolved the question of custody over the children through an automatic and
blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code and of Article 213 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an
appreciation of relevant facts and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing
the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a
simple determination of the age of a minor child.

Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the
child's interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the
child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. In ascertaining the welfare and
best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all
relevant considerations.

If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The
presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by compelling reasons. If a child
is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its
discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or
even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.

We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody over the children through an
automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:

Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.

and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn provides:

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.

In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind
celebrated her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on
January 12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly intelligent
children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they would want to live.
Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the parent thus
chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial responsibility.

We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave
greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing
on the issue of custody.
 Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez stated that Rosalind and her
aunt were about to board a plane when they were off-loaded because there was no required
clearance. They were referred to her office, at which time Reginald was also brought along and
interviewed. One of the regular duties of Social Worker Lopez in her job appears to be the
interview of minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons. The interview was for
purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old child and had nothing to do with any pending litigation.
On cross-examination, Social Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of the minor's hatred for
her mother was based on the disclosures of the minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable
that Ms. Lopez would compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust reposed on a person of
her position in the course of doing her job by falsely testifying just to support the position of any
litigant.

More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage only much later. In fact, the
rape incident itself is unlikely against a woman who had driven three days and three nights from
California, who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon arriving went to bed
and, who immediately thereafter started to live with him in a relationship which is marital in nature
if not in fact.

The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not fall under
"compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children over
seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother
had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral
values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from
the records appears to have become final (pp. 210-222, Rollo).

Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well perform the role of a sole parent and
substitute mother because his job is in the United States while the children will be left behind with
their aunt in the Philippines is misplaced. The assignment of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a
temporary one. He was sent there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component and various
equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the Philippines. Once the purchases are
completed, there is nothing to keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30, 1995,
Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of his assignment abroad and of his permanent
return to the Philippines (ff.
p. 263, Rollo).

The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now both over
seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record.
From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two requirements found in the first
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said
article no longer applies as the children are over seven years.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the
Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the
minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No
special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

BY: 1T – SIERVO, RONELIE SMILE