IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ORDER XII RULE 2(1)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

(Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India)

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. OF 2023
(Arising out of the impugned order dated 06.04.2020 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of
Allahabad at Allahabad Bench in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition (CRLMP) No. OF 2023)

IN THE MATTER OF:

MOOL CHAND …PETITIONER

VERSUS
BALDEV …RESPONDENT

Submitted by:
Name - Aastha Sidar
Roll Number - 212905
Examination Roll No. – 21311806023
Section - I

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

S. No. Particulars Page Nos.

1. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1
2. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 2
3. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 3-4
4. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 5
5. STATEMENT OF FACTS 6
6. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 7
7. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 8
8. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 9-19
ISSUE 1: Whether a prima facie case has been made out against the 9-15
Respondent/ Accused, i.e., Baldev under Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
ISSUE 2: Whether the Hon’ble High court of Allahabad rightly 16-18
quashed
the Trial court’s order of framing of charges against the Respondent/
Accused.
ISSUE 3: Whether the present Special Leave Petition filed under 18-19
Article
136 of the Constitution is maintainable before this Hon’ble court.
9. PRAYER 19
 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Full Form

Hon’ble Honourable
Anr. Another
Ors. Others
v. Versus
SC Schedule Caste
ST Schedule Tribe
SC & ST (PA) Act The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
CrPC The Code of Criminal Procedure
& And
AIR All India Report
U/S Under Section
SLP Special Leave Petition
Pvt. Ltd Private Limited
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. TABLE OF CASES:
S. No. Particulars Page Nos.
1. Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravinder Kumar Suri, AIR 2005 SC 15. 19
2. Alka A Misra v. JP Shoke, 2003 (3) MhLj 62. 14
3. Chandra Poojari v. State of Karnataka,1997 SCC OnLine Kar 280. 14
4. Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 2076. 11
5. Dr. Onkar Chander Jagpal and Another v. Union Territory Chandigarh 10
and
Another, 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 1734.
6. E. Krishnan Nayanar v. M.A. Kuttappan, 1997 Crl.L.J. 2036. 11
7. Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710. 12, 13
8. Isher Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1295. 15
9. Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao 18
Angre & Others, (1988) 1 SCC 692.
10. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 4618. 19
11. Mukesh Kumar Saini & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration), 2001 (60) 15
DRJ 65.
12. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2021 18
SCC OnLine SC 315.
13. Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. CSR No. 1354 of 2019. 11
14. Pradnya Pradeep Kenkare v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 SCC OnLine 10
Bom 574.
15. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs The State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 17
608.
16. R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866. 18
17. Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368. 16
18. Salim Abdul Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, Case No. Appeal/1410/2019 11, 13
19. Sanjay Dutt v. State 1994(5) SCC 402. 15
20. Sanju v. State of M.P., (2002) 5 SCC 371. 13
21. State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Nagoti Venkatarma, (1996) 6 SCC 409. 15
 22. State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 17
335.
23. State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, (2005) 1 SCC 368. 15
24. Stephen Joseph v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 5782. 12
25. Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435. 11
26. Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2019 SCC OnLine 609. 16

II. BOOKS AND COMMENTARIES REFERRED:

1. Cases and Materials on The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, Centre for Law and Policy Research.
2. S.N. Misra on The Code of Criminal Procedure, Central Law Publications, 22nd Edition,
2020.

III. STATUTES REFERRED:

1. The Constitution of India
2. The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973
3. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has jurisdiction to hear the captioned matter under Article
136 of the Constitution of India, 1950. This Petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court arises
pursuant to the order of Hon’ble High Court of Allahabad.

The Article invoked are reproduced hereunder:

“Art. 136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court:

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces.”

If the court thinks it appropriate to proceed in this matter, we humbly accept your

jurisdiction. The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the

present case.
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background

1. Mr. Mool Chand (hereinafter, the Petitioner) is an elected Ward Member of Ward No. 9 of
Rajpura town, elected on the reserved seat for Scheduled Caste (SC) category.
2. Mr. Baldev (hereinafter, the Respondent) is the Chairperson of the elected body of the
Petitioner’s Municipality, and he belonged to the General Category.

Events leading upto the First Information Report

3. On 04.12.2019, the Respondent sent a WhatsApp message to the Petitioner, inviting him for
a personal meeting to discuss the issues of cleanliness in Ward No. 9 to be held at the
Respondent’s chambers at 11 AM.
4. However, the Petitioner read the said message around 11.30 AM and immediately called the
Respondent. The tardiness of the Petitioner made the Respondent angry so he started
shouting at the Petitioner on a telephone call. Furthermore, the Respondent allegedly made
casteist remarks and humiliated the Petitioner on that call while a clerk was sitting in the
chamber.
5. After some time, the Petitioner went to the Municipality for the meeting and it was alleged
that an already angry Respondent abused him on the names of his caste. The Respondent
shouted, “Get lost from my office, otherwise I will make you clean the streets” when no third
person was present inside the chamber. Subsequent to this incident, an FIR was registered
against the Respondent at the instance of the Petitioner.

The Trial court’s order dated 04.02.2020

6. The Trial court framed charges against the Respondent U/S 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter, the
Act).

The Allahabad High Court’s order dated 06.04.2020

7. The High Court quashed the Trial court’s order for the want of ingredients constituting the
alleged offences within the meaning of the Act and denied the certificate to appeal before the
Supreme Court under Article 134A of the Constitution of India.
The present Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution

8. The Petitioner was aggrieved by the High Court’s order. Hence, the present petition.
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. Whether the present Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution is
maintainable before this Hon’ble court.

II. Whether a prima facie case has been made out against the Respondent/ Accused, i.e.,
Baldev under Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
a. Whether humiliating remarks made through a telephone call constitute an offence
under Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989.
b. Whether the remark “Get lost from my office, otherwise I will make you clean the
streets” made in the absence of a third person constitutes an offence under Section
3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989.
c. Whether this statute warrants a strict interpretation.

III. Whether the Hon’ble High court of Allahabad rightly quashed the Trial court’s order of
framing of charges against the Respondent/ Accused.
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1:Whether the present Special Leave Petition filed under Article 136 of the Constitution
is maintainable before this Hon’ble court.

The power to grant special leave to appeal is the discretionary power of this Hon’ble Court. The
Respondent may humbly accept this Hon’ble Court’s jurisdiction if the court proceeds with the
matter. However, for the sake of the argument, it is averred by the Respondent that the present
SLP is not maintainable for the want of “substantial” question of law and “exceptional
circumstances” that would justify its maintainability.

ISSUE 2: Whether the Hon’ble High court of Allahabad rightly quashed the Trial court’s order
of framing of charges against the Respondent/ Accused.

In order to preclude abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice, the Hon’ble High Court
enjoys inherent powers to quash the criminal proceedings. In the present case, the Trial court
passed an order dated 04.02.2020 to frame charges against the Respondent/ Accused under the
SC & ST (PA) Act. However, the ingredients of the offences sought to be invoked could not be
satisfied. Hence, the quashing order has been rightly passed by the Hon’ble High Court.

ISSUE 3: Whether a prima facie case has been made out against the Respondent/ Accused, i.e.,
Baldev under Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

It is respectfully submitted that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the SC & ST (PA)
Act has not been fulfilled. The alleged casteist and humiliating remarks made by the Respondent
were not made intentionally and the burden to prove mens rea of the Respondent/ Accused falls
on the Petitioner. Pertinently, in both the incidents the utterances were not made ‘in any place
within public view’. Especially, the presence of the clerk in the Respondent’s chambers during a
telephone call would not be considered public view since the clerk was not stranger to the parties
involved. Furthermore, the alleged abusive remarks pertaining to cleaning the streets could not
be given a casteist colour.
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER A PRIMA FACIE CASE HAS BEEN MADE OUT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT/
ACCUSED, I.E., BALDEV UNDER SCHEDULED CASTE AND SCHEDULED TRIBE (PREVENTION OF
ATROCITIES) ACT, 1989.

A. Under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter to be referred to as “the Act”), a First Information
Report (hereinafter to be referred to as “FIR”) was lodged at the instance of the Petitioner.
The FIR was registered against the Respondent/ Accused, Mr. Baldev subsequent to the
happening of two incidents that were allegedly in contravention of the Act. First, the
Petitioner alleged that the Respondent made casteist remarks and humiliated him over a
telephone call while a clerk was present in the Respondent’s chamber (hereinafter to be
referred to as “First incident”). Second, the Petitioner has alleged to suffer abuse on the name
of his caste in person when no third person was inside the Respondent’s chamber (hereinafter
to be referred to as “Second incident”).

B. The relevant provisions are reproduced hereunder: -

“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities. – (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled
Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, -
a. (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;
b. (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in
any place within public view”.1

C. To constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act (formerly Section 3(1)(x), prior to
the 2015 amendment), the FIR lodged at the instance of the Complainant must disclose that:

a. the accused were not the members of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;

1
The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, § 3, No. 33, Acts of Parliament,
1989.
 b. they knew that complainant was a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
c. they intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate him as a
member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and
d. in any place within public view.2

D. Under Section 3(1)(s), an abuse by caste name must be hurled ‘in any place within public
view’. It is respectfully submitted that reliance has been placed on “public view” under the
relevant provisions. However, this criterion has not been fulfilled in the present case along
with other ingredients of the aforesaid provisions. Hence, no prima facie case could be made
out against the Respondent under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act.

1. The alleged casteist remarks made via telephone call in the presence of the clerk does
not prima facie constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act.

1.1. It is humbly submitted that to qualify as an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act, the
casteist remarks must be made “in a place within public view”. In addition to that, the
second prong of this argument requires an ‘intent’ or mens rea on the part of the
Respondent/ Accused to insult, intimidate or humiliate the Complainant. However, these
basic ingredients are categorically absent in the present case.

1.2. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, the term ‘public’ is defined as ‘A
place open or visible to the public’. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘view’ is what
you can see from a particular place. The conjoint reading of both the meanings in the
context of the expression ‘public view’ could only mean that the acts of insult or
intimidation has to occur in a place accessible to and in the presence of the public.3

2
Dr. Onkar Chander Jagpal and Another v. Union Territory Chandigarh and Another, 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 1734.
3
Pradnya Pradeep Kenkare v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 574.
 1.3. The Supreme Court ruled in Swaran Singh v. State4 that offensive remarks made to a
member of the Scheduled Caste community are only punishable under the Act if they are
made in a public place where they can be seen by others. Remarks made inside a
building where no one else can see or hear them are not covered by the Act. The court
also clarified that the phrase "place within public view" does not mean the same thing as
"public place." A place can be private but still be within public view, such as if it is
located near a road or other public area. On the other hand, a public place is typically a
place that is owned or leased by the government, such as a park, school, or library. It is
respectfully submitted that in the present case, even if the Respondent's chamber is
considered a public place, the alleged remarks were not made “in a place within public
view” according to the Act because the person insulted was not in the public view during
the telephone call5. Despite the presence of the clerk in the chamber, the clerk could not
have seen the Petitioner getting humiliated. Moreover, the Respondent himself sent the
WhatsApp message for the meeting, not the clerk. The clerk could not have known who
was on the other end of the call, or who the Respondent was making the offensive
remarks to. Therefore, even though the clerk was present, the requirement of humiliation
in “public view" for an offense under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act was not met.

1.4. It is humbly submitted that the objects and reasons of the Act was to prevent indignities,
humiliation and harassment to the members of SC/ST community. The Bombay High
Court ruled in Salim Abdul Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra6 that, for an insult or
humiliation to be considered an atrocity under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, it must take place in the presence of at least one
independent public witness. Furthermore, this principle was also expounded in Dhiren
Prafulbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat7, where it was held that considering the aims and
objectives of the Act, the phrase "public view" in Section 3(1)(x) of the Act should be
interpreted to mean that the public persons present must be independent, impartial, and
not connected to

4
Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435.
5
E. Krishnan Nayanar v. M.A. Kuttappan, 1997 Crl.L.J. 2036; Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr. CSR No. 1354
of 2019.
6
Salim Abdul Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, Case No. Appeal/1410/2019.
7
Dhiren Prafulbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 2076
any of the parties involved. If we extend this observation to its logical end then the clerk present
in the Respondent’s chamber was not a stranger to the parties involved. It is highly likely that a
Ward Member or the Chairperson had acquaintance with the clerk who works in the Chairperson's
chambers.

1.5. It has been alleged that the ‘casteist remarks’ made by the Respondent humiliated the
Petitioner. It is pertinent to note that in a penal statute mere allegation is not enough, the
onus of proving the mens rea of the Respondent while uttering those words on the
telephone call falls on the Petitioner.

1.6. That to be covered by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989, offenses must be committed with racial prejudice.8 In Hitesh
Verma
v. State of Uttarakhand9, the court held that an offense under the Act is not established
simply because the victim is a member of a Scheduled Caste, unless the offender
intended to humiliate the victim because of their caste. Additionally, the fact that the
offender knew the victim's caste is inconsequential, as every individual has the right to
protect their rights through the legal system.

1.7. The Hon’ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana held in Onkar Chander Jagpal and Anr.
V. Union Territory Chandigarh that the words allegedly spoken by the petitioners on
the verandah of their house (which is not in public view) were likely spoken in anger and
emotion, not with the intention to insult the complainants as members of a Scheduled
Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Simply speaking such words without the intention to humiliate
the complainants in public view would not constitute an offense under the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, even if the quarrel or
altercation is between members of a Scheduled Caste and a non-Scheduled Caste and if
the allegations are vague and unsubstantiated.

1.8. It is the humble submission of the Respondent that in the light of these precedents, the
remarks made by the Respondent were devoid of the intention to humiliate the Petitioner

8
Stephen Joseph v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC OnLine Ker 5782.
9
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710.
 in public view. Rather, it was an utterance made in the heat of the moment as a response
to the tardiness of the Petitioner. It is common knowledge that words uttered in a quarrel
or in spur of the moment cannot be taken to uttered with mens rea.10 In the said
circumstances, the Respondent could not have taken notice of the clerk present in his
chamber. Thereby, while engaging telephonically with the Petitioner, the Respondent did
not intend to humiliate him in public view. Hence, in the absence of the two basic
ingredients, i.e., intention to abuse and humiliation in public view, no prima facie case
could lie against the Respondent under the Act.
2. The remark “Get lost from my office, otherwise I will make you clean the streets” made
in the absence of third person does not constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the
Act.

2.1. It is respectfully submitted that similar to the afore-stated provision, an offence

punishable under Section 3(1)(s) of the Act becomes an offence of atrocity only when
the same takes place in the public view.11 Moreover, the abusive remarks must be made
in the caste name.

2.2. In Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand12, it was held by the Supreme Court that even
an enclosed space like a building or a private space could come under “public view” due
to the presence of members of the public.

2.3. The Hon’ble High Court of Bombay clarified its position on the expression “public
view” in Balu s/o. Bajirao Galande v. State of Maharashtra and Another, it observed
that:

“19 Considering the judicial pronouncements on the subject, the expression

within public view must be construed to mean that the insult or humiliation must
take place in the presence of or in the proximity of at least one independent
person. The test of audibility and visibility can be taken to have been satisfied if
an independent

10
Sanju v. State of M.P., (2002) 5 SCC 371.
11
Supra, at 6.
12
Supra, at 9
person is actually present or is at a place where the utterances are clearly audible and reaches
the scene of occurrence while the incident is still in progress.”

(emphasis supplied)
2.4. In a series of judgments in various High Court, it was held that a denigrating remark or
utterance made in a private space could not qualify as an offence under Section 3(1) (x)
of the Act13 (prior to 2015 amendment). In Alka A. Misra v. J.P. Shoke14, the court
noted that to invoke Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the basic ingredients must be satisfied –
intentionally insulting the member of SC/ST community and in any place within public
view.

2.5. It is respectfully submitted that there was no third person in the chamber of the
Respondent when the Second incident happened, nor an ‘independent person’ to
constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the Act.

2.6. It is humbly submitted that the remark made by the Respondent in the Second incident
might be considered harsh but it is no way an abuse on the name of caste. The
surrounding facts are pertinent in the present case. These utterances should not be given
a casteist colour and must be construed in the literal sense with the right context. First,
the Petitioner entered the Respondent’s chamber without any appointment after he
missed his chance to have a personal meeting with the Respondent at 11AM on
04.12.2019. Second, the agenda of the meeting was ‘issues relating to cleanliness in
Ward No. 9’. Third, the Respondent was already in a bad mood since the Petitioner was
late and made him wait for half an hour before intimating, wasting the precious time of
Mr. Baldev, the Chairperson of the Municipality (Respondent). Fourth, the utterance
does not mention a caste name rather it is a reaction to the prevailing circumstances.
Hence, no prima facie case can be made out under Section 3(1)(s) of the Act.

3. The SC & ST (PA) Act is a penal statute which warrants stricter interpretation

13
Chandra Poojari v. State of Karnataka,1997 SCC OnLine Kar 280.
14
Alka A Misra v. JP Shoke, 2003 (3) MhLj 62.
 3.1. It is undisputed that the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 is a special law. So, its provisions must be interpreted strictly,
according to the objectives of the Act and not otherwise.

3.2. The seminal rule of interpretation of laws is that when a statute says something must be
done in a certain way, it must be done that way and no other way. Additionally, when a
law is a criminal law, it must be interpreted strictly and followed carefully.15 People who
are not clearly covered by the language of a criminal law should not be roped in by
stretching the meaning of the law.16

3.3. Mere vague allegations are not enough to attract a penal provision under the Act. Even if
a single ingredient is found missing in the specific accusations of the Complainant, it
would not constitute an offence under the Act.17

3.4. h If there is any ambiguity in a criminal law, it should be interpreted in favor of the
person who is likely to held liable.18 This is known as the "rule of lenity." Criminal laws
must be interpreted strictly, and if there is any reasonable doubt about the meaning of the
law, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt.19

3.5. It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble court that the provisions of the Act
should be interpreted strictly and that no extended meaning should be given to the terms
of the statute. Additionally, based on a strict construction of the provisions of the statute,
no prima facie case can be made against the Respondent.

15
State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, (2005) 1 SCC 368.
16
Sanjay Dutt v. State 1994(5) SCC 402.
17
Mukesh Kumar Saini & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration), 2001 (60) DRJ 65.
18
Isher Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1972 SC 1295.
19
State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Nagoti Venkatarma, (1996) 6 SCC 409
ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD RIGHTLY QUASHED THE TRIAL
COURT’S ORDER OF FRAMING OF CHARGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENT/ ACCUSED.

4. The Trial court erred in framing charges against the Respondent.

4.1. It is humbly submitted that it is a settled principle of law that the court could exercise its
powers under framing of charges where a prima facie case is made out by the facts and
circumstances. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Sajjan Kumar v. CBI20, while
considering authorities on the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred to as “CrPC”), it observed:
“(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on
record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its
judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the
material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging
therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it
cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution
states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad
probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as
distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to
discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end
in conviction or acquittal.”

4.2. Furthermore, in Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh21, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
reiterated and emphasized that the decision at the stage of charge framing must be a

20
Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368.
21
Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2019 SCC OnLine 609.
 function of prima facie appreciation of the facts and material on record. At that stage, the
court must not marshall the evidence and conduct a mini trial.

4.3. It is the case of the Respondent that the contents of the FIR and the material placed on
record by the Petitioner does not make a prima facie case. It has been averred in the
foregoing arguments that all the ingredients of the alleged offences under the Act have
not been satisfied, the same is not repeated here for the sake of brevity. Moreover, a
grave suspicion could not be established against the Respondent by the facts of the
present case. Hence, the Trial court has erred in framing charges against the Respondent.

5. The Hon’ble High Court has rightly exercised its inherent powers.

5.1. If the High Court learns that the legal process is being abused in a way that is leading to
injustice, the Court may use its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure to prevent the injustice, even if there is no specific provision in the
law that allows it to do so.22 For the sake of convenience, Section 482 of CrPC is
reproduced hereunder: -
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice.”

5.2. In the case of State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others23, the Supreme
Court of India held that the inherent powers of the court under Section 482 of CrPC can
be used in the following categories of cases:
5.2.1. “Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even
if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.”
 5.2.2. “Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.”
5.2.3. “Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.”
These principles could also be found in R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab24, and Neeharika
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.25

5.3. The Supreme Court of India in Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others26 has ruled that when a prosecution is
asked to be quashed at an early stage, the court should consider whether the allegations,
if true, would establish that a crime has been committed. In the present case the
allegations made by the petitioner lack the ingredients required to constitute the alleged
offences. Thereby, the High Court rightly quashed the order of framing of charges
against the Respondent.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE PRESENT SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF
THE

CONSTITUTION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THIS HON’BLE COURT.

6. It is respectfully submitted to this Hon’ble Court that the Special Leave Petition filed under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 is not maintainable because there are no
"exceptional and special circumstances" or "substantial and grave injustice" that would
justify its maintenance. The power to grant special leave to appeal is discretionary, and the
Supreme Court of India may refuse to grant leave to appeal in its discretion. An aggrieved
party cannot claim special leave to appeal under Article 136 as a right. It is a privilege vested
in the Supreme Court of India to grant leave to appeal or not.

24
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866.
25
Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315.
26
Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Others, (1988) 1 SCC 692.
7. In the cases of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India27 and Aero Traders Private Limited v.
Ravinder Kumar Suri28, the Supreme Court of India held that the power to grant special
leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India should be exercised with
caution, in accordance with law, and in accordance with established legal principles. The
Court also observed that it is not bound to interfere with an order even if there is an error of
law in the order. It is humbly submitted that there is no pressing matter or question of law
that would require the intervention of this Court, i.e., there is no need to invoke the
jurisdiction conferred upon this Hon’ble Court under Article 136. Even if the case involves a
question of law, it is not a "substantial" question of law. The present case does not involve
such a "substantial" question of law, even if we assume that it involves a question of law at
all.

PRAYER

Wherefore it is prayed, in light of facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced, and
authorities cited, that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:

a. Declare that no prima facie case has been made out against the Respondent under The
Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; and
b. Uphold the decision of the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court quashing the order of framing
of charges against the Respondent; and
c. Dismiss the present Special Leave Petition; and
d. Pass such further and other order(s), as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
interest of justice, equity and good conscience.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS RESPONDENT SHALL AS IN DUTY BOUND EVER
PRAY

Place: S/d
Date: (Counsel on behalf of the Respondent)

27
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 4618.
28
Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravinder Kumar Suri, AIR 2005 SC 15.